'DISSENT IN RUSSIA,' BY ABRAHAM BRUMBERG, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JULY 1974. 'MOSCOW: NOTES ON A SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE,' BY EARL CALLEN, THE ATLANTIC, MAY 1974.

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25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 CPYRGHT FOREIGN AFFAIRS AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW JULY 1974 Foreign Policy under a Paralyzed Presidency Chalmers M. Roberts 675 World Oil Cooperation or International Chaos Walter J. Levy 690 Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy Sabura Okita 714 Europe and America: A Critical Phase Karl Kaiser 725 Population and Development: Is a Consensus. Possible? Michael S. Teitelbaum 742 The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense? Ted Greenwood and Michael L. Nacht 761 Dissent in Russia . Abraham Brumberg.781 Peru's Ambiguous Revolution Abraham F. Lowenthal 799 Asian. Triangle: China, India, Japan . . William W. Lockwood $i8 Tremors in the Western Pacific . . Eugene B. Mihaly 839 Correspondence .. . $5o Recent Books on international Relations 853 - Source Material . . . . . . . ..Donald Wasson 87.1 WILLIAM P. BUNDY Editor JAMES CHACE JENNIFER SEYMOUR WHITAKER Managing Editor ELIZABETH H. BRYANT Assistant Editor Book Editor Editorial Advisory Board A. DOAK BARNETT HARVEY BROOKS JOHN J. MCCLOY C. FRED BERGSTEN CARL XAYSEN HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR. JAMES H. BILLINGTON WILLIAM L. LANGER WILLIAM M. ROTH Published quarterly by the Council on' Foreign Relations, Inc. Editorial Office, 58 East 68 Street, New York, N.Y. I002i. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Cable address Foraffairs, New York. Payments and inquiries concerning subscriptions and reprints of articles should be sent to Foreign Affairs, 428 East Preston Street, Baltimore, laid. 21202. Subscription price $io.oo a year, post-free to any address. a , No. . yrig. t 1974, ounce on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in the U.S.A. 'Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 DISSENT IN RUSSIA By flbraham Bruinberg CPYRGHT HE first chapter in the history of open political dissent in post-Khrushchev (or for that matter in post-Stalin) Russia may be said to have begun in October 1967. At that time the young physicist and grandson of the late Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Pavel Litvinov (now in the United States) threw down the gauntlet to the Soviet authorities by openly dis- tributing the final statement made at his closed trial three months earlier by Vladimir Bukovsky, a young dissident arrested and sentenced to three years in a forced labor camp. Bukovsky had organized a demonstration, in January of that year, against the arrest of a number of dissidents who had helped yet another young dissident, Alexander Ginzburg, compile a White Book on the February 1966 trial of the writers Andrei Sinyavsky. and Yuli Daniel, sentenced respectively to seven and five years hard labor for having published their works abroad. The ineluct- able pattern-arrest-protest-arrest-had thus come into being two years earlier. What distinguished Litvinov's action from the others was that his protest was set down on paper, signed, and distributed to Soviet and foreign newsmen alike. Perhaps, then, Litvinov may also be credited with initiating a new genre of samizdat, all previous such unofficial "self-publications" having been circulated only sub rosa, . , In January 1968, Alexander Ginzburg (who had himself been arrested in February 1967), and three of his associates, were sentenced to long prison and labor camp terms, after a four-day bogus trial replete with bogus evidence and bogus witnesses-two of .them clearly agents provocateurs. The public reaction was instantaneous and extraordinary. Emboldened perhaps by the examples of Litvinov and Piotr Grigorenko-a Soviet Major General with a long record. of civil disobedience-as well as .by official Soviet propaganda extolling the benefits of "socialist le- gality," hundreds of Soviet citizens flooded their own and foreign newspaper offices, and. also the headquarters of various foreign Communist parties, with letters protesting the latest perversion of justice in their country, and voicing alarm about the specter .of Stalinist-or quasi-Stalinist-terror in general. For the next year or so, open protests against specific judicial malpractices-letters, petitions, statements-became the princi- pal instrument of what has come to be known as the Russian "Democratic Movement," a loose conglomeration of perhaps 2,ooo people or so, most of them members of the intelligentsia, and most of them concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad. It was a heady period. As one of the "Movement's" most active par- ticipants, now in the United States, recalls: "the pure idealism, the totally selfless attitudes and hopes, the previously nonexistent hopes ... it was the time of the Prague spring, the best days of our lives." It was a period that saw the birth of the bimonthly Chronicle of Current Events, an. anonymously edited news bulle- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000100580001-2 tin containing scrupulously accurate information on the burgeon- ing struggle for human rights in the U.S.S.R., as well as on the authorities' efforts to combat it. Other hallmarks of this period: the furious battle waged by Alexander Solzhenitsyn-with the support of some of his fellow-writers-against the suppression of.his works and the institution of censorship in general; the for- mation of the so-called "Initiative Group for the Defense of Hu- man Rights in the U.S.S.R.," consisting of about 15 members and 6o active sympathizers; the emergence into the open of various forms of national and religious dissent, both of which provided the "Democratic Movement" with at least a potential base for mass support; and the astonishing growth and transformation of samizdat from occasional items of unorthodox fiction and poetry to something resembling an opposition press. The first chapter-or period-came to a halt roughly by the middle of 1969. So did a measure of the early zeal and enthusi- asm. The government, while obviously not viewing the dissidents' activities as a serious threat, nevertheless took forceful measures to suppress them: arrests, trials (formally "open" but in fact closed, unpublicized, and rigged), house-searches, interrogations, dismissals from jobs and from the Party, and finally that most odious of all. forms of political persecution-confinement to mental hospitals.' Yet, contrary to what might have been ex- pected, the initial enthusiasm did not yield to despair: many of the dissidents defiantly invited arrest, in the hope that their sac- rifice would serve as an example to others, as well as a challenge to the world not to remain passive. With this came a realization that.the early methods did not work, and that new forms of op- position would have to be devised. Not that the practice of send- ing signed letters of protest ceased; it exists to this day, But as the repressions continued, some dissenters concluded that anon- ymous, and in some cases even illegal and conspiratorial methods (such as underground political organizations) might be prefer- able. Paradoxically, too, the reprisals stimulated many dissidents toward greater introspection and reflection, to a look into the country's past, a more conscious stock-taking, and a. search for .ideological and practical solutions to Russia's many and endur- ing problems. II During the following three years, Soviet dissent took on many new and fascinating forms. One was the gradual process of differ- entiation among those who had earlier been united not only in their ultimate and vaguely defined goals (which might perhaps be best described as the elimination of the Stalinist heritage of lies and illegality), but also in their methods. Now differences .began to arise. Some dissidents, known as "legalists," carefully eschewed any explicit strictures against Soviet political institu- tions as such, confining themselves to forceful yet reasoned crit- icism of "socialist legality." Their most distinguished representa- tive has no doubt been Academician Andrei Sakharov, who in 1970, together with two other physicists, Andrei Tverdokhlebov and Valery Chalidze, founded the Committee for Human Rights, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000100580001-2 Appr . w ose aim is to struggle o'r t e observance to oviet law, an N 16 do so strictly "in accordance with the laws of the land." Others, while similarly determined to act entirely within legal confines, have laid the stress on gradual economic, social and political re- forms. Many of the latter-most prominently the historian Roy Medvedev and his twin brother, Zhores (like Chalidze, now an involuntary exile in the West)-consider themselves loyal Marx- ist-Leninists. While the bulk of what might be called the "Dem- ocratic Opposition" has evidently become thoroughly disillu- sioned with Marxism of any variety, the Chronicle of Current Events (our most valuable source of information on that period) occasionally reported on the existence-and liquidation-of small illegal revolutionary groups, with programs that blend a curious social utopianism with elements of militant Trotskyism. More interesting and significant has been the emergence of what might be called a "right wing" within the dissident camp --significant, because it corresponds to the rise of similar tenden- cies on the "official" level. In particular there has been a revival of "Slavophilism," that nineteenth-century philosophical school that looked for Russia's salvation in the country's unique histor- ical and religious traditions, disdainfully rejecting what it con- sidered the corrupting influence of the West. The All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical Monuments, founded .with official blessings in June 1966, and journals such as Molo- daya Gvardiya. (Young Guard), the monthly organ of the-Young Communist League, and Nash Sovremennik (Our Contempo- rary), have all been expressions of the new Russian patriotism, often laced with thinly disguised anti-Semitic and generally xenophobic views. However, since Slavophilism is, at least in theory, fundamentally at odds with the dogmas of Marxism- Leninism, its true believers have "gone below," expressing their ideas in such samizdat publications as Veche (the word for town assemblies in medieval Russia), of which eight bulky issues have appeared thus far, and in occasional essays and