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November 19, 1971
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Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY State Dept. review completed DIA review(s) completed. Secret 19 November 1971 No. 0397/71 Copy Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 SECRET CONTENTS (Information as of 1200 EST, 18 November 1971) War or Peace: Dilemma on the Subcontinent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Thailand: Military Take Full Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Uruguay: Anti-US Charges Highlight Final Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 SALT and US-Soviet Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 5 Ostpolitik: Chances Improve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 FAR EAST Indochina: Vietnam; Cambodia , . . . _ tc Soutli Korea: More Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 The USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 France: Another Missile Submarine . . m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Western Europe: New Free Trade Arrangennts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Malta: Where's the Aid Coming From? ,7' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 MIDDLth EAST - AFRICA ,` The Arab World lt~ 16 }WESTERN HEMISPHERE Ecuador and the Tuna W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Castro in Chile: Comps Manners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Chile: The Pace Picks p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Venezuela Seeks Car' bean Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Mexico: Opening p the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 SI UR ET War or Peace: Dilemma on the Subcontinent Prime Minister Gandhi returned to New Delhi on 13 November after a three-week for- eign tour of five West European countries and the US. She told her hosts that India's problems with almost 10 million refugees from East Pak- istan were rapidly nearing the point where war would be difficult to avoid. So that the refugees might return in safety, she urged that immediate and intensified international pressure be applied to the government in Islamabad to negotiate a political settlement with the rebel leaders of Bangla Desh. As if to reinfore her serious assess- ment of the situation, cross-border firing and guerrilla fighting in East Pakistan intensified dur- ing her absence and is continuing. Back in India, Mrs. Gandhi struck a cautious note. The foreign talks produced few demon- strable results, but she met no flat rebuffs. She closed no options, but her homecoming state- ments implied that the world community would be given only a limited amount of time to con- vince Islamabad to negotiate a political settlement and that no good would come of "forcing a military conflict with India." Although Mrs. Gandhi's statements, both public and private, have served to reduce political tensions, there are no indications that she intends to defuse the military situation. The Mukti Bahini's fall offensive has begun, and both Mrs. Gandhi and her key ministers, especially Defense Minister Ram, continue to laud the guerrillas' increasing effectiveness. The rebels control terri- tory along the border in several districts in East Pakistan, and many groups are able to expand their activities and control in interior areas. Guer- rilla attacks have made all transportation routes dangerous, and one international shipping line has decided to divert its traffic from the port of Chalna in southwestern East Pakistan following attacks by naval commandos on two ships en route there. Guerrilla . successes along the border owe much to supporting Indian troops, who are more willing to cross the border-in as much as bat- talion strength-to fight limited engagements with the Pakistanis. The Indians withdraw only when Mukti Bahini control seems assured. New Delhi is anxious to see continued Mukti Bahini gains and "Mukti Bahini carrying military supplies to Bangla Desh" Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 SEURE'1' appears willing to expand joint Indian-guerrilla operations. In any event, India cannot abruptly stop these coordinated attacks without risking guerrilla disaffection and possibly lowering Indian troop morale. Despite the growing Mukti Bahini strength, it is doubtful that Islamabad yet feels under suffi- cient pressure to negotiate a settlement even ap- proaching the rebels' demand for immediate independence. In the meantime, Islamabad is pro- ceeding doggedly ahead with its own version of a political solution to the Bengali problem. Elec- tions to National Assembly seats vacated by mem- bers of the banned Awami League are scheduled to be held next month; candidates for 55 of the 78 seats have already been declared elected un- opposed. Yahya has managed to convince seven other parties to form a coalition that will domi- nate the new assembly. Nurul Amin, a prominent progovernment East Pakistani, leads the group. If the coalition holds together, it will give Yahya a chance to form a friendly civilian government with Amin as prime minister. Such a government would have almost no support in East Pakistan, but Yahya would have difficulty in preserving his own position were he to deviate markedly from his established course. Even should Yahya be able to open negotiations with the imprisoned Bengali leader, Mujibur Rahman, Mujib might be repudiated by the guer- rillas if he were to settle for anything less than immediate and complete independence for East Pakistan. Against the background of Mrs. Gandhi's assertion that she would not make a decision in "haste and anger," India is continuing its steady preparations for war. Reams of red tape must be unraveled before foreigners obtain the permits MOW now essential for travel to refugee camps and border areas, and New Delhi's charges of Pakistani border and airspace violations-matched by sim- ilar charges from Islamabad-continue as each builds a case that it is a victim of aggression. Mrs. Gandhi has not set a limit on Indian patience but Indian leaders, perhaps with an eye to the effect on the major powers, warn that time is running out. Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal has stated that after another month or two it will be increasingly difficult to maintain the military establishment at its present rate of readiness, and on 14 November Defense Minister Ram stated that a "great con- flagration could occur at any moment." SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 13 L _kJ1cL 1 Thailand: Military Take Full Command The Thai military establishment announced its complete take-over of the government on 17 November under a new "Revolutionary Party." The 1968 constitution has been annulled, the parliament abolished, the cabinet dismissed, and martial law declared. All ministries are being run, at least for the time being, by under secretaries under the direct leadership of the Revolutionary Party commander, Field Marshal Thanom. The government announced that there would be no immediate changes in military or police com- manders. I The imposition of military rule appears to hie resulted when the leaders' impatience with Th' i democratic processes reached the breaking punt. The military had become increasingly exas- pr ted over its difficulties with opposition ele- mts and particularly with parliament. The mili- taC leaders have had serious reservations about the suitability to Thailand of constitutional gov- ertment ever since the constitution was promul- gaid in 1968. The military leaders, who were inept in dealing with a sometimes recalcitrant legislature, lately were quite vocal