WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
30
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 9, 2008
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 19, 1971
Content Type:
SUMMARY
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7.pdf | 3.12 MB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
19 November 1971
No. 0397/71
Copy
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
SECRET
CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EST, 18 November 1971)
War or Peace: Dilemma on the Subcontinent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Thailand: Military Take Full Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Uruguay: Anti-US Charges Highlight Final Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
SALT and US-Soviet Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 5
Ostpolitik: Chances Improve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
FAR EAST
Indochina: Vietnam; Cambodia , . . . _ tc
Soutli Korea: More Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
France: Another Missile Submarine . . m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Western Europe: New Free Trade Arrangennts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Malta: Where's the Aid Coming From? ,7' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
MIDDLth EAST - AFRICA
,`
The Arab World lt~
16
}WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Ecuador and the Tuna W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Castro in Chile: Comps Manners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Chile: The Pace Picks p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Venezuela Seeks Car' bean Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Mexico: Opening p the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
SI UR ET
War or Peace: Dilemma on the Subcontinent
Prime Minister Gandhi returned to New
Delhi on 13 November after a three-week for-
eign tour of five West European countries and
the US. She told her hosts that India's problems
with almost 10 million refugees from East Pak-
istan were rapidly nearing the point where war
would be difficult to avoid. So that the refugees
might return in safety, she urged that immediate
and intensified international pressure be applied
to the government in Islamabad to negotiate a
political settlement with the rebel leaders of
Bangla Desh. As if to reinfore her serious assess-
ment of the situation, cross-border firing and
guerrilla fighting in East Pakistan intensified dur-
ing her absence and is continuing.
Back in India, Mrs. Gandhi struck a cautious
note. The foreign talks produced few demon-
strable results, but she met no flat rebuffs. She
closed no options, but her homecoming state-
ments implied that the world community would
be given only a limited amount of time to con-
vince Islamabad to negotiate a political settlement
and that no good would come of "forcing a
military conflict with India."
Although Mrs. Gandhi's statements, both
public and private, have served to reduce political
tensions, there are no indications that she intends
to defuse the military situation. The Mukti
Bahini's fall offensive has begun, and both Mrs.
Gandhi and her key ministers, especially Defense
Minister Ram, continue to laud the guerrillas'
increasing effectiveness. The rebels control terri-
tory along the border in several districts in East
Pakistan, and many groups are able to expand
their activities and control in interior areas. Guer-
rilla attacks have made all transportation routes
dangerous, and one international shipping line has
decided to divert its traffic from the port of
Chalna in southwestern East Pakistan following
attacks by naval commandos on two ships en
route there.
Guerrilla . successes along the border owe
much to supporting Indian troops, who are more
willing to cross the border-in as much as bat-
talion strength-to fight limited engagements with
the Pakistanis. The Indians withdraw only when
Mukti Bahini control seems assured. New Delhi is
anxious to see continued Mukti Bahini gains and
"Mukti Bahini carrying military supplies to Bangla Desh"
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
SEURE'1'
appears willing to expand joint Indian-guerrilla
operations. In any event, India cannot abruptly
stop these coordinated attacks without risking
guerrilla disaffection and possibly lowering Indian
troop morale.
Despite the growing Mukti Bahini strength,
it is doubtful that Islamabad yet feels under suffi-
cient pressure to negotiate a settlement even ap-
proaching the rebels' demand for immediate
independence. In the meantime, Islamabad is pro-
ceeding doggedly ahead with its own version of a
political solution to the Bengali problem. Elec-
tions to National Assembly seats vacated by mem-
bers of the banned Awami League are scheduled
to be held next month; candidates for 55 of the
78 seats have already been declared elected un-
opposed. Yahya has managed to convince seven
other parties to form a coalition that will domi-
nate the new assembly. Nurul Amin, a prominent
progovernment East Pakistani, leads the group. If
the coalition holds together, it will give Yahya a
chance to form a friendly civilian government
with Amin as prime minister.
Such a government would have almost no
support in East Pakistan, but Yahya would have
difficulty in preserving his own position were he
to deviate markedly from his established course.
Even should Yahya be able to open negotiations
with the imprisoned Bengali leader, Mujibur
Rahman, Mujib might be repudiated by the guer-
rillas if he were to settle for anything less than
immediate and complete independence for East
Pakistan.
Against the background of Mrs. Gandhi's
assertion that she would not make a decision in
"haste and anger," India is continuing its steady
preparations for war. Reams of red tape must be
unraveled before foreigners obtain the permits
MOW
now essential for travel to refugee camps and
border areas, and New Delhi's charges of Pakistani
border and airspace violations-matched by sim-
ilar charges from Islamabad-continue as each
builds a case that it is a victim of aggression. Mrs.
Gandhi has not set a limit on Indian patience but
Indian leaders, perhaps with an eye to the effect
on the major powers, warn that time is running
out. Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal has stated that
after another month or two it will be increasingly
difficult to maintain the military establishment at
its present rate of readiness, and on 14 November
Defense Minister Ram stated that a "great con-
flagration could occur at any moment."
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7 13 L _kJ1cL 1
Thailand: Military Take Full Command
The Thai military establishment announced
its complete take-over of the government on 17
November under a new "Revolutionary Party."
The 1968 constitution has been annulled, the
parliament abolished, the cabinet dismissed, and
martial law declared. All ministries are being run,
at least for the time being, by under secretaries
under the direct leadership of the Revolutionary
Party commander, Field Marshal Thanom. The
government announced that there would be no
immediate changes in military or police com-
manders.
I The imposition of military rule appears to
hie resulted when the leaders' impatience with
Th' i democratic processes reached the breaking
punt. The military had become increasingly exas-
pr ted over its difficulties with opposition ele-
mts and particularly with parliament. The mili-
taC leaders have had serious reservations about
the suitability to Thailand of constitutional gov-
ertment ever since the constitution was promul-
gaid in 1968. The military leaders, who were
inept in dealing with a sometimes recalcitrant
legislature, lately were quite vocal about their
urt#appiness with parliament. Parliament's slow-
nes in passing appropriations and the calls of
sore parliamentarians for the early opening of
relations with Peking were particularly annoying.
The government prefers a policy of caution
toward Peking and some leaders are afraid that
undue haste would encourage the spread of Com-
munist sympathies arTlong Thailand's Chinese
minority.
The events this week in Bangkok do not
appear to be a direct consequence of arguments
within the military establishment over substantive
policies, either domestic or foreign. There is no
evidence so far that issues of direct interest to the
US figured in the considerations that led to the
government's moves. The reassertion of full
power by the military should have little signifi-
cant effect on the way Thailand is governed or on
the country's foreign policies.