articles. In 1971, a brochure called A Word to the Nation: A Manifesto of Rus- sian Patriots made its appearance in samizdat. Unabashedly ad- vocating racist, anti-Semitic, totalitarian, and theocratic ideas, it may be the product of one man's demented labors, or that of a group-it is hard to tell. But it may well reflect a larger body of opinion than is commonly assumed-the widespread anti-Jewish sentiments, abetted and encouraged by official "anti-Zionist" propaganda of the most primitive and repulsive kind, indirectly testify to this. As in the case of the Slavophiles, so have other tendencies, po- litical or otherwise, found a home in samizdat. Indeed, from 1969 to 1972 samizdat had gradually become a vehicle for a discus- sion of a wide range of views, thus appealing intellectually to thousands of readers who otherwise had no interest in political dissent per se. Separate journals and documents sprang up to deal with legal matters, to spell out Stalinist crimes and their sup- pression, to advocate the formation of underground political organizations, to urge genuine federalism coupled with parlia- mentary democracy, and to discuss the theoretical and practical 0P2YRGHT )00 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Approved For Rele set999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01 I94A0001005800 '1-2 there continued to be publication of works of fiction, both Rus- sian and foreign, proscribed by Soviet censorship. Mention might also be made of The Ukrainian Herald, a journal pub- lished by Ukrainian dissidents, which was modeled after the Chronicle of Current Events, and which was recently sup- pressed; and the Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, expressing the views of Catholics in a country where opposition to Soviet domination has both a national and religious character. The remarkable diversity of samizdat literature should not, of course, be confused with numerical strength. A "party" may well consist of a mere handful of individuals; a ringing "man- ifesto" is likely to be the work of a single man; factional wran- gling among political oppositionists is as rife in Russia today as it was at the turn of the century.- Nor is the intellectual level of some of these documents necessarily impressive. Indeed, some are. painfully naive, simplistic, utopian, or abstruse. Program- matic writings in particular are notoriously given more to vague generalizations than to rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, they all testified, at the very least, to a certain process of political matur- ation, to the efforts of some individuals not to rest content with the slogans that animated the protest movement when it first burst into. the open. Finally, the period 1969-1972 (and to a considerable extent the present, too) has been characterized by a remarkable increase .in-links between the Soviet dissenters and the outside world. Sud denly, .Soviet political opposition ceased to be only an internal concern, and its vicissitudes and fortunes engaged the sympathetic interest of a sizeable segment of world public opinion. This is probably attributable, in part, to the successes scored by the Jew- ish "exodus movement." The once cowed and timid Jewish com- munity-or at any rate those of its members eager to leave the U.S.S.R. for Israel-"caught up with and surpassed," to use a favorite Soviet phrase, all other groups of dissidents within the country, in the determination with which they pursued their aims, as well as, eventually, in their attainments. The piece- meal emigration of Soviet Jews would have been impossible without the energetic aid of Jewish communities throughout the world, in the first. place Israel and the United States, and so ap- peals for outside support became a norm to be emulated increas- ingly by other dissidents as well. Glasnost (publicity) has been, of course, a principal aim of the dissident movement ever since its inception; but it was not until 1970-71 that this aim was achieved. The dismal trials of Soviet dissenters made headlines in American and European newspap- ers. Western correspondents filed numerous stories and frequently acted as conduits for samizdat material. Various Western organ- izations, such as Amnesty International, began to concern them- selves with the fate- of individual dissenters. The International League for the Rights of Man in New York established a formal organizational bond with. Sakharov's Human Rights Committee; professional organizations of psychiatrists, notoriously reluctant to delve into the murky waters of politics, began to evince inter- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000100580001-2 Appr authorities that the situation could no longer be tolerated. thus reaching the Western public before the limited number of poorly reproduced copies could reach Soviet readers. Broad- casts beamed to the Soviet Union by Western radio stations did the rest. It was a bizarre spectacle, a unique product of our technological age, a source of succor to the embattled Soviet dissidents-but also yet another factor that persuaded the Soviet est fn and a'sense o outrage at the 1arbaric'uae aftheir piofe"ssion in Russia; and religious groups (e.g., the Baptists) published the appeals of their persecuted co-religionists in the U.S.S.R. In time, the telephone became one of the most effective instruments of glasnost-so much so that some of the protests were actually phoned to journalists in Great Britain and the United States, -tPYRGHT Although the KGB had persistently hounded the Soviet dis- senters and had never been known for excessive charity in coping with any manifestations of opposition to the regime, it seemed strangely reluctant to employ all the weapons in its arsenal against what must surely have been one of its most formidable irritants-the Chronicle of Current Events. The reasons for this apparent timidity had been a subject of endless speculations by Soviet specialists in the West. The most plausible explanations offered were: (a) that the Soviet security police could eradicate the Chronicle (and the group of people behind it) only by un- dertaking a series of massive arrests, thus antagonizing the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole as well as public opinion abroad-all of which it was unwilling to do; (b) that the KGB knew precisely who was connected with the Chronicle, but preferred to keep them under surveillance, so as eventually to net as many as pos- sible. In retrospect, the second hypothesis seems closer to the truth than the first. Toward the end of 1971, the Soviet authorities had apparently decided that the situation was getting out of hand, and that the "Democratic Movement" must sustain a decisive defeat. Accord- ing to information that has subsequently reached the West, the Politburo itself resolved to liquidate the Chronicle, and in- structed the KGB to do so. But the KGB today is no longer what. it was in the days of Stalin. Though some of its present methods are palpably similar to those employed in the past, on the whole they are not predom- inantly those of terror and brutality, but rather a more subtle mixture of threats, intimidation, promises-and coercion. In what was to become known as "Case No. 24," therefore, the KGB at first moved relatively slowly. A number of arrests were made in the Ukraine, where national restiveness among intellectuals had of late become particularly strong. In Moscow and Lenin- grad prominent dissenters were "invited" to appear at the head- quarters of the security police for interrogation. Homes were searched, and "incriminating" samizdat material (some of it of a perfectly innocuous nature) was confiscated. This was followed by arrests, culminating, on June 21, 1972, in the detention of Piotr Yakir. To the dissident Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Appro pleasp. 1999/00/02 - ~' IA-RDP79-01194AO001 005RQ9 - in ee t he writing on the wall. Piotr Yakir is the son of a much decorated Civil War hero, who along with other top officers was shot in June 1937 on fabricated charges of spying. Shortly thereafter, Piotr himself, then 14 years old, was seized by the police and spent the next i5 years of his life in various prisons and concentration camps. His father, as well as the other officers, was "rehabilitated" in the 195os, and Piotr was taken under Khrushchev's personal wing and allowed to lecture and write about his father. This, of course, was during the heyday of the "de-Stalinization drive." With Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, "de-Stalinization" too came. to a halt, and Piotr Yakir, alarmed by what he per- ceived to be not merely a silence on Stalinism but organized efforts to revive it, became increasingly-and overtly-involved in the protest movement. In 1968-69, he emerged as one of its most active leaders, author and co-signer of numerous "open letters" and petitions. The KGB -was obviously aware of his activities (he made no attempt to hide them), but it was gener- ally assumed that Yakir would be left alone, no matter what, since his arrest could only be interpreted-in the words of one of his close personal friends, now in the West "as a final symbol of the actual restoration of Stalinism in our country." Yakir's arrest in June 1972, therefore, produced a shattering effect on the Soviet dissident community. The atmosphere of de- spondency and gloom intensified when it was learned, after several months, that Yakir had decided to cooperate with his jailors, to divulge all he knew and to implicate (as it eventually turned out) more than a hundred of his friends and associates. (Yakir's._propensity for alcohol was well known, and it seemed reasonable to assume that it was this particular weakness that the KGB exploited in order to break him.) More arrests and interrogations followed, and in September 1972 Victor Krasin, another prominent civil rights activist with an impressive record of protest and imprisonment, was put in jail. He, too, it was soon learned, had been "persuaded" to coop- erate with the authorities. After a while, it became evident that the KGB was grooming both Krasin and Yakir for an elaborate "show trial," which would serve as a warning to their friends to desist from any further activities against the regime. While the KGB was thus showing its teeth-as well as its reliance upon some of the most discredited Stalinist methods-it also engaged in a new and considerably more refined strategy, i.e., allowing and even encouraging various known oppositionists to leave the country (in effect expelling them) as part of the "Jewish exodus" to Israel, which was gathering momentum at that time. (Some of the dissidents who have left since 1972 have indeed been Jewish or part-Jewish, or married to Jews, but others, as the authorities were fully aware, had no connection at all, familial or ideolog- ical, with the Jewish movement.) Issue No. 27 of the Chronicle appeared in October 1972. Since no other issues were forthcoming for 18 months, it seemed clear that, the journal would no longer see the light of day-at least not under the (unknown) auspices Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Appr Movement" (though not necessarily all other dissident groups) was in a state of disarray. "Moscow " a recentl arrived youn , y g Russian told this author, was the scene of heartrending scenes : dozens of dissidents returned from camps, prisons and exile to which they had been banished in 1968-69-or earlier-only to find their former comrades talking about nothing else except leaving the country." In March 1o71 'Academician Sakharov received a letter from Yakir, written in jail, in which its author admitted to having engaged in "anti-Soviet activities," and im- plored the scientist to "understand [him) correctly" and to avoid 01-6PYRGHT similar "mistakes and delusions." At the end. of August 1973 Yakir and Krasin were put on trial. Foreign correspondents were refused entry, but they might as well have been there: both de- fendants fully admitted their "guilt" (e.g., passing "anti-Soviet material" to the West and collaborating with the NTS, a right- wing Russian emigre organization with headquarters in Ger- many, which had for years published many samizdat documents, including all the issues-in Russian=of the Chronicle of Current Events). In a macabre "press conference" staged a few days later, Krasin and Yakir repeated their confessions, and named some Western correspondents as their contacts. The tragicomedy was played out to the end. Following the trial, Zhores Medvedev, by then in exile in London, revealed that by 1970 his fellow-dissidents had decided that Yakir could no longer be trusted. Roy Medvedev, in a long essay, "The Problem of Democratization and the Problem of Detente," circulated in samizdat in October)' explicitly accused both Yakir and Krasin of "provocational activity." Whatever the truth of these allegations, it is clear that the KGB had largely succeeded.in accomplishing its mission, and that the small group of civil rights activists who had been in the forefront of the dissent movement in 1968-69 had been decimated. IV Yet if` the Politburo and the Soviet security police could con- gratulate themselves on a job well done, they clearly miscalcu- lated in their apparent belief that "Case No. 24" would deci- sively eradicate all remaining expressions of political resistance in their country. For as the drive against the dissidents gathered force, two men stepped into the fray, challenging the authorities in terms far more radical and far more intransigent than they had ever done in the past. More importantly, the issues they raised-=and the spirited debate that subsequently ensued-no longer touched upon problems of concern primarily to Soviet citizens, but involved the . general attitude of the West to the U.S.S.R. and indeed some very concrete policy issues facing Western governments, in the first place the United States. Whereas in 1969-1972 Soviet dissenters were principally inter- ested in attaining glasnost abroad as a means of insurance against government reprisals and as a source of moral and political sup- port, the West was now being drawn intimately into a dialogue 1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Appr ved For Release 1999/09/02 - - - 0001-2 critics of the Soviet regime. The issues were East-West relations, CPYRGHT the Jackson Amendment, detente, and the future of Russia; and the two men were, of course, Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Sakharov. had long been profoundly concerned with East-West relations, as his three famous memoranda, published respectively in 1968, 147o and 1971, demonstrated. Yet while in the past Sakharov seemed to believe that his efforts to "speak sense" to the Soviet leaders (to whom his memoranda had been addressed) would produce a useful dialogue between the regime and its "loyal opposition," and while in the past he clung to a belief in a socialism reformed through a gradual "convergence between the capitalist and socialist systems, accompanied by demilitariza- tion, a strengthening of the social protection of the rights of working people, and the creation of an economy of a mixed type,"8 by 1973 he had obviously changed his mind. As a result o the grim anti-dissent campaign and the failure of his efforts Sakharov came to two momentous conclusions:, first, that thi Soviet system bore no relation whatever to what he had earlie believed to be certain endemic features of a socialist society second, that necessary fundamental reforms in Soviet life coin only come as a result of specific policies of the West. On July io, 1973, Sakharov gave an interview to the Swedis Radio and Television, in which he expressed his. profound dis illusionment with the Soviet system: It is simply capitalism developed to its extremes, the sort of capitalism you have in the United States ... but with extreme monopolization. We ough not to be surprised, then, that we have the same problems, qualitatively speaking, the same criminality, the same alienation of the individual, as i the capitalist world. With the difference that our society is an extreme in stance, as it were, extremely unfree, extremely constrained ideologically .. [also) probably the most pretentious society; it's not the best society but i claims to be far better than all the others.' The interview, as could have been expected, elicited a furiou storm of attacks and calumnies in the Soviet media. Sakharo was accused of "grovelling before the capitalist system," and- ominously-"slandering the Soviet Union." A few weeks late he was summoned to an interview with the First Deputy Prose - tutor of the U.S.S.R., Mikhail Malyarov, who warned Sakharo to refrain from any further "anti-Soviet activities." Instead o heeding. Malyarov's advice, Sakharov a week later called to Western correspondents to his house, handed them the text his interview with the Soviet official and answered questions on.wide range of problems. In this interview, Sakharov succinctl formulated his views on detente : We are facing very concrete problems, of whether in the process of rapproch - ment there will be a democratization of Soviet society or not.... Deten e without democratization, a rapprochement when the West in fact accep s our rules of the game . . . would be very dangerous and wouldn't solve a of the world's problems .... It would be the cultivation and encourageme t of closed countries where everything that happens goes unseen by foreign ey . No one should dream of having such a neighbor, especially if that neighbor is armed to the teeth.5 These views logically led Sakharov to an explicit endorseme t Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 of the Jackson Amendment, which would deny long-term credits and most-favored-nation tariff status to any "non-market econ- omy" nation that denies its citizens the right to emigrate. And so " in an Open Letter to the Congress of the United States," dated September 14, 1973, Sakharov forcefully appealed "to the Con- gress of the United States to give its support to the Jackson Amendment, which represents in my view and in the view of its sponsors an attempt to protect the right of emigration of citizens in countries that are entering into new and friendlier relations with the United States." The Jackson Amendment is, of course, aimed first and foremost at the Soviet Union, and affects, at least at this time, the Jews more than any other ethnic group in the U.S.S.R. Even granting that Sakharov is firmly committed to the notion that the West, in establishing. closer cooperative links with the Soviet Union, must,.as much as a matter of principle as that of practicality, de- mand certain concessions from the U.S.S.R. in return for eco- nomic and technological help, it might still be wondered why he chose the issue of emigration above all others. Yet in his letter to the U.S. Congress, as well as in a number of other statements that Saknarov has issued within the past half year or so, he has made his reasons crystal clear: First, the Jackson Amendment serves as a symbol of the kind of policy Sakharov believes that the :West must follow in its relations with the Soviet Union. Second, emigration is a universal human right, embodied in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Moscow has ratified. Third, to cite his letter to the U.S. Congress, "the abandonment. of a policy of principle would be a betrayal of the thousands of Jews and non-Jews who want to emigrate, of the hundreds in camps and mental hospitals, of the victims of the Berlin Wall." Fourth, the untrarnelled right to emigrate would eventually- force the Soviet Union to adopt measures that would discourage the desire of Soviet citizens to leave their country- that is, to reform the system in the direction of greater freedom and material welfare. Western failure to press this demand upon the Soviet regime would, indeed, "lead to stronger repressions on ideological grounds," to disastrous consequences for "interna- tional confidence, detente, and the entire future of mankind." While Sakharov was issuing these statements, amidst a hys- terical campaign in the Soviet press ("spontaneous" meetings of protest by "indignant Soviet workers, and so on), Alexander Solzhenitsyn, too, decided to have his say. Unlike Sakharov , Solzhenitsyn had until then limited himself-with several nota- ble exceptions, such as an acid statement on the use of psychiatric hospitals, which he compared, mutatis mutandis, to the exter- mination policies of Nazi Germany-to a vigorous defense of freedom of speech and religion in the U.S.S.R. On August 28. However, exactly one week after Sakharov's first oress conference. oolzhenitsyn invited two Western correspondents to a news con- ference of his own. Much of what he said' was a repetition of his past statements, especially as it related to the campaign of slander that the Soviet press had waged against him for several years. Tr CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 other Soviet dissidents, specifically singling out numerous indi- viduals-such as General Grigorenko and Vladimir Bukovsky' -to praise their "indomitable" courage and their inhuman suf- fering, while also castigating the West for failing to do whatever possible to secure their release. While agreeing with Sakharov on the need for outside pressure, he implicitly disagreed with the physicist by demanding that the West refuse to compromise with the Soviet regime on any matter of principle whatsoever-an attitude which needless to say, holds out little promise for any meaningful detente. Two weeks later, Solzhenitsyn addressed a long letter to the Nobel Committee in Oslo, nominating Andrei Sakharov for the Nobel Peace Prize. Reaffirming his deep concern for Soviet dissidents, Solzhenitsyn-true to his calling of writer/philos- opher rather than politician-avoided the practical questions re- garding East-West relations raised by Sakharov, referred to detente (obliquely) as being dominated by "the spirit of Munich -the. spirit of concessions and compromise," and called upon the world to renounce violence, both internal and external, both in. relations between states and in the relations between the gov- ernments and their people, as the only means of securing, a. last- ing peace.. The practical suggestions made by Sakharov were, however, taken up.by Roy Medvedev, in the essay on detente and demo- cratization referred to above. Disagreeing with his friend and .colleague on his call for outside pressure as the only means of achieving a democratization of Soviet society, Medvedev said: It would be a gross oversimplification ... to presume that only with the help of outside pressure-and pressure, moreover, involving inter-state relations or trade-is it possible to achieve some substantive concessions from a coun- try such as the Soviet Union in the conduct of our domestic policy. Outside .pressure can play a negative as well as a positive role; it can deter our organs of power from certain actions in some cases, and in other cases, on the con- trary, it can provoke those or other undesirable actions and in that way only impede the process of democratization of Soviet society. Support for the Jackson Amendment, Medvedev. felt, be- longed in this last category. As a confirmed "Marxist-Leninist," he argued, moreover, that appeals for support must be directed not at groups or governments that utilize the pressure for their own selfish reasons (i.e., profits), who are not at all interested in .the process of internal democratization and who are in fact deeply opposed to any kind of socialism whatsoever,. but to those "leftist social organizations which are most interested in the evolution of genuine socialist democracy in our country." Re- liance on specifically anti-Soviet organizations would only be grist for KGB mills-a sentiment echoed by Roy's brother in London shortly thereafter. Whatever the flaws or outright errors in Medvedev's argu- ment (e.g., he criticized Solzhenitsyn for comparing the South African treatment of blacks with the Soviet treatment of dissi- dents', whereas Solzhenitsyn had in fact only deplored the lack of response by the world to the latter as compared with the former), his essay represented a closely reasoned argument in which he Appro 01-2 CPYRGH Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 tried to formulate his agreements and disagreements with Sakharov's position. Yet so high run the passions within the Soviet dissident community that, Medvedev found himself im- mediately under attack by numerous of his colleagues, some of whom levelled rather absurd charges against him (e.g., "raising [his] hands against two boundlessly courageous men of our time, the moral pride of Russia, Academician Sakharov, and Alex- ander Solzhenitsyn").? These criticisms impelled'Medvedev to issue yet another essay on this subject in April of this year ("Once More About De- mocratization and Detente"), in which he answered some of the criticisms, and attempted to formulate as concisely as possible the relationship between pressure from the outside (in which he fully believes) and the changes that can come only from within, as well as the prospects for changes instituted "from above" (in his earlier essay the only true means of effecting any meaningful reforms) and for those that can be generated "from below." In March of this year Solzhenitsyn-already abroad by this time-published his "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," which raised yet another flurry of criticism and counter-criticism. Without attempting to do full justice either to Solzhenitsyn or to his . critics-in the first place Sakharov, a subject this.author has treated extensively elsewhere"-suffice it to say that Solzhenit- syn, in a manner singularly reminiscent of the ideas of the Slavo- philes of the early nineteenth century, proposed essentially that Russia turn her energies inward, renounce Marxism-Leninism, which he holds responsible for all the ills that have befallen Soviet society, and also renounce unlimited technological and economic growth as "not only unnecessary but ruinous." In his reply, Sakharov affirmed his belief in international cooperation, technology and detente as the only guarantees for democracy and progress, rejecting Solzhenitsyn's views on ideology as "sche- matic" and unperceptive of its real role in the Soviet Union (that is, as "a convenient facade". and justification for the Party's re- tention of power). He also criticized his friend's "way of think- ing'.' as a species of "religious-patriarchal romanticism." At the same time, Sakharov welcomed the "Letter" as an im- portant contribution to the continuing discussion of major issues affecting the future of Russia and the West, and paid trib- ute to the writer as "a giant in the struggle for human decency in our tragic contemporary world." Roy Medvedev, too, reacted to Solzhenitsyn's letter, criticizing him, though far less exhaus- tively, in terms similar to Sakharov's. In the meantime, Sakharov had also issued a reply to both Medvedev brothers, while other samizdat writers in the Soviet Union have published various statements directed at all four-the Medvedev brothers, Solz- henitsyn, and Sakharov. And so the debate goes on. V What, in the light of the foregoing, are some of the conclusions that may be drawn regarding the current and future state of dissent in the U.S.S.R., as well as some of the lessons for the West? Perhaps the most important conclusion is that perorations App 1-2 CPYRGHT Appr 1-2 dPYRGHT in the past. It would be presumptuous to predict either the nature of the debate or its results, but perhaps a few thoughts on the subject should be ventured: (f) Within the "Democratic Opposition," individual differ- ences will probably revolve largely around problems of strategy and tactics, and are not likely to lead to fundamental schisms among the various protagonists. In this connection, it should be stressed that while the divergencies between the outlooks of men Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000100580001-2 of Stalin-plus the fact that popular discontent, if not open, is nevertheless deep and pervasive, encourages the growth of bn the 'future of p611iticat oppbsitloni-and public opinion-in the Soviet Union are much too premature. There is little doubt that the KGB drive against the dissidents has yielded some re- sults. The small group of intrepid men and women that had led the struggle for human rights in the years 1967-69 has been fairly effectively shattered, as much by sundry repressive measures as by the fact that so many of them have been allowed to leave their country. If the Soviet authorities could succeed in getting rid of all the present and potential "trouble-makers," it would even- tually make the country both "Juden-" and "intelligentsia-rein," at the mercy of unscrupulous careerists, reactionary pseudo- intellectuals, and a cowed, unhappy and dispirited populace. There seems little danger. of tjiat. The very elimination of terror-so that the penalty for political nonconformity, how- ever odious, is no longer as awe-inspiring'as it was in the days unorthodox ideas and may very 'well lead, in turn, to more .defiant and even organized forms of opposition to the regime. Detente, too, with all its pitfalls and shortcomings, encourages dissent (even though. it is in the interest of the Soviet leaders to suppress dissent while improving relations with the West), if only because detente without world public opinion is impossible; and:.world public opinion is surely on the side of the. victims of the KGB, and not vice versa. The very existence of the debate described above shows that the spirit of free thought in Russia has not been extinguished, a conclusion underscored, as this -article was in press, by the re- appearance of the Chronicle of Current Events. In the future, the search for solutions to Russia's problems will probably not be carried on solely within the coniines of the Soviet Union, but jointly with both Western thinkers and the steadily growing com- munity of Russians in exile. The Soviet authorities, of course, count on the eventual disappearance from the public eye of men who had been considered martyrs when in the U.S.S.R. and' material for sensational news stories when they arrived in the West. No doubt they will have proved correct in their calcula- tions-to some extent. Yet Solzhenitsyn, Medvedev, Chalidze, Litvinov, and all the others will probably continue to exert con- siderable influence on their colleagues whom they have left behind. The exposure to their ideas (by means of radio and possibly expanding tourism) may well bring new forces to the fore, just as resolute-and indeed perhaps even more resolute- than those who have spoken up and acted upon their convictions Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Appr like. Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and the Medvedev brothers are formidable, they are not as great or abrasive as frequently assumed. Medvedev may fondly cling to his faith in Marxism, yet in his A Book on Socialist Democracy (shortly to appear in English) he sharply depicts the totalitarian nature of Soviet society, his practical proposals stopping just short of a defense of a multi-party system in the U.S.S.R. Solzhenitsyn idealizes pre- Petrine Russia (hardly a model of progress and democracy), yet his uncompromising stand on intellectual freedom constitutes a powerful indictment against the Soviet system in toto. More- over, whatever their differences, all these men invariably close ranks when one of them is attacked by the regime-an almost automatic (and deeply moving) reflex that is not likely to.dis-- appear. (a)- As a whole, the views of the "Democrats" are probably going to become increasingly radical even as their number de- creases--or remains constant. The examples of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn are instructive. Over the past few years, the first has turned from a mild to an astringent critic of the regime, while the second has escalated his demands and placed himself squarely within the dissident camp-something he had refused to do in the past. Also, in his earlier works (e.g., The First Circle and Cancer Ward) Solzhenitsyn's exclusive subject was Stalin- ist Russia. In his extraordinary Gulag Archipelago, however,: published in January of this year, he ascribes the. ideological and actual origins, of Soviet terror to the hitherto sacrosanct Lenin. The trend toward seeing Stalinism not as an aberration but as an endemic part of a system fashioned by the Bolsheviks had already emerged in the writings of other samizdat authors. As this trend continues, so will the belief that the Soviet system cannot be changed either by partial reforms or strict observance of "So- cialist legality," but only by a complete rejection of the ideolog- ical, economic and political bases upon which it rests. (3) The deepening political debate may also be expected to turn on issues that transcend the primary concerns of the intel- ligentsia. Thus far the dissidents have not aimed their appeals at the population at large, paying little attention to such deep-seated grievances as social inequality, the rank exploitation of the peasantry; economic privations, housing conditions, and so on. But there have been signs of a growing awareness that dissent, if it is ever to assume broader proportions, must address itself .to'. these issues, too. (c) Finally, the persistence of nationalist discontent may also prove a fertile soil for the spread of political dissidence in gen- . er.al. As mentioned earlier,.. the animosities of various ethnic groups provided the "Democrats" with at least a potential base for mass support. There is no evidence that nationalist sentiments are on the wane; quite to the contrary, they are growing. In their search for viable strategies and tactics, the political dissidents may well choose to link their demands with those of the demo- cratic nationalists of, say, the Baltic countries, the Ukraine, or even Central Asia, and perhaps enter into more intimate orga- nizational contacts_as_well_ CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 ? , , is u un must , and it would be sheer . *ft folly to sound confident about the trends within the dissident com- munity, and even more so to ignore the ability of the Soviet au-. thorities to cope with them if they ever reach serious proportions. Still, for the time being it would seem as if the political ferment and the debate are destined t6-go on, and that nothing but a com- plete breakdown in the East-West relationship could terminate them, thus setting the wheel of history backwards. . Which, of course, brings us back to the issue of detente-the principal subject of the current debate, and the principal guaran- tee of its existence. Its benefits seem fairly obvious to us but the fundamental and deeply disturbing question still remains: At what price? What about the issues raised by Sakharov, Solzhen- itsyn, the Medvedevs and others? None of them has the mo- nopoly on truth, none of them should be regarded as a prophet. But surely they and countless others like them better represent Russia's conscience and wisdom than the officials or official rep- resentatives with whom the West is perforce in contact. Perhaps the words of Samuel Pisar, whose seminal work has provided some of the basic ideas that led the West to enter into a new re- lationship with the U.S.S.R., are worth quoting in this instance --even though they refer only to Sakharov: What we are asking Sakharov is to tell us, whatever our nationality may be, . the conditions under which he thinks we can agree to move forward along the path of detente, particularly between America and Russia. We urgently need to know precisely what he thinks about precisely that question. If we do not find that out, the new political efforts will simply be sacrificed by de- fault and discouragement upon the altar of a moral purity it is not within our power to achieve.", i General Grigorenko, for example, has been confined to a psychiatric hospital since 2969, despite numerous efforts-including a finding by Soviet doctors--to release him as perfectly sane and healthy. - 2It also appeared in the Die Zeit (Hamburg). and, severely truncated, in The New York Times. a See index (London), Winter 1973, p. 30. 4 Ibid., p. 23. ,$Ibid., p. 28. R Ibid., PP. fI-45. 2In 1972, as punishment for`Bukovsky's continuing activities-principally for having made available to the West an enormous amount of material bearing on the use of psy- chiatry for political means-he was sentenced to a total of 12 years of imprisonment, camp and exile. 9 Letter by the writer v. Maximov, A Chronicle of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. (New ''. York), No. 5-6, p. 8. Maximov is a gifted novelist who has recently been permitted to leave the Soviet Union. 10 The New Leader, May 27, 1974. 12 Le Monde, September 16-27, 2973? 6PYRGHT' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0001IT2 MAY 1974 VOLUME 233 NO. 5 EDITOR IN CHIEF: Robert Manning MANAGING EDITOR: Michael Janeway ASSOCIATE EDITORS: C. Michael Curtis, Richard Todd ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITOR: Louise Desaulniers STAFF EDITORS: Phoebe-Lou Adams, Stephen Brook, Terry Brown, Peter Davison (poetry), Barbara Gale, Amanda. Heller CONTRIBUTING EDITORS William Abrahams (West Coast), Robert Kotlowitz (New York), Ward Just. John L'Heureux, James Alan McPherson, L. E. Sissman, Adrian Taylor, Ross Terrill, Dan Wakefield PUBLISHER: Garth Hite TREASURER: Arthur F. Goodearl CIRCULATION MANAGER: Roy M. Green PRODUCTION MANAGER: Joseph T. O'Connell Editorial and Business Office: The Atlantic Monthly Company 8 Arlington Street . 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All rights, including reproducticr cy ptotcgraphic or electronic processes a'd translation into other languages. reserved by _.e puc:isher in the United States Great Britair., Mgx:c and all countries participating in the international Ccr right Convention. Unsolicited mar-. scrip?s ^culd be accompanied by return postage. Postr*.as:e' (ease send Form 3579 to The Atlantic, 125 Gardec St. Marion,. Ohio 43302. THE ATLANTIC ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. 37 Is the Vice Presidency Necessary? No OibrAvio PAz 45 In Praise of Hands And the once and future craftsman 48 Useful Beauty A portfolio of contemporary WILLIAM KENNEDY 53 The Quest for Heliotrope or, The Pursuit of Joyce in Dublin GARY WILLS 79 The Impeachment Man Raoul Berger fiddles his own tune FELICIA LAMPORT 86 Portrait of a Mirage Would you walk a mile fora camel? 89 Why .Ted Kennedy Can't Win, and - -Other Opinions -About the Democrats- Responses to David Broder's 'The Democrats' Dilemma" CLAIRE STERLING 98 The Making of the - - - Sub-Saharan Wasteland Can nomads-and governments-change their ways? MARTIN RALRoVSKY 106 Destiny's Forgotten Darlings Little League glory reconsidered FICTION JOHN GARDNER 61 King Gregor and the Fool POETRY LESLIE NoRRIs' 52 Eagle and Hummingbird EDWIN BROOK 85 Diagnosis REPORTS & COMMENT FRANCES FITZGERALD 4 Vietnam: The Cadres and the Villagers EARL CALLEN 16 Moscow: Notes on a Scientific Conference LIFE & LETTERS KENNETH BAKER 121 In the Beholder's Eye RICHARD TODD 127 Getting Real JOSEPH KANON 132 Examined Lives EDWARD WEEKS 135 The Peripatetic Reviewer PHOEBE ADAMS 139 Short Reviews: Books L. E. SissntAN 26 Innocent Bystander 29 The Mail t Cover: Photograph by Ken Bell of Jordanian silver good luck charms. In the ,diddle East countries "lucky hand" 'traditionally offers protection against the evil eye. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000100580001-2 CPYRGHT C"PYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 Moscow. Notes on a ,apers at the Conference: papers invited by the Program Committee (invited papers), and papers con- tributed by authors (contributed papers)... . The - sponsors of the conference were he International Union of Pure d Applied Physics (IUPAP), and he Soviet Academy of Scien s. Following custom, a Pro-1 gram ternational Advisory Com- mittee was appointed. The planners mailed announcements, invitations, ands icitations of ten-minute con- tribute talks to interested scientists aroun the world. For Soviet scien- tists t procedure was different. A Confe nce Committee, and each labors ry, decided which employ- ees wo ld be allowed to attend, and these ersons were given application forms y their supervisors. cluded Voronel's na those convicted of Voronel and the othe as they recounted thi were ecstatJ Scientific Conference On Saturday, December 15, 1973,- in Moscow, officers of the KGB in- terrogated four. Russian scientists, Mark Azbel, Victor Brailovsky, Al- exander .Lunts, and Alexander VoroneI, about violations of Regu- lation 209-1 of the Russian Criminal Code, outlawing parasitism. A "parasite" is defined as an "able- bodied person.. stubbornly refusing to engage in honest work and lead- ing an antisocial parasitic way of life." It is the crime for which oth- ers have been convicted recently. . That - Azbel, Brailovsky, Lunts, Voronel, and another scientist, Moshe Gitterman, had been fired from their jobs or forced to resign when they applied - for emigration visas to Israel is not thought to be relevant by the Soviet authorities in considering their "parasitism." Each of the scientists is Jewish; each is. an active critic of the Soviet regime. Voronel spent one year in jail in the 1950s-for writing a high school class essay on civil liberties. But- whatever the charges, the real crimes of Voronel and the others are these: they have applied to emi- grate,. and they. have publicly de- fended nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov, next to Alexander Sol- zhenitsyn the most outspoken and insistent Soviet dissident. And for- eign physicists mounted an unprece- dented demonstration on their be- half. at the International Conference on Magnetism in Moscow, in Au- gust, 1973. An international physicists' con- ,ference on magnetism is held every three years. Recent conferences were in England, the United States, and France. In 1973 it was the turn of -the Soviet Union. The bulletin an- _'nouncing it read: The International Conference on Magnetism will be held in Moscow, 22-28 August 1973 The scien- tific program will include papers on basic theoretical and experimental investigations of magnetism, -on magnetic materials and their prop- erties and on important new appli- cations of magnetism. According to tradition there will be two types of Unp rsons Mar Azbel, Moshe Gitterman, and exander Voronel are physi- cists; lexander Lunts and Victor Brailo ky are mathematicians and electri 11 engineers. (Moshe Gitter- man as released from the Soviet Union month after the conference, most robably because of appeals. on his behalf by Senator Edward Kenne y.) Mark Azbel was once a profess )r at Moscow State Univer- sity, a group leader of the presti- gious Landau Institute of Theo- retical Physics, the author of. a textbo k and of many research pa- pers. oday he is no longer a pro- fessor or a group leader nor even an em loyee. His books have been remov d from the libraries and from t e schools. His published pa- pers a e not referenced, and his re- search is not published. When Azbel applie for an exit visa in January, . 