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December 21, 2016
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February 11, 2008
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July 27, 1973
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Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4 Weekly Summary DIA review 'completed. State Dept. review completed Secret Secret 27 July 1973 No. 0380/73 Copy Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4 CONTENTS (27July 1973) of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the L mended. Its transmission or revelation of its con 1 Searching for a Way 3 Zhiguli, the People's Car 4 A Tale of Two Cities EAST ASIA PACIFIC 5 Indochina: North Vietnam; Camb odia 8 China: Early Returns 9 The Soviet Union: Purchases from US; 12 Crop Forecast; Mars Probe Spain: Eager to Talk 12 Yugoslavia: Man in the Middle 13 International Money MIDDLE EAST AFRICA WES HEMISP TERN HERE 15 Iran: Buying a Big Stick 15 Fedayeen Terrorism 16 Chile: Some Movement 17 Argentina: Who's Number Two 17 Peru: Not Much of a Holiday 18 Haiti: Fire Fuels Rumors 19 Guyana: After the Election 19 Uruguay: Breathing Space Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes s g t t developments of the week through noon on Thur4.da. . uently includes material coordinated with or prepa~E,d sy the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strater;c earch, and the Directorate of Science and Technoloq: . Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4 The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified informa?in : affecting the national security of the United Stales, withii- published separately as Special Reports are listed i?t l- y ~.> .,,,u queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4 Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4 Searching for a Way President Anwar Sadat had a busy, if not particularly rewarding, week. First, he had to face down President Muammar Qadhafi and his strange march on Cairo, and this took a rather sharper reaction from Egypt than Sadat had hoped would be necessary. Then he had to face the Egyptian people on Revolution Day with little to offer in the way of solid, new accomplishment. So he gave them standard fare-a diatribe against the US, a reassurance about the cool relationship with the USSR, and a few homilies on union with Libya. In Libya, Qadhafi agreed to return once again to the presidency, the better to pursue his mystical search for union with a reluctant Egypt. 2. fSadat opened his address on 23 July with a strong attack on US actions at the UN in particu- lar and US Middle East policy in general. Charging that the US was issuing ultimatums on the sub- ject, Sadat asserted that Egypt does not quaver at the prospect of a US veto, and, indeed, the Egyp- tians seem quite prepared to push the US to a veto at the Security Council. Sadat went on to accuse the US of renegin on its earlier support for UN recommendations. I his surge of anti-American feeling probably influenced the tenor of Sadat's remarks on the USSR~fThe import of his statements was that Egypt must make the best of what has come to be a fairly distant relationshipla point made fre- quE!ntly in Egyptian media in recent weeks. Sadat's tone was a bit warmer than the tone of most recent Egyptian commentary; in fact, the tone was warmer than the state of relations actu- ally warrants. This warmth probably is the prod- uct more of unhappiness with the US than of satisfaction with the Soviets) I Padat's speech was an admission that the Egyptians have again reached a dead end in their search for an acceptable settlement. The speech was also an acknowledgment that Cairo is only feeling its way toward its next move. Sadat did not threaten war, as he did last spring, but spoke of the longer term and of the need to work out a policy that will set guidelines for action for years to come 1 1 fThe attack reflects his frustration over Cairo's inability to induce movement on a settle- ment. He tried militant threats last spring and moved toward moderation in June at the opening session of the UN debate. Both tactics failed in their intended aim of inducing the US to press Israel toward compromise. 