The decision to rule by military decree
comes at a time when another flurry of restive-
ness has been noted among junior officers. The
suspension of the constitution and parliament will
be popular all through the military and will give a
sense of decisiveness and direction that has been
absent at the top. It will not, however, reduce
resentment among younger officers over poor
promotion prospects caused in part by the failure
of top leaders to retire on schedule.
The chances are good that the military will
bring off its assumption of full power with a
minimum of difficulty. It seems unlikely that any
troop commanders will challenge the leadership,
particularly since the immediate targets of the
government are civilian elements. There is some
grumbling among politicians, but the Bangkok
citizenry seems to be taking the change in
' x
Field Marshal Thanom: Still in Charge
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
SECRET
Uruguay: Anti-US Charges Highlight Final Campaign
Shrill leftist charges of US interference are
highlighting the closing moments of the campaign
for general elections on 28 November.
The leftist Frente Amplio has seized on two
recent episodes to deliver broadsides against the
US. On 7 November, the Frente's presidential
candidate, Liber Seregni, received a slight injury
from a knife-wielding drunk. In another incident,
a child was killed by a stray shot as a Frente
caravan was stoned by a hostile crowd in the
interior. Seregni at once linked the attacks to
rightist plots, directed by US and Brazilian ex-
perts. The leftist press has since kept up a well-
orchestrated campaign denouncing the presence
of CIA agents in the US Embassy. On 14 Novem-
ber, the left was given another opening to attack
the US when an accident involving two navy
helicopters recently purchased from the US left 8
dead and 40 injured. Communist press organs
alleged the planes had been bought under US
pressure and that this constituted more inter-
ference in Uruguayan military affairs.
The coalition has not yet attracted a sig-
nificant following in the interior of the country,
which contains about 50 percent of the popula-
tion, and the Frente hopes to parlay its charges
into a sympathy vote. In Montevideo, where the
latest polls show it trailing the incumbent
Colorados by a narrow margin, the Frente hopes
these last-minute accusations will boost it past its
opponents in the important mayoralty contest. It
remains doubtful, however, that these patently
manufactured issues will have much impact, as
the anti-US stance is not as persuasive nor auto-
matic a rallying point in moderate Uruguay as it is
elsewhere in the hemisphere.
The Colorados remain slight favorites in the
election, despite internal problems. The furor
over President Pacheco's choice of an unpopular
alternate candidate-Minister of Agriculture
Bordaberry, whose candidacy will be valid if the
constitutional amendment permitting Pacheco a
second consecutive term falls short of majority
approval-has subsided somewhat. It had caused
the resignations of three cabinet members, and
President Pacheco:
In the home stretch
several nationally prominent Colorados attacked
the Bordaberry candidacy. The dissatisfaction,
however, is still apparent. For example, in an-
other bit of confusion added to the already com-
plicated election, the anti-Pacheco Colorado can-
didates joined the Frente and the traditional
opposition Blanco Party in opposing the Electoral
Court's recommendation that the candidates run
on two duplicate, slates-one for the Pacheco con-
stitutional reform and one without it. Their ac-
tion means that if the amendment should pass,
Pacheco's candidates would fill all offices. The
decision reflects the other Colorado candidates'
confidence that the proposed reform is a dead
letter. By treating it as such, they hope to attract
Colorados away from Pacheco and his alternate
Bordaberry.
The Blanco Party is improving its electoral
chances. Support for it is growing in the interior,
and it hopes to pull out an upset victory by
minimizing its losses in the capital. The Frente,
on the other hand, hopes that its strength in
Montevideo will offset its weak position in the
interior. Both face an uphill battle against the
Colorados in the campaign's last da s. 25X1
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
SECRET
SALT and US-Soviet Relations
The sixth round of SALT opened in Vienna
on 15 November with expressions of good will
and signs of a general improvement in the climate
of US-Soviet relations.
Exchanges of high-level delegations are
under way with an eye to improving economic
dealings between the two countries. Secretary of
Commerce Stans is expected to be in the USSR
by the end of the week, and Deputy Foreign
Trade Minister Alkhimov is already in Washing-
ton. The Soviets have recently contracted to pur-
chase about $140-million worth of American
grain, the US has authorized the $280-million sale
of foundry equipment for the USSR's Kama
truck project, and bilateral dealings on a number
of other subjects ranging from maritime issues to
cultural exchange matters appear to be moving
smoothly if not swiftly.
The announcement on 12 October of Presi-
dent Nixon's planned visit to Moscow next spring
undoubtedly was a fillip to this positive trend.
Since that announcement, the Soviets have taken
pains to highlight areas of mutual interest and to
downplay current tensions. An article this month
by the Kremlin's leading expert on American af-
fairs, Yury Arbatov, seems best to exemplify this
approach. Arbatov warmly endorsed the forth-
coming presidential visit, called it a "positive
act," and expressed hope that it will promote an
across-the-board improvement in US-Soviet rela-
tions including success on SALT. Arbatov bal-
anced these statements, however, with the asser-
tion that it was impossible to believe that an "era
of undisputed harmony" would suddenly be
inaugurated.
The guarded optimism of Soviet political
commentators has occasionally been accompanied
by expressions of suspicion, sometimes outright
distrust, of US intentions. Domestic audiences in
the Soviet Union were told this week by a group
of prominent news commentators that the US
still tries to deal from "positions of strength," to
gain military advantages over the USSR, and to
exploit its new relationship with China at Soviet
expense. Similarly, a leading Soviet military the-
oretician, V. Larionov, recently wrote in regard to
the concept of military sufficiency that the Nixon
administration still pursues military programs 25X1
aimed at outstripping the USSR. The Larionov
article appeared alongside Arbatov's discussion of
A Toast to SALT (Austrian President Jonas, left, welcomes US and Soviet negotiators in Vienna
1
79-00927AO09200050001-7
Os oIitik: Chances Improve
Bo has become much more optimistic about
the immedi prospects for its Ostpolitik. Its inter-
German negot or, Egon Bahr, now believes that by
early December rhk can conclude the East-West Ger-
man accord called or by the quadripartite Berlin
Agreement. Moreover, onn probably considers that
the talks with the Czec slovaks that resumed on 18
November can now get d n to serious negotiation.
West German officials me away from the
unprecedented four-day negoti 'ng sessions, 10-13
November, convinced that Panko under pressure
to complete the negotiations early a gh to allow
the December NATO ministerial to app a multi-
lateral preparations for a Conference on E
Security. Bahr's East German counterpart, M'
Kohl, confirmed this appraisal in answer t direct
question by Bahr. In the Bahr-Kohl tal as well as
in the parallel West Berlin - East Gergi; n talks, East
German negotiators moved clos to Bonn's and
West Berlin's position on severa oints.
