WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010200020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 30, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
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release Completed
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
30 March 1973
No. 0363/73
Copy N2 43
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I,MMARY. issued every Friday morning by
urgent i ntelliqence, reports and analyzes signif-
the week through noon on Thursday.
Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Directorate of Science and Technology.
ino more comprehensive treatment and there-
CONTENTS (30March 1973)
1 The USSR: Crops; Farm Management;
Emigration
4 Soviet Leaders Hit the Road
5 OAS: Cuba and Other Problems
6 Egypt: All Alone Now
I Turkey: Still Looking
I Vietnam: An April Offensive?
9 Cambodia: The Dust is Settling
10 Laos: Waiting Again
10 China-Japan: Hard Realities
11 Australia: Controls on Mining
12 EC Relations with the US
13 Yugoslavia: Knocking the US
13 Iceland-UK: Ready to Talk
14 Romania: Security Chief Ousted
14 Communism, Italian Style
14 Gold Market Volatile
16 Denmark: Strike
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
16 Uganda: Army Blues
17 Kuwait: A Turn of the Screw
18 Pakistan: More Trouble
19 Yemen - Saudi Arabia: Air Attack
20 Nigeria: Army Politics
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
21 Panama: Search for a Way Out
22 Mexico: Promotion Tour
22 Uruguay: Military Pressure
23 Chile: Socialization Ahead
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed
to the editor of the Weekly Summary, F_
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4 [Prospects are poor for the winter grain crop,
but if the spring sowing drive is successful and if
the weather is good, the Soviets could still harvest
a record grain crop in the fall. Meanwhile, the
Soviet consumer is feeling the effects of last
year's poor crops. There have been sporadic short-
ages of some foods, and rationing has been in-
stituted for selected commodities.'
(The Soviet media now claim that the grain
planted last fall-which usually provides one third
of total grain output-survived the winter in good
condition. Soviet agricultural officials in Moscow
have echoed this line. A US agricultural attache,
during a recent trip through part of the major
winter grain areas, was favorably impressed with
the appearance of the seedlings and saw little
evidence of winterkill.)
i IDespite these optimistic reports, the winter
grain crop may be no better than the poor one of
last year. Last fall, the acreage sown to winter
grain was one fifth less than usual because of dry
soil conditions. Then, severe cold and a lack of
snow cover in January almost certainly caused at
least an average amount of winterkill. The Soviets
plan some measures to make up for these losses,
including a cutback in the winter grain area used
for spring grazing.]
J [The Soviets can overcome the deficit in win-
ter grains by sowing a record acreage to spring
grains. The spring sowing campaign is receiving
special attention in the press this year. A joint
government-party decree pledges that the agri-
cultural sector will receive all the men, machin-
ery, and materials necessary for a successful
effort. Assuming a successful sowing campaign,
normal weather, and average yields, a record crop
of 153 million tons could be harvested this fall-
compared with 134 million tons in 1972..1
qSoviet sources continue to report food short-
ages-including fresh meat-and rationing in some
parts of the country. Embassy officers traveling in
the lower Volga region in late March found a card
Page 1
rationing system in effect for potatoes in Volgo-
grad's state stores; potatoes were available in the
collective farm markets at three to five times state
store prices. In Astrakhan, the officers were told
that potatoes had been rationed during November
and December, but were now available in un-
limited quantities. Butter had also been under a
form of rationing-using a card system-during
the winter, but was now available in limited quan-
tities. Very limited supplies of fresh meat in state
stores were noted in about one third of the pro-
vincial cities visited by embassy officers so far this
year.
;q i-f Local officials may have resorted to ration-
ing in an attempt to eliminate hoarding and level
out supplies. A government spokesman, categori-
cally denied that nationwide rationing was being
introduced. Despite government assurances of
adequate food supplies, signs of unease on the
part of consumers have been observed-longer
lines, larger than usual purchases, and ubiquitous
rumors.]
:' IThe ouster of Matskevich as minister of agri-
culture and the demotion of Politburo member
Polyansky to replace him may have paved the
way for a far-reaching reorganization in the
management of Soviet agriculture.]
(/ [A scheme long opposed by the Ministry of
Agriculture because it would have diluted the
ministry's direct administrative control over the
country's collective farms has now been approved
by the party central committee for trial in the
Moldavian Republic. The scheme gives "elective"
councils authority to manage the collective farms
(kolkhozes) and inter-farm enterprises within
their areas. In essence, the scheme revives the
controversial concept of kolkhoz unions.
' lin a related development, the ministry's
authority over state farms (sovkhozes) is being
questioned. At stake in these controversies is not
just the extent of one ministry's power, but the
larger questions of where to strike the balance
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between central and regional control. From the
point of view of economic management, the
Moldavian experiment veers from the narrow,
departmental approach to administration re re-
sented by the ministry to a more regional onej
Real change will probably be slow in
coming. In fact, the approval of the Moldavian
innovation on a trial basis only suggests that it
will not be quickly introduced in other areas.
Nevertheless, the trend does not bode well for the
political career of the new minister of agriculture.
It now looks as if Polyansky, in addition to his
problems with critically lagging agricultural pro-
duction, may find himself presiding over a shrink-
ing bureaucratic empire.]
r Pressure from regional party and government
officials for the establishment of a separate hier-
archy to supervise the collective farms dogged
Matskevich throughout his two long stints as min-
ister of agriculture. Khrushchev was attracted to
the concept in the late 1950s but bowed to
Matskevich's opposition. Pressure for kolkhoz
unions revived after Khrushchev's ouster when
rapid economic diversification was taking place in
the countryside. Collective farms were increas-
ingly pooling their resources for joint construc-
tion enterprises, canneries, and other agro-indus-
trial ventures that fell outside the purview of the
agriculture ministry. Kolkhoz unions, it was
argued, were needed to fill the growing mana-
gerial void.
The growth of inter-kolkhoz enterprises was
particularly rapid in Moldavia and to a somewhat
lesser extent in the Ukraine. Officials in these two
republics-Brezhnev country politically-were the
strongest advocates of the unions. Brezhnev sup-
ported the idea. Strong opposition to the pro-
posal persisted, however, on a variety of political
as well as economic grounds. Finally in 1969 a
compromise emerged in the form of a powerless
hierarchy of kolkhoz councils, empowered to
serve only in an advisory capacity. The ministry
appeared to have won the day. Matskevich was
named chairman of the central organization, and
the councils on the lower levels were put under
the control of ministry officials.
``% Even so, the ministry was clearly concerned
that the councils could somehow slip out from
under its control, a fear justified this month when
the Moldavian councils were given management
responsibilities. The Moldavian minister of agri-
culture was replaced as chairman of the republic-
level kolkhoz council by a Moldavian deputy
premier, with a district party secretary as first
deputy. The latter appointment increased the
local party's control over the newly strengthened
organization j
The announcement of the central commit-
tee's approval of the Moldavian experiment came
soon after Matskevich went out the ministry door
in February. The close timing, plus the fact that
only two weeks earlier Matskevich had visited
Moldavia to inspect agricultural management
innovations, strongly suggests that the issue of the
kolkhoz councils played a part in his departure]
iiOn 5 March Polyansky was named to replace
Matskevich as chairman of the all-union council
of kolkhozes. Ironically, Polyansky probably had
a hand in arranging the 1969 compromise. As the
first deputy premier supervising state administra-
tion of the entire agricultural sector, he then
probably saw little danger to his position in the
arrangement. Now reduced to ministerial rank, he
may view strong kolkhoz councils with as jaun-
diced an eye as Matskevich did..)
'Pressure for collective farms to be managed
in this way was paralleled by moves to establish a
separate administration for state farms. A minis-
try of state farms was set up in the Ukraine in
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1969. Several other republics followed suit,
specifying that they were forming union-republic
ministries, i.e., these republic ministries were in-
tended to be subordinate to a ministry in Mos-
cow.iFor the time being, these state farm minis-
tries in the republics evidently are under the
jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture.
Certainly Polyansky will fight to keep them there,
but he will have to fight the mounting pressures
for the creation of a separate state farms ministry
at the all-union level.I
)It is not likely to stop there. Last year,
Gosplan First Deputy Chairman Tikhon Sokolov
proposed a broad reorganization of agricultural
management. He complained that it was difficult
for the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and its local
subsidiaries "to lead concretely the complicated
multi-branch kolkhoz-sovkhoz production." He
proposed a new arrangement based on specialized
product administrations, a system of state farms
"from top to bottom," and kolkhoz councils
equipped with administrative powers. He did not
clearly spell out the role of the Ministry of
Agriculture`j
1' ~ln view of the subsequent removal of Mat-
kevich and the decision on the Moldavian exneri-
)0s Since Secretary Shultz' visit in mid-March, as
gradmany ares as OhOave Jews fm the been permitted s towemigrate and nlto
j~ Israel without having to pay the education tax.
Waivers are being given in other areas of the
country as well. Many of the 200 emigrants had
received permission to leave the USSR but had
been unable to pay the tax; some, particularly in
Leningrad, had been unable to obtain exit docu-
ments under any circumstances.]
k `Moscow has been at pains to publicize
abroad the recent shift in emigration policy. Jour-
nalist Viktor Louis, who now and then speaks for
the Soviet authorities, said on 21 March that the
7 education levy will not be canceled but will no
longer be enforced. He attributed the change to
US congressional pressure and stated that those
who wished to leave the Soviet Union for Israel
had scored a victory in their "six-month war"
against the education tax. A Soviet Foreign Min-
istry official acknowledged privately that the
Louis story reflects the "real situation." Western
newsmen in Moscow were invited to watch Jews
being interviewed by emigration officials and
were offered film clips showing persons receiving
exit permits./
ment, Sokolov's proposals begin to take on added J, . frhere is no assurance that the liberalization
weight. It is also possible that Sokolov, an expe- v)ill be permanent. Moscow is almost certainly
rienced party and government official, may him- I"j unwilling to repeal the tax law while under pres-
self be one of those under consideration to fill the sure from abroad to do so. Moreover, the bars to
slot vacated by Polyansky as first deputy premier emigration have been selectively lowered, not
in charge of agriculture. removed. A number of controversial would-be
o-W[Moscow has relaxed its emigration proce-
dures in an effort to ease a major obstacle in
US-Soviet relations. Although the concessions to
date involve practice rather than principle, the
Soviets are anxious to counter US congressional
criticism threatening their bid to attain most-
favored-nation trading status.]
emigrants are still being denied permission to
leave despite the official line that only those
connected with Soviet defense are being refused.
Nevertheless, the Soviets' stake in detente will
make it difficult for them to return to more
restrictive practices even if they attain their objec-
tive of a more favorable trade arrangement with
the US. They can, of course, revert to a tighter
policy should their concessions on the emigration
issue fail to produce the desired effect in Washing-
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USSR: LEADERS HIT THE ROAD
IThe three top Soviet leaders will travel separately to Western Europe
this spring. The first of the trips will take Premier Kosygin to Sweden on
Monday and President Podgorny to Finland on Tuesday; the most significant
will take party boss Brezhnev to West Germany, probably in May.
Kosygin's five-day official visit will be his first to Sweden since July
1968 and completes the series of Scandinavian visits he began with a trip to
Norway and Denmark in late 1971. It complements the frequent Swedish-Soviet
exchanges over the past two years. Kosygin and Prime Minister Palme will
undoubtedly discuss the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, disarm-
ament, environmental concerns, and economic relations. The Swedes plan to raise the
matter of their trade deficit with the USSR, and the Soviets can be expected to
complain that Swedish credits are inadequate.
Podgorny's five-day state visit to Finland will be highlighted by ceremonies on 6
April marking the 25th anniversary of the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The
Finnish-CEMA draft cooperation agreement, initialed in Moscow earlier this month,
may be formally signed. The Finns hope the accord with CEMA will ease Soviet
concerns over the proposed free-trade arrangements between Helsinki and the EC, but
Podgorny is not likely to signal acceptance of the arrangements at this time. A
high-level Soviet party delegation arrived in Helsinki Sunday to confer with Finnish
Communists, presumably to ensure that none of the chronic bickering in the Finnish
party mars the occasion.
When Brezhnev goes to Bonn-the first such visit by a top Soviet political
leader-he may have agreements on cultural, scientific, and technological exchanges to
sign. There is also a strong possibility that Bonn and Moscow will agree to long-term
economic cooperation patterned after the Franco-Soviet model. Bonn will need
reassurance that its links to West Berlin will not be jeopardized by the terms of such
bilateral accords.
eeling is growing in West Germany t at Pan ow is paying only lip service to
injunctions in the accords concerning "humanitarian improvements" in contacts
between the two people. For his part, Brezhnev may try to push the West Germans
toward completing negotiations with Czechoslovakia on a treaty of reconcilia-
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OAS: CUBA AND OTHER PROBLEMS
2S [The third OAS General Assembly that con- thinking of a broadly worded resolution designed
venes in Washington on 4 April will provide an- to gain a "moral victory"-a simple majority. At
other forum for Latin American countries to criti- the same time, other delegations may move to
cize US policies and for some states to assault the avoid a public bloodletting by passing the issue to
organization's Cuban policy. The vocal criticism is the Permanent Council.]
not likely to be translated into specific anti-US
action:l JL9 LCuba, of course, will not be present at the
1 C) [(Most of the bombast against US trade and meeting. The conduct of the Cuban delegation to
aid policies will come during the debate on Secre- the 15th session of the United Nations Economic
tary General Galo Plaza's "review of the system Commission for Latin America in Quito this week
=T"~ of inter-American cooperation for development." made clear Havana's negative attitude toward the
Targets of Latin American criticism will include 3 3 OAS. )The delegation walked out of the meeting
t
ti
i
"
"
pro
ec
on
st trade barriers,
coercive
economic
measures like the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez
amendments, and insufficient sharing of new
technology. J
JThe US can also expect criticism during the
discussion on Venezuelan Foreign Minister
' Calvani's "consideration of the ultimate purpose
and mission of the OAS." The primary debating
theme under this heading will be the Latin Amer-
ican belief that the US exerts excessive influence
in the inter-American system. Under the Calvani
item, the Peruvian delegation is expected to call
for a reorganization of the OAS. The details are
not yet known, but it is probable that Lima will
concentrate its efforts on reducing US voting
power in the Inter-American Development Bank,]
;22 [Although the assembly will provide a forum
for articulating the many problems of the Inter-
American system, it will be unable to come up
with practical solutions. The most likely outcome
is a resolution recognizing the existing problems
and empowering a committee to prepare specific
recom.endations for later assembly consid-
eration
:1 L?