about their urt#appiness with parliament. Parliament's slow- nes in passing appropriations and the calls of sore parliamentarians for the early opening of relations with Peking were particularly annoying. The government prefers a policy of caution toward Peking and some leaders are afraid that undue haste would encourage the spread of Com- munist sympathies arTlong Thailand's Chinese minority. The events this week in Bangkok do not appear to be a direct consequence of arguments within the military establishment over substantive policies, either domestic or foreign. There is no evidence so far that issues of direct interest to the US figured in the considerations that led to the government's moves. The reassertion of full power by the military should have little signifi- cant effect on the way Thailand is governed or on the country's foreign policies. The decision to rule by military decree comes at a time when another flurry of restive- ness has been noted among junior officers. The suspension of the constitution and parliament will be popular all through the military and will give a sense of decisiveness and direction that has been absent at the top. It will not, however, reduce resentment among younger officers over poor promotion prospects caused in part by the failure of top leaders to retire on schedule. The chances are good that the military will bring off its assumption of full power with a minimum of difficulty. It seems unlikely that any troop commanders will challenge the leadership, particularly since the immediate targets of the government are civilian elements. There is some grumbling among politicians, but the Bangkok citizenry seems to be taking the change in ' x Field Marshal Thanom: Still in Charge SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 SECRET Uruguay: Anti-US Charges Highlight Final Campaign Shrill leftist charges of US interference are highlighting the closing moments of the campaign for general elections on 28 November. The leftist Frente Amplio has seized on two recent episodes to deliver broadsides against the US. On 7 November, the Frente's presidential candidate, Liber Seregni, received a slight injury from a knife-wielding drunk. In another incident, a child was killed by a stray shot as a Frente caravan was stoned by a hostile crowd in the interior. Seregni at once linked the attacks to rightist plots, directed by US and Brazilian ex- perts. The leftist press has since kept up a well- orchestrated campaign denouncing the presence of CIA agents in the US Embassy. On 14 Novem- ber, the left was given another opening to attack the US when an accident involving two navy helicopters recently purchased from the US left 8 dead and 40 injured. Communist press organs alleged the planes had been bought under US pressure and that this constituted more inter- ference in Uruguayan military affairs. The coalition has not yet attracted a sig- nificant following in the interior of the country, which contains about 50 percent of the popula- tion, and the Frente hopes to parlay its charges into a sympathy vote. In Montevideo, where the latest polls show it trailing the incumbent Colorados by a narrow margin, the Frente hopes these last-minute accusations will boost it past its opponents in the important mayoralty contest. It remains doubtful, however, that these patently manufactured issues will have much impact, as the anti-US stance is not as persuasive nor auto- matic a rallying point in moderate Uruguay as it is elsewhere in the hemisphere. The Colorados remain slight favorites in the election, despite internal problems. The furor over President Pacheco's choice of an unpopular alternate candidate-Minister of Agriculture Bordaberry, whose candidacy will be valid if the constitutional amendment permitting Pacheco a second consecutive term falls short of majority approval-has subsided somewhat. It had caused the resignations of three cabinet members, and President Pacheco: In the home stretch several nationally prominent Colorados attacked the Bordaberry candidacy. The dissatisfaction, however, is still apparent. For example, in an- other bit of confusion added to the already com- plicated election, the anti-Pacheco Colorado can- didates joined the Frente and the traditional opposition Blanco Party in opposing the Electoral Court's recommendation that the candidates run on two duplicate, slates-one for the Pacheco con- stitutional reform and one without it. Their ac- tion means that if the amendment should pass, Pacheco's candidates would fill all offices. The decision reflects the other Colorado candidates' confidence that the proposed reform is a dead letter. By treating it as such, they hope to attract Colorados away from Pacheco and his alternate Bordaberry. The Blanco Party is improving its electoral chances. Support for it is growing in the interior, and it hopes to pull out an upset victory by minimizing its losses in the capital. The Frente, on the other hand, hopes that its strength in Montevideo will offset its weak position in the interior. Both face an uphill battle against the Colorados in the campaign's last da s. 25X1 SECRET Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 SECRET SALT and US-Soviet Relations The sixth round of SALT opened in Vienna on 15 November with expressions of good will and signs of a general improvement in the climate of US-Soviet relations. Exchanges of high-level delegations are under way with an eye to improving economic dealings between the two countries. Secretary of Commerce Stans is expected to be in the USSR by the end of the week, and Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Alkhimov is already in Washing- ton. The Soviets have recently contracted to pur- chase about $140-million worth of American grain, the US has authorized the $280-million sale of foundry equipment for the USSR's Kama truck project, and bilateral dealings on a number of other subjects ranging from maritime issues to cultural exchange matters appear to be moving smoothly if not swiftly. The announcement on 12 October of Presi- dent Nixon's planned visit to Moscow next spring undoubtedly was a fillip to this positive trend. Since that announcement, the Soviets have taken pains to highlight areas of mutual interest and to downplay current tensions. An article this month by the Kremlin's leading expert on American af- fairs, Yury Arbatov, seems best to exemplify this approach. Arbatov warmly endorsed the forth- coming presidential visit, called it a "positive act," and expressed hope that it will promote an across-the-board improvement in US-Soviet rela- tions including success on SALT. Arbatov bal- anced these statements, however, with the asser- tion that it was impossible to believe that an "era of undisputed harmony" would suddenly be inaugurated. The guarded optimism of Soviet political commentators has occasionally been accompanied by expressions of suspicion, sometimes outright distrust, of US intentions. Domestic audiences in the Soviet Union were told this week by a group of prominent news commentators that the US still tries to deal from "positions of strength," to gain military advantages over the USSR, and to exploit its new relationship with China at Soviet expense. Similarly, a leading Soviet military the- oretician, V. Larionov, recently wrote in regard to the concept of military sufficiency that the Nixon administration still pursues military programs 25X1 aimed at outstripping the USSR. The Larionov article appeared alongside Arbatov's discussion of A Toast to SALT (Austrian President Jonas, left, welcomes US and Soviet negotiators in Vienna 1 79-00927AO09200050001-7 Os oIitik: Chances Improve Bo has become much more