Bahr, for his part, j ieves that Bonn is in an
excellent negotiating - sition, but he is concerned
that by holding th a on still-unresolved details he
may be accuse f deliberately delaying the talks
and thereby opardize Bonn's present advantage.
Bonn's ob' tive in negotiating a comprehensive
The broad economic reforms that the Thieu
government began to implement this week are draw-
ing heavy criticism in some quarters, but the meas-
ures hold promise for encouraging development over
the longer term.
The many-faceted reform package aims at mak-
ing the South Vietnamese economy more stable and
more nearly self-sufficient although dependent on
US aid for a long time to come. It includes such
specific belt-tightening actions as a devaluation of
the piaster and increased taxes. These measures are
intended eventually to curb the black market, in-
crease revenues, stimulate the country's
almost nonexistent export trade, and attract foreign
investment. Sweeteners in the package include sub-
stantial salary increases for government officials and
soldiers (including a combat bonus), and plans to
increase benefits for veterans and war widows.
The reforms are expected to cause Thieu politi-
cal difficulties for weeks to come. The initial impact
of the package is likely to boost the cost of living an
additional five to ten percent. Indeed, prices began
to rise even before the program was announced.
There was speculation over the approaching devalua-
tion, fears of a US aid cutoff, and concern over the
possibility of rice shortages. These uncertainties still
complicate the economic situation and, combined
with the new reforms, could produce more price
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
agreement has been to head off future East German
chicanery. West Berlin negotiator Mueller has to en
a similar tack. Bonn feels pressed, however oth by
recent East German and Soviet publ' atements
that an agreement can be reached- the end of
November and by the neces o wrap up its Ost-
politik package in ord assure orderly parlia-
mentary ratificatio9jve controversial German-So-
viet and Germa,?iish treaties.
onn enters the fourth round of its discussions
the Czechoslovaks with enhanced hopes of
normalizing relations. Czechoslovak negotiators in
September indicated a willingness to seek a com-
promise to get around the stalemated issue of the
1938 Munich Agreement. Prague presumably may
repared to avoid troublesome issues regarding
pns and legal problems surrounding the
status o
indicated i
mental conce
slovakia's 1937
and affirm the validity of Czecho-
stern borders. In anticipation of a
German movement, a top-level
Czechoslovak - We
East German delegati
to coordinate the nego
traveled to Prague last week
countries toward Bonn and
ng positions of the two
he Sudeten Germans. Bonn has already
ould be willing to meet Prague's funda-
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
SECRET
increases. When inflation was rampant early in 1970,
it brought complaints and protests from nearly all
classes of Vietnamese and contributed to disturb-
ances in a number of cities. Later in the year,
government price stabilization measures proved suc-
cessful and, until recently, inflation has been kept
within tolerable limits.
President Thieu has personally taken a strong
hand in launching the new economic program, and
he is much more closely associated with economic
policy now than in the past. It appears that he is
prepared to accept fairly heavy criticism in coming
days as the price he must pay in order to project an
image of strong leadership and because his advisers
have convinced him that the package is vitally neces-
sary. Thieu may also feel that he is in a position to
deal from strength following the recent election.
Opposition to the new program will probably
be most vocal in the National Assembly, from which
Thieu must obtain cooperation in order to imple-
ment essential features. The leader of the opposition
in the Senate has already roundly condemned the
plan as a "betrayal" of the Vietnamese people and
nearly half of the members of the Lower House
reportedly have expressed some dissatisfaction.
Many legislators are likely to link some of the un-
welcome reforms to the uncertainties over US aid,
and it is possible that there will be anti-American
overtones in their handling of the new decrees.
Thieu's organizers have been hard at work trying to
line up support in the assembly with promises,
threats, and cajolery, however, and are likely to
obtain passage for the essential parts of the reform
package.
,-1ry Seasnn Plans for Cambodia
--SCrathV -se-ZUMMwtde rS."i rnrm?ulating
plans for offensive operations against C mmunis
15-
forces and base areas across tl --C--artf odian border
during the winter mogthsrSZch operations are de-
signed to kee ,-th --Communists off balance and
pre-eT*..-arr cipated military operations in some
parts of South Vietnam. At the present time, there
,are nearly 10,000 South Vietnamese troops in Cam-
"bodia, mostly just across the border from Tay Ninh
Qvince.--During tast-year`s=*y..son H gRaigr).
mork than 20,000 South Vietnamese operated ink
Caml dia.
G eXieral Ngo Dzu is developing plans for
campaig initially directed at enemy base camp -.yin
northeast rn Cambodia near the South Vietna ese
border. T ese highland bases constitute a thr t to
Dzu's fort s. Each winter, the Communist stage
incursions om the bases into Kontum an Pleiku
provinces.
Dzu will ncounter a number of perational
problems in m nting his offensive sine it requires
considerable m bility and aggressi Hess by his
forces. There hate been improveme s, however, in
the performance f some of his r gular units this
year. If Dzu can o anize his thinlspread forces for
an effective assaul against the eemy's border bas-
tions, their over-all ilitary time able in the western
highlands would be 'srupted.
Farther south, mtJtary caution along with po-
litical concerns may i P fl nce South Vietnamese
planning for operations inst Communist units in
Cambodia during the coring dry season. General
Minh, commander of th South Vietnamese forces
that normally would b ed in such operations,
says he would like to a~fcr some of the enemy's
main forces in Cambodia bu that he needs another
division to help pro
Saigon before he ca
three Communist
ct theprovinces surrounding
conduc any wide-ranging op-
a. Minh concerned that the
egiments st= I operating in this
area will try to taje advantage of the withdrawal of
Australian and Tai forces to mo a closer to Saigon.
Though Itinh's concerns are r al, he has a rep-
utation as a .;fiery cautious comma . der and also is
clearly aware.--of the political import nce of protect-
ing Saigon d its environs. There ap arently also is
some rivals between Minh and oth senior com-
manders o. er the disposition of So . h Vietnam's
9th Divisi h , which is now in the delta:Minh would
like to s it moved to support his fo es, but the
local c mander, General Truong, is nxious to
retain a division for expand d o erati ns in the
delta.
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
SECRET
Cambodia: War on- the Doorstep
During the past week, this Communists had
main force infantry regiments closer to Phnom
Penh than any time since the Cambodian war
began. Elements of the Commune Phuoc Long
Front, including headquarters an three regi-
ments, are about 15 miles west of the city and
apparently are responsible for the regent sharp
increase in enemy activity throughout_#he area.
