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November 11, 2016
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April 1, 1972
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 25X1C10b Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 April 1972 POLITICAL PERSECUTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA "In the fall of 1971 and at the beginning of this year, workers of the Interior Ministry arrested certain disseminators and producers of anti-state leaflets and other materials of the same nature .... The seized documents indicate that these Czechoslovak citizens strove in the period of 1970 and 1971 to create illegal anti-state groups .... They organized these activities in combination with emigres and foreign enemy centers.... Subjects of foreign states also participated in this criminal activity........." Prague Television, 11 January 1972 Although rumors of detentions and police interrogations of certain individuals in Czechoslovakia filtered to the West during the last months of 1971, this was the first official admission by the Prague regime that a new wave of arrests was under way. The harsh facts of these arrests, which took place in late 1971 and in January 1972, are well known by now and are receiving considerable publicity in Western Europe. About 200 individuals, most of whom held positions of some influence during the liberal- ization process of 1968, are involved. The highest ranking of these are Milan Huebl, former Rector of the Higher Party College and co-author of Alexander Dubcek's Action Program of April 1968, and Jaroslav Sabata, former Secretary of the Party organization in Brno. Both were elected members of the Central Committee at the "clandestine" Party Congress convoked 48 hours after the Soviet invasion. According to press reports, Huebl is accused of involve- ment in the distribution of samizdat materials in Prague and Czech Lands, while Sabata is said to have mobilized his entire family (two sons, a daughter and other 'relatives) to conduct a wide-spread campaign throughout the province of Moravia against the national elections of last November. International flavor was added to the affair through regime charges of foreign involvement, and the arrest on 5 January of one Italian newsman, Valerio Ochetto, and the summary expulsion of two others. This resulted in a surprisingly strong and indignant protest action in Italy, which included critical editorials in the principal organs of the Italian Communist Party. Possibly under the influence of this pressure, the Czechoslovak Press Agency officially announced on 17 February that Ochetto had been expelled from Czechoslovakia. The decision to resolve the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 irksome Ochetto case through mere expulsion suggests that the Husak regime is still sensitive -- at least to some degree -- to criticism from abroad, especially when levied by a "fraternal" party. It remains to be seen how the regime will. react to the growing storm of protest its actions have evoked elsewhere in Europe, notably among the French left, particularly on the part of prominent, former French Communists. Some of the public statements made by the French left on the political arrests are contained in the attachments. Most prominent is the half-page protest printed in Le Monde of 5-6 March, signed by 144 leftist intellectuals, mostly French, including socialists and dissident and orthodox Communists. Among the more prominent signatories are philosopher and writer Jean Paul Sartre, former Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister and author of the book The Confession Arthur London, former French Communist Party (PCF) Politburo member and theoretician Roger Garaudy, author Simone de Beauvoir, and the Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis. Additional signatures are coming in despite the PCF's demand that its members disavow their signatures. Roger Garaudy,* writing in the large circulation, independent daily France Soir, exposes the absurdity of the Czech regime's claim that there are no political trials going on in Czechoslovakia. Another PCF expellee, Paul Noirot, expressed his views in his own Communist dissident weekly, Politique Hebdo. At the same time, he published excerpts from a letter written by -the above- mentioned Milan Huebl to his former comrade-in-arms, Gustav Husak, warning about the incalculable consequences of starting political trials. Huebl wrote the letter last October and sent a copy abroad to be published in the event of his arrest. (Attached is a trans- lation of the whole letter, which was published in the Italian newspaper L'Espresso.) On the French left only the PCF sees nothing wrong in Czecho- slovakia. The French Socialist Party has urged the PCF to join it in a common protest against the political repressions but with no success. In fact, a delegation sent to Czechoslovakia by the PCF to seek assurances from Husak that political trials would not be held, returned to Paris with the expected whitewash and denials of political repression, but the exchange between socialists and Communists is continuing. The question arises as to why the Prague regime, having repeatedly proclaimed the completion of consolidation and defeat of the right wing, embarked at this particular point in time on *Garaudy was expelled from the Party in 1970 for his persistent criticism of the Soviet system of Socialism. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 large-scale arrests and trials of known and generally respected supporters of Dubcek. Soviet and Czechoslovak paranoid concern with criticism at home and abroad is well known and amply documented. The year 1968 taught Prague and the Kremlin a lesson they are unlikely to treat lightly again. Husak knows and has admitted publicly that "despite the election results, it must not be assumed that 99% of the people are with us." Probably-more than some of his colleagues, Husak is aware of public sentiment and of the fact that he is presiding over a brooding and even hostile nation. Being unwilling or unable to initiate meaningful steps toward national reconciliation, Husak can only silence potential opposition leaders and thus intimidate and neutralize large numbers of less determined individuals who might be willing to follow someone else's lead but are not themselves strong enough to take the initiative. Given this national impasse, the price of adverse publicity abroad and more intense hostility at home must be paid as the lesser of two evils. Husak has no other alternatives given the inexorable reality within most ruling Communist Parties that those who have been publicly accused of serious transgressions against existing Party statutes must be punished, lest Party discipline among the rank-and-file suffer. Since ridiculing the opposition one day and charging it with heinous plotting the next is obviously not impressing the skeptical and politically mature Czech and Slovak man in the street, the regime must _ as in the past- manufacture intricate and ominous ties between the domestic opposition and "powerful international enemy centers abroad." Consequently, visits to Czechoslovakia in 1968 and since then by Western journalists, academic personalties, etc,, have been and continue to be presented as "espionage trips" and subversion. The press, radio and television tediously repeat fantastic tales of "an invasion by the Green Berets," the presence in 1968 of "American tanks" (which incidentally were rented in Austria for a film dealing with WW 1I), attack purely scholarly meetings in the West, such as the Reading Seminar in England, and put the imperialist brand on even such apolitical organizations as the PEN Club and Amnesty International by calling them tools of Western espionage, Need- less to say, activities of Czechoslovak emigres -- old and new -- are magnified out of all proportion and every activist among them is accused of working for at least one Western intelligence service. As ludicrous as this may seem to the average Westerner, to Prague -- as apparently to Moscow -- it is a deadly serious matter, and Prague's exaggerated concern throws some light on that govern- ment's defensive and nervous posture Apart from the above, the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 decision to crack down on Czechoslovak dissidents may well be a logical consequence of the recent Soviet wave of arrests of dissidents in Moscow and the Ukraine. Given Czechoslovakia's semi-colonial status since 1968, it is unlikely that Husak would take any major step without full coordination with Moscow. Finally, this may all be part of an overall Soviet Bloc tightening of security at home which, as many analysts have predicted, would accompany the Soviet detente campaign vis-a-vis the West. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CPYRGHT LE MiJ DE, Paris Approved For Release 199(R93)41:e2IA-RDP79-01194A000200190001; 4 .. 5-6 March 1972 LES SIGNATAIRES DE L'APPEL ONT SOUSCRIT E N S E M B L E LE PRIX ' CET ANNONCE Q J LE 410,4NDE A BIEN VOULU i EUR ACCO RDER AU TARIF PU LICITAIRE g r , 711 omme au temps de a l'Aveu? - reputees criminelles de Prague a Bratislava ? Si vous nous y aidez, nou! Pour soustraire leur honneur et leur vie aux persecutions qui les mena- Des hommes et des femmes sont suspectes, surveilles, poursuivis, empri- cent et les trappent, nous retusons de les laisser prendre au piege du silence, onnes, fetes au secret des prisons d'Itat parce qu'ils symbolisent 1'espoir d'un de notre silence. F d ' li audrait-il - sous pretexte e n a menter aucune campagne - accep- euple qui, malgre les rigueurs de l'occupation et de la police, ne consent pas ter de se taire? Certains le penseront sans doute. tilais beaucoup d'autres t -- Quelques-uns parmi nous ont rencontre certains de ces hommes et de ces "` - "`"e I? "- ""' ""` "` notre solidarite ouvertement expritnee. emmes, et les connaissent bien. Nous ui par millers signons et signerons cet Appel et contribuerons Nous les admirons d'avoir decide, it y a trois ans, de continuer au coude a interdire le silence sur le sort des victimes de la repression, notamment par coude avec leur peuple le combat pour le socialisme et prefere cc risque auX la voie de tels communiques, les placerons sous 1a seule sauvegarde qui leur olitudes de 1'exil. reste : la notre. LES PREMIERS SIGNATAIRES Maurice AGULHON Rene DAZY Dr Lean HEPNER Pier re NAVILLE Helene SAMAN-MARKOVITCH Pierre ALEKAN Marcel DEGLIAME-FOUCHE Joris IVENS Fern and NICOLON Dr Michel SAPIR Francois ALQUIER Charlotte DELBO Raymond JEAN Hen ri NOGUERES Jean-Paul SARTRE Daniel ANSELME Dr Pout OENAIS Serge JONAS Paul NOIROT Pierre SCHAEFFER Claude AVELINE Serge DEPAQUIT Ernest KAHANE The odoros PANGALOS Laurent SCHWARTZ Yves BAREL Genevieve DEROIN Maurice KRIEGEL-VALRIMONT Jacq ues PANIGEL Gerard de SEDE Simone de BEAUVOIR Maurice DODE Julia KRISTEVA Rog er PANN"UIN Jorge SEMPRUN Loleh BELON Jean-Marie DOMENACH Guy LECLERC Hele ne PARMELIN Robert SIMON Jean BENARD Maurice DOMMANGET Victor LEDUC Ann e PHILIPE Philippe SOLLERS Dr Norbert BEN SAID Jacques DUPIN Henri LEFEBVRE Jean PICART LE DOUX Albert SOBOUL Gilbert BERGER Colette DURAND Germaine LE GUILLANT Edou ard PIGNON Gilbert SOUCHAL Jean BERNARD Marguerite DURAS Michel LEIRIS Gail lard POL Pierre TERUEL-MANIA Ginette BERNARD-POMPIGNAT Dominique ELUARD Daniel LELONG Jean PRONTEAU Mikis rHEODORAKIS Janine BOUISSOUNOUSE Claude FAUX Albert-Paul LENTIN Mad eleine REBERIOUX Laurence THIBAUT Alphonse BOULOUX Victor FAY Artur LONDON 'Paul REBEYROLLES Rene THUILLIER Claude BOURDET M' Jean-Jacques de FELICE Francoise LONDON-DAIX And re REGNIER Janine TILLARD Dr Andre BOURGUIGNON Marc FERRO Serge MALLET Hen ri-Francois REY Charles TILLON Roger BOUSSINOT Vera FEYDER Robert MADROU Mic hele REY Raymonde TILLON Jean BOUVIER Michel FOUCAULT Jacqueline MARCHAND Loui s RIGAUDIAS Jacqueline VERNES Robert BRECY Roger GARAUDY Gilles MARTINET Hen ri ROBERT Aline VELLAY Jeanne BRUNSCHWIG Pierre GEORGES Jean MASSIN Suza nne ROBERT Dr Pierre VELLAY Dr Jacques CARON M' Christiane GILLMANN M' Leo MATARASSO Phili ppe ROBRIEUX Monique VIAL Jean CASSOU Roger GODEMAN Henriette MATHIEU Max ime RODINSON Paul VIEILLE Jean CHAINTRON Andre GORZ MATTA Dr R odolphe ROLLENS Louis de VILLEFOSSE Nicole CHATEL Andre GRANOU Daniel MAYER Jean-Marie VINCENT Maurice CLAVEL Daniel GUERIN Michele MOGUY Jean ROSTAND Olga WORMSER-MIGOT Michel COQUERY Jean-Claude GUERIN Claude MORGAN Clau de ROY Boris YANKEL Jacques COURTOIS M' Gisele HALIMI Edgar MORIN Mad eleine SAINT-SAENS Vladimir YANKELEVITCH Anne CREMIEUX Jean-Pierre HAMMER Pierre-Vidal NAQUET Mar c SAINT-SAENS Alain ZARUDIANSKY Celles et ceux qui veulent se solirlariser moralement et materielle- ment avec cette initiative doivent ecrire a : Apptoved F__F Imaw$?, I~. ,u et7o -4 ~1429URDIR p1-4 CPYRGHT LE MONDE, Paris 5-6 March 1972 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 (Advertisement) CPYRGHT The signers of this appeal have together paid for this announce- ment, for which Le Monde granted them the'conmercial rate. Will revolutionary fidelity and national pride be gain -- as in the days of 'The Confession" -- reputed being criminal in Prague and Bratislava? Men and women are being suspected, kept under urveillance, prosecuted, jailed, thrown into the epths of state prisons, because they symbolize the lope of a people which, despite the rigors of ccupation and police, does not consent to disavow them. Some of us have met these men and these women d know them well. We admire them for having decided, three years go, to continue, shoulder-to-shoulder with their eople, the struggle for socialism, and to prefer his risk to the solitudes of exile. For the Victims of Repression in Czechoslovak a If you help us, we shall not let them be either sullied or broken. We refuse to let them be trapped into silence, our silence, to save their honour and their life from the persecutions that are threatening them and are striking them. Is it necessary to accept silence -- under the pretext of not contributing to some campaign? Some, no doubt, think so. But many others will say with us that their own freedom and, for many among them, their ideals, depend on our solidarity openly expressed. We, who by the thousands sign and will sign this appeal and contribute to banning silence about the fate of the victims of repression, place them under the only safe- guard that still remains to them: ours. The First Signatures [Signatures] Those who wish to express their moral and material solidarity with this initiative should write to: Mme Genevieve DEROIN, 7, rue Victor-Hugo (92) Colombes Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 - Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 PARIS-MATCH, Paris 26 February 1972 CQ i M1 ISTS AGAIN TORN BY EVENTS IN PRAGUE Since the start of the year, a new wave of arrests has been building up in Czechoslova- kia, despite solemn commitments made by its rulers to brother communist parties. Raymond Tournoux tells us about the hidden crisis precipitated by these arrests within the French CP and throughout the political left. The communist party brandishes the tax returns of its elected office-holders. Through Mr Jacques Duclos, it is calling for publication of "cabinet members' fortunes." The offensive falls well within the boundaries of the stardard rules of poli- tical warfare. And yet, even while this is going on, the CP is covering up the inner tragedy, the secret tragedy that deeply troubles many of its members and a number of its leaders. Toward the outside world, its law of silence is still ironclad. In all the shouting of the headlines, the tragedy has got lost. Let us have a look at some of its important acts. At the beginning of this month of February, a new wave of arrests swept over Czechoslovakia. It came in the wake of pres- sure applied to intellectuals who,,in the view of the present authorities, were a bit too much in evidence during the "Prague Springtime." Among the people recently jailed were a philosopher, .a historian, a scientist, and a journalist. A month earlier the police had picked up, among others, Mr Milan Huebl, former rector of the Czech CP's Ecole Superieure, Mr Ludeck Pachman, former chess champion, Karel Kyncl, journalist, Jan Sling, son of Otto Sling, a party dignitary who was executed in 1952 at the same time as Rudolf Slansky, the secretary-general, and ten other leading party lights. What is it they are supposed to have done? What are the trumped-up charges against them? They allegedly formed small groups working "against the state" with the help of emigre associations and "hostile foreign organizations." Some of these men, but only a few, have apparently been freed since their arrest. Events follow one another relentlessly. On 2 February, Mr Jiri Lederer, who had been arrested in the pre-dawn hours of 31 January, without his family's being able to find out the reason for his arrest, was sentenced to 2 years in prison. Why? Because in May 1968, he had written an article for Literarn Listy -- then the organ of the Czech Writers' Union -- critical of Mr GZTmulka. The court called it "defamation of an allied state." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 3CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Mu W4d5 For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Suddenly -- quite by chance, his friends said at first -- Mr Roland Leroy, member of the Chamber of Deputies, secretary of the Central Committee of the French CP, set off for Prague. With him went Mr Paul Courtieu, a member of the CC. In 1968 an emis- sary from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had come to Paris to pledge his party's solemn word that no prosecutions would be opened against those who had taken part in the "Prague Springtime." What has become of those promises, once so freely and prodigally given? On the left, Mr Francois Mitterand takes pen in hand in the first issue of L'Unite, the infant socialist party weekly. He writes about the repression that scourges those Czechoslovak communists "guilty of thinking differently from Mr Gustav Husak, secretary general of the CP." He writes: "Here we are back in Prague again, and in its springtime that knew no summer. What to do? Each of us has the inner for- titude to bear another's sufferings. Are we to leave them utterly defenseless, these muzzled men guilty of having dreamed of a socialism out of joint with the times in their own country?" The fact is that another very grave matter, born of events in Czechoslovakia, is smouldering inside the French CP. On 12 February, the communist party felt called upon to restate its po- sition in an absolutely extraordinary statement which appeared on page 3 of Humanite. It does its best to start its own diver- sionary maneuver: "Trying to cope with the grave difficulties which the crisis in French society has created for it, a crisis for which it must bear the whole responsibility, the big bourgeoisie now seeks to launch a new anti-communist campaign..." The CP makes two points: 1. It states that it stands by its 19th Congress position, namely "its disagreement with the military intervention in Czecho- slovakia [which occurred on] 21 August 196$." 2. It expresses satisfaction "with the statements of the secretary general of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the effect that there will be no prefabricated political trials." Yet at the very same time, Rinascita, the official weekly of the Italian Communist Party, deplores such subterfuge. It goes a great deal further under the headline "Grave news from Prague." It cites the several phases of a kind of liquidation still going on, the elimination of leaders, purges in the party, in the labor unions, in the professional organizations, at the university, among intellectuals, and in the press. And it wonders aloud whether the arrests made over these past few weeks are not actually tantamount to abandonment of a solemn commitment not to engage in repression and not to mount [show] trials. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Touching Italian Appeal It concludes in moving terms: "The news reaching us from Prague is grave. We cry out to the Czechoslovak communists, to the international worker movement, to all who aspire to the free, just world of socialism. We speak as communists, as internationalists, as revolutionaries, as those who are most deeply wounded by what is happening in.Prague." Several Italian newsmen have been arrested and expelled from Czechoslovakia, among them Ferdinando Zidar of Unita, Italy's equivalent of Humanite. On 18 February another communique from the French CP's 'political bureau: 1. It admits that Roland Leroy went on a mis- sion to Prague; 2. It officially notes the assurances from Ian Husak that there would be "no prosecutions, no arrests for poli- tical acts dating back to 1968." So? Still according to the political bureau, Husak said: " A preliminary investigation was recently begun into the constitution of an illegal conspiracy network.... Most of the persons arrested for questioning have been released." In other words, they are arresting people in Prague. And so in Paris the CP suars through its hidden tragedy, whose origins date back to 26 August 1968. That was the day Waldeck Rochet took to radio and TV to make his historic statement to Robert Boulay: "We were painfully surprised to learn, on the night of 21 August, of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. I shall not hide the fact that there is some bitterness and even anguish in our realization that there is grave disagreement between us and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over the matter of this military intervention in Czechoslovakia...." Waldeck-Rochet was just back from a flying trip to Russia. He had failed in his efforts at the Kremlin to prevent the order to move against Czechoslovakia from being given to the Russian troops. His pleading as a child of the people, like his ideolo- gical arguments, were swept away before the icy determination of the general staff and by the steel-clad arguments of strategy. Today, somewhere in a villa outside Paris, Waldeck Rochet, ;secretary general of the communist party, comrade of Maurice Thorez, scales the tragic hill of an endless Calvary. He has become invisible in an inaccessible hideaway. For 3 years this deeply sincere party man has failed to recover, intellectually or physically, from the blow of Prague. He is still too deep in soul-shock, this man who had tried to lead the CP out of the ghetto and into what he hoped would be the irreversible way of leftist unity, this man whc3 had committed his word and his honor Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 in the debate over the eac 1 p sq~ o res ect forAW9yRAF8C ~1-4He wanders in a world of ghosts and nightmares. He is lost in a Kafka universe. His soul runs in search of a lost dream, still seeking a Church that is gone forever. PARIS-MATCH., Paris 26 February 1972 CPYRGHT, i)cpuis IC dCI)Ut (IC I'anncc, UI1C nouvelle Vatiuc (I'arrestations sCVit en `'chccoslovaquie, au nlcprls (ICs engagements pris par ICS rrouvcrnants a I'ct and des P.C. frcres. Raymond Totiri1OLIX 11OUs racontc la crisc cachcc provo Ll6c par CCS arrestations au SCltl (Ill P.C. fral14a15 Ct (I(' 1-0 11tt, In S).' Le parti communiste agite les feuilles d'impot de ses elus. Par la bouche de M. Jacques Duclos, it re'- clame la publication de - la fortune des minis- tres r. L'offensive entre dans les regies classi- ques de la guerre politi- que... Pourtant, dans le meme temps, le P.c. dis- simule le drame intime, le drame secret qui an- goisse beaucoup de ses militants et nombre de ses dirigeants. A regard de I'exterieur, sa loi du silence reste implacable. Dans le feu de l'actualite, le drame est passe inapergu. 11 convient d'en reconstituer les actes principaux. Au debut de ce mois de fevrier, uhe nouvelle vague d'arresta- tions est operee en Tchecoslo- vaquie. Elie survient apres la mise sous les verroux d'intel- lectuels qui, au gre des auto- rites en place, s'etaient trop manifestos lors du - prin- temps de Prague ?. Parmi les personnes recemment incarce- philosophe, un historien, un scientifique, un journaliste. Un mois auparavant, avaient deja ete arretes, entre autres, MM. Milan Huebl, ancien recteur de I'Ecole superieure du P.c. tcheque, Ludek ?Pachman, an- cien champion d'echecs, Karel Kyncl, journaliste, Jan Sling, fils d'Otto Sling,. dignitaire du parti qui, en 1952, fut execute en meme temps que Rudolf Slansky, secretaire general, et dix autres .personnalites. Quels reproches ou quelles char- ges falla.cieuses les accablent donc ? Avoir voulu constituer de petits groupes agissant - contre I'Etat - avec ('aide d'associations d'emigres et . d'organisations etrangeres hostiles ?. Quelques-uns de ces hommes - mais quelques- uns seulement - paraissent avoir ete remis en liberte. Les faits se succedent, impi- toyables. Le 2 fevrier, M. Jiri Lederer, arrete I'avant-veille au petit matin sans que sa fa- Mille ait pu apprendre les mo- tifs de l'interpellation, s'entend condamner a deux ans de pri- son. Pourquoi ? Parce que, en mai 1968, dans Literarni Listy - alors organe de ('Union des sanctionne : ? Diffamation d'un Etat allie. ? LES HOMMES BAILLONNES Soudain - un hasard, affir- ment tout d'abord ses amis' -- M. Roland Leroy, depute, se- cretaire du comite central du parti communiste frangais, part pour Prague, accompagne de M. Paul Courtieu, membre du comite central. En 1968, un emissaire du parts communiste de Tchecoslovaquie etait venu, a Paris, donner ('assurance so- lennelle qu'aucun proces ne serait ouvert contre les partici- pants au - printemps de Pra- gue -. Qu'en est-il done des promesses prodiguees nagua- re ? A gauche, M. Francois Mitter- rand prend Ia plume clans le premier numero de - ('Unite ?, hebdomadaire du parti socia- liste. II evoque la repression qui s'abat sur les communistes tchecoslovaques, - coupables de Denser autrement que M. Gustav Husak, secretaire' general du P.c. ?. II ocrit : - Nous voilfi ramenes a Pre- roes. figurent notamment un a rivains -, ii avast critique que, et a son printemps sans Approved For Release 199/bV~`_ : IAtrl 1&7O1 1 e4A b .?i 1 kQJtf VOns Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A89Q?R80001-4 tous assez de force pour sup- porter les maux d'autrui. Lais- r~c Hans defense ces rnrii mss`' baillonnes, , coupables d'avoir reve a un socialisme inactuel par les temps qui cou- rent dans ce pays qui est le leur 7 En realite, une nouvelle et se- rieuse affaire, nee des evene- ments de Tchecoslovaquie, couve a I'interieur du P.c. Le 12 fevrier, le parti communiste estime necessaire de rappeler, sa position -par une declaration tout a fait inhabituelle, que I'on trouve en troisi6me -page de - I'Humanite w. II s'efforce, P son tour, de provoquer une manoeuvre de diversion : Aux prises avec les graves tiifficultes que lui cree la crise de la societe francaise, crise dont elle porte 1'entiere res- ponsabilite, la grande bour- geoisie cherche a relancer la campagne anticommuniste... Le P.c. precise deux points 1" II affirme s'en tenir a sa po- sition du XIX^ Congres, a sa- voir - son desaccord avec ('in- tervention militaire du 21 aout 1968 en Tchecoslovaquie .. 2" 11 se felicite - des declara- eons du secretaire general du parti communiste de Tcheco- Plovaquie, selon lesquelles it n'y aurait pas de proces ~poli- tiques prefabriques Mans le meme moment cepen- dant, - Rinascita -, I'hebdoma- daire official du parti commu- niste Italien, regrette les faux- fuyants. 