optimistic about the immedi prospects for its Ostpolitik. Its inter- German negot or, Egon Bahr, now believes that by early December rhk can conclude the East-West Ger- man accord called or by the quadripartite Berlin Agreement. Moreover, onn probably considers that the talks with the Czec slovaks that resumed on 18 November can now get d n to serious negotiation. West German officials me away from the unprecedented four-day negoti 'ng sessions, 10-13 November, convinced that Panko under pressure to complete the negotiations early a gh to allow the December NATO ministerial to app a multi- lateral preparations for a Conference on E Security. Bahr's East German counterpart, M' Kohl, confirmed this appraisal in answer t direct question by Bahr. In the Bahr-Kohl tal as well as in the parallel West Berlin - East Gergi; n talks, East German negotiators moved clos to Bonn's and West Berlin's position on severa oints. Bahr, for his part, j ieves that Bonn is in an excellent negotiating - sition, but he is concerned that by holding th a on still-unresolved details he may be accuse f deliberately delaying the talks and thereby opardize Bonn's present advantage. Bonn's ob' tive in negotiating a comprehensive The broad economic reforms that the Thieu government began to implement this week are draw- ing heavy criticism in some quarters, but the meas- ures hold promise for encouraging development over the longer term. The many-faceted reform package aims at mak- ing the South Vietnamese economy more stable and more nearly self-sufficient although dependent on US aid for a long time to come. It includes such specific belt-tightening actions as a devaluation of the piaster and increased taxes. These measures are intended eventually to curb the black market, in- crease revenues, stimulate the country's almost nonexistent export trade, and attract foreign investment. Sweeteners in the package include sub- stantial salary increases for government officials and soldiers (including a combat bonus), and plans to increase benefits for veterans and war widows. The reforms are expected to cause Thieu politi- cal difficulties for weeks to come. The initial impact of the package is likely to boost the cost of living an additional five to ten percent. Indeed, prices began to rise even before the program was announced. There was speculation over the approaching devalua- tion, fears of a US aid cutoff, and concern over the possibility of rice shortages. These uncertainties still complicate the economic situation and, combined with the new reforms, could produce more price SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 agreement has been to head off future East German chicanery. West Berlin negotiator Mueller has to en a similar tack. Bonn feels pressed, however oth by recent East German and Soviet publ' atements that an agreement can be reached- the end of November and by the neces o wrap up its Ost- politik package in ord assure orderly parlia- mentary ratificatio9jve controversial German-So- viet and Germa,?iish treaties. onn enters the fourth round of its discussions the Czechoslovaks with enhanced hopes of normalizing relations. Czechoslovak negotiators in September indicated a willingness to seek a com- promise to get around the stalemated issue of the 1938 Munich Agreement. Prague presumably may repared to avoid troublesome issues regarding pns and legal problems surrounding the status o indicated i mental conce slovakia's 1937 and affirm the validity of Czecho- stern borders. In anticipation of a German movement, a top-level Czechoslovak - We East German delegati to coordinate the nego traveled to Prague last week countries toward Bonn and ng positions of the two he Sudeten Germans. Bonn has already ould be willing to meet Prague's funda- Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 SECRET increases. When inflation was rampant early in 1970, it brought complaints and protests from nearly all classes of Vietnamese and contributed to disturb- ances in a number of cities. Later in the year, government price stabilization measures proved suc- cessful and, until recently, inflation has been kept within tolerable limits. President Thieu has personally taken a strong hand in launching the new economic program, and he is much more closely associated with economic policy now than in the past. It appears that he is prepared to accept fairly heavy criticism in coming days as the price he must pay in order to project an image of strong leadership and because his advisers have convinced him that the package is vitally neces- sary. Thieu may also feel that he is in a position to deal from strength following the recent election. Opposition to the new program will probably be most vocal in the National Assembly, from which Thieu must obtain cooperation in order to imple- ment essential features. The leader of the opposition in the Senate has already roundly condemned the plan as a "betrayal" of the Vietnamese people and nearly half of the members of the Lower House reportedly have expressed some dissatisfaction. Many legislators are likely to link some of the un- welcome reforms to the uncertainties over US aid, and it is possible that there will be anti-American overtones in their handling of the new decrees. Thieu's organizers have been hard at work trying to line up support in the assembly with promises, threats, and cajolery, however, and are likely to obtain passage for the essential parts of the reform package. ,-1ry Seasnn Plans for Cambodia --SCrathV -se-ZUMMwtde rS."i rnrm?ulating plans for offensive operations against C mmunis 15- forces and base areas across tl --C--artf odian border during the winter mogthsrSZch operations are de- signed to kee ,-th --Communists off balance and pre-eT*..-arr cipated military operations in some parts of South Vietnam. At the present time, there ,are nearly 10,000 South Vietnamese troops in Cam- "bodia, mostly just across the border from Tay Ninh Qvince.--During tast-year`s=*y..son H gRaigr). mork than 20,000 South Vietnamese operated ink Caml dia. G eXieral Ngo Dzu is developing plans for campaig initially directed at enemy base camp -.yin northeast rn Cambodia near the South Vietna ese border. T ese highland bases constitute a thr t to Dzu's fort s. Each winter, the Communist stage incursions om the bases into Kontum an Pleiku provinces. Dzu will ncounter a number of perational problems in m nting his offensive sine it requires considerable m bility and aggressi Hess by his forces. There hate been improveme s, however, in the performance f some of his r gular units this year. If Dzu can o anize his thinlspread forces for an effective assaul against the eemy's border bas- tions, their over-all ilitary time able in the western highlands would be 'srupted. Farther south, mtJtary caution along with po- litical concerns may i P fl nce South Vietnamese planning for operations inst Communist units in Cambodia during the coring dry season. General Minh, commander of th South Vietnamese forces that normally would b ed in such operations, says he would like to a~fcr some of the enemy's main forces in Cambodia bu that he needs another division to help pro Saigon before he ca three Communist ct theprovinces surrounding conduc any wide-ranging op- a. Minh concerned that the egiments st= I operating in this area will try to taje advantage of the withdrawal of Australian and Tai forces to mo a closer to Saigon. Though Itinh's concerns are r al, he has a rep- utation as a .;fiery cautious comma . der and also is clearly aware.