At midweek, the Communists had over-tun gov-
ernment troops in Tuol Leap and were continuing
an almost daily rocketing of Pochentong Airfield.
The government has been forced to div 't
several reserve units and armored elements frog
the Chenla 11 area and throw them into the de --~
fense of Phnom Penh. Several large clearing opera-
are underway along the western and north-
tions
western perimeter of the city in an effort to_
re-establish control and push the Communists out
of rocket range of the capital.
The government apars to be abandoning
its efforts to reopenoute 6 but may try to
maintain its position long the road. Prime Min-
ister Lon Nol has 40clecl the Chenla I I task force
into two separcommands and has assigned
them essential lvI efensive missions.
Duringthe past three weeks, government
forces apparently suffered heavy casualties, per-
haps a5>high as the equivalent of four to six
battaJans. The breakup of the task force will
incr 'use the vulnerability of the troops, but it is
n.% clear whether the Communists, who probably
l5o have taken heavy casualties, are in positi
1ake early advantage of the situation. n-t~
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
SECRET
South Korea: More Economic Growth
Seoul's new economic plan is geared to put
growth on a sounder footing by promoting bal-
anced development rather than keeping the em-
phasis on export expansion. This shift comes in
the face of dramatic changes in the trade policies
of its most important trading partners, the US
and Japan.
Seoul will close out its present economic
plan (1967-71) with one of the most impressive
records among the developing nations. Since the
early 1960s, the economy has grown at an average
real rate of about ten percent annually, and gross
national product reached $8.2 billion last year.
Exports, which had been increasing at the phe-
nomenal rate of some 40 percent annually, were
in the forefront.
There was a more than 13-percent gain in
growth during the first half of this year. An
inflation of ten percent was an undesirable side
effect, however, and it continues to be the object
of considerable popular discontent. Moreover, the
expansion boosted imports, while a slower export
growth of 26 percent, largely the result of the US
west coast dock strike, will probably lead to a
trade deficit in excess of last year's $879-million
shortfall. The Korean won was devalued in June
in an effort to counter these trends.
As in previous years, the trade gap will be
more than offset by an inflow of foreign capital.
A large portion is private US and Japanese capital
attracted by Korea's rapid growth, low labor
costs, political stability, and liberal investment
laws. The pace of the inflow this year appears
faster than in 1970 when US direct investment
and commercial loans totaled $193 million and
Japanese investments were $99 million. While this
capital has provided the fuel for Korea's eco-
nomic achievements, it has been accompanied by
more than $2 billion in external debt. Debt repay-
ments this year will absorb over 30 percent of
export earnings.
To keep the debt manageable, the upcoming
economic plan (1972-76) calls for imports to be
held to a 13-percent annual rise, while exports are
to increase at a reduced, but still impressive, an-
nual rate of about 20 percent. In addition, a
stepped-up anti-inflation policy will try to keep
export prices attractive, thus retaining the trading
advantage gained by the June devaluation. These
measures, combined with an increased effort to
mobilize domestic savings, are expected to stabi-
lize the demand for foreign investment and aid at
about $800 million annually.
Exports will continue to play a key role in
economic development. Korea's exports to the
US, its largest market, will be inhibited by the
surcharge as well as by the recent textile agree-
ment limiting volume, but the impact probably
will not be too great. Low-priced Korean goods
are virtually without competition in the US, and a
probable upgrading in the quality of textiles to be
exported is likely to bring greater earnings. More-
over, the appreciation of the Japanese yen has
improved the position of Korean exporters by
making Korean products less expensive than com-
peting Japanese products in both Japan and other
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
SECK ?l'
The USSR
Plan Nears Adoption
The Central Committee and Supreme Soviet
meet next week to adopt the five-year economic
plan for 1971-75 and next year's plan and budget.
The Central Committee may also make some
changes in the positions of key leaders.
The public proceedings at these sessions will
appear even more pro forma than usual since it was
announced on 17 October that the Politburo had
approved the five-year plan. Its final adoption, al-
though delayed to the end of the plan's first year,
will be a significant achievement for the regime and
for party chief Brezhnev. Controversies among the
leaders and planning complexities prevented a final
and complete version of the 1966-70 plan from ever
being published.
among economic claimants will come to focus on its
interpretation and implementation. For example,
the plan's emphasis on living standards is still con-
troversial, and the Belorussian and Ukrainian first
secretaries, Masherov and Shelest, have sharply and
publicly criticized the attention being devoted to
consumerism.
The Central Committee plenum will provide
the first opportunity to adjust leadership posts since
the election of an inflated Politburo at the congress.
Voronov, who openly clashed with the victors in the
agricultural debate, seems destined to lose his Polit-
buro seat after his loss of the premiership of the
Russian Republic last summer. His successor in the
latter post, Solomentsev, should now move to the
Politburo. Other changes are possible. For example,
the election to the Politburo at the congress of both
top Ukrainian leaders-Shelest and Premier Shcher-
bitsky-was unprecedented and increases the
chances of eventual changes in the status of one or
The Politburo's statement on the five-year plan
highlighted the tasks of improving living standards
and aiding the agricultural sector, themes empha-
sized in the draft directives and at the party congress
earlier in the year. Both programs emerged from
years of controversy and only upon Brezhnev's deci-
sive intervention. Brezhnev finally sided with the
lobby for investment in agriculture in the spring of
1970, a time of high tension among the leadership
when even his position may have been under attack.
The definition of raising living standards as
"the main task" of this and future five-year plans
followed decisions taken by the leadership soon
after Khrushchev's fall and in 1967. The theme
emerged in full form, however, only with publica-
tion of the plan draft directives in February and
Brezhnev's elaborate justification in his speech to
the party congress. Brezhnev's public embrace of the
theme followed the Polish disturbances of December
1970 and coincided with the Soviet peace offensive,
his most ambitious effort at personal image building
to date.
The basic decisions on the plan have apparently
held since early this year, and the authorities have
probably used the interval principally to fill in the
details. Adoption of the plan means that the contest
Luna 19-the unmanned Soviet moon probe-
has been in lunar orbit six weeks. It appears to be
functioning properly. Present evidence suggests that
the probe will remain in orbit around the moon to
conduct further experiments.
Luna 19 was launched from Tyuratam on 28
September and was placed in orbit around the moon
on 2 October. A few days later, the Soviets maneu-
vered the probe into a slightly lower orbit in which
it has remained. Luna 19 was the second Soviet
lunar probe launched this year. The first-Luna
18-crashed while attempting to land on the moon
in early September.
