WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 27, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4
Weekly Summary
DIA review
'completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
Secret
27 July 1973
No. 0380/73
Copy
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 CONTENTS (27July 1973)
of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the L
mended. Its transmission or revelation of its con
1
Searching for a Way
3
Zhiguli, the People's Car
4
A Tale of Two Cities
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
5
Indochina: North Vietnam; Camb
odia
8
China: Early Returns
9
The Soviet Union: Purchases from
US;
12
Crop Forecast; Mars Probe
Spain: Eager to Talk
12
Yugoslavia: Man in the Middle
13
International Money
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WES
HEMISP
TERN
HERE
15 Iran: Buying a Big Stick
15 Fedayeen Terrorism
16 Chile: Some Movement
17 Argentina: Who's Number Two
17 Peru: Not Much of a Holiday
18 Haiti: Fire Fuels Rumors
19 Guyana: After the Election
19 Uruguay: Breathing Space
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes s g t t
developments of the week through noon on Thur4.da. .
uently includes material coordinated with or prepa~E,d
sy the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strater;c
earch, and the Directorate of Science and Technoloq: .
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified informa?in :
affecting the national security of the United Stales, withii-
published separately as Special Reports are listed i?t l- y
~.> .,,,u queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly
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 Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4
Searching for a Way
President Anwar Sadat had a busy, if not
particularly rewarding, week. First, he had to face
down President Muammar Qadhafi and his strange
march on Cairo, and this took a rather sharper
reaction from Egypt than Sadat had hoped would
be necessary. Then he had to face the Egyptian
people on Revolution Day with little to offer in
the way of solid, new accomplishment. So he gave
them standard fare-a diatribe against the US, a
reassurance about the cool relationship with the
USSR, and a few homilies on union with Libya.
In Libya, Qadhafi agreed to return once again to
the presidency, the better to pursue his mystical
search for union with a reluctant Egypt.
2. fSadat opened his address on 23 July with a
strong attack on US actions at the UN in particu-
lar and US Middle East policy in general. Charging
that the US was issuing ultimatums on the sub-
ject, Sadat asserted that Egypt does not quaver at
the prospect of a US veto, and, indeed, the Egyp-
tians seem quite prepared to push the US to a
veto at the Security Council. Sadat went on to
accuse the US of renegin on its earlier support
for UN recommendations.
I his surge of anti-American feeling probably
influenced the tenor of Sadat's remarks on the
USSR~fThe import of his statements was that
Egypt must make the best of what has come to be
a fairly distant relationshipla point made fre-
quE!ntly in Egyptian media in recent weeks.
Sadat's tone was a bit warmer than the tone of
most recent Egyptian commentary; in fact, the
tone was warmer than the state of relations actu-
ally warrants. This warmth probably is the prod-
uct more of unhappiness with the US than of
satisfaction with the Soviets)
I Padat's speech was an admission that the
Egyptians have again reached a dead end in their
search for an acceptable settlement. The speech
was also an acknowledgment that Cairo is only
feeling its way toward its next move. Sadat did
not threaten war, as he did last spring, but spoke
of the longer term and of the need to work out a
policy that will set guidelines for action for years
to come 1
1 fThe attack reflects his frustration over
Cairo's inability to induce movement on a settle-
ment. He tried militant threats last spring and
moved toward moderation in June at the opening
session of the UN debate. Both tactics failed in
their intended aim of inducing the US to press
Israel toward compromise. 7
,, 'Relieved that the Libyan "march on Cairo"
had' ground to a halt, Sadat had little to say about
the proposed merger with Libya except to ad-
monish Tripoli for its rashness. The Egyptian
leader did try to smooth ruffled feathers by em-
phasizing that the substance of any union is far
more important than its constitutional frame-
wo~rk. He called on President Qadhafi to withdraw
SECRET'
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SECRET
his resignation, but with the Libyan leader ob-
viously in mind, he reprimanded those who per-
mit their emotions to outrun their reasonl
I Ladat's remarks were uncompromising and
pointed, but they left the door open to Qadhafi,
who, in fact, withdrew his resignation several
hours later. During a somewhat subdued speech,
Qadhafi told a large crowd of enthusiastic follow-
ers that he would remain in office at least until
the union was formalized. The decision was prob-
ably as tentative as earlier ones and can be re-
versed at any time. Qadhafi spent some time
expounding on his personal feelings and experi-
ences over what he described as 14 years of ten-
sion and strain. Confessing that he, like other
men, is subject to human frailties, he said, "One
gets tired, disgusted, and bored-particularly with
Arab politics'
1 fbespite this dispirited tone, Qadhafi showed
no sign of weakening his position on union. He
was neither antagonistic nor condemnatory to-
ward the Egyptians, with whom he differs on
issues ranging from plans for the battle against
Israel to his own cultural revolution. Qadhafi
noted that the Egyptian Government has been
forced to carry out a number of purges and to
maintain strict security controls on its citizens; he
claimed this offered clear proof that Egyptian
political institutions are ill-prepared to survive
another confrontation with Israel. While expres-
sing his confidence in the Egyptian leadership,
Qadhafi bluntly said that he would not himself
shoulder responsibility for a united state "which
would again be defeated by Israel."]