1973, join his twelve-year-old son in Isr el, he lost his job; he has been ithout work for the past year. Altho h Azbel is internationally reno ed, in the Soviet Union he is an un erson, as are- the others. Fel- low s entists and all cautious per- sons s un them. The extent of their isolati n is emphasized by the min- utiae f recognition in which they take mfort. A few months ago Voron 1 was crossing a Moscow street,- jaywalked, and was charged and fi ed. A local newspaper in- story to me They relished the imagined surpris of their former friend the editor, the anger that an unperson had Since Azbel, Git Voronel work in m wished to attend the principle, there should in a list o1 , the pique o s een named- 1 gnetism, the nference. bar. to their admissi rules of the sponsorin IUPAP. Like the IUPAP, chemists, biol tronomers also have inf ganizations, which arel bers of a parent ore International Council Unions (ICSU). The recommended to all members-including t have been n n, under th organization hysicists o gists, and ernational or in turn mem anization, th of Scientifi nions, and ar its nations tional Academy of Scences and th Soviet Academy of Scilences: INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC UNIONS: AMENDMENT O THE STATUTES The Extraordinary General Assem- bly of the International Council of Scientific Unions, immediately pre- ceding the XIV General Assembly at Helsinki, Finland, September 1972, amended the S atutes of the Council. The following new provi- sion concerning the non-dis- criminatory philosophy of ICSU was incorporated into he Statutes: 5. In pursuing the objectives the Council shall observe the ba- sic policy of non-discrimination- and affirm the rights of scientists throughout the world to adhere to or to associate with inter- national scientific activity without regard to race, religion, political philosophy, ethnic origin, citizen- ship, language or sex. The Coun- cil shall recognize and respect the independence o the internal scientific planning of its National Members. RESOLUTION ON THE FREE CIRCULATION OF SCIENTISTS The XTV General Assembly It Recapitulates that the dec- laration of "political non-discrimi- nation" is reaffirmed, nd moreover ..: the Council shall take all mea- suns within its power to ensure the Approvea or a e Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00010058000CYYRGHT without any political discnmina tron. . -this policy be adopted also by the Unions adhering to ICSU for all their. activities; -the ICSU National Members be invited to follow this policy. American and Soviet delegations at the 1972 assembly supported the resolution, which "observes with re- gret. that scientists are still today sometimes not allowed freely to at- tend ... scientific meetings . ei- ther abroad or. in their home countries....." This was a reaffir- mation of a ten-year-old policy, but one which has been viulated time and again by the Soviet Union and the -socialist bloc nations, partic- ularly with respect. to granting of visas. No Israelis were issued visas to attend an IUPAP-sponsored con- -ference in Moscow in 1968. In War- saw in 1972, again at an IUPAP- sponsored conference, the Israelis had.. great difficulty in obtaining visas, and most were unable to at- tend. And in August, 1972, the Hungarian government refused to issue. visas to South African scien- tists wishing to attend an IUPAP- sponsored conference on nuclear structure. An IUPAP regulation states that "IUPAP will not sponsor a confer- ence if visas. are re''used for travel to it purely on grounds of nation- ality or citizenship." Since the So- viet Union has no diplomatic rela- tions with Israel, the Israelis applied for visas through the Soviet Con- sulate in Vienna. Though applicants everywhere received their visas months in advance, those for the Is- raelis were not issued until Monday, August 20, two days before the con- ference, and in one instance, only two hours before the flight to Mos- Cow.: Of the twelve Israelis who had arranged to attend, only six had risked ' going' to Vienna without visas. But in the end the Soviet Union: complied with the regu- lations. All twelve visas were issued on the afternoon of the twentieth. How..to go? Back in November, 1972, antici- pating that they would, have trouble getting into the coming Moscow - meeting, Azbel, Gitterman, and ference on magnetism held in Den- ver in 1972, a few of those of us in attendance posted notices of a spe- cial session to discuss the problems raised by the forthcoming Moscow conference. Although the officers of the conference were opposed to dis- cussion of social issues the session was held anyway. There the Ameri- can representative on (and chairman of) the IUPAP Commission on Magnetism told us that IUPAP was. being firm with the Soviet Union, and that visas would be issued to Israeli scientists. The question of Azbel, Gitterman, and Voronel was raised but not answered, though we were told that IUPAP was doing ev- erything in its power to see that they would be permitted to attend the conference. In June, 1973, .while Leonid Brezhnev visited Richard Nixon in Washington to speak of detente, seven Russian scientists, Azbel, Voronel, and Gitterman among them, went on a hunger strike in Moscow. They wanted to emigrate to Israel, and they wanted the United States to support their right to do so. Voronel's skin became purple' and his body shook from cold. Azbel was close to death. The world noted, and after two weeks the seven gave up. They began to eat- again, at first sparingly. They convalesced together, discussing science to fill the time in prepara- tion for the magnetism conference two months away. By then they would be well enough to attend, and would wish to present papers. The three knew that the Soviet Union would not permit them to go to the conference as Soviet citizens. They had applied for exit visas to Israel. They had been granted Is- raeli citizenship. They had been ap- pointed to * faculty positions at Is- raeli universities. So they decided that they would attend the confer- ence as Israelis. There is no IUPAP or conference rule which restricts membership of a delegation to resi- dents. They arranged to be ap- pointed members of the Israeli dele- gation, and Israel deposited their registration fees. Abstracts of their talks were phoned from Moscow to Israel, to a member of the Program International Advisory Committee, and mailed fro I l b m srae ack to the Voronel wrote to friends in the Conference Committee. -unUMental right o . participation, e 'states. At an American con- In July, one month before the conference, Voronel visited Soviet physicist A. S. Borovik-Romanov, a fair, humane person. and chairman of the Program Committee, to learn if his abstract and those of Azbel and Gitterman had been received and if they might attend. Borovik- Romanov responded that they had missed the deadline for submission of papers. As for attendance, that was not within his authority to grant. Academician S.' V. 'Von- sovsky, a physicist influential in the domestic and international politics of science, was chairman of the con- ference. He and the organizing com- mittee must decide on attendance. Borovik-Romanov said that he ex- pected that they would not be per- mitted to come as members of the Israeli delegation, but he would take up their request with Vonsovsky and the organizing committee. A few days after Voronel's visit, Gitterman called Borovik-Romanov. He pleaded that few Soviet physi- cists would risk speaking to them and they no longer were allowed to attend research seminars at the in- stitutes or to use the research facili- ties. They had to attend the confer- ence. Had Borovik-Romanov heard anything from Academician Von- sovsky? No. Borovik-Romanov had not heard anything yet. -There was nothing more they could do. They .would be informed of any decision. A few weeks later the three scien- tists tried again. They wrote to Aca- demician Vonsovsky: Being members of the Israeli de- legation to the International Con- ference on Magnetism, from Tel Aviv University, but living presently in Moscow while awaiting permission of the Soviet authorities to emigrate to Israel, we ask the Organizing Committee to send our registration forms not to Israel but to our Moscow addresses below. They pointed out that their registra- tion fees had been deposited by the Israeli government at the Foreign Trade Bank, in hard foreign cur- rency, as required. No answer was ever received. That month a petition addressed to physicists throughout the world went out from the New York-based Committee of Concerned Scientists, and an offshoot of it, an ad hoc Magnetism Committee on Human Rights: CP) RGHT Approved For R9I9a o 1999/09/07 ? CIA _RDD7G_A1 1 GA AAAA1 nn5200/11 Dear Friend: for us. There is nothing you can do discrimination against J Gitterman, and A. Voronel, along with many others, have lost their jobs in the Soviet Union because they dared apply for emigration visas. Recently they went without food, ` drinking nothing but water for 14 days, in an attempt to publi- cize their plight. All three physicists have written abstracts of talks (en- closed) for the Magnetism Confer- ence in Moscow. Whether they will be permitted to register and, attend the Conference is problematical. We cannot invoke their names for fear of possible consequences to them, but perhaps the enclosed pe- tition, signed by large numbers of scientists,' will aid Azbel, Gitter- man, Voronel and others in gaining entry to the Conference... . Four hundred and seventy-two scientists from many nations signed the petition, and it was sent to the chairman of