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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001x1 Cl Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 App6pNTA~KG oUNp l6 ON1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011944A00030 9050001-8 Y September September.10-13 Sofia International Conference of Solidarity with the Workers and People of Palestine. Sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions. September 12-18 Dublin 38th International Congress of PEN, the respected writers organization. Representatives from the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries have some- times attended previous congresses. However, the Secretary of the Board of the Soviet Writers Union, Georgi M. Markov, told the 5th Soviet Writers Congress in Moscow on June 29th that the Soviet Union would continue to boycott PEN congresses, as it has done in recent years, because of Western criticism of Soviet literary policies, including the imprisonment of un- orthodox writers in the Soviet Union. September 13-24 New York UN Preparatory Committee meets for the 1972 World Conference on Environmental Problems, September 15 Bulgaria 25th anniversary of the Bulgarian Peoples Republic. September 21 New York 26th United Nations General Assembly opens. September 23-25 Santiago 1st Latin American Journalists Conference of the (Communist) International Organization of Journalists. The main Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 objective of the conference is to establish a Latin American Journalists Federation affiliated to the IOJ0 The conference is also to discuss "freedom of the press" -- although the main organizers of this conference come from Communist countries where freedom of the press is not tolerated (e.g., the beginning of a free press in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was one of the principal reasons why the Soviet Union invaded that country). September 27- Japan Emperor Hirohito is to October 13 Europe visit Belgium,-the UK, West Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands,, France and Switzerland. It will be the first trip abroad for a reigning Emperor of Japan. September 30- Prague 4th All-Christian Peace October 3 Assembly. Sponsored by the Soviet-dominated Christian Peace Conference. See backgrounder, "The Soviet Church in Political Action," in this issue. October 2-3 Warsaw Seminar on European Security. Sponsored by the (Communist) World Peace Council. The WPC is trying to promote a people- to-people approach to European Security so as to create a public opinion in Europe that would exert pressure for the convening of a governmental European Security conference "with- out prior conditions." October 13-16 Iran 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Kingdom. Dignitaries Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 from all over the world, including many heads of state, will attend. October 19 Japan 15th anniversary of the USSR signing of a protocol by Japan and the USSR ending their technical state of war (WW II). The protocol left hanging the question of sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, which the Soviet Union seized when it entered the war in the closing days as Japan was collapsing. October 19-21 Poland 15th anniversary of the Polish Communist Party's successful defiance of the Soviet Union in choosing Gomulka, only recently released from prison, to head a more independent government. The Polish action was a repercussion of the Poznan workers riots in June 1956. October 23- Hungary 15th anniversary of the November 4 Hungarian Revolution started by students and workers, joined by liberal Communists, and crushed by Soviet tanks, 1956, October 28 Europe British House of Commons is to vote on British membership in the Common Market. October 31 USSR 10th anniversary of removal of Stalin's body from Lenin's mausoleum and reburial at an inconspicuous place beside the Kremlim wall. This symbolic, though very important act of de-Stalinization, was partially undone by Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 the Brezhnev regime last year when it had a bust of Stalin placed over his new grave at the Kremlin walla In May this year Stalin's portrait was paraded before top Soviet leaders for the first time since 1956, at celebrations in the Georgian SSR and Brezhnev's speech at the celebrations included praise of Stalin. November 11 USSR 150th anniversary of the (October 30, birth of Fyodor Dostoevski. old calendar) Although Dostoevski is reputed to be one of the most popular authors among Soviet readers today and is regarded internationally as one of the world's great writers, his works are still censored in the USSR. Key passages in The Brothers Karamazov, for instance, are missing from Soviet editions. Soviet schools do not teach Ibstoevski in their courses on Russian literature. November 26-27 Czechoslovakia Tentative dates for parliamentary elections. There have been no parliamentary elections since 1964 -- the elections scheduled for 1968, the year of the Soviet invasion, never took place. The elections this year will be held under provisions of a new repressive law passed in July that insures the Communist Party control of the selection of candidates. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 November 28 Uruguay General elections. A leftist Frente Amplio (Broad Front), under strong Communist influence, is striving to duplicate the Allende victory in Chile. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release I 999/0 -0119 fl MOW0001-8 PENETRATION OF AFRICA VIA THE'TAN=ZAM RAILROAD 25X1C10b 1. The construction of the Tan-Zam Railroad, now in progress, will provide a 1200-mile rail link between the rich copperbelt of Zambia and the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, thereby freeing land-locked Zambia.f rem dependence on white- minority regimes for an outlet to the sea, Construction of the railroad also brings into sharp focus the foreign policy objectives of Communist China, as reflected in its huge subsidy of men, money and materials for this project, It is a major step in the Communist Chinese objective of increasing its influence and enlarging its presence in Africa, 2, The railroad is Communist: China's most important foreign aid project, and for it the regime has granted an interest-free loan of almost $400 million, divided equally between Tanzania and Zambia; both are considered major influence targets of China. Among all African countries the Chinese Communist presence is strongest:in Tanzania where they have steadily increased their investment and involvement, and where they have identified them- selves with President Nyerere's commitment to liberate the white- dominated blacks of south Africa. In addition to the railroad, Peking is helping to build a naval. base in Tanzania, is training and equipping the 10,000-man Tanzanian army, known as the Tanzanian People's Defence Force, and is aiding the air force, Chinese Communist military aid to Tanzania is by itself estimated between $10-$15 million. Other Tanzanian projects in which Communist Chinese aid is involved include a state farm, construction of a stadium and a saw mill. In Zambia they are helping to build a major highway between Lusaka and Choma, and three broadcasting stations near Lusaka, 3, The probable motives underlying such heavy Communist Chinese in.vol?: ement in East Africa 25X1C10b a) The Chinese decision to undertake the railroad project demonstrates not only that Peking is willing to take on a project that was turned down by the West, but it also provides a showcase for displaying Chinese technical capabilities. (This despite a recent report that, a railroad tunnel has collapsed, killing three Chinese and about twenty Africans, and another report of a British TV documentary on the construction work: The film showed Chinese workers loading flatcars with rails which had been pre-laid in concrete ties. The rails were stacked vertically and then moved down the tracks to be set down, one after another, as sections Approved For Release I 999/09/02, I %-EtpE379-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1 79-01194A000300050001-8 of a ladder might be laid end to end, According to one who saw the film, this seems to be a fast method of track- laying, but the railroad has a slightly "meandering" appearance. Presumably it will be adequate for slow-moving freight if not for crack passenger trains,) b) Commitment to the railroad ostensibly puts the Chinese Communists squarely on the side of African nationalism, since it is probably viewed by other African countries as a major Chinese effort to support Zambia in its struggle to have its own route to the sea; thus no longer having to rely so greatly on transportation routes through Rhodesian and Portuguese African territory. Likewise, their almost exclusive presence in Tanzania gives the Chinese Communists access to the numerous southern African insurgent groups based there. Furthermore, if Nyerere fears possible retaliation from the south for harboring the liberation movements, he probably believes that it would be only the Chinese who would give him any substantial support against the countries of southern Africa,. The railroad project provides the Chinese with an easy means of infiltrating their own propagandists and revolutionists into Africa. Of the estimated total work force of 50,000, there are already close to 15,000 so-called Chinese technicians posted in the-area -- outnumbering the Tanzanian army by several thousand. Most of them are reported to be soldiers in the engineering or signal corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and among them are doubtless experts in propaganda and in guerrilla warfare Assuming that the railroad will require a long period of maintenance by Chinese technical personnel, once it is completed, and given the fact that many such Chinese workers traditionally remain for years in the areas where they have worked on building projects, they can probably count on solid and prolonged entrenchment in this areas. (i) With such entrenchment, enhanced as it will be by the railroad, the Chinese will be within easy reach of the vast natural resources of Central Africa with its cobalt, copper, gold, diamonds and other minerals, as well as its natural agricultural wealth, e) Since the Chinese are trying to develop a long-range missile capability and are therefore probably considering the Indian Ocean as a likely test impact area, they would then need monitoring facilities near this area, and a land-based facility in East Africa would have many advantages over an instrumentation ship, Approved For Release 19 L09102 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/0 79-01194A000300050001-8 4, Since construction began on the railroad last ear there have been reports of a variety of new problems 25X1C10b 25X1C10b a) Under the terms of the aid agreement, about half of the credit for the railroad project is being used to finance imports for sale locally to defray the cost of the Africans' participation, However, the commodity imports from Communist China during the past year have not been sufficient to provide the required local revenue, This has stemmed from high import prices, the poor quality of many.Chinese goods, uncertain shipping dates and Chinese inability to guarantee a steady flow of spare parts for someof the imported equipment, b) African workers on the project are becoming increasingly disgruntled about work conditions: They feel that: salaries are too low, the workday is too long and that the work shifts are badly timed for workers to get adequate transportation to their homes They have also complained that the key jobs are all held by the Chinese, and even some of the menial jobs have been taken over by the Chinese. These conditions, plus growing racial tensions, have led the Africans to threaten a strike if the situation is not soon improved. 