Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 30, 1999
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 1, 1955
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9.pdf2.12 MB
Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A00030001.0003-9 NT1AL , Copy No.._ GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW CIA/RR-MR-48 December 1955 DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^ 1 DECLASSIFIED 61 tgl CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: H M1, DAT~ REVIEWER: 372044 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS CONFiDENTL" 7 07 0 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04/17: DP79-01005A000300010003-9 S-E -E-T GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW CIA/RR MR-48 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 S-E-C -R -E -T CONTENTS The Pathet Lao Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Gulf of Aqaba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Status of the Free Territory of Trieste . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Province of West Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 New Chart of Stations in Antarctica for the International Geophysical Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Antarctic Aerial Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 New Bulgarian Railroad Map and Timetable. . . . . . . . . . . 35 A New Agricultural Geography of Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Atlas General du Congo et Ruanda-Urundi . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Following Page Laos : Pathet Lao Area (25018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Israel (13890) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Province of West Pakistan: Administrative Divisions (October 1955) (25076) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 *The individual classification of each article in this Review is given at the end of the article. roved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 THE PATHET LAO AREA Introduction The Kingdom of Laos, with its long northwest-southeast extent, has served as a shield protecting pro-Western Thailand from Communist China and North Vietnam. In 1954 the unity of this buffer kingdom was rent as a result of a provision of the Geneva Conference, which granted temporary regroupment areas to the Communist Pathet Lao move- ment in the two northern Laotian provinces of Phong Saly and Houa Phan (Figure 1).* Possession of these provinces was to be strictly temporary, pending a general political settlement to be effected in 1955 through nationwide elections. Pathet Lao leaders, however, now claim exclusive jurisdiction over the provinces, and all attempts of the Laotian Government to reassert its authority are branded as "attacks" and "violations." On the other hand, attacks of the Vietminh-trained Pathet Lao troops against the Government occur almost daily. In the Muong Peun area of Houa Phan the situation has been described as "critical" by the American Army Attache at Vientiane. Inconclusive negotiations have been underway since January. The cease- fire agreement of 9 March 1955, as well as the recent (10 October 1955) truce providing that neither side shall reinforce its military strength in the area, has been ineffective. If the present stalemate *According to the U.S. Board on Geographic Names, the correct name for the province is Houa Phan and that for the town is Sam Neua, al- though Sam Neua has been popularly used as the provincial name. Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 S-E-C-R-E-T Figure 1. The main street of Sam Neua in you Phan, 1953. Figure 2. the Nam Northward view of the rugged mountains between you and the tags-Vietnam boundary. terrace farming is more in evidence than the prevailing area slash-and-burn method. -2 -- S-- C-R-E-T roved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 in negotiations continues, the Royal Laotian Government will undoubt- edly exclude the two provinces of Phong Saly and Houa Phan from the nationwide elections scheduled for 25 December of this year. Complete domination of the provinces by the Pathets would create two extensions of Communist-controlled territory contiguous with the western border of the Communist Tai-Meo Autonomous Zone. These two extensions, like Scylla and Charybdis, would lie abreast the main route between Luang Prabang and western North Vietnam -- the depres- sion which extends along the Nam Hou (river) to the Plain of Dien Bien Phu, the ill-fated French fortress in the Tai-Meo Autonomous Zone. Since Phong Sally is bordered on the north by China, the situation is especially ominous, representing a further physical consolidation of Communist-controlled territory. Control of Phong Saly would also be a definite psychological gain for the Reds because it would certainly enhance the value of Communist propaganda directed toward Thailand from nearby Ch'e-li, capital of the Tai Autonomous District in southern Yunnan. In Ch'e-li, the Communist