--of the political import nce of protect- ing Saigon d its environs. There ap arently also is some rivals between Minh and oth senior com- manders o. er the disposition of So . h Vietnam's 9th Divisi h , which is now in the delta:Minh would like to s it moved to support his fo es, but the local c mander, General Truong, is nxious to retain a division for expand d o erati ns in the delta. SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 SECRET Cambodia: War on- the Doorstep During the past week, this Communists had main force infantry regiments closer to Phnom Penh than any time since the Cambodian war began. Elements of the Commune Phuoc Long Front, including headquarters an three regi- ments, are about 15 miles west of the city and apparently are responsible for the regent sharp increase in enemy activity throughout_#he area. At midweek, the Communists had over-tun gov- ernment troops in Tuol Leap and were continuing an almost daily rocketing of Pochentong Airfield. The government has been forced to div 't several reserve units and armored elements frog the Chenla 11 area and throw them into the de --~ fense of Phnom Penh. Several large clearing opera- are underway along the western and north- tions western perimeter of the city in an effort to_ re-establish control and push the Communists out of rocket range of the capital. The government apars to be abandoning its efforts to reopenoute 6 but may try to maintain its position long the road. Prime Min- ister Lon Nol has 40clecl the Chenla I I task force into two separcommands and has assigned them essential lvI efensive missions. Duringthe past three weeks, government forces apparently suffered heavy casualties, per- haps a5>high as the equivalent of four to six battaJans. The breakup of the task force will incr 'use the vulnerability of the troops, but it is n.% clear whether the Communists, who probably l5o have taken heavy casualties, are in positi 1ake early advantage of the situation. n-t~ Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 SECRET South Korea: More Economic Growth Seoul's new economic plan is geared to put growth on a sounder footing by promoting bal- anced development rather than keeping the em- phasis on export expansion. This shift comes in the face of dramatic changes in the trade policies of its most important trading partners, the US and Japan. Seoul will close out its present economic plan (1967-71) with one of the most impressive records among the developing nations. Since the early 1960s, the economy has grown at an average real rate of about ten percent annually, and gross national product reached $8.2 billion last year. Exports, which had been increasing at the phe- nomenal rate of some 40 percent annually, were in the forefront. There was a more than 13-percent gain in growth during the first half of this year. An inflation of ten percent was an undesirable side effect, however, and it continues to be the object of considerable popular discontent. Moreover, the expansion boosted imports, while a slower export growth of 26 percent, largely the result of the US west coast dock strike, will probably lead to a trade deficit in excess of last year's $879-million shortfall. The Korean won was devalued in June in an effort to counter these trends. As in previous years, the trade gap will be more than offset by an inflow of foreign capital. A large portion is private US and Japanese capital attracted by Korea's rapid growth, low labor costs, political stability, and liberal investment laws. The pace of the inflow this year appears faster than in 1970 when US direct investment and commercial loans totaled $193 million and Japanese investments were $99 million. While this capital has provided the fuel for Korea's eco- nomic achievements, it has been accompanied by more than $2 billion in external debt. Debt repay- ments this year will absorb over 30 percent of export earnings. To keep the debt manageable, the upcoming economic plan (1972-76) calls for imports to be held to a 13-percent annual rise, while exports are to increase at a reduced, but still impressive, an- nual rate of about 20 percent. In addition, a stepped-up anti-inflation policy will try to keep export prices attractive, thus retaining the trading advantage gained by the June devaluation. These measures, combined with an increased effort to mobilize domestic savings, are expected to stabi- lize the demand for foreign investment and aid at about $800 million annually. Exports will continue to play a key role in economic development. Korea's exports to the US, its largest market, will be inhibited by the surcharge as well as by the recent textile agree- ment limiting volume, but the impact probably will not be too great. Low-priced Korean goods are virtually without competition in the US, and a probable upgrading in the quality of textiles to be exported is likely to bring greater earnings. More- over, the appreciation of the Japanese yen has improved the position of Korean exporters by making Korean products less expensive than com- peting Japanese products in both Japan and other SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 SECK ?l' The USSR Plan Nears Adoption The Central Committee and Supreme Soviet meet next week to adopt the five-year economic plan for 1971-75 and next year's plan and budget. The Central Committee may also make some changes in the positions of key leaders. The public proceedings at these sessions will appear even more pro forma than usual since it was announced on 17 October that the Politburo had approved the five-year plan. Its final adoption, al- though delayed to the end of the plan's first year, will be a significant achievement for the regime and for party chief Brezhnev. Controversies among the leaders and planning complexities prevented a final and complete version of the 1966-70 plan from ever being published. among economic claimants will come to focus on its interpretation and implementation. For example, the plan's emphasis on living standards is still con- troversial, and the Belorussian and Ukrainian first secretaries, Masherov and Shelest, have sharply and publicly criticized the attention being devoted to consumerism. The Central Committee plenum will provide the first opportunity to adjust leadership posts since the election of an inflated Politburo at the congress. Voronov, who openly clashed with the victors in the agricultural debate, seems destined to lose his Polit- buro seat after his loss of the premiership of the Russian Republic last summer. His successor in the latter post, Solomentsev, should now move to the Politburo. Other changes are possible. For example, the election to the Politburo at the congress of both top Ukrainian leaders-Shelest and Premier Shcher- bitsky-was unprecedented and increases the chances of eventual changes in the status of one or The Politburo's statement on the five-year plan highlighted the tasks of improving living standards and aiding the agricultural sector, themes empha- sized in the draft directives and at the party congress earlier in the year. Both programs emerged from years of controversy and only upon Brezhnev's deci- sive intervention. Brezhnev finally sided with the lobby for investment in agriculture in the spring of 1970, a time of high tension among the leadership when even his position may have been under attack. The definition of raising living standards as "the main task" of this and future five-year plans followed decisions taken by the leadership soon after Khrushchev's fall and in 1967. The theme emerged in full form, however, only with publica- tion of the plan draft directives in February and Brezhnev's elaborate justification in his speech to the party congress. Brezhnev's public embrace of the theme followed the Polish disturbances of December 1970 and coincided with the Soviet peace offensive, his most ambitious effort at personal image building to date. The basic decisions on the plan have apparently held since early this year, and the authorities have probably used the interval principally to fill in the details. Adoption of the plan means that the contest Luna 19-the unmanned Soviet moon probe- has been in lunar orbit six weeks. It appears to be functioning properly. Present evidence suggests that the probe will remain in orbit around the moon to conduct further experiments. Luna 19 was launched from Tyuratam on 28 September and was placed in orbit around the moon on 2 October. A few days later, the Soviets maneu- vered the probe into a slightly lower orbit in which it has remained. Luna 19 was the second Soviet lunar probe launched this year. The first-Luna 18-crashed while attempting to land on the moon in early September. According to TASS, Luna 19 is intended "to conduct scientific investigations of the moon and near lunar space from the orbit of an artificial satel- lite." The statement differs from those given for all previous lunar probes in stating that Luna 19 will operate in lunar orbit. Possible amplification of its mission appeared a few weeks ago in an Izvestiya SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 7~ j1C.C, 1 article that discussed Soviet objectives in lunar ex- ploration. The article discussed the need for lunar landings such as Lunokhod, but also stressed the value of orbital probes to provide information on the space near the moon, to study lunar gravita- tional anomalies, and to photograph the moon's surface. Thus far, Luna 19 operations seem to support these indications of an orbital mission. It is not certain that the activities so far are all that is intended for Luna 19. TASS announcements generally understate mission objectives, and the probe may yet attempt to land, perform some other experiment, or even return to earth. Luna 19 can remain in lunar orbit for an extended period because of the lack of atmospheric drag unless gravitational irregularities significantly alter the orbit. Another possibility is that the probe has not functioned properly and is unable to carry out its primary mission. As yet, however, there is no firm evidence to support a further mission or to indicate any difficulties with the probe. Soviet military deliveries to In herr?re indica- tions that the USSR s ep,ping up shipments of equipmen uba and Algeria. Deliveries to Eqy roue at a high but reduced level as Mos- intains its rilit1#lr.r-- SECRET arrival of a se mid-November fighter aircraf 25X1 n increase in the level of military deliveries t iboard Soviet ships first became evident la ft I n late from the U R, the first indentifie to Cuba since Septem and shipment of mi rings deliveries th slightly past th doubtedly is in some extent mo tories. The past I inadequate to acc Cuba's efforts to forces. ed of hardware ernize its agi mplish this An increase in d under way. At least arrived in Algeria recen' with helicopters, medi boats reportedly were signed last February est $100 million. The equip replace Soviet military mid-1960s and presum thus far in 1971 ar large quantities of to-air missiles and . though shipments est monthly lev milit well b it defen ighter airc n October y deliveries to Egypt low 1970 levels, when equipment-surface- ft-were shipped. Al- opped to their low- y 1970, e iveries in rece mon s pro a y are supplies in eded to keep the artier large influx of new equi -gent operating, as II as additions to and maintera nce of Egypt's armsinventories.F delivery of er 1967. The tary goods in 0. Havana un- !b replace and to military inven- may have been even in light of ize of its military o Algeria also appears 50 MIG-21s on order he jet fighters, together bnks, and missile patrol luded in an agreement ated to be worth some gent will be used largely to rdware supplied in the ost through attrition. Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 bLUKL 1 France: Another Missile Submarine France plans to launch its third nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine, Le Foud- royant, at Cherbourg on 4 December. Le Foudroyant, scheduled to be operational in 1974, will be the first French 16-tube nuclear submarine to carry missiles with thermonuclear warheads, each with a yield of about one mega- ton. By then, the first two units, launched in 1967 and 1969, will have entered service I Le Redoutable, France's first missile sub- marine, began its final 40-day test cruise late last month and will start its initial operational patrol at the end of this year. The second, Le Terrible, has completed initial sea trials and will began, operational patrols in late 1972. Each submariner:; has two 135-man crews. The crews will alternate; each will be aboard the submarine for a period of 100 days-72 days on patrol and 28 days in port. The French already have begun construction of a fourth nuclear submarine, L'Indomptable, which will enter service about 1975.,.Defense Min- ister Debre confirmed France's intention to build a fifth unit when he told the National Assembly earlier this month that construction material for it already had been ordered. ./ By the late 1970s, t~e French plan to have five nuclear submarine carrying a total of 80 missiles The uclear submarine base at Ile Longue near Br t, begun in 1967, has been completed. This b e is able to service most nuclear, missile, nd siip components of the force. It has two d docks to facilitate work and to provide sett; cy in the servicing and movement of the su arines. Some minor servicing may also be dnewt the French naval base at Diego-Suarez in ,tRedoutable on first sea trials, July 1969 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 /25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 SECRET l Tvriclrr~~ivre i;stt Missile Submarines Dis lacement v ? g~yt~ on `surfa:c d; 9 000 tone submerged Madagascar, off the east coast of Africa, should France assign one of the submarines in t area. Little is known about Fren plans for de- ployment of their ballistic m' rile nuclear sub- marines. Earlier intelligent reports, however, have indicated that two the submarines will patrol in the Norwegian a and one in the Bav of Bengal. Western Europe: New Free TraArrangements Negotiations will begin soon on range ments to bring within the framework of the uro- pean Community those European Free Trad s- sociation countries that are not applying for II EC membership-namely Sweden, Switzerlan Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Iceland. The agreement to talk was reached by the EC Council earlier than expected, partly because of the gen- eral uneasiness in Europe over the direction of US economic policy. Community views may also have been crystallized by the US demarche, de- livered on the eve of the council session on 8 November, warning against any new discrimina- tion affecting US exports. The major goal of the EC is the establj ment over five years of free trade in indu goods between the enlarged'community a nonapplicants. An effort is being made t to a minimum the list of "sensitive" pro the community will want to exempt trade. The question of special arran EC agricultural exports, which coul titularly harmful to US trade inte left to the EC Commission to negotiations. The six nonapplic not receptive to Dutch, Italia sures for special deals on commission is also opposed h- rial the educe cts that rom free ments for sts, has been xplore in the ts, however, are and French pres- riculture, and the Despite he industrial exceptions and the likely excl ion of agriculture, the Europeans maintain )fiat the arrangements will be com- patible th the GATT rule requiring free-trade areas to nclude substantially all trade. In so far as GATT y is violated, the Europeans concede they must compensate the US for demonstrated injury s commerce. They increasingly believe, how- 'r, that the impact of the arrangements should ealt with, following the community's enlarge- en in general trade negotiations that might have 'Xie additional objective of a more general liberali tion of trade among all countries. The udest protests against the US de- marche ca : from the European neutrals, par- ticularly the - wiss and Austrians, who tend to interpret the S position as a political attack. They view the f ? e-trade arrangements as the only way open to the to assure their continued close ties with Western rope-a view the EC shares. Denmark and Nor , candidates for full EC membership, have pa icular reasons for fearing any new obstacles to t' successful conclusion of arrangements between eden and the EC. A setback to Stockholm wot&ld severely strain the promembership campaigns 'n Norway and Den- mark. These are based, in pa on assurances that the larger Scandinavian mark will be preserved SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 . ------ ,,._ -1 -_ _.... ~-~. _- ...v r.cnc.i~ iuva 1JLI1Qt Llte]e Iree-Lraue ar- ~''''Copenhagen are already having trouble with rangements should come into force at the same Rpou.IQosition to membership, time as the community is enlarged, presumably Malta: re's the Aid Coming From? Prime. Mini er Mintoff has been promoting trade and seeki aid recently in Romania, Poland, and Yugos ia. His travels have provided him with the opport ity to underscore his claim to an alternative to settlement with the UK. Mintoff received his rmest welcome in Ro- mania, where he probabl was angling for tech- nicaladvice and assistance 1r Malta's prospective oil development. Meantime, has continued his economic talks with Libya an his efforts to get A Maltese delegation left for T' oli 14 November for talks on economic c ration. Discussions are expected to include, a g other things, working conditions for Mal se i Lib a and possible work for the Mal drydoc . I n September, Mintoff plicitly accepted a - ATO cash aid offer $24 million annually as the basis for a new fense agreement on the understanding that prof t aid negotiations with NATO countries would follow. The initial rfderstanding was that NATO members woul e expected to give sup- plemental bilateral d in the form of loans or technical assist e, but Mintoff has recently made clear t he expects additional cash grants. For this r eon, he rejected formal aid offers in the for of loans from West Germany and Although the prime minister hopes to get another $20 million annually to supplement the $24 million already promised, the allies have thus far been unwilling to come up with concrete offers to satisfy that demand. Italy recently of- nd call Mintoff's bluff, as they are convinced he fered to increase its contribution to the UK- NATO package if the US, UK, and West Germany did likewise. Rome's reluctance to raise its offer unconditionally is probably an effort to avoid assuming a leading role in the negotiations. Bonn believes that it is already carrying its full share of the burden and is unwilling to take on more. Moreover, the British would like to hold the line icial to Malta, although there is some informatio On the domestic front, most Maltese appear ve that Mintoff's East European trip will uncertain be beri to be also seems f because of the absence of specific on what was accomplished. There be a consensus that an agreement with the UK may have to set entually will be signed. Mintoff for less than his cash-aid goal, but it will be diff knowledge that he lion annually./- It for him because it is public demanding about $44 mil- SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 SECRET The Arab World Arafat at Arms Length in Moscow Once again, fedayeen chieftain Yasir Arafat has tr'`veled to Moscow to seek direct military assistan a and more visible recognition. Once again, h has failed. Arafat and his delegation official gue\ts of the Soviet Government. They were largely ' imited to meetings with the Soviet Committee of olidarity of Afro-Asian Countries and received mi =mal coverage in Soviet media. This treatme attitude toward the edayeen, who represent a far greater threat to tl ments than to Israel: the visit did not ident cials who saw the Arab stability of Arab govern- The communiques capping y any of the Soviet offi For the past several year the Soviet has been seeking to curry favf r with these o zations but has remained eluctant to pro them with direct milita assistance or hea weapons. Direct aid to a terrorist groups woul pose problems for t Soviets, who prefer to work through certa' governments in the area. Egypt and Syria i particular have insisted that they act as mid e men in arms deals, and the Soviets have uiesced. Moreover, the Soviets, apprehensive about the fedayeen as an uncon- trolled ele ent in a dangerously unstable situa- tiori, ha refused to supply the guerrillas, even indite ly, with anything other than light arms such as assault rifles and machine guns. oscow's role as the great power champion of the rab cause compels the Kremlin to support Ar s who claim to be ac- tively fighting on behat of revolutionary causes. By championing the edayeen, the Soviets align themselves with a tional liberation movement that displays the Ind of militant opposition to Israel so popular n the Arab world. Moscow also may believe t, t the fedayeen contribute some- thing to ke ing pressure on the US and Israel to SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 SECRET with the fedayeen indirect mil risk that Middl Fabs. Soviet dealings ar indicate that Moscow continue to provide them with assistance without running the ese arms will cause tensions in the to reach a flash point. ever cohesive, the Palestinian feda nt has been divided even more us debate among its leaders acrimon merits of talks with he Palestine Liberation Organ al organizations, whic smaller, rad bring down that Yasir Ara Husayn. g Husayn, have pub Aside from th mando units have b of Syria and Leban stringent border regu restricted fedayeen Those fedayeen u Army units an Lebanese Gov yeen to mas restrictions, areas. Lebano terme more' elves can no lo nment, whil men in the rura rrounded by Syrian er move freely. The allowing the feda- outh, has imposed n the commandos have been so hampere ures that the fedayeen are than set up delayed-action a ?oss the border, and most of th resence in urban to Israel from y Israeli coun- ble to do little iscovered and defused by Leb patrols. ocket firings have been ese Army The Jordanian-fedayeen talks in Jidda were suspended last weekend while the principals con- cerned went to Cairo for the Arab League foreign ministers' conference. During the recess, lower ranking delegates were said to be focusing on the "technical details" of an eventual agreement, in- cluding the distribution and control of fedayeen arms, the location of possible guerrilla camps within Jordan, and the updating of the agree- ments that governed relations between Amman and the commandos in the past. There is some slight optimism that an agreement of sorts can be worked out. The post-Ramadan holidays may delay the resumption of formal talks until the last week of November. The Arab League foreign ministers meet in Cairo earlier this week in yet another effort to "purify the Arab air." The ministers established a five-nation committee to help settle Arab dif- ferences before further ministerial meetings, the debate in the UN, and a possible heads-of-state conference. Chances for any general success in this search for unity are