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April 1, 1951
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Approved For Release us orpIcIas ONLY -01093A000500050001-8 4 PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT rah-7/9 FOREIGN RADICUROADCASTING RECEPTION POTENTIAL IN EAST GERMANY : CIA/RE PR- 54 (SRI; Project 46,272)r 1 April 1954 NOTICE IME"NT The data and conclusions contained in this report do not necessarily represent the final position of ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and subject to revision.. Comments and data which may be available to the user are solLcited, WARNING THIS DOCUMENTOONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OY THE UNITED STATES WISHIN THE MEANING OF THr, ESPIONAGE LAW, TL E 18, OSC, SECS 793 AND 794, THE TRAWSVMSSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports US ,OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 19 /09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 -E-T VI, Trends 0 , ? , , Appendixes _ . Page 58 Appendix A. Reported Organization of the General Direotovate . of kroadcast Radio, East Germany, December 1950- August 1952 61 Appendix B. Reported Personnel of the State Radio Committee, East Germany, 1953. 63 Appendix C, Radiobroadcasting Transmitting Facilities in East Germany, 1949 . G 0 0 69 Appendix D. Radiobroadcasting Transmitting-Facilities in East Germany, January 1954 , . Appendix E? Characteristics of Radiobroadcast Receivers Produced in East Germany a 0 0 0 77 Appendix F. Methodology. . 0 0 79 Appendix G, Gaps in Intelligence ? C C I 0 0 0 .0& 0 0 81 Appendix Ho, Sources and Evaluation of Sources. e 0 0 a a a 83 1, Evaluation of Sources, J 0 1 G n 0 0 83 20 Sources, . 0' 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 Tables 10 Reported Foreign Radiobroadoasts to East Germany (Aural)' Weekly Program Vours (Non-Entertainment) and Number of Frequencies Used, by Type, January 1954 0 5 2. Growth in Pow,ix of.RadiObroadoast Transmitters in East Germany, Selected Years, 1934-540.6 . 2. ,.......,... , - iv - S-E-C NIMI? .11.?? .0/M. 4?A.? war loom* 29 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Page 3, ,Eptilmated Number of Broadcast Receivers in East Germany, 1946-57 d. . ? ...... ..... LI4588?.E4 .37 4. Estimated Number of Br Adcast Receivers and Percentage Distribution by East German Postal Districts, November 1950 ... ... ? ? . Se ...... V 41 Estimated Productim Civilian Radiobroadcast Receivers in East Germany, 1946-51 45 Chart .Presumed Ovzanization of the East German State Raul() Committee ........... ?.. biEjet ro11oving Page Iffin 22 RadiobrIadcasting Transmitting racilities in East Germany. 28 - v Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 CIAO FS-54 (OUR Project 46,272) S-E-C LR-E-T - _ FEIGN RAPIODROArCASTIPG nErEPTIoll PPTENTIAL IN EAST GEMANY* Summary and Conclusion From the available evidence, it is clear that East Germany- continues to be a fertile target, especially from the proximity of West Perlin and West Germany, for exploitation by foreign radiobroadcasting directed into that domain. This conclusion is supported by the following? . 1. The availability of large numbers of suitable receivers in the hands of the populace. 2. She propensity of the average East German to listen to foreign broadcasts, especially RIAS (Radio in the American Sector, Derlin) produced by a combination of native curiosity, pan-Germanism, known wel- fare inadequacies, and) in marked contrast, the better economic status of West Germans. 3. The failure of jamming to blot out completely foreign broad- cast reception, LL The failure or unwillingness of the Russians or the East German SED hierarchy to solve the problem of foreign broadcast listening by imposing drastic prohibitive measures, such as confiscation of all radlobroadoast receivers capable of Such reception The absence of any other rapid media of mass communication to replace the present basic rediobroadcasting system in use in East Germany today, 6 Possible undermining, by persons within East German radio officialdom potentially susceptible to disloyalties, of Kremlin-inspired . East German Government efforts to solve the foreign broadcast menace and domestic broadcast ineffectualities, East Germany, since the end of World War II, has become the target of an increasing volume of foreign broadcast transmissions.. The program con- tent of these transmissions ranges from pro-Western to "objective" to ' pro-Soviet- The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of the responsible analystas of 1 January 1954. However, some material of a later date hns been included, S-E-C-N-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 13-E? weo? ???? ???? Historically, Germany has been among the leading nations, of the World in the development and use of radio as a medium of mass communication. It was one of the earliest nations to recognize and use radio broadcasts as a propaganda weapon. At the end of World War II, its radiobroadeasting facilities were partly destroyed, damaged, sold, or confiscated. East Germany's radiobroadeasting service got off to a slow and unsure start under Soviet control and restraint. It lacked key trained personnel and effective organization and management. .Domestic production of broadcast equipment and receivers for home consumption.was almost at a standstill. Even after substantial production was. revived, the Russians did not permit retention of a significant amount of newly produced East German broadcast equipment for hone use until 1952. Also in-that year, the Russians began to return German professionals to their homes in East Germany. Technical radio management was completely reorganized and integrated. Eadiobroad- casting organization and management was completely revamped and put on a centralized basis for better control of facilities and program content and of the security level of its personnel. Great progress has been made since 1952, but there are indications that neither the Russians nor the SED Party Hierarchy in East Germany are yet satisfied, A plan to reorganize the present State Radio (Droadcasting) Committee, reported to have been drawn up in March 1953, has not been implemented, however, even after the provocation, if it were needed, brought home by the effectiveness of broadcasts from West Germany Which helped to spread the East German riots in June 1953. ? The nazi. broadcasting system transmission base remained virtually at a. constant dimension during the decade ending in .1941. Some facilities were damaged, destroyed, or confiscated in consequence of World War II and Soviet occupation. The East German transmission base, however, had been pearly restored to its prewar condition within 5 years of the end of hostilities. Possibly influenced by the Soviet philosophy of dependence on very high power transmitters, the East Germans have almost tripled their total transmitter power during the last 3 years. This increase in transmission should make it much more difficult to penetrate the area with Western broadcasts effectively and should Provide much better coverage of Western Europe by East German stations. Although the number of broadcast 'receivers in service had fallen to a relatively low point by the end of World War II, A steady growth has brought the number up to .an estimated 3,7 to 4 million today. These figures include a few very high frequency and television receivers. The geographical distribution of radio receivers follows generally the same pattern as the distribution of the population. Dy far the great bulk - 2 - S-E-C-E -T ? _ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T of receivers in operation are relatively insensitive, many with only one tube, and in general of a poor quality, reflecting shortages of material and poor workmanship. These receivers are hardly capable of satisfactory reception of high-frequency transmission from fcreign countries. There is some development of wire-diffusion systems in public places, factories, and newly constructed apartment houses, and a few, apparently, in private homes. Much of the East German production of electrical equipment has gone for reparations and export,- The prohibitively high prices charged for receivera and the conditions surrounding their purchase tend to make It hard for the average citizen to ac.atire them. There are no formal laws, decrees, or statutes specifically forbiddin listening co foreign radiobroadcasts. There has been, however, a steady increase in the harassing measures adopted by the East German regime to restrict this practice. These measured involve both legal and political restrictions (surveillance, intimidation, insinuation) and technical interference with reception through jamming operations. There are definite restrictions on the viewing of television programs and permits to own a set are held to a minimum. The present jamming facilities in East Germany are capable of reducing seriously the potential East German audience for Western broadcasts. This is done by the use of both high-power and medium-power transmitters stra- tegically located and of log-power local jammers which distribute their signals over electric power lines. In spite of countermeasures, Western broadcasts have been effective In East Germany. A large audience listens regularly to Western programs, The effect upon East German listerners has had widespread political and economic reverberations. Among Western stations, RIAS (Radio in the American Sector, rerlin) has been in the forefront of popularity among East German listeners.. RIAS broadcasts reportedly were effective in spreading news of the 17 June 1953 riots throughout East Germany. News and political programs are the most popular programs broadcast by Western stations. The radio audience in East Germany has become an increasiagly attractive target for Western exploitation. This exploitation is welcomed by a large part of the audience. Accordingly, foreign broadcast trans- mission ,into East Germany has increased over-all since the end of World War II. To counter this, the East Germwn. radiobroadcast service has moved toward centralized .control, integration, and improvement in the. effectiveness of Its radiobroadcasting propaganda weapon at home and abroad, particularly in West Germany. Incompetence, subversion, and - 3 -0-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-CaR -E-T security-vulnerabilities of personnelassociated with the East German radio- broadcast service have forced the authorities to improve the screening and training of employees and applicants. Organizationally, 1952 was the critical and dynamic year, but some evidenee shows that the many cure-all actions taken that year have not yet solved East Germany's radicbroad- casting problems. Trends point towerd increasing foreign exploitation of East German listeners, Managerially and organizationally, East Germany, probably under Soviet insistence and directionl.has been moving dynamically on all fronts since early 1952 toward greatly improving the effectiveness a the broadcasting resource in its East German and West German political .and other missions. Although the trend is upward on availability of East German receivers, it is levellingoff or receding on the number capable of foreign reception. .The East German transmission base trend has been upward in terms of total power being used, clearly' for purposes of "qapturing" both the East German and West German audience. The jamming trend and its degree of effectiveness have been rising-and will probably continue in that direction, A slight trend is perceived in the direction of possible ,alternative syntems, such as frequency modulation (ITO and IN? wire diffusion, and group listening, possibly designed to yield ultimately a "captive" audience, at least insofar as foreign broadcasting is concerned, I. 'Transmissien Facilities of Fereign Broadcastere ta East GermanL(Aural), ? - Seven Communist countries, 7 Western countries (excluding West Germany). and 4 organizations operating in West Germany beamal weekly total of 248.5 hours of original programs into East Germany, exclusive of entertainment. Although a considerable portion of this broadcast time is designed for both West German and East German listeners, all of it has potential reeeption:in East Germany and is therefore significant to this study. Table 1* shows the breakdown, by country, of ereign broadeasts to East Germany, It will be. noted that progranm by local West German. stations re not included in this table, for reasons discussed in I, G, below, 47-755,aj-T-FOliows on p.. 5, S-E-C-R-E-T _ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Table 1 leported Yoreign Rndiobroadsts to Fast Germsny (Aural) Weekly Program tow's (Non-Entertainment) snd !lumber of Frequencies Used, by Type 1,4 Zrnnuary 1954 ? scavass--astSUssues.....arlt.. Communist Countries egwou...166 Original Weekly Program Eours ' Number of Frequenelea 'Medium c/ 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 ir,ow d/ 0 1 n 0 (..% t - ?? Very 1:01 1311_ 13 8 v 4 2 2 2 35 23.5 9 12.5 9 7 5 0 0 0 (3 0 0 , , USSE Poland TkumAnia Yugoslavia. Hungary 1:,ulgaria Totsl 101 Western Countries kr..xcept West Germany) Switzerland - 32. , 0 2 ? 0 UK Trance 21 . 6.5 -r) . 6 2. 1 1 . 1 -, Italy 5. ? 0 3 Vatican City 5 5(...) 1 -, pain 2 0 ' 2 Turkey 2 . 0 1 0 r) VOA 15 0 Totra Be 7-lootnoie-eferences in arIbio numerals are to sources listed in Appendix .?ootnotes for Table 1 follow on p, 6, -5 - MM. ?=1. `MOW Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S -E -E ? Table 1 .Reported Foreign Rediobroadeasts to East Germany (Aural) Weekly Program Hours (Nm-Entertainment) .and Number of Frequencies Used, by. Type- 1/ January 1954 (Continued.) AMMILIMIYMPARISOMMOCial. Number of 7.E2aueneies Original Weekly Program sours Very / High 2i fm?ftityyr7.,.? High -b/ Medium51'7/d/ Low - West Germany 1 1 3 R'Pli (Radio free aussia) 18 0 2 0 S'edio Liberstion 3,5 0 1 0 lotal 67.5 Grand Total 248.5 z=e: _ . a< Very high frequencies WEFT extend. from 30 to 300 megacycles ffic-T-Tald are often referred to as "very short waves," b. High frequencies extend from 3,000 to 30,000 kilocycles (kc) and are often referred to as "short waves." c. Medium frequencies extend from 300 to 3,000 kilocycles and are often referred to as "medium waves," d. Low frequencies extend from 30 to. 300 kilocycles and are often referred to as "long waves," Actual reception potential is much greater than this table would indicate, since many of the Western broadcasts are repeated at later hours- None of the broadcasts from Communist countries are repeated, although most of them are transmitted on several frequencies simultaneously. Or the 248.5 hours of original programs, 101, originate in Communist countries (ineluding Yugoslavia), 80 in non-German Western countries, and 67.5 are beamed from West Germany rt should be pointed out that a malority - 6 - Sil? MOM Lir 4.1 4111?.1 Vide1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R -E-T of the 67.5 hours beamed from West Germany are carried by stations which are owned or controlled by US interest, either officially or by citizens' committees. The outstanding broadcaster to East Germany is the organization known as RIAS, or Radio in the American Sector (of Berlin). It operates around the clock and carries programs that are of interest to both East and West Germans. This report is based upon the latest available information, but it must be realized that frequencies and programing may change from day to day and certainly from month to month. It is felt, however, that the over-all picture remains relatively constant and that the composite study presented will remain reasonably accurate until major changes in broad- cast policy are effected, A. RIAS Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor nerlin (Radio. American S in the PIAS has transmitters at Britz, in the US Sector of Berlin, and at of inthe US Sector of West Germany near the Czechoslovak and East German borders. At Britz there are 4 transmitters, 2 of them on medium frequency, 1 on high frequency, and 1 on a very high frequency unit employing frequency modulation (FM) type of emission. The 40-kilowatt (ka) transmitter at Hof operates on medium frequency. 2/ RIAS has maintained continuous broadcasting since early 1952, 3/ At least one frequency in each category, -- medium, high, and very high-- is in operation from 0500 to 0305 (GMT). The gap from 0305 to 0500 (GMT) is filled by a second medium frequency unit which operates from 1500 to 0500 (GMX): a third medium frequency transmitter is in operation from 0700 to 1800 (GMT), 4/ Most of the material prepared for East German listeners by the Voice of America (VOA) in Munich and New 1'c:irk is relayed by RIAS? but this represents a very small fraction of the total RIAS transmissions. 5/ RIAS2 though controlled by the US High:Commissioner for Germany (HICOG)p is essentially a German station for the German people. 6/ Originally designed to reach the people of West Derlin, it operated only as a Wire-diffusion unit, by interconnection with the Perlin telephone system, for the first 6 months after its inception in early 1946. 7/ As the capacity and facilities of RIAS expanded, it gained recognition throughout Germany. Although many other transmitters are beamed toward East Germany, RIAS has by far the strongest and most extensive voice. 8/ - 7 - S-E-C -R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T Approximately one-third of BIAS programs '(52 hours -a week) are of an informative nature. Of this, 24 hours a week are devoted to news coverage Or comments on the news. 9/ The remainder consists of music, plays, and the like. B. Voice of America (VOA). The Voice of America spendscomparatively little time or money in trying to reach the ears of East Germans, 12/ probably because it is felt that BIAS IS doing a good job. VOA, New York, prepares and transmits 1 hour of? material daily except Sunday for East German consumption, employing from 3 to 8 high frequencies. 11/ This material is also relayed by Tangier, Africa. RIAS picks up 3 of the 15 minute programs for relay and repeat broadcasts, and several local West German stations handle the fourth pro- gram. 1E/ These four programs consist mostly of news, press coMments, interviews, topical reports, and spotlights on US life. A special Thursday program features "USA -- Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." In addit-aa, there is a one-half hour Sunday program "Answers to Listeners' Letters and Stamp Corner," which is also transmitted by RIAS? from preshipped tape. No VOA transmitters in West Germany are employed to beam German-language material to the East German people. 13/ Probably the most significant function of VOA, as far as East Ger- man listeners is concerned, is the Russian-language programing designed for Soviet occupation troops stationed in the Satellite countries./ These programs are broadcast over numerous medium- and high-frequency channels, and most of them could be picked up by the troops in East Germany, whether or not tpecifically beamed toward them. Such programs are not, however, represented in Table 1, because they are not specifically designed for or beamed to the territory of East Germany. C. Radio Free Europe (RFE). Although there are About 600 Germans on the Munich staff of RFE, 12/ there is no more than a token appeal to East .Germany and it is not included in Table 1, Primary target areas ef:RFE are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. 16/ D. tma_pritishl:icastilfLg_9u_r-Q,imtlstrLaslo. ap beams 21 hours of original programs weekly to Germany, using 1 low, 1 medium, and 2 high frequencies, 11/ Some of the BDC programing has in the past been expecially designed for East German listeners, but for the most part it is of a general nature for German-speaking peoples of - 8 - S -E -C -R -E -T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 .?.-E-C.R7EaT varying political Inclinations. lc/ A from Montreal once a week. 12/ All of the medium frequency and at least 1 of a day is transmitted on low frevenby. one-half hour program la relayed these transmissiOna are carried on the high frequencies, but only 1 hour 20/ DIOC concentrates on objective coverage, of the news, but includes fill,in music and feature programs that?depiat daily life of the Western Worl4 as well as ?programs alich point up Dritish appreciation for problems. of European peoples. 31/ E Sad Liberation. Radio Liberation, sponsored by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc., went on the air 1 March 1953 Ath a 10-ka high- frequency transmitter located at Munich. 22.1 Proadcasts are beamed to East Germany in the Russian language and are apaarently designed to appeal to the elLte of the Soviet occupation forces, since the operation is supported by the Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR also located in Munich. 