WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 12, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
No. 0028/74
12 July 1974
COPY N2
58
Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
 Aft
Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
CONTENTS (July 12,1974)
1 After the Summit: Europe and Moscow
3 Canada: A Comfortable Majority
4 Cuba: Castro Ready to Talk
5 China: Governing From The Clinic
urrent Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
fes material coordinated with or prepared by
is of the week through noon on Thursday. it
Research, the Office of Strategic
tEKLY 5U",, MA Y, issued every Friday morning by
ed separately as Special Reports are listed in the
reguirtnu more Comprehensive treatment and therefore
25X1
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
7 Laos: The Demise O "he ssem
8 Cambodia: An Olive Branch
9 Thailand: A Forceful Approach
10 Western Europe: Plane Shopping
12 United Kingdom: EC Renegotiation
13 Portugal: Cabinet Shake-up
14 Italy: Austerity Begins
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
15 Iraq: Kurdish War Grinds On
16 Ethiopia: Keeping Things Moving
17 Lebanon: Seeking Security
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
18 Argentina: Outwardly Calm
19 Venezuela: Against the Critics
20 Mexico: President's Southern Trip
20 Bolivia: Banzer Gives In
Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
SLUKL I
After The Summit
WESTERN EUROPE REASSURED
U [The West European allies seem satisfied with
the results of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit and are
delighted with the detailed briefings they received
both before and after it. The summit was
regarded as a test of the greater consultation
pledged in the recently signed Atlantic Declara-
tion-7
'1. [Press commentary in Western Europe wel-
c%med the agreements limiting underground nu-
clear testing and deployment of ABMs. While there
was some regret about the limited nature of the
curbs on strategic arms, there was general agree-
ment that detente had reached the point where
dramatic developments could not be expected.
Much of the commentary, in fact, expressed relief
that the results were relatively meager in some
areas. Before the summit, the fear had been
widely voiced that the US might make deals with
the Soviets-especially on the European security
conference and the force reduction talks-without
taking European interests into account./
` FOnly the passage on the European security
conference in the summit communique threat-
ened to dampen the satisfaction of the Euro-
peans. They felt that this leaned too far in the
direction of Soviet interests by seeming to en-
dorse the progress of the conference and by
coming close to agreeing that the conference's
final stage could be held at the summit level.
lAt the NATO ministerial in Ottawa last
June, the US and the West Europeans had agreed
to a far less forthcoming description of the con-
ference's status and prospects. Moreover, the EC
foreign ministers recently deplored the lack of
progress at the conference and concluded that no
decision could be made about the level of the
final stage until the results of the present stage are
known. The West Europeans believe that the best
way to break the deadlock at the conference is to
stand fast until Soviet concessions are made,
especially in the area of the freer movement of
people and ideas.
ti ISome dissatisfaction with the summit
communique was also expressed by Western dele-
gations at the security conference itself. They
were particularly sensitive to the fact that the
communique used traditional Soviet language in
referring to a summit-level conclusion of the
conference. Their resentment deepened as Eastern
delegates began using the communique to argue
against a summer recess so that the conference
could conclude speedily at the summit.]
I~ In Brussels, Secretary Kissinger was able to
pers ade most of the allies that the US had not
31given in to the Soviets on security conference
issues. His explanation, according to one report,
4 prevented some of the West Europeans from
delivering critical statements in the North Atlan-
tic Council. In Bonn, Kissinger's conversations
may have helped put the West Germans-the most
intransigent of the allies at the conference-in a
mood to make compromises. The secretary and
Chancellor Schmidt reportedly agreed that the
security conference's problems could be solved,
and that the final stage could be held-possibly at
the summit level-by the end of the year]
3 [The allies found little to object to in the
summit communique's expression of support for
the Vienna force reduction negotiations. They are
not at all distressed that force reductions were
apparently not discussed in detail at the summit
because they think NATO should hold fast to its
proposal for the time being and offer the Warsaw
Pact only limited hints of flexibility.]
JWest German Foreign Minister Genscher
%summed up the European view of the consulta-
q tions surrounding the summit when he said that
they were "in accordance with the letter and
spirit of the Atlantic Declaration" and had been
"fully satisfactory and proof of the revival of the
Atlantic alliance." The allies realize, however,
that these consultations are only a step toward
more regular and detailed consultations between
the US and Western Europe. Until that elusive
goal is reached, the West Europeans will continue
to be uneasy-as they were during this
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jul 12, 74
Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
 Aft
Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
SECRET
summit-about the possibility of bilateral US-
Soviet agreements.]
MOSCOW EMPHASIZES ACHIEVEMENTS
fl he Soviets are haying that the recently con-
cluded Moscow summit was "a major new contri-
bution" to improving US-Soviet relations,
despite the absence of "sensational develop-
ments." The Soviets have also suggested, however,
that more might have been accomplished, par-
ticularly in the arms control area, had it not been
for the constraints on the President resulting from
Watergate and the continued truculence of the
Pentagon.
At the US Independence Day reception in
Moscow, several Soviet guests professed to believe
that more might have been achieved in the arms
control area had not domestic difficulties limited
the President's freedom to negotiate such
sensitive national security problems. With the
exception of an insinuation along these lines by
Brezhnev during the course of the summit, how-
ever, the Soviets have studiously avoided such
linkage in public.
Over the past week, the Soviets continued to
give heavy news coverage to the results of the
summit, playing up the salutary effect of regular
exchanges between the leaders and emphasizing
the breadth of support for detente in the US.
Pravda called the summit a "milestone" in the
history of US-Soviet relations. Other news com-
mentaries, drawing on Brezhnev's statement to
the press on June 28, characterized President
Nixon's visit as a further demonstration of the
resolve of both sides to maintain the course laid
out in various documents and decisions over the
past few years. Soviet propagandists have taken
the line that the importance of the Moscow meet-
ing stemmed not from the number of agreements
signed, but from the evident intention of both
sides to maintain the momentum of improving
relations,
The President with Soviet leaders Podgorny, Brezhnev, and Kosygin
SECRET
Paae 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jul 12, 74
Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800160002-6
Jtumt= I %NWI
Canada: A Comfortable Majority
a FThe victory of Prime Minister Trudeau's
Liberals in the July 8 elections gives the party an
unexpected majority in the 264-member House of
Commons]
The strong Liberal showing contrasted with
poll!; that indicated throughout the campaign that
the electorate would not return a majority admin-
ft istration. The Liberals gained chiefly in the swing
province of Ontario, where they picked up 19
seats. They also gained several seats in the Atlan-
tic provinces, Quebec, and British Columbia
October 1972 July 1974
Liberals 109 141
Progressive Conservatives 107 95
New Democrats 31 16
Social Credit 15 11
Independents 2 1
future, however, because their high cost would
threaten any efforts to counter inflation
The win is a personal victory for Trudeau,
whose perfunctory 1972 campaign contributed
greatly to the Liberal setback that year. This
time, the Prime Minister adopted an aggressive,
highly visible style that was more convincing to
the voters. Mrs. Trudeau, who previously guarded
her private life and shunned political activity,
campaigned actively and no doubt helped her
husband regain some of his popularity.?
10 rA majority Liberal government without pres-
sure from the nationalist-minded New Democrats,
who held the balance of power in the last Parlia-
ment, might be less influenced by the "Canada
first" approach that frequently surfaced during
the term of the minority Trudeau government.
The current policy of trying to lessen Canada's
dependence on the US,-,however, will still have
strong bipartisan support