he Venezuelan delegation intends to take
the initiative against the sanctions imposed
against Cuba in 1964 and 1967. Significantly,
(these sanctions resulted from Venezuela's charges
that Cuba was sponsoring subversion in its ter-
ritory. A two-thirds majority (16 votes) is neces-
sary to repeal the sanctions. A vote of this size
probably will not be obtained, so the sponsors are
hall when OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza took
the rostrum and was also absent for the speech of
a high official of the Inter-American Development
Bank, an offspring of the OAS,)
LThe insult to Galo Plaza, who has long
advocated terminating Cuba's suspension from
the OAS, was meant to convey the message that
Havana has no intention of retreating from its
hard-line policy toward that organization. Al-
though the reactivation of Cuba's OAS member-
ship has been a popular line for some Latin Amer-
ican politicians, Havana has made it abundantly
clear that an offer of reinstatement will be re-
jected out of hand. The Castro regime considers
itself the aggrieved party and will not be satisfied
with anything less than the total destruction of
the OAS and its replacement by an organization
that excludes the US.
_) 3 [The latest Cuban spokesman to heap in-
vective on the OAS was Foreign Minister Raul
Roa. In a lecture at the University of Panama,
carried live on the Panamanian Government radio
on 23 March, Roa characterized the OAS as "that
putrid organization which is nothing more than a
soleless shoe that gives off an infectious odor.''" J
ay [[Cuba's attitude probably will have little ef-
fect on the voting on the sanctions question. The 25X1
final vote will probably be close; it might even be
a tie (ten affirmative, ten negative, three absten-
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EGYPT: ALL ALONE NOW
19n26 March, President Sadat pulled another
rabbit out of his hat. In naming himself premier
and governor-general, he probably hopes to give
the impression that dynamic action on Egypt's
many problems will be forthcoming, but no sharp
breaks with the immediate past are expected.1
tSadat judged that the removal of the un-
popular Aziz Sidqi would help deflect the criti-
cism of the government being voiced by many
Egyptians. Sadat may have had to take the job
after he encountered difficulty in finding a suit-
able, or willing, candidate.
!By taking over himself, however, Sadat has
become more directly exposed to_criticism that
was previously absorbed by Sidqi. "~ealization of
this truth was reflected in the President's speech
on 26 March, when he promised that a joint
conference of representatives of the legislature
and part would meet periodically to approve
policies'hereby spreading the responsibility for
potentially unpopular decisions.
)Despite headlines in the Cairo press that the
changes mark a turning point in Cairo's policies,
neither Sadat's speech nor his cabinet overhaul
points toward any dramatic shifts)LSadat de-
''4scribed the current phase as one of "all-out con-
frontation" and repeated familiar phrases about
the coming battle. The US was the target of
lengthy criticism for its policies in the Middle
East. Washington was even said to have mounted
a campaign of psychological warfare designed to
weaken Egypt. Sadat was careful, however, to
leave the door ajar to further diplomacy.3
iSadat's new cabinet appears to be designed
mainly to deal with domestic problems. The 18
new members were apparently selected for their
technical skill as well as for their loyalty to Sadat.
The important posts of war, foreign affairs, and
interior were left in the same hands. Sadat's con-
cern with the poor state of the economy resulted
- in several ministerial changes)aand efforts to alle-
3('aviate problems in other areas were also evident. A
Muslim conservative was given a deputy premier
5")-slot, presumably as a gesture toward that sector
of the population, and a member of the Coptic
minority was appointed minister of state)
y [For his next act, Sadat on 28 March ap-
pointed himself military governor-general. This
was probably meant to provide a legal basis for
the belt-tightening measures he feels are neces-
sary. It may also be intended to strike a militant
chord for the benefit of Arabs who have criticized
his lack of action, as well as to raise apprehension
among Western observers of the Arab-Israeli
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TURKEY: STILL LOOKING
qj Pekin Ariburun, Justice Party member and
presiding officer of the senate, became acting
president on 29 March and will serve until parlia-
ment elects a successor to former president
Cevdet Sunay. There are signs that the military
command, which dislikes Ariburun, may be
getting restless over the political stalemate.]
`% )The next round of voting is scheduled to
begin on 30 March. Eleven ballots have been cast
since the presidential election process began on
13 Marche The recent ballots have been perfunc-
)) tory, reflecting the boycott of parliament by the
major partied
~ j IThis week, a proposed constitutional amend-
ment to extend Sunay's term until 1975 fell by
the wayside. Even though it was supported by the
leadership of the Justice and Republican Peoples
parties and the armed forces, the amendment
failed to secure the needed two-thirds majority in
the senate.jLShortly thereafter, leaders of the
country's three largest parties, looking for a way
out of the impasse, came up with a compromise
candidate-constitutional court chief justice
Muhittin Taylan. This also came to nought when
President Sunay refused to name the jurist to
parliament; the president must be elected from
the ranks of the legislature. Sunay's decision
doubtless reflected the wishes of high military
officers, some of whom are believed to have been
e ommunists are anning an of ensive in
the near future. reports vary widely as
to the scope, in ensi y an timing of the attacks;
most of them peg new action to the completion
of US withdrawal from South Vietnam, and some
make such action contingent on the failure of the
bilateral talks in Paris. Saigon, noting North Viet-
namese infiltration and resupply activity, is taking
these warnings seriously. The Joint General Staff
has ordered field commanders to take all neces-
sary precautions.)
troubled by earlier rulings of the constitutional
court]
1LQ trhe military may not be disposed to permit
'Ariburun to serve as acting president for an ex-
tended period, and already there is hot debate as
to whether he can exercise the full powers of the
office. Ariburun was air force commander at the
time of the May 1960 military coup, but he
declined to join the coup group and subsequently
was held in custody for more than a year. His
wife, once a member of parliament for the now-
disbanded Democratic Party, was imprisoned for
four years and does not yet have full political
rights. The military's dislike of Ariburun was
compounded by his outspoken criticism of the
political actions taken by the military in 1971.
L1/ [The unsuccessful search for a president has
spotlighted the lack of any real consensus in
Turkish politics. At various times in the struggle
to find a new president, each of the various
groups-major parties, minor parties, and the mili-
tary-have been able to veto solutions, and no
one, not even the military, has been able to
muster the kind of voting combination necessary
to choose a president. While the political groups
continue their somewhat aimless search for solu-
tions, the danger arises that the military will re- 25X1
sort to force. The air force has already buzzed
parliament-a device used in the past by the mili-
tary to warn the politicians.
-fin terms of battlefield strength, the Com-
munists clearly have the capability to launch
extensive military action, especially in the north-
ernmost provinces and northwest of Saigon. They
have increased their manpower in South Vietnam
since last fall, they now have as many tanks and
as much artillery in the South as at any time in
the past, and they have even more air defense.
+)' Some increase in military activity, probably
by both sides, appears almost certain during the
next few weeks. There is as yet no firm indication
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that the Communists are planning a major of-
fensive soon, or that Hanoi has reached a final
decision on when and if to use the military op-
tions it has. Along with forecasts of increased
military action
the Communists are emphasizing the im-
portance of the political struggle and playing
down big military operations in briefings to their
cadre.I
{! Jin the northern provinces artillery exchanges
were less intense than in previous weeks and fight-
ing tapered off west of Hue and in the Que Son
Valley. There are reports that the Communists
may make another attempt to capture the coastal
village of Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai Province, but
no such effort appears imminent.)
Saigon - Viet Cong Negotiations
;, 1./ Whe bilateral talks in Paris have never really
gotten off the ground, but in South Vietnam the
government and the Viet Cong have ironed out
4some of their differences about the Two-Party
Joint Military Commission. The political nego-
tiators in Paris have agreed on some agenda
items-discussions of general elections and the
creation of the Council of National Reconcilia-
tion and Concord. Saigon wants to add to the
agenda the question of demobilization of Viet-
namese armed forces, including the withdrawal of
Hanoi's troops; the Viet Cong want to add one on
"democratic liberties" in South Vietnam. Each
side is trying to pin responsibility on the other for
the slow pace of the talks, and both may be
waiting to see what happens when President
Thieu meets with President Nixon next week- I
Lit The two-party military commission was
formally inaugurated on 29 March. The total
strength of each delegation to the commission
will be between 1,200 and 1,500. The question of
how it will be used outside of Saigon is still at
issued
'-~Y 4he deadline for compliance with the presi-
r dential decree on political parties came this week
and left the country with only three legal parties.
Military action this past week was confined9=~ Only one of these, the government's Democracy
t
to ar
illery duels and a few sharp skirmishes near
Communist infiltration routes. Southwest of
Saigon, the Communists were improving their
access routes from the Cambodian border into the
delta. Northwest of Saigon a number of govern-
ment outposts were kept under such heavy pres-
sure that they were unable to keep an eye on
Communist troop and supply movements along
the Saigon River corridor. `1
Party, has gained formal recognition. Two new
independent coalitions-the Freedom Party and
the Social Democratic Alliance-have provisional
status for a year while they try to meet the
decree's membership requirements. If the govern-
ment enforces the decree strictly, several other
parties that have not attempted to co I will
have to dissolve or go underground ~
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25X1
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CAMBODIA: THE DUST IS SETTLING
11(' An uneasy calm prevailed in Phnom Penh
this week in the wake of the government's neu-
tralization of the feeble civilian opposition. The
military establishment, which holds the key to
political power in Cambodia, appears to be taking
the regime's crackdown on the civilians in stride.
'j,
' \'Prince Sihanouk contines to take a hard line
on negotiations. He said again on 23 March that
he would not negotiate with the Lon Nol admin-
istration and that the war will continue until the
US agrees to talk or negotiate directly with his
"govern ment.") J'His message was issued from
Shanghai, where he supposedly arrived on 16
February. He has not been seen in public since his
arrival, and his long seclusion, combined with the
absence of his "prime minister" from a reception
in Peking, has led to speculation that Sihanouk is
in Cambodia. He has often said he intended to
return to the "liberated zone," but the Khmer
insurgents have always recommended against such
a visit on the grounds that the danger was too
great.I
The War Drags On
7 t The Khmer insurgents are keeping up their
attacks against Cambodian positions east of
Phnom Penh along both banks of the Mekong
River. The insurgents hold part of the lower end
of Route 1 between the capital and the govern-
ment base at Neak Luong. The deteriorating secu-
rity situation in this sector has resulted in an
indefinite suspension of vital supply convoys on
the Mekong. Insurgent attacks on 25 March
against government positions northeast of the sea-
port of Kompong Som closed Route 4, over
which Phnom Penh receives many of its military
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CHINA-JAPAN: HARD REALITIES
1Some of the warmth in Sino-Japanese rela- bluntly accused Tokyo of dragging its feet in
tions has given way to a certain coolness stem- modifying political and economic links with
ming from Peking's sensitivities over Taiwan and Taiwan. He charged the Japanese with a desire to
the Soviet Union. Of the two, the latter is prob- continue profiting financially and to use Taiwan
ably more important in Chinese eyes.) -),for leverage against Pekin
LAOS: WAITING AGAIN ('` C J
)With the fighting all but ``halted and the
US prisoner issue out of the way, the Lao
Communists and their mentors in Hanoi ap-
parently feel under little pressure to imple-
ment the other provisions of the Laos agree-
ment. They have not replied to Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma's request for a resumption
of high-level meetings or responded to the
government's draft protocols.
Hanoi may want to delay final set-
tlement in Laos pending further developments
in South Vietnam and Cambodia. In any case
in mid-March, Peking made public what it
had been saying privately for months. It criticized
Tokyo's plans for joint Japanese-Soviet exploita-
tion of oil reserves in Siberia. A high-ranking
Chinese official told Japanese journalists the
Tyumen pipeline project would aid Soviet mili-
tary forces arrayed along China's northern
frontier and would cause "bitter feelings" in
Peking
the North Vietnamese are certainly in no
hurry to set a deadline for the withdrawal of
their forces from Laos, and the Lao Com-
munist leadership may not have decided what
cabinet portfolios to demand and what strat-
egy to pursue in a new coalition government.
Whatever the Communists' motives, there is
ample precedent for stalling and inactivity
when the Lao negotiate. In the 1961-62
negotiations, the two Lao parties took 14
months from the date of the cease-fire to
agree on the composition of a coalition gov-
ernment.
`y .Such difficulties do not mean there has been
a sharp deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties; the
Chinese ambassador arrived in Tokyo this week,
for example. In the economic sphere, trade ap-
pears to be expanding at a fairly rapid rate. On
the Japanese side, the government no longer has
to take into account the strong public sentiment,
so evident last fall, in favor of normalizing ties
with China. The Chinese, for their part, are
acutely sensitive to any signs that Moscow is
improving its position in Tokyo, and they have
probably raised difficulties over the air pact to
show their displeasure over the Tyumen project.
Chinese leverage on Japan is clearly limited, and
Peking is likely ultimately to accept the Japanese
position on this matter with a modicum of good
grace. Nevertheless, concern about Soviet rela-
tions with Japan will not easily be dispelled in
Peking, and the euphoria over Sino-Japanese ties
S'i. Peking may have overreached itself on the
Tyumen issue. Japanese officials have assured the
1 US and the Soviets that Chinese criticism will not
alter Japanese plans Peking's open opposition has
only served to enhance Moscow's political staked
In a project already regarded as economically
important, and the Soviet press was quick to
ridicule the Chinese.~l
, jAlso in mid-March, the Chinese brought the
initial negotiations on a civil aviation agreement
to a deadlock by demanding basic adjustments in
Tokyo's air pact with Taipei~[The trade chief
is robably one for good. ~
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AUSTRALIA: CONTROLS ON MINING (
In response to growing public concern over
foreign control of Australia's mineral resources,
Prime Minister Whitlam has emphasized the need
for more Australian ownership in mining. In the
new Labor government's first official statement
on mining policy, he indicated that the govern-
ment would take a more active role in the indus-
try. This would be achieved primarily through the
controls on mineral exports imposed last month
to help assure that export prices are in line with
world prices. Although Whitlam reiterated the
need for more processing in Australia, he gave no
indication that his government will restrict the
supply of raw materials to major export markets.