23/ Radio L:beration begins the broadcast day with a one-half hour pro- gram of news and features, carried on 3 high frequencies; 1 is beamed to East GermanY, 1 to Austria, and the third to the USSR. From 0330 to 2300 (GMT), this program is repeated continuously on the East German frequency. 24/ Thus the Radio Liberation effort shows as only 3.5 hours a week of original -- programs, although the total weekly broadcasts, as far as reception potential is concerned, amounts to 140 hours. F . Radio Free Russia (11100 Radio Free Russia (RFR) is a mobile, clandestine unit operating on high frequency, controlled by the Natsionalno Trudovey Soyuz (National Worker's Union -- NTS). 32/ Programs are in Russian with no rebroadcast in the German.language, as was the practice in 1951. 26/ FI is the only known non-Communist radio station operated by Russians and has as its objective an internal resistance to Communist pressure by the formation of underground cells, each with 2 or 3 members, that would listen to RFR broad- oasts for guidanae in their activities. 27/ in addition to special broad- casts designed for the common soldiers of the Soviet occupation forces, 28/ RFR periodically sends "operational messages," 29/ and comments on matters of internattonal interest and Soviet internal affairs. - 9 - S-E -C -E -T -------.-- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 25X1X7 UR IS on the air 18 hours a week, 311 Its transmitter (or tran- mitters; .operate with low?power,ebut a study shows that its signal is receivable about 75 percent of the time, probably in part due. to - frequent changes in transmitting frequency over a rather wide- range, which helps to reduce the effect of,:oviet jamming. Other Western Broadcasters. Six other non-Communist countries transmit 52 hours of program time a week in the Germanlanguage for Germany, using I low, 1 medium, and 14 high feequencies. 32/ Neus and comments on the news are featured in the broadcasts. . Except for Vaticem City, which employs 1 low Fend 5 high frequeneies, end Prance,. which uses 1 medium and 1 high frequency, &11 of these trans- missions are carried by high frequency. 33/ Switzerland is high in this category, with 32 hours of broadcast time in the German language, The other countries are prance ?6,5 hours, Italy-and-Vatican City -- 5 hours eneh, and Spain and Turkey -- 2 hours each. _ It will be noted that programs carried by local West German stations are not included, although in many cases they are received. by East German residents and.come under the general eategory of "foreign stations" as far . as East Germany is concerned, The reason such programs are not included is that there is no reasonable place to draw the line that is, it would be obrioubly inaccurate. to list all transmissions by local West Germnn stations. It would be less inaccurate, but would nevertheless present a confusing picture, to include. only the MDR (Vordwest Deutsche 1,undfunk) network. Therefore the dichotomy has been on the basis of bether or not the statiens operating in. West Berlin and West Germany have intentionally beamed their programs to East German. residents. Since IUDS is just getting into this field, it is not included, although e!),ny future study of this nature would have to take its facilites into consideration. E. Foreign Communist nros,deasters. -,!ommunist countries, exclusive of East Germany, transmit 101 program hours in the German language - to East Germany, using 1 low, -6 medium, and 31 high frequencies.- Me USS8 leads this group with 35 hours, followed by Poland,- Zunenia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, in that order. Most of these pregrams are devoted to the news, or are related to news items. - 10 - S-E-41-1:i-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S -E -C -R -E -T ? - All of the programs broadcast by the ussa to Eat Germany are carried on at least 4 frequencies,. and 1 of the half-hour programs is carried on 2 medium and 8 high frequencies. 11./ Of the 13 high frequencies used by the USSR in these broadcasts, 12 emanate from Moscow, the other from Leningrad. One of the Soviet medium-frequency, transmitters is in Kaunas, Lithuania. 35/ The other, 100-kw medium-frequency unit, operates in Leipzig, East Germany, but is under Soviet control. It is used to relay some of the programs originated by aadio Moacowa 36/ II. East Germany Broadcasting System. A. Early History. 1. German Leadership in the Field of Radio. Historically, at least until the end of World War II, Germany vas among the leading nations of the world in the development and use of radio as a medium of communication. It kept pace with other technologically modern countries of the period. In many instances it outran them, By the beginning of World War II, Germany had built up a huge radio research and development capacity, It .had prolific radio equipment productive facilities. While consuming large quantities of its own production to build up its own operational communication resources, it was able to export large quantities of radio equipment. puring the period, Germany had evolved mass techno- logical and. organizational "know-hoa" and the necessary trained manpower pool. Germany's radio history dates from 1897 at least. In that year radiotelegraph communication over a short distance took place in that country. Sadiobroadcasting, as a voice medium of raaid mass communication, was initiated in 1923 with the establishment of a transmitting station in Taarlin. It was about this time that the practical applications of the vacuum tube, both for transmission and reception, began to be heavily exploited. High-frequency radiobroadcasting was commenced there in 1929. In 1930, television picture transmission was conducted and very-high- frequency radio was employed on German railroads. In the same year, public address and wire diffusion facilities became associated with radiobroad- casting. As early as 1936, PM techniques were conceived and tested_ 37/ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-EaT 2. German Droadcasting as a Political Weapon. The first use of radio to further a nations political objectives took place in Germany in 1915. Isolated by war blockade, Germany took 'to radio to establish a Morse-code telegraph news service to neutral countries. This German novelty perhaps gave a cue to Lenin, On the very first day of the proletarian revolution in Russia, on 7 November 1917, he had the Russian Cruiser AnX02a announce to the "world" by radio- telegraphy that 'they had overthrown the provisional government. Daily accounts of the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk followed with preaen7 tations of the revolutionary :views. for reception by the outside world. 38/ It was during the 1914-18 period that the popular discovery of propaganda and its power was made. 11b.t "In the immediate post -a 1917 period, the Soviet leaders had found that, deprived as theyaaxe at the start of all other means of power, they had in propaganda a cheap effective weapon of their own. By its use, they broke the spirit of the German armies in Russia, and its application on the international scale materially .assisted them in putting an end to the intervention policies of Rtasia's former allies..." 4o/ In effect, the Russians. are doing the same thing today on. German.soil. 3. German Management Organization., Consistent with early pot-World War I efforts to democratize Germany, radiobroadcasting service was provided by private tompanies. Ten such companies were ia business when, sometime before Hitler came to power, they were merged into. the.Reich Rundfunk Gesellschaft (State Radiobroad- casting Company). 41/ With this move, private broadcasting enterprise seems to have died 7n Germany. It was consonant with the then current trends toward statism. When Hitler came to power in 1933, sweeping organizational and managerial changes were made inGermanradiabroadcasting. It is highly probable that Garman experience over the years in the field of propaganda and the potentialities of radio as aamedium for its dissemination, coupled with Hitler's intentions, gave great iMpetus to the develoament and use of raditabroadcasting AS an instrument of State following Hitler's political victory. . Hitler moved dynamically. One of the initial acts or his new goverament was the organization early in March 1933 Of a: Ministry of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment. It was headed up by the infamous Goebbels. It absorbed the.Stata Radiobroadcasting Company. The purpose - 12 - S-EaC-ia-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S -E-C -R of the new Ministry was to coordinate the national and international propa- ganda efforts of Hitler's National Socialist (Nazi) Party, a synonym for the German Government, 12./ Fully sensing the potential of radio as a medium of propaganda as did the Russians, Goebbels organized his Ministry into five deaartments, giving recognition to radio along with other media of mass communication. These were propaganda, radio, press, cinema, and theater. Goebbels, who enjoyed cabinet rank and stood near the top of the Nazi hierarchy, gave national dictatorial powers to these departments, Upon activating the new Ministry, Hitler took over all propaganda channels and facilities, including the German radiobroadcasting network. Their operation was then coordinated with the experienced propaganda department of the Nazi Party, .1.13,/ It is likely that German jamming of Soviet foreign-language propaganda broadcasts, begun about 1935, was also a responsibility of this new ministry. 44/ Sometime prior to 1942 the Nazis took direct action in improvin and expanding the propaganda benefits of radiobroadas.sting, The Nazi Party had a radio section. The section had regional and branch offices in all provinces and districts. Heads of these offices, acting as political and radio propagandists, set up reception facilities to close any communication gaps between the Government, the Party, and the masses. To achieve this end, the radio-manufacturing industry, at the request of the Minister of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, manufactured large numbers of cheap "people's" radio receivers. From the foregoing it can be seen that Germany had gone a long way in the development and exploitation of radiobroadcasting as a medium of rapid mass communication even before World War /I, It had,all the human and physical resources for the undertaking. The fact that Ger- many lost the war can not be attributed to a failure of mass communication, or specifically radiobroadcasting, to do an'effective job. It is probably more nearly correct to conclude that mass communication including radio- broadcasting contributed greatly to the solidification of German thinking and to rallying the populace to build up its war efforts to the tremendous peak achieved in 1943, :A is with this background that post-World War II East German capabilities in the field of radiobroadaasting must be viewed, conditioned, however,,, by Kremlin dictates, Pan-Germanism, and subversion by East Germans themselves. - 13 - S-EaC-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 B. fas?t.:-W-2E.1-14 War 7-4.11X? '1' -2-1ElEena. Emerging from World Wax II, Eaat Germany, under Soviet possession and control, was in chaos. Goebbels and his Ministry were gone. Radiobroadcasting transmitting and reception facilities were partly de- stroyed, damaged, Sold, or confiscated. So were the general telecommuni- cations facilities, including wireline plants used for .broadcast network operations. Experienced key personnel, engineers, and technicians were in short supplY. Some fled to the Nest) others died in the war or were otherwise liquidated) or were probably considered poor security risks. Still others, including thorough-going scientists and research engineers, were deported to the USSR for terms of 5 years and in some cases remained for a second 5-year term. 2, Larjz?..._ManagementOrianiz_atio.a. In July 1945 the Soviet Maitary AdMinistration created in East Germany a?Central Administration for Posts and Telecommunications for the administration and operation of information cmmunication services in general.In these early days, such radiobroadcasting as could be provided cane under the Ministry of Popular Education. It is not clear what the division of responsibilities was between these two mechanisms in the field of radiobroadcasting. It is likely, that the Ministry was essentially responsible for programing, program content, and program con- trol, whereas the Central Administration for Posts and Telecommunications installed, operated, end maintained the physical facilities, SeVeral changes took organization between 1948 and 1952. In the spring of 1948 the Central Administration for Post andftelecommuni- cations was redesignated the Main Administration for Posts and Tele- Communications and was placed under the newly, created German Economic Commission. this Main Administration became the Ministry.of Posts and Telecommunications in October 1949. 47/ As of 1951, while adMinistrative control was ostensibly in the hands of the Ministry of Posts and Tele- communications, the Soviet Control Commission through its Telecommunications Department was exercising' at least strict superVision over the more vital aspects of Ministry functions. 48/ ? Soon after, in early 1950, the radiobroadcasting administration was reorganized and placed in "a'dependenCe directly under the Minister-President .of the German Democratic Repnblic" 1GDR). 122/ There are other indications that'at.the same time the Ministry of Information may -14 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R -E-T operated and controlled the radiobrOadcasting service, aerhaps in behalf of the Minister-President, as the General Directorate LOT. General Manage- ment Of the Soviet Zone Radio Droadcasting SysteM7. Appendix A is a reported organizaaion chart of this directorate, at least as it stood during the period from December 1950 to 31 August 1952, Although the chart gives a somewhat iietailed depiction of activities, it appears to distort the line and stalf functions And overemphasize by relative detail the importance of c.he technical functions. Program management is Considered to be s line function, not a staff function as shown. Some of the techni- cal fanctions shown as line functions are believed to be staff functions. Thie directorate was decentralized in form and operation.. Apparently each of the radiobroadcast stations -and studios had its own technical, editorial, and operations staffs. Perhaps significantly, there was a reported shortage of trained and. loyal (to Communism and East Germany) personnel tor staffing the new General Directorate organization. In particular there was a shortage of editors?reporters, and commentators. Accordingly, at the end of 1950 a central radio school was established and two courses were organized. One was a 6mOnth political course and the other was a 5-month professional radio course. There were only 19 pupils in the first course, 36 in the second, and 90 in the third. In the latter Ito percent were women', As will be noted in later subsections, this school did not solve either com- petence or loyalty problems once and for all. 22/ It may well be that this dual.problea, now as then, may be one of the most vulnerable internal spots in the whole East German radiobroadcasting complex,, Prior to 1952, according to the evidence, the administration of the radio medium as a natural resource was not. centered in one organi- zation in East Germany. Organizational decentralization or division aa research, development, and technolegy in the field of radio qas also a condition of the period. At least by Western standards these situations would not generally lead to the effective and efficient use of the radio resource for legtimate purposes nor for the development and use of that resource as an electromagnetic warfare weapon, a'subject of considerable concern to the US today. 21/* For an estiaate on this general subject see CIA/SE-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in 'Electromagnetic Warfare, Ta7k5r'1953-.S. -15- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T It is strongly conjectured from subsequent evidence that during the winter of 1951-52 the USSR and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) Germans realized that radiobroadcasting in East Germany wag losing ground to West Berlin and West Germany and that this tool of the State was not making its full contribution to fashioning East Germany -- and for that matter West Germany -- as a solid Communist satellite of the USSR. 3. The Critical Year 1952. Evidence clearly shows that the year 1952 was critical to radiobroadcaating in East Germany. By this time, Soviet and East German SED officials were unhappy with the development and effectiveness of that resource bAh. at home and abroad. Neither was it standing up to the Input of foreign broadcasts, particularly from West Germany. In con- sequence, a number of far-reaching actions were initiated to correct the unsatisfactory conditions. Among these were reorganization of radio administration, reorganization of radio technological activities, reorganization of radiobroadCasting administration and operations, baniti- zation ca: personnel, ambitious replanning for the rapid expansion of - facilities) and a revamped approach to radiobroadcast program content and slant. .0Ver the years the Kremlin has asserted the organizational concept that the administration of radio as a medium should be centralized for ccatrol and administrative purposes.* It is so organized in the USSR. Apparently it had. beers somewhat decentralized in East Germany as late as 1952. Entering 1952. there was a Main Department for Communications under the Manistry of Posts and.Telecommunications. It was in some way related to a Central Office for Postal and Telecommunications Techniques The lattea had among its duties the technical and organia,ational supervision of all radio transmitting and receiving stations. However, broadcasting eqw_pment used by the General Directorate 4:Or General Management of the Scliet Zone -Radio Broadcasting Systegwas. not included. The Central Office was the procuring and purchasing office for,all radio stations with regard to equipment. It was also responsible for rendering expert (Tinton on receivers and for-ehecking of all electrical apparatus in the interest of interference suppression. &branch of the Central Office was concerned with radio security. 22/ Reportedly, in April 1952, "the Soviet Control Council ordered that the organizational set-up of the Mlnisterium W--lhis concept has significance for jamming operations in which the avoidance of self-jamming is an important consideration. -16- S-EaC-R7E=r. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 fuer Post-ernmelde-technisches Zentralant (Central Office for Postal and Telecommmications Techniques) be altered to-conform to Soviet patterns. The Russiens demanded that all radio communications be .controlled by a special Main Administration." 13./ This demand may have been in some way relate': to means for coordinating planned expansion of jamming. Dy June 1957 there was in fact established, presumably pursuant to the above de,and, a Main Radio Administration under the Ministry of Posts and Tele- emmunications. Though some parts of the Central Office were retained, he essential radio functions and duties were apparently assumed by the new Main Radio Administration. 514/ It seems likely that it was the Main Radio Administration which carried the burden in preparing two regulations on radio adopted as decrees by the GDS in August 1952. These were the "Decree on Radio- Frequency Installation" and the "First Provision for Execution of the Decree on Radio-Frequency Installations." These decrees by definition and explanation cover all uses of radio in the radio spectrum range from 10 kilocycles to 3 million megacycles. Oddly enough, introduction to the basic decree itself would seem to limit the benefits which it seeks to achieve by the phrase "In order to protect the interference-free reception of broadcast transmissions and of radio news transmissions." 55/ Several other organizational shifts were conceived during 1952 and put into effect on 1 January 1953, which directly affected the exploitation of rado in East Germany in general and, pertinently here, radiobroadcasting As directed by the Council of Ministers of East Germany, a Central Institute for Radio Techniques was established on 1 January 1953, for "purposes of coordination and .guidance in the field of radio engineering, and in order to promote a research and technical development in this field." It was made part of the Main Radio Administration of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunicatons. At the same time (1 January 1953) the Radio Department of the Central Office for Postal and TLlecommunications Tecnniques was shifted to the new Central Institute lor Postal and Telecommunications Techniqges. In the shift it took with it all installations, equipment, and instruments which could be used for research and development in the field of radio technology. Further to bring together in one place creative talent Ln the field of radio and the necessary research and development tools apd equipment, "personnel and equipment useful for radio development work" were transferred from the 4-month old State Radio 1Eroadcasting7 Committee, successor to the General Directorate previously mentioned, to the new Central institute. The Committee, hoiever, was to retain "equip- ment and personnel essential to the radio and television studio industry." -17- S- -C-R-E-T - Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T ? To oversee the new Central Institute, the Ministry for Posts and Tele- communications was to appoint a board of trustees (kuratorium), subject to the approval of the Director of the Central Office for Researcd and Technology. An unconfirmed report relates that the board was to include repreaentation.from the Academy of Sciences, the Technical University of Drepden, the Ministry of Traffic apparently transporg, the Office of Economic Questions, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and the tadustries engaged in producing radio equipment and related products. " Also effective 1 January 1953, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications created and placed under his Main Radio Administration a People's-Owned Radio Installations Planning and Assembling Enterprise for Radio Transmitting and Receiving Installations., It is physically located on the grounds of the Funkwerk in Koepenick, Perlin) where one or more powerful radiobroadcasting and/or jamming transmitters are located. In the production and erection of radio installations, the Enterprise has the duty of preparing projects 4ith cost estimates, technologcal projects for radio installations with cost plans setting up uniform drafting norms, and performing technical evaluations upon request. It may perform designing and: assembly Work and Construction management. It has the right to .nspect radio installations being produced by other enterprises. It was to be the only agency authorized to give final approval for the trans- fer of completed installations; .g./ It seems amply clear that this sequence of shifts in technical radio organization and management reflects a clear pattern for improving coordination, integrating research and development effort, gearing the latter to operational needs, proliferating creative production, enhancing top level control, and generally accelerating the exploitation Of the radio medium, probably for both East German and Soviet benefit. The two or more thousand German returnees with competence in science, tech- nology, and engineering who remained in East Germany after their return undoubtedly are contributing greatly to a revived East German technological competence,.particulorly those who had or acquired Communistic sentiments. b. Creation of the State Radio Committee. To overcome organizational and administrative defects the East Germany Council of Ministers adopted a far-reaching decree on 14 August 1952, At that time, President Grotewohl explained "that the new- great tasks in creating the foundations of Socialism in the GER enhanced the importance of the democratic radio. The previous system of the demo- cratic radio is no longer up to these tasks and cannot satisfy the gro4ing requirements of the working population. In the future the entire work of -18 S-E -C -R -E -T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S7E-C-R-E-T the radio gill be centralized in Berlin and will be subject to uniform direction." 21/ The decree, so revealing as to East German, and probably Kremlin, intentions and plans, follows 58/: 111 "Decree of the Government of the German ,Democratic Re ublic ConcerningLthe Setting up of a State Radio Committee 3 from Auust iii, 92 (nib) The new and great task of the building of the foundations of socialism in the German Democratic Republic, demanding the raising of the political and cultural level of our population. It is a question of develop rig the socialist formation of the workers, of propagating among the inhabitants and of instilling Into them deeply, the idea of the defence of peace and our country, hatred of the imperialist warmongers, militarists and traitors to their country; of intensifying the struggle for the unity of Germany for the rapid conclusion of a peace pact. For the solution of these problems, the radio of the German Demo- cratic Republic is developing increasingly important activity. The system of the radio of the German DemocraticBepublic, which existed hitherto, no longer suffices for present day tasks, nor does it meet the overgroging demands of the workers. The new tasks demand that the people of the German remo- oratic Republic and of western Germany should have the possi- bility of receiving three different programmes carefully co-ordinated, and of high quality, broadcast throughout the day by the radio of the German Democratic Republic. That i6 why radiophonic acttvity must be centralized in the German Democratic Republic in Berlin, and subordinated to a single directorate which will be responsible for the structure of all three programmes. That is why the Council of Ministers has decided to promulgate the following decree, .4?1:1?1??????11. -1. With the .aim of improving radio activity in the German DemocraticRepublid, a state radio committee has. peen Set up attached to the Council of Ministere. The administration of the State Radio Committee comet within the competence of the president, the vice-Oresident and 11 members. -19- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T 3. (a) The chairman of the State Radio Committee is nomi- nated and recalled by the chairman of the council on the proposal of the Council of Ministers. (b) The vice-chairman and the members are nominated by the premier, on the proposal of the president. 4. The administration of the Radio Committee is charged particularly with the following tasks: (a) The planning and structure of the programmes of the broadcasts of the German Democratic Radio. (b): Continual use of the experience of the Radios of the Soviet Union and the countries of People's Democracy. (c) The working out, on scientific bases, of activities concerning programmes. :(d) The direction of radio studios in the regj,ons of tiya German Democratic Republic. (e) The direction of the television centre in Berlin and the development of television in the German Democratic Republic. (f) The direction of the radiophonic school as a pro- fessional institution for the preparation of cadres. (g) The publication of a weekly paper on radio programmes, (h) Co-operation with the competent ministries and secretariats of the state, to ensure technically the transmission of programmes of the German Democratic Radio. (i) The conclusion of agreements with friendly radio organizations in the framework of cultural agreements of the German Democratic Republic, (j) The observation of obligationsj.esulting from its membership in the International Droadeasting 0rpni.2ation (92q. 5. (a) The decision will be carried out on the directives of the president. -20 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 rm. MOPS ley ?????? (b) The chairman of the lAdio Committee will issue, within his field of competence, directives and instructions based on and in execution of the lawa.which are in force, and the decrees .of the Council of Ministers, and will control their carrying out, 6, The budget of the Radio Committee will be established separately within the fremework of the state budgetary plan of the (erman Cemocratic Fepublic. 7, The Radio Committee attached to the Council of Ministers is the responsible body in the field of planning and investments for everything concerning radio in the German Democratic :epublic, 8, The studios in the various regions of the German Demo- cratic Republic are directly responsible to the Radio Committee, 9. Directives are given by the Radio Committee. 10, The present decree comes into force on the it of September, 1952, An analysis of this decree reveals basic changes ir Govern- ment policy, The reogranizetion shows a shift from deeentralieatior to centralization for control, oordination, and economy reasons- The new Committee is attached directly to the Council of Ministers affording elose liaison with top Government leaders. Top level officials of the Committee are subject to appointment and removal by top level officials of the Government and probably the Party (SE)), The decree not only directs what to do, but also, in some matters, how to do it. The Committee is respon- sible feir certain eolicy formulation,for, program planning and content, as well as for broadcast service bperations. It is reported that the Committee is empowered to coordinate all technical offices of the CTR for the pur- poses of :nsuring faultless technical transmissions of its broadcasting programs over the networks, 59/ (See n, 1,, 3, a, above, on Technical 1;adLo Management), A presumed organizational structure of the new State Radio Committee (SSC) appears in the aceompanying chart.* The Committee members appear to have specific responsibilities beside those of the Committee sa a whole, The assigned specieic responsibilities probably reflect the importance attached by the government and the Party to those matters. It is significant that most of the Committee members are concerned with program content, his seems to mean that efforts to eapture and retain en audience (pan-nerman) 44 12o11owing p. 22c - 21 - S-E-C -E -T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T were to be the crucial task of the new Committee. The chart attempts to ? depict the functions of the Committee and to identLfy,line and staff relationships as well as principal lines of coordination with e)tternal mechanisms. The Television Center segment of the SRC is apparently operational and developmental. As of 1 January 1953, when there was a Central Office for Television, the dominant function was probably develop- ment. According to one comprehensive report it was an organization of considerable size. Apparently, however, when radio technical management was reshuffled, the new Television Center segment of SRC lost much of its developmental functions. 60/ Within about 2 weeks of the adoption of the decree, on I September L952, the SRC as in business. By 16 September 1952, three phases of the reorientation were implemented. These were centralization of program production in Berlin, large-scale release of employees, and the use of the new Koepenick transmitter, possibly as a jammer. 61/ On 14 September 1952, Berlin initiated 3 directed programs over the 3 newly constituted netaorks. One of these was directed chiefly to West German patriots to encourage resistance to the West German Government, the second contained cultural and scientific matters, and the third was addressed to the masses. 62/ There are three other aspects of organization and manage- ment which are highly germane to an understanding of East German and Soviet intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. They are personnel, eenip- ment availability, and relations aith other Soviet Bloc countries. These deserve separate treatment. 4. Personnel Problems, The loyalty and performance of personnel associated with East German radiobroadcasting seems to have been continuing problem at least since 1951. It is conceivably a soft, vulnerable spot in the East Genmon structure. In November 1951, Friedrich Trede, business manager of the Communist-run Perlin radio station was dismissed without notice by SED authorities, reportedly because he refused to join the Party. He was to be succeeded by SEn activist Vogel. The same report states that about 900 employees of Berlin Radio who reside& in West Germany were dismissed in 1951. All staff members who still resided in West Germany were directed to move to East Perlin by the end of 1951. This directive applied as well to SED members aho by special permission had been permitted to retain per- manent residence in West nerlina 63/ -22 - S-E-C -R -E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 PRESUMED ORGANIZATION OF THE EAST GERMANY STATE RADIO COMMITTEE (SRC)a EXTERNAL COORDINATION SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY (SED) Central Committee Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications Main Radio Administration Central Institute of Radio Techniques COUNCIL OF MINISTERS STATE RADIO COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN?Kurt Heiss DEPUTY CHAIRMAN?Wolfgang Kleinert FIRST SECRETARY?Otto Langer Central Office of Research and Technology Police Trade Union Organization Ministry of State Security I STAFF FUNCTIONS Legal I. Administration Personnel Personnel Performance I (Possibly includes SRC and "pre-military training"). 13169 CIA, 3-54 GENERAL MEMBERS (DIRECTORS) (Special Functions) SECRET ADMINISTRATION Herr Ebel LINE FUNCTIONS Technical Department Center Berlin-Adlershof Transmission (Apparently takes in the radio transmitting facilities) MAIN PERSONNEL Herr Adannek PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE Herr Zahnke rTelevision MAIN TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT- CHIEF ENGINEER Dr. Probst TELEVISION Hermann Zilles Technicians for the 3 Programs External Technical Service Technical Scheduling Office PROGRAM CONTENT, Radio Station Operations Wireline Networks (?) POLICY, AND CONTROLSb PROGRAM PREPARATION b SECTIONS Commentary Domestic "All-German Questions" Foreign Affairs (formerly News truth about America) Literature West German Cultural Policy West German Communist Theater and Film Party and Unions Drama Political Culture Music Children's Entertainment Soviet Union and Satellites Economics Current Events Youth Religions F:edagogics Berlin Science and Research SED Regional Broadcasts Women's Sports Domestic Economy Farm Broadcasts Country News PROGRAM AND EDITING CENSORSHIPb I Editing Censorship TRANSMISSION Werner Fehlig MAIN MUSIC Prof. Pischner (or Pfuechner) Main Music Department "All I "ALL-GERMAN QUESTIONS" PROGRAMMING W. Perk -German Questions" Literary and Cultural? LITERARY AND CULTURAL- POLITICAL PROGRAMMING R. Fuetzner Political Subjects Entertainment and Public ENTERTAINMENT AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCES PROGRAMMING Kaete Ellrodt Performances "Youth Pedagogics" "YOUTH AND PEDAGOGICS" PROGRAMMING Hanna Prisky and SECRET a Reconstructed from material from various sources up to 30 November /953. bit is not dear how these functions are tied together organizationally to effect control of program content. Some of these sections may have been combined sometime between March and November 1953. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R7E-T One reliable report of 16. September 1952 states that widespread personnel changes were taking place, no doubt in connection with the staffing of the new SRC. About 3,000 employees including technicians, were to be released from the Leipzig, Dresden, Potsdam, Halle, Weimar, and Schwerin stations. On the other band, some 400 selected com- petent radio peeple were to be employed to help staff the new operational headquarters in Berlin. 2../ Another report reveals that at the beginning of January 1953, 76 young reporters and editors who had been recruited from among the workers and peasants, went to work on the staff of the SRC. -They were given basic theoretical and practical training in.a 1-year course at the SRC radio school. They reportedly have the necessary qualifications to afford them an opportunity to become qualified reporters and editors in a short time. 65/ This action is considered consistent with the recon- struction and reorientation of the administration of broadcasting under the SRC. In spite of a "clean" slate of personnel selected to staff the new SRC in September 1952, by November 1953, East Germany was agaliehaVing loyalty problems in its radiobroadcasting sfructure. One report of 23 November 1953 relates that the. Investigation Committee of Free Jurists reported. that several hundred employees of the GDR SRC:, among them GDR Television Director Hermann Zilles, a member of the SED, had been "released for political reasons." 66/ Another report Which may relate to this item dated 18 December 1953 states that a "large number' of employees of the Soviet Zone radiobroadcasting system ha, been dis- missed without notice for political reasons," qi and still another ? report, dated 16 December 1953, states that "al East Zone oress and radio editors will be thoroughly screened by the State security service during the next two months.. Special attention is to be given to their attitude during the June 17 uprising and their reports on the rebellion." 68/ One highly illuminating report from reliable sources in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, if true,.gives an indication of the potential security-risk vulnerabiltty, questionable competence, or political unreliability on numerous personalities in the SRO. Some of the characterizations on the more important personalities are quOted below from that report 69/: Kurt Heise, Chairman SRC: "Spent much time in the Soviet Union and often visits there now. Unpopular. Central Committee warned him against drinking on duty. Referred tollIAS as 'station we will soon kill off.'" - 23 - S-EeC-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T ????? ????? Hermann Zilles? SRC Committee Member and Chief of the television station at Adlershof: "Has been disciplined several times by the SED because of immorality and incompetence. Good connections with West Germany. An intriguer." Note: The report avers that he had been released for political reasons." Zahnke, SRC Committee Member: "When drinking, complains about the GDR government." Eduard v. Schnitzler, Senior Commentator: 'Intellectually able but amoral. Is criticized at every party meeting as not being sufficiently attached to .the Party. in an employees' :meeting he claimed that Radio Berlin could learn:apme- thing from RIAS." Erich Selbamnn: "Son of a Cabinet Minister, Selongs to:the Party leadership within the station past Derlini7 but Is in conflict with it. Is having divorce troilbaa." Appendix B contains a consolidated listing of reported biographical sketches on personnel of the SRC -- 1953. 4 From all the available evidence it is difficult to con- ceive how the SRC can function as an efficient, effective, dynamic organism. Neither esprit-de-corps nor morale seem to be of the highest order. Wide variations in political orientation appear rampant. Reported incompetence is scattered over the structure. Solidarity in sense of mission, devotion to duty, aid loyalty to a cause seem wanting. Sub- version might well flourish in such a human environment. 5. Eqnipment Considerations. About 1950-510 Soviet economic policy probably motivated by political considerations, toward East Germany underwent change. Prior aa, this time, at least in the field of telecommunications, the USSR and certain of the satellites as derected by the Kremlin, were absorbing practically all of East Germany's production of telecommunications equip- ment including radio equipment. Little if any was left in East Germany with which to rebuild its telecommunications operational resources'. Soviet policy clearly called for acceleration in the build-up of East Germany's S-E-C-R-E-T ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T O... *ma. ...?? wpm. waleur telecommunications esnipment production capacity in 1951-52, it also called for an increase in the amount of East German production which could be retained there for use. This shift in policy may well have been occasioned by Soviet recognition that the depleted telecommunications resource of East Germany was retarding the over-all economic contribution which East Germany could make to the USSR. The Russians may have also reasoned that the effectiveness of East Germany es a strategic area could be enhanced as a first line of defense by enlarging its resourees. The build-up in East German radiobroadcasting facilities commenced about this time, and undoubtedly stems from that change in Soviet policy, The details ? of equipment and facilities build-up appear in other sections of this Report. 