marginal, but President Sadat will at least be able to say he has consulted his allies on future tactics in dealing with the Israelis. The ministers discussed some of the other factors that have inhibited concerted Arab action against Israel. There was consideration of new means of strengthening the so-called eastern front, for restoring normal relations between all Arab states, and for continuing the Saudi-Egyp- tian mediation to end the Jordan-fedayeen dis- pute. The Iraqis distributed a memorandum on the situation in the Persian Gulf-they call it the "Arab" Gulf-andLibya highlighted the impor- tance of the "pan-Arabization of the battle." A proposal to consider the status of Arab relations with West Germany was postponed until the next meeting of the Arab League Council in March. The Egyptians appear to have drawn up their diplomatic battle plan for isolating Israel in the United Nations. Egyptians terms may be hard. The authorita- tive newspaper Al Ahram, amplifying President SECRET divisions, the com- ed by recent actions amascus has imposed ons that have effectively ge to and from Syria. aining on Syrian soil Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 ~IrUKtt Sadat's speech of 11 November, reported this week that Egypt now demands a "positive an- swer" to Ambassador Jarring's February request for Israel's requirements for a final settlement before discussions on opening the canal can go forward. T444.--land, if accurately stated by Al Air--am, would represent aconsiderable stiffening of the Egyptian position-. The Egyptians intend to raise the Middle East in the General Assembly around the begin- ning of December. Sadat is expected to send a personal representative to New York to take charge of the Egyptian delegation during the debate. Egypt will ask that the UN require Israel to clarify its stand regarding implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 which, in the Egyptian view, stipulates Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. If Israel, as is likely, re- jects this ploy, Egypt will call for an arms em- bargo and economic sanctions against Israel, among other things. While not binding on mem- bers, such action by the assembly would further erode the Israeli diplomatic position. The Israelis have thus far chosen not to meet Cairo's maneuvers head on. Instead, Deputy Premier Allon reminded the press that Israel, in any case, prefers a comprehensive settlement to President Sadat's initiative for opening the ca- nal. A month cro` in an effort i troops have several times in er- _th d over the border into en (Sana) the regime's overthrow' adoption of a t governmentj Mean- e ega ion arrived in to discuss economic military and security cooling-of =the major s nce of tribal unrest, n its relations with oes not appear h Aden, even if made available. A al and economic diffic its successful offensive ag 55 6a is considering the P sident Iryani and Prime Minister al-Ay of Ye An (Sanes) are apparently among th e taking a and lin toward Aden, even though ey have been eluctant to risk a confrontation ' thE25X1 past. They re probably being pressed to opt a more aggre ive position by military fficers embarrassed the Adeni raids. w hie a ig -eve Sana this week, purp matters. The presencd personnel on the dele may raise more vital is The Sana gov, money, troubled and experiencing the Soviet Uni tary aid. San showdown money we I own poll ing ove nx- side wh SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 estroy the,,~an varies of Adeni - plier of past mili- p be ready for a n, despite its Ities, is gloat- pled those 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 SJ XJKJ 1' CEYLO : The new economic program an- nounced la week strengthens the leftists in Mrs. Bandaranaike cabinet. There had been talk by the Trotskyite a Communist parties of with- drawing from the go ment, and if they had done so some of the leftis embers of her own party might have followed su These elemen had been concerned that the prog would Jack "anti-capitalist" measures to co terl f nce proposals for cutting back Ceylon,'s cost nrelfare system. The program as announced n es ovi- for limiting the size of landhold'irgs. The Trot" -*% skyites and Communists seem r bllified.\ t e program not only gives t e e tists w at t ey want but will help to Valken their opponents' economic base and th ' influence in the government. The austerity aspects of the program are not likely to shift enough resources from consump- tion to investment to bring the economy into balance and alleviate Ceylon's chronic unemploy- ment problem. There was some public protest when the belt-tightening measures were an- nounced, but Mrs. Bandaranaike quickly moved to stem this by rescinding the proposed increase in the price of flour-and by raising the sugar SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 SECRET Ecuador a d the Tuna Wars The largest aul of the skipjack tuna season in waters off Sou America's west coast has been made by Ecuador, which has netted some 15 fishing boats and $ 0,000 in fines and license fees. As a result, the has extended the suspen- sion of military sales til November 1972, and relations between the t o countries again are strained. On 1 November, Foreig Velasco informed the US amba dor intended to enforce its regulat added that if the US retaliated in a dor would take the issue not onl OAS, as it did in January, but also be and any other forum available. An o protest followed the first seizures, but jected with the comment that it should sented to the "deceitful fishermen" of the can Tuna Association. The matter was disc dor on 14 November, but there has been softening in the Ecuadorean position. President Velasco now is ruling with dicta- torial powers, and has indicated that h might postpone or cancel the elections schedul d to be held in June 1972. Should he so decide he prob- ably would move early next year befo the elec- tion campaign is fully under way. Th season for yellowfin tuna opens on 1 January, d more US seiners will be operating off the Ec dorean coast at that time. Their presence coul serve Velasco well to distract public attention ould he decide to prolong his term. The recent controversy ith the US has had a mixed reaction within to Ecuadorean armed forces. The US defense at the comments that he has rarely seen such an ir of confidence among the senior officers, parti ularly the commanders "Per pound, they bring a much larger return than fish!" f the army and navy. They allege that the only y to get the US to move on a problem such as thers, however, are unhappy because the gover ent's policy has complicated the problem of acq ing new military equipment. many officers like the ision of little Ecuador standing up to the giant U In addition, alternate sources of military supply e available; some of the tuna seiners were captur by the navy's newly ac- quired patrol boats lit in Germany. SECRET Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Castro in Chile: Company Manners Fidel Castro's first week in Chile has rein- forced early suspicions that the visit would be less a working trip than an attempt to improve Cas- tro's image and reduce Cuba's isolation. Castro has been well behaved and has avoided the fiery language for which he is noted. He has gone out of his way to be both cordial and discreet in all his public pronouncements. He has indeed gone so far as to moderate temporarily his attacks on the US. Castro told one crowd he had never ruled out elections as an alternative to armed struggle to gain power. During a two-hour debate with students at Antofagasta, he said he had not come to Chile to "teach the subject of revolution and did not even consider himself an expert on the subject." On the OAS, Castro reaffirmed his well- known position of completely rejecting any re- newal of ties with the organization, although he did so in a tone of uncharacteristic mildness. Castro's circumspection slipped a little when he exhorted Chilean miners to avoid sectarianism and self-interest. Opposition newspapers and poli- ticians were quick to criticize this as "objection- able intrusion," but media treatment in general has been factual. The orthodox Communist Party has played an active role in organizing receptions for Castro Overt opposition to his presence in Chile has been limited. A bomb blast near Antofagasta on 12 November, before his scheduled arrival, knocked out some communications lines and temporarily disrupted a local television station. The blast was blamed on a small right-wing ex- tremist group that has condemned Castro's visit. SECRET Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 SECRET The length of Castro's stay in Chile is still not known. Perhaps it will depend on how well he lasts. There have been reports that his strenuous schedule and a severe cold forced him to cancel one full day's activities. Speculation centers on a stay of about two weeks. Chile: The Pace Picks Up President Allende's constitutional reform bill has turned out to be sweeping indeed. In addition to proposing a unicameral legislature with a cur- tailed capacity to obstruct the executive, the measure published on 11 November would broaden the President's already extensive powers, make important changes in the conservative Supreme Court, and nationalize key sectors of the economy now beyond the government's grasp. Some apparently minor features are tailor-made to provide the governing' Popular Unity coalition with new weapons in its quickening effort to con- solidate political power. One, for instance, would legalize the formation'of joint electoral slates by parties that agree on a formal political program. The breadth of the reforms increases the chance of congressional opposition, but the bill's complexity and vagueness may assist Allende in getting approval of changes that he most wants. The multiplicity of items included serves both to placate the demands of his diverse coalition and leave some room for Allende to maneuver in re- sponse to political and popular reaction. The bill will also help to divert attention from new problems that have risen to complicate the government's task. Copper workers at the big Chuquicamata mine hardly waited for Castro to leave town before they announced their decision to ignore Allende's personal appeal to scale down their demands for a 50-percent wage hike. Coali- tion parties are in a minority position on the union council at Chuquicamata. , he On his way home, he apparently intends to stop briefly in Lima to meet with President Velasco, at which time Peru's intentions on bilateral relations with Cuba and an initiative on Cuba in the OAS may be clarified. Socialist union leaders who hol balance of power. The Popular SoCjAP6tf bolted Allende's Socialist Party sevW4tl ears ago in a leadership fight but coo a with the government when it suits thei rposes. In this case, they know that it m e crucial to the government to keep wa }as down and to avert a copper strike, so the eir cooperation is--stiff. The escalating struggle to avert government control over the University of Chile is another headache. Under the guise of effecting badly needed reforms at the mushrooming national uni- versity, its coalition-dominated governing council is trying to consolidate the numerous autono- mous units into four divisions that can be dominated from the center. The university rector, a political independent with Christian Democratic ties, is leading the fight against the council. Sev- eral university sections have been taken over by antigovernment forces, others have been dis- rupted by professors' walkouts. Violence may bring the matter to a boil. Government slates have been defeated in several student elections re- cently, which may have encouraged opposition forces to unify their efforts in the far more im- portant university issue. The university has a large role in national life, so victory for the government would be a key contribution to consolidation of its political position. SECRET Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 SECRET Venezuela Seeks Caribbean Leadership The Caribbean Conference of Foreign Minis- ters, set for 24-26 November, is the Caldera gov- ernment's latest and most ambitious effort to establish Venezuela as the major Caribbean power. The avowed purpVse of the meeting is to discuss geographical issues\ffecting the Caribbean (especially the law of the.-sea), to foster an in- crease in commercial, cultural, and tourist exchange, and to examine other topics of mutual interest. The Venezuelan initiative is meeting a welter of criticism, with neighbors on all sides less than willing to regard Venezuela's-.policy as to- tally benign. A number of factors have combined to turn Venezuelan interests northward. These iinclude the desire of the Christian Democratic admin' tra- tion to show independence of the previous i v- ernment's Andean orientation, a surge of assertiv9 nationalism, President Caldera's particular inter-\ est in Haiti, Trinidad-born Foreign Minister =\ pre, Calvani's paternalistic feeling toward the islands, i and the obvious significance of the Caribbean in terms of security and trade potential. Both the President and Calvani have traveled extensively to the islands and have hosted island visitors in pur- suit of increased influence in the area. In pro posing a foreign ministers conference to de especially with law of the sea issjies, Venezuela is attempting to establish itself asleader of a mod- erate position between the'`00-mile territorial claims of its continental neighbors and the still inchoate policies of thg. Central American and Caribbean countries. Venezuelan officials have become fairly expert_Jn law of the sea matters through the extensiv research required in their bilateral negotiatiois with Colombia over ter- ritorial disputes. The roun of criticism provoked by the Caracas convocation is a gauge of the other Carib- bean states' suspicion of Venezuela's motives. These govements have not forgotten Vene- zuela's re iness to send troops to Trinidad- Tobago ring disturbances in 1970, and some may sus ect Venezuela's earlier clandestine insti- gation jf an insurrection in Guyana as part of its irrede ist policy there. The Colombians privately disd n the Caracas meeting as hastily and poorly ared, and say the lack of a technical raison re is a telltale of Venezuela's political and n'V tation, tendered despite the break in relations, buts- oreign Minister Raymond, while indicating williness to resume diplomatic exchanges, says he doe not intend for the Venezuelan chancery once again to become a base for subversion. SECRET Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7 0J )J i. 1 The most serio the conference has bee an omission that has stir' embarrassment raised by he exclusion of Guyana, d the sleeping dog of the border dispute, involvin five eighths of Guyana. Hype ensitive to what it perceives as Venezuelan hostili its friends to boycott the confere Guyana asked are sympathetic but believe their of better serve Guyanese interests. Seve sadors have challenged Calvani's decisi dance will I ambas- nore Guyana, but Venezuela officially ho to ig- the view that Guyana is an Atlantic, not a Ca bean state. Several diplomats in Caracas_,Afa- has no Caribbean coast. Venez Guyana is in fact a necessity o application of the 1970 p which imposes a 12 country's pressin ,,,e pute. There .-