Canberra has agreed to press for revaluation
adjustments for those mining companies hurt by
recent currency realignments. This is particularly
important in the firms' contracts with Japan, the
largest buyer of Australian minerals. Iron-ore
producers, who ship 85 percent of their exports
to Japan, face a loss of some $65 million in
profits this year unless their contracts are ad-
justed to reflect the Australian dollar's revalua-
tion. To prevent this situation from recurring,
Canberra is insisting that future contracts be
written in Australian rather than US dollars or
that they provide for adjustments in case of fur-
ther currency realignments.
Canberra apparently intends no major
changes concerning foreign investment, but will
scrutinize investment proposals to assure maxi-
mum long-term benefits for Australia. Whitlam
stressed that the share of foreign ownership of the
mining industry-now 62 percent-must not be
allowed to increase, but he recognized the bene-25X1
fits that Australia has received from resource
development and indicated that constructive
investments from abroad will be welcome
Ore Loading Facilities at Port Hedland
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)i IDifferences on trade and monetary policies
continue to dominate US-EC relations, but there
are hints of future community flexibility on two
issues that have been major irritants: - a riculture
and the so-called "reverse" preferences.
)lThe EC Commission has coupled its pro-
posaTs for modest rises in 1973-74 farm support
prices with a call for less reliance on such sup-
ports and greater use of direct income payments
to farmers in the future. This would reduce the
protectionist effect of the common agricultural
r policy, because lower internal support prices
would discourage production. The Commission's
proposals also seek to stimulate beef production,
~-,gwhich would enlarge the market for US feed
grains. During US-EC consultations last week, the
new community farm commissioner indicated
that in the longer run the community might be
able to offer outside suppliers a guaranteed access
to the EC.f
j~ !The Commission's thinking reflects growing
f
arm program,
concern over the EC s high-cost
which has not noticeably improved the lot of
many farmers despite its heavily protectionist
cast. Changing the program will be a tough and
drawn-out task, however,)tgiven the strong pres-
sure from farm lobbies in many of the member
states. Paris will be particularly wary about any
watering down of the common agricultural poli-
cy's preference for intra-community agricultural
trade?
early date. There is some worry that the legisla-
tion could lead eventually to trade restrictions
rather than liberalization. The concern focuses in
particular on the authority to raise as well as
lower tariffs and on the use of balance of pay-
ments criteria to initiate trade protection meas-
sf~ [The French, who fear any weakening of the ures against individual countries. Moreover, as the
and the Mediterranean, will probably also take
the lead in resisting any loosening of the EC's
preferential access to the markets of those less
developed countries with which the community
has special trade ties. US opposition to these
"reverse" preferences has had some effect on
France's EC partners, and the Commission now
favors both holding such preferences to a mini-
mum and encouraging the less developed coun-
tries in question to offer comparable access to the
US and other third countries.
standards illustrated, the community remains
suspicious about US intentions to use interna-
tional negotiations to attack regional systems like
the EC, which, the community fears, Washington
regards as discriminatory.]
Nevertheless, those in the EC who want to
initiate a dialogue on the US-EC relationship as a
whole seem to be making limited progress. The
latest meeting of EC foreign ministers at least
ip- succeeded in launching a stud of the ossi-
i The community is generally pleased that il'
new'US trade legislation will go to Congress at an
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w JCI,iRC 1
YUGOSLAVIA: KNOCKING THE US
! The recent press campaign against the US
appears designed to divert attention from internal
J problems and to emphasize to the Yugoslavs that
').gthe Westward-leaning foreign policy of the past
several years is being modified. Tito is still inter-
ested in ties with the West, but he wants better
relations with the Soviets in the hope that this
will inhibit them from intervening in the succes-
sion crisis after he departs
j The campaign began early this month. Major
Yugoslav newspapers carried distorted accounts
of allegedly "improper" political questions asked
candidates for a US youth exchange program.
Front, a party-military journal, then charged that
the Voice of America had turned over its broad-
cast facilities to emigre extremists.Osev-
eral Yugoslav officials admitted that the accusa-
tions against the Voice of America were false, but
said the charges were aired because of pressure
from higher up. 3
for the eventual succession crisis. Tito seems con-
fident that the US will not meddle in the succes-
sion; he suspects that the Soviets would, and he
would like to make this as difficult as possible for
Moscow.
ICELAND-UK: READY TO TALK
7'`;' Iceland and the UK last week agreed to
resume ministerial talks aimed at settling the dis-
pute over fishing rights, but have not yet set a
time and place for the talks. An early resolution is
not in sight.]
i,1 )The British have had a naval frigate patrol-
ling just outside Iceland's claimed 50-mile fishing
zone ever since Iceland put its claim into effect
last September. Despite Icelandic provocations,
which have been increased this monthlIthe British
J ')The attacks reflect President Tito's insist-pare reluctant to bring their naval forces into play.
ence that "decadent Western" influences on London says it will use her Majesty's Navy to
Yugoslav youth are a serious threat to socialist protect the British trawlers only as a last resort."'(
morality. The moves are part of the current cam-
paign to clamp down on ideological deviations.
Tito in effect issued a license for propaganda
attacks on the US in a press conference in early
February. He asserted that the US "does not
make an issue" over Belgrade's criticisms. Yugo-
slav editors-still shaken from the purges last
fall-were all too eager to impress party leaders
with their vigilance against Western ideological
inroads.;
7 Tito's insistence on restoring party suprem-
acy and forcing through unpopular economic sta-
bilization measures has increased tensions
throughout the country. He has now reverted to a
usual means of diverting attention from stress by
indulging in propaganda blasts at real or imagined
foreign threats. The US is the target this time
probably because Tito's paramount concern is
mending fences with the Soviets in preparation
f In earlier talks, the British showed some
willingness to make concessions. They were will-
ing to leave aside the legal questions of territorial
fishing rights and to seek agreement on the areas
around Iceland where they might fish and on the
size of the catch. The last round of talks broke
off at the end of November because the Iceland-
ers wanted restrictions more severe than the Brit-
ish could accept. Now, the British might accept
somewhat less favorable terms, and the Icelanders
could show a greater willingness to compromise if
government leaders can get Fisheries Minister
Josefsson to tone down his hard line.)
25X1
'j 'J (Neither side can look to international law
for relief. Iceland has already ignored two rulings
of the International Court of Justice, and current
UN committee deliberations will not culminate in
a conference on Law of the Sea until next year.
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ROMANIA: SECURITY CHIEF OUSTED
The removal of Ion Stanescu as minister of
interior was brought about by problems in the
Romanian security and intelligence apparatus, as
well as his own apparent high-handed approach to
his duties. President Ceausescu, as he has done in
the past, reached down to the county level for a
replacement, elevating Emil Bobu from regional
obscurity to fill this important post. Stanescu
reportedly will be sidelined to a relatively insignif-
icant section in the party central committee. j
!Earlier in the year, Ceausescu had criticized
the Interior Ministry for a number of short-
comings. Ceausescu's annoyance probably
-;stemmed from the ministry's failure to weed out
corrupt officials who worked the black market
and otherwise abused their offices for personal
gain. The reported defection of a deputy interior
minister, Nicolae State, to Switzerland last
December doubtless added to the awkwardness of
Stanescu's position.
- jAs is all but inevitable in matters of this
kind, rumors of Soviet complicity have surfaced.
The rumors suggest that Stanescu was conspiring
against Ceausescu-with Moscow's backing. At
present there is no evidence to support such
speculation in Stanescu's case. "j
' ;Stanescu had been a long-time close associ-
ate of Ceausescu and until recently his career
looked bright. Stanescu's fall may indeed mean-
as the West German incident suggests-that Ceau-
sescu viewed the high-handed Stanescu as a po-
tential challenger to his own authority. F
COMMUNISM, ITALIAN STYLE
IThe secretary-general of the Italian Com-
munist Party, Enrico Berlinguer, is making some
headway in showing that his party is not entirely
under the Soviet thumb. This month in Moscow,
Berlinguer and seven of his colleagues conferred
for two days with a Soviet group headed by party
chief Brezhnev.
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)Over the past several years, the Italian Com-
munists have made overtures toward West Ger-
many's Social Democrats, supported Chancellor
Brandt's Ostpolitik, and called for the abolition
of opposing blocs in Europe. Berlinguer visited
British Labor Party leaders in London in late
February; in addition, the Italian party gives
qualified support to the European Communities
and takes part in the European Parliament. At the
Italian party central committee meeting in Feb-
ruary, Berlinguer summed up his European strat-
egy as "a policy for an autonomous and demo-
cratic Western Europe, neither anti-Soviet nor
anti-American but, on the contrary, based on
friendly relations with the USSR and the US and,
in general, with all countries of the world."yI
y -~, )The Soviets have qualms about Berlinguer's
European strategy. They see it as likely to
strengthen the Italian party's independence of
Moscow and are concerned that it might en-
courage other West European parties to follow
the Italian lead.j
f The joint communique, issued after the
meeting in Moscow, papered over the differences
between the two parties. For example, a reference
to "the harmfulness of all forms of anti-Sovi-
etism" balanced a concession to the Italians on
party autonomy. Pravda published the com-
munique in full with minor word changes on 15
March, but the next day an editorial in the paper
highlighted only those points that Moscow could
view with satisfaction. Moreover, and contrary to
fact, the editorial implied that the Italians had
endorsed the Soviet intervention in Czechoslo-
vakia at an international Communist conference
in 1969. 7
,) IBack in Rome, Berlinguer took the unusual
st~p of contradicting the Pravda editorial on tele-
vision and in the Italian Communist daily
L 'Un i ta. "To tell the truth," he declared,
"Pravda's comments do not reflect the spirit and
SECRET
2same time, he highlighted the communique refer-
f, publicity for standing up to the Soviets. At the
4; Overnight, the Italian party chief won nationwide
the letter of the communique on some points."
ences to the right of each Communist party to
determine its own path and to the principle of
non-interference.?
.24Berlinguer evidently hopes to escape the di-
lemma the Communist leadership has long faced.
He would like to put more distance between his
party and Moscow in order to win greater accept-
ance from non-Communist Italians. At the same 25X1
time, he understands thoroughly that interna-
tional ties are essential to the party's hold on its
GOLD MARKET VOLATILE
' \The price of gold again went over
$90 an ounce this week before falling
back slightly. A recent forecast by a
Y'1 prominent London gold trader that the
price will go beyond $100 an ounce this
year probably was the major factor in the
rise.
~ South
Africa's gold sales since 23 February have
been about 16 metric tons a week, almost
all of its weekly output. Continued uncer-
tainty in monetary markets generally has
resulted in pressure on gold prices, and
this in turn, creates still more uncertainty
in monetary markets.
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UIt will be another week at least until the IThis week, Prime Minister Jorgensen suc-
nafionwide strike that has crippled Denmark since ceeded in restarting negotiations between labor
21 March is resolved\[Popular dissatisfaction with and management. On 27 March the negotiators
the Social Democratic government, however, will announced a new agreement that presumably de-
persist. It was an awareness of this dissatisfaction mands less from employers. The agreement must
that encouraged employers to reject an agreement be submitted to a workers' referendum which
proposed earlier] may take to the end of next weeklin the mean-
7? '-11'time, the employers' federation will' stage a gen-
IThe work stoppage, involving some 260,000 eral session to review the compromise from their
workers, resulted when the employers turned standpoint
down a settlement that would have added as
much as $66 million to payrolls over the next two
years. The employers have resented the govern- jLeft-wing labor elements, as well as some
ment's tendency to favor labor since it came to die-hard employers, probably will oppose the new
power in 1971. They sensed that the government, agreement. The government could impose a settle-
jolted by a recent poll that showed its popularity ment by parliamentary statute if the compromise
at a 20-year low, was in a weak position to (l)'is not accepted, but this would be sure to dis-
intervene against them. Opposition parties were please one side or the other-something the
also stunned by the poll, which indicated signifi- government does not want to do. 25X1
cant support for a newly formed anti-tax party.
President Amin is more concerned than ever
over 'a possible move against him from within his
faction-ridden army. He has tried to reassert his
shaky control over the military)
Last week Amin placed the armed forces on
alert and ordered back to barracks all troops
living in houses abandoned by the Asians expelled L
last year. Amin justified this action by implying
that another invasion from Tanzania was immi-
nent, and this week charged that a 3,500-man
force made up of Tanzanian troops, guerrilla sup-
porters of ex-president Obote, and expelled
Asians was massed on the border for an imminent
attack.
The charges were groundless.
Amin himself 25X1
later toured the border; he announced that the
area was "peaceful and calm" and that he had no
intention of invading Tanzania.)
rf;~ The Ugandan President probably manufac-
ture~the whole episode to keep the military too
busy to carry out any moves against him}/ 25X1
1Jr LAmin may also be concerned about the in-
tentions of senior military officers who are op-
posed to his excesses
Some of these officers are
from tribes at odds with Amin's Kakwa tribe. A
confrontation between Amin and his opponents
in the army could touch off serious tribal fighting
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and lead to a further decline in the security situa-
tion for foreigners, including the approximately
500 Americans still in the country.?
In these unsettled circumstances, further in-
lasio'n scares and border troubles between Uganda
and Tanzania are almost certain; Amin, who must
divert attention from domestic woes, will con-
tinue to exploit the Tanzanian threat.11The Ugan-
`,Odan President has threatened "drastic action"
'against Tanzania if Dar es Salaam does not soon
release or bring to trial about 50 Ugandans ar-
rested in Tanzania for spying. Major clashes be-
tween Uganda and Tanzania are unlikely, but
border incidents are always possible. Uganda
probably has several battalions near the frontier,
and in has rejected a Somalia offer to establish
a peace mission on the border.