6, Intra-Soviet Bloc Arrangements. . -- In the field of intra-Soviet Bloc relations the SRC has been carrying out the terms of the decree, previously nuotedi which set it up Mentioned specifically is the /nternational Broadcasting Organization (01R). Originally this mechanism could make some?claim of being a trule international .mechanism for dealing with international broadcasting. However, in 1949, virtually all Western country members gave up memberahip. This left actual control in Communist, if not Kremlin, hands. Yugoslavia and Syria were expelled in 1951. in 1951,Communist China and in 1952 East Germany became adherentG. Finland, the only remaining non-Communist mem- ber, has not been active From 195a' on, OIR has become essentially a Soviet Bloc organization with administrative and technical headquarters at Prague, It is considered to be an important mechanism for coordinating. the Soeiet Bloc radiobroadcasting operation. 12i Possible in consequence of East Germany's adherence to the OIR, the SRC of the GDR has concluded several agreements with other Soviet Bloc countries. An agreement was signed in Moscow on 13 February 1953 between the SRC and the Radio Information Committee attached to the. Council of Ministers of the USSR. In submitting to his government, the Chairman of the SRC characterized the agreement as a further step towards the strengthening and development of cultural relations between the two entitiep, as well as cooperation between them in the field of broadcasting end probably jamming. 71/ On 15 May 1953 a similar agreement was signed? between the GDR and Bulgaria. Under the agreement, radiobroadcasts were to be exchanged and each country was to send experts to the other to familiarize themselves with developments in the radio field. 72/ In late 7ecember 1953, another similar agreement was signed in Perlin?Uetween the GDR SRC and the Radio Committee of the Rumanian Council of Ministers. Under the agreement the two countries "will regularly exchange their best e 25 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -E-T programs" and will otherwise cooperate in the field of broadcasting. 73/ It is probable that similar agreements with other Bloc aountries have been:concluded, are in the maaing, or are under revision, it seems reasonably clear that the Kremlin, through the medium of the OIR, is laying down fundamental policies and directions in the field of radiobroadcasting to be implemented through bilateral and multilateral operational agreements between the Soviet Bloc countries. 1' a logical mechanism for coordinating and integrating the whole Bloc radiobroadcasting complex as well as jamming activities directed against foreign broadcasts. 7. Reported Plans to Reorganize the State Radio Committee. A single report, upon which no confirmatory information is available, states that in Yebruary or March 1953 the SRC visited the Soviet Union. Following the visit, recommendations were reportedly made for the reorganization of Radio Berlin (East Zone) along Radio Moscow lines. The recommendations envisaged a mechanism of five main departments: political agitation, music, literature and drama, science and education, and administration. Allegedly, considerable economies would result from this change. 74/ An intelligence comment on the above reaort states in part: l"The reorganieation of East German information media which nas been taking place since last September suggests considerable dissatis- faction with their effectiveness. Last fall ... the functions of the entire Office of Information were transferred to thePress Office of -Minister-President Grotewohl. It is expected that the SRO, whose functions are political and administrative rather tnan technieal, will ultimately be consolidated with the oll Office of Information in some new general propaganda agency under Groteaohl." 75/ While this report may be true end the, intelligence comment valid in so far as plans or intentions are concerned, it is very doubtful that the structure of the ?SRC, at least, has been so altereda If in fact it has not been so altered, it would seem that the influence of RIAS in spreading the riots in East Germany in June 1953 provided a suitable occasion, were one needed, to revamp SiC better to cope with foreign influences. -26- S-E-C -R -E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 mittinS 0* 1- Pre-World War II. At the beginning of the 10-year period 1934-44e the area presently defined as East Germany was served by one low-frequency trans- mitter (known as the Deutschlandsender), located at Zeesen, near Berlin; 2 relat:ively high-power, medium-frequency transmitters at Berlin and Leipzig; and 2 medium-power, mediumrfrequency transmitters-lit Dresden and Magdeburg. During this 10-year period, the low-frequency transmitter was inereased in power from 60 kw to 150 kw and, finally, to 200 kw and the transmitter site was changed from Zeesen to Herzberg. The power of the t-ansmitter at Dresden was increased from 0.25 kw to 5 kw and one new 5-kw, medium-frequency station was added at Reichenbach. The complete geographic coverage of the area was further ensered by the installation of low-power, booster transmitters in areas whrre signal strength for reception by weak receivers proved to be too leu, The number or locations of such booster stations is not available. 16/ By 1940, radiobroadcasting on very high frequencies had been introduced; with two stations in operation, -- in Derlin and on the Brockenburg in the Harz Mountains -- and a second station for Berlin was under construction. 77/ Germany was a pioneer In the then infant art of television Scheduled entertainment programs had been transmitted for a few months prior to the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939. Two of the three television stations were located in the area presently designated East Germany -- in Berlin and Witzloben Brocken in Harz.'A/ The war put an end to this, although the Germans did a great deal of research on military? applications of television. With the surrender of Germany in 1945 and the Soviet occupation of the East Zone; the research ended. German scientists, and their television equipment, dere taken to the USF 'where it was reported that the television equipments were modified by the Germans for use in Soviet television broadcasting facilities. In 1934, all German international broadcasting was conducted from Zeesen employing 6 high frequencies with power of 5 kw. During the Nazi regime this service was increased markedly, in terms of numbers of frequencies employed and the power of transmitters. Dy 1937, the number This subsection was prepared by OSI. -27- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S -E-C -E-T 1.1.-? OEM ..1???? 1?10.? Ow* vr.11, of high frequencies had been inareased to 12, with 50 kw power on 2, and 5 kw on the remainder. Dy 1940, 33 high frequencies gere employed -- 6 with power of 12 kw, 3 with.poger of 20 kw, and 24 with power of 50 kw. 79/ No inforMation is available as to the hours of programing which were originated, the transmission schedules or the world areas to Whieh such programs were addrested. 2. World War II and the Immediate Post-War Years Notwithstanding the ravages of World War II the East German radiobroadcasting facilities apparently were restored to their prewar activity fairly rapidly ye1947 not only had prewar service been restored, but there had been additions. One low-frequency, 2 medium- frequency, and 2 high-frequency transmitters had been added. There were a feg shifts of traasmitter locations, but coverage does not seem to have changed materially.? Dy 1950, 2 more loa-frequeneyand 3 more medium- frequency transmitters had been added.. : Television end 'very-high-frequency (VHF) services do not appear to have been restored during this 5-year period.e 8ecent Growth. a ? - From 1950 to the present there has been considerable grogth:in the broadcasting facilities in East Germany, It is believed that 1951-52 as the iMportaat period in this :change. Plans were-made-then. for the development and construction of high-power transmitters?. The fruit Ln of these plans was the installation of several high-power, medium-frequency traasmitters in East German towns. These transmitters w.:re based on a design allch had the .cover name "Zwilling" (twin) or Zae71 As the. name implies high power as aehieved by installing to identical halves .(halbzuege) and operating both $imultaneously.. There are: indications that half sections of these transmitters were installed initially and operated alone on an interim basis while taeir twins were being eompleted in the East German factory at Koepeniek, 4, Present Facilities,* The present day radio and television transmitting faeilities of East Germany are believed to include approximately 4 1o4-frequency trans- mitters with- powers up. to 100 kw, 15 medium-frequency transmitters aith estimated poiers up to 440 ka, 3 high-frequency transmitters with estimated peelers up to 10 kw, 6 very-high-frequency transmitters employing frequency modulation (rM).type of emission, and 3 television transmittere. There are no reports of plans to restore the high-frequency international broadcast facilities of prewar Germany. * See?M;irfol.lowing p. 28. -28- Approved For Release 19$1697tik1A-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 "d\ e Magdeburg Brocken ,..Effarz Mts.] 60 sp (-.) 100 Kilometers Radiobroadcasting Transmitting Facilities in East Germany ( includes power increases scheduled for 1954) 30-300 kc ved For Release 1W91-6A02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 1/17r1 1'14 .1.RA Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -P -8-T ? The increase in power of the low- and the medium-frequenc transmitters from 1934 to 1954 (selected years) is set out in.Table 2 Table 2' ? Growth in Power of Radiobroadcast Transmitters in East Germany Selected Years, 193454 sr. ? Total Average -Power Power Year Number (kw) J. Low-Dmosa_TElamalEgi 1934 1 6o 60 1937 1 6o 6o 1940 1 150 150 1947 2 120 60 1949 1 loo loo 1950 4 105 26 1953 3 14o 47 1954 4 1,o4o 260 Me41um-Fz:2N.lency Transmitters 1934 4 220 55 1937 4 280 70 1940 5 230 46 1947 7 290 41 1949 8 297 37 1950 11 362 33 1953 15 1,872 124 1954 16 2,452 153 The reported total transmitter output power in the medium- frequency broadcast band in East Germany is now nearing 2 million 'watts, giving this area, roughly the size of Ohio,' almost 6 times the total or it had in the 'same band in 1950. - 29 - S-E-C-TR-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 SaEaC-R-E-T High frequencies wore not employed for domestic broad- casting in Germany prior to World War II. Information on high-frequency transmitters employed since 1945 Is inadequate to warrant tabular presen- tation. a. Low-Fre uepcy Broadcast Transmitters. The low frequencies used in some European broadcasting services have the capability of giving good coverage day and night in their primAry service area, When high-power transmitters are employed, their primary service area is obviously rather large. Before World War II, therefore, people in all parts of Germany were able to receive consistently god signals from the low-frequency, 200 kw Nazi Deutschlandsender located at Zeesea, later at Herzberg. It is believed that the tiussiahraismantle this installation during the early days of their occupation of East Germany at the close of World War II. A substitute was installed at Koenigs Wusterhausen, a Berlin suburb, by East German authoaitiaa. Thi a1a+4a, transmitter was built around an old German Army transmitter and was rated at 20 kw, By 1949, this substitute installation had been replaced by a 100-kw transmitter, and it is probable that thisapowar will be Increased to 500 kw in the near future. A second. high-power installation for operation in the range 150-300 ka is variously reported as under development or under construction for installation in Zehlendorf, Koepeaick? Ludoigslust? or Burg near Magdeburg. Known as the SL-II, it is to have a power output of between 750 and 900 kw. It is scheduled for completion in 1954.9,2/ b. MediumaYre uency Broadcast Transmittera. In the first half of 1950 the Ministerium flier Post und Fernmeldevepen (Ministry of Posts and Telecommanications) asked the Zeltral-amt fuer enrschana und Technik (Central Bureau Of Planning and Engineering) of the Staatlichen Planaommission (State Planning Commission) to develop a 250-k4 medium-frequency broadcast transmitter for production purposes. Apparently within the following 2 years this program was modified by the Z-3 or Zwilling program which envisaged the operation of these transmitters In pairs to produce about 500 kw. In the original plans only Derlin-Koepenick was scheduled to get a twin instal- lation initially, The other East German locations were to get only a half Lh_a11_Lz2gl for interim operation at power of 250:kw until the second half could be delivered, Ill/ Production schedules identified these transmitters as the SM (Sender, Mittelwellen -- Transmitter, Medium Wave) aeries with the numbers I, II, III., and IV assigned to the individual installations. -30- S-E-C -E -T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R-E-T Operation of the twins (440 kw) at Berlin-Koepenick and Sehwerin began in October 1953. The reported power of transmitters put into operation in October 1953 at Burg (near Magdeburg) and Dresden-Wilsdruf is 300 kw. This may be an exaggeration of an actual power of 220 kw (the reported power of a half),or operation of 2 halves at reduced powar pending delivery of some parts, or operation of a half at well over its rated capacity, Among the reported features of all these transmitters are quick tuning to any point in the broadcast band and. directiOnal - anteana systems at the installations, The transmitters may be completely retuned in 40 minutes and the two-tower antennas provide for a degree of directivity. Provisions: are reportedly being made for varying the direction of maximum signal radiated by these antennas, They are so oriented that it is possible to condentrate the signal in the direction of Western Europe, The exception to this is the Dresden-Wilsdruf instal- lation about which there is not suffcient information. Erfurt is scheduled to get a 440-kd installation in 1954, but it is not known when the power of the Durg,and Dresden-Wilsdruf installations will be raised to that figure. At one time, Leipzig das reaorted to be scheduled to get a 440-kw installation, but in view of the fact that it presently has tdo.100-kw transmitters broadcasting separal programs it may be assumed that its priority was not as high as that of cities having lower power transmitters in operation, or as those nearer the Western border. 02/ he locations of these transmitters near the border and the flexibility of operation afforded by quick tuning and antennas of variable directivity provide bases for conjecture about possible methods or operation, such as redirecting the program to a part of East Germany other than the normal service area, jamming of Western broadcasts,? or beaming of Eastern propagandabroadcasts toward Western Europe, For a tabulation of 1949 and 1954 transmitting facilities, see Appendixes C and S. Mobile Transmitters. A new factor in mediumafrevency broadcasting in East Germany was introduced during .1952-53 by the production of mobile 5-kw and 20-4cw transmitters. These transmitters were reported to have been designed for mounting in trailers for transportation from one site to another by highWay. Doth RET's (1Radiofunkteohnik), Finikwerk, Koepenic and C. Lorenz, Leipzig, are reeorted to be participating in the con- struction of these units. It is possible that some of these units will - 31 - S7EaC -R 7 El7T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 operate on 575, 611, 728, 800, 820, and. 920 kc inasmitch aaerystals for these frequencies are reported to have been ordered. It is probable that some of these units are intended to be Used to jam. Western broadcasts. Another possible use for these transmitters would be to give better signal strengths to weaken signal are of East Germany until permanent transmitter installations may be atdompliahed. This would tend to discourage listening by the East Germans to Western broadcasts, particularly if the East German transmitter were operating on the Same frequency ?that of the Western stations.. One 20-kw transmitter appears- to have been in operation in 1953. It is reported variouplY,as,having,been used for jamming and as having a steady test tone as modulation, Two additional transmitters are, expected to be completed in 1954 which, when dOMbined with. the first, will be known as SM-VII0 It. is reported to be deetined for installation at Potsdam-Golm. it is reported five 5-kw transmitters were to be completed in 1953. ? d, Vf M 131:521AK-1111A.V.-2 There is an increasing interest in the Use Of VA FM broadcasting in East Germany, as there: is in much of Western Europe ': -The main reason for this popularity ie the crowded medium-frequency broad- cast band. Since VHF signals do not traVel Materially beyond.the.horizon, mountain top transmitters dan provide excellent service for a'restricted area without interfering with another PM transmitter on the same frequency Operating in a remote part of the country' The first post-World War II FM broaddast transmitter in East Germany was installed in Perlin in the fall of 1950, with one in the Harz Mountains, near Drocken, follOwing.shortly thereafter. As of October 1953, transmitters are reported to be operating in Leipzig, Schwerin, Derlin-Friedrichatadt, carrying the Berlin III program; in Inselsberg (Thuringia)?:Drocken (Harz Mountains), and another is projected for Berlin tO carry the Derlin I Program. In,view of the report of 30 additional VHF transmitters (10 each with powers of 0.25 kw, 1 kw, and 10 kw, respectively) having be2n completed. In late 1953 it is possible that there, Will be considerable expansion of the VHF FM?facilities in 1954 In. addition to providing interference-free reception. a group of FM stations operating on different frequencies in an area can provide a convenient program distribution network0 Daalmana is tne - 32 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T designation for the method of receiving and rebroadcasting programs over an FM network. There are also reported provisions for supplying medium- frequency AM (amplitude modulation) broadcast transmitters with programs from these networks in East Germany, Miler nations have found this a successful system for program distribution. In addition to the above advantages of FM, it is relatively impervious to jamming since the jamming transmitter must be located virtually within it of the target station to be effective. 84/ e? When .the East German broadcasting facilities had achieved a fair state of repair following World War ti, listenershad a choice of three programs in addition to those of local origination. Network operations ',Jere provided by wire-line interconnections under the administration of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications Berlin 1, Derlin II, and 715er1in III programs were intended to attract all listeners by the variety of their offerings. They were sUpplemented by approximately 1- our of programs originating locally., "Berlin I is an 'al1-German fighting program'; it is not only a program for East German audiences, but the main vehicle of Communist radio propaganda fel. West Germany." During 'a recent reorgani- zation Berlin It was reported to have been discontinued, having been replaced by "DeutSchlandseader" propaganda broadcasts aimed at West 'Germany. It had carried "many of the programs of Berlin I, but its particular emphasis" was "on the exposition of Communist theory of science, society and art." Berlin III "is characterized by less ideological inten- sity and more nonpolitical broadcasts than Berlin I." In the main it is believed that 4reline facilities distribute these programs, As the VHF FM transmitter program goes forward distribution will probably shift to these transmitters. There have already been reports of a device (Dallempfaenger) for receiving.a program from an FM transmitter and feeding it to a medium-freqaency transmittera (See section 'an TM Broadcasting). Similar techniques have been used in the US and other countries with success for several years. 