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October 29, 1971
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Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret 29 October 1971 No. 0394/71 Navy review State Dept. review completed. completed Copy Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 CONTENTS (Information as of 1200 EDT, 28 October 1971) India ~nPakistan Focus on Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . ,, . The Sadat` Visit to Moscow . . . . . . . 3 China: The '&,-A Change of Chinas . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ' 5 FAR EAST Indochina: Vietnam: Worrit~akor the Con4munists; L)ds: The Open Road; Cambodia: 8 Lon Nol Sticks to His Guns . . , . ? ?;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' 13 Kosygin in Canada: A Mixed Picture. .'g . . N, ? ? ? ? ? ' ' ' ' ' . 14 ' s une ;;..... . . . . . . . . , Soviet Economy Dances to Agric iture . . . . 15 Belgium: Political Tempo Ride( . . ? ? ? 15 WESTERN MISPHERE 1: 17 25X1 Panama Tortijos Thinks Ahead 3e 4 18 Cuba Dusts Off Its International image . . . . . . . . Uru u2i`"'s Election Sta a Set Amid Strife 19 NOTES: Philippines; Germany; UN-Drugs; Argentina; USSR-Cuba; IThe Yenigns SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Oct 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 SECRET India and Pakistan Focus on Diplomacy Troops of India and Pakistan remain massed on the borders, but both countries are under- iaking diplomatic initiatives. Some of these seem more designed to score propaganda points than to attack the crux of the problem. Islamabad pub- licized UN Secretary General Thant's offer on 20 October to assist in defusing the crisis, as well as the full text of President Yahya's affirmative re- ply. Yahya called for UN observers on both sides of the borders to oversee a mutual withdrawal of military forces and requested the secretary gen- eral to visit both countries to discuss a pullback. Islamabad probably hopes this gesture will induce major powers to press India for an equiva- lent response or, at least, for restraint. The Pakis- tanis undoubtedly consider it highly unlikely that there will be a change in India's resistance to UN mediation or to withdrawal from the borders. They probably hope this gambit will help counter the impact of Prime Minister Gandhi's three-week tour of Western European capitals and the US. Mrs. Gandhi justified her trip at this time by the need to exchange views with world leaders and to explain to them the "reality of our situa- tion." Last week, she told visiting President Tito that she could not rule out war as a solution and that unless major powers used their influence with Pakistan to bring about a return of the refugees, India "would use all available means to force a solution." Before departing on her foreign tour, Mrs. Gandhi met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, who arrived on 22 October for allegedly routine biannual talks. According to a joint statement issued at t e conclusion of the talks, the Indo-Pakistani situation dominated the agenda. According to pre-;s reports, a Soviet military delegation headed by Deputy Defense Minister Kutakhov, com- mander in chief of the air force, was to arrive in New Delhi on 29 October, probably to assess Page 1 SECRET Prime Minister Eyskens Greets Indira Gandhi in Brussels Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 be consider d near ready for military ag ion. The remainder a & primarily college students who would require considerable training efore being able to functio effectively. In p. ctical terms, therefore, the ca -up of reserves fovides an only marginal strengthe ing of t_ndia's already superior military position. India's use of Soviet military equipment, possibly to discuss further military aid. ._ e-mWtary side, Mrs. Gandhi on 23 October called up all of India's army reserves app selected,, navy and Air force reserves. Althytiigh India has-,about 700,00.0 army reserves, onl some 44 000 ar sufficientlV,trained and equped to Along the Ind\ - -`Weft Pakistan border, where the largest con ertrtions of troops and equipment are, the I aps now have at least 200,000 men facing a 'akistan force of some 160,000. India has been eploying ground troops as well as aircraft to they rder area since August. now all of the large- gr> n uni s have been moved. India's only-armo d division recently moved from its ho e based the Jhansi-Babina area in"north-centrajIndia to n+ rd the border with West Pakistan, placjng most oaf dia's 1,300 tanks near the border Pareas. Pa W or n probably has moved most of ' s availableor s to the border area. In the east, India has more t n 100,000 troops near y surrounding ast Pakis n, with at least four more divisions ear the b rder with China. TII'e Pakistanis ha a force f about 80,000 the East, if the 10000 or so p Tice and guard u its are counted. Indi's Air Force ips the scales decisively in the East, where it s sta- tioned/three squadrons of 16 IG-21s each nd at least six squadrons of groud:support air raft. The /Pakistanis have just 20 jgmg F-86 ground- supj5ort aircraft, only about h1lf of which appear to be combat ready. Pakistan's ability to resupbly its forces in the East is at bQst questionable. In any case, the Pakistanis need all of the forces they can muster in the West, particularly aircraft, in which the Indian Air Force-has a negrly two-to- one edge in fighter In sharp contrast to the usually bleak prog- nostications about the food situation in East Paki- stan, the latest assessment by the US Consulate in ,Dacca is that the danger of famine in the East has subsided, at least until next spring. The improved situation results from the outflow of over nine million East Pakistanis, the intensive program to distribute imported foodgrain in the countryside, and the normal monsoon rice crop, which will be harvested shortly. Localized food shortages have been reported, but there have been no indications of widespread hunger or starvation. If relief ef- forts go on expanding, there should be enough food available, during the winter period to assure reasonably `a'dequate supplies in all but limited pockets. The consulate thus concludes that hun- ger is unlikely to be a reason fora continuing large refugee flow to India this winter. As for India's economy, at a meeting this week in Paris of the 13-nation consortium of aid donors India was successful in securing a