(O(J'On 20 March Iraqi troops overran a Kuwaiti
police post, killing two of the defenders and cap-
turing several othersJ[The post is strategically lo-
)t cated overlooking an Iraqi battery defending the
naval base at Umm Qasr. There is little Kuwait
can do to get the Iraqis out, and little help has
been forthcoming from other Arab states.]
iiDD ),'Kuwait had recently been trying to negotiate
a firm demarcation of the border and an end to
the construction by Iraq of a road around Umm
Qasr-the road reaches into Kuwaiti territory. Ku-
waiti attempts to negotiate a halt to this violation
were futile, and this led Kuwait to reinforce the
police post in mid-March. The appearance of the
additional Kuwaitis, in turn, sparked the Iraqi
attack. 1
F~phr An NaSirlyah
st~$
Iraq
Al B.?rai
Border post
occupied by Iraq
I
1 554261 373
Warbah
Iran
-Shaft at
Arab
Ku' ait
Mina'al
Ahmadi
Jlragi concessions, if any, would probably be
designed more to satisfy Arab state mediators
than to reach an amicable solution with Kuwait
Baghdad undoubtedly expects that it can work its
will on Kuwait better in the privacy of a two-
sided negotiation than in the glare of publicity
which would accompany a pan-Arab effort. Iraq
has in mind a larger goal than the acquisition of a
small strip of Kuwaiti territory on the mainland;
Iraq has its eye on the Kuwaiti islands of Al-
Warbah and Bubiyan, which' control the approach
to Umm Qasr from the Persian Gulf/
/C'c'(Kuwait is not strong enough militarily to
fight back. Its 8,000-man army is no match for
Iraq's 90,000-man force, and in this instance Ku-
wait's large oil income used often in the past to
}(DJ Baghdad's interest in maintaining free access j o2buy off Iraqi hostility, is not likely to serveiln
to Umm Qasr makes an easy solution unlikely. fact, the Iraqi attack and its aftermath are forcing
Iraq did agree late last week, following mediation Kuwait to recognize that its generosity in doling
1 f,~ efforts by the Arab League and various Arab out money has bought neither insurance against
states, to withdraw a short distance from the attack from raq nor meaningful help from other
Kuwaiti post. Kuwaiti officials claim, however,le, Arab states4JAII of this spells trouble for Kuwait,
that the Iraqis have not done so, and it is not which faces stiff bargaining with the Iraqis in
clear in any case that Baghdad would allow the which its own options are severel limited.
Kuwaitis to reoccupy the post.]
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PAKISTAN: MORE TROUBLE
[Since the violence at an opposition rally in ,-"ffour provincesJJ Bhutto has an overwhelming
Rawalpindi on 23 March, statements by both the majority in the assembly because of strong back-
government and the opposition have further ing from populous Punjab. A majority of the
diminished the already slim chance for a con- delegates from the two frontier provinces, how-
sensus on the proposed constitution. The opposi- ever, and possibly from Bhutto's home province,
tion is against provisions in the draft which would the Sind, oppose his constitution.1
make it difficult to remove the prime minister-
presumably the present President Bhutto-and IThe opposition is boycotting the constituent
which would limit provincial autonomy.) assembly, and several prominent opposition lead-
ers have drawn an analogy between the present
,i [Nine died, including four workers for Bhut- situation and the events which led to the seces-
to's party, and many more were injured when sion of East Pakistan. The opposition plans to
shooting broke out at the rally, which was called hold more rallies in coming weeks.j,
to reinforce demands for changes in the draft
constitution.1The opposition and the government
blame each other for the outburst. In any case, j, LBhutto has offered to discuss the constitu-
the government clearly expected trouble and did tion with his opponents if they will end the
little to prevent it.0 boycott, and the government has delayed consid-
eration of some controversial provisions. Other-
According to his opponents, the incident in wise, Bhutto has shown no inclination to com-
Rawalpindi provides further evidence that Bhutto promise. The National Assembly continues to
plans to rule by force and impose his constitution approve provisions of the constitution, and
on the country. They claim that the document CIBhutto apparently expects that the threat of
will be invalid unless it is approved by a majority force and his still strong legislative and popular
f th
i
o
e nat
onal assemblymen from each of the support will carry the day.
Tear Gas Explodes at Opposition Rally
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554254 3-73
YEMEN (ADEN) - SAUDI ARABIA:
AIR ATTACK
01
.41
17
)l Saudi Arabia does not intend to take
retaliatory action for the attack last week by
two Adeni MIG-17s on a Saudi Army post at
Nudayah. The attack apparently caused little
~? damage, although some Saudis were injured.)
The Saudis themse ves have
:ne to avoid a direct confrontation with
Aden. Since the Adeni air raid, the Saudis
have augmented their air strength in the
south, and their caution will be tested if Aden
attempts further harassment, which is a dis-
tinct pos ibilit .
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R ~M1des~
Ada Y
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NIGERIA: ARMY POLITICS
fl] [The armed forces top job has been vacant
for some time, and General Gowon's procrastina-
tion in filling it has made his senior officers im-
patient and contributed to a spate of coup ru-
mors. Tribal interests are involved since the lead-
ing contenders are a Yoruba from western Nigeria
and a Hausa-Fulani from the north. In the end,
Gowon should be able to find a compromise that
would alienate neither tribe-1
lit had long been expected that the senior
army officer, Major General Adebayo, a Yoruba,
would be elevated to the vacant post. The delay
apparently stems from competition within the
army and from high-level suspicion about Ade-
bayo's personal loyalty to Gowon,)who comes
If from a small northern tribe.
)Adebayo is being challenqed for the top job
by Major General Hassan Katsina, the army's
ranking member of the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy
that ruled Nigeria from independence until the
military seized power in 1966.
j , JGowon recently took steps to tighten his
personal security, suggesting that he felt threat-
ened by the growing tension among his senior
officers. The army's brigade of guards, including
Gowon's bodyguard, has been expanded, and
some of its commanding officers have been reas-
signed or replaced. Unprecedented protective
measures were taken when Gowon returned from
a state visit to Mali early this month) [Despite
I ?these developments, however, no action is known
to have been taken against officers incriminated
by the recent coup rumors.'(
7 1Gowon is always put to the test when it is
time to shuffle the military hierarchy. In the end,
he may well effect a compromise, possibly by
creating equivalent positions for the generals in-
volved. If he can find the proper formula, the
generals will almost certainly grudgingly accept,
thus reducing tensions and curtailing coup
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- JCl.AnIZ I
ftmpr
PANAMA: SEARCH FOR A WAY OUT
3eneral Torrijos' "consultations with the
people" since the Security Council session ended
have not yet provided any solution to his foreign
policy predicament/
i L21 FThe basic quandary which Torrijos faces is
whether he should in effect abandon efforts to
work out differences with the US and exploit the
willingness of certain countries to back Panama in
international organizations; or whether he should
try to move to what he has termed "face-to-face"
discussions on the major issues separating the two
countries.)