62./ f. Directional Antennas. The use of a directional antenna installation at a radio transmitter provides for reinforced eignals in some directions at the expense of signal strengths in other .directionsa The East Germans -33- S-E-C-R-E-T no. am. mi. arm Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R---T are reported to be installing directional antenna systems at the sites of some of the high power transmitters. These systems are so arranged that signals may be beamed to the West, CT to the East. With some adjustments the antennas will radiate equally in all directions. The significance of this, when coupled with the reported high powers of the transmitters, is that the East .Germans will be in a position to beam extremely powerful signals to a large part of Western Europe from these installations, many of which are relatively close to the border between East and West Germany. There are re.,)orts that high-power, medium-frequency transmitter installations at. Berlin-Karepenick-, Burg (near Magdeburg), Dresden, Erfurt, and.8chwerin Were to include two-tower directional antenna systems. They were said to be aimed toward the West, 'with the exception of the Dresden installation, the direction of which Is unknown. 216/ It should be noted that Schwerin, Burg, and Erfurt are relatively close to ' the border. The medium-power (20 kw) transmitter at Potsdam-Golm is also reported to have. a directional antenna system. pl./ The high-power, low- frequency installation supposedly under construction at Zehlendorf is also to have a directional antenna. 88/ g, Television. Because of the lack of trained manpower in East Germany and its economic condition,- there as no post-war television in the country until 1952, when. an installation at Berlin-Adlershof began a 2-hour daily test transmission. This operation was begun despite such handicaps as lack of proper raw materials from whidh to manufacture the delicate and complex cOmponents of the transadtting and receiving equipment, fires in the studios, and accusations of sabotage. These latter were levelled against East GerMan technicians'by German and Soviet administrative personnel. Original demonstrations of television were apparently "closed-circuit" operations. That is, the transmitting and receiving equipments were connected by cable, rather than by a radio is custo- mary in the US. Difficulties in finishing the 'transmitter were finally_ overcome in 1952 so that broadcasts in the true sense Of the word were sent out at a frequency of approximately 99 mc with.a low-power-(100 watts) transmitter, 2,2/ Now there are indieatione that the transmitter situation has impoved and in addition to a more powerful transmitter in Berlin, one has heen'put into operation at Leipzig. Two hours of daily programs are scheduled .There are reported plans for six transmitters to be located on the trocken (in the Harz .Mountains), intresclen, Erfurt, Salswedel, Stralsund, and.on the richtelberg (in the Erz Mountains). 22/ 34 S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 -E -C -R Studio facilities in Berlin are reeorted? as being -elaborate. It is reported that these facilities are intended to supply programs for the entire East Zone. At the moment, still and moving picture films provide a considerable part of the programing in East Berlin. A shortage Of camera pick-up tubes is said to be a major factor in limiting the programing facilities. .21/ h. .Miscellaneous Transmitters Soviet occupation forces in East Germany are pro- vided with program service by transmitters in Berlin-Koenigs Wusterhausen and Leipzig. Neither of these transmitters is under the control of the East German authorities. Operating on a frequency of 263 ko with an estimated power of 20 kw,."Radio Volga" has been located at Koenigs Wusterhausen by direction-finding equipment. Studios are believed to be In Potsdam. Some programs are believed to originate in these studios, but most of the time is devoted to relaying programs from Radio Moscow and from Berlin 711, This station, started in 1946 )has never used a call letter identification, nor has it announced its location. 22/ The high-frequency transmitter inLeipzig, not under the control of the East German governMent, relays the German-language programs of Radio Moscow's European service. _gReceivingEtpmeriEaELGEEEEz. Introduction. Prior to World War II, Germany ranked first of all European countries in the field of telecommunications research, production, and utilization. In 1935, more than 7 million broadcast receivers were 11 use in Germany. 93/ A large proportion of those receivers 1,4...!re of high quality and covered the low-, medium-, and high-frequency broadeast bands. After the coming-to-poaer of the Nazi hierarchy, radiobroadcasting was exploited as a prime pro2aganda tool. Concomitant to the supplemental coverage of the country by a network of small transmitting stations for synchronized transmission of a single program was the wide-spread dis- tr'bution of inexpensive, 2-tube, relatively insensitive broadcast receivers, designed for reception. Loudspeakers attached to wire-diffusion systems, employing existing telephone wire lines as the medium of trans- mission, also were employed to some extent. These relatively insensitive receivers and the wire-diffusion loudspeakers served the dual purpose of making broadcast reception economically available to practically the entire 35- S7E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 development and future of broadcasting by means of wire-diffusion. Tecause of the Lack of data pointing out the directions and extents of these influencing factors, an ahnual growth of 200,000 receivers for East qermany and 10,000 for East Berlin has been assumed for a lover limit, and 400,000 and 20,000 receivers for East Germany and East Berlin respeatively, for an upper limit, It is felt that figures between these limits will probably be realized. From the figures in Table 3 it is estimated that in 1952 there were about le receivers per 100 population in East Germany and 28 in East Perlin, while the figure for the combined area amouated to an aVerage of 19 receivers. By way of comparison with pre-aar conditions, as of 31 March 1939, there were an estimated 20.3 receivers per 100 populatior in the territory now kaon as East Germany, 27,25 in Lerlin (not East )erlin), and the combined figure for East Germany and all of :eerlin was 22,1 re- ceivers per 100 population, 121/ As of late 1952 and early 1953, there were in West erlin and West Genially an estimated 22 broadeastereeeivers per 100 population, 104/ It.e same souree gives the number of listeners per set as 2,53 for West. Germany, 3 lieteners per set for West Derlin, and 4 listeners for East Germany and Fast 7.-er11n combined - The. number of loudspeakers connected to the. vire-diffusion networks of East lermany is not known and no estimate of the. number is attempted :or this-reecitta This system is discussed in III, As 4; be1o4, where it is stated that the system has been expanded sinceWorld War -TI. he nuniber of receivers operating in East. Germany for reception of very-high-freqaency (a4) broadcasts is not known, It is pre- sumed, however, to be a very small number, In the first place, it is tholaght that there are not many receiver's with the very-high-frequency comeonent available for such reception, and although there are adapters preduced Alich will allow this reception when used in conjunction with. the ueual type of broadcast receiver intended for lower frequency bands, it is not believed that many of these are it use. Furthermore, this type of 'Jroadcast is net developed to any extent at the present timee As develop- ment of this transmission takes place, receivers vill undoubtedly-be made available and an increasing number will be in operation. b. TeleVibione , The number of television receivers in East Germany' is apparently very small, This is indicated by an estimate in one report of ? 50 receivers in operation in East Berlin at the end of September 1952, while - 38 ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-O-R-E=T a second report gives an estimate of 800 receivers in East Germany in December 1952. 10.5i Estimates of the number for later dates are not avail- able, A substantial number of Leningrad T-2 receivers produced as reparations for the Russians were reportedly returned to East Germany as being faulty. This has been resorted as 10,000 and again as 40,000 receivers. 106/ At most it can be said that at the present time there is a very small reception base for television, but it can be expected to grow wath improvement in design, lowering of prices, and lessening of production demands for reaarations. The rate of growth will depend upon Soviet wishes. 2. Characteristics. a. Aural. Notwithstanding the German tradition of production of high-quality telecommunications equipment of top efficiency, it appears that a large part of the broadcast receivers in use in Germany at the close of World War II were by intent relatively insensitive and were capable of local reception only. In mid-1945 the Russians reportedly ordered that all broadcast receivers be reduced to three tubes. Since about 85 percent of all receivers at the time had 3 tubes or less the order was applicable to only 15 percent of receivers. It is not known to What extent this order was carried out, except that in Leipzig it vas not enforced, and only a few apparently obeyed the order. It is not known at that date the order was rescinded, but production of receivers with more than three tubes for sale in East Germany was resumed in early 1914-7 101/ so it would appear that the order did not have much effect upon the listening capabilities of the receivers or habits of the listeners, Numerous reports indicate that many high-quality German broadcast receivers found their way to the USSR with returning Soviet military forces. It seems logical that most of these broadcast receivers would have been of high quality, Although the pre-war distribution of high quality receivers is believed to have been fairly uniform throughout Germany and the current incidence of broadcast receivers in East Germany is almost as high as in West Germany, it is doubtful that the proportion of these receivers &let are of high quality is as great. The quality and workmanship of recently produced broad- cast receivers for purchase by the East German public appears to have deteriorated markedly by comparison with pre-war produced receivers.. One reason for this deterioration appears to be the absence of thorough - 39 - S -E -C -R -T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R -E-T testing of new models, which are put into production as soon as pilet models are completed. Improvements and adjustments are made later, based on complaints of purchasers. 12?/ An unconfirmed report by a former employee of a plant producing one of the cheap one-tube receivers stated that it was being discontinued because the set had proved to be unsatis- factory. 122/ The probable causes of this deterioration in the quality of broadcast receivers are the Soviet influence on design and workmanship; shortages of materials with concomitant substitutions, and lack of pur- chasing power of the people to obtain higher quality receivers. The production of the higher quality receivers probably is intended for reparations to the USSR, the export trade, and the use of the hierarchy of East German officialdom. The list of broadcast receivers produced in East Germany, as given in Appendix El indicates that a large majority of these models are equipped for high-frequency reception. Even the one-tube set, Type is capable of receiving high frequency transmissions, although ? limited in range from 5.9 mc to 9,8 mc.* nevertheless, a one-tube receiver is relatively insensitive and it is highly speculative that it can be used satisfactorily for reception of transmissions originating at distant iodations. .Even though most of the types of broadcast receivers produced in East Germany appear to have high-frequency reception capabilities, the distribution of broadcast receivers would not necessarily follow production, since many factors affect the availability of these receivers to the general public, The use of receivers capable of reception Of very high frequencies is relatively new. The behavior of radio waves in the very- high-frequency band is such as to limit reception generally to 'line-of- sight" distance from the transmitter, Which automatically precludes reception of Programs from distant stations. There is no known production of receivers designed exclusively for very-high-frequency receation in East Germany, although 6 models, 3 of medium quality and 3 of high quality, contain YM reception components in addition to the low, medium, and high frequency components, * This range covers the portion of the high-frequency broadcasting bands employed for high-frequency broadcasting by East German stations-. See Appendix D, S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T YM adapters are available for two other models. It is not known ho4 many IN receivers are operating in East Germany, but presumably they are few in number. The characteristics of tdese receivers are not known. b. Television'. The Leningrad T-2 television receiver has a very small screen, 13 by 18 centimeters !about 6 by 7 inches) with a 625-line picture, 50 frames per second, the same as the West Germaxi picture delineation. It is said to be the oldest Of the Soviet models, snd is presumably the type used in East C.;ermany. Aside from performance standards, this size picture is outmoded and far from satisfactory to the viewer, An improved model with a larger screen and better performance is reportedly under development and production, 112/ 3. DiTtribution. a, Aural. Table 4 shows the estimated number of broadcast receivers by postal districts as of November 1950, and affords a representation of the geographic distribution throughout East Germany. Table I. Estimated Number of Droadcast Receivers and Percentage Distribution by East German Postal Districts .November 1950 111/ Postal District erlin ))resden Erfurt Halle Leipzig Potsdam Schwerin Total -3roadcast Receivers 324,000 435,000 490,000 773,000 773,000 422,000 218,000 31453,000 -41- S -E-C -R -E-T Percentage Distribution 9.4 12.6 14.2 22,4 22,4 12,4 6.8 100 0 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 -R -E -T In general, the incidence tends to follow the pOpulation pattern, with a somewhat heavier concentration in the cities where there is a concentration of state, military, and Party personnel, since these are the ones most able to purchase receivers and are particularlY favored in other respects. ' It is apparent that the people as a'Whole have receivers Capable of short-distance reception, although the majority of types of receivers produced in East Germany have greater capabilities. The .estimates of receivers wIth high-frequency capability vary from 4o1 to 90 percent, from Which it can be deduced that a large perdentage of them is 1 capable of such receptionot least theoretically. Many defector reports relating to reception of broadcasts on the part of farmers indicate that receivers are operating in the rural as well as the Urban areas. The following excerpts are of interest with. 'respect to distribution: "... in Coswig most homes have radios"; "Most of the farmers have old sets ... The reception ... is limited only to a few stations ..."; "Most people in Cottbus own radio sets ..."; "... many families (Anneberg-Duehholz) own their own radios ..."; "The number of privately-owned radio receivers owned by the population of Muechelm is estimated at 1,500." 114 While, certain types of receivers can be adapted to FM reception by Means of.a special unit, and a few types of receivers are initially equipped for this reception, it is not known. where the few FM receivers are located. Presumably they are odned by state, industrial., and Party personnel in the upper brackets in East Berlin and the cities having VHF transmitters. b. Television. So far the distribution of televition receivers has been limited to peoples-owned plants,. schools, universities, state-owned clubs and hotels, and important State and Party officials. 1173/ Presumably they are confined to East. Berlin and its immediate environs. It is conjectured that distribution will necessarily be very slow, primarily because of the prohibitively high cost of the receivers. Geographically-they will be con- centrated around the cities in which television transmitters Will be Aperated. S-E-C-R-E-T _ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R -E-T ?????? 4.? *Ida OD. NISI MOO 4. Wire-Diffusion. The wire-diffusion network, begun under the Nazi regime, was used to connect loudspeakers in public places and in private homes, its use was far less extensive than the use of individual receiVers, especially in private homes. The telephone cables were employed to transmit programs direct to the listening points. The system permitted a choice on the part of the listener among several programs. The sUb- seriber might possess either a simple loudspeaker of a tube broadcast receiver. In the case of a tube receiver, the subscriber could either connect the loudspeaker of the receiver to the wire-diffusion network, or employ the receiver for direct radio reception. The principal advantage of wire-diffusion reception was freedom from atmospheric and Industrial interference and from jamming. Wire-diffusion systems were found chiefly in large cities. 114 in 1942, 170,000 loudspeakers were in use throughout Germany. 115 The wire-diffusion system in East Germany has been expanded, since the end Of World War IT. Mainly, installations have been planed-- in the major squares and streets of towns and cities:, in factories' recreation centers, barracks, premises of mass organizations, collective farms, and in newly-constructed apartment houses, 116/ These systems appear to range in size from a single loud- speaker in a village square for limited use in making occasional announcements, :to the elaborate center of the Eisenhuettenkombinat Oat in Frankfort-on-the-Oder, which is claimed by the Berlin aadio to be the "largest and most. modern factory radio installation in the German Dema- cratic Republic." The studio is said to be abke-tG-tmomaitlifferent programs simultaneously and the installation to have 4o relay points to which hundreds of loudspeakers can be connected. 117 Wire-diffusion loudspeakers in newly-constructed apartment houses appear to be the only installation$ in private-dwellings, The high incidence of independent receivers in private dwellings probably aacounts for this situatien. No information is. available as to numbers of loudspeakers in service today ov aa to geographical distribution, -43- 4 S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 E fivailabillty and Costs of Radio Receivers, 1, Production ei1112EERFIE, a, Aural, 002.6.41fflalla.??? Assuming availability of raw materials ,East German telecommunication production facilities are capable of manufacturing practically all types of telecommunications equipment, including broad- cast receivers of all ranges of capability from simple One-tube low- cost table models to 9-tube deluxe console models with automatic record players and tape recorders, A very high percentage of all these models are capable of reception of low, medium, and high frevenzies. Some models also have very-high-frequency rece)tion capability, '..;he East Germany five Year Plan (1951-55) contemplated standarizing of broadcast receivers by the production of only 4 basic types, with average retail prices of 95 DME, 250 rNE, 350 nmE, and 700 JME (East German Marks), Emphasis was to be placed on increased production of the cheapest models. 