SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000300020005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 29, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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29 August 1950
SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
1. Communist Chinalsnote to the UN Secur .ty
Council. 4_chi the US with are sio?ainst Formosa
represents the latest Soviet maneuver to weaken the
Communist front in the UN and to obstruct SC action on
Korea, The Chinese Communist charge is a logical, develop-
ment of Soviet propagandistic efforts, within and outside of
the SC,, to label the US, particularly for Asiatic eyes, as
an aggressor`
(Page 4. )
2. here has boon no?_imiMort ,n.t increase recent
.Communist a ctivity jnWest Germ ny except Inthe' field of
E epa ane Soviet agents approximately 1500 in West
Germany probably have agitation and espionage, rather than
sabotage, missions.
(Page 5 )
3. One shame nt of Anr can m bdenum 3s kno?u
to have yreached the USSR thru an illegal transsha~amentt,
A second shipment of American molybdenum plus a shipment of
French cobalt may also reach the USSR by similar channels,
(Page 6 )
4. the USSR and Burma nave a ro d to x~ha e
ambassadors, according to a Foreign Office announcement in
Rangoon on 22 August. The two countries extended mutual
recognition on 1.8 February 1918 and Burma initiated negotia-
tions for the exchange of representatives at least as early
OCUMENY'""~ n
NEXT flEV4EUq DATE.
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as December 1949, Both the USSR and Communist China apparent-
iy withheld closer relations with the Burmese Government until
it became evident that the Burmese Communists were not powerful
enough to establish a government which might be safely recog-
nized. A Soviet mission in Rangoon can be expected to encourage
and exploit Burmats policy of "neutrality," its suspicion of
the West, and the leftist tendencies of influential non-Communist
Burmese leaders, both within and outside of the present Govern-
ment.
GENERAL
5. A by-product of World War II and the present
alignments of Western Europe with the United States has been
the emergence of the Communist countries as the chief traffickers
in weapons.
(Page 7 )
6.
allay ,r to Czechoslovakia to force Czech adherence to terms of
1950 trade agreement.
(Page 7 )
FINLAND
7. now Social Democrat-sponsored Finnish wage
offensive led off this week with a strike in the Metal Workerst
Union. Strikes by other unions, including the vital Lumber
Workers: Union, are scheduled to follow on 2 September. The
Sweden has sus ended shipments of vital ferro-
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Social Democrats probably saw in the Governmentts institution
of price controls on 1 August an opportunity for the Communists
to claim that the Government, by delaying increases in the cost
of 1 ving index, was attempting to prevent wage increases. The
Social Democrats have thus moved first to keep the initiative
in wage demands out of the hands of the Communists.
Vory probable additional Social Democratic
motives were to make the Kekkonen Government appear incompetent
and to raise their own stock among the workers in preparation
for the communal elections of 1-2 October. During the period
of pro-strike negotiations between government and labor,
Kekkonen informed the Diet and the Government would reimpose
wage control at the level created by the Fagerholr agreement,
if a peaceful settlement to the wage disputes could not be
reached. The bourgeois majority in the Diet gave the Cabinet
a vote of confidence on this statement with the Social
Democrats and Communists voting solidly in opposition.
tTG0SIAVIA
$. Froscts of a Yugoslav-Greek rapprochement
nc
are littleimiroved. but there has been a definite ameliora-
tion of Yugoslav xelationswith both Itaiyy_ and Austria.
F ~. (Pago $ ~
INTERNATIONAL COI NNNISM-
FROPAGlLND11 ANALYSIS
9, The WWorld Student Lo_nM:2ss__of the International
Union of Students Just concluded in Prauevirtually ignored
,functional issues o# primer interest to students and, instead,
confined itself to an endorsement of the "peace" campaign,
condemnation of US aggression in Korea, and a demand that the
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UN Security Council immediately undertake a peaceful settle-
ment of the Korean question.
(Pago 10 )
10. The Presidium of the World Committee of Peace
Partisans announced aatt the conclusion f its Prague 2etin
that the Second World Con ross of. Peace Partisans would moot
in Brita n from Novombor.12 to 12. The Congress- originally
planned for Italy, had already been shifted once, to Warsaw,
where it was scheduled to meet from October 16 to 21.
(Pago I )
hinoZCo. munistchar,.ges of US aggression "B"
designc d to confuse Korean issue
Corrnzunist China ' s note to the UN Security
Council, charging the US with aggression against Formosa,
represents the latest NS
manouvor to weaken the non-
Communist front in the UN and to obstruct Security Council
action on Korea, The Chinese Communist charge is a logical
dovelopmont of Soviet propagandistic efforts, within and
outside of the Security Council, to label the US, particular-
ly for Asiatic eyes, as an aggressor. The latest Peiping
protest that US and British planes have bombed. Chinese
territory is apparently intended further to substantiate
Soviet al.logations of US aggression.
The USSR probably hopes by bringing the issue
of Formosa before the Security Council at this time to: (1)
confuse the issue of Communist aggression in Korea; (2) drive
a wedge botwoon the US and Asiatic powers by attempting to
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SEC ET
fan the flames of Asian suspicions and resentment of Western
imperialism and colonialism; (3) weaken the unanimity between
the US on the one hand, and the UK and France who have not
favored the US stand on Formosa; (4) Focus upon the US the
blame for possible Chinese frustration arising from the
obstruction of their plans to invade Formosa.
The introduction of the Chinese issue at this
time is a further indication that USSR has no intention of
resuming its boycott at the end of the month. Since its
presidency expires then, the USSR probably intends to employ
the Chinese demand as a new pretext to obstruct Security
Council action on Korea. If it can succeed in broadening
the UN discussions to include Formosa as well as Korea, the
USSR may hope to effect a compromise settlement of the Korean
problem on the basis of Western concessions regarding Formosa.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
No importantSoviet-GDR action has. acponjj2aie "B"
increased pro . ~_anc.a ho f: litY toaWes Germ
Although references to West Germany in the
recent speeches of East German officials retain the high
degree of hostility introduced at the Socialist Unity Party
Congress, there has boon no important increase in Communist
activity in West Germany except in the field of propaganda,
Communist reaction to increased Allied and-Wost German restric-
tions (suppression of Communist newspapers, more numerous
arrests, and banning of demonstrations) has boon limited to
propaganda and unsuccessful-attempts-to organize local strikes.
A few West German policemen, however,, have boon injured in
clashes with "peace demonstrators," and the Communists continue
to insist that they will hold a Free German Youth rally of
100,000 in Dortmund in late September. (The rally has been
banned by the local authorities). The Communists, who are
reportedly transferring newspaper files and printing machine
ownership titles to party members in order to evade possible
seizure, are apparently preparing for illegal publishing
activities.
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There has boon a recent increase in the number of
Soviet and East German agents entering West Germany. It is
estimated that there are now approximately 1500 agents. operating
in the Gorman Federal Republic. They are believed to have agita-
tion and espionage, rather than sabotage, missions. Reportedly,
they are to place special emphasis on increasing fear in West
Germany and on the collection of economic Intelligence. While
these agents increase the Communist capability for sabotage,
the Communists are unlikely to embark on a widespread sabotage
campaign in the near future. They are undoubtedly aware that
widespread sabotage could be undertaken only once and at the
cost of the destruction or serious crippling of their entire
subversive machine by Allied and West German retaliatory
action. (SECRET)
Thru ill al transshi .s opts "All
cobalt and i-.iojZbdonurn p-ay reach USSR
The wrench have issued an export license for an
order of 5$080 kgs. of cobalt notal by a British firm and
intended to be shippod to Eastern Europe. This same firm
succeeded in transshipping 144 barrels of naerican molybdenum
to the USSR in May 1950, It has also been reliably reported
that a Brussels `.m is trying to arrange a second transship-
ment of 200 tons of Liorican molybdenum through Switzerland
to the Soviets.
Molybdenum and cobalt are two of the USSR's most
scarce industrial raw materials. The transshipment of the
molybdenum in May is most serious; the acquisition of those
metals represents a significant addition to the Soviet poton.
tial for war. (SECRET)
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EASTERN EUROPE
Comrmn st ee l of E .n inhc rnatianal arms traffic "Bit
A by-product of World War II and the present
alignments of Western Europe with the United States has boon
the emergence of the Cornunist countries as the chief traf-
fickers in weapons, Insufficient capacity in France, embargoes
by Switzorland and Sweden on weapons, prohibitions in Germany
and Italy, and strict regulations by the US and UN, have left
Soviet Orbit sources,, particularly Czechoslovakia, the only
producers willing to sell armaments on reasonable terms to all
comers with no questions asked. Furthermore, the Soviet hand
has been visible in the clandestine export of surplus arms
and stocks of older models from other sources.
In addition to fomenting political unrest, arms
and munitions make an excellent exchange item by supplying
the Soviet Bloc with readily convertible currencies. Principal
buyers have boon dissident groups or'small neutral countries in
the more backward parts of the world. such as Ethiopia, Israel,
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Egypt.
The high rate and improved quality of military
production in Czechoslovakia and other (Orbit countries pro-
vides a constant stock of material for ready sale. The effects
of Orbit military supplies have already been evidenced in the
conflicts of the Middle East and the increasing tension between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, (SECRET)
Sweden discontinues Ferro-alloy shipments
to Czechos lovakia
Shipments of forro alloys to Czechoslovakia have
ngu
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been suspended by Sweden because of the Czechts failure to
import the amount of nonessential goods scheduled under the
annual trade agreement signed 1 February 1950: Under this
pact Sweden is to deliver 50 tons of fcrro.-vanadium, 400 tons
of forromtungsten, 280 tons of forro-chromium and 120 tons of
forro-silicon, all of vital importance to the Czech iron and
stool industry.
The Swedish action is similar to that which
occurred in the fall of 1949 when shipments of high grade iron
ore were halted temporarily until the Czechs increased non-
essential imports. The selection of forro-alloys, rather than
iron ore or ball bearings, as a lever to force Czechoslovakian
adherence to the trade agreement is probably due to the in-
creased supply of Soviet ore to the Czech industry and to the
growing competitive Western European shipments of ball bearings?
Czechoslovakia undoubtedly will increase non-essential imports
to meet Swedish demands, because the Czech iron and stool
industry must have a constant supply of Swedish forro-alloys.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
YUGOSLAVIA
Yu slar,rul.r iongy w .tn non Coninform
neiEhbors_ irnrove
Prospects of a Yugoslav-Greek rapprochement are
little improved, but there has boon a definite amelioration
of Yugoslav relations with both Italy and 1' ustria. British
efforts to bring Greece and Yugoslavia to the point of ex
changing Ministers bogged down over the Macedonian issue oven
before the fall of the Plastiras Government, and Tito will
probably be loss willing to come to terms with the new Govern-
ment than he was with the old.
The Yugoslavs have protested that they genuinely
desire to exchange Ministers with Greece, and would also like
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to confer with Athens on the resumption of post and rail corn-
munications, as well as on the granting of visas for Yugoslav
representatives to visit the Salonika free port. Although the
Greeks apparently also app:Mciato the wisdom of an improve-
mont in relations, they would be unlikely to consider oven
relatively minor issues without assurances from Tito that he
will not again stir up tension over Macedonia, Because Tito
appears unwilling to renounce his Macedonian aspirations at
this trine, the present tension will probably continue, especial-
ly in view of the fact that the Venizolos Government will-be no
less adamant on Macedonia than its predecessor.- Moreover, while
the problem of the 9,000 Greek children in Yugoslavia has not
figured in recent discussions, Titots promise to return only
63 of than is not calculated to improve relations greatly.
Meanwhile, tension with Italy is relaxing. British Undersecretary
Davios, on his recant visit to Rome, spoke with Foroign-Ministor
Sforoa and found a marked improvement in the atmosphere, which
he, attributed to dormancy of the Trieste issue, as wall as
easing of traffic restrictions between the Allied and Yugoslav
Zones of Trieste and the cessation of the Yugoslav practice of
requiring Italians working in Zone A to convert their lira,
hold%gs'into Yugoslav dinars at a loss. At the same time,
Romots increasing awareness of the importance of Yugoslaviags
position to Italian defense plans will probably stimulate the
Government to seek more amicable relations with Yugoslavia.
Relations with Austria have, meanwhile, continued
to improve largely because of the Tito-Soviet break, The
Yugoslavs have ceased pressing their claims against the Austrians
in the state treaty now being negotiated, have sought economic
aid from Austria, and have rofrainod from stirring up dissension
among the Slovene Carinthians. Yugoslavia has also requested and
obtained consent to establish liaison offices at Klagenfurt and
Graz to perform consular functions, a freer movement of traffic
is permitted, and a friendlier atmosphere has boon aided by such
events as the visit of the Yugoslav football team to Klagenfurt
and the performance of the Vienna Philharmonic at Belgrade.
(SECRET)
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INTERNATIOTNNALCMMUNISM - PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS
Pra_ u.e ygtudenLS p orforms rout .no function
o endorsing mace c?1"i,,:~ 4gn
The World Student Congress of the International
Union of Students just concluded in Prague virtually ignored
functional issues of primary interest to students and, instead,
confined itself to an endorsement of the "peace" canpaign,
condemnation of US aggression in Korea, and a demand that the
UN Security Council. immediately undertake a peaceful settlement
of the Korean question, The Congress also roconmondod the
establishment of peace committees in every university, faculty,
and school and suggested that "student week" from 10-17 November
be devoted to the widest popularization of the results of the
IUS congress and the peace efforts?
Organizationally, the Union emorgod from the
Congress minus the. membership of Yugoslavia, whose expulsion
it confirmed, but with twenty-five new members from West of
the Tron Curtain. The Congress was marked by protests against
the policies of the IUS leadership from the delegations of
England, Scotland, Doirunrk, and South Africa, supported by
organizations with observer status from Now- Zealand and the
ITS (National Student Association). However, there also wore
National Delegates from each of those countries who supported
the Congress majority. Soviet propaganda publicized these
disagreements, apparently for the purpose of giving the Congress
a semblance of free and democratic discussion. Despite a previous
vote of-censure against the chief British delegate, Stanley '
Jenkins, he was elected a vice-president of the organization.
While the Prague Congress may have helped to con-
vince some of the Western delegates that further cooperation
with the International. Union of Students is useless, it is not yet
clear whether this disillusionment will result in the withdrawal
of any of the Western organizations. It does not appear, however,
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that such a withdrawal of non-Corriunist student organizations
would greatly weaken the IUS as a mouthpiece for Moscow Propa-
ganda. (SECRET)
Second World Peale Can ress mec~tint? site shifted nBti
The Presidium of the World Committee of Peace
Partisans announced at the conclusion of its Prague meeting that
the: Second World Congress of Peace Partisans would moot in
Britain from November 13 to 1.9. The Congress, originally planned
for Italy, had already boon shifted once to Warsaw - where it
was scheduled to moot from October 16 to 21.
It seems likely that one reason for the move to
London may be a desire to give the Congress a lWostern't color-
ation and make it more attractive to Western audiences. This
is borne out by the general propaganda tactic of the peace
campaign as illustrated by the final resolution of the Prague
moo-Ling. The resolution did not blomo any nation for the
Korean war, but called on the. UN Security Council (aI,onsisting
of t ho legal ropresontativcs - of the five groat poworst~) to Ind
a peaceful solution in Korea,, demanded the withdrawal of all
foreign troops from Korea, the cessation of "foreign inter-
vention by force of arms in the internal affairs of any peoplett
and the general restrictions and control of all arms. The
phrase 1?control of all arms" was added to answer Western
criticism of the peace cempaignts concentration on atomic
weapons only. At the some time,, an outright condemnation of
any of the Western Powers was avoided so as not to offend
potential Western supporters.
Thus, the shift of the Congress from Warsaw to
London is simply an additional device for carrying the campaign
directly into the Western camp. In case the British government
should refuse to issue visas for the delegates,, this could be
used as a further demonstration of the Western govornment?,st
"hostility to peace." (SECRET)
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