pledge of additional funds to assist in shouldering the costs imposed by the deluge of Pakistani refugees. This sort of aid to India so far has been slow to materialize. At the same time, the consortium declined to consider Pakistan's request that its debt be rescheduled. Islamabad may now be forced to negotiate with each consortium member individually to extend its six-month unilateral 25X1 moratorium, which saved Pakistan $60 million in scarce foreign exchange. The moratorium expires this week. Page 2 SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 .7t lJ1tL. 1 The Sadat Visit to Moscow Moscow and Cairo are trying to create the impression that President Sadat's three-day visit tD the USSR has deepened Soviet-Egyptian friendship, but there are signs that the talks were tough enough to leave a healthy residue of resent- ment on both sides. Relations between the two countries have been clouded in the past six months by the removal and trial of leftists from the Egyptian Government and the anti-Commu- nist purge in the Sudan which was supported by Sadat. These factors ma have been the primary reason for Sadat's visit. Egyptian news media are claiming full Soviet support for Cairo's position in the wake of the visit, but two articles by a member of the Egyp- tian delegation state that the two sides were "ex- tremely frank and outspoken" in discussing their differences. Lutfi al-Khuli, a member of the cen- tral committee of Egypt's only political party, wrote that the Soviets wanted an explanation of Sadat's description of 1971 as the "year of deci- sion" and of Cairo's connection with the anti- Soviet slogans being heard in the Middle East. The Egyptians reportedly wanted a Soviet comparison between arms they have given the Arabs and US arms given the Israelis. They also wanted Soviet views on how high an Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory ranked in the general framework of Soviet strategy on world issues. AI-Khuli did not say what answers were given to these questions but noted that the discussions enabled Arab- Soviet relations to pass over a "pool of troubled, putrid water." An Egyptian journalist who was with Sadat agreed that the early sessions were tense. The communique that capped the visit indi- cated that the two sides could only agree super- Page 3 ficially on the role of the Confederation of Arab Republics and the threat of anti-Communism in the Middle East. The Soviets hitherto have been lukewarm in their praise of the confederation, fearing that Libya's role in the triad is not in Moscow's interest. The communique's strong con- demnation of "attempts to spread anti-Commu- nism in the Middle East" offers a reminder to Sadat that his support for the purges in the Sudan last summer was anathema to the USSR. The communique also notes that the two sides have agreed on "measures aimed at further strength- ening the military might of Egypt." So far, there has been no sign of a Soviet airlift of materiel, which has followed previous successful visits of an Egyptian president to Mos- cow. The USSR already has provided Cairo with nearly all types of modern conventional arms in the Soviet inventory. In ground armaments only a new tank and an armored personnel carrier might be offered to Egypt, but these would not significantly alter Israel's superiority over Egyp- tian ground forces. In both naval and air forces, the Soviets could supply some new types of weap- ons but these either would offer no significant improvement in capabilities or would be beyond current Egyptian capabilities to operate. In sur- face-to-air missiles, the combination of the SA-2 and SA-3 is the best the Soviets have for the Egyptian theater of operations. Continued train- ing in the operation and maintenance of existing weapons systems-and not new systems them- selves-offers the most practical method of im- proving Egyptian military capabilities. All of this, of course, does not rule out the provision of additional conventional weapons. Moscow is taking the line that while it con- tinues to provide military assistance to the Arabs, SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Oct 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 U.L U1 \L 1 UNEASY COMARADERIE: Sadat in Moscow with Podgorny, Kosygin, and Brezhnev it opposes a military solution to the Arab-Israeli deadlock: Perhaps in response to Soviet admonitions during his visit, Sadat has been referring less fre- quently to the decisive nature of 1971, and has blunted the sharp edges of his earlier rhetoric. Page 4 SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Oct 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Or,un.r, I China The UN-A Change of Chinas cialized agencies, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The mission said Taipei has decided in principle to attempt to stay on in all specialized agencies, which will decide individually on the modalities of Chinese representation. The wide margin in favor of the Albanian resolution suggests, however, that Taipei will in most cases face great difficulties in main- taining a position. The Chinese Communist acting foreign minister said on 26 October that Peking, for its part, was already considering sending a delegation to New York, but this is unlikely be- fore Taipei's position is clarified. The General Assembly's expulsion of Na- :ionalist China late Monday night is sure to in- crease the erosion of Taipei's international posi- :ion, but should not have an immediate impact on Taiwan's internal stability. Peking is certain to make full use of this dramatic blow to Nationalist prestige to undermine Taipei's diplomatic rela- tions even further. Belgium announced recogni- tion the day after the vote, and such states as Argentina, Peru, Togo, and Senegal are likely soon to open diplomatic relations with Peking. Chinese Nationalists: Bloody but Unbowed The Chinese Nationalist UN mission has said that Taipei's withdrawal statement applied only to the UN and its subsidiary organs, not to spe- The General Assembly vote did not come as a complete surprise on Taiwan either to officials or to the public. Page 5 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 SECRET A series of forthrig' h ar- ticles in the island's controlled press had prepared the populace for the possible defeat of the US- sponsored resolutions supporting Taipei's mem- bership. The loss of UN representation has thus far not aroused