118/ '73som the number of models listed in Appendix E, it is seen that there Us a wide variety of radio reeeivers it is likely that these are numerous variations of a few basic types, as improvements and advancements in the art have been incorporated into pro- duction, and as variations are introduced to satisfy differences in performance demands. Production of radio receivers, tubes, and component parts has been carried throughout East Germany and in East rerlin in many plants. The majority are being produced at the T,TE.q. plant, i.e., plants of the People's Owned Enterprises, with a small number produced by private plants and the Soviet-owned SAG plants (Staatlicner Aktien Gesellsehaften), This is borne out by the proposed 1954 production plans of the State Planning Commission. This plan itemizes 160,000 radio receivers to be produeed by SAG plants: 607,000 by plants of the VE; and only 46,00a by private plants, totalling 813,000 set6, 112/ It Is ,not stated that these sets are radiobroadcast receivers and it is presumed that other types of an unknown quantity ere included,. All production, of eourse, is planned by and under the supervision of the Russians, Radiobroadcast receivers produced in East Germany have been shipped to the USSR as reparations, exported to Soviet floc countries, to non-Ploc countries, and. some have been used for home consumption (some as replacements for -retirements). While data are not available as to proportions of the above, it is known that less emphasis has been'placed on reparations since 1950-51, Tor these reasons, production figures do not - 144 - S-E-C -R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S -E -0 -E -T reflect accuretely the growth of the recedtion base in East Germeny, Table 5 shows the'estimeted production of eivilian radiobroadeast receiver sets for the years 1946-51, Table 5 Estimated Eroduction of civilian Radiobroadcast Receivers in East Cermany 120/ 1946-51 Yer llumber 1946 6o,000 1947 1009000 1948 15o,000 1949 220,000 1950 275,000 1951 321,000 While shortages of certain materials and components are reported to have aused slow-downs in production of SOM2 types of electronics equipment, these shortages apparently tave not prevented a fairly steady increase in production of broadcast receivers yer by year, 'In Appendix E under the description of the chexacteristies of mdiobroadcast receivers produeed ill at Germany it will be noticed that there sre none listed as being intended for very-tigh-frequency trm) reception exclusively, There are 6 models, 3 of medium quelity end 3 of high quality, with nil reception components in addition to the usual low-, medium-, and high-frequency components. Seventy thOusend Stern broadenst receivers sre reported to have been produced in 1953, 45,000 of which conteined very-high-frequency components. The 1954 quota, of produetion. of Stern broadcast receivers is said to be 84,000 units.' of which. 70,000 unit swill contain VEF components, 121/ from the descrLption of the models listed in Appendix E, it appears that the majority of such receivers are of Stern manufacture, 1T'or two other models, PM adapters are availab)..e, A separate one-tube super-regererative converter unit not indicated in the table) is also re?orted available to eneble 7M reception on AM broadcast receivers at a cost of 80 leVE 122/ -45- S -E -C -E -T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 4?11.? ?????? 411?1?1? ????? 4.1* Imports related to production of radiobroadcast receivers and imports of radiobroadcast receivers into East Germany have been minor. As already stated East Germany produces radio receivers not only for its own use and for reparations but for export. b. Television. There are varying reports on the production of television receiving units. Production started in East Germany in 1951 as reparations to the USSR One report gives the planned production for 1951 as 44,000 sets and 60,000 sets for 1952, with only 17,626 receivers delivered and accepted as of 27 October 1952. RV A production figure for 1951 of 29,000 Leningrad T-2 receivers is reported. 124./ There ere other indications that anticipated production plans were not fully realized. A production goal of 200,000 receivers in 3-2 years, possibly from mid-1952 through 1955, has been reported, but there is some doubt apparently as to the possibility of realizing this rate, wnich averages some 57,000 re- ceivers per year. 125/ Production of Leningrad T-2 receivers apparently was discontinued in late 1952 and a newer, improved model vas scheduled to begin production in East Germany in late 1953 or early 1954. It is not known wnether this model would be for export or for domestic use or both. 126/ 2. AvailabilIty and Prices of Radio Receivers a. Aural, Under a state-controlled economy, the availability of broadcast receivers can be very closely regulated by controlling their. cost to the people. As can be expected, therefore, the high prices pre- vailing :or receivers precludes the purchase of all but the cheapest and least effective, except by high officials. The simple one-tube receiver thus popularized in East Germany sells for about 96 DME. According to a publication of the Free Gernan Trade Union, 17,000 of these receivers were to have been distributed in Derlin. and 33,000 in the Soviet Zone by early 1952 127/ Whether this was actually accomplished is not known, but it emphasizes the plans of the state to popularize a set which would be satisfactory for nothing but local reception. A two-tube receiver sold for 120 UNE prior to Slily 1952, in Cottbus, where Most households reportedly owned radio receivers. 128/ Other types of receivers were reported as selling at 420 WE for one of the best all-wave receivers; 500 DNE for a medium-size receiver made in East Germany; And 900 1E for the most expensive nasupunkt" receiver in a State store catering. exclusively to Soviet Army officers. 129/ - 46 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R -E-T ? ? A purchaser is required to present his credentials and to make a formal applieation for purchase of a new receiver. Periodically, all broadcast receivers. must be registered. 130/ These measures tend to control the availability of receivers, both old and new. Reportedly the Central Committee of she Soviet Zone SEP Party in October 1952 prepared a legistlative bill for the "seizure with receipt" of all private radio receivers, and theia replacement in enterprises and homes with a single type receiver, and in shops and apartments with loudspeakers. 121 This points to the possieility that, at some future date, only cheap, insensitive broadrast receivers and loudspeakers will be at the disposal of the people. It is therefore evident that while the majority of the people now have access to some sort of broadcast receiver, even though it is apt to be a one-tube set, the Russiana are concerned over the number of higher quality receivers still in the hands of the general public and are prepared to take drastic measures if and when they con- sider recovery rf these receivers expedient. It is not known to what extent broadcast receivers capable of veey-high-frequency reception are available. There are several models producki in East Germany that have VE41 components in addition to the usual loa-, medium-, and high-frequency components. VHF adapters are available for several Modelsdand a separate super-regenerative converter- unit to enable VET reception on AM broadcast receivers is available at a cost of 80 INIE 132/ b. Television, The limited number of the Leningrad T-2 television receivers .aich were available in East Germany in 1952-53 retailed for 3,500 ONE in the State shops. A newer model, reportedly to be ready it 954, is expected to sell for 1400 to 1500 DME. Payment by instaliments is not allowed. Price, alone, would preclude purchase by the nseral public. The usual approval to purchase a receiver is necesse y, but permits are understood to be limited to trusted Com- munist,, supposedly to prevent reception of "capitalist" programs from the W.:rst,. Ownership, thus far, has been limited to top Party and gove:ament officials, schools, factories, clubs, and Communist Party orgalizations, 133/ - 11.7 S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T - IV, Yegulations and Conditions of Listening A. Aural, 1 Reanlations. Curing World War El the National Socialist authorities promulgated a law which forbade all listening to foreign programs, under threvut of severe penalties, including death. 134/ These restrictions were ebolished after World War a, and according to present information there are no laws, decrees, or statutes forbidding listening to foreign broadcasts by the East German population, although it has been reported at verLous times that legal measures were being contemplated, 135/ Despite the lack of formal regulations forbidding listening to foreign broadcasts there are a number of mk?esures to open to OR authorities as a means of inhibiting this practice. These include intimidetion and insinuation, including loss of jobs,. The names of regular listeners to .7r.CAS broadcasts have occesionally been published in the press, end these listeners have been caut.oned against the dangers inherent in this practice. 136/ German youth leaders were ordered by East Zone authorities to inform on persons listening to Western radio broadeasts. 137/ in February 1953, Vcakspolieei questioned students of a school in Eberswalde regprding the radio stations to whieh their parents listened, 138/ In Slily 1953 a campaign was leegun against BIAS in which employees of the county administration offiees in Lucken, Brandenburg, were informed the listening to EIAS was forbidden and would be punished by immediate dismissal, 139/ tn October 193, probably as a result of the East Zone riots in June and the part played in them by F.IAS broadeasts, a special RIAS-listener file was Bet up which contained the names of employees of the funs nnd Leuna works, 140/ Although there mre no formal restrictions against listening to Western broadcasts, listeners have been warned that they were violating the Law for the Protection of the Peace, passed by the Satellites in 1950-51. This law forbids the spreading of false rumors, and has been applied by the Communists to information eontained in Western broadcasts, Other measures taken by the authorities to limit the audience include orders to hold power a minimum during news broadcoests of BIAS and VWDR, 141/ This ratLoning of electric power greatly hampers the ebility of radio set owners to tune in Western stations, No information is available on radio receiver license fees, if there are any such fees. - 48 S-E-C -Ft -E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R -E There are, therefore, numerous techniques available to the authorities to restrict listening to Western broadcasting. Why the authorities have not instituted stricter measures, such as the con- fiscation of radio receivers or the passage of legistation specifically forbidding listening to foreign programs, is not clear. The regulations and conditions concerning broadcast receivers and reception in East Germany are comparable to such regulations aad conditions prevailing in most countries of the Soviet Zloc. In the absence of an extensive 'tire- diffusion network, the confiscation of independent broadcast receivers, which would be an effective measure to prohibit East German listening to Western broadcasts, would also remove a prime propaganda tool from use by the authorities. Further, such confiscation apparently would be con- trary to Soviet poliey in regard to the claimed "freedom of the people" under Communism, Moreover the mass reaction, active or passive, or the East Germans might well be inimieal to the Russians' best interests in East Germany. 2. Conditions of Listening, The advanced state of technology in East Germany, which is considerably in advance of this.t of the majority of the Satellites, has provided a production base ahich has resulted in the availability of a relatively large number of radio receivers for the East German population( M:st of these receivers have some capability for reception of low, medium and high frequencies, but are not of sufficiently high sensitivity to receive signals emanating frem distant points, that is, weak signals. Preclusive control of reception by means of the aire-diffusion technique appears to have limited use in East Germany, Probably because the Russians recognize the difficulties involved, there appears to have been no effort to extend this controlled listening technique into private homes. Eowever, the present ogram of wire-diffusion, with its instal- lations in factories and public places, seem to assure that the German public will be exposed to Party doctrine at least some of the time, Although there has always been a certain amount of inter- ferenee with reception due to the jamming of Western broadcasts, the events of 17 June 1953 have evidently caused the Russians to take strong measures to blot out reception of these programs,. This subject is discussed at greater length in IV, C, below, According to reports certain measures have been taken by some East German listeners to overcome the effects of the jamming operations. One eource reports that the magnetic Ferrite antenna used S-EeC-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R -E-T in good quality West German receivers were obtained and installed on radio receivers in East Germany. These antennas supposedly have sharp directional characteristics Which, permit the separation of the RIAS transmissions from those of East German jammers. 12-2/. It has also been reported that VHF attachments for radio receivers are available to those people who wish to receive the VI F transmissions of nearby Western stations, Which are relatively free from interference. B. 'Visual.. The viewing of television programs is rigidly controlled by the regime. Official sanction is necessary even to watch a set, and permits to own one are limited to trusted Communists. 2.2i.V The Communists seem to have in mind, at least for the present, some such system for tele- vision as that used throughout the Satellites to control radio listening, i.e.,. the wire-diffusion network. Plans are reported to call for the Installation of a network of television sets in public places, such as theaters and meeting halls, thus placing viewing more strictly under the control of the State. Both the East and West German television systems use the 625-line viewing screen., At present, however, the number of television receivers available in East Germany is very limited. Reports in early 1953 indicate that only a few hundred sets had been supplied, with most of these going to state-owned enterprises and Communist Party centers. C. Jamming.* 1. Introduction. East qerman jamming of Western broadcasts may date back to 1947 when Soviet Zane listeners to RIAS reported, in letters to the station, that there was interference with RIAS signals reminiscent of the jamming activities of World War 1E, 145/ The congestion of the European broadcast bard in recent years could have inspired mistaken reports of jamming. It appears well-established, however, that by 1951 the East Germans were engaging in deliberate jamming activities. An instance of this was reported in Which a transmitter in Erfurt operated on a frequency so clese to that of a West German transmitter at Munich that serious interference resulted in Bavaria as well as in East Germany. 116.1 This subsen-ion,prepared by OSE. -50- S-E-C -R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T Performance of jammers in East Germany indicates that, as a result of an expansion of facilities beginning in 1952, the East Ger- mans now have all the important elements of an effective jamming system, 147/ These include high-power transmitters, directional antenna arrays for these transmitters, a monitoring system to determine which programs shall be jammed, a control network over which to send jamming instructions to the various jamming stations, and a staff of trained personnel, While there have been reports of jamming of Western low- frequency 148/ and high-frequency 1.122/ transmissions, East German' activities are devoted mainly to the medium-frequency band. This is to be expected because a large proportion of the Western radiobroadcasts to East Germany are in this band. Because most of the East German jamming of the medium-frequency band consists of broadcasting their Own programs on both high- and low-power transmitters operating on or very close to the frequencies of Western transmitters, it might be well to review briefly the history of the most recent allocation of European low and medium frequencies - a, The Coperhm21112911.2ncy Plan. In the summer of 1948 a European broadcasting conference was held in Copenhagen to help resolve the problems brought about by the crowded condition in the low- and medium-frequency broadcast bands. The results of this conference were put into effect in March 1950, The US, not being a European nation, was. not a signatory power. However, the USSR refused to be bound by the convention if it were not observed by Spain (which did. not attend the conference), by Luxemburg (which announced that it would not sign) and by the powers occupying Germany, including the US.* The USSR reserved to itaelf the right "to take the necessary technical measurea to eliminate interference in the work of its stations" if all the signatory powers did not abide by the convention. .152/ This reservation has provided the Soviet Bloc with an excuse for operatin transmitters at powers much higher than those of the Plan and on frequencies other than those assigned, -a Under the terms of the Copenhagen frequency Plan, the US Armed Forces Network was assigned one frequency, All other US broadcast operations in West Germany do not conform to this plan, to. which the US was not a party. - 51 - q-E-C-R-E-T ? ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -E -T 2' -!...." a. 21,11EILW77.-.?1A2LINETEE. The jamming pattern in East Germany is similar to that of other Satellite nations in that a number of high- and low-power trans- mitters are used, under the direction of an effective monitoring and control network, Noise-modulation jammers are used against low-frequency and high-frequency transmissions;, while, in general, programs modulate the medium-frequency jammers, 151/ Program modulation serves to pro- pagandize Soviet Dloc populations as well as to reduce reception of Western programs. One difference, however, between East Germany and the rest of the Soviet ?lac is the apparent lack of use in other Moe nations of the power-line jammer (to be described below which appears to be used in East Germany, he institution in 1952 of the program of high-power broadcast transmitter construction presaged more and better facilities for ,jamming. It is reported that the high-power (220-440 kw) medium- frequency broadcast transmitters now being put into service in East Germany are designed for frequency change to any point in the broadcast band (525 to 1605 Ito) in 40 minutes. 12E/ In view of this, and the fact that reported locations of jammer stations generally coincide with the sites of known broadcasting stations, it is probable that the East Germans are depending on the use of these broadcast transmitters nlat only to put strong ptopaganda signals into Western Europe, but to effect a marked reduction in reception of Western broadcasts in East Germany, A list of the broadcast transmitters probably used in this service, together with their locations, frequencies, and powers, is to be found in Appendix D, Those operating on the same frequency as Western transmitters are so marked. b, 2he Power-Line Stamen In addition to the use of the high-power transmitters for jamming, the East Germans appear to have developed a jamming apparatus which distributes its signal over electric power lines in a town, The device is reported to be loeated at a central point in a town, often the post office or the liolkspolizei 1:Peop1e's Police'; installation, Known es "the set for improving radio reception in poorly served localities" (note disauasion of Soviet attitude toward lopenhagen Plan, above), it apparently receives the radio program of an East German transmitter and retransmits it over the power lines on the frequency of the Western signal which is to be jammed. Reported as having an output power of 50 watts, ro - S-E-C -R. -E-T- ?=.0 ?????? 61 ma Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 it is said to be effective within a radius of about 12 kilometers (7.5 miles". '11-,is jamming sigma, however, will not be transmitted by power trmsformer whieh may be installed in the electric power dis- tribution system This janmer, known as either the "Transponierungsempfaenge frequency nhanging reeeiver: or as the 1F 2962 epparatus, is variously reported as using 5 or 8 tubes One report indicates that provision may be made for sending A noise instead of a program by means of this equip- ment 'here are indications that from 300 to 600 of these devices were ordered and that 65 were delivered in 1953, There is little information ns yet on the distribution of these equipments, 153/ 'n Effectiveness of Western Propaganda Yroadcasts A size of the Audienve Estimates as to the size of the audience listening to Western broadvasts in. East Germany nre difficult to express statistically, lowever, one of the most recent estimates pinees the number of radio listeners in. East Germany at 12 million plus, 154/ When this is com- pared with the total population of East Germany, whieh stands at about 18 million inhabitants 156/ some idea of the very large audience can be obtained. The attention paid by the communist authorities to the effects of Western broodcasts upon,the East German population is an indication that the audience is considered to Lave reached sufficiently high pro- portions to be of doncern, As has been previously ststed,na large percentage of the redio receivers are in private homes in East Germany, RIAS transmitters, located in. nerlin and at Eof, West GerMany, enjoys the geographical . status of "local" stations, 1:eports of reeeption of PIACI broadvasts have been received from all parts of East Germany, eVen those parts now under Polish controlt 156/ A survey eonducted in early 1953 indicted that RIM outranks all otherWestern stations in popularity among Germans, with 8 out of 10 adult East Zone refugees reporting that they listened, more often to 717:AO than to any other stationn broadnasts are generally considered as supplementary to RAO, but it does not enjoy anywhere near 88 large n audience, 157/ See'IT. concerning the impact of Western broadcasts, particularly RIAS, upon the East German SK policy and the reactions of some of its officials - S -E-C -5 -E -17 u??? Yr. WIRY MY' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 -.a...?. e. b, Nature of the Audience, The audience for foreign broadcasts in. East. Germany appears to be drain from all sectione of the population, and includes Soviet per- sonnel as well as native inhabitants. It is retorted that enlisted personnel- of Soviet Army units in Germany are not allowed to have ralio receivers in military barracks; thus officers are the only military personnel who have the opportunity to listen to foreign broadcasts. There are numerous reports that Soviet officers do listen to foreign broadcasts, with reception of ITO, VOA, RYAS, FeEs Radio Liberation, Radio aree Russia, and Yugoslev broadcasts in Russian being reported. 