the IUPAP Magnetism Commission. Doing Something Wednesday, August 22, was the first day of the International Con- ference on Magnetism. Fifteen hun- dred conferees gathered at the Hotel Russiya, where they were to eat and sleep for the next week.. (Excluding food, Westerners had to pay eigh- teen rubles a day, or about twenty- seven dollars at the conference ex- change rate, for a room for which Soviet scientists paid three rubles.) The conference sessions were held at Moscow State University. There the conferees passed between uni- formed police carving rifles, guard- ing the entrance. Each registrant was issued a large blue lapel badge. The guards would * be at the door each day but the last; only those wearing badges would be admitted. That first night a few of us visited Azbel, Gitterman, Voronel, and the others, in Voronel's apartment. They knew nothing of thee. meeting on their behalf -in Denver, had heard nothing from IUPAP, or ICSU, nothing of the petition. We wished to protest, but we feared that our actions would bring retribution not on. ourselves-we were protected by foreign passports-but on Azbel and the others. The Soviet scientists con- ferred, and Azbel told us: "You may do whatever you consider proper on our behalf. Do not fear As you know, Mark Azbel, ht. that can hurt us. Anything the au- these people had co thorities wish to do to us they can. do to us now. There is only one thing you can do that will hurt us, and that is to do nothing." None of us knew what we could do, but .each swore to himself to do some- thing. Thursday,- August 23. Delegates wearing blue. badges walked past the armed guards and entered the meeting, eight sessions running at once, twenty sessions in all, one hundred and thirty-six speakers. The delegates had earphones to fol- low simultaneous translation into Russian and English. That day Mark Azbel remained in his apartment, a metro ride from Moscow State University, where he himself taught until two years ago,. but which was now barred to him by armed guards. Although he couldn't be among his fellow scien- tists at the conference, he had learned from his visitors that his pa= per, .having been carried out by a tourist, was being published in Physical Review Letters, the Ameri- can journal of important new dis- coveries in physics.-The paper, en- .titled "Random Two-Component One-Dimensional Ising Model for Heteropolymer Melting," was on the theory of the melting of nucleic acid mixtures, DNA, at elevated tem- peratures. Azbel had had to work out his calculations on biophysics in the isolation of his apartment. Al- though scientific papers usually credit the author and the laboratory or institute at which he works, the Physical Review Letter reads only: "M. Ya. Azbel, Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Preoccupied with thoughts of Az- bel, Voronel. and Gitterman, some of us questioned the conference chairman, Academician Vonsovsky, about them. Of course the Soviet Jews could not come as Israelis, he told us.. They are Soviet citizens. Of course they cannot present papers. Their papers were submitted too late. This would be unfair to others whose papers were rejected because they were too late. And it is not be- cause they are Jews. These persons are trouble-makers. There is no dis- crimination against Jews in the So- viet Union. He, Vonsovsky, is mar- ried to a Jew. Soviet law prohibits within the required tim to attend, it would ha ranged. But now unfi was- too late. Regist closed, and it would. others who had not reg low these persons in lat Though his wife and are Jews, there is much mician Vonsovsky pre ws. If only, e to him and asked e been ar- rtunately it ation was unfair to tered to al- :ier children that Acade- Eers not to know about the life of !,Jews in the Soviet Union. Discrimi ation is en- demic and pervasive. I country's greatest, of th in mathematics and about half were Jews. L entering class in thes about five hundred usual. Only three wer three are sons of prom at the university, p enough- clout to gain ment for.their sons. The Soviet Union h vision: there are too the professions. They w Jews are hindered fr college to train for the the 1960s, ?ersity, the st year, the fields had Jews. All ent faculty rsons with pecial treat- made a de-- any Jews in nt no more_- r entering professions- A man need not be a practicing Jew. So long as his identification card reads "Jew," his cl brilliant, will find it di come a scientist, or a doctor. Every -Jew knc dld, however f'icult to be- lawyer, or a ws . this and. every official denies it. Since religious discrimination is a violation of the Soviet Constitution, it is accomplished in ormally. or -nominally on other grounds, such as ideology. For example at Moscow State one of the admissions tests pertains to the subject of Commu- nism. Jews know they till be failed on this test no matter ow they an- swer. In one instance we learned of, two brilliant Jewish b ys, preparing for the tests, studied horthand, as well as science and hi tory. During the interrogation .on Communist ideology, they recorded clandes- tinely the interrogator's questions and their responses. With. a verbatim transcript of accurate nswers, they are now appealing their failing grades to higher authorities, c ting the law against discrimination. Friday, August 24. There was disturbing incident a the confer ence. Over the public address sys tam one of the American visito Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 denounced the exclusion of Azbel, Gitterman, and Voronel. The trans- lator remained silent, and the Soviet conferees, were spared hearing the insult through their earphones. News In Russia, it is safer not to speak of, dangerous matters. When one must discuss them with trusted friends, one does not do so in pub- lic buildings, or hotels, or in the laboratories. Those may be bugged. One -does not speak in restaurants or taxicabs. The waiters, the drivers may be spies. Since talk is inhibited and- the press, the radio, and the books and magazines are controlled, the Russian people are ignorant of many things. Few ordinary persons, have heard of, the U.S.-Soviet grain deal. Each year the press reports. new miracles of farming. Why should the Russians need to buy American wheat when their own crops have been so huge? Watergate is a puzzle. The word is known to them, but only those well up in the power structure know what it repre- sents. The Russians want detente, and Nixon stands for detente; hence Nixon is favored and Watergate is not reported. The Soviet press may, not discuss the grain deal or Watergate, but it does give news, both foreign and domestic. 'the big foreign news that week in August was of a "bloody". strike at the Chrysler plant in De- troit. There was also news of the signing and ratification by the So- viet Union of two United Nations "international covenants on eco- nomic, social, and cultural rights and on civil and political rights." The _ covenants commit nations to respect each citizen's right to pri- vacy, freedom of opinion, freedom to exchange books and newspapers "regardless of frontiers," freedom of out. that the covenant on civil and political rights can, according to its text, be suspended "for the protec- tion of national security or of public order, or of public, health or. mor- als." In the Soviet Union national security and public order are well protected. The domestic news was. full of Andrei Sakharov: father of the So- viet hydrogen bomb, winner of the Lenin prize, the Stalin prize, the State prize, three times "Hero of Socialist Work," full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Farm- ers, factory workers, housewives were seized with., the desire to write letters denouncing. him. Fellow sci- entists repudiated him. The satellites joined in-the Hungarian Commu- nist Party accused him and author Alexander Solzhenitsyn of "irre- sponsible malice." A Kremlin func-. tionary, the chief deputy. prosecutor general, ordered Sakharov to cease all political activity, especially press conferences. He announced that Sakharov could' be jailed for '.'clan- destine meetings with foreigners." We visited Sakharov. He was de- pressed and feared for his life and for those around him. He himself has been too important for the se- cret police to eliminate, so far, but they go after all who associate with him. His wife has been repeatedly interrogated by the KGB, his wife's daughter expelled from Moscow State University, her husband is without a job, their seventeen-year- old son barred from college. Sakha- rov told us of two friends, both now in prison, Yuri Shikanovich and Ed- ward Kuznetsov. Yuri Shikanovich, a mathemati- cian, was fired from his job for sign- ing a statement in defense of an- other dissident. For a while he was a construction worker, but on Sep- tember 28; 1972, he was arrested and charged with crimes of sub- religion, and the freedom "to leave version: possession and circulation any country,. including his own." of an underground newspaper, the New Times proclaimed that the. So- Chronicle of Current Events. For viet Union "has again emphasized eight months he was held in- that it is a consistent struggler for communicado; then in May, 1973, democratic rights and freedom, and he was declared insane.. According for social pprogress," and pointed out to Soviet law, a party' charged with that the United, States had neither insanity is entitled - to-=a hearing, to signed nor ratified the covenants. defense counsel, and to examination But no Soviet newspaper printed by a, psychiatrist of his own choos- the text. of the covenants, or de- ing. Yuri Shikanovich, at the time scribed them fully. On the other of our. visit, had been imprisoned hand, the press was careful to point one sear. He had not been seen by, @tl'TQfl[ CPYRGHT family .'r friends and bad not been allowed to speak to a lawyer, nor had he seen a psychiatrist. and his wife are in prison for pro- test activities, he for fifteen years (commuted from a death sentence), she for-ten. Kuznetsov kept a secret diary, a daily account of his. life in prison, which was smuggled out to the West by -Mrs. Sakharov and published, and Kuznetsov is being punished. To ensure no one knows of the punishment, the authorities forbidden to see him because' she too is imprisoned. Last year Mrs. Sakharov was permitted to see him only once. This year, while one of our group, Edward Stern, was vis- iting the Sakharovs, they received notification that "because of repairs to the prison,". their visit must be cancelled. They are afraid that next year there will be no Edward Kuz- Sakharov also spoke