popular emotion on Taiwan, and there is no indication that antigovernment reac- tions will take place as a result of the repudiation of the regime's claim to represent all China-the stock justification for mainlander minority rule on the island. Despite Moscow's unhappiness with the idea of Peking's UN membership, the Soviets appar- ently engaged in no behind-the-scenes manuever- ing to forestall Peking's admission prior to the decisive vote. I n fact, the Soviets spoke in favor of Peking's entry earlier in the debate and in each case voted in a way favorable to the eventual adoption of the Albanian resolution. Pravda sub- sequently called the vote a "triumph of common sense." SECRET Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 SECRET R't ~'V ETNAkI Hanoi `Haiphong Vientian TH IrA_ND LAOS SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Oct 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 SECRET Indochina Vietnam: Worries for the Communists An authoritative Hanoi foreign policy article has added to earlier indications that North Viet- nam fears that its ability to set an independent course in the war is threatened by the prospect of negotiations between its major Communist pa- trons and the US. The review, written by Foreign Minister Trinh and published in the October issue of the Hanoi theoretical journal Hoc Tap, is designed to pass the current Vietnamese Communist foreign policy line to key officials. It conveys a bleak message. In resurfacing the concern over big- power summitry that produced a rash of anti- Chinese polemics last summer, Trinh leaves the clear impression that the Vietnamese have not been fully reassured by Moscow's and Peking's continued protestations of support or by the visits to Hanoi of President Podgorny and Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Trinh seems particularly concerned over the possibility that Soviet and Chinese military aid may be reduced. He is lavish in his praise of the economic assistance from Peking and Moscow, but expressions of satisfaction with military sup- port are conspicuously absent. Instead, the of- ficials are given standard exhortations to be self- sufficient and slightly defensive passages are de- signed to remind them of the war's importance to the Communist movement as a whole. Trinh also displays great sensitivity over Hanoi's loss of initiative in its negotiations with the US. He promises to step up Hanoi's diplo- matic activities in support of its war effort. He resurrects a line, which has not been prominent for some time, to the effect that diplomacy is a "front of strategic importance" in its own right. The article naturally reveals few specifics about what Hanoi intends to do on the diplo- Page 8 matic front. It could, of course, presage some reformulation or change in Hanoi's terms for a war settlement. There is nothing in the text of the article, however, that indicates this is in the of- fing. It does appear that Trinh's article conveys a message to the officials that Hanoi is going to have to rely to a greater extent in the coming period on diplomatic and political efforts to achieve its objectives in Indochina. Although Trinh nods to the importance of military action, pledges a continuation of protracted warfare, and promises total victory eventually, he significantly omits its importance in reinforcing diplomacy and leaves the net impression that Hanoi realizes the war is entering a phase in which political ma- neuvering on both sides may play a greater role in_ the development of the conflict thanr in the past. `Communists Withdrrw from Border Fighting The Communi is appear to be abando ling the'i'r month-long n ilitary campaign in outh Vietn m's Tay'Ninh Pr vince and along the Cam- bodian -border. Althou some scattered fighting continues,. the Commu ist 7th Divi i6n and its three subdrdinate regi ents have -departed the South Vietnkmese b tlefields..~` When the f kiting begga`fi, it appeared that the Communists ,tende"Eo sustain their offen- sive for several r the aptured documents in- dicate that the egm`--.j_ ign was launched to tie down Saigon's formes i.q northwestern Military Region 3 and there`b`y, prevent the South Vietnam- ese Army from tagin a major push against Com ' s munist base as in Ca bode However, Saigon forces, s ported b masse e US bombing, blunted he Communi offens a and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Buists Debate Anti-Thu Tactics 1 The An Quang Buddhists apparently, still discussing tactics for dealing with Prident Thieu, although their most influential leader ap- parently intend to continue pursuing a relati~Rly SECRET Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 SECRET moderate course avoiding an open confrontation elected Lower f-louse, where various political fac- tions have been trying, behind the scenes, to set up coalitions. The An Quang monks- are concerned that they might lose prestige and influence within the Buddhist community if they appear too moderate and willing to cooperate with Thieu. The senior monks are being challenged by a group of younger activists who are hopeful that, some of their seniors can be discredited through identifica- tion with a policy of cooperation with Thieu. The activists believe this would give them an opor- tunity to gain influence within the Buddhist com- munity. Thus far, the senior monks ha-fe been able to block the activists from instigating Bud- d-ist antigovernment demonstrations. But pres- sure from the activists may have beed responsible for the An Quang's adoption of a harsher position in opposition to Thieu's re-election in the final days before the referendum. Although relatively rrr3derate leaders still seem to have the most influence within the An Quang, continued pi~,essuye from activist elements could eventually induct them to move toward more open oppositid to Thieu. This would be particularly true if Ern Quang's legislative repre- sentatives prove ineffective or if some new situa- tion develops in'which the government shows signs of weakness. Internal divisions among the Buddhists pert and this could weaken their force of any O position they try to mount. Lower House in the Political Spotlight The National Assembly, which began its fall term after the presidential election, has been slow to organize itself. The process should pick up steam next week after President Thieu's inaugura- tion. Attention has been focused on the