159; During the ferlin Yalth. Festival in 1951, a study was made by RIAS personnel in West Derlia of the reaction of East Zone Youth to foreign broadcasts. The refUlts of this study showed that 88 percent of those interviewed reported listening to the radio, and of this total 83 percent stated that the:. listened to Western broadcasts, la/ More than 15,000 members of the ?ree German Youth movement in the Soviet Zone are reported to have visited R1AS studios during the restival, 161/ The OS Eigh. Commission, in a report of Yebruary 1953 on its Derlin operations, listed the following priority target groups within East Germany e (1) public opinion leaders'(e.g., the press, political figures, educators, clergy, etc.), (2) visiting Soviet Zone residents, (3) youth, (4) students, (5) unemployed and refugees, (6) labor, and (7) women. 1621 Questioning by HX0G personnel of some 500 East German farmers Who visited Perlin, during January-Jebruary 1952 as to their listening habits indicated that 82 percent where regular radio listeners... Of these, nine-tenths listened to RIAS's farm -broadcasts, three-tenths to those of VWDRf and one-fiZth to Soviet Zone stations. 163/ It is interesting to note that among the farmers thus questioned, by far the great majority expressed a preferenae for farm programs or political broadcasts, while such programs OX radio plays, music, and comedy drew only a small per- centage of listeners C? Popular Stations Times, .:.nd Frequencies for Listening< 1, Aural? -- Low Mediumaillgaency. Lecording to numerous surveys, by far the most popular station among East Carmans is SIAS, This is probably due to a variety of reasons. RYE, for example, does not consider East Germany as a target area, and its - 5)4 - 'v. *AO rob& VAN Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -R -E-T broadcasts are beamed almost exclusively to the other Satellite countries. vac is reported to be pepular among certain of the more educated elements of the population, and its news is valued for its objectivity, but reception of BBC broadcasts is reportedly poor. 164/ BOR is oonsidered mostly as supplementary to RIAS broadcasts it should be remembered also that RIAS's position in the center of East Germany is unique, and affords an opportunity not accorded to any-other stations. Reports indicate that the best times for broadcasting vary with the type of audience, that is, whether the broadcasts are intended for the East German population or for Soviet personnel stationed there. One report, for example, indtcates that the best time for VOA Russian- language broadcasts to East Germany would be 2030-2200 GMT, which is off. duty time for Soviet troops. 165/ This is borne out by another report, which gives the period .1900-2200 GMT as the time best suited for listening to foreign.broadcasts. 166/ This latter report also points out the difficulties encounterenvy Soviet enlisted personnel in attempting to listen to foreign broadcasts, since there are few individuals who have access to tunable broadcast receivers... VOA at present carries Rassian-language broadcasts to Germany at 1900-1930 and 2215-2245 GM, both times mentioned as having good reception or high frequency. Other VOA and LBC Russian language high-frequency broadcasts mentioned as having good reception are those in the 9-me band in the daytime, and in the 14- and 12-me bands in the evening. 161/ tadio Liberation is reportedly very effective in its brohdcasts in the 6-mc band from 1500 to 1530 GMT. 12/ Az has been previously shown, RIAS outranks by far all other station, in its popularity among East German listeners. In 1951, a sampling of opinion among East Zone residents indicated that more than 80 percent of those who listened to the radio regularly deaended mainly upon RXAS broadcasts. 1g21/ Amcng those stations heard, the relative popularity rating showed RIAS first with 66 Percent, MDR second with 12 percent, Radio Leipzig and Radio Berlin (both Communist) with 3 and 2 percent respectively, and BBC With. 1Lpercent. A more recent suraey? made in November 1953 by-a/coal indicated that RIAS hed lost approximately .one-quarter of its audience since mid-1951, 112/ but remained by far the most popular station. The loss of listeners was attributed mainly to poor reception owing to jamming pitrations, rather than to a drop in the quality of its programs. The most popular programs unong East Germans appear to be news and political broadcasts. This is true of all sections of the population -- professional people, workers, farmers, and students. 211/ These broadcasts are carried by RIAS on both medium and high frequencies. S-E-C-F-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T Some programs, with their broadcast times, which have a certain popularity among East German listeners are listed below: 172/ Frequencies 3.1.31 Time (GMT) Medium High "Berlin' Speaks to the Zone" 0620-0630 1240-1250 "The Week in Bonn" 0930-1000 Perm Broadcasos 1120-1130 RIAS Locator Service 1145 A.V. Boerner's Commentary 1901-1906 Other popular programs ere "Pinsel and Schnorchell" "The Parade," and "The Perlin Atmosphere." Ey Islanders," "Hit 2 Aural -- Very sigh Most of lhe specific programs listed in Section IV, C, 1 are also carried by RAS on VHF siMultateously with the medium- and high- frequency transmissions. There is no information available as to pro- gram preferences for VHF reception. 3, Televieion. The prosent situation as regards the reception of television broadcasts from the West is unclear. There is little or no information which would indica'oe the size or nature of the audience, and the present base for reception of telecasts is still in a very elementary is, therefore, inyossible to make any appraisal of the conditions which might govern reciption of television in East Germany., D. Some lconomic Effects of Western Broadcasts. All Euidence points to .he fact that Western radiobroadcasts have had a considerible econemic'effect in East Germany. It is estimated, for example, that at present there are 6o or more transmitters of various power ratinge used at least pert time in East Germany in the jamming of Western brmicasts. This operation involves the employment of skilled technicians and a large amount of expensive equipment, all of which are a drain upo% the East German economy rather than a positive contribution- -56- S-E-C -E -17 - Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 .0n ???? row rm.. mom Broadcasts by RIAS have often had the effect of causing panic buying by reporting the existence of shortages in East Germany. In one such instance a RIAS report of a shortage of meat in Zrandenburg was carried at 064o hours, Py 0800 the county offices had been mobilized to see to it that the report would be proved false, and meat taken from that usually reserved for Soviet troops was put on the market. Yn another case it was reported that a collective wage contract for the Brandenburg Steel Works was concluded only after great difficulty with the workers, These difficulties were attributed to BIAS broad- casts, 176/ The most dramatic eviienee of the effect of Western broadcasts wen the East German economy oecurred during the riots which took place in Berlin and the Soviet Zone in ,:une 1953. Numerous reports testify to the effect of RIAS broadcasts in spreading the news of the riots throughout East Germany. ;11E/ It is perhaps too strong a statement to attribute the "new course announced by the East German regime to this development, but it is certain that considerable damage was done to the economy during the period of the riots. Looting and property damage were reportedly widespread. In addition, there was the expense involved in moving People's Police and soviet military units to Derlin to quell workers' resistance. Any effect upop the riots that may have been attributed indirectly to the RTAS broadcasts would seem to have been well worth the effort in term of the disruption, even though temporary, of the functioning of the eroeomy in East Germany, The broad malignant Umpact of Western broadcasts upon the propensity of the East German worker to work heartily, though not measurable quantitatively, iF estimated to be appreciable. E. East German Press end Radio Reaction to Western Broadcasts, There is abundant evidence of the reactions of the East German press and radio to Western broadcasta. Some instances of this have been reviewed in LV, A, Articles have appeared in the official press listing the names of persoes known to be regular RIAS listeners. Ely The party organ, Neues Deutechland, has often carried articles inveighing against those East Germans eho listen to the "anti-democratic (Western) radio," 179/ Listeners to RTAS and NWT, were warned that they were violating the Law for the Peotection of the Peace, 12:2/ which was passed by a11 the Satellite countries in the latter part of 1950. In April 1952 the magazine of the People's Police carried an article which stated that 'RIAS listeners have lost the right to do duty in the People's Police." 1?1/ -57- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T Perhaps the finest tribute to the effectiveness of Western broad- casts is contained in an .article whieh appeared in Neues Deutschland. This article carried a statement to the effect that it was not igre:?even for true Communists to listen to Western news on an academic basis, since this made them a perty -- wittingly or unwittingly -- to the campaigns of the "warmongers and foes of democracy," 182/ VT. Trends, The end of World War II left East Germany in political, economic, and social chaos. Its radiobroadcasting resources were depleted,' Their reconstruction proceeded slowly end unsurely under Soviet controls and restraints, The winter. of 1951-52 became critical and dynamic, Technical radio management, radiobroadcasting management, and production of radio equipment all went under review or reorientation to overcome deficiencies and to cope the influence of foreign broadcasts, particularly those from Western Germany. Most major changes were completed by Sanuary 195j Personnel problems, principally coneerning competence and loyalty, have persistently plagued the effectiveness of East German radiobroadcasiing and its administration. To cure all ills, the State Radio Committee was set up in September 1952. One unconfirmed bat reliable report indicates that plans were laid in March 1953 to reorganize radiobroadeasting %gain. There is no evidence to show that this planned. reorganization has since taken place, notwithstanding the recognized success which West Germany's broadcasting had in causing the spread of East German rioting in June 1953. In spite of serious problems: the trend since 1952 has been toward more effective and efficient organization and management of East German radi broadcasting resources, The trend in ?the East German normal broadcasting transmission base appears to be to saturate not only East Germany with medium-frequency signals, but to beam them toward much of Western Europe for propaganda purposes. In addition, it appears that from the current modest beginning the East Germans will make increasing use of very-high-frequency (FM) and television broadcnsting with expanding coverage of the countryn The trend in the number of available broadcast receivers for use In East Germany for the usual types of broadcasting is steadily upward aM it is expected to continue in this direction, with possible larger increases in FM and television receivers than in the past, since Indications point toward development of these types of broadcasting. This' upward trend should be helped by the present attitude of the iissiensi which contemplates a larger portion of East German production going toward home consumption, It Is not expected that the percentage of receivers capable of satisfaetory high-frequency reception from foreign countries -58- S-E-C -R -0-'1 ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-0-P-E-T will improve materially. While production embraces many high-quality models with several tubes and incorporation of all wave bands, it is probable that these will not find their way into the hands of the average citizen, Who can afford to buy only the cheapest receiver. The latter is a relatively insensitive receiver capable of local reception only, The better, more expensive, reeeivers will continue to be held by the ,higher-ups in the government, military, industrial, Party, arid Soviet circles. There should be an increased reception base for rm and tele- vision as these two types of transmission are expanded. Their distribution will naturally follow the installation of the transmitters since both are virtually of a line-of-sight nature The .development of wire- diffusion networks and loudspeaker connections will probably continue to follow the pattern of the past, with limited use in private homes unless Soviet policy changes rad1eally toward this arrangement. The trend in restrictions on listening to foreign broadcasts during the period 1946 to the present time has been toward an increase in such measures, but until now has not reached the point where listening to such programs is legally prohibited- or where the regime has taken steps to confiscate sets. As regards the conditions for listening, the general trend here hs? been toward an increase in the measures taken by GE1Raauthorities to build up a "captive" audience which will be forced to listen to the Communist programs, aecompanied by a decrease in the reception of Western broad- casts as a result of jamming interferenve, It is estimated that the current strong propensity on the part of the average East German to listen to foreign broadcasts, especially those from West 'Perlin and West Germany, will increase with increasing efforts to prevent it. Xf present plans for expansion of both strategically located medium- and high-power. transmitters, and low-power local jammers distributing signals over electric power lines are carried out, the potential East German audience for Western broadcasts will be reduced. The apparent goal of this progrsm is to make reeeption of Western broadcasts in East Germany impossible., The complete achievement of this goal will require jamming facilities considerably in excess of those presently in use of believed to be projected. There has been a recent trend toward a decrease La the si,e of the East German audienfle for foreign broadcasts, but this is attributed to Interference resulting from jamming rather than to any drop in the quality - 59 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C -E-T - of programs, "Lncreased difficulty in getting through the jamming curtain with presently airt.ilable transmitting equipment can probably be expected in the future, because the Oommunists are constantly stepping up their efforts in this respect. -6o- E-C -R -E -T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 ? S-E-C-R-E-T APPENDIX A REPORTED ORGANIZATION OF I'M GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF RADIORROADCASTING: EAST GERMANY December 1950 - August -1_952 GENERAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT L. SOVIET ZONE RADIOBROADCASTING SYSTEM TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT FERNSCH CENTRUM Aldershof?Berlin STATION Potsdam TECHNICAL DIRECTION PROGRAMMING TELEVISION SUPERVISION HSOUND SUPERVISION PHCYTO TECHNIQUE HLIGHTING H STAGE STATION Berlin GENERAL LABORATORY GDR BROADCASTING SYSTEM STATION Leipzig CHIEF: CENTRAL LABORATORY BROADCASTING DIVISION TELEVISION DIVISION TECHNICAL SUPERVISION?CABLES IMPULSE AN]) SYNCHRO DEVICES SIGNAL INSTALLATION STATION Dresden --I HIGH FREQUENCY INSTALLATIONS DEFLECTORS? HIGH VOLTAGE INSTALLATIONS BROAD BAND AMPLIFIERS TELEVISION CAMERA AND CAMERA AMPLIFIERS TELEVISION OPTICS H TRANSFORMERS? NETWORK INSTALLATIONS OFFICE OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT - 61 - S-E-C-R-E-T STATIONS Weimar Halle Schwerin STUDIO Goerlitz Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/0,? ? CIA-RD,F79-01093A000500050001-8 APPENDIX B RETCRTM PERSCNNEL CF THE STATE RADIO O'ONMITTEE ---- FAST HEISS Chairman of the Commission is Kurt Halos, a professional journalist, who W35 formerly director' of 'the Soviet Zone Radlobroadcanting System and editor of Deutenhlandsender. His wife is Russian. Born in 1909 in Mannheim, Helss became a Communist Party member when he fled from C.ermany in 1933 e4,cape arreot by the Gesapo. After World War II he served for a time as chief editor of Radio -Leipzig, until assuming the position of Director of Radio rertin ou 26 October 1949. In December /95/ he left Radio Berlin to become Director of the East Zone Radlobroadcasting System, suceeding Hans Mahle. In August 1952 he was appointed to his present position. Heise attended the Antifa (Lnti-Fasnist) School in Moscow. He waliin Warsaw with a delegation from the Central Radio Office from 20 June to 6 July 1950, where he signed a protocol on behalf of the GDR providing for cooperation and exchange of knowledge between the two conatries FTEINERT Wolfgang Fleinert, who also received training at the &Alfa School, is Deputy Chairman of the Commission. He headed a Commission delegation to Sofia on 28 April 1953 to conclude an agreement on coopera- tion in the field of broadcasting with the Radio Committee of the Bulgarian council of Ministers. He is a member of the S. PERK W, Perk, of Deutschlandsender, is responsible for the broadnaat "All-German QuestIons," He has visited the Soviet Union, He deals with Radio'Berlin's West German .reporters, who are equipped with miniature re- corders for work in the GDR.' Perk speaks and writes German poorly and his own commentaries must be extensively edited. . PFEUCHVER (possibly Pisahner) Professor PTnechner ip in charge of the Main Musin,Department. He believes that Radio Berlin, in line with the "new course," should imitate RIAS ,1 first hot music) then political reports." (CONNEVT- This is not, of course,, the RIAS method.) He sends people to West Berlin to buy Western records and to engage Western artists -- money no object. Party affiliation not available. Piachner has been reported to be an SED member, FUKALNER R. Fuetzner is responsible for literary and cultural-political broadcasts, He has visited the Soviet Union. His job is to demonatrate the "impossibility" of Western culture, Party affiliation not available. - 63 - Approved For Release 1999/09424-eV6P79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-O-R-E-T EIIRODT &tete Ellrodt is in charge of entertainment and public Figaiiences. She plant off-color jokes about the Americans and the West. Party affiliation not available. A K. Ellrodt, perhaps the same persons has been reported as Chief Editor of Berlin III and a member of BED, PRISKY Hanna Frisky is in charge of "Youth and Pedagogiee." She maintains close liaison with Komsomols, and believes that "you can'tede anything with the grown-up,eanyway." She is often in the Soviet Union and Satellite States. Party affiliation not available. ? ADAMEK Heinz Adameks director of the Main Personnel Departments is responsible for personnel policy. He hae close connections with the State Security Service. Be is a mebber of the SED, and regards political attitude as a decisive factor in the employment of personnel. PROPST W. Propsts director of the Main Technical Department, is supposedly a technicians but was removed from his post at Radio Berlin for incompetence. Heise took over his functions. Propet explains technical faults at Radio Berlin as being the reeult of poor qaality of technical personnel and equipment.