COMMENTS ON STATE/DEFENSE STAFF STUDY RELATIVE TO ORGANIZATION OF CIA FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 25, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 1999/0 082A000200050002-2
July 1950
COLVENTS ON -31'1,.T.E, EF.MISE STAFF' STUDY RELATIVE TO
.ORGANIZATION OF CIA FOR :TATToon, ITITETLIGENCE PI,X1DUcTION.
I. Analysis of the staff Study
1. The effective result cc subject study and its .impleoontino;
NSC directive is to change the irxlividkial statutolg.i-osTonsibilit,f of
the Director of Central for the product ..o.a of nutiall
intelligence, to that of a collective resnonsibilit oti: the Inter Li-
gonoe Advisory Comittoe.
2. The study accoUshes its actual objective in the MC Dir-
ective as follow
a. 'by reading into the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, in paragraph 10 b and 10 c the follow:Ing:
(1) ". Until the emergence of a national
estimate or study from the MC, collective responsi-
bility is inescapable. under the Act of 1947."
(2) ". . The full 0U:tato-leg re,sponeibility of
the CJCI for the production of notional intelligence
becomes operative or:Ly when final drafts of na-
tional estimates or studies are recommended by the
MC to the D/ CI,."
ty defining national intelligence in paragraph 2 in
such a way as to picescz:lbe its production as being a "coopera-
tive process of preparafiZn" (production by committee) for the
purpose of integrating (L e. , incorporating the substance of)
the best intelligence opinion of the departments.
c0 by providing the IAC in paragraph 3 with responeibilitie.a
for planning, prescribing scope and terms of reference, initiate
ing projects, reviewing and accepting or rejecting thefts, and,
in certain cases, producing national .:'intelligence estimates sad
studies, including related liaison and coordimting, functions,
presently allocated to the 0/Cl and WA.
th by providing in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 an organization-
al realigment of the intelligence production facilities of CIA
which transfers the current intelligence and estimating facilities
from the jurisdiction of the fl/Cl (except for administration) to
the functional direction and ?pc-rat:Loral control of the IAC, ard,
Jefg*11"11?klk
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/ -
c-s a eilee
-2-
01082A000200050002-2
which provides the 1AG with responsibilities far functional direction
of the remainder of GIAts intelligenoe production and collection
machinery. (See Chart attached)
3. Using the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, the NSG1D0s,
the Dulles Report and= 50 as terms of reference, the study asserts%
a. that expertnce has irdicated that the quality of national
intelligence e3t?natei1ao not substantially improvedisince issuance
of NSC 50 (1 July 1949).
b0 that unwarranted duplication of effort as between the
various agenoies hap continuo:I.
In support of the assertions, the study states that the abaft
conditions result in largo measure from:
a. disagreement between GIA and departmental agencies as to
the meaning of national intelligeree.
b0 inadequaeies of existing mechanisms and procedures for
the production of national intelligemce? .
e0 continuing internal CIA confusian between its responsibility
for producing national intelligence and miscellaneous research and
reporting.
5. The study concludes that remedial aotien required consists oft
a. re-defining national intelligence in such terms as to
r.oeseribe the principle of collective responsibility of the IAG
r fUr6roduction as the criterion which distinguinhes it from
all other kinds of intelligence.
b. revising existing; mechanisms and procedures in accordance
with the principle of collective responsibility.
c. reorganizing CIA to place its current intelligence and
estimating facilities' under the funotional direction and operatimal
contra of the IAC? and the remainder of CIAts production and col-
lection facilities' under the functional direction of the IAG.
6. Accordingly the study racoon
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/0
79-01082A000200050002-2
au approve and issue the implementing NSC direotive attached
to the study.
b. place a limit on the strength of the proposed. National
Intelligence Groups not to exceed 100 officer and/or professional
personnel of whom not more than 20 may be detailed by the depart?
mental agencies. (Note: After the accumulation of operating
experiences the D/drTiiith advice and assistance of the IAC, will
recamaend to NSC such modifications in strength and composition of
the National Intelligence Group as may be necessary.)
c. Note that the 1)/Cl with advice and assistance of the
IAC will submit revisions of existing NSCIDIs and D/CIts as may
be required to bring those directives into conforaity with the
attached directive.
II. Discussion
1. The principle of collective responsibility of the IAC for the
production of national intelligence is neither present nor implied in
the National Security Act of 1947 as amended. On the contrary this
responsibility is clearly an individeel statutory responsibility of the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Central intelligence Agency,
as evidenced by the references cited below.
a. Reference Section 102 d: no . it shall be the duty
of the Agency, (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating tnhe national security, and provide for the appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where
ap ro nate existing agencies and facilities. . Provided furtN;F?
a e-agpartments and other agencies shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate and diseeminate departmental intelligence.
b. Reference Section 102 e: ". . such intelligence as relates
to the national security and is possessed by such departments and
other agencies of the government. . . shall be made available to the
Director of Central Intellisence for correlation, evaluation, and
nee?en.
MaTriiriiation:
2. Moreover, the National Security Council in USG 50 has disavowed
the principle of collective responsibility for the production of national
intelligence as follows:
". . we do not believe that the Director and the IAC should
bound by the concept of collective responsibility because this
mould inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to
the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned."
-?641414410ift
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
? Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
30 It is therefore the intent of the Congress and of the NSC
That the responsibility for national intelligence production Should be
the individual responsibility of the D/CI and CIA, and not in anyway
a committee or collective responsibility.
4. Further objectione to the principle of collective responsibility
follow:
a. The primary mission of a departmental intellieence agency
is to fulfill the intelligence requirements of its own Secretary
or Chief of Staff, as the case maybe. Because of this situation,
it inevitably follows that:
b. Departmental intelligence responsibility in a given field,
such as naval affairs is undeniable. Intelligence estimates in
a field of this kind may easily become "national" in _importance,
but they do not become "national" in character until related to
other "national", not deleEnmental, asneets of the situations from
which t76Y-aFrie. This proce7ra relating all pertinent "national"
aespects of a situation is a truly national intelligence function,
not a collective departuental responsibility, which must be
performed by personnel selected and trained for the purpose, among
whom departmental personnel might profitably be included, provided
they become an organic part of the national intelligence eoehinery,
c. The production of nationally important departmental
intelligence is not: eqUiVanNt-EFITITYFZEZTIoriel-national
IaTIeen'OeeT-Illo contrary prosmaX6E-EFTWAWit In thtoe
-51-55E-57-Eo ectrie-7177117153711WYconcepnliTC17717inal
Tatia over care lesizea intelligence Eoduc
TriarTirduaTIEChave no respons iti-Mr, or e ? ence 7214?
Th-F7iroCia4 701T-IRMITence synTheirs?arThe-Tia ion, ever:?
d. The factor of timeliness in the production of intelligence
is important at all leVas.--This is no less true at the national
level. The proposed arrangalmt would interpose two additional
layers in the review and coordination process, namely the IAC Staff,
and the assembled IAC. Even if this were sound in theory, it would
be monstrous in practice and tend to reduce the intelligence process
to an hiatorical process. Tileliness would not be a characteristic
ef national intelligence under such procedures.
e. 'I:he principle of collective responsibility on 2m:bas
inevitably invites the paiticipants to consider and assume responsi-
bility for all aspects of the estimate, not merely those inthin his
--9914fieettift
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
? Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
_
jartieular departneneal fields of responsibility and competence*
elect this prinesple gives each agency an eoual voice on
,esues outside its nereel responsibilities and competenee.
it fs inescapable under any working principle of collective
aseonsibility to avoid the pitfall that national intelliFilce
;111iiitnerely coordinated intelligence, which in effect is
jeinteintelligence, at the nercy of departmental bias. CIA came
tette being out of the intellieence experience of World War II
herein the JICAITS intellifeace process resulted in reduction
? intallieence to the lowest common denominator.
e. It is the individual responsibilities of the departmental
? ncies to CIA thgrare?Frimportance here, Their individual
esilection effort and -production effort is required m rniBriupport
national intelligence production. The principle of collective
eeenoneibility merely involves them beyond their responsibilities
eel competence and slows down the entire national intelligence
e. eduotion procesJiTA s.
cannot support the principle of collective responsibility
se ani er the bsses in which it permeates the subject seudy. CIA does
eeet assuredly reauire that the individual responsibilities of the
''esartmental agencies to CIA in 77666Fra CIAls mission be recognized
e ,ee-ssecabIy, and be fulfilled on a priority basis upon request by CIA
? the denartment concerned. These departmental responeibilities are
? neeted and included in a proposed National Security Council Intel?
;;.:ence __,Ixel.D'-thir.a...accn_rapnying this eaper.
The assertien In the study that "Experience has indicated
.t the quality of national Intelligence estimates has not substantiaDee.
'-neSeee slnee the issusnee of DSC 50" (1 July 7949) carries with it
-e-,; ens,' onth,t CIA's est:VI at are rplal itativel?y def talent. The
not id- i.ry the source of the etated "experienee", nor
nnture o: t1ie imn 1 ted (11 (ill 4 tp-ft tive clef ci enclns
, chqrt,e that nunwrwranted dupi cation of effort as between
e oes sgencea has continued" cermet possibly apply to national
t:Int "11.Tf. ,..s1 the only 7ency respe)nsil,le for the
.,e os naM on 1 i ron3e.f., the 1..ef, ore ,:luplication of any kind
' st 5-7,a1 b-, st one 17SO inte1Untic titres e Tr.
grAgiiiiiktittr
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/0
2A000200050002-2
however, the assertion applies to all fields of intelligence production,
then it is believed that this assertion is more valid in theory than in
fact. CIA has attempted to negotiate interdepartmental operating procedures
designed to accomplish an interchange of information on projects undertaken
by each of the departmental intelligence agencies. Until very recently
only the Department of State has complied with the procedures. Vhen and
if the procedures become fully operative within each departmental agency,
there will be abasis upon which action can proceed to reduce such duplica-
tion as may arise.
8. The assertion that "continuing disagreement between CIA an the
one hand and the departmental agencies on the other as to the meaning of
national intelligence" is true, as evidenced in subject study. CIA cannot
accept the definition of national intelligence which the subject study
recommends in view of the fact that the definition prescribes the principle
of collective responsibility of the IAC for its production as the critericn
which distinguishes it from all other kinds of intelligence. Accordingly
CIA has re-defined national intelligence in terms of content and end use
and as an individual statutory responsibility of the Director of Central
Intelligence and CIA. A copy of this definition is incorporated in
Section IV, paragraph 1 of our proposed National Security Council intelli-
gence Directive.
9. The study further charges that existing mechanisms and procedures
for production of national intelligence are inadequate on the grounds that
they do not insure its production in accordance with the principle of
collective responsibility. CIA, for reasons expressed under Section
paragraphs 1 through 4 on this principle cannot accept the mechanisms
and procedures recommended by the study. Our proposed ESCID prescribes
mechanisms and procedures which will provide for the more effective
production of national intelligence.
10. The so-called "continuing internal CIA confusion" between its
responsibilities for producing national intelligence and miscellaneous
research and reporting has become an Over-worked catch phrase and actually
stems from external confusion regarding the individual as distinguished
from the collective departmental responsibilities VCIA in support of
national rnIreigi7ice production. As long as the departmental agencies
neglect to meet their individual responsibilities to CIA, then CIA is
required to engage in the production of such miscellaneous intelligence
as may be necessary to provide the intelligence basis and framework required
in the production of national intelligence estimates.
III. Conclusions
1. Assertions in the study are not supported in fact and contain
implications whiCh should be clarified prior to referral of the issue
raised by this study to the NSC.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/
-01082A000200050002-2
2. The principle of collective responsioility of the IAC for the
production of national intelligence is contrary to the National Security
Act of 1947 as amended, and thus has no basis in lau. This principle
has been disavowed by the National Security Council in NEC 50 dated
1 July 1949, and is invalid on the grounds that it violates the concept
of a strong Central Xntalligence Agency, as it removes the control and
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence over mechanisms presently
available to him to discharge responsibilitl.es for uMch he is held solely
responsible by law. It also imposes duties upon the departnental agencies
which exceed their legal responsibilities and actual competence.
(Signed)
R. H. Nillenhoetter
R. H. HILLENK0317111
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
40140K+Rhi
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
25 Znly 1950
PpIONkil 8,13GPIVIIT COME., DITELLIGRICE DMECTIVE
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the Xational Security
Act of 1947, as amended? and for the purposes enunciated in paragraPhs
(d) and (e) thereof, the Zational Security Council hereby anthorizes
and directs that the following policies, duties and responsibilities
will govern the conduct of United States intelligence activities in
the interest of national eecurity. The recommendations of the Central
intelligence Agency, required by Section 102 (d) (2), on matters con-
cerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and
a!ekncies ag relate to national security, will, ehen approved by the
National Security Council? issue so amendments or supplements to this
Direetive.
;ar1tV4icAi2n
1. The jurisdiotion of the Central Intelligence Agency'
eMbraces all intelligence activities of the Government relating
to the national security. .The Central Intelligence Agency shall
have no police, sybpoena? or lav enforcement powers, or internal
security functions.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
IL The Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelllence
WY.
1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall fuaction within
his juriediction as the intelligence officer of the National Security
Council and as its executive agent for the purpose of coordinating
the intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies
of the Government.
2. The neceseary authority is hereby delegated by the
members of the National Security Council to the Director of Central
Intelligence, so that his decisions, orders and directives concerning
the intelligence activities of the Government shall be considered as
emanating from them, in their executive capacity, and Shall have full
force and ffect as such, provided that any agency shall have access,
through appropriate channels, to the National Security Council, in
connection with such directives.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence or representatives
designated by him Shall make Bud' surveys and inspections of de?
partmental intelligence activitiee and faeilities of the various
departments and agencies of the Government as he mgy deem necessary
in connection with his duty to advise the National Security Connell
and to make recomaendations for or to bring about the coordination
or improvemeat of intelligence activities. This authority is subject
to the provisions of Section 102 (e) of the National Security Act
of 19470 as amended, regeroBng the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Approved For Release 1
? ? ,fit. A r?
1082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
4. The Central Intelligence Agency shall function under the
Director of Central Intelligence as the intelligence facility of
the President of the United States and the National Security
Council.
5. The Director of Central Intelligence Shall be responsible
far the protection of intelligence sources and methods. from un-
authorized disclosure.
III. Coordination of Intelligence Activities
1. Coordination of intelligence activities by the Central
Intelligence Agency Mall be designed primarily to strengthen the
entire governmental irtelligence structure and to achieve a fully
integrated United States intelligence effort in objective support
of policy planning, strategic planning, and operational decisions
at all appropriate levels within the Government. A fully integrated
intelligence effort is considered to mean thatz
a. the in igenee production effort of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the departmental intelligence agencies
is continuously oriented tanard the requirements of United
States national security interests and dhjectives.
b. the intelligeree collection and source exploitation
effort of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other
344#45timir
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
? 4 1
intelligence agencies effectively meets the requirements and
priorities of the intelligence production effort.
co all categories of intelligenoe requirements bearing an
the national security are specificalky identified and defined
and the responsibilities for collection and production are
appropriately allocated throughout the governmental intelligence
structmre.
do the interchange of intelligence, intelligence informa-
tions, and other information which has utility for intelligenae
pmrposes is effected between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the other intelligence agencies under appropriate security
provisions prescribed by the Director ce Central Intelligence.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for
The coordination of intelligence activities to meet the foregoing
objectives.
3. In accordance with Section 303 of the National Security
Act of 1947, as amended, the Direetor of Central Intelligence sir
appoint such advisory committees and empley suCh part-to advisory
personnel as he may deem necessary in carrying out the functions
of the Agency.
C1414T-REffItt.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/
A000200050002-2
170 production and Diaames reteen of mance the Central
1. National intelligence is that intelligence needed at the
appropriate levels of the Goverment in the formulation and execution
of national policies. National Intelligence shall be produced only
by the Central Intelligence Agency, and *Ian be produced primarily
for the President and the National Security Council, and for other
departments and agencies of the Government as appropriate. In the
production of Rational Intelligence, the Central Intelligence
Agency may draw upon and review the intelligence production of
the departmental intelligence agencies. The Director of Central
Intelligence will not be bound by any concept of collective
responsibility in the production of National Intelligence, as he
has the direct and sole responsibility for such production.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency shall also produce intelligence
not otherwise available 'which is required to support the Central Intel-
ligence Agency production and operations as well as those of other
appropriate governmental agencies.
3. Normally the Central Intelligence Agency will, prior to
publication for general disseainatian, request the appropriate
departmental intelligence, agencies to examine Central Intelligence
Agency reports and estimates for the purpose of ascertaining depart-
mental views on aspects which are related to their respective
-4444s1144._
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/09
-6-
2A000200050002-2
individual departmental or agency intelligence interests0 intelli-
gence so examined shall carry a statement of agency concurrence
therein, or a comment which sets forth the substantial points of
difference; provided, that delays in the receipt by the Central
Intelligence Agency of such comments shall not bar the timely
dissemination of national intelligence.
4. The Central intelligence Agency shall disseminate intelli-
gence and information in its possession to the President, members
of the National Security Council and to other departments and agencies
of the Government, whenever such dissemination is appropriate to
their functions relating to the national security. Such dissemina-
tion shall be made under security regulations and procedures established
by the Director of Central Intelligence.
5. The Director of Central Intelligence may exchange intelligence
and intelligence information with appropriate representatives of
foreign governments in accordance with established policies.
V. Additional of the Central intelligence Agency
1. The Central Intelligence Agency shAll perform, for the
benefit of the intelligence organizations of the Government, such
additional services of common concern as the National Security
Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
-WM*Mitt--
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-R
082A000200050002-2
and such other functions and duties related. to intelligence
affecting the national security as the NatLonal Security Council
may from time to time direct.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence may make arrangements
with the respective departments and agencies to &Beim to the Central
Intelligence Agency sudh experienced and qualified officers and
meMbers as may be of advantage for advisory, operational, ar other
purposes, in addition to sudh personnel as the Director of Central
Intelligence may directly emplcry In each cams, such departmmatal
persoraiel will be subject to the necessary personnel procedures of
the Central Intelligence Agency and the department concerned. Such
personnel muat be acceptable to the Central Intelligence Agency and
responsible solely to the Director of Central intelligence during
the period of their assignment.
VI. Resonsibilities of Governmental REREEtsti and Agencies
*he Cena1 VIIrie-r---lestAgen4
10 Subject to the special proviso of Section 102(e) of the
National SecuritY Act of 1947, as amended, regarding the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, all departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment shall make available to the Central intelligence Agency all
intelligence, intelligence information and other information, which
has utility for intelligence purposes in their possession. Such
lv-5=411?Igir
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 :
79-01082A000200050002-2
material shall be made available to the Central Intelligence
Agency regardless of its source* To this end, the so-called
"Third Agency Rule", which provides that classified information
originating in one agency 'hell not be disseminated outside the
receiving agency without the consent of the originating agency, is
specifically abrogated insofar as the Central Intelligence Agency-
is concerned.
20 Each of the departments and agencies of the Oovammemet
shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency 8321 with each
other, as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a
continuing interchange of intelligence information aad intelligenoe
available to them. "Operational" information and scientific,
technological, diplomatic, and other information which has utility
for intelligence purposes is included in this directive, as mil
as information available only under special security handling
restrictions. The flow of such material shall be immediate,
spontaneous and comprehensive.
3. In cases where the originating agency requests that special
security considerations govern the dissemination of speoific material
to third agencies, suah requests will be given the maximum considera-
tion by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall be complied with
to the maxima extent which the Director of Central Intelligence
&hall determine is compatible with the national security..
Approved For Release
9/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2
:n@NIADDITIAL
-9-
40 The departments and agencies of the Government shall provide,
produce or collect euch intelligence and information in their fields
or primary responsibility as the Central Intelligence Agency may
request for its use or for that of one of the other departments or
agencies. Upon determination by the Central Intelligence Agency
that agy department or agency so requested does not have the
capability to fulfill sudh a request, the Central Intelligence
Agency shall take direct action to meet its aeedp. Within the
limits of their capabilities, the departments and agenoies shell
provide, produce or collect such additional intelligence and informa-
tion in other fields as may be requested by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
S. In order that the Central Intelligence Agency may adequOaly
discharge its responsibilities to the President and the National
Security Council, timely departmental action in meeting Central
intelligenne Agency commitments and deadlines is imperative. Upon
specific request of the Director of Central Intelligence, first
priority shall be given bY each department or agency to his require-
ments for collection, production, and the comments on Central Intelligence
Agency reports and estimates.
444iiivieRffli-Le
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79-01082A000200050002-2