According to TASS, Luna 19 is intended "to
conduct scientific investigations of the moon and
near lunar space from the orbit of an artificial satel-
lite." The statement differs from those given for all
previous lunar probes in stating that Luna 19 will
operate in lunar orbit. Possible amplification of its
mission appeared a few weeks ago in an Izvestiya
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
7~ j1C.C, 1
article that discussed Soviet objectives in lunar ex-
ploration. The article discussed the need for lunar
landings such as Lunokhod, but also stressed the
value of orbital probes to provide information on
the space near the moon, to study lunar gravita-
tional anomalies, and to photograph the moon's
surface.
Thus far, Luna 19 operations seem to support
these indications of an orbital mission.
It is not certain that the activities so far are all
that is intended for Luna 19. TASS announcements
generally understate mission objectives, and the
probe may yet attempt to land, perform some other
experiment, or even return to earth. Luna 19 can
remain in lunar orbit for an extended period because
of the lack of atmospheric drag unless gravitational
irregularities significantly alter the orbit. Another
possibility is that the probe has not functioned
properly and is unable to carry out its primary
mission. As yet, however, there is no firm evidence
to support a further mission or to indicate any
difficulties with the probe.
Soviet military deliveries to In herr?re indica-
tions that the USSR s ep,ping up shipments
of equipmen uba and Algeria. Deliveries to
Eqy roue at a high but reduced level as Mos-
intains its rilit1#lr.r--
SECRET
arrival of a se
mid-November
fighter aircraf
25X1
n increase in the level of military deliveries t
iboard Soviet ships first became evident la ft
I n late
from the U
R, the first indentifie
to Cuba since Septem
and shipment of mi
rings deliveries th
slightly past th
doubtedly is in
some extent mo
tories. The past I
inadequate to acc
Cuba's efforts to
forces.
ed of hardware
ernize its agi
mplish this
An increase in d
under way. At least
arrived in Algeria recen'
with helicopters, medi
boats reportedly were
signed last February est
$100 million. The equip
replace Soviet military
mid-1960s and presum
thus far in 1971 ar
large quantities of
to-air missiles and .
though shipments
est monthly lev
milit
well b
it defen
ighter airc
n October
y deliveries to Egypt
low 1970 levels, when
equipment-surface-
ft-were shipped. Al-
opped to their low-
y 1970,
e iveries in rece mon s pro a y
are supplies in eded to keep the artier large influx
of new equi -gent operating, as II as additions to
and maintera nce of Egypt's armsinventories.F
delivery of
er 1967. The
tary goods in
0. Havana un-
!b replace and to
military inven-
may have been
even in light of
ize of its military
o Algeria also appears
50 MIG-21s on order
he jet fighters, together
bnks, and missile patrol
luded in an agreement
ated to be worth some
gent will be used largely to
rdware supplied in the
ost through attrition.
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
bLUKL 1
France: Another Missile Submarine
France plans to launch its third nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine, Le Foud-
royant, at Cherbourg on 4 December.
Le Foudroyant, scheduled to be operational
in 1974, will be the first French 16-tube nuclear
submarine to carry missiles with thermonuclear
warheads, each with a yield of about one mega-
ton. By then, the first two units, launched in
1967 and 1969, will have entered service I
Le Redoutable, France's first missile sub-
marine, began its final 40-day test cruise late last
month and will start its initial operational patrol
at the end of this year. The second, Le Terrible,
has completed initial sea trials and will began,
operational patrols in late 1972. Each submariner:;
has two 135-man crews. The crews will alternate;
each will be aboard the submarine for a period of
100 days-72 days on patrol and 28 days in port.
The French already have begun construction
of a fourth nuclear submarine, L'Indomptable,
which will enter service about 1975.,.Defense Min-
ister Debre confirmed France's intention to build
a fifth unit when he told the National Assembly
earlier this month that construction material for
it already had been ordered. ./
By the late 1970s, t~e French plan to have
five nuclear submarine carrying a total of 80
missiles
The uclear submarine base at Ile Longue
near Br t, begun in 1967, has been completed.
This b e is able to service most nuclear, missile,
nd siip components of the force. It has two
d docks to facilitate work and to provide
sett; cy in the servicing and movement of the
su arines. Some minor servicing may also be
dnewt the French naval base at Diego-Suarez in
,tRedoutable on first sea trials, July 1969
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
/25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
SECRET
l Tvriclrr~~ivre i;stt Missile Submarines
Dis lacement v ? g~yt~ on `surfa:c d; 9 000 tone submerged
Madagascar, off the east coast of Africa, should
France assign one of the submarines in t area.
Little is known about Fren plans for de-
ployment of their ballistic m' rile nuclear sub-
marines. Earlier intelligent reports, however,
have indicated that two the submarines will
patrol in the Norwegian a and one in the Bav of
Bengal.
Western Europe: New Free TraArrangements
Negotiations will begin soon on range
ments to bring within the framework of the uro-
pean Community those European Free Trad s-
sociation countries that are not applying for II
EC membership-namely Sweden, Switzerlan
Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Iceland. The
agreement to talk was reached by the EC Council
earlier than expected, partly because of the gen-
eral uneasiness in Europe over the direction of US
economic policy. Community views may also
have been crystallized by the US demarche, de-
livered on the eve of the council session on 8
November, warning against any new discrimina-
tion affecting US exports.
The major goal of the EC is the establj
ment over five years of free trade in indu
goods between the enlarged'community a
nonapplicants. An effort is being made t
to a minimum the list of "sensitive" pro
the community will want to exempt
trade. The question of special arran
EC agricultural exports, which coul
titularly harmful to US trade inte
left to the EC Commission to
negotiations. The six nonapplic
not receptive to Dutch, Italia
sures for special deals on
commission is also opposed
h-
rial
the
educe
cts that
rom free
ments for
sts, has been
xplore in the
ts, however, are
and French pres-
riculture, and the
Despite he industrial exceptions and the
likely excl ion of agriculture, the Europeans
maintain )fiat the arrangements will be com-
patible th the GATT rule requiring free-trade
areas to nclude substantially all trade. In so far as
GATT y is violated, the Europeans concede they
must compensate the US for demonstrated injury
s commerce. They increasingly believe, how-
'r, that the impact of the arrangements should
ealt with, following the community's enlarge-
en in general trade negotiations that might
have 'Xie additional objective of a more general
liberali tion of trade among all countries.
The udest protests against the US de-
marche ca : from the European neutrals, par-
ticularly the - wiss and Austrians, who tend to
interpret the S position as a political attack.
They view the f ? e-trade arrangements as the only
way open to the to assure their continued close
ties with Western rope-a view the EC shares.