newly Page 9 L The government also wishes to limit the amount of time available for the house to consider the bud et for 1972. The constitution stipulates that the Lower House must act on the fiudget and forward it to the Senate by 30 No- vember. The budget has been a frequent source of friction between the executive and the assembly, and Thieu may be anticipating considerable trouble this time in view of the apparent increase in opposition strength in the Lower House. The government's concern about its position in the house may be well-founded, since some ostensibly progovernment deputies are really lukewarm toward the palace and others dislike being regarded as government lackeys. Opposition blocs have been coalescing around the An Quang Buddhists and the Progressive Nationalist Move- ment. When the house gets down to business, however, the. government still seems likely to re- tain majority support on most issues. Inaugural Preparations The government is heavily engaged in prepa- rations for President Thieu's inauguration this weekend. Thieu appears determined that an im- pressive ceremony be held as a further demonstra- tion of his strength and popularity. Thousands of members of the military and the bureaucracy are being transported from the provinces to Saigon for the affair. Security officials are somewhat concerned about possible attempts by the Viet Cong or by extremist non-Communstgroups to disrupt the inauguration, but most of tfe;officials are confident that any incidents will , e mi- nor. SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Oct 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 SECRET Laos: The Open Road Route 23, the main road across the western portion of the Bolovens Plateau, has been re- opened to civilian traffic, although some portions are subject to harassment by Communist units in the area. Sweep operations and patrols are being conducted but, despite the presence of two com- panies, enemy troops on 25 October were able to ambush a government convoy near Paksong. De- fense forces in Paksong town have been strength- ened: 4..,a;rlval of two more.:. irregular bat- talicns, bringing the, total- to- six irregular bat- talions plus a three-battalion `regular army task farce. North Laos: Preparations Continue Although military activity around the Plaine des Jarres has been confined to small-unit actions, probes, and shelling attacks, there is evidence that the Communists are continuing to prepare for a dry season offensive. Enemy activity has been particularly heavy northeast of the Plaine: Route._. 7, -the 'principal line of communication., into the Plaine from North Vietnam, carried sustained heavy traffic last week. Road cuts from air strikes were quickly bypassed or repaired: Pilots have also noted a',continuing supply buildup in the Khang Khay area on the northeastern edge of the Plaine. Pilots have also spotted large groups of North Vietnamese in the open,,during the last several days. The troops were innew uniforms and failed to take cover when the" planes ap- proached, suggesting that the were newl'' arrived from North Vietnam. Cambodia: Lon Nol Sticks to His Guns Seemingly unperturbed by the adverse inter- national reaction or by the limited displays of domestic disapproval to his strong speech of 20 October, Lon Nol is maintaining the position that authoritarian measures are called for under present wartime conditions. SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Oct 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Lon Nol has wisely used a much more mod- erate approach in dealing with Buddhist elements in Phnom Penh who demonstrated against the transformation of the National Assembly and who wanted him to replace Cheng Heng as chief of state. He informed the Buddhists that the government wants to adopt a new constitution as soon as possible in order to hold general elections, after which he implied he could become the re- public's first president. Thus reassured, the Bud- dhists have not followed through on earlier threats to stage additional protest demonstrations. Page 11 Early in the week, Finance Minister Sok Chhong announced the government's reforms to help stabilize the economy. The program includes cuts in spending, higher tax rates, stronger credit control, and a possible relaxation of price con- trols. The key elements are liberalization of im- ports and abandonment of the official exchange rate of 55 riels per US dollar in favor of a flexible rate. These moves are essential if inflation is to be checked. Implementation of the reforms will clear the way for a $20 million US cash grant needed to bolster Cambodia's critically low foreign ex- change reserves. Action on the reforms is also considered a prerequisite to obtaining foreign contributions to an exchange support fund, now under active consideration. Cambodian officials hope to complete plans for the fund at a donor's meeting in Paris in early November. The Communists moved against several main roads during the week. Enemy forces launched a coordinated series of ground and rocket attacks on 27 October against a number of Cambodian positions on Route 6 between Rumlong and Tang Krasang. Four government battalions in and around Rumlong reportedly have suffered sub- stantial casualties. Reinforcements are being sent from Skoun to Rumlong, and the army high com- mand apparently is confident that it can with- stand the increased pressure against Route 6. The Cambodians are concerned, however, over the major bridge farther south on Route 6 that has been partially destroyed by the Commu- nists. It apparently will be difficult to repair, thus hampering the government's ability to move sup- plies to its troops strung out along the road. In the southwest, light harassing attacks in the Pich Nil Pass have temporarily closed two miles of Route 4. Government forces have not yet made an sust fined effort to reopen the hi h- way. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 SECRET 9V4~ r- Treaty Limits of the Philippines SECRET PHILIPPINES: The long-smoldering Muslim dissidence in the southern Philippines flared up again on 25 October when insurgents launched a series of attacks in Lanao del Norte Province. In the most serious incidents, 17 men of a 22-man government force were killed while en route to relieve a besieged constabulary garrison. Armed violence between the private armies of Muslim and Christian political leaders has been endemic on Mindanao for some time, though most observers have regarded the problem in Lanao as less deeply rooted than that in nearby Cotabato Province. The Lanao dissidence has been closely associated with a personal struggle for supremacy between the area political boss, N,aci alista arty Congressman Dimaporo (a Muslim) and Liberal Party Governor Quibranza (airistian .When violence broke out in early September, President Marcos resolved it primly throf:h a political settlement by which Governor Quibranza agreed to withdraw from eggubexnatorial race in favor of a compromise candi- date. Quibranza later had second th9 tsbut foie election commission rejected his bid to file as an independent candidate. In an f t to dJs Aver what triggered the latest antigovernment violence, President Marcos is tryr'n ntDimaporo and other Muslim leaders. At the same time, he has ordered more trodpsg5t theprovince and has placed the army in charge of security operations. Page 12 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 SECRET Kosygin in Canado: A Mixed Picture Canadian and Soviet officials breathed a sigh of relief on 26 October, when Soviet Premier Kosygin departed alive and unhurt for Cuba. The Canadian visit probably is looked upon by both sides as a qualified success. It provided Prime Minister Trudeau an opportunity to underline his ef-iorts at diversifying Canada's foreign affairs. It allowed the Soviets to draw attention again to their detente policies and to take another step in developing a special/relationship with an ally -of the US. Efforts by minority groups to remove some of the luster from the visit were successful. Dem- onstrations, bomb threats, and an assailant who., mauled the Soviet premier managed to distrqcl Kosygin in Canada: '-Smoking the Pipe of Peace? Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 from the favorable notice giver. 'the trip. The Canadian press gave predomi brit space to the demonstrations. The press also distorted and sen- sationalized Trudeau's,>r'emarks about Soviet- Canadian friendship.,.Although most Canadians approve of Trud qu 's efforts to provide Ottawa with more varieged political and economic con- tacts, the pulp#ic generally was indifferent to the visit. Fair the most 'part, the two leaders were careful to avoid statements that would give of- flense to Washington. One exception was Ko- ,,-=sygin's luncheon toajt given on 19 October, at- tempting to fan Canadian resentment over US economic policies. The Soviet premier did not Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 SECRET repeat this effort, however, and at a news confer- ence the following day passed up several oppor- tunities to be critical of the-,US. For his part, Trudeau balanced his professed desire for warmer relations with Moscow with aV('knowledjment_oJ the many differences between the two, cocrntries. On bilateral issues, th a two sides agreed on a general exchanges agreement. The Soviets re- buffed Trudeau's suggestion 'for an international conference on the arctic, even though both sides agreed to expand bilateral cooperation on arctic problems, ,particularly the prevention of pollu- tion. Kosyginlreeeated the Soviet proposal, raised during Trudeau'sNay visit to Moscow, for a sep- arate agreement co,7&ring economic development and technological and, industrial cooperation, but the final communique noted only that the Cana- dians promised to givb further study to the pro- posal.-The two counj ies also agreed to continue discussions on maritifne shipping and air transpor- tation as well as to negotiate an extension of the bilateral trade agreement for another four years. Soviet Economy Dances to Agriculture's Tune Moscow reported that by the end of the third quarter industrial growth, although still at a respectable rate, had slipped from its midyear pace. As for agriculture, the Soviets are continu- ing to buy grain from the West despite a near- record grain crop this year. Civilian industrial output is estimated to have grown by about five percent during July- September over the same period in 1970, com- pared with nearly seven percent achieved at mid- year. The growth in industrial materials and con- sumer nondurables such as food and clothing fell several percentage points below the rate achieved during the first six months. Growth in the civilian machinery sector, however, exceeded the rela- tively high rate of growth reached at midyear. As in 1970, the third-quarter decline can probably be attributed in large part to the diver- sion of labor and trucks from the industrial sector to support harvest operations in August and Sep- tember. Strong support?for the agricultural sector also is indicated by the high growth rates of mineral fertilizer and agricultural machinery. Unusually good weather during the recent harvest period improved the prospects for this year's grain crop. The grain -harvest will be at least 145 million tons and may approach the 1970 record level of 150 million tons. Nevertheless, the' Soviets are still in the market for Western grain. By September, they had contracted for about 4 million tons of Canadian and Australian wheat worth about $305 million. M rket-s races-reporter $300-350 million more, mainly -fed-grains. -Altogether these deals equal about -fourth of the country's ann.ualz,hard cu rency ~-earnings. Both foreign and domestic demands prob- ably influence Soviet decisions to buy grain. De- mand for grain by Soviet client states could reach 7.5 million tons during this fiscal year, which began in July. Domestically, harvesting conditions and storage problems in the past two years re- duced the quality of some wheat stocks. More importantly, the program to increase livestock holdings, as a long-run solution to meat supply problems, has drawn down stocks of wheat and intensified the need for greater amounts of fod- der. Large grain imports, in addition to the meas- ures taken to ensure a good harvest, illustrate the regime's firm intention to improve the quality of consumer diets. This year, there has been a mod- erate upturn in the amount of wheat available per capita after several years of stagnation. SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Belgium: Political Tempo Rises Both arties in the present government, Social Christi additional seats November. This s and the Socialists, should win the parliamentary election on 7 of recent years. T whether the