11 va beaucoup plus- loin, sous le titre : - De graves nouvelles de Prague -. II men- tionne, pour sa part, les diffe- rentes phases d'une sorte de liquidation en cours, ('elimina- tion des responsables, les purges dans le parti, les syndicats, les organisations professionnelles, l'Universite, les intellectuels, la presse. Et it se demande sans ambages si les arrestations effectuees du- rant ces dernieres semaines ne sont pas, en effet, ('abandon d'un engagement : celui de ne pas se livrer a la repression et de no pas ouvrir des proci's. v ie.. APPEL PATHETIQUE aldeck Rochet revenait d'un II conclut en termes patheti- ques : - Les nouvelles qui nous parviennent de Prague sont graves. Nous nous adres- sons aux communistes tcheco- slovaques, au mouvement ou- vrier international, a tous ceux qui aspirent au monde libre et juste du socialisme. Nous par- Ions en communistes, en inter- nationalistes, en revolutionnai- res, les premiers qui sont blesses par ce qui see passe a Prague. r Des journalistes italiens son' arretes ou expulses, dont 'Fer- dinando Zidar, de - l'Unita ('equivalent de - I'Humanite Le 18 fevrier, nouveau commu- nique du bureau politique du parti communiste frangais : 1) i' reconna:t que Roland Leroy s'est rendu en mission a Pra- gue ; .2) it prend acte des as- surances donnees par Jan Husak : ? aucun proces, au- cune arrestation pour des faits politiques remontant a 1968 ^. Alors ? Toujours selon le bu- reau politique, Husak a decla- re une instruction a ete recemment ouverte sur la cons- titution d'un reseau illegal de conspiration... le plus grand nombre des personnes inter- pellees et interrogees ont ete relachees Autrement dit, on arrete a Prague. 'Ainsi a Paris, le P.c. vit son drame cache dont l'origine re- monte au 26 aoGt 1968. Ce jcur- la, devant le micro de R.t.l., Waldeck Rochet faisait a Ro- bert Boulay une declaration historique : ? Nous avons ete douloureu sement surpris en apprenant dans la nuit du 21 au 22 aoiit ('intervention militaire en Tche coslovaquie. Je ne cacherai pa que ce n'est pas sans amer tume et un certain dechire ment que nous constaton notre grave desaccord avec I parti corrrmuniste de I'Unio sovietique au sujet de I'inte vention militaire en Tchecosl oyage-eclair a Moscou. II vait echoue dans sa tentative n vue d'empecher, au Krem- n, que solt donne l'ordre d arche des forces russes. Se djurations de fits du peuple es arguments ideologique vaient ete balayes par la froi ajors, par les argument ans appel de la strategie. ujourd'hui, quelque part dan ne villa de la region parisien e. Waldeck Rochet, secretair eneral du parti communiste ompagnon de Maurice Thorez ravit les tragiques etape Fun calvaire jamais terming. I st devenu invisible dans un etralte inaccessible. Depul rois ans, ce militant sincere n i physiquement, du coup d Prague. 11 demeure trop anti ement choque, lui qui avai voulu sortir le P.c. du ghett pour I'entrainer dans la voi esperee irreversible, de ('unit de la gauche ; lui qui avait en gage sa parole et son honneu dans le debat sur Ies voles p cifiques du socialisme, sur I respect de la souverainete de I'independance national par les partis freres. II err dans un monde de fantbmes de cauchemars. 11 evolue dan un univers kafkaien. Son esprit court en quete d'un reve perd a la recherche d'une Eglise di Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0119#A000200190001-4 7 I Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 FRANCE-SOIR, Paris 25 February 1972 Roger Garaudy FROM BURGQS TO PRAGUE, THERE ARE NO POLITICAL TRIALS CPYRGHT In late January the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union published two resolutions on the "ideological struggle." This is the usual means of indicating that the policy of the leaders is encountering difficulties and of announcing new measures of repression-- .the only method known to these leaders for overcoming difficulties. And here are the chain reactions: First, in the Soviet Union where men who advance the slightest criticism are sent either to insane asylums or prison: Bukovskiy after Grigorenko and hundreds of others. Then, in the Czechoslovak protectorate, where Husak is again repeating that there are no "political trials" when, among hundres of other arrests, Bzoch has been imprisoned in Brno for carrying in his briefcase the Smrkovsky interview published by an Italian communist newspaper. He was also proclaiming that there were no "political trials" when the first wave of repression swept General Prchlik into prison for having carried out the orders of the Dubcek government in 1968. There are no "political trials" because the slightest divergence is qualified as a "violation of the law." According to this terminology, there were never any "political trials" under Stalin. The unfortunate thing is precisely that political opposition under such a regime is a violation of the law. The political opposition is by definition an "enemy of the people" as in all police states, from the Spain of Franco to the Greece of the colonels. Thus from Burgos to Prague, there are never "political trials." An Italian journalist is gathering information on the opposition; he is arrested for conspiracy. There are no "political trials," at least not for all those who accept, in France or elsewhere, the normalization and its vocabulary. Bilak, the man who was preparing himself as early as 20 August 1968 for a position as jack-of-all-trades for the occupiers of Prague, is charged with seeing that the orders of his masters are obeyed by those who do not accept the normalization and its vocabulary. fie condemns the Romanian desire for independence. The Romanian Bilak, General Ion Serb, was removed from office and arrested (if not executed) as a Soviet agent. He castigates Yugoslavia, which he says is abandoning "the principles of Marxism-Leninism" in its attempts to allow the workers self-management of their factories and the possibility of criticizing the policy of their government. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 C PYRG I accuses Hungary of following the path of Czechoslovakia when trying 'to regain its independence. Ile reproaches Gierek for having restored the workers' councils in Poland at the very moment that Mravec and Lederer are being arrested in Czechoslovakia for having criticized Gomulka. There is a link among all these facts: the will of the Soviet leaders to impose their law in all socialist countries. In so doing they are the means they propaganda--periodically t eirthey best suppliers t of are intervene anti-counist are prepared "fraternal" countries and parties. But where is the socialism in all that? Who strikes? And who is struck? Those who strike are those who continue the political and ideological illusionism of Stalin. At-the 18th Party Congress in 1937, Stalin presented the new Soviet constitution as a "consistent and fully developed democracy." Ile was completely right. One has only to read the text to recognize that it was the most democratic of constitutions up to that time. It was, none- theless, in the name of this constitution, and without the slightest violation of it, that one of the bloodiest dictatorships the world has ever known was established. The key to the enigma is found in the postulates of identification and substitution. If we translate each reference in the text to the worker class or the citizens as the party that represents them and is identified with them, and if we recognize that the leadership represents the party and is identified with it, everything becomes clear. This sort of democracy led 200 million Soviets, acting in good faith, to "participate" in the crime against Czechoslovakia in August 1968 because they had no reason to doubt the official lies: "We have been called by the Czechoslovak people, and our troops are welcomed with enthusiasm." Who is struck? Those who combat the postulates of substitution and identification and who tried, in Yugoslovia in 1948 in the first resistance against Stalinism and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, to construct socialism by the people--giving the workers themselves the control and self-management of their enterprises. This is why the Soviet problem and the Czechoslovak problem are French problems. At stake in these instances of intervention and repression is the future of socialism in our country. As long as the Soviet model with its substitutions and identifications that are a hideous caricature of socialism is not repudiated, as long as these interventions are not denounced, as long as the lie that "there are no political trials" (because the political opposition is an "enemy of the people") is accepted--and by this acceptance, one becomes an accomplice--socialism is dishonored and French prospects are blocked. The struggle for socialism will never be credible until it is clearly 11 9 GPY(RGHT Approved For Release 199 FRANCE-SOIR, Paris 25 February 1972 Fri to Comjtti C ntraleduuPartj Communist, do I'Unton Sovl6tiquo publie deux risolu- fians stir In - lifts 1ti6ologique .. C'cst In formulo hahituello pour dire quo in politique ties dirt. goants co heurto A des dlfficult6a et pour annoncer Jos r6pres- Slon, seulo method, que cc gen. re do dirigmnts connaisso pour leg surmonter. Et voicl lee rdactione en chat- Be. i)'nbord on Union Sov16tiquo, oil Ins hommos qui avancont la moindro critique sont vntilCs entro lax itr)pitaux psychlatri- gung at leg prisons , Bnukowskl npr6s Grigorenko of dos rental. nes d'autres. Puis Bans to protectoral tchd- cnlovaquo Of, ttusak r6peto uno foi,s do plus quit nest pas cities- lion do ? procbs politiques . insguo, pnrmi des centnInes d'nutres arrrstnttons, tlzoch net nmprl.vonn6 A Brno pour avoir dons sit serviette ]'Interview tlo Sntrkowaky publi6e par un )our- n;tl contmttnisto italien. iI pro- clumnit'rnletnrnt , II n'y it pas ,in ? proces politiques ? lorsquo la prentlbro vague tie repression cunduiatt on prison to general PrrhIlk pour avoir execute, en 1960, ton orclre.s du gouvernement Duhrrk. If n'y a pas do ? procbs politiqune - pufsqun In moindro diverg;enco oat quallfi6e do ? vi l o ation d I lt S ono .olon co vocabulniro it n'y a lamats ou do ? proces politiques . sous Sta- line. Ln ntalbeur c'est prec)s6- mrnt qua I'opposltion politique Inns un tot r,,rItoo soft line vie. Minn Itin in lot, L'npposant politique nst, par ctrfinltion, tin ? ennrml Fit, peu- pin ?, comme dans tmis leg r6f~i- mns policlers, do I'i spalrna tie France A In Greco tics colonels. Afnsl, do Burt;oc A Prague. 11 n'y a jamats do ? procbs politi. grits .. Un lournalisto 11a1ten s'infor- me sir l'oppnsitinn , Il est ar- rPt6 pour complot. II n'y a pas tin . proces polttlqurs . du moms pant toffs cnux qui aCCeptent, on France oft ntileurs. In norma. Ilsat(ort et son vocabulaire. ** I~'OUR crux qui no I'accnptent pan. Minh. celul qui s'on. prCtait. des le 20 notlt 1960, o rme ce s n Approved For Releasei I 49 'Ib~lb11~`'ti ?-RD Pf?'C 1'94-A000000190001-4 1.occupant A Prague , Oct charge do r6percuter lee consignee do see maitres. tif blAmo J. vo1ont6 d'lhd6pon- Banco do Ja Roumanie, oil Is Bi- talc roumain, to general lord Serb, a ate destitue et arrbte (ni- non execute) comme agent go- vi6tique. 11 somonce la Yougoslavle qui, en s'efforcant do donner aux travailleurs I'autogestion do lours usines et Ia possibilit6 do critiquer In politique do -tour gouvernement, abandonne, Solon lul, ? ton principes du marxisme leninismo .. II accuse la Hongrfo de pren- dre le chemin do In Tch6coslova- quio au temps oil oil() tontait do rocouvrer son ind6pendance. 11 roprocho A Gierok d'avolr rostaurd an Pologne leg conseils ouvriers, aft moment mime oil on Tch6coslovaquie Mravoc of Lederer sort arrbtCs pour avoir critique Gomul)ca. 11 y a un lien entre tous co fait , s ]it volont6 des dirigoants sovibtiques d'imposor lour lot dans tout pays socialist,, C'es't par lit qu'ils soot 10.5 ntoillours ournisseurs do la propaganda anticommunist, . en faisant p6- rlodiquemnt In preuvo qu lie sont prbts A intervenir par toue los moyens darts Its pays of lee penis qu'lIs appellant des pays et des partis freroe. M A)S ou oat in eociatisme on tout cola ? frappe Qui frappe 7 Et qui est Coux qui frappent Co sont log continuatours do I'lllusionnisme politiquo of id6ologlquo do Stall- no. Au XVIii' Congres do son Partt, on 1937, Stalin, pr6sentalt In nouvelle Constitution sovibti- quo comme ? one d6mocrntJe cons6quente et developpCe jus- gtt'nu bout. ? iI avnit parfaite. ment raison , II suffit Wen lire In toxic pour reconnaltre qu'elle est In plus d6mocratiquo des constitutions avant existd Jus- gur-IA. C'es't pourtant au nom do cello Constitution, t sane )a vfnler le mains du monde, qu'a Tin s'instituer l'uno des plus san- glantes dictatures quo l'histoiro aft connues. de substitution , si chaquo foie qu'il s'agit, daps le toxto, do In classo ouvriere ou des citoyens, noun traduisons par , to Perth qui les represents et s'identiflo A aux, et si nous admotions quo la direction represents co paril of s'identifie A lul, tout deviont clair. Uno dcniocratio do co gen- re a fait ? participer - do bonne tot deux cents millions do Sovi6- tiquos, on aout 19x,8, nu crime contre is Tchecosiovaquie parco qu'ils n'avaient aucun moynn do mettro on douto los mensongos officiels , ? Nous sontntes apno- l6s par be pouplo tchOcoslovequo et nos troupes sont accuelilies avec enthousinsme. . a cmbattent lesPostulate do sub- stitution et d'identification of qui ont tenth, en Yougoslavje on 1918. Flans is premiere resistance au stalinlsme, comme en Tch6co- slovaquio en 1968, do construiro to socialisme par le peuple. en donnnnt Flu. travai)leurs oux- memes In parole et I'autogestion do Ieurs entreprises. C'ost' pourquot to proltlbme soviCtique et to problbmo tch6- coslovaque sont den problbmes francais. L'enjeu do cos Inter- ventions et do cog repressions, r'es't I'avenir du socinlisme Clans notro pays. Tant quo ]'on no rb- puclicra pas le model, sovl6ti- quo avec son substitutions et see Identifications qui sont uno ca- ricataro hideuso du socialismo, tant quo I'on no denoncora pas COS Interventions, tant quo I on accepters, on 8'(,n fatsant ninsi compllco. Ie nlensongo Arlon lo- 'U ele;1 n 'y a pas do proces po- qU ? parrs qu'on a baptise i'opposant politique - ennoml du Poupin ?, on laisso d6shonorer to socialisme et )'on bouche, to perspective francalse. La lutte pour le socialisme no sera credible quo lorsqu'on dire clalrement , le socialisme, ce n'es't pas vela I Prochain , FACE A, L'OPiNlON JMIN (dipole UDR, president do t La cle de retie 6nl 10 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 POLITIQUE IIEBDO, Paris 10 February 1972 TIE HOUR OF THE TRIALS CPYRGHT Mow Far i e o. From his free tribune, Le Monde, Vercors cries, "Now it is starting all over again," in reference to the wave of arrests that is now sweeping so many comrades into Iiusak's prisons. The author of "Silence de la Mer" refers with moving sadness to the responsibility of the French Communist Party. It must, in fact, be denounced, again and always. For, objectively speaking, it has aided the normalization -- by its lies, its half-lies, its silence. Objectively speaking, it bears and will bear the cross of the coming trials in Prague -- the beginning of which is marked by the sentencing of Jiri Lederer, for having uttered criticism of Gomulka in 1968 a thousand times milder than what Gierek is saying about him now. "We support Husak completely when he says that there will be no trials. We are absolutely opposed to political trials," Georges Marchais affirmed to television and to Europe I in July 1970 (L'Humanite, 22 July 1970). Husak lied; he could do nothing but lie. Today is the proof. Georges Marchais is silent; L'Humanite is silent. Roland Leroy, secretary of the French Communist Party and the party "liberal," reiterates to all who will listen his dismay at the return of Stalinism; Roland Leroy is in Prague, while they are arresting my comrades, who were also his comrades. Powerless. Doubtless so. But an accomplice like so many others because he is silent. It is beginning all over again. How far will you go this time? The witch hunt has begun in Czechoslovakia. Heavier and heavier repression strikes the friends of Dubcek and those behind the "Springtime of Prague" who remained in their country, occupied by the Red Army, to wage a combat becoming more and more difficult with resources becoming more and more limited. After those of December and January (1), the third wave of arrests in early February claimed figures who, by virtue of their reputations, had hereto- fore been spared. Thus, the historian Karel Bartosek and Karel Kaplan, the former secretary of the Prague Committee of the Communist Party, Jiri Litera, well known in scientific circles, Jiri Hochman, former editor-in-chief of the Reporter, (the organ of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists, prohibited in 1969 by order of the Soviet authorities) and another journalist, Vladimir Nepras were arrested. The police arrested, then released, but kept under surveillance the philosphers Karel Kosik and Sochor, the jurist Frantisek Chamalik, and Richard Slansky. Slansky is the son of the former secretary general of the Communist Party who was arrested in 1952 with 10 other leaders of the Communist Party, sentenced, and executed after a rigged trial, replete with confessions, the sinister machinery of which Ar-,:hur London unveils in his resounding book. 11 CPYRGHT ARprfllveegroSfR&lpaea9p-r/,OaZsO2 aga~instRR~ie o pos94 o00b0eg00n19 g0011f over again? Already the journalist Jiri Lederer has been sentenced to two years in prison by a Prague court for having "defamed the representatives of an allied country." In truth, Lederer, in April and May 1968 made the same criticism of Gomulka in several articles in the newspaper of the Union of Writers, Literarni Listy, that are made officially today in Warsaw. It is possible that the intellectuals and militants arrested recently or in early January -- like the former rector of the Advanced Political School of the Communist Party, Martin Huebl -- will be brought to trial on charges of ,having printed and disseminated not only "subversive tracts," but also a clandestine opposition newspaper circulating secretly in Czechoslovakia. Jiri Hochman Hoch an, 44 years old, a former deportee, was., in the early years after the liberation in 1945, a carpenter. After obtaining his baccalaureate at the School of Economics, he began working as a journalist for Obrana Lidu, the organ of the army, as director of the foreign politics section. In the late fifties, he began work for Rude Pravo, the central organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party as foreign politics editor. In 1967 he took a job with the weekly of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists, Reorter. It was there, as editor-in-chief, that he waged the fiercest battle or the "Springtime of Prague." Expelled from the party in 1969, he was, although gravely ill with tuberculosis, forced to find employment as an ironworker in a small town. His wife, a teacher, became an agricultural worker,. Jiri Hochman is the author of a satirical novel, Jeleni Brod, which has just been published in Czechoslovakia by Index Publishers of WeNest Germany. Milan Iluebl 1luebi ,, 45, is a specialist in contemporary history -- particularly that of the socialist states. In this scientific work, he devoted several studies to the problem of the DAV, agroup of Slovak progressive intellectuals. In the late fifties and early sixties, he brought attention to himself by demanding the release of the leaders of the Slovak Communist Party who had been arrested and sentenced in 1952 for "bourgeois nationalism" -- among them was Gustav Husak. A professor at the Advanced School of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, he became its rector in 1967. He was one of Alexander Dubcek's closest associates. Karel Bartosek Bartose , 41, is a historian. He is the son of a working-class family of Skutec (Moravia), a working-class city near Gottwaldow. In 1948, the son of a militant (his mother was a member of the Communist Party as early as before the war), he entered the university. He then went on to the Institute of Contemporary History, where he specialized in the study of the Second World War. He published his first book in 1959, The Slovak Insurrection. In the sixties, he worked with Karel Kaplan, director of the Institute, on an analysis of the crimes of the Stalinist period. Ile wrote for Literarni Listy and participated from its beginnings in 1963 in the movement of ni ellectuals against the obscurantism of Novotny. In 1968 he was one of the active members of "Springtime" and wrote for the Reporter. At the time of the invasion, he and others were maintaining the free Czechoslovak Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CPYRGHT radio -- thus contributing to resistance agar resigned from the Czech Communist Party in 1969, he has been without work since June 1970: the Institute of Contemporary History was purely and simply closed. A Fifty-Year Old Student At the last meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Union of Students, held in Warsaw from 26 to 29 January, the representative of the Czech students was --- 50 years old. This old official of the Stalinist machine was one of the principal figures behind a coup that permitted the Soviet dele- gation and other delegations closest to the Russians to exclude two students of the National Union of French Students (UNEF) from the IUS congress and to expel them from Poland. These two students, Pierre Nesterenko and Jean-Claude Boksembaum, had recalled the position that their organization took "against intervention by the armies of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia" and against governmental repression by Itusak for the Brezhnev government. The Socialism that Itusak Condemns "We are going to begin a new struggle. And your task, my comrades-in France and in Europe, is to understand . . . It marks the beginning of a new period of our political history: the struggle of all those exploited by 'socialism' against their exploiters. . . "Against the bureaucrats who have taken over the national state and its possessions. On the threshold of this new class struggle, we must choose our position carefully. "We are those who tomorrow will struggle for the power of the workers in the factories, in the cities, and in the country, at all levels of social activity, and thereby for the destruction of the state of the privileged persons who speak of socialism. "For the moment, we are weak. The best among us are falling without glory today. But there will be revenge!" K.B. Self-criticism in the blood of a few comrades. 25 August 1969 "We must unite so that the fifties will not be repeated. The abuse of power and the contempt for the law knows no limits -- reaching the highest officials as well as ordinary citizens, those who are politically committed as well as those who are not. "We must then build a bulwark against the illegality that has resulted in the political trials." Karel Kaplan "Machinery for a Trial" translated in "Politique Aujourd' hui" September 10 and 12 1970. "It is very important to begin a new and exhaustive investigation, and in particular, a review of the fundamental conditions for socialism. It seems to me, in fact, that the notorious consequences such as disrespect for the individual, destruction of libert',-, consumption of the individual by the masses, the concentration camps, etc., ar:~ only just that -- consequences. We will all remain prisoners of the secondary and the superficial as long as we do not pd~ 1AM00b'crat is i CPYRGHT soc K9veA fto[Rgl9 sSe 11909/09/ e2TeCIA-RDP79-of h94 0000200190001-4 concepts ry, of man, of truth. We can summarize all that in these terms: the Czechoslovak experience brings socialism before critical thought and before philosophical reflection on the primordial and the essential." Karel Kosik Conversation with Antonin Liehm in '"Three Generations" "The revolutionary political union of workers and intellectuals must take as its point of departure the fact that this union is based on mutual and bilateral action, on dialogue. The natural attribute of one and the other, as modern social classes, is the capability for an overall view that goes beyond the partial or the biased. It is, furthermore, a critical spirit that spares nothing, not even itself. One must consider as symptomatic of abnormal circumstances that the intelligensia is forced to convince others of its own importance -- being unable, furthermore, to exercise its normal critical role with society and with itself. The revolutionary ties of workers and intellect- uals arise from the fact that the two classes have both brain and hands; that they both work and think: the meaning of their union is to bring innovations to the political level. This undefined political innovation is effected pre- cisely in this association and results from the dialogue, the contact, and the reciprocal influence. The union does not mean then that one class falls in line with another, or that one takes everything from the other. In that case, there would be no union, simply destruction." Karel Kosik (Ibid.) The Union of Writers Protests and Calls for Protests Czechoslovakia has lived or tree years under a regime of military occupation. We all have reason to fear that its leaders, after having so long affirmed their hostility to political trials, are now engaged in a process of repression as brutal as it is cunning, aimed at depriving all intellectuals of their means of subsistence, when it does not deprive them of their liberty. That is why the Union of Writers, meeting in general assembly, appeals to all democrats to protest vigorously these methods, which are incompatible with true socialism. 7 February 1972 Address signatures to the headquarters of the Union of Writers, 23, rue Gazan, Paris, 14. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 14 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris 10 February 1972 TC ECO SLOQUIE. "I'hQUrQ des procQs Approved < Voici que ca recommence >>, crie Vercors Bans sa Tribune fibre du ? Monde >>, devant la vague d' arrestations qui emporte en ce moment Bans les prisons de Husak tant de carnarades. Et l'auteur du < Silence de la Mer >> evoque avec. tine emouvante tristesse la responsabilite du P.C.F. On la doit denoncer, en effet, encore et tou- jours. Car, objectivement, it a aide a la nor- malisation, par ses mensonges, ses demi- mensonges, ses silences. Objectivement ii porte et portera la croix des proces qui s'an- noncent a Prague et dont la condamnation de Jiri Lederer pour avoir, en '1968, dit de Gomulka mille fois moins que ce qu'en a dit ,au jourd'hui Gierek, sonne l'ouverture. < Nous appuyons tout a fait Husak quand it dit qu'il n'y aura pas de proces. Nous sommes resolurnent opposes aux proces politiques >, affirmait Georges Marchais a la television et a Europe I en juillet 1970 (1'H:Humaiiite 22-7-1970). Husak mentait, it ne pouvait que mentir. La preuve en est aujourd'hui apportee. Georges Marchais se tait, l'-1 rumanite fait silence. Roland Leroy, secretaire du P.C.F., le du Parti, celui' qui repete a tous ceux qui veulent IV entendre sa souffrance devant le retour au stalinisme, Roland Leroy est a Prague, Landis qu'on arrete mes cama- rade*s qui furent les siens. For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020 190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Impuissant ? Sans doute. Mais complice, comme tant d'autres parce que muet. ra recommence : jusqu'ou irez--vous cette fois ? P. N. a chasse aux sorcldres est ouverte on Tcheco- slovaqufe. Une repres- sion de plus on plus lourde s'abat sur les amis de Dubcck et sur !es artisans ?du ? prin- temps de Prague - qui etaient demeures dans leur pays occu- p6 par I'Arrnee rouge pour y wiener, avec des moyens do plus en plus faibles, un combat de plus en plus difficile. Apres celles de decembre et celle de janvier (1), la troisie- me vague d'arrestations, celle du debut Wrier, touche des personnalites qui, du falt de leur renom, avaient etc jusqu'ici epargnees. C'est ainsi qu'ont etc apprehendes les historiens Karel Bartosek et Karel Kaplan, !'ancien secretaire du Comite du partl communiste de Prague, Jlrl Littera, blen connu dans les mf- lleux scientifiques, Jirl Hoch- man, ancien redacteur en chef de - Reporter - (/'organe de P. Union des journalistes tche- coslovaques interdit en 1969 sur ordre des autorites sovietl- ques) et un autre journaliste, Wladiniir Nepzas. La police a arrete, puts rela- che, mais maintenu sous surveil- lance, les philosophes Karel Ko- sik et Sochar, le Juriste Frantl- sek Chamallk et Richard Slans- ky. Celui-cl est le fits de I'an- clen secretaire general du P.C. qui fut arrete en 1952 avec dix autres leaders du P.C., condam- ne a retort et execute apres un prochs entierement truque mar- que par des - aveux , dont Ar- thur London a, dans un livre re- tcntissant, dernonte le sinistre mecanisme. L'cre des - grands proces contre 7es opposants va-t-elle s'ouvrir a nouveau? Deja le journaliste Jir! Lederer a etc condamne par un tribunal de Prague a deux ans de prison pour avoir - diffame, les repre- sentants d'un pays atlle en fait, pour avoir porte contre Go- mulka, en avril et mal 1966, dans plusieurs articles du jour- nal de !'Union des Ecrivains, - Literarni Listy ?, des critiques qui sont celles que I'on pout en- tendre aujourd'hui officiellement a Varsovie. II n'est pas exclu que les in- tellectuels et les militants arre-- tes recemment ou au debut jan- vier, comme 1'ancien recteur de la Haute Ecole Politique du P.C., Martin Huebl, comparaissent en justice sous !'accusation d'avoir redige et diffuse, non seulement des - tracts subversifs ., mais un journal clandestin d'opposl- tion circulant sous le manteau en Tchecoslovaquie. Jiri Hochman 44 ans, ancien deporte, fut d'abord menuisier, apres la libe- ration en 1945. Ayant termine l'ecole economique (niveau bac), it entra comme journaliste a - Obrana Lidu organe de I'arrnee, dont it dirigea to servi- ce de politique etrangere. A la fin des annees 50, it passe au - Rude Pravo organe central du parti communiste tchecoslo- vaque, a la redaction de politi- que etrangere, puis en 1967 a I'hebdomadaire de l'Union des Journalistes tchecoslovaques Re- porter. C'est la que, comme re- dacteur en chef, it menera le plus rigoureux des combats pour le Printemps de Prague. Exclu du Part! en 1969, it est, bien que gravement tuberculeux, oblige de travailler comme serrurier dans une petite vflle. Sa femme, universitaire, gagne sa vie com- me ouvriere agricole. Jiri Hoch- man est 1'auteur d'un roman sa- tirique, - Jeleni Brod -, qui vient de sortir en tcheque aux edi- tions index en Allemagne fede- rate. etudes au probleme du groupe des intellectuels progressistes slovaques DAV et, a la fin des annees 50, au debut des annees 60, 11 se fit remarquer en recla- mant la liberation des dirigeants du parti communiste slovaque accuses et condamnes en 1952 pour - nationalisme bourgeois - (dont, notamment, Gustav Hu- sak). Professeur a 1'ecole superieu- re du parti communiste tcheco- slovaque, if en devient recteur en 1967. 11 fut I'un des tres pro- ches collaborateurs d'Alexandre Dubcek. Karel Bartosek 41 ans. Historien. Fits d'une famille ouvriere de Skuteo (Mo- ravie), cite ouvriere proche de Gottwaldow. En 1948, comme fits de mili- tant (sa mere etalt membre du P.C. des avant la guerre), it en- tre a I'Universite ; puts, a I'lns- titut d'Histoire contemporalne. 11 se specialise dans !'etude de la seconde guerre mondiale. A cc titre it public en 1959 un pre- mier livre sur - !'insurrection slovaque -. Dans, les annees 1960, II par- ticipe avec Karel Kaplan, direc- teur de cot institut, a I'analyse des crimes de la periode stall- nienne. CPYRGHT ii collabore a - Literarni Lls- ty - et participe, des ses debuts, en 1963, au mouvement des in- tellectuels contre I'obscurantis- me de Novotny. En 1968, 11 est un des membres actifs du - Prin- temps - et collabore notamment au - Reporter Au moment de !'invasion, if assure, avec d'au- tres, la survie de la radio I1- bre tchecoslovaque, contribuant ainsf a la resistance aux occu- pants. Demissionnaire du P.G.T.. des 1969, it est sans travail de- puls juin 1970: !'instltut d'His- toire contemporaine a etc pure- ment et simplement ferme. Milan Huebi 45 ans, historien, specialiste de I'Histoire contemporaine, no- tamment de celle des Etats so- cialistes. Dans cc travail scien- tifique, if consacra plusleurs Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-WE- fli 94AO009001 Qn001-4 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Un etudiant de 50 ans... Lorsde la dernlere reunion du Comite Executif de /'Union Inter- nationale des Etudiants, qui est tenue a Varsovie du 26 au 9 janvier, le representant des "tudiants tchecoslovaques etait -ge... de cinquante ans. Ce vteux onctionnaire de I'appareil stali- fen a ate I'un des principaux rtisans du coup d'Etat qul a ermis a la delegation sovieti- exclure, d'abord du Congres de l'U.I.E., puts de faire expul- Nesterenko et J.-C. Boksembaum qui avalent rappels la prise de mees du parti de Varsovie en Tchecoslovaqufe - et contre Is repression gouvernementale or- ganisee par Husak pour Is comp. le socialisme que husak condamne Nous allons donc com,nencer une nouvelle lutte. Et votre t6che, mes camarades de France et d'Europe, est de to comprondre (...). Elie marque le debut d'une nouvelle periode do notre hlstoire politique : to lutte do tous les exploites du ? socialisme ? contre leurs explolteurs (..). Contra les bureaucrates qui se sont approprles 1'Etat national et ses proprietes. Au seull do ce nouv,~; combat de classe, if taut savoir cholsir oil nous situer. Nous serons ceux qui, domain, lutteront pour le pouvoir des travalfleurs darts les usines, dens /as villas at les campagnes, A tous les nlveaux de I'actfvite Societe at, du memo coup, pour In destruction do I'Etat des nantis qui parlent du socialisme. Pour le moment, nous sommes foibles, les mellleurs d'entre nous tombent sans gloire aujourd'hul. Mats gare A to revanche I - K.B. Autocritique dons la sang de quelques camarades. (25-8-1969.) - Nous devons nous unir pour que _ le;; ennees 50 no so repetent pas. L'abus de pouvoir at to mepris des lots no connaissent pas de limites, atteignent les plus hauls fonctlon- nalres comme les simples citoyens, les personnel engagees polltiquement comme cellos qui no Is sont pas. 11 Taut donc edifier un rampart contre 1'idegelite dont sont issus les proces politiques. - Karel Kaplan. Mdcanismes pour un proces - Tradult dons ? Politique Aujourd'hul ?, 9/10-1970 at 12-1970. ? /1 imports d'entreprendre une nouvelle at exhaustive Inves- tigation, at, en particulier, If taut repenser /as conditions londamentales du socialisme. It me semble an effet que des consequences de notoriete enerele tapes %r',rirrespect v CPYRGHT l'homme par la masse, les camps de concentration, etc., no sont, precisement, que des consequences, et que nous demeu- rerons tous prisonniers du subsidiaire at du superficlel aussi, fongtemps qua nous ne nous rendrons pas compte que le socialisme humaniste jail/it d'eutres racines qua le socialisme bureaucratique, quo I'un at rautre procedent de conceptions _differentes de I'histoire, de I'homme, de Is verite. Nous pour- rions aussi resumer cela an ces termes : rexperience tcheco- slovaque convle le sociallsme a une pensee critique, a une meditation ph'losophique Sur le primordial at I'essentlel. Karel Koslk Entretien avec Antonin Liehm, dons ? Trols generations -, ? L'union politique revolutionnaire des ouvriers at des intellectuals devrait partir du fait qu'etle s'appule sur une action mutuelle at b/laterale, rur un dialogue. L'attribut natural des uns et des autres, comme couches socieles modernes, c'est I'aptitude 6 une vue d'ensemble qui depesse les aspects partiels ou partiaux, c'est, an outre, un esprit critique gut n'6pargne rien of sot-memo. Aussi dolt-on tenir pour sympto- matique de circonstances anormales que /'intelligentsia soft dens /'obligation de convaincre eutruf de so propre impor- tance, no pouvant, de surcroit, exercer son rdle critique normal envers to societe comme envers ells-m6me. Le lien revolu- tionnaire des ouvriers at des instellectuels nalt de cette donnse que les deux couches ont 6 la foss cerveau at mains, que toutes deux travaillent at pensent; le sens de leur union, c'est d'innover sur le terrain politique ; cette nouveeutd politique indefinie se realise precisement dens cette asso- ciation et resulte du dialogue, du contact at de rlnfluence reciproques L'unlon no signiffe done pas qu'une couche s'aligne sur i'autre, qua l'une emprunte tout d rautre ; sfnon, iI n'y aurait pas d'union, mais simple dcrasement. - Karel oslk (Ibldem) L'Union des Ecrivains proteste et appelle a protester ... Le Tchecoslovaqufe vit, depuis trois ens, sous le regime do roccupation or- m6e. Nous avons toutes raisons de craindre quo ses dirl- geants apres avoir long- temps affirms leur hostilite aux proces politiques, no soient maintenant engages dans is voie dune repres- sion aussi br 'tale qua sour- noise, quf tercf 6 privet tous (as intellects,'Is de leurs moyens dex :tence, quand else no /as prive pas de feur liberte. Ceest pourquof !'Union des Ecrivains, reunie an assembfee generate, appelle tous les dsmocrates a pro- tester avec eclat contre des procedes incompatibles avec un veritable socialisme. Le 7 Wrier 1972. Adresser les s gnatures au siege do ? L'U lion des Ecrivains -, 23, rt a Gazan, Paris-14'. ^ Approved For Rele 00190001-4 17 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris 17 February 1972 CPYRGHT First in a few lines, then in a long, gray anonymous communique, I had the answer to the question which in this same column last week I directed to he leaders of the PCF [French Communist Party] in general and to Roland Leroy n particular. In a few lines, first of all, as filler in L'Humanite of Friday, 1 February, just below the news of the arrival of Queen Elizabeth of England in Thailand: "During a brief trip that he made to Czechoslovakia, Comrade Leroy iad talks with Comrades Gustav Husak, Secretary-General of the CCP [Czechoslovak ommunist Party] and Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium and Secretary of the entral Committee of the CCP. Comrade Paul Courtieu, member of the Central mmittec of the PCF, participated in this fraternal discussion." How far will they go? I asked. The answer came quickly. While they ere throwing into prison my comrades who were his comrades, Roland Leroy as fraternally clinking glasses with their jailers. The long anonymous communique, for its part, came out on page three of the Paris edition of the L'Humanite of Saturday the 12th, and was rerun that Monday the 14th in the same paper. It explained that the PCF still "disagrees" with (it is now longer a question of censuring) "the military intervention of 21 August 1968 in Czechoslovakia," that it was quite right to congratulate itself over the declarations of G. Husak, according to which there would be no "prefabricated political trials" in Czechoslovakia, and that it plans "to develop and strengthen its close cooperation with the CPSU and with all the other Communist Parties," thus with the CCP. And this is why, the communique goes on to specify, Comrade Leroy was clinking glasses with the jailers of my comrades who used to be his comrades. That's how it is. But then, how is it that, very fraternally, Vasil Bilak himself explained in camera to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on the 21st of last October that "at present there are only a few parties which have reservations concerning the current line of our party: above all the Communist parties of Australia, Great Britain, Spain and re certain problems, also the Italian Communist party?" Then, the PCF no longer has any reservations? Who's lying? V. Bilak or the Secretary of the PCF who doesn't even dare sign his communique? Or, in reading the two texts more closely, should one conclude that it is only the interpretation of the past that still causes differences (friendly) and that the trials which are being prepared against the authors of the Prague Spring will not be considered by the PCF as "prefabricated," but will-fall in the category of acts justified in advance in this ambiguous phrase of the anonymous communique: (the Party) "has always considered Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :1clA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CA1PRt IMWd For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 it the duty of the socialist authorities to protect the new regime against every attempt to cast doubt on it by illegal means, as well as against all external interferences?" Upon reflection, that's surely it: Husak, in toasting with Roland Leroy the condemnation of my imprisoned comrades who were his comrades, must have explained to him about the interference of our Italian comrade Ochetto and the subversive activities of the old Communist militants Hubl, Hochman, Kaplan, Bartosek, etc. Roland Leroy was convinced. On his return he convinced George Marchais. We eagerly await the next step; the communique justifying the non- prefabricated trials. Like those of the 1950's. To be added as an annex to the little orange book, a chapter on freedom in the "advanced democracies." Paul Noirot POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris 17 February 1972 'al eu, d'abord en quel- ques lignes, puis en un long et gris communi- que anonyme, la reponse a la question que je posais ici me- me la semaine derniere aux dl- rigeants du PCF en general, et a Roland Leroy en particulier. En quelques lignes d'abord, dans les ? puces ? de i'Huma- nlte du vendredi 11 Wrier, jus- te en dessous de I'annonce de I'arrivee de la refine Elizabeth d'Angleterre en Tha'ilande : ? Au cours d'un bref sejour qu'il a fait on Tchecoslovaquie, to ca-grade Leroy a eu un en- tretien avec les camarades Gus- tav Husak, secretaire general du PCT, et Vasil Bilak, membre du Presidium et secretaire du Comite central du PCT. Le ca- marade Paul Courtieu, membre du Comlte central du PCF, a partlcipe a cot entretien frater- nel. . Jusqu'ou front-Ils ? interro- geal-je. La reponse est venue vite. Tandis qu'on jetalt en pri- son mes camarades qul furent les slens, Roland Leroy trinqualt fraternellement avec leurs geo- Iiers. Le long communique anonyme est sorts, lul, en page 3 de I'edi- tlon pprlslenne de l'Humanlte du samedl 12, et II a ete reprodult a nouveau ce lundi 14 dans le memo journal. 11 explique clue tion militaire du 21 aout 1968 en Tchecoslovaquie ., qu'ii a eu bien raison de se feliciter des declarations de G. Husak selon lesquelles iI n'y auralt pas de proces politiques prefabri- ques . en Tchecoslovaquie, et qu'll entend, dans ce cadre, a developper et renforcer sa cooperation etroite avec le PC US, avec tous les autres par- tis communistes ?, done avec le PCT. Et c'est pourquol, preci- se encore le communique, Ro- land Leroy a ete trinquer avec les geoliers de mes camarades qui furent ses camarades. Dent acte. Mass alors, comment se fait- ii que, tree fraternellement, Va- sil Bilak lui-mame expliqualt le 21 octobre dernier devant le Co- mite central du parts communis- to tchecosiovaque reuni a huts clos qu' ? 11 no reste a present clue quelques partis qui font des reserves a I'egard de la ligne ac- tuelle le notre Parts : II s'agit avant `out des PC d'Austraiie, de Gr ,nde-Bretagne, d'Espagne, et, sur un certain nombre de proble mes, egalement du PC ita- lien ? ? Le PCF ne fait done plus de reserves ? Oui ment ? V. Bi ik ou le secretariat du PCF, ; ui nose meme pas si- gner ,, m communique ? Ou Mors, en Ilsant de plus pres le! deux textea_ faint-ii au o r le rL I- est tou ours ? on desac- conciure que s I r a c*OPPOW ForgRsilease 1 M/09/Q2s:e6 $ 1 194A000200190001-4 reprobation) avoc ? I'interven- diverger.:e (amicale), 1ue les CPYRGHT proces qul se preparent contre les Inspirateurs du Printemps de Prague no seront pas juges par le PCF comme ? prefabrlques ., mals rentreront dans la catego- rie de ces actes justifies par avance dans cette phrase ambi- giie du communique anonyme : (le Parts) ? a toujours conslde- rd que le pouvolr soclaliste a pour devolr de proteger avec rl- gueur le nouveau regime contre toute tentative do le remettre en cause par des moyens file- gaux, de memo que contre toute Ingerence exterleure ? ? A is reflexion. c'est surement cola : Husak, en trinquant avec Roland Leroy a la condamnatlon de mes camarades emprisonnes qui furent les slens, a dO lui expliquer les ingerences de no- tre camarade itallen Ochetto et les activates subversives des vleux militants communistes Hubl, Hochman, Kaplan, Barto- sek, etc. Roland Leroy a ete convaincu. En rentrant it a con- vaincu Georges Marchals. Attendons avec curlosite la suite, le communique Justifiant les proces non prefabrlques. Comme clans les annees 1950. A jolndre, en annexe, au petit II- vre orange, chapitre sur les II- bertes dans Ia societe de ? de- mocratle avencee ?. P l AN r ot Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 L'ESPRESSO, Rome 20 February 1972 I IUEBL' S LETTER TO HUSAK Prague Dear Comrade First Secretary, us a . CPYRGHT I address myself to you once more in writing, despite the fact That my previous letter of 18 February of this year, has remained unanswered. I consider it indispensable to communicate new information to you, so that you cannot say later that you were' not told about it. Sine 1 July 1970, that is,.from the time when my employment as Rector or the Party Political College came to an end, I have been out of a job. Since then I have received no salary; I cannot receive unemployment benefi-G, nor have I been allowed the grant from the journalists' fund for which I had asked and to which I was in- deed entitled, having been a journalist for many years; in short, I am, totally deprived of the means of livelihood. Moreover, the ten months which I have spent searching for a job have brought no result whatever. Not only have I not been able to find work corresponding to my qualifications as a historian of the modern period, but I 1?ave not been able to find a job of any kind, either in Prague or in Bratislava. This was not because people did not want to take me on but because I am on the "black list," and directors of every. type of office and factory ire afraid -- if they take me on - of getting involved. They know, in fact, the relevant precedents: they know that the director of an institute who had had hired the former secretary of the, Prague Party organization and this with the. explicit agreement of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPCS -- was later dismissed; and the city committee of the party justified his.dismissal by the very fact that he had taken on Bohumil Simon. I worked in the aoparat of the party from 1947, except for period 1964-68. If a private employer behaved in this way toward um;m cone who worked for him for twenty years, he would be justly condemned as asocial. If a French Communist could not find employ- ment in his homeland, the French Communist Party would certainly protest against this method of discriminating against citizens on the basis of their political convictions. And when this kind of think occurs within a party in power, in which in its very name defines itself as socialist, are we to consider-it normal, just, natural, and even downright normalized? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 20 CPYRGHT AnnrnviPrl Fnr RPIPact 1 999/n9/n9 - C1A_RfP79_n119dAnnn9nnl gnnnl _d Of course, you can-cite various declarations by yourself and other representatives of the leadership in which it is affirmed that those who have been expelled from the party also have the right to work corresponding to their qualifications. I personally know hundreds of persons expelled from the party, but there is not even one of them who has been able to find work corresponding to his qualifications -- unless you consider that a job measuring water- levels is appropriate to the qualifications of a /former/ pro- fessor of cybernetics. You are deceiving either yourselves or pub-. lie opinion, domestic and foreign,"about the reality of the present situation. On 1 October last my wife, Eliska Skrenkova, special assistant in the Faculty of Russian Studies at the University of 17 November, was also dismissed. The management of the school had invited her to rethign voluntarily, telling her that otherwise she would be dis- mi`rDsed on the ground that she was "unworthy of trust." She replied that, because her salary had been the only means of support for.the family since 1 July, she could not agree to resign; and the Rector, Otaker Taufer, then dismissed her without further ado on the ground of being "unworthy of trust." Dismissal for being "unworthy of trust," reserved for those who try to subvert'the socialist order (evidently in the case of my wife it is possible to subvbrt the socialist order by simply teaching Russian) makes it practically impossible to-find other work of any kind. oo, at a time when my own prospects of finding employment in e'situation marked by lay-offs, checks on non-party people, etc. -?? are minimal, we find ourselves facing the dismal prospect of being, left at the end of the year without the indispensable means for main- taining even minimal living standards. And 'on top of that we have two sons whom we must not only .-Feed but also educate. Thus, there has been created an atmosphere in which there is no way out, an atmosphere which has brought more than one to madness. In such a situation it is possible to understand the protest of the poet, Stanislav Neuman, who lost all wish to live when the party trampled underfoot the ideals for which he.entered the political struggle; and so he committed suicide.-. The men marked down are being destroyed materially and crushed morally. You are tolerating a situation in which -- in violation of the the Constitution -- a section of the public has been arbitrarily deprived of all rights, including that of existence and that of de- fending one's honor. We are outcasts in this society, and with regard to us everything is permitted. I am not exaggerating: it is literally true. - Recently there was published the Slovak translation of the book, Beware of Zionism!, written by Ivanov, to which Yevgeny Yevseyev Mass adder a note on Czechoslovakia.- It came out in an extremely large edition,-and-is being used as a basis for the prepara- tion of party reports and to 'illustrate the zionist background of the'events of 1968. The work has been produced by the party publish- Approved For Release 1999/09/01: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CPYRGHT Approved For, Release 19g 2 I R ing- house in Bratilava, and9 ~~ eye As~,CQ i'iQ~~1~90~@?~9?~@1~4 carried by the party journal Vvchodoslovenske N?lovinv (Eastern S1ovaKian, Journal). In this wor~c`i am accusea or awing been one of the leaders of zionist subversion in Czechoslovakia. Last spring I had already been accused by Ta ncianskke Novi. (Trencin'Journal) having been nothing less than one or the heads of the international zionist plot," apparently because I had gone to Trencin to give lectures and not to Tel-Aviv as the-guest of Ben Gurion (I may say in passing that 'these were lectures on the need for a new constitu- tional set-up in Czechoslovakia and for the return of Husak and others to political life); at the time I let it go, considering it as a: clumsy joke that didn't come-off. But since similar absurdities are now being repeated with in- creasing frequency in ever more important and influential organs, it seems to me that there is no longer anything, much to laugh at. This country experienced its first "Dreyfus affair" with the case of Hilsner (he too, like Dreyfus, a Jew, and he too falsely. accused). A second "Dreyfus affair" -- but a much more absurd and bloody one was imposed on the country with the trials of Slansky and others. Dn . you want it to-happen a third time, with all the concomitant phenomena of poli`cal agony? The above-mentioned Yevseyev talks about espionage and con- spiracy, in a style worthy of a pupil of Beria. He includes me among the members of a zionist club which was allegedly directed by a foreign diplomat named Zucker. It is of course useless to try to' defend oneself by objecting that it is hard to believe that an Israeli diplomat could carry on such activity -- and still less direct a club -- in a country which had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel. It would be equally useless to make the objection that in my whole life I have never known anyone called Zucker. Perhaps I shall then have to confute the charge of zionism by demonstrating my -- forgive me "pure aryan origin"? For experts of the caliber of Yevseyev,.a diaeresis (Umlaut) on the "u", the "a" or the "o" of the name, and even more the fact that one condemns the anti-Semitic character of the trials in the 'fifties, constitutes sufficient proof to establish the Jewish origin of the accused. He evidently goes by the principle established by the old anti-semite Lueger: "I decide who,is Jewish." What a humiliation for a movement that has'had among its ranks.Marx, Liebknecht, Luxemburg and Lenin! At this point I must ask a question: are we to take as still valid the resolution of the 1963 resolution of the Central Committee of the CPCS, in which it wat declared that the trials of the 'fifties were falsely rigged-and that all the accused were free of: guilt? This is certainly not a rhetorical question, now that the Czechoslovak Government weekly Narodni Vvborv (National Committees) has published in seven installments a rev it of this Soviet work on zionism. This pamphlet has been published by Narodni Vyborv in seven installments, numbers 34:to O. And you are poring on tranquilly on while the party press and the government weekly are preparing an atmosphere suited to a new series of political trials! 