leader Pridi Phanomyong could point to Phong Saly as one more step toward the eventual goal -- the taking over of all Thailand by a "Peoples' Regime." Terrain Phong Saly and Houa Than are part of the great massif between the Red River and the Mekong. These mountains form a barrier that makes travel difficult and, to a large extent, isolates the area. 5A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04117 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 The elevation of the mountains averages between 3,000 and 6,000 feet, but individual crests rise above the surrounding ridges. Although the predominant trend is northwest-southeast, ridges and spurs extend out in all directions, creating a confused terrain pattern (Figure 2). In many places the extreme dissection of the mountains is con- cealed by the mantle of dense subtropical rain forest that covers most of the slopes. The steep slopes are dotted with agricultural clearings that have been abandoned by the mountain tribes and allowed to revert to a second growth of more open forest. The narrow mountain valleys are often deep, almost impassable gorges. The lower slopes of the steep valleys of the major streams are commonly covered with open forest interspersed with areas of grassland. Small plains areas at the mouths of major tributaries and occasionally at higher eleva- tions near the headwaters of streams are prized as natural sites for settlement by some of the ethnic groups of the area. Climate Day-to-day existence in northern Laos is geared to the seasonal cycle of the monsoonal climate, in which the rainy summer and dry winter are separated by shorter transitional seasons. The rainy season extends from the middle of May to the end of August. Of the 65.9 inches of rainfall received annually at Phong Saly, 45.8 inches fall during the period from May to September. During their first invasion of Laos in the spring of 1953, the Communist Vietminh were reportedly forced to retreat when they had almost reached the gates Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 of Luang Prabang. Because of the heavy rains, their thousands of supply coolies had been bogged down in mud along the jungle trails, leaving front-line troops without rice supplies. The transitional period during September and October is followed by cool, dry weather that continues until February. During this season the days are gen- erally sunny, with cloudless skies, but early-morning fog is common in the mountain valleys. The spring transitional season, lasting from March into May, is characterized by hot days and fairly frequent storms, forerunners of the summer rains. Temperature data for the Pathet Lao area are not available, but the April mean daily maximum and the January mean daily minimum temperatures for nearby Luang Prabang, at an elevation of 942 feet, are 96?F and 56oF, respectively. Temperatures in the mountain areas are generally about 30 lower for each 1,000 feet of elevation. Transportation In mountainous country, where travel by path and trail is diffi- cult'and tedious, river travel is the "easy way," even though it is often periled by rapids. As might be expected, trade to some extent "flows with the current," and foreign ideologies from the more advanced lowlands may be carried back upstream. It is therefore significant that, although the rivers of Phong Saly flow toward Luang Prabang (traditional residence of the King) and into the Mekong River, the rivers of Houa Phan flow southeastward through the central part of Communist Vietnam to the Gulf of Tonkin. Such orientation might well pprove 00/04/17 IA-RDP79-01005A00030001 0003-9 have its effect on the loyalties of the many Houa Phan villages, isolated as they are from Luang Prabang. From 1893 to 1905, part of Houa Phan actually was governed by Annam. In Phong Saly, the Nam Hou, which joins the Mekong River about 18 miles above Luang Prabang, is the chief riverine artery. Fairly large pirogues (native dugout canoes) navigate the river at all seasons for some 150 miles upstream. Except when the river is in highest flood stage, small pirogues able to carry a payload of 660 pounds can reach Hat Sa, the river port of Phong Saly. On the Nam Hou the flood stage or high-water period lasts from May to September, and low water prevails between December and March. The volume of water may be 20 to 30 times greater at high water than at low water, and its turbulence often makes navigation impossible for small boats. In Houa Phan the two main navigable rivers are the Song Ca and the Song Ma. Junxs can ascend the Song Ca only as far as Cua Rao in North Vietnam, but pirogues can continue through numerous rapids to the vicinity of Muong Peun, within 30 miles of the river's source. The Song Ma is navigable for an unknown distance by pirogues, but they must make their way through many rapids. The high-water stage lasts from August to December on the Song Ca and from July to October on the Song Ma. Low-water stage extends from January to June on the Song Ca and from January to March on the Song Ma. Transportation by land in this undeveloped mountainous area is largely along trails, by pack animal and coolie. The major trails Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : and connecting roads are indicated on the accompanying map, No. 25018. Most of the trails are ephemeral; landslides may block them and flash floods may wash out one or more of the primitive bridges along their courses. Thus, a road that is usable today may be out of commission tomorrow. Trails commonly avoid the major stream valleys, which are too deep and narrow for easy passage, and instead follow the ridges or the valleys of smaller tributaries. In isolated areas such as Phong Saly and Houa Phan, air trans- port would be a logical method of maintaining contact with the outside world, but the rugged terrain limits the development of airfields. The airfield 2 miles east of Sam Neua, which has a grass cover over a base of gravel and rolled earth, will accommodate C-47 type planes in the dry season (Figure 3). Most of the other fields -- such as those at Phong Saly, Sam Teu (20?02'N-101+?38'E), Sop Hao (20?34'N- 104?27'E), and Nong Khang (20o371N-104004+'E) -- are usable only during the dry season and can accommodate only light planes. The mountains that surround the fields make approach and takeoff hazardous. People Of the estimated 1,300,000 population in Laos, more than 100,000 live in the provinces of Phong Saly (1.6,200) and Houa Phan (63,300). The population is a veritable mosaic of ethnic groups, subgroups, and tribes. In general, however, the people may be divided into three major ethnolinguistic groups -- Tai, Indonesian, and Sino-Tibetan. pprove Centuries ago the Tai moved southward out of China. In Laos today, they include a large group of Laotian Tai and small groups of so-called Tribal Tai. The latter differ from the Lao Tai in minor dialectical variations and in their places of origin or historical affiliations in China. In general, they are less literate than the Figure 3. This airstrip under construction in a narrow valley outside the town of Sam Neua will accommodate C-47 type transport planes. Lao Tai and occupy subordinate positions politically and commercially. Ethnically the Lao Tai are identical with the great group of Laos in northern Thailand, and contact between the two groups of Laos is maintained to some extent through trade and migration across the border. Tribal Tai in the Pathet-Lao area are chiefly the Red Tai (Tai Deng), White Tai (Tai Khao), Black Tai (Tai Dam) -- named for the color of the women's clothes -- and the Lu. The first three Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-0 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 speak closely related dialects and are collectively called Phu Tai. The Lu speak a dialect showing Burmese and Chinese influences. Reportedly, almost all of the Tai dialects are mutually intelligible. In the Pathet Lao area the Lao Tai are found chiefly in a belt extending northward along the banks of the Nam Hou, and the Phu Tai (Red, White, and Black) in southern and western Houa Phan and along its northern border. The Lu occupy a wedgelike area extending south- ward from the northern border of Phong Saly, as well as isolated areas in the west-central part of the province. The villages of the Lao Tai are in valleys and on gentle slopes; those of the Tribal Tai are usually at low altitudes, but occasionally they may be found at elevations as high as 1,000 feet. The Indonesian group consists of the Kha,* a name loosely applied to any of the primitive mountain peoples who are not distinctly of the Meo tribe. They speak a Mon-Khmer language, which has many dia- lectical variations between villages. Where the Kha are in contact with the Tai, Laotian Tai words have been borrowed. The Kha are found throughout large areas of west-central Houa Phan and throughout the southern half of Phong Saly. Traditionally, they have been manual laborers for the more advanced Laotians. Kha villages are generally found at elevations of about 3,000 feet. *"Kha" is the Laotian word for "savage," and its use is resented by the people. The Laotian term "Puteng," meaning "men of the up- lands," is used by the Kha people in referring to themselves. Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 The Sino-Tibetan group consists of the Meo (Miao) and the Lolos. The Meo (Figure 4+), like the Tai, are divided into a number of tribes, each having an individual costume for the women, which gives rise to the names White, Black, Red, and Flowery Meo. The Meo speak a Figure 4. People of a Meo tribe. language of the Miao-Yao-Pateng stock. Although they have no writ- ten language, they place great value on their oral literature -- chants, songs, and narrative poems. Small groups of Meo are found in the western and southwestern parts of both Phong Saly and Houa roved For Rele Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-0 00030001 OUM_-s Phan. In the northeast and southeast of Houa Phan, relatively large areas -- extensions of the Meo stronghold in Xieng Khouang -- are occupied by Meo. The Meo are mountaineers, and their villages are rarely located at levels below 3,000 feet. The Lolo, known as Ho in Laos, speak a language that differs dialectically from that of the Lolo in Yunnan. Today, many of the Ho speak a Tai dialect, which has become the lingua franca of the hills. They are concentrated largely in an area in north-central Phong Saly. Southwest of the town of Phong Saly are the related Akha (Kho) tribes. The villages of the Ho and Akha are generally at altitudes ranging from 3,000 to 4,500 feet, often displacing Meo villages in the lower areas. Economy The economic importance of the Pathet Lao area is negligible, even in the primitive Laotian economy. The agricultural subsistence economy of the mountain tribes is based on a slash-and-burn practice called "ray." The forest is cleared and burned, and crops such as maize, dry mountain rice, tobacco, indigo, squash, cucumbers, taro, bananas, and sweet potatoes are raised for a few years. The Meo, in particular, raise poppies for opium, chiefly as a trade commodity. When the fertility of the soil is exhausted, the tribe moves to a new location and repeats the slash-and-burn technique. Some livestock are raised by all tribes, but the poorer tribes reserve such animals ease 5514000300010003-9 for religious ceremonial sacrifice and obtain most of their meat supply by hunting. The lowland Lao bases his economy on rice, which is grown under irrigation in the valleys or on the terraced lower slopes. Total rice production in 1952 was 31,100 tons in Houa Phan and 21,1+50 tons in Phong Saly. The total of 52,850 tons represents about 10 percent of the total Laotian harvest. Mineral production is negligible, but there are some deposits of lead, zinc, and pyrites in Houa Phan and of salt, gypsum, copper, coal, iron ore, antimony, and gold in Phong Saly. In the latter province, only salt, gypsum, and copper are present in commercial quantities. Attitudes The prejudices of the tribes of the Pathet Lao area are many. From the standpoint of their possible effect upon loyalties toward Luang Prabang, some of these prejudices are of particular interest at this time. The Laotian Tai have a traditional dislike for the Vietnamese. Undoubtedly the 1953 invasion by the Vietminh intensi- fied this feeling. This dislike is probably shared by some of the Tribal Tai. As recently as the spring of 1954, a large group of Red Tai on the southeastern border of Houa Phan cooperated with the French in guerrilla warfare against the Vietminh. On the other side is the possible effect on the Tribal Tai of propaganda from the Vietminh- sponsored Tai-Meo Autonomous Zone in nearby North Vietnam. To the freedom-loving Tai mountaineers, disillusionment should come quickly. Approved For Release 2000/04/1 Among the widely spread Kha, who have served as corvees (forced laborers) on the lowland Laotian ricelands, there is often a strong feeling of resentment against the Laotians, which the Communists can be expected to exploit as a divisive medium. The Meo tribes, tradi- tionally fiercely independent, are generally anti-Communist. Meo tribal leaders, such as the almost legendary Touby I.yfoung in nearby Xieng Khouang Province, should exert a strongly anti-Communist influence upon Meos within the Pathet Lao area. Overshadowing the interplay of all these prejudices is the dismal fact that the Laotian Government is unprepared for a major conflict with the Pathet Lao movement, which would certainly receive logistical support from the Vietminh and Communist China. The Laotian Government, therefore, is faced with a continuing dilemma. Permitting the Pathet Lao to continue their occupation of the two provinces, with less than an all-out attempt to dislodge them, gives the Pathets additional time to achieve complete control of the populace and to improve their military position. On the other hand, calling for a general insur- rection of the populace against the Pathet Lao and simultaneously starting an all-out military effort (probably the only chance left to dislodge the Reds) would most certainly involve active conflict with the Vietminh. (SECRET) Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 S-E-C-R-E-T trance -- Tiran and Sanafir. THE GULF OF AQABA An Emerging Trouble Spot The Gulf of Aqaba is rapidly emerging as a trouble spot in the Israel Arab struggle. Although Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan border the gulf, only Egypt can be said to control it, chiefly because of Egyptian possession of two small islands athwart the en- Before Egypt occupied the island s in 1950, reportedly at the recommendation of German military were uninhabited. Although z'3' advisors, Egypt gave assurance that peaceful passage into the gulf would continue unhampered, observers noted that artillery was moved onto the island of Tiran. Since then the Egyp- tians have monitored shipping bound for the Jordanian port of Aqaba near the head of the gulf and have at times seemed intent upon stop- ping British vessels bound for that port. Under these conditions, few vessels have attempted to reach Eilat, the nearby Israeli port. -14 - S-E-C-R-E-T roved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approve or Release The fact that the Gulf of Aqaba remained quiet during this period can be attributed to a combination of factors. The Israeli port of Eilat was little developed and had poor connections with its hinterland. Furthermore, neither Asia nor Africa, the areas most accessible from the port of Eilat, offered markets for Israeli products. The nearby Jordanian port of Aqaba also lacked satisfactory connections with the interior, and consequently most of Jordan's trade was directed to the Mediterranean. Aqaba, however, is more active than Eilat. It is the seat of the only British garrison in the area and has been a port of embarkation for Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Early in 1955, when world attention was focused on the recurrent Gaza incidents, Egypt announced that passage through the Gulf of Aqaba was forbidden to all ships bound for the port of Eilat. Israeli Defense Minister David Ben Gurian promptly gave sharp warning to the Egyptians of the serious consequences that might follow, and the Israeli cabinet was known to be interested in freeing the mouth of the gulf by "suitable means." More important than the threats was the fact that Israel planned to develop a better port with deeper water near Eilat. The Gulf of Aqaba assumed new importance to Israel, which is faced with the necessity for circumventing the Suez blockade and the need for expanding trade in order to bolster the national economy. At the same time the hinterlands began to open up, and Israel began thinking in terms of trade with Asia and Africa. Jordan also began to show greater interest in the Gulf of Aqaba coincident with the planned revival of the Mayan (Jordan)-Medina (Saudi Arabia) rail line and the exploitation of phosphates in the interior. The plans will probably include the construction of a branch line to Aqaba to provide an adequate outlet for the minerals of Jordan. (See "Ma-an-Medina Railroad," Geographic Intelligence Review No. 40, April 1954, pp. 40-46.) Strategic Importance Although the Gulf of Aqaba is bordered by barren land, it has retained one strategic asset throughout history -- position. The lands to the north, the Israel and Jordan of today, can be reached by way of the gulf.' If an enemy controlling these lands launched an attack on the Suez Canal, any counterthrust would probably include an attack northward through the Gulf of Aqaba. These tactics were used in World War I. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Sultan of Turkey made an effort to extend his boundary midway across the Sinai Peninsula in order to include all of the Gulf of Aqaba within his territory. But the British ultimately forced the Turks to agree to a boundary between Sinai and Palestine that did not encompass the gulf. In formulating the boundaries of Israel the Zionists, keenly aware of the geographical position of the state, provided for an outlet on the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as at Haifa on the Mediterranean. Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Israel's interest in the Gulf of Aqaba is also closely related to the boundary problem. The present boundaries of Israel are merely armistice lines and will remain unsettled until a treaty of peace is signed with the Arabs. Meanwhile, the expansionist idea is not,dor- want among Israeli politicians. Like the early Zionist leaders, some of them would place-the boundary of Israel eastward far enough to include the Hedjaz railway, which passes through the Hawran of south- western Syria and continues south into Jordan past Amman to a point south of Ma'an. Israel therefore has a vital interest in the projected reextension of the Hedjaz railway from Ma'an to Medina and an even greater interest in the possible extension of a branch line to Aqaba, which would become an outlet for the minerals of Jordan. Economic Importance As a trade route, the Gulf of Aqaba occupies an ironic position. Israel, the nation most actively concerned with unobstructed use of the gulf, has neither an adequate port on the gulf nor commodities to export through such a port. Jordan, the nation with relatively free passage through the gulf to its one port, uses these waters for only a minor portion of its imports and for almost none of its exports. These situations, however, could change. In the case of Jordan, a change is actually in progress. In the case of Israel, exploratory work is underway, but the economic aspects of the problem have not yet taken shape. Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 The Gulf of Aqaba's hinterlands -- whether in Sinai, Saudi Arabia, the Negev of Israel, or southern Jordan -- are all alike in lacking proved economically exploitable mineral deposits, population in numbers sufficient to provide markets, and satisfactory transpor- tation. Agriculturally the hinterland is equally barren. Along the southern part of the gulf the mountains that border the coasts of Sinai and Saudi Arabia extend inland over 50 miles. Farther north the barren, heavily dissected plateaus of both nations extend northward into Israel and Jordan. Agricultural possibilities of southern Israel are slight, despite the much publicized plans for agricultural development in the Negev. In the area south of Beersheba, the Negev receives less than 4 inches of rainfall annually and to the north only slightly more. In the entire Negev there are only 250,000 acres of true soil accord- ing to the most optimistic estimate, whereas nearly 10 times as many acres are too stony or salty for cultivation or are dune covered. Without large-scale mineral exploitation, an environment of this type would scarcely attract enough population to justify converting Eilat into a deep-water port. In the case of Jordan, phosphate deposits in the interior could be exported through Aqaba if transportation were improved. As long as the phosphate deposits remained unexploited, however, there was little reason to develop the port. Furthermore, Aqaba is Jordan's only port, but hinterland connections have been so poor that trade Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 has been directed largely to Beirut, Lebanon. In 1953, exports from Aqaba amounted to only 3,500 tons out of a total of 50,000 for the entire country; imports normally amount to about 70,000 tons out of a total of 260,000 to 300,000. The exploitation of mineral deposits of the interior coincides with the idea of extending a branch rail line from Ma'an to Aqaba. Even with present poor connections to the hinterland, cargo unloaded at Aqaba reaches Amman, the chief popula- tion center, in 2 days, whereas cargo unloaded at Beirut takes 10 days (see Map 13890). As of May 1955 the proposed expansion of the port of Aqaba was nearing the end of the planning stage. Two quays costing nearly 3 million dollars were planned, and construction time was estimated at 2 to 3 years. The phosphate quay was planned to handle 1 million tons per year, the cargo quay a mere 200,000 tons. Clearly, Aqaba is being developed as a raw-material shipping port. The neighboring Israeli port of Eilat at present has an estimated 500 civilians, but plans call for a future population of 15,000 to 20,000, depending upon the extent of development within the Negev. Eilat today is actually a military settlement with better housing and recreational facilities than similar settlements elsewhere in Israel. Although fishing is the only economic activity of the town, the small fishmeal factory is not currently in operation. Under these circum- stances, speculation is aroused by the recent launching of two "fishing vessels" -- Tiran and Sanafir -- by Achdut Avoda, the Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 left-wing activist political party favoring a strong line against the Arabs. The development of a satisfactory port at Eilat poses diffi- culties. In Israel the terrain at the head of the gulf consists of a flat beach 2 kilometers long and a 9-kilometer stretch where the mountains of Sinai border the shore. Although offshore conditions along this mountainous stretch present port possibilities, storage space is lacking. The flat northern stretch has offshore reefs that endanger approach by ship, and nearshore waters are shallow. From an engineering standpoint, it is both difficult and expensive to compen- sate for these disadvantages. Two years ago it was stated that con- struction of an open wharf 150 meters from the present shoreline was the only solution; no later information is available. The development of ports at both Eilat and Aqaba might raise serious boundary problems that thus far have pass unnoticed. United Nations and Israeli interpretations of the Armistice Line differ radically. According to the United Nations interpretation, Eilat is left with flat terrain a mere half kilometer in width for the landward part of its port. At the time the Armistice Line between Israel and Jordan was agreed upon, the United Nations negotiators were supplied with the wrong map and erroneous data. (For further details, see "The Israel-Jordan Armistice Line," Geographic Intelligence Review No. 40, April 195+. roved For Release 2000/0 piproveg For el* RBP:Fg 3 36 l ISRAEL BEIRUT . ' / Sidon LEBA P SGVS % P rumr;:ed Tyre j ~--Zon per, Y J 33 ..`.1? SY I A ~??~ International boundary 3 - - Armistice line Acre ? National capital Tiberia De,ndaor;zed Selected canal HAIFA Tiberias Zone Selected road Tsemah -?-I Selected railroad Nazareth Dara 'Afu a Belt Irbid Scale 1:2,600,000 /N Shears ~? Hadera 0 25 50 Miles I r+ f i 4 i 0 25 50 Kilometers jj arm Nabulus ' A.. Peta51 32 TEL AVIV a ' Jaffa Ram Allah MAN 32 Jericho 4-.. A Migdal JERUSA M DEAD Ashqelon oop SEA ~ : ~.-{ [a 1~1 J Ga Hebron J.~... ? p PORT SAID f S 0 4p p AI 'Arish {~ l rsheba B?~- l Q~ ? .' ? ao JORD S 3 1 U Misfaq 1., t r 31 EI Qantara " ?~ I '''~~~''' la '- Neuna., f ISMAILIA Al QLsaima -`' -/ A - Crest Bitter / Lake .../..-...~ ~.. \ Ma'an o G Y / ( / 3 0 SUEZ El Shatt Al Kuntillah 3 0 % Ra's an Nagb ~ A ri~N .` I At 'Aqabah SAUDI Abu Ze i ~, 0 A R A B I A 2 n ma .. ti ai ~ .. Nuweiba'el 2 9 Muzeina ltr1 4%, Where the international boundary and ~ armistice line for Israel coincide only ... f. l (i the former is shown. ~ Boundaries are not necessarily those . recognized by the U.S. Government. 32 Base 13890 7-55 33 34 35 36 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 S-E-C-R-E-T Thus, the Gulf of Aqaba area presents two threats to the peace of the Near East. The development of the Israeli port near Eilat may raise new boundary problems, with resultant "incidents." There is also danger that Egypt may do what the Turks failed to accom- plish -- convert the Gulf of Aqaba into a closed sea -- and so con- trol both economic and military access to Israel and Jordan from the south. (CONFIDENTIAL) - 21 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 S -E-C -R -E -T STATUS OF THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE After protracted negotiations, the Italian-Yugoslav dispute over the Free Territory of Trieste was provisionally settled in London on 5 October 1954. The agreement -- entitled "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia Regarding the Free Territory of Trieste" -- provides that the future civil administration of the area will be divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. Italy has taken over Zone A from the Allied Military Government, which had administered the Zone since the end of the war; the task of administering a slightly augmented Zone B will continue to rest with Yugloslavia. The city of Trieste remains within the Italian sector but will retain free- port facilities. Since the memorandum of understanding does not alter the de jure political status of the Free Territory of Trieste, which is provided for in the Italian Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947, neither Italy nor Yugoslavia has legal sovereignty over its respective sector. No limit, however, is set by the memorandum to the duration of the de facto administration. The discrepancy between the legal and actual situations is complicated by actions of the Italians and Yugoslavs. Although technically the Free Territory of Trieste is still an international area, the boundary lines separating Italy and Yugoslavia from their S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 S-E-C -R-E-T respective sectors of civil administration are not international boundaries in actual practice. This is especially true of Yugoslavia, where the former Zone B districts of Koper (Capodistria) and Buie (Buie) have been administratively incorporated into the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, respectively. This situation is already reflected in statistics and on maps published by Yugoslavia. The situation in Italy is somewhat different since, for political reasons, the government must emphasize the provisional aspects of the settle- ment. Therefore, Italy has not made a similar effort to integrate its sector of the Free Territory into its administrative framework. The boundary separating the two, however, seems to lack customs stations and consequently cannot be regarded as truly international. A cartographic solution of this problem for maps of wide distri- bution would involve the representation of the de facto situation within a framework of de jure boundaries. There will be an increasing tendency for maps of Yugoslavia and Italy to contain information on their respective civil zones. On a recent map of Yugoslav adminis- trative divisions (CIA 13681, 4-55) the Yugoslav-administered districts were included, together with an international boundary line separating them from Yugoslavia. With one modification, the procedure used on Map 13681 seems the most suitable for maps of both Italy and Yugoslavia. To indicate the international character of the Free Territory of Trieste, the boundary between the two zones should be a provisional S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 S -E -C -R -E-T line rather than an international line. Besides being technically correct, particularly if the notations "limit of Italian [or Yugoslav] administration" are added along the provisional line separating the sectors, the procedure would make alteration of existing maps rela- tively simple. This approach may be necessary to prevent duplication of mapping in the NIS program, wherein the entire Free Territory is included with Italy. The few maps that might require representation of the de facto situation, including boundaries, should be for limited distribution only since the Free Territory of Trieste would not appear as an international entity. Even so, it would be advisable to add a standard disclaimer. (UNCLASSIFIED) Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/OgLl7c_PISA,FDP79-01005A000300010003-9 PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN The dream of the late Mohammed All Jinnah, founder of Pakistan, visualized a united Muslim country untorn by interprovincial strife. In a move intended to bring this goal closer to realization, an Order of the Governor-General of Pakistan was issued on 5 October 1955, under which the various political divisions that comprised West Paki- stan (with the exception of the Federal Capital Area of Karachi) were to be merged into the single Province of West Pakistan, effective 14 October. Since the merger includes the Pushtoon areas of Pakistan, the possibility of violent reactions had been anticipated from Afghan- istan, which had been agitating for an independent Pushtoonistan. The only formal protest to date, however, has been the recall of the Afghan charge from Karachi. Prior to the merger the political divisions of West Pakistan were: 1. Governors' Provinces a. Punjab b. Sind c. North-West Frontier 2. Chief Commissioners' Provinces a. Baluchistan b. Karachi (formally known as the Karachi Federal Capital Area) -25- Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2 Vq%4f 1 j-TCIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 3. Princely States a. Bahawalpur b. Khairpur c. Baluchistan States Union d. Dir e. Swat f. Chitral 4. Miscellaneous political units a. The 2 small states of Amb and Phulra,which had been closely allied with the North-West Frontier Province. b. Tribal areas and agencies, which are found chiefly in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan areas. The new Province of West Pakistan includes 10 Divisions, each of which will be administered by a Commissioner. The capital of the Province will be at Lahore in the Punjab. The Federal Capital Area of Karachi will continue to be centrally administered. Although it will send its representatives to the Province of West Pakistan Legis- lative Assembly, the Capital Area will not be affected by the laws passed by the Assembly. Thus the entire national administrative structure of the country now consists of the two units of West Pakistan and East Bengal (East Pakistan), which has 3 Divisions. Current information relevant to the details of the change is not complete and includes apparent contradictions concerning the components S -E -C -R -E-T Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 2000/0#147C_F1~4tDP79-01005A000300010003-9 of the new divisions. The accompanying map (No. 25076) indicates, by a magenta overprint on the 1951 administrative divisions., the approximate boundaries of the new divisions. This map should be considered provisional and is subject to revision upon receipt of additional information. According to information received from Pakistan, the 10 Divi- sions and the areas included in each follow: Division Areas Included 1. Peshawar The districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Hazara, and Campbellpur; the Tribal Areas attached to the districts of Peshawar, Mardan, and Hazara; and the Agencies of Malakand, Mohmand, and Khyber. 2. Dera Ismail Khan The districts of Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, and Mianweli; the Tribal Areas attached to the districts of Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, and Kohat; and the Agencies of Kurram and North Waziristan. 3. Rawalpindi The districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat, and Shahpur. - 27 - Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 Approved For Release 29V /q,Y1Z ,-CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 1.. Lahore The districts of Lahore, Shekhupura, Gujranwala, and Sialkot. 5. Multan The districts of Multan, Jhang, Lyallpur, and Montgomery. 6. Bahawalpur The districts of Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, Rahimyar Khan, Muzaffargarh, and Dera Ghazi Khan. 7. Khairpur The State of Khairpur and the dis- tricts of Jacobabad, Sukkur, Larkana, and Nawabshah. 8. Hyderabad The districts of Hyderabad, Thatta, Dadu, Mirpurkhas, and Sanghar. 9. Quetta The Agencies of Quetta, Zhob, Loralai, and Sibi. 10. Kalat Baluchistan States Union and Chagai. The Tribal Areas of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province as well as the States of Amb, Chitral, Dir, and Swat have been designated as "special areas." There will be no change in the internal administration of these units. Through the establishment of the new province the Pakistani hope to create a country that will be politically more coherent and econom- ically more nearly viable. Politically, it is hoped that the merger will facilitate agreement with East Pakistan -- separated from West Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9 M GG p_.W U?4 o tC 5 c m? w 2 din n ~ ~ ~ ~ .ro ~b 9 0~ m ,g.8 ~' FCbcs ~a G3i~A~ o'~C7 (7 o ?#?,~ ~e 9d ~"~~ RSA t ~{ x a o 6- .2~ X? a o o? s :q yp -,y ?~ o a go .+i :+7 a ,np m y. s a c 3 ,q? '~ "o ~y 4 a, (~ .Z w S4 ?4 J4 dar. c7 ~ 0 oo zM Z, r"n a4 i-1 I?L ~C1Fa A C~ Spi bci Vlgz ~) ~~:~{{ pp