t fThe outpouring of support for Qadhafi's re-
turn to office has overshadowed, at least for the
moment, any loss of prestige he may have suf-
fered as a result of his trip to Egypt and the
subsequent fiasco of the "march on Cairo." His
return to Tripoli will ease the uncertainty and
turmoil that has plagued Libya for over a month.?
I (Nevertheless, the Libyan leader seemed to be
telli g his people, his colleagues on the Revolu-
tionary Command Council, and the Egyptians
that they will ultimately have to get along with-
out him if his "personal" concept of unity proves
too great an obstacle to union. Qadhafi's motiva-
tions for placing his leadership in the balance
appear to be a mix of deeply held conviction and
political design and are entirely consistent with
his character. Like his Bedouin countrymen,
Qadhafi is a tough bargainer; he is pushing for
concessions from the Egyptians and is not
through using brinksmanship to that end. At the
same time, Qadhafi's deep commitment to Arab
unity is born out of a genuine conviction, which
may yet dictate that he step aside for the sake of
union.
The march on Cairo
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 Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO10400040001-4
ZHIGULI
The People's Car
(we sou*cfs)
The Soviet leadership is ushering in a new
era for the Soviet consumer by permitting private
individuals to purchase most of the Zhigulis-
replicas of the Italian Fiat 124-produced by the
new plant at Tolyatti. More than half of the
500,000 Zhigulis and the 400,000 other Soviet
cars to be built this year will be sold through a
growing network of state-controlled retail outlets.
The decision to build the Tolyatti plant
reversed long-standing Soviet policy of keeping
car output low and set a course toward "auto-
mobilization" of the economy. Until recently, the
USSR had fewer cars than any major industrial
country; the government owned most of the few
cars there were. By 1975, however, the country
will have an estimated 5 million cars, and two
thirds of them will be privately owned. According
to Soviet plans, by 1980 there will be 11 million
cars on the road, 8 million privately held-about
one for every ten families. By that time the
family car-once a Kremlin symbol of the deca-
dent West-will have established its place in Soviet
society.
The high prices of cars and the absence of
credit and deferred payment arrangements pre-
clude ownership by average citizens. The Zhiguli
is priced at 5,500 rubles ($7,400). A Fiat 124
costs about $2,500 in the West. Many well-to-do
families in the USSR can afford such a price, but
not the average worker. Although progress is
being made, there will not be a Zhiguli in every
garage until the government lowers the price,
raises worker income, or offers extended payment
terms.
Availability of cars, however, is not an un-
mixed blessing for the Soviet purchaser. Car
service-already notoriously poor-is getting
harder to find as more new cars hit the road;
private owners have to do much of the repair and
service work themselves. Filling stations are also
difficult to find in many cities and along the
highways. The road system is poorly developed,
resembling the US road network of the 1920s;
traffic snarls are common and the number of
accidents is growing.
Page 3
Retail Market
150,000
300,000
400,000
Official Use
100,000
100,000
100,000
E: