INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM MONTHLY December 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01082A000200010003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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ORE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTENNATIONAL COMMUNISM. MONTHLY
December 1949
The material used in this publication was
reported during the month of November 1949..
NOTICE: This document is a working paper,. not
an official CIA issuance It has been coordinated
within ORE,, but not with the IAC Agencies.. It
represents current thinking by specialists in ORE
and is designed for use by others engaged in
similar or overlapping studies.. It is intended
solely for the information of the addressee and
not for further dissemination.
Copy for : A 9 o R r~
25X1A2d
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n "m
Vol. I. No. 2
CONTENTS
PL L, M(1JOR DEVELOP;; ENTS_IN t"ti ORLD COI IUNISM DURING NOVEMBER
PART II SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT TRENDS
1. UNITED FRONT TACTICS
International
National
China . . . . . .
Thailand ? . .
e ? . + . . r
Indonesia ? + ? r + . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? r ? ' . ..
Iran ... *
French Equatorial Africa ? . . . ? ? ? ?
Italy. ? . . .'.'. ?.?
Page
4
5
5
6
6
6
2. DISSENSION ATND DEVTJOIT
Non-orbit Arecs
Spain . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . 7
France ? 8
United Kingdom . ? S
Norway . . 9
India . ? . . 9
Eastorn Etxrnpn
Czechoslovakia . . ? . ? . ? ? . ? . . 10
Bulgaria ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? . . 10
Rumania . . . . . . 10
Poland ' . . 10
3. CHANGE OF TACTICS
Greece ? ? . . . . . r r . l1
J
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CONTENTS (con't)
4, NLV P REI S OF W NIFE_ED COP.4I'JNNIST II,`T'EREST
Tibet - Nepal ..... . . . . . .
Page
5. SOVIET FIMNCING OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
Thailand .:. . . . . . . ? . . . 13
Iran ? . ..... . 6.606 13
6. PEzICE CTP,4PLaGN
International.. .......... ? , . 13
LGtin Ixerica.?.?.?...,?., ?.. ?.?,?,? ? 14
I1ldic . ? .4 . ? ? . a r ? ? ? ? ? . ? _ ? . ? . ? ? 14
PORT III FORTHCOMING COW:IUNIST EVENTS
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MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS _ IN WORLD C OhIMUNI$M
2URING NOVEMBER
World Communism still leans heavily on the gullibility
of fellow-traveling "liberals" and opportunists to achieve its
ends. Only by exploiting man's reluctance to face political
realities have the Moscow tacticians been able to create and
re-create the illusion of a "united front". The month of
November furnished ample demonstrations for an increasing imple-
mentation of this Communist tactic in Europe and even more
strongly in the Far East, where it appears to have a good chance
of success.
At two high-level. Communist meetings, in Hungary and
in China, leaders gave new meaning and impetus to the use of
this device, The Cominform meeting at Galyateto, Hungary, while
dealing chiefly with the problem of Tito's liquidation, published
a significant resolution by Togliatti for "unification" of the
"large masses of the working class" rogardless of their political
and religious affiliations. In Peiping, keynote speeches at the
WFTU's Congress of Asian and Australasian countries} went farther,
calling for extension of the united front campaign into new
political and geographical areas, In both meetings, Communist
leaders did not hesitate to recommend cooperation with non-
Communist groups of all complexions so long as they were in
opposition to the existing regimes. Confronted with steadily
diminishing returns from its "defense of the peace's campaign
in the West, the Kremlin is now seeking to revive the older
concept of uniting all "moderate" and "democratic" elements
in a united front.
While the success of this tactic in politically sophisti-
cated Europe remains as doubtful as over, its potentialities in
the Far East, particularly in Southeast Asia, are from the stand-
point of US security, very serious. The "directives" for Commu-
nist conquest along united front lines which were issued in Poi-
ping, leave no doubt about their Stalinist motivation but are
sugar-coated with tactical. moderation. They are almost certain
to impress large groups of Asians by the powerful and simple
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principle of "cooperation" among the exploited classes. At the
same time, the anti-foreign feelings of these Asian masses are
,arefully diverted from the USSR and channelled toward the Western
powers, notably the US..
The achievement of the Chinese Communist victory opens
great opportunities for Communism in the Fax East and will be
increasingly exploited by the Communists as a means of diverting
attention from the rising tide of anti-Communism in Europe and
the stalemate in the Near and Middle Eastern areas. A compre-
hensive program for the exploitation of this Communist opportunity
in the Far F&st has boon devised. Soviet Politbureau member
Bllalonkov, in his speech at the occasion of the 32nd anniversary
of the October Revolution, mado this quite clear when he implied
that Moscow would by no means rest on the laurels of the Communist
victory in China. He characterized China as a springboard rather
than as a goal achieved and significantly linked India with China
as decisive factors in the East-West struggle. Meanwhile,
Chinese Communist leaders in Peiping will apparently direct their
efforts toward penetration of Southeast Asia, hoping to acquire
the same status in that area as the USSR has acquired in China;
in any case, the Chinese Communist effort in Southeast Asia should
prove an effective instrument of Soviet expansion.
From a long range point of view, the magnitude of the
Far Eastern program is unprecedented in the history of Communist
expansion. It dwarfs the scope of Soiriot-Communist endeavors in
Europe and other parts of the world and is almost certain to achieve
a large measure of success among the discontented masses of the
Far Eastern areas.
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'M M
SURVEY OF SIGNIFICI~NT TRENDS
This survey of significant trends
in the international Communist movement
which have become apparent during the
month of November, contains only those
developments which are believed to have
an important effect on the potential
of World Communism.
1. UNITED FR0INT TACTICS
Wherever the power of the Kremlin cannot be backed
with the threat of action by the Soviet armed forces, where
the influence of the local Communist parties has yet to be
firmly established, or where its strength is declining rather
than increasing, the Communists seek to enhance their status
by trying to co-operate with sympathetic non'-Communist factions
who are, at tho moment,, in opposition to their governments...
Such cooperation may take the form of collaboration with other
political parties, religious groups, etc., in which case it is
tormed the "united front from above." If the collaboration is
primarily on an individual rather than an organizational basis
it is called a "united front from below." Once established,
either of these united fronts is exploited and dominated by the
Communists. Eventually those participating non-Communists who
have not completely surrendered to Communist discipline will be
discarded and possibly liquidated.
. International
Although the ap nlication of the united front tactics
within many national areas indicates a shift in Communist party
tactics, the international front group; continue in their efforts
to attract non-Communist followers by exploiting the griovances
* n m
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and nationalist tendencies of various social groups. During
November, it became apparent that the major front organizations
were beginning to implement the long-planned coordinated offensive
in Southeast Asia.. Although the WFTU has been assigned the key
role in these efforts, all the front organizations will probably
accelerate their activity in this area in the coming months. .
Soviet and Chinese Communist labor leaders at the WFTU
Asian Conference, held in Peiping during November, stressed the
importance of measures to hasten liberation of "the oppressed
peoples of Asia," while their speeches at the conference indi-
cated that the contemplated "assistance" would be extended
principally through an Asian Liaison Bureau in Peiping, Communist
controlled national labor federations, and the Chinese overseas
labor unions. :At the same time, the heavy Chinese representa-
tion on the conference presidium suggested that the leadership
in VWFTU penetration efforts in the area will be largely the
responsibility of the well-disciplined All-China Federation of
Labor. .
The Asian Women's Conference, which the Women's Inter-
national Democratic Federation (W IDS') will hold in Peiping in
December, will probably provide additional support for the Soviet
drive in Southeast Asia.
National
China
In his inaugural address to the WFTU-sponsored Trade
Union Congress of Asian and Australasian countries in Peiping,
LIU Shao-ch'i, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) leading Marxist
theoretician, outlined the program which had led the CCP and which,
he claimed, could lead the Communist parties of other Asian nations
to victory. LIU emphasized that the victory could not be achieved
without the creation of a Communist-led army, the establishment
of bases for it, and the coordination of military operations with
the activities of workers and peasants in enemy territory. LIU
advocated, as an essential first step, the formation of a united
front with whatever classes, parties, groups and individuals are
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willing to work against "imperialism and its lackeys." He
warned, however, that it was up to the Communist Party to con-
trol this united front. This tactic, a "united front from
above," is particularly applicable to what the Kremlin defines
as colonial areas.
This "directive" for revolution in Asia was further
elaborated upon by LI Li-san, the CCP's principal labor leader,
who re-stated the united front tactic by asserting that the
"Chinese working class was able to lead the revolution to
victory" through its ability to unite with the peasant masses,
the petty bourgeoisie in the cities, and that part of the
"national" bourgeoisie which opposes "imperialism."
Thailand
Apparently responding to "directives" embodied in the
statements by Communist leaders in Peiping, Chinese Communists
in Thailand and other pro-Communist Chinese political groups
are forming a permanent Democratic Forces Union Committee. The
aims of this Committee are, reportedly, to form similar committees
uniting all Chinese democratic associations in Thailand, and to
issue a secret propaganda paper. Dissident elements of the
Kuomintang are to be included in the organization. Also, a new
group of young Thai socialists is reported tentatively willing
to cooperate with Communists in order to obtain "political and
social reforms" through a "united Front." They believe that
later it will be "time enough" to break with the Communists,
In view of the new Peiping directives there is a good possi-
bility that a union will be formed between Chinese Communists
and the Thai socialist group which won a recent Bangkok munici-
pal election.
Indonesia
A different but hardly loss dangerous trend toward the
united front tactic is indicated in Indonesia where the "nationalist"
Tan Malaka Communists are reported to have reached an agreement
with the Moscow Communists and whore the Darul Isla1 (fanatic
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Mohammedan) forces are reported to have accented Communist leader-
ship in certain instances. This strange associationhas developed
chiefly by the agreement of the parties involved that they cannot
accept the results of the Hague Round Table Conference. If this
move toward consolidation should materialize, a much graver throat
to the stability of the now Indonesian Federal Government will be
posed than if these groups acted separately,.
Iran
The clandestine Azerbaijan radio transmitting from the
USSR has urged the formation of national front in Iran, appeal-
ing to the "center opposition" elements to support the front.
The Communist radio declares that a united front of all opposi-
tion elements is the only effective course of action..
Fnch Equatorial Africa
Communist members of the Assohbly of the French Union
have reached French Equatorial Africa in the course of a propa-
ganda tour of French North and West Africa. They are urging that
Nationalists and Communists unite for purposes of combatting US
economic penetration of French overseas territories.
Italy
The "moderate" united front policy under the Jeader-
shi of Togliatti will probably be continued in Italy, at least
until the spring of 1950.
This conclusion is based on Togliattits attendance at
the mid-November meeting of the Cominform in Hungary,. and the
unanimous adoption there of his resolution calling for the unifi-
cation of "large masses of the working class" regardless of their
political, labor-union, or religious orientations.,
However, the. presence of two prominent Longo followers,
Dr'Griofrio and Cicalini, at this mating may indicate the existence
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of an alternative plan of direct action, to be introduced possibly
in the spring. (Longo and Secchia were reportedly conferring
with Satellite envoys in Rome at.the time the Cominform meeting
was taking place.)
The Italian communal elections due in March and April
of 1950 may bring about severe losses for the moderate, mass
party policy, resulting in a change of leadership from the
Togliatti group to the direct action policy of Longo and Secohia..
Such a shift would become even more probable should, by that time,
the Cominform's winter campaign against Tito have failed and
guerrilla warfare on the Yugoslav borders become a necessity.
2. D.ISS~RTSION AND DEVIATION
Nn-orbit. Areas
Spain
Disillusionment with Soviet leadership, resentment over
Cominform action against Communists who fought in the Spanish
Civil War,and Spanish regionalism have caused a spread of dissi-
dence which is weakening the Spanish Communist Party (PCE).. These
factors are likely to induce among the dissidents a more sympa-
thetic attitude toward Tito, in view of his service in the Inter-
national Brigades during the Civil War and his more palatible
nationalist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism..
