NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 1 MARCH 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 1, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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mmetities
NEAR EAF,T/t4-)3..X.,,,-, DIVISION
OFFICE. Of' Ft.EFO?rit-S L,N1) ISTXMATES
CEN'IltAL, INTF,I,LICrENCE AGENCY
MAR 1 1950
WOIKflG PiPER
NOTICE: Tivis tiocuirentl LE; "kv,rking paper, trt
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4??????11.11.111111.0
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NE14.E.
EASTAiIC DIVISION
INV41,1GF.;N 17, SUMMARY
For \.4reek Ending
1. Mai': eh 11)50
TA1314E OF CONTENTS
Sunday's elections ? .
No single warty lik.cly dornicate th-r., new parliamont
s m r
Vol. V No. S
LIE
Church moderates :ss tad . .
Arebbishop p!' O3i:.Lnprot...se, at:r2eenle..ut with UK
TIM riots in Astnra . . ? . . . . . . 2
Moslem-Copt vioLneE:dds tr, st?ains
Internal security dangers . . . . ? .?, ? ? .
liazinara .1nd others', c?,.11_-press12:6]it c)v.,.IT situation
? ?
3
The Bengal issue ? ..... _ ? _ _ ........ 4
Comxnuiral disturtr2tFiliccl,.. new imer-dDrninion ilarcup
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Turkey, Svidi Anbia
NO(
5
? . ? . ? ..... . ....
CONFIDENTIAL
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NEAR EASTIEMICA 'Neu. IGENCE SUMMARY
Swedes's elections!. The netional elect-len scheduled far 5 Marches
Greece's first since 1946--ivill probehly fail to establish the leader-
ship of any one party or geese", with ilia result that a new electioe
may be called for in a relatively fee, months. The majority of the
votes will probably gravitate, as 111 Oka past, toward the two established :
major parties, the centrist Venizeice Liberals and the rightist Tsaldaris
Populists, Under the peonoriAonal represestation system being used,
however, the welter of smaller parties, also in the race will probably
divide up a sufficient number of the 250 setts at stake to prevent any
single party from foeminga cebinet itseif. Inasmuch as the old
Liberal -Populist coaliticn will be hard to revive, the result is likely
to be the most intense poitieiM341vetwerirg seen in Greece since its
liberation.
Unless the leteof-ceriter PleeetrassTsouderos group makes
too serious an inroad, the Liberals ileay supplant the Populists as the
largest single party, since Populist leader Tsalda,ris is handicapped
by recent defections from his party and by dissatisfaction with his
leadership on the part of other pellet's-Ansi-whose help he might need.
Although Venizelos may tie able to gain the ooperation d two or
three minor groups nese to his Liteiral Perty, and thus have a slightly
better chance than esnyona Is te 7..eisiri workins coalition, no single
party leader stands out es a. kgia cc1e ior the premiership. Among
the minor parties which the posit cin eabinet will have to take
into account, the mos( importeit beeides that of Plastiras is the modoes
ate rightist Papandreou group. In addition, e considerable segment
of popular suppoet will ge i hf&win linear' groups, ranging from
that of the extreme rightist. Merit &skis to Sofianoixsulos'- "Dentecratic
Front" at the left edge f the legal pele. The maneuvering ca. any of .
these groups may have critical iselluence on the balance of power.
such a situation succeeded in preventire yeBective and reasonably
stable government firom e.reergigig, icing would probably not wait
long beore cflthg ifor e new election in which he would urge Marshal
Papagos to participate.
CYPRUS
steed: As euli o Communist pressure of
for greete-r 'militancy oril th?,, "tvaitn -3,10 Crece" (aapsJ) issue, the
Cyprus Church as leader the mc,,v&inent now seems eager to
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reach a compromise with Greet Britoir. Archbishop Makarios has
announced his willingness to eccept any British promise to give the
island its freedom after ten years; at the same time he has rejected
the Communist proposals to sand a united delegation to the UN and
European capitals to spread caosis poopaganda, and as a face-saving
alternative he plans to send his own delegation to Western European
capitals alone. Meanwhile there are indications that both Greece
and the Cyprus Church would be egreeable to British retention of
military bases and perhaps to British proteetion of Cyprus, if ems's.
should become a reality. While the ,Thurcla is exposing itself to the
change of being less mllint than the Communists on the issue, it
would gain considerable local prestige at Cemmunist expense by now
obtaining a definite coramitm:,r4 for the lettere, since immediate union
is out of the question. The Turkisheverneeent, opposed to any
change in the status wee 11 tal?li 3 time, might well be less strongly
opposed to a definite pleciee which seeved to postpone the issue for
the next critical decade. n that per,eti Communist influence in
Cyprus may be expected to decline ao the colonial development pro-
gram increases economic stability end eaises tha star lard of living
and as Cypriot political matueity is improved with greater literacy
and more experience in interim self-government. (In the same period,
meanwhile, the uncertainities ef the clyeek situation might be largely
resolved.) While the British have recently reiteeated their position
that the issue is entirely closed, the more conciliatory attitude of the
Church may persuade them that a fresh approach, in the nature of a
new offer of limited kept seir-goverrrament, might be desirable.
ENTREA
riottajr_LA.matm: Th a reaantt lrup e Moslem-Christian violence
In Asma.ra--eyidently touched oil by the muzder of a minor Moslem
official by pr -Ethiopiae bailees ,and m atteck on his funeral procession
by Christian Copts adds nett to tin already tense situation. Hitherto
the principal cause o? uneest th Eriteta has been political, with the pro
-
Ethiopian Copts ranged :4-,ietistei the pen-independence Moslems and
Italians. Recent repeeis,teetreeer, telicate that the Moslems have
defected trom the independence bloc, opparently fearing Italian as
much as Ethiopian domination, and this latest instance of Copt violenee,
directed against a. group whese obiectives are now unclear,
May in part represent an efLrotit i 1ienee the 1Thi Commission of
Inquiry now in Asma.ra. Menwhile te Iteetens have not been idle in
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supporting the liadeperaderace bix, anc,, with Moslem-Copt fegling at
fever pitch, the sLuation is likely to /A ,.urbo_ent, for some tirfaeto
corne.
IRAN
Inymial security dangers! Sereral leeeilng Ieanian figures have
recently asserted that populae unrest lonerated by itilais S depressed
economic situation and spur reI on by the pro -Soviet Tudeh underground
Is reachiing threatening prepo3tiors el).4 may soor get out (..e hand.
They include Chief. of Staff Resenara, eltio contends that the situation
has developed 0 a point wher( the at-my ea. no longer contain Tudeh
resurgence, sit ee the undeely rg caust is widespread economic distress,
and that he would hesitate. to eeurtt eernmon soldier, who is
drawn from the Masses. shoal a poreler seg e of resentment against
the government develop. Moeeover, ithe Oriental Secretary of the
British Embassy'beileves deaf the Tedeit PaEty is now in a position
at least to attempt :a conp d'etat and 'CIS Ambeseador Wiley considers
the situation daragerous
These statements canretb entirely discounted ever though
Razmara.;Lnd other Iranian lm.ders rely be cenggerating their fears
in an attempt to gain direct Ur suppce t Set ittOUS distress and unrest
are known to exist in certain eerasitive areaea The Tudeh Party has
increased its activities in spire of feet that it has been outlawed
aad is operating under colitis ef inertial law --indicating thabiliy
of Me array to cope with et leest thin phase zd subversion. In the
iigha of what tangible evidenc,,' aveiteble, however, Razmara does
seem to be overstating the immediacy et the subversive danger The
Tudeh Party, 'while it'has elneern in& !././ ed eigns of vitality in recent
months, has still to demonstrate ,,ess eeadiness to move on from the
printing press 0 the, pinket line of the barricade. In the absence of
general reSiSfanCe to the governenertee aothority, it is difficult to
believe that the armed foree; 7.tssisteei as they could be by the tribes,
would prove unable to retain (;ontlrOl
The current state ef af.faire, epeetheless, does represent a
challenge to the Iranian Goya Talle ilt , anmraic pressure should be
somewha$. lessened by summe wher te,e neree elfects si seven-Year
Economic Development Peewee:et epee'etierts should be felt annd the new
crops will be in.' Ihileee exVeloreiree t clieC messures are taken
;Of ar:NTIAL
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4.
betore then, however, the government may be confronted not only
with sporadic local protests but also with a growing resentment
among the population and a Zalling away of large number or those
who have hitherto supported the regime bet:ause of their belief in
Its promises of economic rePlorm. Muanwhile, the Tudeh Party,
which already appears to be getting as well as moral sup-
port from the USSR, will undoubtedly Capit aliz e on this situation.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
',rho Bengal issue: The recent counnunal -disturbances in Bengal are
at the moment :overshadnwing even th.Q Kashmir dispute in their
efffect upon India-Pakistan yelatiorp. Thus far the extent and immediate
cause Of the disturbances are not entirely clear, although it is know_
? that lives have been taken and property destroyed first ip East Bengal
and then in West Bengal arid that a limited tlirUALS Of the minority corn-
munity has octurred 'in both provinces. Whatever the facts e the ?
situationfr Bengal itself may be, h.owver, the subject of OCrlY1131/3111.1
outbreaks there has aroused violelat feelingsiti Nw Delhi which
have now been echoed i Karachi:. ,Qaoting an Indian titicial in East
Bengal to the efgect that fear for tlreir &ultvival might lead to attempts
at mass migration by the pr6v.iiace,' 12 milhou Hindus, high offiaals
of the Indian Government have got*& tt, express both concern lest
widespread Communal viutenco reedit thzotighout India and their resent
--
mad over th# Pakistan Primt Miiister's gefusai either to tour the
provinces in peaeson' with Nehru 4Ye lc poring; jrAnt commissions to do
so. Pakistan A first diRmissed 1idlis Bergli proposals as unneces-
sary, recommendin simply that hoth governments take steps to pre-
vent {_further emigrat!-on. Howevee, Prime Minister Liaquat All
Igka.n has no* reportedly joinod the (o-iotroversy with a statement
asserting that Indh kfas been guilIF (4': provocative lies in) the Bengal
'Wale and warnirg that "if India 7wazOs war she will 7'ind us fully pre-
pared." It is possible, as suggested IV British observers, that
India may be deliberately (overstating the gravity cif the Ituatinn th
order to entbarrass Pakistan tig the 1.1N Secairity Co-ufncii deliberations
on Kashmir, alid the re3tiveness:hinolug East Bengal's Hindus may :
have been heightened by agentA 4: die Indiarg Council tor the Protectioq
of the Rights of_Z Mirtotitiesi. No4:?erthe1ass, teeliaggs ri the subject,?
pa.rticUlarly or India pan sigaziently intense to make the
Issue a rstenttally explosive ctga,,
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5.
Althouich it constitutes a very_grtnt a. severely' stained
t"comY, the 1:1rge f.rapprIgirri:017 f,;1:3 million) 1950-51 NEnistry of
Nteional Defense budtrt apprrpri.-A1,1,1 ttas t,eezi approved bv the
Turkish Grand Naional Ass,-,,mbly. The politically realistic Turks
obviously still 'feel that their p-)silon '._1?41.-0.:ation to the USSR is
insecure, and that the co vtinuad nss.,,..rnption cc heavy deense costs
?
despite substantial US i& isAs iece,,s:-try ir the coming year as
it has been in the past.
ktApilasti te '''
nsion ..atNvec-ri Turk, 7 and Bulgari, which
recently led the TurkishRoz sign MiA ;Car. f,'.) suggest the possibility
a'', closing Turkeys consglar ile ulraria, Turkey has so tar
made no move it follow US 161d in bking diplomatic relaions.
The Turks wzgretted that: Buigan actions_ m:ade such a move on the
part of the US lec?ssary,, bccau.vi. Eppar.intly f.urtherc:d a Soviet
plan to aliminsite. US ohs Vi from 64.Latries. Since
Turkey is the only nstion :1st( with western democracies
whkh has a commen boreieE with Bug -.1141., lad still maintains
diplomatic relltilons with thli t&i 1h ; Tuecs may hesitate to break
oil those relations until 1316k ina2girc: car:till estimate, of how much
hxformation might thereby bc
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The appointment o;', Husein Ala in Prime Minster Sae 's iier cabinet_
to the post of Foreign Minister, should 1?esult_ in a more realistic
approach on the part of Iran in its relations with the US, especially
in its eitorts to obtain geeater US aid. Having represented his govern-
ment in Washington for many yzam, Ala is ccmversant with US policy
and procedures. He is, moreover, a icse advisor of the Shah.
The election of Reza Hekmat ti prdency of the recently elected
Majlis by a strong rnajoriliy cOVV: pro-Liltisb deputy Taheri and the
election o2 Rasa n Taqizadrh t1.7 the przsi.dency of the Senate augur
poorly for favorable action on1.1e A.I0C agreement,. The Shah is insist-
ing that the sgreement be prestmted without prior attempt to e)btain
further concessions from the British, apparently ill order to give
the matter a "pariliamentairy aiying" An.d ,)lace the responsibility
or rejection of the agreement ton the M411.s.
anOlitrr
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