to us about Evgeny Levich, a son of Benjamin Levich, a theoretical physicist of some renown. Tww years ago Ben- j,amin Levich, his wife, his two sons, and their wives applied for exit visas for Israel. They were all fired from their jobs. Evgeny Levich has high blood pressure and a chronic stomach disorder. Last May he was seized on the street by the military police and disappeared. In time Ev- gene wrote from a. work camp in a forbidden area of the Arctic Sea near the North Pole,, the Bay of fined in a military hospital, declared to be in fine health, and forcibly in- ducted into the army. His blood pressure has risen and his nose bleeds. He has bloody diarrhea. He is allowed no special diet and no re- duction in work. He must break ice and carry heavy loads-. At first. the camp doctor exempted him from the heaviest jobs, but now the doc- that the Levich boy would not sur- vive. In an open letter to the free world he called for an international campaign on Evgeny Levich's be- half. He denounced the abduction of Levich as "an action that is meant to. frighten and to take re- venge upon those who wish to exer- cise their right to emigrate from this country." A pprovad For Relearn "Have you heard? In Moscow the tourist guides ex- plain to visitors that there is no reli- gious discrimination in the Soviet Union. All are free to go to church or synagogue, as they see fit. If you ask where the synagogues are, the .guides tell you that there are many, and they suggest you visit the one on Ulitsa Arkhipova, for example. In fact, the synagogue on Ulitsa Ar- khipova is the only one in Moscow. Each Saturday morning, pious. Muscovites gather in the synagogue. Each Saturday those Jews who have applied - to emigrate gather outside in the square. Who got a visa? Who has been denied? Who has been fired? Have you heard who the police took away? Is he in a mental hospital or a concentration camp? No doubt there are undercover agents among them, for across the street the KGB stand openly, eavesdropping, aiming directional microphones at turned- aside heads, photographing the crowd, photographing those who en- ter the synagogue. Perhaps there are KGB in the synagogue wearing yar- mulkes. Saturday, August 25. Several of us skipped the conference sessions to attend Sabbath services. The world youth games were going on in Moscow that week. The Soviet Union encourages such events, which bring foreign exchange, and last year more than two million vis- itors came to Moscow. From young- sters quartered in the Hotel Russiya we had learned that the Israeli.con- tingent was being harassed- On the -streets, at the games, they were greeted with "Zhid." Today, on the Sabbath, they planned to come to- gether to synagogue,. and we timed our visit to watch them march up,. straight and proud and tall, in their bright blue. uniforms. Outside in the. square, young Israelis greeted pro- spective Israelis. "Shalom, shalom." "Next year in Israel." Then the youths spread through the syna- gogue. They mingled with the old men, praying. The cantor chanted on, but the bearded old ones looked. up and smiled with a thrill of recog- nition and pride at the young ath- letes donning prayer shawls and yar- mulkes and chanting among them. The Russian worshippers could tell we were foreigners. Perhaps they all know each.other, or maybe COYRGHT 1999109022 . rin ono7o n44on nnnna nnaannna o it was our well-made clothes or something about our manner. They would glance over and nod or smile. In the lobby the old ones pressed up and shook our hands. An an- cient woman held one of us,. kissed his cheek, greeted him in Yiddish. "God bless you. You are our hope. Here Judaism is dying. Only the old come to synagogue. The young are atheists. Or they are afraid. In your country do the young -Jews still go to synagogue?' God bless you." She was crying and we struggled not to cry with her. ... That Saturday afternoon.was the meeting of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics Com- mission on Magnetism. There was a long agenda, and it went slowly.. The last item was the question of the exclusion of Azbel, Gitterman, and Voronel. Several -members ob- jected that it was a political issue unsuitable for discussion at an inter- national conference.. Others argued that it was purely an internal affair of the Soviet Union. To discuss the matter would be a breach of the Helsinki Amendment, which says that the "Council shall recognize and respect the independence of the internal scientific planning of its National Members." Physicist George Rado, U.S. representative on the IUPAP Commission on Maa netism and then and now its chair- man, gave a speech which ended the discussion. As he wrote later: "Both before and during the Moscow conference I was put under considerable pres- sure to have IUPAP intervene... However, as chairman of the IUPAP Commission on Magnetism, I must. adhere to the policies of IUPAP, the international organiza- tion which elected me, even in cases where those policies are contrary to my personal feelings:=To make sure. that my actions would be ? in accordance with IUPAP policy, I re- quested (well before the conference) the advice of -..: the Secretary- General of IUPAP` and:. . the. Secretary of the U.S.-National Com- mittee for IUPAP.'--They- informed me that IUPAP cannot. intervene, and has never intervened, when an individual scientist is prevented from proceeding from one part of his country to another. In view of this-policy, I considered it inappro- Magnetism Commissi, Azbel, Gitterman, or the Moscow Confer spite of the fact th .could not intervene wanted to do whatever I could unofficially to help them. Therefore, I requested and obtained a private meeting with Academician S. V. Vonsovsky, the ? cha rman of the .Magnetism conferee e.. . . In a friendly and (hopefully) persuasive manner, I conveyed to Professor Vonsovsky the intense concern from many different countries. . . . I strongly sympathize ith Drs. Az- bel, Gitterman, and oronel and do hope that IUPAP's policy on the Free Circulation of Scientists will be improved. But until the governing bodies of IUPAP adopt a different policy, my continuing efforts to help are limited by the clear obliga- tion that I operate, within the con- fines of the IUPAP exists at present." fine distinctions here hand, the statutes pro of a. scientist from a conference on racial, ical, or citizenship gr other hand, the . cou .the independence of t entific planning of its bers. Objectivity is profession. It can als pational disease. `Best sons" n ... to visit oronel during t officially I for [them], I policy which ter. There are On the one hibit exclusion international eligious, polit- )unds. On the cil recognizes e internal sci national mem- the scientist's be his occu- Sunday, August 2 . There were twenty more morning and afternoon sessions, eight sessions in parallel, one hundred and fift?-two lectures. Itinerant ferromagnets bubbles, do- main walls, spin densities and form factors, polarized neutrons, unpaired electrons, quasi-tw -dimensional models, specific heats, magnetic mo- ments, Knight shifts, Green func- tions, and Barkhausen noise. Scientists are the monks of our time, illuminating -theiPhysical Re- views. Outside in the world' there is discord, but in the to ple one hears only a muted orison : "praseody- mium, gadolinium, ne dymium, ytt- rium.". It was Sunday, and fifteen hundred anchorites led past the armed guards. Again t ere were dis- turbing incidents. Sig s were posted and handwritten announcements priate. as chairman of the IUPAP were distributed in the lobbies. An Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT announcement was broadcast from the rostrum: "This afternoon there will be a special seminar on Critical Phenomena and Related Topics in Magnetism. The seminar will be held in the apartment of Professor Voronel. Those wishing to attend will meet in the lobby of the Hotel Russiya at 1:30." Like the signs, the scheduling was spontaneous. Vora nel and his colleagues had hoped for a few visitors; they were aston- ished when forty-one conferees turned up. Not many out of fifteen hundred, but still, in the Soviet Union, forty-one persons flouting authority is a large number. They went by subway to Professor Voro- nel's apartment and sat on the floor. Several Soviet scientists attended, and of course the KGB. was there. But Mark Azbel, Moshe Gitterman, and. Alexander Voronel finally got to give their talks. Tuesday, August 28, was the last day of the conference. The guards were gone from the entrance to Moscow State University. Most of the delegates had already left. Those of us who still remained packed up our bags and invited our new Soviet friends to the Hotel Russiya to say good-bye: Azbel, Al- exander Lunts, the Gittermans. Vic- tor Brailovsky, the Voronels, hus- bands and wives, brave people. Back home, we spoke to Mark Azbel by phone from Moscow. He said that though he and Voronel and Gitterman have applied to emi- grate, they could never "remain in- different to Russia. . . . If any .enemy appeared who wanted to de- stroy everything beautiful in this country, he would begin with Sol- zhenitsyn and Sakharov. Any great country would be proud of these people, and only Russia carries on its old traditions of devouring best sons." . Iii the United States, -the National Academy of Sciences wrote to the Soviet Academy: "It was with con- sternation and a sense of shame that we learned of the expression of censure of Sakharov's contributions to the cause of continuing human progress that was signed by forty members of your academy. . In Budapest, Hungary, on Sep- tember 29, 1973, officers of the In- ternational Union of Pure and Ap- plied Physics convened. The Soviet delegate, B. M. Vul, insisted that the Helsinki Resolution on the 'Free Circulation of Scientists,.-was merely a floor resolution of the XIV Gen- eral Assembly . and had no legal weight. He further insisted that the statutory amendment on non-dis- .crimination explicitly exempted internal actions by any national member. This was the same inter- pretation the Secretary of the U.S. National. Committee for IUPAP and the Secretary-General of IUPAP had stated previously.. The U.S. representatives bowed to reality. The Soviet delegate sug- gested that if IUPAP pressed for a stronger interpretation of the Hel- sinki Amendment, or voted to cen- sure the. Soviet Union for the ex- clusion of the three .scientists, the Soviet Union was prepared to aban- don IUPAP. Faced with this threat, the AmAr-isafts .7 t'. -EARL CALLEN Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100580001-2