7 ,, 'Relieved that the Libyan "march on Cairo" had' ground to a halt, Sadat had little to say about the proposed merger with Libya except to ad- monish Tripoli for its rashness. The Egyptian leader did try to smooth ruffled feathers by em- phasizing that the substance of any union is far more important than its constitutional frame- wo~rk. He called on President Qadhafi to withdraw SECRET' Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4 Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4 SECRET his resignation, but with the Libyan leader ob- viously in mind, he reprimanded those who per- mit their emotions to outrun their reasonl I Ladat's remarks were uncompromising and pointed, but they left the door open to Qadhafi, who, in fact, withdrew his resignation several hours later. During a somewhat subdued speech, Qadhafi told a large crowd of enthusiastic follow- ers that he would remain in office at least until the union was formalized. The decision was prob- ably as tentative as earlier ones and can be re- versed at any time. Qadhafi spent some time expounding on his personal feelings and experi- ences over what he described as 14 years of ten- sion and strain. Confessing that he, like other men, is subject to human frailties, he said, "One gets tired, disgusted, and bored-particularly with Arab politics' 1 fbespite this dispirited tone, Qadhafi showed no sign of weakening his position on union. He was neither antagonistic nor condemnatory to- ward the Egyptians, with whom he differs on issues ranging from plans for the battle against Israel to his own cultural revolution. Qadhafi noted that the Egyptian Government has been forced to carry out a number of purges and to maintain strict security controls on its citizens; he claimed this offered clear proof that Egyptian political institutions are ill-prepared to survive another confrontation with Israel. While expres- sing his confidence in the Egyptian leadership, Qadhafi bluntly said that he would not himself shoulder responsibility for a united state "which would again be defeated by Israel."] t fThe outpouring of support for Qadhafi's re- turn to office has overshadowed, at least for the moment, any loss of prestige he may have suf- fered as a result of his trip to Egypt and the subsequent fiasco of the "march on Cairo." His return to Tripoli will ease the uncertainty and turmoil that has plagued Libya for over a month.? I (Nevertheless, the Libyan leader seemed to be telli g his people, his colleagues on the Revolu- tionary Command Council, and the Egyptians that they will ultimately have to get along with- out him if his "personal" concept of unity proves too great an obstacle to union. Qadhafi's motiva- tions for placing his leadership in the balance appear to be a mix of deeply held conviction and political design and are entirely consistent with his character. Like his Bedouin countrymen, Qadhafi is a tough bargainer; he is pushing for concessions from the Egyptians and is not through using brinksmanship to that end. At the same time, Qadhafi's deep commitment to Arab unity is born out of a genuine conviction, which may yet dictate that he step aside for the sake of union. The march on Cairo Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400040001-4 Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO10400040001-4 ZHIGULI The People's Car (we sou*cfs) The Soviet leadership is ushering in a new era for the Soviet consumer by permitting private individuals to purchase most of the Zhigulis- replicas of the Italian Fiat 124-produced by the new plant at Tolyatti. More than half of the 500,000 Zhigulis and the 400,000 other Soviet cars to be built this year will be sold through a growing network of state-controlled retail outlets. The decision to build the Tolyatti plant reversed long-standing Soviet policy of keeping car output low and set a course toward "auto- mobilization" of the economy. Until recently, the USSR had fewer cars than any major industrial country; the government owned most of the few cars there were. By 1975, however, the country will have an estimated 5 million cars, and two thirds of them will be privately owned. According to Soviet plans, by 1980 there will be 11 million cars on the road, 8 million privately held-about one for every ten families. By that time the family car-once a Kremlin symbol of the deca- dent West-will have established its place in Soviet society. The high prices of cars and the absence of credit and deferred payment arrangements pre- clude ownership by average citizens. The Zhiguli is priced at 5,500 rubles ($7,400). A Fiat 124 costs about $2,500 in the West. Many well-to-do families in the USSR can afford such a price, but not the average worker. Although progress is being made, there will not be a Zhiguli in every garage until the government lowers the price, raises worker income, or offers extended payment terms. Availability of cars, however, is not an un- mixed blessing for the Soviet purchaser. Car service-already notoriously poor-is getting harder to find as more new cars hit the road; private owners have to do much of the repair and service work themselves. Filling stations are also difficult to find in many cities and along the highways. The road system is poorly developed, resembling the US road network of the 1920s; traffic snarls are common and the number of accidents is growing. Page 3 Retail Market 150,000 300,000 400,000 Official Use 100,000 100,000 100,000 E: