WESTERN EUROPE BRANCH OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES WORKING PAPER BRANCH WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000400010002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 21, 1949
• Content Type: PAPER

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WESTERN EU1IOPE BRANCH
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTI MATES
CONT AL IN T ELLIGE`NCE AGE CY
WORMTG PAPER
BRANCIT %tE a Y
ITOTICE: This document is a working p per,
NO an official CIA issuance, - n has not
necessarily been coordinated with other ORE
producing components ry It represents current
thinkink; by one group of specialls is in CIA,
and is designed for use by others engaged on
similar or overlapping studies,, The opinions
expressed herein may be revised before final
and official publication.. It Is Intended
solely for the information of the addressee
and not for further dissemination.
DOCUMENT No.
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VIESTEfT EUROPE BRANCH
WEEKLY S#i?:IP A 15v
For week aiding
25X6A ~~s? 399
VOL. IV A Yo. 9
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AUSTRIA
Pre-election activity in Austria points to a
bitter, har - out; car3ptz bet yrecen t xe people's Party
and the Socialist Party, the two major anti-CorrrJunist
roues a Contributing to the intensity of the campaign
is the revelation by the Socialist Party of a conference,
to be secret, between representatives of the~
conservative people's Party and high-ranking e: -TFazi
leaders.* The People's Party can normally expect to get
the support of most of the former Nazis, 500,000 of whom
will b-e voting for the first time since the warm People's
Party leaders are, however, evidently trying to lake
doubly sure, through a definite under?standing, that there
wi.11 be no large-scaie drift of ex-r'azis to any new right-
st or regional parties that may be formed before the elec-
tions, scheduled for October,
The Socialist Party, though it also would like the
votes of the ox-Nazis, exposed the secret conference to gain
popular support at.. the expense of its rival and coalition
partner,, ocsibly the Socialists also :lave a genuine fear
that.inoreased Lazi influence in the People's Party would
it up a marked rightist trend, which would make a continua-
tion of the coalition after the elections more difficult.
Actually, the revelation of the conference is not likely to
affect materially the popular support for either party.
ACE
B Labor discontent in France may increase enough
to perrai the gun sts o un er ake a series of major
strikes in the fall, although the Communist Party is
probably too optimistic when it believes that worker
support for its strike offensive would be based on solid
political as well as economic grounds , The Comnsunjsts
are confident that as a result of the political shift to
the Right in the March elections, the Government, under
pressure to balance the budget and protect farmers from
price deflation, will follow policies Which will Increas-
ixtgly alienate worker support o In the attempt to encourage
this slicn.ation the CornmunIsts will probably build their
strike campaign on charges that the Government has not only
failed to restore the worker's prewar share of the national
income, but has joined reactionary groups in an effort to
deprive workers of social security gains and other post-
liberation social benefits o They believe that worker
rpsentme 'at over tbase issuers on which the "unity of action"
Movement is feeding, will provide the eie?n.ent of political
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eti.ctionac h. was fatally lacking in the strike
ations of 1947 and 1948,
. It is not likely, however, that the Government=s
program will develop in a manner to fulfill the hopes of
Commt s1 leaders0 Despite Premier Gueuill?'s recent
e.ced ion ,to the demands of Right and Center groups for
i discussion of reforrAs in the social security system
end the ntionalized industries
it does not ap
ear
,
p
orobable at the present time that Paul R
d
t
d
eynau
an
o
her
dvoI ate$ of such measures will be able to determine the
.Goverment r s eeon i.c policy. Premier Queuille probably
.has enough political foresig''t,,, as well as sufficient
hutertoal, strength behind the left wing of his Government,
to rdsist the full demands of eight and Center groups
;t is notcortain, on the other hand, that
Queu .I'le will be a~ble to adopt the positive measures re-
q,uir4d to alleviate the worker's legitimate economic
;rie~tances. Faced with a large budgetary deficit and
g
"'
- - --A--, -
ueuilie -would encounter serious difficulties
in an
move
_
y
to meet labor's demands for wage increases
or for a re-
,
turn to pollective bargaining. Unless there is a sub-
!tantial improvement in the real wages of the worker,
abo' discontent may become sufficiently great to aid
ommunis t plans.
PfMTCIH AYD, SPANISH NOW-11i AIM WWI' AFRICA
a l DA) -with the enc ozmrmrn s t Party may
V601 4t French Governnont's proposed measures to
etard further Communist penetration of French West Africa
F?A). These measures are made possible by the estab-
ishr)e it cif ; a now . , coordinated defense area in MIA.
Already used by the PCP as a vehicle of Communist
4etivity in FIA, the RDA has lately been flattered by
4 series of articles in Humanite, entitled "Black Africa"
by Pierre Ilerve, who attended an RDA Congress in Abidjan.
treg, the parallel aims of the RDA and the CP, Herve
n the struggle for liberation of all dependent peoples,
Ospedially as the RDA lacks a philosophic theory or a
religious doctrine.
Although the leaders of the RDA vote consistently
omm nist in the ,rational Assembly in Paris
the Party
,
itself has so far insisted locally on denying close
'
filiation with the CP, The current well-timed Communist
olicitude for the PDA is all the more likely to attract
1upport from the more than half a million RDA adherents
because of greater French efforts to stifle the movement.
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BTH ,GIUM
B Altho ;h the return of King Leopold is the
s _ ~~
+ ~~s xz~~?a . Flue aautpatgn Tor the 26 Jhne electionns,
MO is issue Will probably have little affect on the
voters,. The people seem unconcerned about the intern-
stfied press war over the King, and apparently have
already decided how they will vote. The Catholic
Party (PSc) has recently modified its assertion that
the national elections will be, in effect, a plebiscite
on the ret,ttn of the King. Instead, if the PSC wins a
parliamentary majority, it then reportedly plans to
hold such 4" plebiscite* Under this arrangement, the
r$c wou .lave an opportunity to make a post-eleotjon
Judgment of .the strength of Socialist opposition, in
order to determine whether a prompt restoration would
result ink rioting, and thus prevent the solution of
his change in PSC views may enable the Part
t
h
ld
y
o
o
dome "independent" Catholic voters who have been luke-
warm on the. restoration. To counterbalance any benefit
that might accrue to the PSC from this tactic, there is
Socialist Premier Spaak's personal appeal to the voters,
azd the desire of many of them to see the present
coalition Government continued.
TIM 17MIEF LANDS
he Dutch 0overnment will be more reluctant to
on ant basic issues in con c w h
the Indonesians the preliminary question of
rector the Republion can Government when negotiations on
the'future status of Indonesia begin. Vihereas Dutch and
Republican generalizations on the United States of
Indonesia and the Dutch-Indonesian Union are not widely
divergent, heir views on the actual delineation of the
powers and duties of the Netherlands and Indonesia within
thpse two proposed groupings are still far apart. The
butch Government probably will be induced, nevertheless,
to continue Its policy of conciliation and cooperation
.because: (1) the same pressures, which early in r.Say
produced Dutch agreement on Republican restoration, will
0e' tinue to operate; (2) the Government is now resigned to
substantial independence for Indonesia; (3) it is determined
to reach an agreement with the more moderate Indonesian
groups as the only alternative to a Communist-dominated
Indonesia,
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The Duteh attitude in future negotiations
Will also be influenced by the degree of success
achieved by the Republic in controlling its following
when it is restored to Jogja:arta. If unrest prevails,
the Dutch Government will be less conciliatory in its
dealings with the Indonesians.
ITALY
B A s r debate in the Italian Parliament may
be expec a on the P01106 b2 id ea aspee .s of the
unified Intelligence Service being urged by the Defense
Ministry. Despite the military and budgetary merits of
the recorar.ended reorganization, it is causing concern
anal disapproval in some Government circles. The
prioposals would effect the merger of the Intelligence
I3ranchos of the three military services into a single
organization under the control of the Defense Minister.
The now organization would include a strategic intelligence
branch and, a counter-intelligence branch, the latter to be
a function of the Carabinieri (the national police).
General apprehension is felt lest control of counter-
espionage by the Garabinieri could result, as under Fascism,
in the subversion of the military to political ends, and to
an undue concentration of power in the Defense 1i nistry.
One purpose of the unification may be to eliminate penetra-
tions made by the UK and the US into the Italian intelligence
services. It is reported that opposition to unification (as
,contrasted to coordination) has been voiced by the three
Chiefs of Staffs and their Intelligence heads, and within the
Defense Council ,by De Gaspori and Sforza. Defense Minister
Pacciardi and his group, however, appear to be pushing their
proposals vigorously at this time. Their eager activity in
this regard, taken :?n conjunction with reported attitudes on
other raattt.rs, anuses suspicion of the ultimate desizs of
the Pacciardi group,
THE VATICAN
B Vati.c circles associated with Underaecretan
q State , vn-tihi are fearful that certain leading
prelates in the US--and by association the Church as
a whole in the US--are failing to fulfill the Church's
function as a protagonist of social improvement.
Holders of this view fear that, whereas the Church in
s. ope has moved with the times more and more in the
direction of social reform TTTS Catholicism, which
started as the protector of the impoverished immigrant
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tinorities, may come to be considered a protector of
the well,to-do middle class. These Vatican e~,eeents
express regret that, in its fight against Corm nism,,
certain Church leaders in the US fail to recognize
the basic social problems which continue to demand
volution. These Vatican circles are particularly
disturbed by this development because they feel that
the focus of the Vatican's power is shifting from
home to the US, where the Church is financially
strong; and is not as directly handicappod by the
s drug?;le for survival which engages the energies of
the Church In ;.arts of }aurope e Implicit in the con-
oern of this Vatican group over the allegedly negative
character- of JS Catholicism is the Fear that lack of a
a'ync.Mic sociil program in the US wi:;l render the
Catholic Church less effective in the struggle against
C ortB'4t ism a
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