Socialist key question, however, is can win enough seats to become the dominant p with the opposition Libera arty. Few policy changes have'een promised in the campaign:- Rather,. the. rull'gg?parties take liti? PCB- Communists PSB- Socialists PLP- Liberals FDF-RW- Coalitio of Francophone Democratic Fron and Walloon Rally GERMANY: The . inter-German talks have pro- duced agreement onsome technical details affect- inc sealed-fright in `transit between West Berlin and West Gerrrilany._ Np progress has been made on thornier issues such' "85 one-day passes for West Berliners to visit East -Berlin. The West Germans have expressed satisfAction with the "bu51n s- like" way the East German negotiatgrs--t r ap- proaching the talks/ but warn=,agTnst overopti- mism and believe th0t e= g otiations will not be concluded befojeJ [e end of the year. The East Germans appear willing to agree on those issues that do not impinge ion their notion of statehood strength from constitutional reforms that have eased tensions between the country's French- and Dutch-speaking commun lies and have weakened the appeal of the milit4ylt parties, such The Soci hristians, stressing continuity and expertis are hopeful that they can recover votes lost the Volksunie in Flanders. They are, however vulnerable to charges that Prime Min- ister skens called the election to avoid legisla- tio romised the French-speakers as part of the r orm package. The co-president of the Social- sts, Leburton, who would like to be the next prime minister, has been particularly vocal on this score. He has made little political mileage, how- ever, and the Socialists' self assurance, is waning. They are now stressing standard "progressive" themes. The Liberals, the other major party, are split on ial and linguistic issues. Like the other opposi n parties, they were caught off guard by the gover ent's call for early elections and have not campaig d effectively. badly. The contest particularly hard fought in Brussels. The govetnment's municipal reform program has done little for the city's predomi- nantly French-speaking population and, as a con- sequence, the government parties may suffer but apparently hope to gain concessions by drag- ging out talks d playing on West` Germany's desire for progress in its Ostpolitik. There is, however, speculatib that the Soviets may not support prolonged fqt-dragging by the Pankow regime. `This is fueled by the achievement of peripheral progress folf~wing the 20 October --whirlwind trip to Moscow by the East German foreign minister and senior. East German negotia- tor s. Tile East German leadership may also find it more difficult` to-appear Unreasonable in dealing with the new Nobel" Peace Laureate, Chancellor Brandt. SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 bh KJ 1 Gierek's Poland: Calm Without Contentment During his first ten months as party leader, Edward Gierek has reduced the hostility of the workers with selected ad hoc solutions to their complaints and by creating channels through which they can communicate new grievances. Gierek's policies have established a freer atmos- phere and have been well received, even though they have not satisfied all of the populace's de- mands. These same tactics have proved unpopu- lar, however, with many of the party's middle and lower cadre who believe that Gierek's "renewal" has encouraged the public to become too assertive in pressing demands upon the regime. One of Gierek's more popular innovations-a television program called the "citizens' tribune," through which the people can question national leaders and voice opinions about the country's problems-has been adopted for use in several of the large industrial enterprises. Earlier this month, workers at the Lenin Combine in Krakow sub- mitted 3,600 questions to party and industrial leaders, including the provincial party chief. This type of dialogue has become a permanent fixture at the Warski shipyard in Szczecin. In Poznan, provincial government leaders man phones two hours a week answering questions from the citizens. The dialogues reveal that the workers want a broad spectrum of economic and social benefits, especially better living accommodations, modern work facilities, and recreational opportunity. A worker summed up one aspect of the problem when he asked, "In the summer we can go to the park, but where can we go in the winter?" The authorities neither have a satisfactory answer, nor can they ignore the question after last winter's riots. Gierek believes it is better to explain why all inadequacies cannot be overcome immediately rather than have them smoulder, but he cannot count on the cooperation of large segments of the party bureaucracy inherited from Gomulka. These include mossbacks who are unaccustomed to making decisions on their own, or to defending their actions from public scrutiny. They would have been unable to cope, for example, at a recent meeting with a worker who, amidst the cheers of his co-workers, told his director, "We shall force the authorities to finance the con- struction of a cultural center." Top party officials have served notice that passive resistance of local bureaucrats to Gierek's programs will not be tolerated. Most recently, politburo member Jan Szydlak warned that party officials who avoid the "inconvenience" of estab- lishing links with the workers should prepare for the consequences. Indeed, three cabinet ministers and several deputies lost their jobs this week. The middle layer of the party apparatus may be exten- sively overhauled next month at the provincial party conclaves that precede the party congress in December. By contrast, Gierek is in firm control of the top levels of party and government, al- though he may make some additional personnel shifts at a precongress party plenum. UN-,DRUGS: Despite final report that was op- amendments v ijl be considered formally at a con- pose1 by the _US, basic American objectives were ference in Mar 1972. Illicit trafficking in the achieved at the recently cancluc a24,day meet Middle East rece ed special attention at the ses ing of the UN's Commission on Narcotic rugs,; Sion, and an ad h c committee was created to Most delegates favored U proposals that would Zeal with the probl . Little support was given, amend the 1961 Single nvet5tion on Narcotic however, to the UN - and for Drug Abuse Con- Drugs to give more iat tude for action to the trot, to which the US=has provided $2 million in International Narcotics Control Board. The recent months SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 SEURE t' Panama: Torjo's Thinks Ahead With one eye. on the status of canal negotia- tichns with the US,*General Torrijos is considering chap to-Z. he cabin et and in the National Guard. This prepare the way for revision of the constitution"and legalization of the junta govern- ment. Torrijos'`` mestc moves will be well con- sidered and cautiol executed but, at least in the short run, he is lily to adopt a more aggres- sive posture on the canal fide. He has measured his stren kh against that of the church, the economy elite, ar'rsI the political parties. He has gained' control ove the news ti media. He has even---co-opted the Cm munist Party, and has built/at least the beginnin of a political base a4nong students, labor, qd present one, cf anges might have more administra- tive than political significance. More important would be changes within the National Guard to deal wijl{ known rivalries, especially those`,between sta'fif officers Lt. Colonel Noriega and Lt% Colone(Paredes. Noriega, who has been Torrijos' a$_tiet man, is sympathetic to ` the government-Co munist modus vivendi, while Paredes is suspici'ou Hof growing leftist influence. Torrijos is b9lieved t be interested in becoming the next president-a 1osition in which he would have considerably less ime to devote to guard matters. With this in mid, he may wish to review tbe'performance of his hilitary commanders and .,eliminate rivalries that r light lead in the future to the first steps toward legitimizing the revoIu- osupport is the guard, Torrijos would have to move tionary governmeri. The 1946 constitutian'is to be amended withinix months, and election of an assembly has been 1972. The assembl stii:ution and elect a omised no later fhan August will approye'the new con- of the republic, thu government with a co residentsand vice president repjdcing the provisional stitutional one. After three yp4 Fsfin power, Torrijos is more confident of his`abiliy to govern, but he is also mere aware of the complexity of his country's problems and the intractability of the bureauc- racy. In =an effort to get greater efficiency and a new sense of dynamism, Torrijos may go ahead with 'his second cabinet reorganization this year, without waiting for any constitutional change. As any feasible cabinet would be as loyal as the ARGENTINA: The Lanusse government is faced with a ne'Vor and of labor problems in Cordoba, where labor strile"s-dpd to serious rioting twice in the past three years aft- ha5?contributed, at least indirectly, to the ouster of the"presid?ents in power at the time. Following a successful gel ral strike last week, the government ordered the take-over of the extreme leftist labor unions at the Fiat automotive plant and the public em- ployees union. It apparently hopes to eliminate the extremist and Trotskyist influence in these M h great circumspect 1k ,the same timi negotiate its may ho future. He ?'Sould, ceptance of any,treat objectives: an e creased compensati over the zone. Nevert he is well aware that canal d the key to his political course, win popular ac- that met Panama's primary the perpetuity clause, in- nd significant jurisdiction ess, concerned about his compelled to push hark ir$he next couple of months for maximum cbncess ns from the US. Not until he is faced with; the choi of a treaty in early 1972 or waiting until after the S electoral campaign is Torrijos likely to decide ether to compromise or go for broke. 25X1 major unions. If successful, it should help defuse the volatile Cordoba political situation over the long term. President Lanusse apparently believes that his generally good relations with Peronist labor and rank-and-file disenchantment with political strikes-ten so far this year in Cordoba- ll limit the adverse reaction. The more moder- ate unions`1n- C,prdoba, however, will probably feel constrained Vd'*' emons.$.rate some active support for the affected 'unio'ns./ Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY slgry, Torrijos may feel Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Cuba Dusts Off Its International Image After a long period of preoccupation with domestic concerns, the Castro regime is entering the world spotlight with a burst of activity designed to demonstrate that the continued international isola- tion of Cuba is neither popular nor feasible. One manifestation of this activity is the current visit to Cuba by Soviet Premier Kosygin. Havana pulled out all the stops to welcome Kosygin when he arrived on 26 October. The current meeting of the two leaders, unlike the visit in June 1967, comes at a time when Soviet-Cuban relations appear to be on an even keel. Economic problems would appear to be the major topic of discussion. Castro's coming visit to Chile and Cuban relations with other Latin American countries may also come in for attention. The duration of the Kosygin visit is uncertain, but Castro will be eager to portray it as a further indica- tion of solid Soviet support. Havana's apparently deliberate efforts this week to embarrass the US by sending Cuban dele- gates without US visas to a privately sponsored international conference of sugar cane technicians in Louisana may be a further reflection of Castro's current interest in world recognition and publicity. The fact that the delegation arrived unexpectedly and refused to leave without orders from Havana, and the identification of the Cuban pilot as a senior civil aviation official who has led Cuban delegations to international air safety conferences, suggest that Castro engineered the incident primarily for its propaganda potential. At the same time, Cuba is showing consider- ably more interest in regularizing and expanding its USSR/CUBA: The Soviet naval task group off Florida"'5-east coast is scheduled to arrive in Havana on 31 Octobe _10r ?