Denmark and Nor , candidates for full EC
membership, have pa icular reasons for fearing
any new obstacles to t' successful conclusion of
arrangements between eden and the EC. A
setback to Stockholm wot&ld severely strain the
promembership campaigns 'n Norway and Den-
mark. These are based, in pa on assurances that
the larger Scandinavian mark will be preserved
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
. ------
,,._
-1 -_ _.... ~-~. _- ...v r.cnc.i~ iuva 1JLI1Qt Llte]e Iree-Lraue ar-
~''''Copenhagen are already having trouble with rangements should come into force at the same
Rpou.IQosition to membership, time as the community is enlarged, presumably
Malta: re's the Aid Coming From?
Prime. Mini er Mintoff has been promoting
trade and seeki aid recently in Romania,
Poland, and Yugos ia. His travels have provided
him with the opport ity to underscore his claim
to an alternative to settlement with the UK.
Mintoff received his rmest welcome in Ro-
mania, where he probabl was angling for tech-
nicaladvice and assistance 1r Malta's prospective
oil development. Meantime, has continued his
economic talks with Libya an his efforts to get
A Maltese delegation left for T' oli 14
November for talks on economic c ration.
Discussions are expected to include, a g other
things, working conditions for Mal se i Lib a
and possible work for the Mal drydoc .
I n September,
Mintoff plicitly accepted a - ATO cash aid
offer $24 million annually as the basis for a
new fense agreement on the understanding that
prof t aid negotiations with NATO countries
would follow. The initial rfderstanding was that
NATO members woul e expected to give sup-
plemental bilateral d in the form of loans or
technical assist e, but Mintoff has recently
made clear t he expects additional cash grants.
For this r eon, he rejected formal aid offers in
the for of loans from West Germany and
Although the prime minister hopes to get
another $20 million annually to supplement the
$24 million already promised, the allies have thus
far been unwilling to come up with concrete
offers to satisfy that demand. Italy recently of-
nd call Mintoff's bluff, as they are convinced he
fered to increase its contribution to the UK-
NATO package if the US, UK, and West Germany
did likewise. Rome's reluctance to raise its offer
unconditionally is probably an effort to avoid
assuming a leading role in the negotiations. Bonn
believes that it is already carrying its full share of
the burden and is unwilling to take on more.
Moreover, the British would like to hold the line
icial to Malta, although there is some
informatio
On the domestic front, most Maltese appear
ve that Mintoff's East European trip will
uncertain
be beri
to be
also seems f
because of the absence of specific
on what was accomplished. There
be a consensus that an agreement
with the UK
may have to set
entually will be signed. Mintoff
for less than his cash-aid goal,
but it will be diff
knowledge that he
lion annually./-
It for him because it is public
demanding about $44 mil-
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
SECRET
The Arab World
Arafat at Arms Length in Moscow
Once again, fedayeen chieftain Yasir Arafat
has tr'`veled to Moscow to seek direct military
assistan a and more visible recognition. Once
again, h has failed. Arafat and his delegation
official gue\ts of the Soviet Government. They
were largely ' imited to meetings with the Soviet
Committee of olidarity of Afro-Asian Countries
and received mi =mal coverage in Soviet media.
This treatme
attitude toward the
edayeen, who represent a far
greater threat to tl
ments than to Israel:
the visit did not ident
cials who saw the Arab
stability of Arab govern-
The communiques capping
y any of the Soviet offi
For the past several year the Soviet
has been seeking to curry favf r with these o
zations but has remained eluctant to pro
them with direct milita assistance or hea
weapons. Direct aid to a terrorist groups woul
pose problems for t Soviets, who prefer to
work through certa' governments in the area.
Egypt and Syria i particular have insisted that
they act as mid e men in arms deals, and the
Soviets have uiesced. Moreover, the Soviets,
apprehensive about the fedayeen as an uncon-
trolled ele ent in a dangerously unstable situa-
tiori, ha refused to supply the guerrillas, even
indite ly, with anything other than light arms
such as assault rifles and machine guns.
oscow's role as the great
power champion of the rab cause compels the
Kremlin to support Ar s who claim to be ac-
tively fighting on behat of revolutionary causes.
By championing the edayeen, the Soviets align
themselves with a tional liberation movement
that displays the Ind of militant opposition to
Israel so popular n the Arab world. Moscow also
may believe t, t the fedayeen contribute some-
thing to ke ing pressure on the US and Israel to
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
SECRET
with the fedayeen
indirect mil
risk that
Middl
Fabs. Soviet dealings
ar indicate that Moscow
continue to provide them with
assistance without running the
ese arms will cause tensions in the
to reach a flash point.
ever cohesive, the Palestinian feda
nt has been divided even more
us debate among its leaders
acrimon
merits of
talks with
he Palestine Liberation Organ
al organizations, whic
smaller, rad
bring down
that Yasir Ara
Husayn.
g Husayn, have pub
Aside from th
mando units have b
of Syria and Leban
stringent border regu
restricted fedayeen
Those fedayeen u
Army units an
Lebanese Gov
yeen to mas
restrictions,
areas.
Lebano
terme
more'
elves
can no lo
nment, whil
men in the rura
rrounded by Syrian
er move freely. The
allowing the feda-
outh, has imposed
n the commandos
have been so hampere
ures that the fedayeen are
than set up delayed-action
a ?oss the border, and most of th
resence in urban
to Israel from
y Israeli coun-
ble to do little
iscovered and defused by Leb
patrols.
ocket firings
have been
ese Army
The Jordanian-fedayeen talks in Jidda were
suspended last weekend while the principals con-
cerned went to Cairo for the Arab League foreign
ministers' conference. During the recess, lower
ranking delegates were said to be focusing on the
"technical details" of an eventual agreement, in-
cluding the distribution and control of fedayeen
arms, the location of possible guerrilla camps
within Jordan, and the updating of the agree-
ments that governed relations between Amman
and the commandos in the past. There is some
slight optimism that an agreement of sorts can be
worked out. The post-Ramadan holidays may
delay the resumption of formal talks until the last
week of November.
The Arab League foreign ministers meet in
Cairo earlier this week in yet another effort to
"purify the Arab air." The ministers established a
five-nation committee to help settle Arab dif-
ferences before further ministerial meetings, the
debate in the UN, and a possible heads-of-state
conference. Chances for any general success in
this search for unity are marginal, but President
Sadat will at least be able to say he has consulted
his allies on future tactics in dealing with the
Israelis.
The ministers discussed some of the other
factors that have inhibited concerted Arab action
against Israel. There was consideration of new
means of strengthening the so-called eastern
front, for restoring normal relations between all
Arab states, and for continuing the Saudi-Egyp-
tian mediation to end the Jordan-fedayeen dis-
pute. The Iraqis distributed a memorandum on
the situation in the Persian Gulf-they call it the
"Arab" Gulf-andLibya highlighted the impor-
tance of the "pan-Arabization of the battle." A
proposal to consider the status of Arab relations
with West Germany was postponed until the next
meeting of the Arab League Council in March.
The Egyptians appear to have drawn up their
diplomatic battle plan for isolating Israel in the
United Nations.
Egyptians terms may be hard. The authorita-
tive newspaper Al Ahram, amplifying President
SECRET
divisions, the com-
ed by recent actions
amascus has imposed
ons that have effectively
ge to and from Syria.
aining on Syrian soil
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
~IrUKtt
Sadat's speech of 11 November, reported this
week that Egypt now demands a "positive an-
swer" to Ambassador Jarring's February request
for Israel's requirements for a final settlement
before discussions on opening the canal can go
forward. T444.--land, if accurately stated by Al
Air--am, would represent aconsiderable stiffening
of the Egyptian position-.
The Egyptians intend to raise the Middle
East in the General Assembly around the begin-
ning of December. Sadat is expected to send a
personal representative to New York to take
charge of the Egyptian delegation during the
debate. Egypt will ask that the UN require Israel
to clarify its stand regarding implementation of
Security Council Resolution 242 which, in the
Egyptian view, stipulates Israeli withdrawal from
all occupied territories. If Israel, as is likely, re-
jects this ploy, Egypt will call for an arms em-
bargo and economic sanctions against Israel,
among other things. While not binding on mem-
bers, such action by the assembly would further
erode the Israeli diplomatic position.
The Israelis have thus far chosen not to meet
Cairo's maneuvers head on. Instead, Deputy
Premier Allon reminded the press that Israel, in
any case, prefers a comprehensive settlement to
President Sadat's initiative for opening the ca-
nal.
A
month cro`
in an effort
i troops have several times in er-
_th
d over the border into en (Sana)
the regime's overthrow'
adoption of a t
governmentj
Mean-
e ega ion arrived in
to discuss economic
military and security
cooling-of
=the major s
nce of tribal unrest,
n its relations with
oes not appear
h Aden, even if
made available. A
al and economic diffic
its successful offensive ag
55
6a is considering the
P sident Iryani and Prime Minister al-Ay
of Ye An (Sanes) are apparently among th e
taking a and lin toward Aden, even though ey
have been eluctant to risk a confrontation ' thE25X1
past. They re probably being pressed to opt a
more aggre ive position by military fficers
embarrassed the Adeni raids.
w hie a ig -eve
Sana this week, purp
matters. The presencd
personnel on the dele
may raise more vital is
The Sana gov,
money, troubled
and experiencing
the Soviet Uni
tary aid. San
showdown
money we I
own poll
ing ove
nx-
side
wh
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
estroy the,,~an varies of Adeni
-
plier of past mili-
p be ready for a
n, despite its
Ities, is gloat-
pled those
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
SJ XJKJ 1'
CEYLO : The new economic program an-
nounced la week strengthens the leftists in Mrs.
Bandaranaike cabinet. There had been talk by
the Trotskyite a Communist parties of with-
drawing from the go ment, and if they had
done so some of the leftis embers of her own
party might have followed su These elemen
had been concerned that the prog would Jack
"anti-capitalist" measures to co terl f nce
proposals for cutting back Ceylon,'s cost nrelfare
system. The program as announced n es ovi-
for limiting the size of landhold'irgs. The Trot" -*%
skyites and Communists seem r bllified.\
t e program
not only gives t e e tists w at t ey want but will
help to Valken their opponents' economic base
and th ' influence in the government.
The austerity aspects of the program are not
likely to shift enough resources from consump-
tion to investment to bring the economy into
balance and alleviate Ceylon's chronic unemploy-
ment problem. There was some public protest
when the belt-tightening measures were an-
nounced, but Mrs. Bandaranaike quickly moved
to stem this by rescinding the proposed increase
in the price of flour-and by raising the sugar
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
SECRET
Ecuador a d the Tuna Wars
The largest aul of the skipjack tuna season
in waters off Sou America's west coast has been
made by Ecuador, which has netted some 15
fishing boats and $ 0,000 in fines and license
fees. As a result, the has extended the suspen-
sion of military sales til November 1972, and
relations between the t o countries again are
strained.
On 1 November, Foreig
Velasco informed the US amba
dor intended to enforce its regulat
added that if the US retaliated in a
dor would take the issue not onl
OAS, as it did in January, but also be
and any other forum available. An o
protest followed the first seizures, but
jected with the comment that it should
sented to the "deceitful fishermen" of the
can Tuna Association. The matter was disc
dor on 14 November, but there has been
softening in the Ecuadorean position.
President Velasco now is ruling with dicta-
torial powers, and has indicated that h might
postpone or cancel the elections schedul d to be
held in June 1972. Should he so decide he prob-
ably would move early next year befo the elec-
tion campaign is fully under way. Th season for
yellowfin tuna opens on 1 January, d more US
seiners will be operating off the Ec dorean coast
at that time. Their presence coul serve Velasco
well to distract public attention ould he decide
to prolong his term.
The recent controversy ith the US has had
a mixed reaction within to Ecuadorean armed
forces. The US defense at the comments that he
has rarely seen such an ir of confidence among
the senior officers, parti ularly the commanders
"Per pound, they bring a much larger return than fish!"
f the army and navy. They allege that the only
y to get the US to move on a problem such as
thers, however, are unhappy because the
gover ent's policy has complicated the problem
of acq ing new military equipment.
many
officers like the ision of little Ecuador standing
up to the giant U In addition, alternate sources
of military supply e available; some of the tuna
seiners were captur by the navy's newly ac-
quired patrol boats lit in Germany.
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Castro in Chile: Company Manners
Fidel Castro's first week in Chile has rein-
forced early suspicions that the visit would be less
a working trip than an attempt to improve Cas-
tro's image and reduce Cuba's isolation.
Castro has been well behaved and has
avoided the fiery language for which he is noted.
He has gone out of his way to be both cordial and
discreet in all his public pronouncements. He has
indeed gone so far as to moderate temporarily his
attacks on the US.
Castro told one crowd he had never ruled
out elections as an alternative to armed struggle
to gain power. During a two-hour debate with
students at Antofagasta, he said he had not come
to Chile to "teach the subject of revolution and
did not even consider himself an expert on the
subject." On the OAS, Castro reaffirmed his well-
known position of completely rejecting any re-
newal of ties with the organization, although he
did so in a tone of uncharacteristic mildness.