22 CPYRGHT Do you not at least realize that the trial of alleged zionists in the 'fifties was directly linked with the trial of so- called Slovak nationalists? Anyone who knows the way such trials are managed can easily imagine how in an early phase Huebl would be. questioned about his relations with Zucker in Kriegel's club. As far as such an interrogation is concerned, the fact that this club did not exist and that I did not know Zucker at all is- of no importance. At a later stage, Huebl could be brought to confess having acted as a link with the Slovak conspirators -- for example, Husak's club. In a country which is like one great Dionysian ear competent agents will certainly have documented how often I went to Bratislava,.and how I regularly stopped in - Ot rancov mieru-Street and then in 4a Ostravska-Street. In addition,' they-will be able to cite our appearances together on television, our frequent meetings and our common activity in the federative commission. I am not joking: I just want to impress on you with the greatest seriousness that if you permit this campaign to keep on developing, it will end by forming a tidal wave that will sweep over your heads as well. It is not an accident that the ideologist of the new trials, Lang, is already rebuking you, saf =?; that "with your silence of complicity, holding yourselves neutral between the two sides of the barricade, you seek to hide the more or less important part which you played in the recent events" (Narodni Vybory, No. 39,.p. 11). These circles take the criticisms which you have expressed in Rude Pravo about as seriously as the USA takes the 457th serious warning from China! Through your preceding praise for the activity of the Cechie circle, the ultra-Stalinist club founded after the invasion, you have given your blessing to all this. If you think I are exaggerating, consider the year that has just passed and draw up a balance-sheet. When twelve professors were dismissed from the Party Political College in 1964, you described it as an arbitrary act Ily Novotny, of the most serious kind; but 75 have been dismissed in 19701 What has happened to your comrades who were imprisoned with you in the 'fifties? All of them who had been rehabili- tated again under Novotny are being once more expelled from the Party, with the usual accusations being made against them. Even their children are being expelled from the party. Where are the members of the commissions who sought to achieve their rehabilitation and yours? Almost.without excep- tion, they have all been expelled from the Party and have lost' their jobs. Where are those political figures who worked for your return to political life? Tray have been excommunicated and deprived of any possibility of political action. Perhaps this h sp `6~ipec 08r 'eI easer1 559 2t: %AFA 6`~T91d 19 Xb8O $OI 96sOH-4 CPYRGHT ve M77 L '" rince: ne who elps:others to gain power is digging a grave To- r himself." But Lenin insisted that party leaders should behave loyally toward their comrades. Where have these men-ended up? Who can say? There is the other side: where are those who falsely accused you, interrogated you, condemned you, imprisoned you, and finally did all they could to prevent your rehabilitation? You know better than anyone what positions they hold today, to what high posts you are often obliged to appoint them.. You are caught in the fatal clasp of your former jailers. Nevertheless, I would like to remind. you once more of how -- and it's not so long ago -- you and I found ourselves in agree- ment with Marx's saying: "A revolution which, like Saturn', devours its.own offspring, has taken the wrong road." LE MONDE, Paris 20-21 February 1972 Approi CPYRGHT MR. MARCHAIS Q-IARGES MR. MITTERRAND WVITII BECOMING IDENTIFIED IV 'H AN ANTI - CCU have an impact on the French left as witness the response, full of bitterness, that the French Communist Party's politburo has sent Francois Mitterrand, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, on this subject. The executive office of this party had issued on 9 February 1972 an appeal condemning the polit- ical repression in Czechoslovakia and requesting the authorities of that country to review "their present positions." The national secretariat had then transmitted this appeal to all the or- ganizations of the left so that the latter might become identified with it or might participate in the formulation, in the same spirit, of an- other protest. It is in reply to this initiative -- whose authors assert that it was in no way provoc- ative -- that Georges Marchais, deputy secre- tary general of the PCF (Parts Communiste Francais; French Communist Party), wrote a long letter to Francois Mitterrand in the name of the French CP's politburo, a letter made public on 18 February 1972. Mr Marchais recalls the assurances given by Gustav Husak, secretary general of the Czechoslovak CP, to the delegates of the French CP as regards the absence of political repression in his country ed(1;00 FA 9410 bf ltWRDFI? 11a9J400020019000 1-4 Approve Y G Lase 199910910-2 . onsider a that the initi...ti1ro of the Social- st Party is "111-found ee and untirmely." ;tor cnumeratinr- a bill of p :a ticulars ainst tho Socialists re gating to facts hat have nothing, io do u th prescnt events n Czechoslovakia, Georges Marchais charges rancois initter acid and his friends with ivirg their support to an anti-communist ampaigri. ho tone of this letter is -fairly surprising nd it astonished the Socialist leaders who Lad just read with intoreat the statement of he French CP's politburo. As.Claude Estier, member of the Soc .aliat Party's national ecretariat, noted on Europe 1 television net- ork on Friday, the Socialists had seen in he letter the confirmation of 'the fact that the French coxzunist loaders were themselves reoccupied by the situation in Czechoslovakia." eorges Marchais' communication indicates at ,ly rate that they are extremely sensitized to his problem and to its consequences in French omestic policy. CPYRGHT After rejecting the Socialist protests, Georges Marchais wrote the following in his letter to Francois Mitterrand: "'you claim to be 'desirous of upholding in all places and in all circumstances the right of individuals to criticize and. to the free e ,session of their opinions even though these be contrary to the established order.' We note your claim with interest but are obliged to find that your expressed concern has not always been corroborated by facts. "Accordingly, to restrict ourselves to a timely example, you have not raised a protest against the scandalous decision, taken recently by the Senate of Hamburg, to prohibit members of the German Communist Party from being hired in the civil service, that party still being banned in the German Federal Republic of Willy Brandt.* "The workers and democrats cannot fail to draw an analogy between the lack of initiative that you often display ii the defense of liberties 'in all places and in all circumstances' and the haste that you have evidenced, thanks to our free press, as soon as a socialist country is concerned. *The .D_7: i7ri;117L1.iti:icho Par tai Deutschlands; Communist Party of Germany), which ir. 1951 won only 2.2 percent of the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 25 CPYRGHT P?vreminrd youajgso democrats have had to wage on numerous occasions an uphill struggle against the repression of 'individuals' rights to criticize and to the free expression of their opinions even though these be contrary to the established order,' a repression that was--also the result of governments in which men presiding over the destinies of the French Socialist Party today used to partic- ipate. This is incidentally why, beyond all polemics, if we ourselves give democratic guaranties in our practice and our proposals for the future, it behooves us to request same from the Socialist Party." Georges Marchais went on to recall the principles which he holds, specifically the acceptance of criticism and challenge expressed in legal forms. He added: One cannot help wondering about the significance of an initiative like yours. The latter, by reinforcing a campaign with very evidently anti-communist overtones, cannot but tend to raise new obstacles in the path of unity, to seek new pretexts to delay once again the time for a political agree- ment taking the form of a joint government 'program." allots and thereby lost all its parliamentary representation, was outlawed by the Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe on 17 August 1956. This proscription was never lifted. However, a new legal communist party, which inverted the letters in the old set of initials and is known as the DKP [Deutsche Kommunistische Partei; German Communist Party], was established in Frankfurt on 26 September 1968 under the presidency of Mr Kurt Bachmann. The DKP, forming a single front with various organizations of the German extreme left, obtained at the general elections of 1969, under the banner of the ADF [Action for Progress and Democracy], no more than 0.6 percent of the ballots cast. Its offers of collaboration with the German Social Democratic Party never met with any notable response. LE MONDE, Paris 20-21 February 1972 CPYRGHT L . ~ G -0c he AA9 kv4A .4 P% Qt .OUTG d s'cssocier a une cam agne anti-commuuist~e ,r sort (it, a c eeos m'agute na pas lint de prser sur relui de in gartclie Irancaisr, cotttmc en tdmoigne In reporse, lactic err aigrenr. que Ir liurearr politique du parti cornrnuniste viral d'adressrr h cc suict. a M. Francois Alit trrrarid, premier sccrtllaire du parts sociali.clc. Le bureau csdcutif de ccl(c drrnidre formation anait tamed Ir .u /errricr fin altne1 condamrtant in rdpresslon poliliqur (,it Tehecoslovaquic at demandant aux auto ties do cc pays de reviser (lours po:;ftlons actuellea a ; le srcrdtariat national await ensuile Iransrnis crt appcl a toutes Ies srs a It t c it r s assurent qu'rlle n'avait rirn dune provocation - qua M. Georges Mar- ehais. secrdtaire general adjoint du P.C.V. a. au noun du bureau potitique, ecrit une longue I c t t r e a M. Francois Mitterrand, lcltre qui a did rendue publique le 18 fdvrier. M. Marchals rapprlle les assurances qui oat dt(l dotndcs per M. Gustav Husak, secrd- laire gdndral du P.C. tchdcosiovaque, aux ddldguds du P.C.F. en cc qui concerne Cab- sence de repression politiquc darts son pays (la Monde date 19 /dvrier), et consid?re que I'initlative du parts socialiste est a mat slovaquie, M. Marcltais rcproche d M. Mit- terrand ct a ses amts rt'apporter Ieur ran/ort it une campagne anticommuniste. Le ion de cetic lettre est asses surprenant, at if a elonnd (as dlrigeants socialistes, qui venaient de lire aver interdt la drlclaretion die bureau potitique du P.C.F.: its y avaient vu, comma M. Claude Esilar, membre du secretariat national, 1'a notd vendredi a Europe 1, la confirmation du fait qua a lea dlrlgeants communistes trangals @tafent eux- mames preoccupas par la situation an TchCco- slovaquic n. La Icitre de M. Marchals montre an tout cas qu'ils sont extrdmement aensi- associrnt art qu'a hpq s st VXA ion. daps to mdinetc fiT ii TitT'atttl'e~td lea quI fl L A .1eilconsdquen ces yra gaise. - A. L. C~IY , d For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00200190001-4 Aprrs avoir oppose une fin de non-rccevoir h la proposition so- cialiste, M. Marchais ecrit : a Volts rows deciarcz a soucieux de main- t> tenir an tolls lieux at an toutes ? circonstances le droit des intli- ? vidus it la critique at it la Libre ? expression de leers opinions, ? /assent-clles contraires it l'or- a dre etabli ?, ? Nous an prenons note area interdt, mats force est de cons- tatcr que cc souci nest pas tou- jours corrobore par Les baits. ? C'est ainst que, pour nous limiter it un exempla actuel, vows nc vous etas pas clever contra la decision scandaleuse, prise reccm- . ment par he S6nat de Hambourg, de refuser l'acces de la fonction pitbliquc aux tnembres du parti contmuniste allcntand, lui-mama toujours sous le coup dune inter- diction dans la Republique fe- derale allemande de Willy Brandt (1). ? Us trarailleurs at Les demo- crates ne pcuvent manquer de mettre en par a i 10, 1 a l'ahsence d'initiative dont vous faites sou- tent prcurc s'agissant de la dC- /ense des libcrtcs a en toes licux BASLER NAQIRIQITEN, Basel 18 January 1972 n at en toutes circonstances n et l'empresscment que vous mani- festez, ,sue la loi d.'informations incontrdldcs, des lors qu'il s'agit d'un pays socialists. ? Notts vows rappelons Cgale- ment que les communistes /ran- cais at d'autres ddmocrates ont ell it soutettir it maintes reprises tine dure mite contra la repres- sion du cc droll des indivld'us 4 la critique at d la fibre expres- sion de (curs opinions, Jussent- elles contraires d l'ordre etabli ?, (1) Le part( communlste allemnnd (K.P.D.) qui. en 1951, n'avalt obtenu quo 2,2 r, des suffrages et perdu do cc fait tottte representatlon pnrle- mentnlre, a 6t6 Interdit par la Cour constitutlonncllc do Karlsruhe, to 17 aoi,t 1956. Ccttc mosure n'a Jamnls '6t6 levee, mats un nouveau parti communiste Itgal Intervertissant lee lcares du slgle, to D.K.F. it 6.0. fond(, It Francfort to 26 septembro 1968 sous Is rp6sldcnce do M. Kurt Bach- mann. to D.K.P. formant un front commun aver dlverses organisatlonsi (('extreme gauche n'n obtehu aUx elections gen6rales de 1969, sous In banniere de I'A.D.F. (action pour to progres et 1% democrat(s) quo 0,6% des sutfrnegs exprim6s. Sea offres do collaboration avcc to parts soclal- democrnto Wont Jamals trouT6 d'eoho notable. CPYRGHT At official gatherings in Prague the consolidation process in Czechoslovakia is described as "already completed." This seems to be as much a part of the communist propaganda's world of lies as is Husak's assertion that there have been no political trials in his country since 1968. Last weekend the Czechoslovak regime found itself obliged to admit officially that some 150 people had been impri- soned in a wave of arrests during the last few days. Among those ar- rested were Huebel, former director of the party academy, Pachman, former world chess champion, and Kynzl, the well-known journalist. They were all accused of having engaged in anti-government activity. At the same time Czechoslovak Prime Minister Korcak in a speech to factory workers in Prague issued a warning to all those seeking to disturb relations with socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. Thus, after three and a half years of Soviet occupation, the si- tuation in Czechoslovakia can not yet be regarded as consolidated, since the government is still forced to maintain peace and order by intimidating the people with periodic mass arrests. Several actions of this kind were carried out in the second half of last year alone, and arrests have for years been part of the daily fare in this country under the yoke of the Soviet Union. Thus last May about 2000 people were arrested in Moravia. At that time Nova Svoboda, organ of the North Moravian communist party praised the "good cooperation" between people and police in this action carried out against "parasites." repression qui Jut aussi le fall de gouvernements auxquels partici- paicnt des hommes qui president aujourd'hui aux destincIcs du parti socialiste. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi, au-dais de touts pold- mtquc, st holes donnons nous- mCmes des garanties desmocrati- ques dans notre peatiquc et nos propositions pour l'avenir, n ou s sommcs /ondds it en rdclamer du parts socialiste, ? M Marchais rappelle les prin- cipes auxquels it est attache, notsmment l'ncceptation de la critique at de In contestation s'ex- primant dans les formes legales, ? et ajoute a... On no pent que s'interroger sur la signi/ication dune initia- tive comma la vOire. Celle-ci. an apportant ran/ort it une cam- pagne aux motivations tres dvi- demmcnt anticommunisles, no pent que tcndre & dresser de nouveaux obstacles sur le chemin de l'unitd, it rechercher de nou- veaux prdtextes pour retarder une Jois de plus l'heure d'un accord potitique prenant la forme d'un programme commun de pouver- nement. n Approved Ew Releaasen'L9908 O2ilC .J D 7i9O14 4A O049@001-4 trials in which --hiefly intellectuals received draconian sentences. CPYRGHT I Ap-gwedAort W-r?A ' MO/t4rZr (; RPg7q ,1,9s4hggQ204lg9qqII4 July for example, Professor Jaroslav Sedivy, Alois Polednak, Vaclav Cerensky and his wife Dr Edita Cerenska, Dr Hubert Stein and Mrs Milada Kubjasova, all recognized scientists and journalists, were put on trial and accused of "subversive activity." The notorious trial ended with their being sentenced to long prison terms of between two and 12 years. Even Pavel Licko, the prominent Slovak writer, was sentenced at a secret trial by a Prague court at the end of August. Other long- term prison sentences were also meted out to well-known writers and journalists like Vladimir Skutina, Vladimir Vavra, Arnost Vrajik- Prazak, and Vladimir Burda. On 8 October 1971 the regime had the federal parliament pass a new law on safeguarding state secrets and security. This was done to assure it legally a free hand in carrying out terror tactics and to have a two-fold deterrent effect by intensifying police methods. The terror trials carried out on the basis of the new law are intended to demonstrate not only the regime's power to arrest anyone and send him to jail, but are also supposed to intimidate those who still dare to main- tain contacts with foreigners or even make the slightest criticism of the system. It is certainly conceivable that the present wave of arrests is related to the summit conference of Warsaw Pact states to take place at the end of the month in Prague, and that the arrests are supposed to prevent possible anti-Soviet demonstrations. Often before, Husak has tried to muzzle his potential opponents by terroristic means prior to important events. His purpose was to let the opposition elements understand that those who do not submit to the goals of the Soviet rulers will sooner or later have to reckon with political. removal and punish- ment. BASLLR NACHRICQiTBN, Basel 18 January 1972 Neue Verhaf fungs)velle in cler CSSR r Regime m .terdri ckt jecle Opposition Von unscrem Osteuropa-Korrespondenten tml. Der het offis.icllen AnIissen in Prat stets nls tthe rests obi rschinssen? hezcichnete Konsolidie- rungsprnzess In der Tschechoslotvnkel scheltit ehwtsn in die Liigemvelt der konununistischen Pro- pni;anda zu gehhren vie die Ilehanptung llusaks, das5 os in seinent Land sell, 19G8 keine politisehen I'rozesse gegelmn Mille. Ant verzani;enen 'Vochen- ende snh rieh they tvchccltuvlntvaleiecitc Rei;inte fie. zwtntl;en, nun a.uch offizicll einzuGeK.tehen, doss fin Laure oiner Verhafiungstvefle in den letzten Tagen CPYRGHT wieder 180 Personen, daruntor der frtihere Leiter der I'artei-Akademie, Ilfibel, der ehemalide Sclinch- weltnieister Pitchman and der heknnnte Journalist Kynzi festgenommen wurden. Sic vile tvurden oppo- sitioneller Tlitigkelt bese.huidlgt. Glcichzeitig warnto der tschechoslowaklsche AIlnIsterpri sident` Korcak in elner Redo vor Fabrikarbeltern in Prag nlle jone Personen, die die Dezichungen in sozialintl- schen Llindern, insbesondero in der Sowjetunion? stdren wollen. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 28 CPX ved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Von diner Konsolidierunz drr Tae in der Tsche- ehnclowalcri lcann a]sn Hach dreieinhalh Jai,..-en so. wjetischer Pesctzung nosh immer nicht die Rode scin, da die Regierung nach wit-, vor gez wangen 1st, die I3evhlkerung llurch periodische Massenverhaftungen cinzuschuchtern, um Rube and Ordnung aufrechtzu- erhalten. Allein in der zweiten Htilfte de.o, vergange- nen Jahres wurden mchrerc derartige Aktionen durchgefhhrt, and Verhaftungen stehen scit Jahren auf der Tagesordnung in diesern von der Sowjet- union unt:erjocliten Land. So wurden zum 13eispiel im Jolt let.zten Jahres in Mahren rund 2000 Personen verhaftet. Das Organ der nordml:hrischen KP -Nova Svoboda~ lobte damals die ^?gute Zusanvnenarbeit:> zwischen der Bcvhlkerung and der Polizei bei diesen gegen -Schmarotzer., durchgefuhrten Aktionen. Im August folgte eine weitere Verhaftungsvmlle, bei der laut offiziellen tschcchoslowakischen Mel- dungen in insgesamt 4000 Fiillen IIausdurchsuchun- gen durchgcf0hrt and 178 Personen festgenommen Warden. Im November, kurz vor den sogenannten ^Wahlon?, versuchte das Regime, die Opposition lurch lihnliche Aktionen einzuscht ehtern, denen un- ter anderem der international anerkannte Histori- ker Jan Tesar, der angesehene Philosoph Ladislav Iiedjanok and der Historiker fatek zum Opfer fie- len, die herelts 1969 mehrore Monate im Gefangnis verhringen mussten, Zur gleichen Zeit filhrte das Regime auch mchrere Terrorprozesse durch, in denen vor allem Intellek- tuelle drakonlsche Strafen erhielten. Es handelte sich dabei jewellen urn geheime odor halbgeheime Verfahren. So wurden zurn Beispiel im Jull Professor Jaroslav Sedivy, Alois Polednak, Vaclav Cerensky and seine Frau Dr. Edita Cerenska, Dr. Hubert Stein and Frau Milady Kubjasova -- alles anerkannte Wissenschaftler and Journallsten - vor Gericht gestellt and der Sabana, and der Studentenfiihrcr Jrri Muller, der sclion 1966 wegcn Kritik an Novotny, aus der Partei ausgcschlossen worden war. Den moisten Vcrhaftetcn wurde Vcrbreitung von Fhrgbliittern vorgeworfcn. Die danialige Aktion der Sichcnccitsorganc 1st zu Beginn dieses Jahres offiziell bcstiitigt worden. Angst vor Izutigranten Eine ztreile Verhaftungsivellc folgte urn die Jahrestvende. Wicder wurde dcn Bctroffenen die I-ferstellung and Vcrbreitung fcindlicher Flug- blatter vorgeworfen, aber auch andere castaats- feindliche Aktionen> , wic die Bildung regime- ;egnerischcr Gruppen and die Absicht, den KonsolidicrungsprozcS im Landc zu sti ren. fill Zusammenhang, mit den damaligen Verhaftungen sieht man auch the Fcs(nahmc des it alicnischen Fcrnschjournalistcn Valerio Ochc'tto anfangs Januar. Ochetto ist immcr noch in haft. ES wird ihm (lie illegalc Ein- timid Ausfuhr gewisser Schriftcn vorgeworfen and angedeutet, data cr als Verbindungsmann zwisc}tcn den Reformanhiin- gern in Prag and den exiliertcn Krcisen in Rom um Jiri Pclikan, den friihcrcn Chef des Prager Fcrnsehcns, gcdicnt hahe. Zu den ungcfiihr glcich- zeitig vcrhafteten tschechoslowakischcn Pcrson- lichkeiten, denen staatsfcindliche Tiitigkcit and Vcrbindun"ert zu emigricrtcn Kreiscn wic auch feindlichen aushinuischen Organisationen vorge- worfen wurdc, gchoren A Mall Iliiehl, chenutliger Reklor der Parteihochschufe, der bcrcits friiher verschie(lentlich verhaftete Schachmeister Ludwik Pachinarut, der chentalige Radiojournalist Karel Kvncl and Jan Sling, Sohn des Hach deco Slansky-ProzeS gchiinetcn Ota Sling. In (fen leizlen Wochett and Tagen Sind wcilere Pcrsonlichkciten festgenontmen worden, darunter der friihcre Prager Parteisekrctiir Jiri Litrera, der Historiker Karel Kaplan, der . Philosoph Karel Kosik, der Malcr Hegr, die Journalistcn Vladi- nrirNepras and Jiri Lederer sowic Rudolf Slansky, der Sohn des friihcrcn Partcisekrctiirs Slansky. Einzelne dicser Pcrsonlichkciten wic Kosik, Slansky and Flcgr sind inzwischen, nach Mcldun- gen der franziisischen Nachrichtcnagentur, wieder freigelassen worden. Bedcutend mehr Eindruck hat aber (lie Vcr urteilung Jiri Ledcrers vor ciner Wochc hinter- lassen, wail ihnt die zweijiihrige Gcfangnisstrafe wegen kritischcr Aeul3erungen iihcr die Politik Govnulkas aufcrlcgt wurdc - Acufierungen, die er vor vier Jahrcn getan hat and die inzwischen Approved For Release 1999/09/024 CIA-RDP79-01 194A000200190001-4 uPr r~9ATFor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 von Merck selber offizicll wiedcrholt worden rind. Daly cr nach so linger L.cit dcnnech wegen sl3eleidigung einer belreundeten Nation> verur- teilt wird, 1 diffamiert hiittcn. Drci der Strafen wurdcn nach Angaben des Organs der KP Nord nrilire ns, Tos~ow and as the war may perhaps be won there Peking, the Vietnam war has lost some CPYRGHT f its glamour tor the communist world fter all these years. Soviet aid to North Vietnam during [ 97 [ has been esti- mated at about ?2I01n ; China's ontribution was approximately half that fgure. Much of the aid is required imply to feed North Vietnam and keep its economy afloat. But a large pro- portion is directly earmarked for the war effort, which would collapse with- out it. If, as is widely believed, the oviet 'Union intends to ask President ixon for technological help during his oscow`. visit in Mav, he might suggest that the' Russians should stop sending o many , resources to Vietnam. The group in Hanoi which advocates ANEW YORK TIMES 17 February 1972 a quick crack at victory is thought to be led by Truong Chinh, the party's chief theoretician. The defence minister, General Vo Nguyen Giap, has also been associated with talk about main- force warfare and decisive leaps for- ward-a contingency for which the North Vietnamese army has recently shown signs of preparation along the borders of South. Vietnam. The opposing school, which favours a long-drawn-out preparation for victory while rebuilding the north, seems to be led by the party secretary, Le Duan. It may well be that this uiew currently prevails. It is interesting that the North Vietnamese did not in the CPYRGHT CPYRGHT end launch the offensive they were expected to make in February, even though they completed the necessary preparations. The obvious explanation' at the time was that the leaders in Hanoi realised that the attack would probably fail. But it is equally plausible that in a see-saw debate within the politburo the advocates of the long haul had it called off because it would have been too expensive. In South Vietnam this week President Thieu ordered his troops to put more stress on smaller-unit guerrilla warfare. He believes the communist command has decided to revert to guerrilla tactics. P"i IT 7r 1 '.. L,a C',-& By FOX Inu-V 1TI'. LI) $; I to T. :e_:'. .,?k T,n`.?, iG-\Vhen Pt. Bud Van Aub'ft his native village near Ifanoi last fall tai begin the long march to South Vietnam, he ra~?s, his parents and re1 ttives cried for, a long For no soldier; from their village had ever re-t turned after infiltrating; into the South. Private Au's jr,`rrncy ended three days ago ',.hen his cf>m- pany of RO nlrn will by an Anlrriran of ?^r . tioni plane In the Central 11:~11il::ndra near Hontum. Air atrikra called In, killing alnsn.t all of~ his contfades, and Private Au was captured by an American! helicopter pilot who swooped down on the survivors. Priv,1te All, who says his Tills-I lion was to bolster North Viet-' namcsa strength in the Higit-! lands in preparation for a raa-! jor offcnsivc, dis,c,issecl his ex-I periences on the Ho Chi ?.1inh Trail in, an unusual Interview today. Ip the past, the South ictnamese Army has selrlom1 allowed interviews with enemy) prisoners. Although the Central Hi^11- iands has remained quiet this, week, American and South ictnamcse.officials in Pleiku,, he hcadquarter3 of 'Military eglon IT, which Includes the entral iri;:'rla !' lit ^. ,r ~. rt. - i J ?,.. -:1 A rt J' j J"ry ?` ! y ~\ ' S j-: , r7 t~ A ...'... 4. +. 'til ~-t r. licvc that t1. C: , eii c i will ilaunr} :+ ;,r ',"A by. D1vi ;ton InMlratcd Till c:pt, c cf Private Au,i and the di~covcry that his unit, the 30113 Div;: on, had just in- filt.ratrd Into hontum Province the expectation that Hanoi) would launch its predicted Teti offensive in the highlands. I{ "Actually, the Tot oflenshe has already h-gun" said John Paul Vann, iii" chief Americlal official in Military 12r,1ion 11.1 "It he;gin last neck with a series of s;nall-:scale zit: cks in 13inhdinh Province on the coast and an attempt to cut the highway up to the Highlands." Mr. Vann, a short, intense man, believes that some of the' isolated South Vietnamese Ranger camps along the. Cam- :hodinn and Laotian homers, such as Lcnhct, may be tem- porarily overt un. But, he argued, the disparity Is great between what the Com- munists have told their men they will do and what they are now capable of achieving. The Communists have contc- where bete.