~In deciding whether to pursue the "pres-
sure ' option, Torrijos must take account of the
rapid evaporation of prospects that the vocal sup-
port of Communist and nonaligned countries will
be translated into cash. The mirage of $100 mil-
lion in loans from Libya seems to have grown
fainter as that country evaluates Panama's pos-
sibilities as an ally.]
[At the same time, Torrijos and his advisers
have painted themselves into a bit of a corner
from which the prospect of a quick resumption of
talks with the US looks highly embarrassing. His
"consultations with the people" may be designed
to get him out of this corner.]
jTorrijos was out touring the interior all last
weekend and again at mid-week. His speeches
have reflected his lack of a definite policy, but he
I ' may be merely taking his time to analyze the
results of the meeting. He probably wants some
manifestation of public support before moving
forward with formal negotiations. Torrijos con-
tinues to raise veiled hints of violence, but in a
context suggesting that he wants the decision to
pursue such a course left to him.1
j rTorrijos may be in no real hurry to have the
problem resolved. His foreign policy advisers are
waiting in the wings with a full Third World
program to press upon him, and the longer he
delays a decision, the longer he avoids their solici-
tations. The "consultations" are likely to drag on
for some time, and while they do, Torrijos has
administrative reorganizations in Panama City
with which to distract himself. There is, however,
a real time constraint in the longer run; the tenth
anniversary of the riots in January 1964-from
which Panamanians date the current treat
talks-is only nine months awa
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JCI~r%C:1
MEXICO: PROMOTION TOUR URUGUAY: MILITARY INCREASES PRESSURE
iy fLu is Echeverria, already Mexico's most t 3 1 or the second time within two months, the
traveled president, departed yesterday on a military has rapped the knuckles of civilians who
month-long trip to promote his two favorite have balked at the armed forces' role in govern-
causes: the Third World and the Mexican econ- ment)(The latest warning, ostensibly directed at
omy. Billed in Mexico as a "mission for peace,"(3-i congressional opposition to the military's plans
his journey will take him to Ottawa, London, ,} for economic recovery, was really aimed at
Brussels and Paris. He will go on to Moscow and ,squelching civilian criticism of the armed forces'
Peking, the first Mexican president ever to visit (,control of the executive branch and encroach-
either country.) meat into other areas once reserved for civilians.)
,-? )The trip is another indication that Echever-
ria wants to give Mexico more exposure in the , I Apparently to undermine the little support
international arena and more independence of the politicians have among a largely apathetic
big-power influence. He would like to be accepted public, the warning dwelt on civilian corruption.
as a spokesman for the developing nations and, to! 3`I Among other charges, it accused all but one of
this end, takes the industrialized powers, in-
cluding the US, to task for what he calls their
mistreatment of the underprivileged countries. He
has advanced a "charter of economic rights and
duties," which calls for special treatment for the
poorer nations. It has been received warmly by
some of the developing nations, and Echeverria
hopes to place it before the UN this year. Among
the countries on his trip, only China, intrigued by
the charter's anti-imperialist overtones, has ex-
pressed any fondness for it]
CWhile he hopes the Third World will pay
close attention to what he says on his trip, many
of his remarks will be calculated to please audi-
ences back home. Mexicans, as a rule, expect their
leader to speak bluntly to the great powers.
Echeverria has shown he is quite capable of casti-
gating all the big powers, but many in his audi-
ences will read the US into his preachings.J
7 ]While salesmanship for the underprivileged
will be part of his pitch, Echeverria will be just as
interested in specific economic prizes for Mexico.
In Canada and Western Europe he will try to
attract foreign investment. He will stress that
Mexico welcomes foreign capital that meets its
development needs. In the Communist countries,
he will probably emphasize trade. Mexican trade
delegations have already done some spadework in
China. No fundamental changes in Mexico's trade
patterns are likely to come out of the trip; about
all he can expect are limited trade and cultural
agreements and technological assistance.\
the major political factions of failing to pay off
loans made by the government bank to finance
their 1971 election campaigns. No names were
given, but the lack of strong reaction from polit-
ical circles suggests that the charges were well
founded.
13s' ITo consolidate the miltary's position, Presi-
dent Bordaberry has reaffirmed his support for
the armed forces. He has charged that the top
leaders of the leftist Frente Amplio coalition and
the opposition Blancos have joined together to
try and force his resignation.)
3-1 ~So far, the only major political leader to
answer the military has been Jorge Batlle, of the
Colorado Party. His reply was confined, however,
to the corruption issue and did not touch on the
broader question of the military's involvement in
government. The opposition Blancos have not
commented on either the military's or the Pres-
ident's charges
t ;j )Regardless of how the parties respond, it is
clear that the continued existence of the already
weakened civilian institutions in Uruguay depends
on their acquiescence to the dictates of the gen-
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CHILE: SOCIALIZATION AHEAD (' 1 14~ - 114 2'
President Allende's cabinet reorganization
on 27 March appears to be a stopgap intended to
alleviate dissension in his Popular Unity coalition.
The end of military participation in the cabinet
after less than five months is the most important
aspect of the latest shift. The make-up of the
cabinet is now like it was before three military
ministers were included last fall to help restore
calm after prolonged opposition protests.
The departure of the military is a sop to the
radical wing of Allende's Socialist Party, but the
President did not include leaders of this group in
the new line-up. In line with the election results,
the Socialists still have one more post than the
Communists; Allende added three ministers from
the coalition's miniparties, which now hold six
posts, all out of proportion to their dismal elec-
tion showing. These small parties have proved
useful in giving the government the appearance of
broad support desired by both Allende and the
Communists.
Allende has given the cabinet the task of
enforcing "drastic new policies" to solve his most
urgent problem, the serious deterioration of the
economy. These will include a strong crackdown
on the pervasive black market, tough new con,
trols on business and industry, and probably food
rationing. The president said that the armed
forces will play a leading role in future economic
programs, probably because he knows military
leaders are concerned that the faltering economy
is weakening the country's defense. The armed
forces are less likely to be given any real authority
now that they are out of the cabinet. At the same
time, their continued collaboration at the work-
ing level in transportation and distribution will
facilitate the extension of controls and over-
coming politically bothersome consumer short-
ages.
Since the election, there have also been un-
mistakable signs that Allende has new plans for
strengthening his government's hand in dealing
with education, the media, the church, and the
unions as well as the unorganized bulk of the
Chilean work force. President Allende may also
be preparing a new campaign criticizing the US,
following recent Senate hearings on ITT and talks
with the US that he regarded as unproductive.
On the political front, Allende is trying to
fashion his quarreling coalition into a more co-
herent political force. The Socialists and Com-
munists will be particularly jealous of their
prerogatives, but Allende may be getting some
support for his goal of making the Popular Unity
more broadly representative and more responsive
to his leadership. His plans may appeal more to
the coalition miniparties and to Chileans who
support him than to the Socialist and Communist
parties, which exert conflicting pressures in his
government. In any case, Allende took the results
of the elections on 4 March as a mandate to
continue his program of socialization at all
feasible speed.
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