Castro's circumspection slipped a little when
he exhorted Chilean miners to avoid sectarianism
and self-interest. Opposition newspapers and poli-
ticians were quick to criticize this as "objection-
able intrusion," but media treatment in general
has been factual. The orthodox Communist Party
has played an active role in organizing receptions
for Castro
Overt opposition to his presence in Chile has
been limited. A bomb blast near Antofagasta on
12 November, before his scheduled arrival,
knocked out some communications lines and
temporarily disrupted a local television station.
The blast was blamed on a small right-wing ex-
tremist group that has condemned Castro's visit.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
SECRET
The length of Castro's stay in Chile is still
not known. Perhaps it will depend on how well he
lasts. There have been reports that his strenuous
schedule and a severe cold forced him to cancel
one full day's activities. Speculation centers on a
stay of about two weeks.
Chile: The Pace Picks Up
President Allende's constitutional reform bill
has turned out to be sweeping indeed. In addition
to proposing a unicameral legislature with a cur-
tailed capacity to obstruct the executive, the
measure published on 11 November would
broaden the President's already extensive powers,
make important changes in the conservative
Supreme Court, and nationalize key sectors of the
economy now beyond the government's grasp.
Some apparently minor features are tailor-made
to provide the governing' Popular Unity coalition
with new weapons in its quickening effort to con-
solidate political power. One, for instance, would
legalize the formation'of joint electoral slates by
parties that agree on a formal political program.
The breadth of the reforms increases the
chance of congressional opposition, but the bill's
complexity and vagueness may assist Allende in
getting approval of changes that he most wants.
The multiplicity of items included serves both to
placate the demands of his diverse coalition and
leave some room for Allende to maneuver in re-
sponse to political and popular reaction.
The bill will also help to divert attention
from new problems that have risen to complicate
the government's task. Copper workers at the big
Chuquicamata mine hardly waited for Castro to
leave town before they announced their decision
to ignore Allende's personal appeal to scale down
their demands for a 50-percent wage hike. Coali-
tion parties are in a minority position on the
union council at Chuquicamata. , he
On his way home, he apparently
intends to stop briefly in Lima to meet with
President Velasco, at which time Peru's intentions
on bilateral relations with Cuba and an initiative
on Cuba in the OAS may be clarified.
Socialist union leaders who hol balance of
power. The Popular SoCjAP6tf bolted Allende's
Socialist Party sevW4tl
ears ago in a leadership
fight but coo a with the government when it
suits thei rposes. In this case, they know that
it m e crucial to the government to keep
wa }as down and to avert a copper strike, so the
eir cooperation is--stiff.
The escalating struggle to avert government
control over the University of Chile is another
headache. Under the guise of effecting badly
needed reforms at the mushrooming national uni-
versity, its coalition-dominated governing council
is trying to consolidate the numerous autono-
mous units into four divisions that can be
dominated from the center. The university rector,
a political independent with Christian Democratic
ties, is leading the fight against the council. Sev-
eral university sections have been taken over by
antigovernment forces, others have been dis-
rupted by professors' walkouts. Violence may
bring the matter to a boil. Government slates have
been defeated in several student elections re-
cently, which may have encouraged opposition
forces to unify their efforts in the far more im-
portant university issue. The university has a large
role in national life, so victory for the government
would be a key contribution to consolidation of
its political position.
SECRET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
SECRET
Venezuela Seeks Caribbean Leadership
The Caribbean Conference of Foreign Minis-
ters, set for 24-26 November, is the Caldera gov-
ernment's latest and most ambitious effort to
establish Venezuela as the major Caribbean
power. The avowed purpVse of the meeting is to
discuss geographical issues\ffecting the Caribbean
(especially the law of the.-sea), to foster an in-
crease in commercial, cultural, and tourist
exchange, and to examine other topics of mutual
interest. The Venezuelan initiative is meeting a
welter of criticism, with neighbors on all sides less
than willing to regard Venezuela's-.policy as to-
tally benign.
A number of factors have combined to turn
Venezuelan interests northward. These iinclude
the desire of the Christian Democratic admin' tra-
tion to show independence of the previous i v-
ernment's Andean orientation, a surge of assertiv9
nationalism, President Caldera's particular inter-\
est in Haiti, Trinidad-born Foreign Minister =\ pre,
Calvani's paternalistic feeling toward the islands, i
and the obvious significance of the Caribbean in
terms of security and trade potential. Both the
President and Calvani have traveled extensively to
the islands and have hosted island visitors in pur-
suit of increased influence in the area. In pro
posing a foreign ministers conference to de
especially with law of the sea issjies, Venezuela is
attempting to establish itself asleader of a mod-
erate position between the'`00-mile territorial
claims of its continental neighbors and the still
inchoate policies of thg. Central American and
Caribbean countries. Venezuelan officials have
become fairly expert_Jn law of the sea matters
through the extensiv research required in their
bilateral negotiatiois with Colombia over ter-
ritorial disputes.
The roun of criticism provoked by the
Caracas convocation is a gauge of the other Carib-
bean states' suspicion of Venezuela's motives.
These govements have not forgotten Vene-
zuela's re iness to send troops to Trinidad-
Tobago ring disturbances in 1970, and some
may sus ect Venezuela's earlier clandestine insti-
gation jf an insurrection in Guyana as part of its
irrede ist policy there. The Colombians privately
disd n the Caracas meeting as hastily and poorly
ared, and say the lack of a technical raison
re is a telltale of Venezuela's political and
n'V tation, tendered despite the break in relations,
buts- oreign Minister Raymond, while indicating
williness to resume diplomatic exchanges, says
he doe not intend for the Venezuelan chancery
once again to become a base for subversion.
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Nov 71
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200050001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200050001-7
0J )J i. 1
The most serio
the conference has bee
an omission that has stir'
embarrassment raised by
he exclusion of Guyana,
d the sleeping dog of
the border dispute, involvin
five eighths of Guyana. Hype
ensitive to what it
perceives as Venezuelan hostili
its friends to boycott the confere
Guyana asked
are sympathetic but believe their of
better serve Guyanese interests. Seve
sadors have challenged Calvani's decisi
dance will
I ambas-
nore Guyana, but Venezuela officially ho
to ig-
the view that Guyana is an Atlantic, not a Ca
bean state. Several diplomats in Caracas_,Afa-
has no Caribbean coast. Venez
Guyana is in fact a necessity o
application of the 1970 p
which imposes a 12
country's pressin ,,,e
pute. There .-