-con 35,000 and 60,- 000 inen, most of them regular North Vietnamese soldiers, in the mountainous, - iungle-cov- crrcC':nt:il lti"iil,lnds. But Pit! South _ Vietnanlesel sou tl` can 'veil prepart:dfor d"y ive, 1%11- , ;trill as- serts. "Actually, I welcome a Communist offensive," he said. "For after the enemy expends himself and loses many of his. men, be has to stay quiet un- til next year and rives us n n ro . Sinc a prolonged North Vietnamese siege of Fire Bases 5 and 6 In Kontum province last' spring, enemy activity in the Central highlands has been at it.; lowest level since the build tip of the war In IDG5, Mr, Vann added. Private Au, who was inter. vie ed with another member of his unit, Private Ngtrvnc van Minh. in South Vietnamese headquatersin Pleiku,appeared tired and nervous, but in good health. He spoke through a South Vietnamese Army inter-preter. A slight, boyish-looking 20- 'ycar-old with close-cropped hair and iii easy smile, Private Au said that 1115 officers had told him very little about conclitions~ in South Vietnam, except that his trait Was to help liberate the South Vietnamese from the Americans. "At hone In my village, the' people didn't pay much atten-i tion to the war,".hc. "id. "The war has been going on so long, who kno','s when It will end. Be idr's, thcv are more in- terested In ntantin-, their rinnnt' Private Au, who was drafted lost May. explained that he had not been happy nhout Joining the army. "None of the soldiers from my tillage who have gone off to the South have ever re- ts cd and only one time when anyone in the village got a letter from a relative who had been sent south." Private Minh 'told a ;similar story. Other North Vietnamese prin. oners have previously reported, that until the last year or two the Ito Ciii Minh Trail network has been largely it. one-way (street, with few soldiers ever going hack to the North. Private Au's unit marched during the day, but it was hard going, with steep mountains and mud up to the men's knees. ,At first they got food, at sta- tions along the way, but as they moved farther south they were given only rice and salt and were often hungry. "We could hear air strikes In the distance," Private Mink reported, "hut we never expe- rienced any ourselves until three days ago. The worst problem was the fear-we didn't know what to expect-. and all the marching. We got so tired. 2' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002001906g1 Y4GHT U IE ECONaII ST 19 February 1972 They had a holiday while they waited A volley of fireworks lit up the Saigon sky on Monday night, but it was not the much-rumoured Tet offensive. People were just trying to frighten away evil spirits at the start of the Year of the Rat. With both sides having declared a ceasefire for the lunar new year-the communists for four days, and the South Vietnamese and the Americans for 24 hours-the fighting had stopped. Well, not quite. A few minor guerrilla attacks were reported in various parts of South Vietnam, and the Americans' B-52 bombers were diverted to Laos for an intensified bombardment of the I-To Chi Minh trails. But despite all the recent speculation about a major communist offensive, officials in Saigon were not expecting trouble before the end of the week. The phrase " Tet offensive " has stuck in people's minds ever since the bloody events of 1968, but the hopeful guess is that the communists have little to gain from an onslaught during Vietnam's main family reunion of the year except the element of urprise. And this year, unlike 1968, South Vietnam's army was on full alert all week. At the beginning of the week mcrican and South Vietnamese dicers were picking Sunday, February TT IL ECONOI`IIST 19 February 1972 The electronic war the gEdge s loth, as the likelier date for an attack that is the day before President Nixon's arrival in Peking. North Vietnam has not concealed its anxiety about the shift of Chinese policy towards the United States last year, and the uneasiness persists in Hanoi despite assurances of undiminished support from Peking. It is now becom- ing quite clear that China considers Russia, not the United States, as the greatest threat to its security. And Russia is the chief arms supplier to North Vietnam, and currently the most active supporter of its persistent search for total military victory. The fear in Hanoi is that Chinese suspicions of Soviet intentions in Indo- china could provide the ground for a narrowing of the gap between Chinese and American ideas about. how to end the war. 'So it is highly desirable for North Vietnam to provide an unfavourable backdrop for Mr Nixon's talks in Peking : an offensive that calls into question the -success of Vietnamisation, sets off a new wave of breast-beating and defeatism in America, and 'te11s Chou En-lai that 'Vic'tory lis close and therefore not to be compromised. An offensive which coincides with the Nixon visit might achieve these aims, and also spoil some of Mr Nixon's favourable publicity at home. But if it started too early the Saigon government nm'i;g+ht have time to got on top of it while MT Nixon is stdi91 in Peking, thus proving his conten- tion that vietnan- isation is working. At any rate, that is the reasoning used in Saigon to explain the fact that things were still so quiet on Thurs- day morning. North Vietnam's other main target, of course, is vietnamisation itself. The communists' concern over this programme is revealed in their policy statements, including their refusal to negotiate a political settlement unless Vietnamisation is stopped. A really successful attack now could have a decisive demoralising effect on Saigon's forces before what is expected to be a final all-out communist cam- paign a year from now. As the Tet holiday drew towards its close this week, the men in the military planning offices conceded that the North Vietnamese might be strong enough to launch spectacular assaults in three regions : just south of the demilitarised zone, in the central high- lands around Pleiku and Kontum, and in the provinces around Saigon. But they were still waiting, with fingers crossed, to see when it would start, how rough it would be--and even whether the big thing might be put off until the autumn. CPYRGHT CPYRGHT ovea, the American command now has more sophisticated methods of assessing enemy activities than relying on hunches and anniversaries. The elec- converted General Westmoreland to the idea of their wider use. The most common form of sensor is shaped like a torpedo, with antennae made of green plastic which hh?nc1 in trails is in full swing. the Laotian jungle. When dropped :vcr since the 1968 Tet offensive the g. from tl- the , mcricans have got anxious at about juice lqt)b the Americans have laid sensor is buried and records the his time of year. But this year their a $3,000111 electronic network along movement of men or vehicles passing rrecautions have gone to unusual the communists' supply route from by. There are also acoustic sensors, engths. They have brought another. North Vietnam. The development of which pick up noises above ground, tircraft-carrier to the Vietnam coast ; electronic warfare for Vietnam began and a host of other devices implanted wore I3-52s have been put into Guam earlier, under Mr McNamara. But it on the trail : metal del ctors to dis- nd the born iyy~~~~.,, ~tt }~, }~v 1; QX1 ns, magnetic o be Jul rpiK* ofbr~fhe prTegaS~c~i4dt?rYgO et ct-eneOm~yltiro~ u9 194 ,~O QDe1N9~,~ea truck is licted communist offensive has been the siege of Khe Sanh in 1868 that coming or CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 up trucks' ignition, and the notorious " people-sniffers." These eerie devices are said to detect the ammonia in human urine. The sensors and their like are laid in patterns parallel with the , Ho Chi Minh trails. Their signals are relayed back to computers in Thailand which can then calculate the number of men or vehicles, their speed, distance apart and direction. The patterns of signals built up by the computers can reveal other subtleties. For instance, a convoy which -takes an unexpectedly long time to pass a set of sensors may reveal that there is a truck park in the area ; a southbound convoy which stops and then heads back towards the north may indicate a dump ; and silence from the sensors may- mean that the North Vietnamese have constructed another bypass. Once the targets are identified, it is up to the bombers from the four American bases in Thailand and the jets flying off the Seventh Fleet's aircraft-carriers to attack them. The most common bomb is the 750 lb blockbuster. But there are other bombs, as ingenious as the sensors : bombs with radar, TV, and laser guidance. built in. There is also the particularly . destructive "mother" bomb which rains smaller bombs over a wide area. One form of bombing is ",geological bombing." Geological faults are sur- veyed and then bombed in the hope of causing landslides across- part of the trails. Airborne gunships have been fitted up with computers which relate automatic-sighting devices, such as infra-red radar for night work, to the actual firing. In all, it makes up a, much more precise system of bombing than anything the Americans had four years ago. As General Westmoreland once mused, " I see combat areas under 24--hour surveillance where we can destroy anything we locate through instant communications and almost instantaneous application of firepower." That, at least, is the theory. Whether it works in practice is another matter. The United States Air Force claims that it destroys almost 85 per cent of all war material coming down from. North Vietnam. Even more impartial observers estimate that the ow a ong the Ho Chi Minh trails is 40 per cent less than in previous years. But there is a cost. Probably the number of non- combatants killed and wounded is small ; there have never been many people living in the tangled hills through which the trails run, and most of them fled from the fighting some time ago. But the damage to the countryside is great. Large parts of eastern Laos, north-eastern Cambodia and the north-west of South Vietnam are now virtually free-fire zones. The days when targets in Laos and Cam- bodia had to be carefully checked out with the authorities in Phnom Penh and Vientiane have pretty well gone. Now the computers in Thailand do it all. Yet it seems likely that the new capital-intensive war will go on for some time. The Americans' casualties in this aerial war are tiny. And is any politician going to campaign on a bring back the sensors " platform in " bring United States ? The following are excerpts from news dispatches of January, February and Mardi 1972. CPYRGHT DAILY TELEGRAPII, London 8 February 1972 By IAN WARD in Saigon Waves of Coll CCtlil'C vicinity of Knntnm city, and with According to the South Viet- them upwards of 50 tanks. Nearby, amese high command, Hanoi's in lli,ih Dinh, loner a Viet Con; military re -deployment over the stronghold and South Vietnam's past two months has resulted in least pacified province. Communist at least five and probably seven agents are busy organising " up- infantry divisions inside South rising committees" whose activ-- Vietnani or in adjacent border tics they clearly intend to ce- areas. A further breakdown reveals ordinate with the coming offensive. the Fifth, Seventh and Nin'1i Finally, further north, the 3001 i Divisions - originally Viet Con;; Division has returned to the de- units but now comprising 80 per militarised zone after assisting in cent. North Vietnamese regulars- flood relief throughout the Red stationed in Fastern Cambodia rlivrr delta of Norih Vicbiarin.. within walking distance of some of This time 1vas1unhtnn9ehas rbd - Smith Vietnam's most important cided to encourage population centres. from Saigon's bevy of instant Hanoi's 320th Division, usually experts-television reporters and based in the Toll epona area of the newspaper journalists. The reason- Laos panhandle, has heen sig'c'rd ins is simple. In an election year in the Communists' base area f1O11 it is far better to prepare the near the tri-bor(Ier. T'he Second American public for torrid battles T)ivision, code-named NT2, than have these erupt un- formerly operational on the cen- announced as in 1968. tral coastal plains, is in the same At least the psychological impact reion, of heavy South Vietnamese some r(Qivod,,F,ortRejeas&4i999i0$ 2 sRO 9-01 are known to he in the general, what-even though shown that the first sign of trouble will automatically be interpreted by the Western Press as yet another Government debacle. Currently on offer is a complex battle strategy-a drive at the central highlands to suck in Saigon's strategic reserve, a feint at the capital city itself and a push to the coast along Route Nine, slicing off a chunk of Quang Tri province-a sort of thinking man's guide to Communist intentions. That three predicted commence- ment dates for the offensive have come and gone without incident in no way diminishes the waves of conjecture. Optimists within the Government, and particularly in the Saigon high command, insist that the South Vietnamese military will not only prove the validity of Vietnamisa- tion and pacification in the coming weeks, but will go on to demon- strate that 1972 is, for all intents 1'~~b"b~1tri4ber e o CPYWKoved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 pointers to success. High on the list are the remark- able strides made 1 v the '['hieu administration in terms of 'eneral political control. Saigon would not ) e nnrm;al withmit a Iiberal sprinIs]ing of anti-Government fervour, yet the fact remains that flirro is no viable alternative to Ihiru. Anil this has never been leper appreciated by the pposition groupings than at this nomen t. Viel:namisation and pacification are also considered plusses for the mnvernment despite the outpour- '111E WASHINGTON POST 9 February 1972 j! "s from sceptics who insist that bn h activities merely maintain facades of success. Prorran;,iies of this nature, which must retain standards while continuing their expansion, are, by definition, delicately balanced. Setbacks in one field or another tend to i7roduce a string of alarm- in * statistics, readily available and open to limitless speculation. That the war, for the past 1.8 months, has been fought essentially outside South Vietnam's borders- on the battlefields of Cambodia and Laos-is a testament in itself. Viet Pr vin'c e 1 e JP a~ By Peter Osnos Washlnctan Post Foreien Service QUIN]ION, Feb. 8-The order has gone out to all gov- ernment forces In Binhdinh province that any soldier seen carrying a weapon but not wearing a helmet can be shot on the spot. The reasoning behind this drastic regulation . is that enemy troops In the past have managed to infiltrate close to villages and milt- tary outposts by donning gov- ernment uniforms easily purchased in marketplaces. "You , see, now, we will break the Vietcong plan," Col. Nguyen Van Chuc, Binh- dinh's province chief said with a grin the other day. "They cannot find helmets (or boots for that matter) so they cannot fight." For weeks now, Binh- dinh, a populous coastal province about 200 miles north of Saigon and one of South Vietnam's least se- cure areas, has been braced for a surge of enemy activ- ity. Indeed, many here In Auinhon, the provincial capi- tal, are predicting a full. scale offensive. One cap- tured document said the date would Le Jan. 27. Now senior Americans fix tlae date as Feb. 10. Others make it even later. Reinforcement Among the signs of trou- A-k ble in Binhdinh are Intelli- gence reports that a North Vietnamese regiment re- cently crossed into the prov- ince from neighboring Quangnnai to join the two regiments alrcad} there. A 13-?vear?old North Viet- namese soldier, who de- fected to the government be- cause he was weak from ma laria and discouraged about ever getting home again, de- scribed in detail ]low his unit spent six months train- ing in the Binhdinh jungles for an assault they were told would come.on Feb. 16, the second day of the Tet new year holiday. "Cadres said this would be the big year," the soldier said In an interview at the Having said this much. eve.,, the optimists concede the. ce tit ai nature of world public opinion as fashioned by Press reports emanat. ing from Saigon. No one appre- ciates better than they horv Tot 19F8, the Cambodian invasion and last year's Laos fighting became of incalculable propaganda value, to the Communists. Their confidence over the put. come of the Government's bathe. field strategy does not extend to the war for international public opinion. CPYRGHT government center for defectors. "We would have to go Ill' out this year or the war would drag on for an. other five." Moreover, the South Viet- namese secret police epn- firmed in December that Vietcong political cadre were busily engaged in or- ganizing "general uprising committees" and Instructing people to make preparations for a big attack, If what the Communists really do have in mind is an- other T&-style military of. fensive, with the kind of popular uprising that failed to happen in 1968, then Binh- dinh, is certainly one of the best places In Sokith Vietnam to go all out. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 THE ECONOMIST, London 13 January 1972 Confidence in Saigon r expectation that the communists will make some sort of attack during the next few weeks. At the moment, the fighting is largely confined to the far north and extreme south. The general picture is one of increasing prosperity. Transportation and commerce are flowing throughout the country, with the outgoing American troops being rapidly replaced by incoming `carpet-baggers', sniffing possible big profits in the near future. Both politically and economically, Saigon now sees itself in a position of strength. The controversial election of last October is now fading; in the public's memory; the new austerity measures are being pushed and accepted; the countryside is almost at peace; foreign money is coming in; oil drilling is about to start; and adequate continued support from the United States, both military and economic, is reasonably assured - thanks in no small measure to astute tactics by Pham. Kim Ngoc, the economics minister, whose new schedule of `tiered' exchange rates neatly hung the Vietnam albatross around Washington's neck. If anything, there is perhaps an excess of ebullience. The new draft investment law is couched in terms which suggest that its authors imagine that foreign capital is fighting to get in; the terms for repatriation of profits are not sufficiently attractive to lure investors, who have many other options. Second thoughts are now surfacing. As President Thieu and his advisers see it, a democratic structure will be main- tained but the future of the country will be in the hands of the army; there will be no more well-meaning but starry-eyed meddling by Washington to change this basic reality. There will be no, demobilisation, and hence no significant unemployment. The surplus manpower of the armed forces will be used increasingly on development projects, but the armed forces will remain around their present strength for a long time to come. Thicu's scenario is that, if there should be a `Peace of Amiens' for a few years, South Vietnam should be ready, to take the communists on, if and when they reopen the war in the late 1970s or 1980s. His more hawkish supporters. talk seriously about a South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam -'next time'. All this may look like rhetoric to western observers - but it is a far ?cry from the mood of January, 1968. At the moment Thieu has probably firmer control than ever before. South Vietnam is gearing itself for a possible communist attack - but also for foreign business. BALTIMORE SUN 12 March 1972 Pentagon cliuigs to the view t .:gat a Hanoi offensive is likely CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Forecasts of attacks General Westmoreland said He noted that the military before the presidential election during a Vietnam visit January forces had to develop their herein Forecasts of possible attacks 31 that there was "every indi- plans on the basis of the capa- The officials proved to be in February-in part designed bilities being ? shown by the fur. wrong in the timin to insulate the public against cation" the enemy was prepar- y g predicting ~ Pased on Mr. Laird. too, spike at the for the first attacks but not, I ing for an offensive. Shock effects-had came from " end of January of several (en- authorities say, in their esti- intelligence, estimates, this 114elvin R Laird he Secretar . , t y could come in February. "indi- emy) spectacylars THIS YEAR, mate of the enemy build-up, of Defense, Gen. William C. { cations" were that it would probably some time in Febru- which is still going on. W It l d l A h' f' l t es ore an , ie tiny c ~e come, in the highlands and ary, and undoubtedly against There is thus no chortling In of staff, and U.S. Officials in rt rn bond r this summer and so - as there has Vietnam anc WPB~~c lPOr I~eiease IM/69/02 ~ CIA-RDP79-01 194 o00? ~~1 ~0 '1-4 a CPYRGJNl proved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 been in some areas, over the, failure of an offensive to mater- ialize as yet.. "All the evidence shows the enemy is building the capability' for an offensive," a well-placed Defense Department source said. "There are even larger forces in place than there were a few weeks ago. Units long in South Vietnam are being beefed up. We don't have the enemy's plans, but we'll believe the cap- ability fpr attack has subsided when we see those divisions move away." The ep emy divisions (usually numbering 8,000 to 10,000 men) believed preparing for attacks, six in all, are strategically lo- cated along the Ho Chi Minh trail opposite the northern part of South Vietnam, with some elements inside the country, and opposite Military Region 3. Opposite Khe Sanh The 304th Division is reported opposite Khe Sanh in the far northwest, the 324th near the A Shau Valley, and the 320th part- ly in the Central Highlands, and partly in the enemy's so-called B-3 front in the tri-border area where Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam meet. A fourth divi- sion, the 305th, has moved down from Vinh and is avail- able across the buffer zone. These farces are in addition to smaller units normally based in the 13-3 front. The other three divisions, the 5th, 7th and 9th in eastern Cambodia, have moved closer to the border of the 3d Military Region. Officials can only offer their best judgment as to why an enemy in an attack posture has not actually attacked. They are heavily persuaded, however, that serious disruption of the foe's schedule was caused by the aerial counteraction. Systematic strikes This began with systematic B-52 strikes in mid-January and was bolstered in mid-February by Air Force and Navy fighter- bomber attakcs. There was also the increased readiness of the South Vietnam- ese ground forces, making it additionally difficult for the foe to achieve the sort of surprise that it managed in Tet, 1968. And there remains the simple explanation that this may not .have been the time chosen by Hanoi for attacking. An authoritative analysis holds, however, that it is hardly possible the Allied forces were victims of a hoax, given the knowledge at hand of battle, orders and extensive battlefield preparations. Rise in enemy rak There was no visible oi posi- tion to hold off because ,cif k res- ident Nixon's visit t) China, according to this reasoning, and in fact there was a rise in enemy rinds in andaround pop- ulation centers after Tat. In mid-February. These raids proved to be unimpressive, however, and analysts conclude the enemy tried to mount some attacks but that the plans flopped. The effort to build up strength near population cen- ters continues, hand-in-hand with the bolstering of division forces near the borders, it is said. All authorities continue to ex press confidence in the South Vietnamese ability to cope with the attacks when and if they cone, assuming the continuing availability of American air support. NEW YORK TIMES 11 February 1972 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT AnyEnem, Offensive Expected to Be Long By WILLIAM IBI'.ECHER Fprcikr to rht Ntw York Tinua Troop Shifts Described they expect the offensive to bel focused close to sources of sup- ply. Operations in the southern] as hinted in recent rrcsrnentlai speeches, has not been decided, the officials said. ."A?t if Tl..rth V'nrnam North Vietnam could well view t at as en anc hhin the The intelligence data on .a; "' " """"' "` , which the. Pentagon officials 'Probably Into May' ranrag r 5 , 1 1 u , prospects o to emiden t base their projections of North expect a decision to bomb sup- candidates for the Presidency, Vietnamese intentions over the The continued movement porting supply targets as far most of whom, according to the into the northern end of the up the peninsula of North Viet Pentagon theory, might be ex- next few months report the re- i eline, the analysts add, leads nam as is necessary to stop the' cent movement of three divi- p p petted it pledge a quick and le . t 3'lOll. the 424 B btoons the will not conclusion end that after that a opera- week we'flow.d, That, at recommend to least, theis'Presiwhat; forces. Alternatively, of American stuns`tr . Alternatively, if Presi- and the 304th-into positions along the Laotian-South Viet- or two of heavy fighting. We dent. dent Nixon considered his re- along for repeated assaults namese border: a fourth, the The Political Advantages election endangered, rlie a might , is reported poised just throughout the dry season, decide to shirt hift his strategy tt- 309th, the northwestern end of probably into May,' a general The analysts say that, from take the issue away from his; said. Hanoi's perspective, an cffet Democratic rival. . bput 50,000 replacement the intelligence reports said Live campaign this spring and The prospect of :r series of that the. flow Of trucks along summer might offer a real pros-, enemy attacks this spring, pare troops are said to be strung out the Ito cm Minh Trail in 1.8ns pert of eliminating the last 'ticnlarly in the. Central High-j aloe the infiltration "pipeline" is at record lev"ls. with each vestiges of American force and from North Vietnam through lanes and the northern prow Laos. Since the trip normally truck Carr}in> ^hout four tons making moot the question of laces o of South Virtni m, has takes about three months, the of supnties. In two nights last the United States presence as 1)(-n r:n ,rested in recent weekSi replncentents should enter week, it was said, American a negotiating issue. gunships damaged about ^00 The officials believe the North by the President, the Sense- South Vietnam in February, ` Vietnamese have concluded that varies of State and Defense, March and April, the intel- trucks a night. the political advantages of such Mr. Kissinger and various gen- ligence reports say. "This won't stop the flow." a result would outweigh what- erals and civilian advisers. The level of infiltration, up an analyst said. "They merely ever military risks might be en- More recently some local of- more than 10 per cent over last feed more trucks into the sys- tailed. They analyze North Vi- ficers in the field, Vietnamese year, appears channeled toward tem. But it reduces and slows etnamese thinking in this way: and American, have said they units in the northern half of the delivery effort, without Besides embarrassing Presi- believed the speculation had South Vietnam rather than doubt." dent Nixon during his visit to been overstated. those in Cambodia and the The American planners be- Peking starting Feb. 21, bloody Brig. Gen. Pham Van Phu, southern Half, as were most lieve that United States and; combat after a hiatus of nearly' commander of South Vietnam's replacements last year, intel- South Vietnamese fighter-bomb- four years should rekindle the First Division, at Hue, voiced ligence analysts gay. They dig- erg could play a decisive role in Vietnam issue during the Presi- doubt that the North Vietnam- cern plans for major combat ini efforts to meet the expected dential campaign. Widely pub- ese in his sector would be the t' Ao northern n;1.t,toryassaults }fir out y~ a gionsAp uirQll/tw ref ease,., W6/41 Rr4~c~ic e?e ,t suppLacd to begin Because they believe tile. Lion heavy strikes against sup- mi ht convince the American n a o o Pensive for at least nearby hind enemy's supplies are deficient, ply depots in North Vietnam, 7 public that Mr. Nixon's Policy i a mander couple of f the months. The Third CPYR(P1RProved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Division, Brig. Gen. Vu Van Giai, voired similar doubts. Officials in Washington say that even though enemy forces do. not have what a cautious planner would regard as req- uisite supplies for a major assault, they may still be or- dered to proceed, depending more than usual on infiltration for enough ammunition and re- placements to continue tha attack. Approved For Release 1999/09/0 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 April 1972 RUSSIFYING RELUCTANT SOVIET NATIONS The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which exploits to the fullest propaganda possibilities of all anniversaries, has issued a decree for celebrating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union on 30 December 1922. Like the year-long tedium of the Lenin Centenary in 1970, this "celebration" will also serve an ulterior purposes Just as the Lenin anniversary attempted to revive the moribund religion of Leninism and use it to reunify all Communist parties under direction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, this year's special effort is to insure continued Russian domination of the non-Russian minority nationalities of the Soviet Union. With cavalier but typical disregard for the facts, the decree states (according to TASS international, 21 February, attached), "The Soviet Union is an embodiment of relations of unity and friend- ship of free peoples, that history has never seen before," and "all the peoples of the country have come to see by their own long experience how rich are the fruits of unity," and "the Marxist- Leninist teaching on the nationalities question has stood the test of practice and the Leninist nationalities policy has won a com- plete victory." Those familiar with Communist style will recognize that such exaggerations are the most necessary when they are the least accurate. Certainly Communist parties around the world, to whom Soviet Russia presents itself as the only model, recognize the falsity of such words. So do the nationalities coerced and dragooned into the Soviet Union; they are the most affected and least deceived. The 50-year effort to dominate and Russify these subject peoples is one of the cruelest sagas of modern imperialism and one of the least known Within seven years of establishing the new Soviet Union, many old non-Russian Bolsheviks had been purged-- The constitution had affirmed the republics' right to secede but Moscow had made it clear that each republic was considered an inseparable part of the USSR. In the 1940's Stalin moved whole populations* (including Communist Party and Komsomol members) out of the Caucasus and Crimea to Soviet Asia, ostensibly for collab- orating with invading Germans. The death toll of these long The most prominent nationalities were Balkars, Chechens, Ingushi, Kalmyks, Karachai, Meshketians, and Crimean Tatars. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 marches went well over 40%! One scholar, Robert Conquest,** esti- mates conservatively that 1,650,000 people were deported from their ancestral homelands in addition to 200,000 Germans who had moved into the Volga farmlands after World War I, Incredible as it seems, neither the mass deportations nor even the existence of these nationalities were mentioned in the Soviet press from the migration period until 1956, the year Khrushchev exposed many of Stalin's crimes. They and their homelands simply ceased to exist. Russians and Ukrainians were quickly moved in to fill the vacuum and place names were changed, The Russian minority now dominates these areas, even where some deported peoples have been allowed to return. Russian language takes precedence, intermarriage is officially encouraged, provincial arts and languages are discouraged. Russifi- cation extended to the Baltic countries as well. By the 1959 census, Russians constituted 26% of the population of Latvia (67% in the capital, Riga) and 20% of Estonia. In the south the Kazakhs were a mere 25% of the Kazakhstan population, The Crimean Tatars have suffered most of all the "un-nations." These Turkic:-speaking Muslims lived under a Crimean Tatar Autonomous Republic until 1928 when their leaders were executed or thrown into concentration camps. As a consequence, a few thousand Tatars joined the Germans to fight the Russian despot during World War II. For the traitorous actions of this small minority of Tatars, Stalin deported all Crimean Tatars -- some 200,000, According to Andrei Sakharov, tiie prominent Soviet nuclear physicist and human rights champion, 46% of them -. mostly children and old people -- died en route to Siberia: The Tatar Republic was abolished, Tatar build- ings were destroyed, their books burned and even cemeteries were ripped up, The region is now part of the Ukraine. fn 1956 Khru.shchev rehabilitated many of the nationalities when he denounced both Stalin and the mass repression against "whole nations,," But it was not until 1964 that the Crimean Tatars regained some civil rights and limited cultural freedom. But even now, unlike some groups, the Tatars have not been permitted to return to their homelands,. Virtually the entire population has demonstrated and petitioned for redress of their grievances. In reply, hundreds were arrested and imprisoned for "bourgeois nationalism" (which is the charge leveled against more than half of all the camp and prison inmates throughout the USSR), the Meanwhile, Soviet they are, press announces that the Crimean Tatars are happy where , The most populous of the minority nations: the Ukraine, and the most prosperous: the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and **The Nation Killers: Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, Robert Conquest, MacMillan, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Estonia are the centers of resistance to Russification. Both regions exhibit a fine contempt and hatred for their Russian masters. The effect of repression on other peoples, too, has been to increase their resistance to official assimilation efforts. The minority groups who escaped persecution, as in the Volga region, have already been partly assimilated, Why, then, has Moscow decided to push this seemingly unproductive minorities campaign now? The reason may lie in several current developments which feed Soviet paranoia over what it calls a lack of unity but which is actually a matter of rising discontent over 50 years of Russian- imposed political and cultural domination: -- Nearly 250,000 Jews, 8% of the Soviet Jewish population, have applied to emigrate. Under pressure of world opinion, nearly 15,000 were permitted to leave in 1971. Those remaining have been severely harassed in the regime's effort to suppress further agitation, but the success of the few has surely emboldened other minority peoples, Courageous dissenters among Russian intellectuals. might take up the nationalists' cause. Both Andrei Amalrik, author of "Will Russia Survive Until 1984?" and Sakharov have expressed sympathy with the struggle. Dissident General. Petr Grigorenko, still imprisoned in a mental asylum, has actively supported the Crimean Tatars' pleas. The possibility of the nationalists and inter- nationally known intellectuals speaking with one voice raises before the Soviet leaders the fearsome specter of another international scandal. of the magnitude created by their misuse of psychiatric. hospitals to suppress dissent. Rising nationalism among Eastern European Communist countries could infest Soviet nationalities and vice versa. While Tito fears that separatist demands of the Croat republic of Yugoslavia and the federation crisis they precipitated could bring Soviet troops in for a Czech-like crackdown, Moscow undoubtedly sees Croat chauvinism as a dangerous precedent for its own republics,. In varying degrees, the Czech experiment of 1968 and the Polish food riots of'1970 were also protests against centralized Moscow authoritarian command oveb all Communized peoples. This centralized Moscow control is, of course, the real meaning of the "spirit of so:ialist internationalism" of which Brezhnev spoke to the 24th Party Congress in 1971 while he railed against "nationalist chauvinism." The stagnating economy and agricultural failures throughout. the Soviet Union require continued exploitation of the resources of non-Russian republics. Any loosening of the tight economic reigns over the richer republics could spell enormous diffibulties. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 With all these pressures simmering below the surface, the CPSU can be expected to flood the country from now until the December anniversary with exhortations to unity, decrying the evils of nationalism. Harsher repressive measures can also be expected. In January alone, twelve nationalist dissidents were arrested in the Ukraine and 100 in Lithuania for anti-state activity. Many protests and many trials have been kept quiet. A Latvian group of Communists has protested attempts to Russify their country (see attached), The effect of this nationalities problem on the Soviet Union is twofold. First, since to the regime unity means stability, the regime's failure to "unify" all peoples reinforces their fear of relaxing controls and thus results in even stronger conservatism. But this extreme conservatism in turn serves to sharpen nationalist discontents, Secondly, the obvious hypocrisy of the regime on the national- ities question adds to the alienation of the intellectuals and humanists, who are the very people most secessionist-minded. An example of this hypocrisy is the CPSU accusation that the southern republics are blind to the distinction between the "progressive historic meaning of the union for the Caucasus with Russia and the colonialistic actions of the Czars in the Caucasus," While the Soviet leaders continue to call for liberation of peoples in non- Communist countries around the world, righteously declaring all peoples' right to self-determination, they condemn every breath of nationalistic feeling among their own (non-Russian) peoples. Finally, the CPSU continuously cites Lenin to bolster the centralized control concept but ignores his pre-revolutionary statements (as Lenin did after he took power) on the right of the republics to disagree, even to secede. The ultimate and most visible symbol of the fraud inherent in Soviet nationalities policy is the fact that two Soviet nations, the Ukraine and Byelorussia, which patently have no independence of any kind -- thus even less than the minimum granted to the Soviet Union's East European satellites -- hold seats in the United Nations! Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CPYRGHT i.".SS, MCSCDi 22 February 1972 CPSU DECISION ON 50TH ANNIVERSARY The Central Committee of the CPSU has adopted a decision on preparations for the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be marked on December 30. "For its political significance. and socioeconomic consequences the formation of the USSR occupies an outstanding place in the history of the Soviet state," says the decision published here. This action made it possible to ensure favourable conditions for reshaping society ,In socialist principles, raising the economy and culture of all the Soviet republics, strengthening the defence might and the international positions of this multi-national state. "The Soviet Union is an embodiment of relations of unity and friendship of free peoples, that history has never been before." Great merit in creating the multi-national socialist state, the decision notes, goes to Lenin. On 30 December, 1922, the first all-union Congress of Soviets unanimously adopted a declaration on the formation of the USSR. The treaty on the formation of the union was first concluded by the Russian Federation, the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and the Transcaucasian Federative Soviet republics. In 1924 the Turkmen and U*bek Soviet republics, and in 1929 the Tadzhik Soviet Republic were formed. In 1936 the Kazakh and Kirghiz autonomous republics were made into union republics. In the same year the Azerbadzhan, Armenian and Georgian republics, earlier comprised in the Transcaucasian Federation, became constituent members of the USSR. The reunification of the Ukrainian people in 1936-1945 and of the Belorussian people in 1939 were stupendous events. In 1940 the working people of Latvia, Lithuanian and Estonia restored Soviet statehood and the republics joined the USSR. As a result of the reunification of the Moldavian people the Moldavian Autonomous Republic was made into a union republic. "The practice of forming a multinational state of a new type, shows that only a socialist revolution ensures the close unification of all the popular forces led by the working class, aimed at eliminating the system of capitalist exploitation and the system of national oppression at the same time". "Only tho communist party, which expresses the vital interests of the working class, of all working people, which pursues a Leninist nationalities policy, could rally together all the nations and nationalities into a single internationalist brotherhood and direct their efforts towards the building of a new society", the decision says. The path towards the unification of equal peoples into a socialist family was neither easy nor simple. "Formidable difficulties connected with economic and cultural backwardness, had to be overcome, the attempts by counter-revolution to utilize in its aims the legacy of former national strife, bourgeois nationalism and great-power chauvinism, the resistanco of the national-deviationists within the party--had to be fought". ~pproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CPYRGHt TI?m~m9t99 lqf~te1C5~~/n0oe02tha1~4eR,pP79 A-1 USSR by the objective course many-sided experience of the Soviet peoples, a reflection of their aspirations. The question of the unification of the Soviet republics was broadly discussed: The working people of all the nationalities expressed their unbending will and determination to unite their forces and resources for achieving the common goal--the building of socialism and communism. The decision states that the Soviet Union is approaching the red-letter date "with great achievements in all spheres of life". The concentration of material assets and efforts, the selfless mutual aid of the Soviet people made it possible to create a highly-developed industry and large-scale mechanised agriculture in all the republics. Instead of the feudal and semifeudal borderlands of Tsarist Russia, there have grown up industrial and cultural centres, well-appointed towns and villages. Exploitation and the exploiter classes, unemploy- ment, illiteracy, have been eliminated, the workers and peasants alliance has strengthened. Socialist nations have formed, the social and ideological-political unity of the Soviet people has firmly taken root. More than forty peoples who in the past had no script are now the possessors of developed literary languages. The culture of the peoples, socialist in content, national in form, is flourishing. "All the peoples of the country, notes the decision, have come to see by their own long experience how rich are the fruits of unity". "A new historical community of people ha- emerged during the years of socialist and communist construction in the USSR--the Soviet nation", states the decision. It has formed on the basis of social ownership of the means of production, unity of the economic, socio-political and cultural'life, the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the unity of the interests and communist ideals of the working class. All the material and spiritual conditions necessary for the further growth of every Soviet person, for the all-round development of the personality, have been created in the USSR. "The Marxist-Leninist teaching on the nationalities question has stood the test of practice and the Leninist nationalities policy has won a complete victory", the decision points out. "The formation and successful development of the USSR of its tremendous international significance, an important milestone in mankind's social progress", the decision stresses. The Soviet experience of creating a multi-national socialist state has won world recognition and is of invaluable aid to all fighters for social and national liberation. The system of capitalism is now opposed by the world socialist system. Relations between socialist countries "are increasingly characterized by constant:. growing political, economic and cultural ties, by a development of economic integration, by'an active exchange of experience and knowledge and close cooperation in the field of foreign policy". "The USSR comes out on the world scene as a force firmly and consistently pursuing a policy of peace and friendship, upholding the Leninist principles of equality of nations, resolutely opposing colonialism, nee-colonialism, racism, and all forms of national oppression. This policy was and is a most important factor resisting the aggressive strategy of imperialism and reaction, an instrument of active struggle against wars of conquest, for the security and freedom of the peoples, for social progress", the decision says. With the young national states the USSR has established relations based on equality, mutual respect, non-interference into internal affairs and on all-round cooperation in the common anti-imperialist struggle. "The Soviet Union consistently supports the revolutionary movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for economic liberation from imperialism, for social progress. The USSR conducts a policy of international solidarity with the patriots who are fighting arms in hand against the still existing colonial and racist re im it Approved For Release 1999/09/0 : t'IA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 2 C Rr(qM" For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 The Soviet Union consistently upholds the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The decision notes that the constructive and realistic programme of struggle for peace and international cooperation, for the freedom and independence of the peoples, set forth by the 24th CPSU Congress, is of tremendous importance for the implementation of the USSR's Leninist foreign policy course. It is a mighty, monolithically united Soviet people, confidently and purposefully advancing under the leadership of the communist party along the road mapped out by the party's programme, by the 24th CPSU Congress which is approaching the USSR's 50th anniversary, the decision says. NLW YORK TIMES 23 February 1972 Soviet Organizing Fete For Its 50th Anniversary By THEODORE SIIARAD pcclel to The Kew York Times CPYRGHT MOSCOW, Feb. 22-As plans for the bicentennial of the American Revolution appear to be floundering on, the Soviet Communist party, which runsi a tight ship, laid down the law today for an anniversary of its own, and there were no ifs or buts. A party decree filling all of the front page and half of the second pago of all major news. papers this morning mobilized the nation's resources for the celebration of the 50th anniver- sary of the Soviet Union next Dec. 30. The Soviet Union was estab-, ,lisped in 1922, five years after the Communists seized power in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. 1 In the first five years after that revolt, a chaotic political situation and Civil War led ul- ~timatcly to the formation of ;nominally independent Soviet !republics, which then banded Vion, ether o become the Soviet or, as its full title runs, ,Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the United States, plans for the country's 200th birthday have been bedeviled by the fail- urc of Philadelphia, the pro- posed center of the 1976 cele- brations, to come up thus far with an acceptable plan. Today's Communist party decree, setting the keynote for, ,the Soviet celebrations, con-, tamed such sweeping instruc- tions mobilizing people in all !walks of life as to raise some !doubt whether the preparations would leave time for anything else this year. The nation al- ready faces the problem of meeting the ambitious produc- tion goals set by the current five-year plan. The decree called on the ;editors of the major news- papers, all of which are offi- cially controlled, to pubicize preparations for the 50th anni- versary and to vaunt the party's policy toward this country's national minorities, which is being presented as a model of interethnic relations. The Soviet Union's political structure of republics and other, minority areas is nominally based on the various ethnic communities that have been settled within Its boundaries. Judging from the party de- cree, the anniversary celebra- tions are to be used mainly to portray the Soviet Union as a country in which ethnic ani- mosities have been eliminated, bias and prejudice rooted out, and the various communities live in peace with one another. However, the decree also launched a campaign of indoc- trinating citizens in ethnic re- Ilations, suggesting that at least some vestiges of ethnic preju- dice, nationalism and chauvi- nism still survive. All industrial plants, farms, offices, schools and construc- tion projects, as well as mili- tary units, were instructed to hold meetings commemorating the anniversary. Communist youth organiza. tions received orders to indoc- trinate young people particu- larly in what the Communists view as their approach to eth- nic problems. Political commissars in the armed forces are to focus their, talks "on further strengthening of friendship and fraternity among servicemen from differ- ent ethnic groups." Writers and artists were called upon to work on ethnic themes, and the 50th anniver- sary is to be comemorated wlthl conferences, exhibitions, festt- -vals and sports events- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : clA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CPYRGHT NEAPffrgor Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 27 February 1972CPYRGHT LATVIAN PROTEST HELD AUTHENTIC Letter Circulated in Europe Charges 'Russification' By BERNARD GWERTZMAN OP MC! WASHINGTON, Reb. 26-A letter attributed to 17 Latvian Communists, complaining about what they say are efforts by Moscow to "Russify" their Bal- tic republic, has been sent to several foreign Communist par- ties. A copy or the letter, which has been published in Western Europe, was made available re- cently to The New York Times by Latvian t migres here. United States Government analysts who have studied it say they believe it is authentic and consistent with what was already known of the nationalistic tendencies still prevalent in Latvia, which was forcibly annexed to the So viet Union in 1940. The Voice of America has al- ready broadcast the full text to the Soviet Union. Tho letter is not signed, but In the body of the document the 17 say: "We are Communists and most of us have been such: for 25-35 years and more. We wish only well to socialism, Marxism - Leninism and man- kind." They declare, "We cannot sign this letter," but do not say why. Russian Chauvinism Charged The chief complaint in the 5,000-word document is that the Soviet leaders are practicing -111 cat JAUSSIR11 are seeking to force the smaller Soviet ethnic groups, such as the Latvians, to assimilate with) he Russians. Although an effort was made, to redress ethnic problems af- ter ter Stalin's death, the letter says, current policy is to trans- fer as many Russians, Byelorus- sians and Ukrainians -- all Slavs-to Latvia and the other Baltic republics of Estonia and Lithuania. The letter criticizes the cre ation of new industrial sites in Latvia and the influx. of non- Latvian workers. It points out that the republic now has "a number of large enterprises where there are almost no Lat- vians among the workers, en-I gineering - technical personnel and directors." "There are also those where most of the workers are Lat- vians but none of the execu- tives understands Latvian," It asserts. "There are entire insti- tutions where there are very few Latvians. The apparatus of the Ministry of Interior in Riga, for example, has 1,500 em- ploycs, but only 300 of them are Latvians." The Interior Ministry super- vises the police force. The letter says that about 65 per cent of the doctors do not speak Latvian "and because of this often make crude mistakes in diagnosing illnesses and pre- scribing treatment." 