* Propst is a member of the SED. ' ZAHNKE .Zahnke is the supervisor of empleyeeel work conduct. .When riMing, he complains about the GDR government. Party affiliation is not available, HEVDEISOHN Meter Nendelsohns a member of Free German Youth, was installed In the commission to keep von Schnitzler and Gesener under observation. Be is a yonng man, in his early 20s. lion Schnitzler wan formerly in charge. Party affiliation not aVallable. GISSNER Herbert Gessner; a well-known commentator, was removed from Radio Vianich in 1947. His wife was employed in the cultural section, but was removed for conduct injurious to the SED. Party affiliation net available, KUHFELD Guenter KUhfeld has had difficulties on the score of morals and professional qhalifications. party affiliation not availdble. SCHNEIDER Helmut Schneider waa formerly chief of eection. He wae removed In a series of intrigues and is now a script writer for DEFA. Be writes dramatized documentaries for Radio Berlin and did the Rosenberg dhows. Be is very able, though a heavy drinker. He is reported to have stated that "the party is the highest form of exploitation." Party affiliation not 47?TPERTZ717aCi1ities at Radio Berlin Include 6 recording rooms, 14 cutting rooms, and 10 dubbing rooms; half of them are constantly out of service and all have acoustical faults. -64 Approved For Release 1999Mage-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09KRi_9*FRID79-01093A000500050001-8 CO. 101.1, mole MI" 1.1. available. An Hy Schneider has been reported as .an SED menber, in the Entertainment Department. REONBAK Frew. Rennhak is in charge of Berlin I. Eels a heavy drinker. and is professionally unqualified. His party affiliation is not known. It is reported that he was in "Western Enigretiony" MOERICKE Hanz Nbericke is in charge of Berlin III. His father is a personal friend of Wilhelm Pieck. When drinking, be makes critical remarks about the Communist system. Be receives financial support from his father- in-law? Who lives in West Berlin. Party affiliation not available. Name Adolph,Kari Alberty Bartel:3 Bauer Bexertt Boehm Bosse, Johann Brang Braumann Brenk Burkhardt, H. Buschmann Busse, H. Classen, H. Crossman Demuth Doerge ' Dost, W. Duchrow Dunger, K. Ebel Edelhoff Edeimann Fehlig? Werner Frenzel- Froehlich Gegget, H. G4isetzner Grenzel Gruenstein Bakke, Rudi Haendler Function "????????,1111.21?Or.m...1??????111*W Director, Leipzig Radio Assigned Announcer Assigned Announcer Youth Departnent Assigned Announcer Transmission - 3 Programs Nes and Program Announcer Director's Pool News and Program Announcer Assigned Announcer Chief Editor, Berlin II Chief Editor, Berlin I Theater, Film and MUbie Depextnent West German Communist Party and Unions Department Women's Department Transmission - 3 Programs Technician for 3 Programa Current Events Department SED Department Children's Department Director of Main Administrative Department Domestic Economy Department Country News Department Deputy Director, Leipzig Radia?. or Director, Transmission Berlin Department Director's Pool West Germany Department Assigned Announcer Berlin Section Censoring Department Technical Director, Leipzig Radio Truth About America Department Party N.A. No Party BED BED No Party SED No Party SED BED SED BED SED SED SED BED SED No Party SED SED SED BED SED BED BED SED No Party SED No Party SED BED SED - 65 - Approved For Release 1999/09/02-ECIXRDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 F F Name Hartmann Hats Hauuchild jokann Heizig Herr ierwia Heydecks H. Hildebrandt Hilgert Hoerne, Wolter Horn Intelas Xahlow Kaminski Kasswan Kaul, Dr. Kendt Klaehn lenges, HQ Mackat Mlerche Atka, V, Valtrodt Nehmzoy Opitz Ortner, Paschke Paul. Pbuetzner, Rudolph Pletsch POlensen Polland Porth Preusker Schnitzler, von Schoellig Schoenendorf, W. Sthwendtner SeIbmann, Soeldner Steinke Stelzner, R. Stoll Stuebe Function Assigned. Announcer AS signed Announcer News and ProGrram Announcer Personnel Referent AU:signed Announcei. Censoring Departnent Assigned Announcer West Germany Department Director's Pool Director's Pool Fbreign Connections Tchnican for 3 Programs Technical Scheduling Office Dramatics Department Cenuoring Department Transmission - 3 Programs Direvtor,'Iegal Department Assigned Announcer News and ProgranAnnouncer Neve and Program Announcer Domestic Econogy Department Director's Pool Traffic Office External Technical Service Censoring Denartment Finance Department - Youth Department SED Department Berlin Section Director, Radio Berlin or Deuts hlandsender News ana Program Announcer Assigned Announcer Files and Archives (Scu.nd Carrier) Director's Pool Chiefs Production Department ComMentary Department Production Directors Organization Office Deputy Director, Production Technical for 3 Programs Science or Economic Department Womengs Department Director's Pool Religious Department USSR and Satellite Departments Literature Department -66.- Party lib Party No Party SED SED No Party SED No Party SED No Party LA SED LA SEP SED SED SED SEP Vo Party Nb Party SED BED NO Party BED SED N.A. SED SED SED SED No Party SED No Party No Party SED SED SED SED SED SIM SED &ED SED SEP Approved For Release 1994/ Idi-NA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 SECRT- 'Dia= Function toopmelyma,....coilpECI.MR121.5.1.101 Thierfelder. 'Censoring Departnent Thiess Aseigned Announcer Tbelg Assigned Announcer Wander Assigned Announcer Zilles Hermann Deputy Directorv Dutchlandsender or Director, Television Branch Zinneringv Political Culture Department SED No Party No Party No Party BED SED - 67 - S-E-1.2,..R.E,-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 -0 -0 3 CD a. -11 CD (7) a) Location CD et -Berlin-Koenigswusterhs.usen 841 100 CD CD Merlin-Deutschlandsender 191 100 a c.o aerlin 6115 ' 5 to 10 7113 erlin 7610 5 tresden 1465 10 4?1110..01.14.1=11.1.1.m. S-E-C-R-E-T APPENDIX C FACIIMIIS?B_EAZIL_LTIRMAtu 184/ 1949 od peAwddv Frequency Power (kc) -(lpt) 7trfurt cb aalle CD ipzig a a :eipz ig aoksdem 01a :active r in a Co 1231 20 1303 20 785 100 9729 12 722 7 564 20 1231 20 Prow Berlin Home Service Deutschlandsender Deutschlandsender "Radio Volga" Central German Radio and Saxony Regional Service Central German Radio and Thuringian Regional Service Central German Radio and Saxony Anhalt Regional Service Central German Radio "Radio Volga" Berlin Home Service and Potsdam Regional Service Berlin Home Service and Neckletburg Regional Service Hours of Operation 2/ Approximately 18.5 hours daily Approximately 18.5 hours dpily Irregular Approximately 17,5 hours daily Approximately 17.5 hours d al 1 y Approximately 17.5 hours daily Approximately 17.5 hours daily N.A. Approximately 18.5 hours daily Approximately 18.5 hours daily CD Remarks (7) CD CD CD CD Power e st imated a Program for USEal? )ccupation force); CD 6 a (.0 Program for U. occupation f ? 7a a cri a a a cri a a a a. Detailed program schedules not available. - 69 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 .10d peAwddv a) Location CD -a CD CO Biglin-Koenigswusterhauser APPENDIX D RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 182i January 1954 Frequency Power Hours of (kc) (kw) Progiaa Operation (GMT) 173 2.1 Low, Medium and High Frequencies N.A. Berlin I ?33?-?71?)aasumed 0900-0000) Baplin-Koenigswusterhauser 185 K.) Binlin-Xoenigswusterhauser 263 1> Bnlin-Koenigaimaterhsuser 833 13 B41111-1Coenigswusterha,user 6115) CD . 7150) Balin-Koepenick 782 CD (AV a a Bglin-Koenigswusternauser 782 a 100 20 20 5 440 70. Deutachlandsender 0330-0710, 0900-0000 "Radio Volga" to Daily: 1500-2200 Soviet Occupa-Sunday: 1000-2200 tion Forces Berlin I 0330-0710, 0900-0000 Berlin I 0330-0710, 0900-0000 Night Program 0000-0330 Deutschlandeender 0330-0910 1100-1300 (1500-0000 du, do. Nglin-Stadt sender 1570 c a a a ? ? 20 Berlin III (which para- ;leis Berlin I from 0330-0710) 0330-0710, 0710-0850, 1040-1700, 1730-0000 ET Remarks a) CD -a CD CD Station not announced or listed; 92 probably used to counter VOA on 173act Power to be increased to 500 kw in ti6 K3 near nature. Relays Moscow Main Program 5 hours .(-; daily, 8 hours Sunday; this stations not under GDR control. Probably triobile type transmitter. 0 CD cb a CD > a a Spare transmitter for Berlin-Koepenig, above. a a a 01a a a Transmitter is the &filling Z-3, recently installed. . Underscoring indicates that this frequency is the same as that of a radiobroadcast station located in West Germany. - 71 - S-E-C-R-E-T 0 CD a. Location S-E-C-R-E-T RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GEMANY 182/ January 1954 (Continued) Frequency Power (ke) .,(kw) 9, +in -a Dresden I 910 C) 5; 33 0 - "CV Dreisden II Wiledruff) .1016 a a a a a a a a a a Co Program Hours of Operations (GMZ) Remarks Low, Mediumdand High Frequencies Probably Berlin I or Berlin III 20 erlin III Saxony Regional Service 300 Berlin III Saxony Regional Service (also short programs several times weekly from Goerlitrzin Lusatian Serb) 033C-071u 0710-08501 1040-1700, 1730-0000 1700-1730 Reported to be under construction.' * g Frequency reported to be in the lolow w frequency range beteeen 150 and 300 kc; Power reported to be be- tween 500 kw and 1,000 kw. Location reported variously as Berlin-Zeblendorf? Ber1it-Koepenick,12 ludwigslust, or Burg (near Negdeburgt? (parallels Berlin I), K3 0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), 0710-0850 likmw transmitter 1040-1700,: 1730-0000, 1700-1730. - 72 - S-E-C-R-E-T - o inaugurated 9 Oct 195g CD CA) cn cn 63 CD Location RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 182/ January 1954 (Continued). Frequenty Power (kc) (kw) a;xfurt w CD CAD CAD CAD adetermined - thought to Se Halle c) K3 Halle-Bernburg 0 fRipzig a ipz a a a ig a a a 01a ?1pig iii 63 20 B.A, 1196 20 1043 1:40 9730 10 1079 20 Program Hours of Remarks Iow, Medium, and High Frequencies Berlin I 0330-0710, 0900-1715, 1745-0000. Thuringian 1715-1945 Regional Service Undetermined - 0330-1700)ezsunied thought to be 1730-0000) Berlin III Berlin I 0330-0710, 0900-1715, 1745-0000 Saxony Anhalt 1715-1745 Regional Service ' Berlin III ? Leipzig Regional. Service Night Program Deutschlandsender Berlin III -73- (1?. Expected to be replaced in May 1954a7 by 440 kw transmitter. CDw CAD CD CD Low power transmitter apparently uses to jam the RIAS-Hof (West Germany) 51.71! transmitter on the same frequency. 0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I)) 0710-0850) Actual power output believed to be 14404-1700., 70 11.7. 1730-ooloo 1700-1730 0000-0330, 0330-0910, 1100-1300, 1500-0000 0330-0710 (parallels Berlin 0710-0850, Mobile type transmitter; super- 1040-1700J rower transmitter scheduled for 1730-0000 Leipzig in 1954. 8- 1.00090009.000V?601.0-6/dC1N-V10 S4-C-R-E-T RADIOBROADCASTING TBANSMITTLNG FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY Apiary 195h (Continued) Location a_ - CD 41i1341g C,) CD -a Adeburg (Burg) a 0 Oetennined - though to Plauen PetsdaM,-Golm CD cb Frequency Power (kc) Hours of Program Operations((GMT) ? antI High Frequencies Leipzig Regional 1700-1730 Service 1322 100 Radio Moscow (re*, 1600-2130 lays German pro- grams from Moscow European Service) 575 300 Berlin I 0330-0710, 09oo-1715; 1945-0000 Saxony Anhalt 1715-1945 Regional Service 890 2 Berlin I 611 20 Berlin III 'Brandenburg Regional Service -74- enter This station is not under GDR control. 0330-0710) assumed Not announced or listed; forperly 0900-0000) interfered. with RIAS --Hof (West Germany). 0330-0710 (parallels Berlin 0710-0850, Probably maile type transmitter. 1040-1700; 1730-0000 1700-1730 S-E-C-R-E-T 8-1.00090009000V?601.0-6/c1CIN-V10 : Z0/60/6661. eSeeleN .10d -0 -0 a Frequency Power Hours of Location (kw) Program Orations .(GMT) Low Medium;and High Frequencies S-E-C-RZ-T - RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 1A2/ January 195 (Continued) CD CD Ichwerin CD CAD CAD CAD 25 CAD 25 Unknown 0 a Remarks Pu CD ET m 728 4.40 Berlin III 0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), Cl) 0710-0850) 440 kw power inaugurated 9 Oct 19531, m 1040-1700) CAD 1730-0000 CAD CAD 1700-1730 25 CAD Mecklenburg Regional Service 683-Night N.A. Berlin I 1385-Day grlin-Friedrichstadt 92.5 .4 cb a CD 0330-0710)assumed 0900-0000) Very High Fre4uencies (FM) 0.25 Berlin III 0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I)) 0710-0850 1040-1700 1730-0000 0.25 Berlin I Projected 0.25 Berlin I 0330-0710 0900-0000 N.A. Berlin I 0330-0710 N.A. Berlin I 0330 0900-07N0000 N.A. Berlin IIT 03300710. (parallels Berlin I) 0710-0850 1040-1700 Wlin-Friedrichstaa 94.9 CD Bracken (Harz Motuitains) 94.6 CD cn CD gelsberg (Thuringia) 94.0 ta-ipzig 88.0 a ahwer in Co 89.2 Mecklenburg Regional SerWe 1700-1730 S-E-C-R-E-T 8- 1.00090009000V?601.0-6/dC1N-V10 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/a4katepP79-01093A000500050001-8 APPENDIX E CHARACTERISTICS OF RADICBRQMINUMURECEIVFES PRODUCED IN =TUMMY 116,/ Name No. of Thbes Frequen y Bands t. emarks RFT u 11 1 LNE I' Band, kc. Probably most population setplowest costo Stern 4 u 64 4 LMH Superheterodyne, AC-DC) adapter for VHF available. Stern 4 u 65 14. LHVB Superheterodyne. Stern 5U 61 5 L H Superheterodyne, Ac-rc,, adapter for VHF available. nrr 5 E 61,D 4 M Superheterodyne. RFT 5 E 63 5 LMBVH "Medium class' set: pbonograph. RFT Stern 5 u 53 5 LMH VH Superheterodyne. RFT 5 E 64 5 N.A. Phonograph. RFT 6 E 62 6 LMH High-fidelity, record player and tape recorder. 6 D 71 5 Portable, Ac-rco Stern 9 E 91 9 L M H VH Superbetaroplaul, Stern 9 E 92 9 L M H VH Superheterodyne) record player and tape recorder. 9 E 61 Belaphon 4251ff LA, N.H. L M H Receiver for coaches (busses). "Sonnebere 66/52 W 5 LMH Superheterodyne. 'Olympia!' 522 'JM 5 NH Superheterodyne. 64/50 WS 4 M H Superheterodyne. RFT S 1049B 5 H Automobile set. RFT AE 66 N.A. M Automobile set, superheterodyne. Skala 5 Stern]. U 16 12/ 1 Loy cost, said to have been dis- continued in .1953. Stern 7 E 86 y 7 LMHVH Superheterodyne? tone controlled. Stern 12/ 2 M Midget superheterodyne dispatch case. 4. low frequency. ? - medium frequency., H - high frequency. VH - very high frequency. b. These sets were reported scheduled to be placed on exhibition at the Leipzig Fair, 1952, They were new developments not then in production - 77 - Approved For Release 1999/09/0T:MTA:RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 25X1 X499 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E4-11-E-T APPENDIX F METLIODOICGY The totals of radiobroadcasting hours transmitted to East German audiences, both foreign and dome etic, were obtained from overtly pdbliahed material of the broadcasting agencies and from reporte based on monitoring. .71a0 estimates of the nuttier of broadcaat receivers (Table 4) for the years 1946 to 1951 were taken from CIA/HR 1M410 25 August 19530 BIS (this vas the only source of the geographital distribution), overt published materials and a State Department despatch. For subsequent years estimates' were predicated on a flat yearly increase, extending the estimates to 1957, which baa been done in the S/COM contribution, dated 9 January 19540 to officewide projects ENC-P-6. As a result of research for the current reports it was felt that the estimates for EIC-P-6 probably were high because of the uncertainties of the impact of certain economic factors. These include the development of very-high-frequency and tele- vision broadcasting, wire-diffusion expansions and the "new course," which ,is intended to liberalize economic benefits to the masses. For this reason a more modest yearly growth increment wee considered and adopted. Lower estimates then resulted and were coMbined with those for EIC-P-6 so that eatiMates for 1952 through 1957 are stated in the form of a range for each yoi. rather than a definite figure.. Appendix E setting forth the characteristics of radiobroadcaat receivers produced in East Germany was derived from material contained in catalogs of a German import-export organization; CIA/RR 11, 26 September 1952, and 25X1 A8a ? - 79 - S-E.C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 k. No information is at hand regarding plans beyond 1954 for radio broadcasting transmitting facilities. 1. Tb .re is little information regarding proposed power of new VHF (rm) and 7V transmitters. 2 I1& to fill gaps have been proceeding on two broad fronts a- the general and the specific. AB for the general, a Telecommunications Working Group of the EIC ?i'ubcommittee on Requirements and Facilities for Collation has undertaken to develop a complete, new set of requirements manuals geared to the specific capabilities of the various. collection agencies, along with the establishment of priorities according to subject matter and country. In consonance With this program, working groups of the EIC Subcommittee on Electronics and Telecommunications is now preparing 4 set of survey sheets on the Soviet Bloc countries which will measure the state of our intelligence in the field, the deficiencies, and the reasons for the deficiencies. This over-all program Mhen put into effect, should greatly improve the quantity and quality of raw material and should help to fill in some of our more wide-open gaps. As for specific efforts, advantage is taken of knowledgeable sources discovered in the daily reading process by the initiation of specific requirements geared to our known gaps and the competence of the source. were also utilized to a limited extent in the preparation of this report. In addition, numerous requests for re- quirements have been respondea to in this field and continue to help fill in gaps. 25X1 A6a -82- S -E-C -R -E-T ? ? ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 _ APPENDIX H SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES 1. Evaluation of Sources. a. Transm1slsa_Easllities2LE2E21galroadcasters to East Germany (Aural The information on foreign broadca6ting addressed to the East German 25X9A2 audience was obtained chiefly from based on monitoring and on overt publications. It is considered reliable. 25X1A8a c. Rece1lflaLEILLIaZa"2-__-tETEX' This -information on distribution of receivers came largelyfrom NIS NIE and CIA punished documents, State Department despatches, In general, this information was confirmatory. 25X1X4 83 S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 25X1X400050C Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 S-E-C-R-E-T 25X1A8a The information on receiver production and characteristics was from CIA published documInts, and East German trade catalogs, This information is taken as having fair reliabilit d. Regulations and. Conditions of Listenin 25X1A8a Department and USIA despatches, Since Most of the material in i c om? reports were, in general, substantiated by the overt Information, they are believed to be of good reliability. obtained 25X1A8800501 State 25X1X4a 25X1X4gs e. Effectiveness of Western Broadcasts. The majority of the material on the effectiveness of Western broad- casts is taken from surveys made by ParOG or BIAS personnel. These surveys are considered to be of good validity. Information on popular programs, statione, and frequencies was obtained from HICOG reports, and confirmed as to time and frequencies by program schedules overtly published. 2. Sources. Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated have the following significance: Source of Information A - Completely reliable D - Usually reliable C - Fairly reliable D - Not usually reliable E - Vot reliable F - Cannot be judged Information "Eval.?" Doc. - Documentary 1 - Confirmed by other sources 2 Probably true 3 - Possibly true 4 - DoubtfUl 5 - Probably false 6 - Cannot be judged "Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff officers. all of which will carry the field evaluaton 'Documentary" instead of a numerical grade. Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report, No 'RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited document. Evaluations designated "SI" are by WI. -84- - ? ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 5X1 A2g Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8 11 25X r _ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 OFFICE CV RESEARCH AND REPORTS Projects Control Staff Control Sheet DocumrNTN0 CIA/RR PR Series ;:: A;; TO: T's nnther CIA/RR PR-54 Lite of Document I April'54 Fp: ? 00050001-8 711 AR ts tiAlkag Classification Number of copies 154 DISTRTBOTION C::OPY NO, DIVISION OR AGENCY DATE RETORTED 1, 2 AD /RR 3 May 54 #2 ret'd 5 May 54 2, 3 2 6 May 5.4 75, 76 az T 7 May 54 ?2ZR i ? - II . ! ? Henry Loomis. USIA 7 May 54_ ',5 oscArD 1 'Ili s'q -1 0 - I 1 511-1 -2 '''2 CA/t4 l' 4' --'-' . 25:1A%al /04 Afro -t'-- 0 C.---(--r, A(Z2______ -,