The alleged arrest of Dolores Ibarruri, who reportedly
has been at odds with Moscow because she objected to the treat-
ment of Spanish Communists in the USSR, and the ouster of Juan
Comorera, who resisted the Cominform order to Merge the Catalan
and Basque Communists with the PCE, have further increased the
tension within the Party. Although Ibarruri has, since her
alleged arrest, participated in a conference in Moscow, she
has probably lost favor with the Kremlin and only her ability to
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prevent the complete disintegration of the PCE has caused this
tolerance. This struggle for power among the Communist leader-
ship probably is primarily responsible for the postponement of
t'--e overdue Party Congress.
France
The French Communist Party (POF) is trying hard to
prevent the spread of Titoism among its intellectual members
and fellow travelers. The appointment of Billoux, an ardent
Stalinist, who will now handle the party's dealings with intel-
lectuals (formerly the task of Casanova), will result in efforts
to return Jean Cassou to the fold. It was Casou who first broke
away from the Soviet camp to sing the praises of Tito.
There is no evidence of critical dissension in the PCF,
however, Rumors concerning the removal of Thorez as Secretary
General of the Party appear to be unfouded Even thrr,.ugh
Cachin, after a visit to Moscow, revealed that Stalin has more,
faith in such militants as Mauvais, Fajon and Marty than in
Thorez and Duclos, the generous publicity accorded by the party
organs to Thorez's new book Fils du Peu-.e seems to indicate that,
at least for the time being, Thorez is not out of favor or about
to be removed from office.
Un't" ed Kingdom
The Tito-Cominform rift has even reached follow-travel-
ing circles in the United Kingdom resulting in a split in the
British-Yugoslav Friendship Society at a meeting on 16 November
The Stalinists proposed a resolution denouncing Tito and pledging
support of the true Stalinists in Yugoslavia. The resolution
passed by a vote of 72-54, but it reflected such an irreconcilable
division of opinion that Zilliacus announced that he would form
a new pro-Tito Society. The intensity of the division on this
subject could conceivably affect the UK Communist Party (UKCP),
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NOW
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Norway
As a corrollary to the recent expulsion of the leaders
of the so-called Furubotn faction, the Norwegian Communist Party
(NKP) is presently in a state of turmoil. While this situation
greatly weakens the Party, there is little reason to conclude that
this state of affairs will be permitted to continue much longer.
An extraordinary Party Congress, scheduled for February 1950, will
in all probability confirm the action already taken by Party Chair-
man LOvlien and his supporters. Although the dissident element
may form an independent organization, it is not likely that it will
assume significant proportions because the LOlvlien group represents
the official party, retains control of the NKP administrative
machinery and press, and has almost three months in which to insure
that the majority of the Congress delegates will be LOviien sup-
porters.
India
P.. C. Joshi,.former secretary-general of the Communist
Party of India, is reportedly attempting to organize a rival
organization under the name of the Red Flag Communist Party of
India. Joshi,, whose minority faction was recently expelled from
the CPI for advocating that the party employ non-violent tactics
at present, may be joined by members of the Andhra Communist Party,
which was recently expelled from the CPI for its nationalist ten-
dencies.: If Joshi can weld these diverse elements into an orgm),-
i:zed political party, such a party may come to have considerable
importance in Indian politics..
Ea ts. ern Euro; e
Dissension within the Communist hierarchy is not limited
to areas outside the Soviet orbit. It is also. apparent in the
Satellite parties where nationalism, opportunism and incompetency
have resulted in widespread purges designed to strengthen the hold
of the ruling clique on the state and thereby to consolidate Soviet
contrc .
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Czechoslovakia
The Czechoslovak Communist Party will undergo a purge
in December to "rid the Party of hostile elements." The purge
will nrobably be a relatively moderate affair; springing less
from any specific "nationalist deviation" than the necessity'to
impress upon Party members the responsibilities of their member-
ship.
Bulgaria
Continuing purges of all ranks within the Bulgarian
Communist Party are intended to eradicate Bulgarian nationalism
and facilitate the extension of Soviet control over the Bulgarian
state apparatus. Nevertheless, despite the purge, the majority
of Bulgarian Communists would welcome a greater degree of indepen-
dence from the Kremlin and this attitude will. probably persist
as long as Tito is successful in his defiance of the Soviet Union
and as long as Soviet exploitation of Bulgaria continues.
Rumania
Rumanian Communist leaders, whose firm control has
prevented the emergence of any widespread anti-Soviet trend within
the Party, are pursuing a quiet but effective party purge begun
in June. The Rumanian purge, which has been conducted, without
fanfare, does not appear to have produced the feeling of terror
that has developed among all ranks of the Bulgarian Party as a
result of the ruthless Bulgarian purge: As a result, the Rumanian
Party will emerge from the current shake-up a stronger and even
more reliable instrument of Soviet policy than at present.
Poland
The dismissal from their Party positions of leading
nationalist Communists Goriulka, Spychalski, and Kliszko, as well
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as the removal of lesser Communists and former Socialists from
their Government and party jobs, indicates that the Polish Commu-
nist Party is endeavoring to tighten its control of the Govern-
ment and Party apparatus, Besides dismissal from the Communist
Party and Government of unreliable and deviationist elements,
other steps recommended by President Beirut for Polandts first
purge include: (1) demotion of some party members to candidate
status, (2) new elections of party officials throughout the party
hierarchy from cell groups through provincial committees, and
(3) the development of mass party training, stronger cadres, and
greater self-criticism.
3. CHANGE IN TACTICS
Greece
The Greek Communist leadership has finally formalized
the shift in emphasis away from military matters which has been
taking place since last Augustt.s defeats. On 4 November, after
all hopes of a favorable UN compromise of the Greek issue had
faded, the "Free Greece" radio announced that the party Central
Committee, meeting on 9 October, had decided on a "temporary with-
drawal" of the main guerrilla forces to prevent their annihilation
and a shift in the party effort's "center of gravity" to political
and economic struggles. The approximately 1,400 guerrillas still.
in Greece have evidently been instructed to reorganize into small
squads under political commissars, for sporadic sabotage and
terrorism. The rebuilding of the Communist intelligence, supply,
and recruiting network, broadcast on 25 .November, outlined a broad
program for utilizing labor unrest as a basis for an "open political
struggle."
At the moment, the Communists are too weak to match
these words with deeds. Nevertheless, the preliminary work now
being done may yield significant results in coming months, If
winter conditions hamper Greek security forces, guerrilla organizers
will enjoy a certain freedom of action in outlying communities.
In the cities, the long-deferred surge of labor agitation for higher
wages--while not inspired by the Communists--may eventually pro-
vide them with a substantial labor following, if government in-
eptitude in handling the situation continues. Gradual government
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release of former political prisoners will undoubtedly contribute
to the Communist political reserve. Meanwhile, the guerrillas
outside Greece, although they pose problems of morale and dis-
cipline, still represent a force-in-being of some 12,000.
4. NN.AREAS OF MANIFESTED COMMUNIST INTEREST
Tibet - Nepal
Communist control of Tibet, which may be effected in
1950 through occupation of that country by forces of the Chinese
Communist regime, under pretext of reestablishing the Panchen
Lama (now a tool of the Chinese Communists), would. not only increase
Communist pressure along India's borders, but also would allow added
infiltration of foreign Communist agents into India and render easier
the subversion of elements of northoo,storn Ind .snot heretofore easily
reached. The significance to India of Chinese Communist control in
Tibet does not lie in the long but seldom-crossed common frontier
to the northwest between India and Tibet. Rather i-U concerns the
effect of Communism in Tibet on the neighboring country of Nepal
and on the semi-independent Indian State of Sikkim, ':c nth of those :teas
possess well-developed communication with Tibet, '- .nd
both have much in common, culturally and racially, with the Tibetans.
These peoples, at the same time, have similar ties with the neigh-
boring hill tribes within India proper; ahould they espouse Commu-
nism, subversion of the populations to the South and East within
the Indian borders would become a much easier task. Considerable
social unrest already exists in both places. In Sikkim, there is
popular dissatisfaction with both the Maharaja and the Government
of India, which took over the administration of the state last
June when an insurrection led by the Sikkim State Congress appeared
imminent. In Nepal, there appears to be sufficient social malaise
to render the people of the country vulnerable to the type of
proselytizing which could be expected if their Tibetan neighbors
adopt Communism; moreover., some dissident elements have already
shown a pro-Communism bias.
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5. SOVIET FINANCING OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
Tha i land
Two independent reports indicate that Soviet sources
occasionally give financial assistance to the Vietnam News Service
in Bangkok and have subsidized several Bangkok Chinese language
papers among which is the leading Communist-line CHUAN MIN PAO.
This information constitutes the first evidence that direct Soviet
financial support is being accorded to either presumably sympa-
thetic news agencies or definitely nro-Communist newspapers in
the Fngkok area. While this information is still unconfirmed,
certain credence is lent by several other reports of-Chinese
Communist financial support of a group of Thai language newspapers.
Apparently the USSR Legation, while ostensibly maintaining the
position of an observation post in Bangkok, has actually entered
other fields of activity, even if only on a very limited basis.
Iran
Soviet financial aid was reportedly given to at least
one of the parliamentary opposition candidates who is said to
have been involved in the plot against Minister of Court Hajli,
who was assassinated in early November. If true, this support is
another indication of the renewed vigor with which the USSR is
trying to exploit the unrest precipitated by the pf;r;1.in,mentary
elections and by Hajli's murder,
p -
6. THE COMMUNIST PEACE Ct IIGN
International
During November the drive of the international Communist
front organizations "for the defense of peace and democracy,tT
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previously focussed - largely without success - in Western Europe
and the US, shifted to the economically underdeveloped areas of
Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Latin America
Continuation of the "peace" campaign was chiefly
noticeable in Latin America where "peace" speeches were made by
Communists in Uruguay, Brazil and Chile. Communist peace propa-
ganda appeared in Mexico and Cuba in connection with other Commu-
nist activities. Formation of a "Peace Committee" in Mexico was
started and rumors of the creation of a similar committee in Peru
wore reported. Several local "peace" committees were reportedly
set up in Venezuela. This campaign is probably being used to
coordinate and strengthen the Latin Ara;rican Communist movement,
following intimations by Moscow which wore critical of Latin
American Communist activities.
India
Opposition to Nehru's commitment of India to the Anglo-
American bloc was the theme of the manifesto unanimously adopted
at the All-India Conference of Partisans for Peace held in Calcutta
from November 24-27. Organizations participating in the conference
included the Communist Party of India, the All-India Trade Union
Congress, the All-India Students Federation, the Progressive Writer's
.'Psoeiation, the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Indian People's
Theatre Association and the All-India Kisan Sabha. The confor6nce
ended with a torchlight procession in which illuminated portraits
of Stalin, Lenin, Paul Robeson, Mao Tse-tung and Ana Paukor wore
carried.
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PART III
FORTHCOMING COMP,IUNIST EVENTS
,12L
December
3
New York
New York Congress for Defense of Peace
5
Brussels
Congress of International Organization
of Journalists
6
Peiping
Asian Conference, International Federa-
tion of Democratic Women.
10-12
Bucharest
Preparatory Conference for WFTU Trans-
port Workers International
11-15
Prague
Congress of Czechoslovak Trade Unions
21
Stalin Day
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1950
January or
February Mexico City Preparatory Conference for WFTU
Petroleum Workers International
January 7-21 France Combatants for Peace Special Propa-
ganda Campaign to Outlaw Atom Bomb
15 -
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200010003-5
1250 (con't)
ebruary 21 World Federation of Democratic Youth
(VTDY) Day of Solidarity of Youth
of Colonial Areas
17-19 Oslo Extraordinary Congress of the
Norwegian CP
March (indefinite) ? First Constitutional Congress of
the Italian Communist Youth
Federation
Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79-01082A000200010003-5