-a?,. terl? ,,ay visit. A week ago, Moscow announced, "Two antisub_ifiarines,s, two submarines, and a tanker will pay a friendly visa o Cuba," and the ships have since been slowly moving,, south in the Atlantic about 200-300 miles off the diplomatic contacts with Latin American and other governments. One aim of such contacts is to show that OAS sanctions against Cuba are no longer viable. The most recent example is Cuba's having become a member of the so-called "Group of 77." At the recommendation of Peru, Cuba was accepted on 20 October as the 95th member of this loose group of developing countries that seek to formulate a joint strategy to protect their economic interests. Cuba has sent a high-level delegation headed by Foreign Minister Raul Roa to attend the meeting of the "Group of 77" that opened in Lima on 25 October. Castro's real chance for grandstanding in the Latin American arena will come when he makes his long-awaited trip to Chile. It will be his first trip abroad since 1964. Latin American media have been giving extensive play to stories about the trip and have speculated that Castro will arrive in time to help celebrate the first anniversary on 4 November of President Allende's inauguration. Both Cuban and Chilean officials have refused to pinpoint the dates of the visit, however, and it is quite possible that Castro might arrive a little later to be on hand for the first anniversary of Chile's resumption of diplomatic relations with Havana on 12 November. Castro may boost his prestige even further by meeting with other Latin American leaders during his travels to and from Chile. Cuban Foreign Min- ister Raul Roa may arrange for talks with Peruvian officials should Castro's plane make the usual tech- nical stop in Lima. Peruvian President Velasco has indicated an interest in meeting Castro at the air- port. F_ I In addition to the pending naval callwa-Bear D naval reconnaissance planes fletca.Hlavana's Jose Marti Airfield on 27 O,ctab` r The Soviets have made five such fl, .ghts-since April 1970, and this is e third tim-e one has been made in conjunction wi ` r"' 'r av l visit. These planes will probably remain in Cuba a fe tys.zojd may provide reconnaissance US east coast conducting trairrfng maneuvers and support for the naval fore be:Qre returning to the carrying out some,-AS1N operations. I USSR. SECT Page W ' KL S MMARY 29 Oct 71 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 JLVi~L, 1 Uruguay's Election Stage Set Amid Strife President Pacheco's long awaited selection of an "alternate" candidate in Uruguay's compli- cated election next month has provoked an un- favorable reaction. It has probably erased any lingering hopes that the President might win his re-election bid. Despite the intraparty strife caused by Pacheco's choice, the country's unique electoral system helps to cushion the party against damage to its prospects, and the governing Co orados remain favored to win. On 22 October, a presidential spokesman announced that Minister of Agriculture Borda- berry and Minister of Labor Sapelli were Pa- chE!co's "designated" presidential and vice presi- dential candidates. The voters on 28 November will consider: 1) a constitutional amendment al- lowing for immediate re-election of an incumbent president; 2) a slate of presidential candidates that will include Pacheco; 3) a separate ballot, which will list Bordaberry in place of Pacheco and wh ch will be valid in the event the proposed amendment fails. Several significant defections from the Colorado group promoting Pacheco's re-election followed the selection of Bordaberry. Vice Presi- dent Abdala and Director of the Budget Lanza, both disappointed "alternate" aspirants, with- drew. Both the Civil Service director and the secretary to the presidency resigned. Those op- posed to Bordaberry can cite his former member- ship in the Blanco government coalition of 1962 and his lack of Colorado credentials. Another facet of the trouble is that the President again trampled on political sensitivities by failing to consult with close supporters before announcing his Decision. These defections further dim the pros- pects-never bright-for approval of the constitu- tiorial amendment. With several other Colorado candidates in the combined primary-general elec- tior;s, however, most of the dissatisfaction should be expressed in the form of votes for other Colorados rather than result in a bolting of sup- porters to their major opponents, the Blancos. In addition to the Pacheco slates, the final election line-up includes three other Colorado candidates, although only one-Jorge Batlle-can come close to equaling President Pacheco's drawing power. The Blancos have entered two slates, and the leftist coalition, Frente Amplio, has put up a single presidential candidate. The most-voted can- didate of the most-voted party wins the presi- dency. An electoral survey last month showed the Colorados leading on a country-wide basis, with the Frente running second in the important capi- tal area but trailing both established parties in the country as a whole. More than 25 percent of the voters were still undecided, and all three parties will be making a major effort in the campaign's closing weeks. Although the law-and-order question is the primary campaign issue, the terrorist scene has been subdued in recent weeks. The most recent political kidnaping, that of a prominent news- paper publisher, has been claimed by a new ter- rorist group, the Popular Revolutionary Organiza- tion-33, which is probably an anarchist group of limited capabilities. Armed forces leaders, recently charged with responsibility for counterterrorism, have empha- sized that they plan no major effort against the chief terrorist group, the Tupamaros, prior to the elections. The Tupamaros have done little to pro- voke military reaction since their mass escape in early September, and security forces have been slowly recapturing some of the fugitives: SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 vi~v1~L, 1 MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA THE YEMENS: Further border incidents are likely 25X1 in the wake of the military incursion last week by Adeni forces of at least brigade strength into Yemen (Sana). The three-clay foray, which ended on 19 October, was directed at,anti-Adeni dissidents who have been conducting terrorist operations against targets in Yemen (Aden) from Yemen (Sana). The ? operation apparently was successful;. Over 100 rebels allegedly were killed, and a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and documents was captured. Only one day after the conclusion of the operation, a land mine explosion-the second fatal one in ten da s- took the life of an Adeni officials. SECRET Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A009200020001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2008/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200020001-0