'Just Indignation' Cited "All this calls forth just in- tion," it declares. The letter maintains that pri- ority is given to "the progres- sive Ru i i " of all 1ifP in Latvia, and the assimilation of the Latvians." There are now about 2.4 mil- lion people in Latvia, of whom only about 57 per cent are ethnically Latvian, a drop of 5 per cent in the last decade. Russians make up 30 per cent of the population, a 3 per cent increase. Poles, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Jews and Ukrain- ians make up the remaining 13 per cent. The decrease in the percen- tage of Latvians living in Lat- via. via has been due not only to the influx of non-Latvians, but also to the exceptionally low birth rate in the republic, com- bined with an aging Latvian population. For instance, in 1969, Latvia recorded a birth rate of only 14 per thousand, which is the smallest of any republic in the Soviet Union. Its death rate was 11.1 per thousand, the second highest after Estonia. This means that its natural increase (birth rate minus death rate) was only 2.9 per thousand, also the smallest in the Soviet Un ion. The natural increase for the Soviet Union as a whole in 1969 was 8.9 per thousand. Russian Broadcasts Noted The letter states that although Latvians still are in the major U. two-thirds television broadcasts are in Rus sian. Latvian writers have more difficulty getting their works published than Russians, it says, district organizations, in most local organizations and in all enterprises, business is con- ducted in Russian." If there is a single Russian In an organization, he will de- mand that the meeting be con- ducted in Russian, and his de- mand will be satisfied," the letter goes on. "If this is not done, then the collective is ac- cused of nationalism." , The letter specifically decries the "loud preaching" of mixed marriages in the republic and' says that Latvian language theater groups must produce Russian plays but that Russian; language groups rarely have Latvian ones. The letter was received by the Communist parties of Rumania. Yugoslvaia, France, Austria and Spain among others. It calls on them to use their influence with Soviet leaders to improve the state of the Latvian and other ethnic groups, Approved For Release 1999/09/024: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 THE GUARDIAN, Manchester 13 March 1972 AB Al AM BRUMBERG reports on a new trend in Soviet protest Ukraine's law-abiding dissidents In the aic-t drive a:;am,,t So\ let di~sidcots more arrc~is have talkcn place in the Ukraino than anywhere ?eIsc in the USSR. i Three names have already lbeen mentioned in the official Soviet press : Ivan Svitlycluty, a literary critic and translator Vyacllcslav 'Chornovil, a journalist and critic; and Ycvgcn Svcrstyuk, a literary critic and educationist. Dissident sources in the Ukraine have now disclosed the -names of 13 more prisoners c Irene Stasir, a p o c t e s s; Stephanie Shabatura. an artist specialising in carpet designs Vasyl Stus, a poet and l i t e r a r y critic ; Alexander Scrgiyenko, a teacher ; Leonid 7,cleznenko and '/,inoviv Antonyuk, about whom there is no biographical information. Nicholas. Shuniuk, who had already spent 27 years in labour camps in prewar Poland and then under Soviet rule. Stephanie I[ulyk, a student Michael Osadchy, a poet and philosopher: Ivan Het, a worker and student of. history ; the Rev. Vasyt Romanyuk, a Roman Catholic priest ; Gregory Chubay, a poet ; and Hryhoriy Kochur, a translator. Why has the KGB singled out the Ukraine as a special target'. Since the charge against the defendants will no doubt he "nationalism" as well as having engaged in " anti- dS.oviet activities." it is important to realise that national sentiments have been rising throughout the Soviet Union. The Chruniele of Current Events - that remarkable -clandestine periodical - has .within the past year reported the arrests and trials of "nationalists" in such widely scattered areas as Armenia, Tadzikistan, Lithuania. Mold- avia. on the movement of Jews to Israel. and on the campaign waszed by tthe Crimean Tartars and the, Mfr~kheti;+ns for their rr;:ht to return to their original hnntehnnls. front 1thlch they were expelled at the end of the tirrnnd World War for having cullahurated with the Nazi in%aders. Nowhere, however. have national feelings been more stronly held than among the 40 million Ukrainians-the second-largest' group in the Soviet Union, and the second- largest nationality next to the Russians. . Indeed, the entire history of Soviet Ukraine is one of con- tinuous turmoil, of efforts, on Moscow's part. either to come to terms with the powerful currents of nationatism in the Ukraine. or to suppress them by methods ranging from outright terror to the banning of the Ukrainian language from institutions of higher learning and the assignment of Russians to leadership posts in tradition- ally Ukrainian areas. Moscow's difficulties were increased during the immedi- ate postwar period with the absorption of millions of Wes- tern Ukrainians who lived in areas formerly belonging to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Separatist sentiments were much stronger among the Western Ukrainians than those who had already lived for nearly three decades under Soviet rule. and so were Right- wing ideolosical predilections. which led many Ukrainians to wage hitter t;u"rrilla strugslec against the Red Army in some ar"ac well into the late 1940s. With his customary dis- regard for distinctions. Stalin labelled all manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism as " bourgeois " and "anti-Soviet." In the 1930s, the cream of the Ukrainian intedi. gentsia - many of whom were unflinchingly- loyal to the Soviet rt' inic - was decimated on charges of " bourgeois national- isin." During and after the Second World War, whole village populations would often be accused of collaborating with the anti-Soviet --merrillas. and either massacrrc] or deported to Central Asia and the Far Eastern parts of the country. Thesc strong.arm methods were superseded by cultural and administrative Russifica- tion - policies which con- tinued until well after Stalin's death, and which have been only partially- ameliorated under Khrushchev and his successors. Yet the very relaxation of Soviet policies in the Ukraine - above all the elimination of wholesale terror - has created a situation which the regime may well consider potentially more dangerous than sporadic miltary forays by starving and poorly armed guerrillas. . In the mid-1960s, a new breed of Ukrainian nationalists came to the fore. Known as the s)testidesiatniki (men of the sixties), these have been mainly young intellectuals, mans of whom had been dedicated mem- bers of the Komsomol (the Communist youth organisa- tion) and of the Communist Party. "Card-carrying" members or not, almost all consider them- selves -Marxists or democratic Socialists, as well as inheritors of the humanistic traditions of nineteenth-century Ukrainian literature. Their protest against specific policies of the regime has not been voiced in anti- Soviet terms but rather in legal terms. Much as their counterparts in Moscow and Leningrad, they have not criticised Soviet laws and institutions as such, but rather those who have con- sistently violated them - the police, the courts, the censors. To the extent that they have opposed forced Russification and have urged a greater degree of cultural autonomy for their country, they have done so on strictly constitutional grounds - in other words, as freedoms granted both to individuals and to national groups by the Soviet Constitu- tion (freedom of speech, assembly. and conscience - articles 124 and 125), and as legitimate expressions of Lenin's views on the rights of ethnic minorities in a Socialist society. True, some of them have also either alluded to, or openly conic out in favour of, separate Ukrainian statchond - h u t again, basing themselves on the Soviet Constitution. article 17 of which guarantees the right of secession to all republics of the USSR. In 1965-66, the secret police descended on these young intel- lectuals, detaining about 100 of them, and finally sentencing CPYRGHT about 20 to terms of hard labour ranging from six months to six years. The blatant viola- tions of judicial norms per- petrated by the KGB and the courts (most of the trials, for instance. were held in secret) were highlighted in -two remarkable documents com- piled by Vyacheslav Chornovil. Chornovil himself was arrested in 1967 on charges of po*=essine "anti-Sovict documents." and sentenced to three years hard labour (the term was later reduced to 19 months). In one of his letters from the labour camp. Chornovil - who is again under arrest - sum- marised what may he termed not only his personal. but the collective credo of the, " men of the sixties " : " 1 Categorically state. con- trary to all illogical asser- tions ... that I have always firmly adhered to the principles of socialism and continue to do so. But not of that socialism which tries to regiment not merely the actions but also the thoughts of individuals. I cannnt imagine Prue socialism with- out guaranteed democratic freedoms, without the widest political and economic self- government of all the cells of the state organism down to and including the smallest. without a real guarantee - and not merely a paper one - of the rights of all nations within a multinational state." It is these men and woritcn, who again find themselves the objects of the secret police's wrath. Yet much has changed since 1965.6. For one thing, much as the authorities may try, to smear the Ukrainian dissi? dent with the brush of " hour- geui., nationalism " and attempt to link them with th!, activities of l:i;itt-Wine Ukrainian group. abroad. they will find it impos- sible to lend any credence to such charges. - The L"krainian dissidents may be described - for want of better terms - as national Communists or national democrats." Their ranks have swollen over the past five years or so, and their activities have grown correspondingly. Perhaps their most notable achievement is the .snnrisrlnt journal, the Ukrainian Herald. five issues of which have Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : Cl k-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 ,t?ar.. towever. I h e (,111.() 1-1 e? pect.y similar to the Chro o(-1' evenj of Current F~O~r~a/OrrrFl@4$gn~tv~t9t~/~id? has also. p shed many symp:,tii;: for. t1 ' a t)iratuen, of literary works by Ukrainian the Ukrainian dissidents. There writers and poets. hare even been reports of its principal' aint, however, actual collaboration between has beert to document all viola. t;roitps in Moscow and L.'nin? tions of "Socialist legality" in grad on the one hind and those the Ukraine. all expressions of in Kiev or Lvov on the other. protest and dissent - by There can be little doubt that Ukrainians as well as other this growin ideological and ethnic groins - and all mani. practical collaboration causes festation, of Russification and "Great Power chauvinism" by considerable discomfiture in the Russian authorities. Moscow. For it is only by Even more important - and espousing popular gries ance most likely the key to the curr- that the civil rights movement ent crackdown in the Ukraine in the Soviet Union can hope to - is tie steady but unmistak- break out of it, isolation. and able cenversencc between the begin to assume the character aims a td tactics of the Ukrain- of a genuine mass movement. sans an(I? the other dissidents in While national aspirations the USSR. have so far been voiced mainly Five, years ago, the eloquent by intellectuais (as they have pleas (}f the Ukrainian Intellec- been in every country over the tuaks for national and basic past century), there is mount- human freedoms found little jog evidence that they have echo among the intellectual, in stud: a responsive chord among Russia. Within the p?i:t two many ordinary men ;'nd women. who bitterly resent the rn) Les divergences qui se mani- festant tie sont pas une particu- larit(' des r at p p o r t s roumano- tchecoslovaqucs. Dans le pass(', Woos a.vions des bonnes relations do camaraderie et des opinions concordantes sur torts les pro- blemes essentiels de politique Internationale. Cc West pas do noire fnuto ,i depuis longteiups dcjlt, et on dcptt de grnnds cf- forts et dune grande patience, nous no tr>uvons pas de langage cotnuiun.,. . , La raison essenticlic de ces divergences entrc des partis coin- munlstcs et ouvriers, dont le noire, ct la direction du P.C. rou- nialn c'est la tendaiice qua cclle- ci >l opposer lcs intent des avantages de la. coopera.t.ton cntre pays socia- hstcs ct qu'en meme temps elle no se sente pas lime pair Ics cnga- gements collectifs decoulant do 1'appnrtenamcc de la Wpublique socdnllste rounialne au pacts do Varsovie. )> Face nux revendications con- eernnnt If, renforecinent de 1'ttnltie M. Biiak est un pro-sovietique notoire. En janvier 1968, it remplava M. Dubcck, - nomme premier secretaire du P.C. tcheco- s?lovaque. - a la tote du parti slovaque. Aprcls l'invasion, - accuse de ? collabora- tion n, - it dut ceder sa place a M. Husaic, mail aprcis la chute de M. Dubcck it Jut a rehabilite ?. ti redevint un des principaux de classe : ells parlo de la limi- tation indisl>en;,lible do l'inihuence du pacte de Varsovie sur les pays soclaliste s. etc. Elle no veut ab.;o- luinent pas parlor de lutt~ contre Ies d e v i a t ions opportunistes, contre le revisionnisnie et le na- tionalisme dans le niouvenient communists international. Elle proclame meme que la delegation du P.C. rotunain a.voit signs, on faisant des reserves, les docu- ments de ]a conference de Mos- cou de 1116) et que setts confe- rence n'aurait _ pas contribuc a. 1'unite du mouvement conmiuniste mpndial. >) Dnns Ic travail iWologique du parti, tout cc qui est nation-al est jugs do mnniere peu criti- que et fait ('objet de louanges qu'il s'agisae de 1'histoire de la Roumanie, de la creation litte- raire et des arts ell general -, on parle merne des qualites extraor- dinaires du peuple roumain. Wine si faisant preuve de la plus grande comprehension, nous vou- lons tolcrer certaines specificitcis -- alors queues noun sent incom- prehensibles, - noun no pouvons quand me'mc pas former les,yeux sur le fait que la direction du P.C. adopts, en politique etrangere, une attitude dirigt e contre les int6r;ts de la conimu- nuutc? socialists ct, on fin de corpte, au,si Contre Ies interets propres du peuple roumain, u Bien que scion la, pratique usuelle, lee pays socialistcs s'in- forment mutuelletnent des mcsu- res importanles en maticre de po- litique cxtcrieure, la Republique soclaliste roumaine, non Mile- men[; n'en fnit Tien, mais de plus, lie s'cit tient niC;uie p:us tt line ac- tion commune dans des questions concernanL Iv,,; inti:rcls de tour les membrec; du paste de Varsovie, La position de la direction ion- 'des paiys sociallstes et 1'approfon- malne sur Ies uvcnemcnts tcheco- disscumnt co 1'inte;;ratlon soda- siovaques. prenant fail. et cause li:;te, lit direction roumaine met pour Ies forces de drolte.rst sur- 1';icrrnt tour It's prin,?ipc, de non- fi.eatnnunt c Were : cc?Itt (H-cc- 1 ti It c'- r e ri c r rt de : ottverainctt' Lion per,) Cette attitude des dirigeants roumains, non fondce sur un es- prit de classes, est attestee aussl par le fait qu'ils s'idcntifient A la these sur l'indispensable unifica- tion des Etats, petits et moycns, dans la lutte contre les preten- clues superpuissances, cc qui dans le vocabulaire chinois sous-entend avant tout 1'Union sovietique. C'est un paradoxe penible ? on se donne pour objectif d'unir dans la lutte contre le principal appui du socialisme - ('Union sovie- tique - memo des pays tels que le Portugal, 1'Espagne fasciste de Franco ou ]'Arable saoudite, oit exists encore un regime semi- feodai et semi-esclavagiSte, )) 11 n'y a 6videmnicnt dans le communique sino-roumain aucune mention de 1'indispensable unifi- cation du systcme socialists mon- dial. La direction chinolse it pro- fits de Ia visite de In delegation roumaine pour atteindre ses pro- pres objectifs nationalistes et anti-sovietiques. Ncanmoins, Ic rapprochement roumano-chinois a un caractere conjoncturel et peu stable, parse quo 1es pretentions A. l'hegcmonie des dirigeants chi- nois et les objectifs nationaux It- mites du P.C. roumain sont logi-, quement on contradiction : sans parlor des besoins objjectifs de la Roumanie, qui, sans une coopera- tion avec les pays du Comecon, se trouverait 6viden-iment clans une situation sans issue. n La presidence ciu counts cen- tral du parts communiste tcheco- slovaque estime do ,,on devoir d'informer le comite central de ces graves probletncs. Mass it est inad- missible que Yon pane publique- ment de ces questions clans les or- ganisations du parti ou qu'une po- lemique a lour propos se deroule clans la presse, ]a radio ou la tele- vision. C'est pourquoi lc presidium du comite central du P.C.T. a re- proche au pcriodique do la Jeu- nesse slovaque Smcna d'avoir pu- blie deux articles critiques sur la politique; etrang(re rournalne ?, a dit encore M. Biiak. En. concitt- sion, it a affirms qu'il n'y avail aucune campagne contre la Roumanie)) en Tchetcoslovaquie et que celte-ci ferait taus ses efforts pour cc influencer positivement le parts et la Republique de Rou- manic ,. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 e.rpose, M. r;zta1c s'est Iclicue, tie I'ametioration des relations de pays socialiste s aver la Yougo- slavie et a exprime 1'espoir quit en irait ainsi a 1'avenir, a Mais, a-I-il ajoutd, nous de- vons tenir compte do la realltc : it existe clans cc pays des forces qui ne sont pas interessecs par les per:;pcctives socialistes do ]a You- goslavie . ni par une amelioration de ses relations aver les pays for- mant 1e; poyau cssentiel du socia- llsme mondial. ? L'intlucncc de la classe ou- vriere sui` la formation de la poll- tique ycitiKoslave est faible, et nombre ilc tentative,, pour chan- ger cet etat de choses n'ont pas, jusqu'a present, etc couronnees de succes. it y it de graves problemes, m@me en cc qui concerne 1'unite dc la Ligue des communistes de Yottgoslavic et de son role dlrJ- toujours a a position de pretendu non-engagement, rneme si cette politique ]'clot,,ne de la Commu- naute socialiste et du mouvement communJste international. ? Nous ne voulons pas nous in- gerer daps les affaires yougo- slaves, trials nous sommes IntUres- ses a cc quo clans cc pays les prin- cipes socialistes soient renforces et que sa direction se manifesto scion les principes du marxisme- leninisme. Sur la base de noire experience, nous disons franche- ment, aux representants yougo- slaves que, clans une clure lutte de c]asseg, les miles en garde et les priere adressees aux adversaires du socialisme ne sont pas effi- caces, que les inconsequences et 1'abandon des positions du marxisme-leninisme se patent toujours cher. ? geant clans la :',ociete. La direction M. Bilak a aussi constate que ((la de la Ligue des communistes de majorite absolue des partis freres appuient Yougoslavie n'a pas en main la du P.C. politique aautant climetion do ]a presse ecrite et tchecoslovaque? d'autant parlee. que ca notre experience de la lutte Darts ses relations internatio- contre 1'opporLunisme les aide efflcacernent dins la lutte contre I'opportunisme dans leurs rings ?. ? Dans certains partis freres s'est manifests e I'opinicn qu'ils no peuvent reviser Icurs prises de position incorrcctes sur Ies ev~- nements tchecoslovaques en 1968 sans porter cttteinte a lour Unite et affaiblir leur autorite stir la population. La vie denaontre tou- tefois que c'cst exactement le contraire qui se product. Los par- tis freres qul, des le debut, ont pris une position nettement inter- nationaliste ou qui ont revise leur opinion unilaterale originelle sur les evenements tcltecoslo- vaques ont renforce leurs propres rangs et ]eurs liens avec Ia classe ouvriere et les travailleurs de tour pays. It ne reste a present que quelques partis qui font des reserves a 1'egard de la ligne actuelle de notre part]. 11 s'agit avant tout des P.C. d'Australie, de Grande-Bretagne, d'Espagne et, sur un certain nombre de pro- bletnes, egalement du P.C. italien. ? Bien quo nous ayons constate depuis assez longtemps d&Ji1 cer- taines tenclances centrifuges clans la politique du P.C. italien, nous Les errellirs des eoI11111111lls[es sollt1allais Face a 1'dinotion soulcr tie en Tch,;eoslovaqulc par le.s c.rcru- tions do conem.unistes au Soudan, M. Bilak a jugd stile de prdciser que ecs a nobles reactions ? te- moignaient (rune mdcounaissance de la situation. e 11 n'aurait pas etc sage d'abandonner volontairement des positions difficilement acquises au Soudan ou ,tilleurs. Nous au- rions seulement fait le jeu de l'imperialismc (Jul ::erait henreux de nous voir pcrdre la po:;siuilite d'Jnfluencer les evenements nltc- riours en rompant nn; contacts avec les forces pro~reai;,.c aic- cidees 'a ntener cur ,ju5ie 1:1.e. De surcroit, it y avait clops tes evcucment:; sondanais, do; i c- tcurs dont it e,t imi,ussibl', dc parlor publiquCinent ?, rt. (lit Al'. Bilak. Ces ? facteurs ? cc sont dvl- demment les a erreurs ? commises par la direction du parti souda- nais. Lea groupe autour do Mah- goub, evoluant aussi vers des po- sitions sectaires ?, a eu le tort de CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan 14 February 1972 critiquer le regime dentocralique rez:olutionnaire des a officers progressistes de Ninlciry ?, qui avaicnt un gouvernemeut representant a les feodaux et ]a grancle bourgeoisie ?. Une autre parlie de la direction, favorable a uric cooperation totale avec Ni- mciry, repoussa Ics m.ethodes du secretaire general et provoqua une scission aft sein du parti. Mahgotlb, apres s'etre en./ii de prison, a commenr;a a preparer un coup d'Etat militairc, dont ni nous, ni Ics autres partis freres CPYRGHT OFFFNSf W'A-, D;_1 ccF:^ ~ z"ii)) N LL PAT TO DI VA SAVif- Per Vasil Ci1al tre soli partiti com~nisti possona dirsi Vuramerte ?ortoslossi}>: quello S014 otico, q!lello rl~cn clo a t!!?I(o ceccslovacco - a!,re criticlte a Unghcria, Mania e Germania oriental DAL NOSTRO CORRISPONDi:STE Vienna, 13 c traio. N,e1 movimento mondiale ccnninista ~:arebbero sollanto tie i partiti veratnente or. todosst .. decni di antniini? strare I'eredita idcolo zwa e politica di Marx c di Lenin: it ,ovietico, it ntongolo c it cecos]ovacco. In questi ter. tnini Si cra espresso Vasil Tsilak. inembro del prams. diunt del partito comllnista cvcoslovacco. I.e?endo a Pra- ga, it 21 ottobrc scorso it rapporto SCgreto davanti at plenum del Coinitato Cen- irate. Le parti essenziali di quel doctunento erano state pubblicate icri clal quotidiano parigiuo Le Monde: Bilak aveva pore detto di pill ed avcva. tracciato tin duadro nettanicnte pessintistico delta situazione nella quale sJ tro- cialista europeo. Da nuove it forina?r,Joni ricevute ogei Vienna, risulta the Vasil B lak aveva formulato un wit dizio neaativo anche viers I' J i heria, la Polonia c 1 Germania orientate. dove partiti comunisti sarebbcr piu o meno knitani dal pit cipi fortdamentali del ma xi:fmo leninisme. ttOi'~ ?":ata:rs efforces de tie pas conirligt:cr no, re1ations tuu- tuellcs. C'est pourquoi nous avotls sugg0ri: plus d'unc fois a to direc- tion de ce parti do se concentrer particulierement sur les questions qui nous unissent, c'est-a-dire sur ]a lutte contre 1'ennemi de classe commun. Notre complai- sance n'a toutefols pas trouv+# d'echo. Au contraire, la presse dU parti italien a pubiie 1es points de vue d'eminents fonctionnafes du P.C. italien qui prenaient par- fois failure d'attaques violentes contre notre parts et dune Ingd- rence ouverte clans nos affalres Jnterieures, ? Le fait quo quelques P.C. tie comprennent pas encore dq quol i it s'etait agi Bans notre parts et clans notre pays a aussf des rai- sons plus profondes, dues a des opinions differentes stir nombre de questions concernant le pt'o- gramme, la strategle et 1;1 tae- tique du mouvement communtste international. C'est pourquoi ndus devons Ore patients affil que In vie et le temps confirment que ]a verite est de notre cote. ? . ne savions rtes ?, precise M. Bi- lak. It rslime que It' putsch c?tait ' mul prepare, tt avait Ili l'appui de I'arnue iii celui des nnasscs, fie p7u.s 1'0ttitudc negative du secr+s- trrize ~r'zrrral dre I.G'. soudanais a I t tutrd du projet dc ledc.'t?atia)ti des I>republiques arabes liti a vale i'lnimitid de t'Egllpte et de la Libile et a fait le jcu des pro- antCricains. Maintcnant, selon M. iilak, it s'agit d'aidcP ics ca- marades sortdanais tt reconnaft ` lour? errcurs et a agir autrement, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020019000ti4YRGHT y I t Uiv bens. sccon o 1i.a ?. si farebbero ora :gii sh:. i er- rort che avevafl' co:n1inrr;r) ncl 1966 c net 1057 i diri. r rtlti cecvs!vvaccili: is rifot- Illy econoilliCa ll nt!L'rl'C:i!` S: a- rcbhe avendo Ic rs,>e ccn- seguenze politiche defe ,Pic- Cole rifDrtlle , che ('satin bta- tc attuate dui'ntc 1?ultimo periodo delta dittatura di Novotny a Praza: il mrcca? nismo economico starebbc sful*gendo al controilo del partito mettendo in movi? Mento fol'ze cell tri fugtlr che, col tempt,. potrcbbero Iaette- re In chiiicolta Is stcssa m- rezione del partito, La ca- duta di Novotny c l'elezionc dl Duck sarebbero state provocatc, Fccondo Bilak. da unit serie di errors analonili a quclli che ora starebbero complendo Kadar c I suoi cullai;w'atori- 13 , avcva detto al P11r1U7ll Cilr i a fra- teili un llrresi erano stab informati di qursto panto di vista cecosiovacco. Y V Bilak si era poi drtto scet- tiro anche surli sforzi del capo polacco Ciierek diretti a nligliorare 0 tenor, di vita del paese. A kiudizio del di- rigente cecoslovacco. it I TO- me polacco uscrehbc troppa arrendevolezza verso 1a Chic- sa e cib sarelibe un sintonlo di s debolezza #. Bi1ak aveva pot manifcstato ^ ^ravi riser- ve A sulla, rivalutazione del comitati operai di fabbrica. operata di Gierek dopo i suoi incont ri toll le nlac- stranze dei cantieri navali del Baltico. La relativa au- tonomia ricono,ciuta a que- st) comitati potrcbbe sfocia- re tin ui:a situazione di , obictti- vamente in contrasto con is, gestione che Gierek tents di realizzare. Potrebbero di con- seglleiiza sorl;'re Ililovi Coll- flitti e iI rc?xhnr si indebo- lirebbe ulteriormente. La requiSitoria di Bilak si era rivolta inline verso Is Germania erientaie: occorre- rai no vent'anni, secondo Bi- lak. uer risollevare 1'apparato politico e 1'econonlia Bella Repubblica Dcmocratica Tc- desca dalle consc_uenze delta gestione sclerotizzata , di Walter Ulbricht. Sin qu; le informazioni sal n rapporto > ricevttte nclla capitale au- striaca. Aggiunte a qurtle for- nite ieri da Le Monde, esse consentono di avere un qua- dro critico dei rapporti tra i pacsi membri del Patto di Varsavia. Va notato che it rapporto era stato presentato al Plenum quasi quattro me- si or sono: non senibra Pero clle le cos, siano mi!-liorate. Al Colltrario, it rapporto Bi- lak dimostra 1'esistenza. al- l'interno del a Campo socia- lista di unit forte corrente dei re falchi che Si e Pro' posts di instaurarC. con nlano ferrea. nn sistema Politico ncostal inista, capace di esclu- dere qualsiasi tentativo di ri? forme o gt:aai,i,i 1, :ae::za a plant dt E' diflicile Poter tile le tesi di Bilak ri::,nano quelle di Breznev E' nnta comunque 1'amieir.a di Bi- lak con Scheiest. ii cape del partito ConluniSta ucraino. esponente dei fa!chi nto? scoriti. che ha ':a cr:ricato Is politics brezilr% jilt-,, di apertura o verso 1.Occi- dente. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CI)k-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CUBA: THE ECONCMIC RECORD Thirteen years into the Casto regime and Cuba is beset by its gravest economic crisis in history: Overall outlook Through 1971, Cuba registered some gains in the industrial sector and in fishing, and continued to invest heavily in expanding output. Agricultural production continued to decline. Efforts to revitalize sagging production of rice, coffee, tobacco, cattle, and fruit were unsuccessful. Strict rationing of food and consumer goods continued and on a few items,had to be tightened. Trade deficits and foreign debts Sugar represents about 85 percent of Cuban exports, nickle about ten percent, and tobacco, three percent. Because of declining exports and growing domestic needs, Cuba's trade deficit has been on a steady rise, especially her imbalance with the USSR which represents about 60 percent of Cuban imports, During 1971, the Soviet Union sent Cuba some $510-million in economic aid plus $240-million in military and other assistance. In all, Cuba is believed to owe the USSR $4-billion --- a debt Moscow cannot realistically hope to collect. This year, because of the low sugar harvest anticipated for 1972, Cuba faces an estimated trade deficite with the USSR of up to $600-million. Sugar industry The 1972 sugar harvest, mainstay of the fragile economy, is not likely to reach 4.5 million tons. Possibly the lowest yet on record. Two years of drought and unseasonably heavy rains will not help either. In 1970, Castro pledged the honor of the revolution to an unprecedented goal of a 10-million-dollar harvest. The whole island mobilized for the harvest as Christmas 1969 and New Year's Day 1970 were Y postponed until it was finished. When he failed by 1.5 million tons of the announced goal, Castro fired his sugar industry minister but admitted his own inefficiency as a leader and indicated Cubans were worse off than at any time since he took over. The 1971 crop was at a low 5.9 million tons. Commodity rations Castro's "sugar obsession" has caused severe cutbacks on other agricultural production. So, in a country famed for its tobacco production, -Castro has warned that smoking is unhealthy and rations Cubans to two packs of cigarettes and two cigars every week. The 1970 sugar harvest reportedly contributed to a 25% drop in milk production. Now, milk is available to children under Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 two years and is rationed at two cans of condensed milk per month. Rice, the staple food in Cuba is rationed on a per capita basis of 34 pounds yearly (compared to 134.22 pounds pre-1962); meat is rationed at a per- capita low of eight ounces weekly (compared to about 73 pounds pre-1962); coffee is rationed at 1 1/2 ounces weekly; split peas, kidney beans and soya beans, at six ounces weekly; and butter or margarine, at four ounces every four months. In February 1972 the government cut individual sugar rations by two pounds per month. Gasoline and fuel oil have been rationed since 1968 and Cuban cities become increasingly dark as the government shuts off electric power to preserve the little there is. Public health The Cuban government has not published health statistics since 1966, but data released by the Ministry of Public Health before that date revealed: deaths from gastroenteritis had risen from 14 in 1958 to 1,662 in 1966; death by hepatitis for the same period jumped from 26 to 8,977; and incidence of syphilis, rose from 26 cases in 1958 to 1,863 in 1966. Rationing and shortages of goods have cut per capita consumption of goods and services in Cuba by a minimum 25 percent. The average worker now can buy everything that rationing allows for a month with the equivalent of three weeks' work. This lack of incentive to work fosters the absenteeism that Castro frequently deplores in his public speeches. Further, deliberate production slowdown by disgruntled workers is reportedly widespread. In 1971 the government decreed an "anti-vagrancy law" providing for penalties, including prison terms, for troublesome workers. By the end of the year, a Cuban radio commentator noted that despite the shortage of manpower "loafers are on the rise." CHILE: THE ECONOMIC RECORD Seventeen months into the Allende regime and the economic outlook for Chile is indeed bleak: Overall outlook When he took office, President Allende -- walking in the economic footsteps of Fidel Castro in 1959 --- froze prices, ordered production quotas doubled, and began granting wage increases of from 30 to 50 percent. There was instant, but shortlived euphoria. Now, with inflation and deficit spending going up, productivity going down, and rationing threatened, Chile looks to be in for a tedious winter. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 5 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Industrial production Since the Allende government has been in power, it has nationalized 102 industries --- copper mines, cement plants, breweries, textile mills land other enterprises all of which have shown large increases in costs, declines in productivity and either reduced profits or outright losses. Losses suffered by the state managed industrial enterprises have been covered by Central Bank currency issuances. This practice, together with the drying up of sources of new capital investment, could mean an even more rapid decline in production during the remainder of 1972 with alarming .inflationary effects. Many skilled technicians and managers have been replaced by politicans and those technicians still in the newly nationalized copper mines predict absolute chaos by late 1972 or early 1973 in Chile's vital copper industry. Investments and foreign reserves State capital under the Allende government has been used, not for new investment, but to buy up existing companies and to finance dramatic, but delusionary, rises in salaries and social benefits. Following its decision to seize foreign properties without paying the foreign owners, Chile has become an unacceptable credit risk for potential new investors. Foreign currency reserves which stood at approximately $550 million when Allende was inaugurated in November 1970, are now down to less than $50 million. Allende's claim of an expected $300 million in aid from socialist countries during 1972, as well as another $100 million from international organizations during this year, will hardly close the gap. Foreign indebtedness Large-scale foreign aid and credits during the past decade sharply increased Chile's external debt (to approximately $2.3 billion), with the heaviest repayments scheduled during the next few years (an average $330 million annually during 1971-1973). Chile could have covered debt service obligations if copper production had increased by some 40 percent as had been anticipated under the previous management's expansion programs. Allende tried to use Chile's foreign indebtedness at the time of his assuming office as justification for his policy of nationalizing foreign businesses without compensation. Now that he finds his economic policies leading Chile to the brink of economic disaster, Allende has initiated efforts to refinance the foreign debt. Chilean currency Every foreign visitor is required to buy at least $10 worth of Chilean escudos for every day he is in the country, at the official unrealistic rate 6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 of 28 escudos for one dollar. The black market rate, available on any downtown corner in Santiago, is roughly 80 escudos per dollar. In the past 17 months, Chile has printed more paper money than in the previous 20 years combined. Like the Cuban peso, the escudo has value only at home. Agricultural production As a result of the "agrarian reform program" (early revealed to be a plan to organize all agricultural production into a system of state `.farms), agricultural production has dropped and cattle stocks have fallen. 'Production failures stem primarily from the rural Chilean's rejection of the state system. Workers on the state-run farms complain of low wages which result mainly from the incompetence and indifference of their politician/managers. To make up these failures, Chile must now spend about $30 million a month to import food from abroad. Compounding the problem is the fact that payments must be made in hard currency from the vanishing foreign reserves because the sellers will not take Chilean escudos and will give only the most limited form of crbdit. Cost of living Food prices are higher than ever and the real rise in prices last year may have reached 35 percent. For the first two months of this year prices have already jumped up 10 percent with indications that the rate of increase is still going up. Most food items are in short supply. No beef is allowed to be sold in retail stores during the first ten days of every month. Allende increasingly talks of the possibility that foods ay have to be rationed. Last year's women's march of "pots and pans" in Santiago vividly expressed a rising discontent with the direction of Chile's consumer affairs. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 THE ECONOMIST, London 1.1 March 1972 -CPYRGHT 7 7 '~ :, .. ~. , ,~ , -., ~: ~.. .. is ~ -,~ 13ii-.1L11 of a civil war (Excerpts) BY OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT n the Chilean surnn>cr, it is hard to marine .civil war. The yachts bob out n the Pacific at Algarrobo, beautiful *irls sip pisco sours in the Grand Hotel t 7.apallar, and apart from a few onscicntious " summer widowers " antiago is strangely empty over ebruary as the population streams vest to Viva del Mar and the other esorts. " Silo," the name of an obscure \rgentine apostle of hippiedom crawled on the pavements, seems more elevant than all those political slogans hat have eaten up the whitewash ince President Salvador Allende took (lice in November, 1970. But summer nearly over, and behind the holiday miles most people are conscious of the ng rough winter ahead. Over the past year, there has been a omplete transformation in Chilean olitics. Last suuiner Dr Allende was >crfornririg a skilful balancing act ; he opposition was fatalistic and iviciecl ; and although the economy as running down it was still possible believe that the Popular Unity fanners would abandon their ideolo,i i- al ohsr?s.sion with state control in order > persuade people to invest. "Today, Dr Allende is very touch on the, defer- ve. The defeat that his coalition suf- 'red in the by-elections in O'Higgins, ,olchagua and Linares in January towed not only how strongly the tide c f public opinion is running against 1 in, but also that the opposition hristian Democrat and National I trties have managed to submerge t leir personal differences and cement firm alliance. Last month, the Popular Unity I aders got together in a house at El rrayart just north of Santiago to mull ver tiled- defeat. An extraordinary i eternal communist party document 1 aked to the -conservative newspaper I I Mercurio while the meeting was taking place provided evidence of the squabbles within the government coalition as well as the bruising effects of the by-election. The communists blamed the " ultra-leftists " within the alliance for their defeat : " The enemy has tried to identify the idiocies of the ultra-left with the actions of the govern- ment.... The ultra-left tries to make out that there is a contradiction be- tween -trying to win over the middle class and trying to win over the pro- letariat. This idea has been expressed by Comrade Carlos Altamirano " (the secretary-general of the Socialist party). The communist tactic, in contrast, is to aim for the support of the middle class and of moderate opinion, to " neutralise and then win over the social base of the Christian 'Democrats " in order to isolate the most conservative elements. The bid to win the centre is the key to Dr Allende's current political manoeuvres. He is trying to get the eight political groups that form his coalition to agree on a single list of candidates for the next election. He is also trying to build up the rump of the Radical party headed by Sr Carlos Morales and the Leftist Radical party (PIR) (more conservative despite its name) into a third force within the Popular Unity alliance. Sr Morales told this correspondent that he believed that Dr Allende was personally committed to the " decentralisataion of power " within the coalition. But the Radical party has lost much of its grassroots support, and many of its leaders are suspected of shady deal- ings. The PIR, on the other hand, is firmly opposed to marxist ideology, and has been one of the stumbling blocks for Dr Allendc's attempts to move to- wards a single government party. Any- way, the support of the middle class does not depend upon which jobs a clutch of Radical or PIR leaders are given within the cabinet, but on the state of the economy and the constant expansion of state control. Economics is power In the space of 16 months, Dr Allende's government has created enor- mous, possibly insoluble, economic problems. The men who run the economy-and above all Sr Pedro Vus- kovic, the minister of economy who is closely aligned with the Communist party-are narrowly obsessed with widening what they like to call the "social area," a euphemism for state control. Since they have been in office, they have failed to create a single new industry of national importance, to import new technology, or even to rationalise or reorganise the private industries they have been swallowing up. On the contrary, skilled technicians and managers have been replaced by politicians and standards of service and production have dropped alarmingly. Driving up to Santiago from Ran- cagua, this correspondent passed a crowded passenger train travelling at night with only five or six light-bulbs burning in the carriages. Most people were sitting in darkness. The decline of the state railways under the manage- nment of Sr Nahum Castro, a Socialist party iniii.ant, is an extreme example of the effects of Popular Unity super- vision. According to somc sources, ,.joo trained enginccrs hive been replaced by political cicmcnts, including nicni- hers of the Movement of the Revolu- tionary Left (Mir) who advocate armed struggle in Chile. Despite a 72 per cent increase in the govcrnmcnt subsidy last year, the work of construction and re- pair has slowed to a standstill because of shortages of materials and imported equipment. Some 40 per cent of the Approved For Release 1999/09/0$2 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 CPYRGHT rolling stock is rumoured to be out of service awaiting -repair. But it is the impact of state manage- ment of the copper mines that has the most serious implications for the economy as a whole. Although total copper production in Chile rose last year, this was due to "the opening up of the Exotica and Andina mines. Produc- tion in the three big mines taken over from American companies---Chuquica- mata, Salvador and El Teniente -dropped by more than 8 per cent between ~ January and September. The decline in production and The persis- tent lahpur troubles in the biggest cop- per mines cannot be shrugged off (as Mr Graham Greene and other observers have tried to shrug them off) as the result of the whims of a " labour aris- tocracy." Sr Carlos Correa Iglesias, a former supervisor at the Chuquicamata mine, has provided an insider's view of the copper crisis in a series of articles publishizd in El Mercurio around Christmas. He showed that, under the direction of two communists, Sr Julio Zambrano (appointed president of the administrative commission with sweep- ing powers) and Sr Antonio Berthelon, the sub-director of industrial relations, the Chuquicamata mine has been turned into a happy hunting-ground for the. extreme left. Systematically, government agents have worked to expel managers and technicians regarded as politically "un- reliable." The result has been the loss of scores of trained men with many years' experience. The shortage of skilled manpower became so acute that t:ocirlco, tile. state copper corporation, prrp:urd a Contract for cnnploying Jugoslav copper technicians at inflated salaries to be paid in dollars. At the same time, under state supervision company resources have been abused for political ends. It has been charged, for example, that the number of com- pany guest houses at the Chuquica- mata chine has been raised from three to eight in order to accommodate the cait)n unist Ramona Parra and socialist Elmo Catalan paramilitary origades, which make use of company cars and store arms on the premises. Mismanagement of the mines has added to the problem of low world prices. While the world market price of copper dropped from 8o cents at the end of 1969 to 47 cents at the end of 1971, production costs climbed to 32 cents-a very slim margin for a country dependent on copper as the prime earner of foreign exchange. But the copper crisis is only part of the reason for Chile's economic malaise, The government has been working with formulae borrowed from the Russia of the 1920S and from Cuba. Sr Vus- kovic's economic strategy is in a sense entirely political. It is concerned with power, with destroying the economic base of the middle-class opposition. That is why inoreasingly many Chileans are asking themselves whether political liberty is conceivable without economic liberty. On the one hand, the opposi- tion can score heavily against Popular Unity in a by-election and has a good chance of winning a two-thirds majority in congress in the legislative election that is coming up next year. On the other hand, despite the constant opposition of a hostile congress that is now trying (through the Hamilton bill) to limit the power of the state to buy up private companies, the government has steadily -tightened its grip over the economy by executive action and the purchase of shares. The list of 91 companies scheduled for expropriation that was issued last month is a death-warrant for private enterprise. It remains to be seen whether the government has the power or the cash to execute it, since the take- over of the 91 depends mainly on the sale of private shareholdings, ? and many of the companies seem deter- mined to resist. Anyone who talks with the opposi- tion and with individual businessmen in Santiago today will be immediately impressed by the new spirit of resis- tance. The case of the Papelera (Com- pania de Manufactura de Papeles y Cartones) late last year-when private shareholders held out against an attrac- tive state offer to buy them out-set an important precedent. But the overall outlook for the economy is bleak. Industrial investment is down to nothing, and not many ,people are convinced when Sr Vus- kovic ascribes this to "monopolistic conspiracies." It is not just that private investors have stopped spending. The vast increase in state spending over the past year was used, not for new capital investment, but to buy up existing companies and to finance dramatic 'rises in salaries and social benefits. This creates a huge problem for the future. Industrial production rose by something like io per cent last year because managers were able to meet increased ronsuiner demand by running down stocks and drawing on unused productive capacity. The dry- ing up of new investment could mean static or declining production this year -with alarming inflationary effects. Up to the end of 1971, the. govern- ment played out the parable of the emperor's clothes : because Sr Vuskovic could not detect any sign of inflation, it could not exist. In fact, when you raise wages by 50 per cent and increase the monetary supply by 118 per cent in the course of a year, something is bound to happen to prices even if you apply a control svstrrti of s1e0-11kc VI i,urs produced by the C;IInsIiait 1)riuocttt, snf;grst that the real rise. III prices last year ntay have reached :;,i percent. At any rate, a sericS of dramatic Brice hikes early this year sngi;rststhat inflation has finally caught ttp with Popular Unity-the average price of r.ars, for example, is up by 56 per cent, petrol is up by 33 per cent, and on top of the price rises there is a new hill call- ing for a wage bonus of 120 escudos a 111011th to enable workers to stay ahead of the cost. of living*. When you add to the prospect of this sort of inflation the shortac of foodstuffs (especially meal) and of imported goods, the burden of the farcign debt that Dr Allende's envoys are having trouble in renegotia- ting in Paris despite his softer line on copper compensation, and the huge budgetary deficit, it is easy to under- stand why the government is not look- ing forward to the next election. J 9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS 9 March 1972 -1}y S. 1. HAYAKA\VA 0 -1d.M . t,... e....-.~i.~,, a~.~. r..u.,.. 1.JNTIL RECENTLY most South Vietnamese . peasants were tenant farmers. Their resent- ment of avaricious landlords was a continuing source of discontent-a discontent that was skillfully exploited by the' Viet Cong to turn f village people against the government. Today much of this has changed. In March 1970 President Nguyen Van Thieu signed the "Land-to-the-Tiller" law passed by the Nation- al Assembly. This legislation transfers owner- ship of more than two and a quarter million. acres of rice land to tenant farmers. thru. Even before this legislation was' enacted; cult decision to raise the official price of rice in the cities; thereby giving the pea- sant incentive to progress from subsistence farming to.production for the market. With increased security, better distribution of fertilizer and pesticides, the introduction of "miracle" high-yield rice, and crop diversifi- cation already under way, the Land-to-the-Till-. er program apparently came at just the right, stake in his newly-acquired land. All the foregoing is what I have been told Landowners, who traditionally received one- and what 1 have read. How is the program third to one-half of the crop as rent, are being like Mme, pwho doesn t know hbeans aboutnfarm? compensated: 20 per cent in cash and the rest; in g, be, able, to tell? All I can do is tell the in bonds payable with 10 per cent interest in ? reader what. I saw. cqual installments over an 8-year period. The I was taken b to the Mekong Delta new owners may not transfer or encumber by car . their land for 15 years. It must remain in the around My The by Mr. C. F. Huang. of the possession of those who till it. Chinese (Taiwan) Agricultural Technical Mis- Thru November 1971 over 350,000 farm fami- sion. lies have been issued titles to over one million ^[ v`r acres of land. It is expected that by spring W ]~ SAW endless fields of rice at all stages 1973. 800,000 former tenant farmers will have of development, young green plants as well as become owners. Furthermore, the government- ,field:, ready for harvesting or already harvest- has begun a program to provide titles to the ed. There were fruit orchards and vegetables Montagnards for lands traditionally claimed in every available -space-even between the by them. This program will ultimately involve rice paddies. Ducks and chickens and fish 1,400 Montagnard villages and 500,000 acres of were being cultivated for the market. land. .._ --- ----I-'- ,-_... /-l =-- - - _ _ _ LAND REFORM has been an issue in Viet- nam for a long time. Previous efforts in this direction had foundered thru mismanagement and the lack of will to see it thru. The present program, however. shows considerably more promise for two reasons. First, it appears to. he exceptionally well designed and well re- ceived. For this, part of the credit can be given to two Americans, Dr. Roy Prosterman of the University of Washington Law School and Robert L. Coate, San Francisco business- man and former California Democratic chair- man. Dr. Prosterman helped to shape the final form of the legislation. Mr. Coate did much of the lobbying that got it thru the assembly. Dr. Clark Kerr, former president of the Uni- versity of California and chairman of the Na- tional Committee for a Political Settlement in Vietnam, describes the program as "revolu- tionary" in that it gives "the bulk of South Vietnam's farm land immediately to the sever-? al million Vietnamese now farming the land. It is, he believes. "probably the most impor- tant thing that's happened yet in Vietnam." The second reason the program is promising is that President Thieu, himself more at home in the country than in Saigon, has given it the highest priority and is determined to carry it was being used to help the Vietnamese-in- struction in live stock culture, crop rotation, irrigation, cooperative marketing. The Land- to-the-Tiller program, he said, was not enough in itself. The tiller must prosper, or his owner- ship of the land is meaningless. In the area I saw that day, farmers certainly seemed to be prospering. The prosperity manifests itself not In sophis- ticated farm-machinery, American-style, but in little power units like the outboard motor, used not only to navigate the canals and riv- ers, but also dismounted and used as irrigation pumps, in place of the slow, old-fashioned, treadle-operated water-wheel. The road we drove was lined with newly harvested sacks of rice. In the fields whole families were at work, threshing the rice by hand, winnowing it and piling it onto huge mats. The group I stopped to visit consisted of a pretty young girl and her father and brothers. ?I took snaps of the group at work, but when I tried to get a close-up of the girl, she was overcome with embarrassed giggles. But her father. stepped forward, and smiling. ly lifted tip her straw sunhat so the light would fall on her face.,So I .snapped the picture. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Aporoved ForRelEacP1 q-09/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A00 M19S1-4 DATES WORTH NOTING April 10 U.S./CPR 1st anniversary of "ping-pong diplomacy," the first phase of the opening up of contacts between the United States and the Chinese Peoples Republic. On this date in 1971 the U.S. table tennis team arrived in China, and on the same date this year the Chinese table tennis team arrives in the U.S. for a return match. April 13- Santiago UNCTAD III meets. (See articles in this May 17 and last month's issues.) Apr 13-15 Singapore The ASEAN foreign ministers are to meet; they are expected to discuss the future alignment of Southeast Asian nations in world affairs. April 15 North Korea Kim I1 Sung's 60th birthday. April 17 USSR Anniversary of the dissolution of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in 1956. The Cominform, like its pre- decessor the Comintern (Third Inter- national), was tasked by Moscow with asserting Soviet control over Communist Parties throughout the world. On March 8 this year the German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau reported the Soviet neon is planning to set up a successor to the Cominform for its Warsaw Pact allies following the improvement of Chinese- U.S. relations. April 27 Chile Plebiscite at the University of Chile to determine the university's administration. This will be a test of popular support between Allende and the opposition. April 28 USSR 52nd anniversary of the Soviet Army's invasion of Azerbay_dzhan, a Mos4lem land bordering Iran and Turkey, in the Russian Communists' drive to reestablish Moscow's control over the Tsar's lands which had been freed by the Russian Revolution. On December 30, 1922 Azerbaydzhan, along Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 with Georgia (see May 7 below), Armenia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia, were joined to Russia to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (This year is the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. See article in this issue, 'Russifying Reluctant Soviet Nations.") April 28 Japan 20th anniversary of the restoration of Japanese sovereignty following World War II. In the peace treaty, which was signed by 49 nations, the United States provided for return of Japanese islands it had captured during World War II: in. 1968 the U.S. returned the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands, and Marcus Island; and on May 15 this year the U.S. is returning Okinawa to Japan. By contrast, the Soviet Union has not signed a peace treaty with Japan and still holds the Northern Territories -- Japanese islands that it seized after declaring war on Japan in the last week of World War II. May 7 Italy Parliamentary elections. May 7 USSR 52nd anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by Russia and Georgia and broken less than a year later when the Soviet Army invaded Georgia February 11, 1921. Georgia, formerly part of the Tsarist Empire, had gained its independence and been declared a republic on May 26, 191.8. (See article in this issue "Russifying Reluctant Soviet Nations.") May 15 Japan Okinawa reverts from the United States to Japan, reestablishing Japanese sovereignty rights over islands captured during World War II, May 22 U.S./USSR President Nixon is to visit the Soviet Union. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4