5~ Attached is a detailed backgroundfstudy of Railroad: It was written in 1969 and contains a wealth of information useful for propaganda. Your attention is called in particular to Section 4, "Possible Chinese Gains," for several additional themes, Also attached is material from the U.S. and foreign press which provide analysis and comment on the Chinese involvement in Africa.. Although most of these appeared last year, before or at the time construction on the railroad began, they contain themes still valid for our purposes, 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : 1 - P79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1971 THE TAN-ZAM RAILWAY 1. Background Serious interest in a railroad connecting the Zambian Copperbelt to the Tanzanian Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam dates to the early 1950's% In 1951, Sir Alexander Gibbs and Partners undertook a feasibility study on behalf of the government of the territory of Northern Rhodesia with the purpose of determining the possibilities deriving from a rail link between Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. The firm's conclusion was that such a railroad would not be economically viable although it might provide political and strategic. advantages to the territories concerned. With decisions for Northern Rhodesia being made in Salisbury, the huge cost was the dominant consideration, and the scheme was shunted aside. In the election campaign in Northern Rhodesia in 1962, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the present ruling party in Zambia, focused on the political rather than the economic benefits of the rail line and exploited the rail issue to its advantage. UNIP argued against dependence on Rhodesia for exporting Zambian copper and importing almost everything that Zambia needed. Victorious in the ellection of January 1964, UNIP under President Kenneth Kaunda undertook to carry out its campaign pledge for the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway (see the map, inside front cover) and requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD - World Bank) for a loan to build the line. The government of Zambia was joined in its request to the IBRD'by the government of Tanzania. President Julius Nyerere saw the rail line as an opportunity to open up the agricultural potential of the Kilombero Valley and the mineral resources of the Mbeya area, both stymied by a lack of transport. A recent survey indicated a potential of 300 million tons of coal and 45 million tons of iron ore south of the area through which the railroad would pass. In addition, Tanzania expects to share in the revenue result- ing from the passage of Zambian copper shipments through its territory. The Tanzanian-Zambian request was rejected by the IBRD, which concluded after a survey that the railroad would cost some $162 million and would operate at a-loss?until about 1990. Later the cost estimate was revised upward to $390 million. The IBRD noted in its report that transport through Rhodesia'`s existing railroads was economically more Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 sensible, that no political development was really likely to disrupt it, that the Zambian economy was unlikely to be able to afford a second railroad system, and that if routes were needed to the north and east, a road system would be economically more feasible. These findings were confirmed by two further surveys, one by East African Railways and another by Lonrho. As Rhodesia's threat to proclaim a Unilateral Declara- tion of Independence from the UK approached, the sense of urgency that the Zambians felt toward the Tan-Zam Railway increased'. Zambian dependence o,n Rhodesian railroads was a political handicap to any Zambian government, however much more sensible economically such an alternative might be. During 1964 and 1965, Tanzania and Zambia, alone or in concert, sought assistance from the US, the UK, Canada, West Germany and Japan -- public or private, as individual contributors or in consortium -- but to no avail. All the western countries made reference to the 1964 IBRD report as the basis for their refusal to subscribe to the under- writing of the railroad and instead offered to assist in the improvement of road facilities. In despperation, Tanzania had even turned to the USSR for?help in August 1964 but was rejected outright by the Soviets who refused not only to build the railroad but even to conduct a survey. It was then that Nyerere seriously looked to Communist China for assistance. The Initial Tanzanian approach to the Chinese for aid may have taken place as early as July 1964 during a visit by Vice President Kawawa to Peking. A more urgent request for assistance probably was made by President Nyerere during his trip to China in February 1965. In any event, in July 1965 Nyerere announced that China was willing to help. A month later a Chinese'survey team arrived in Tanzania. The team studied the proposed route in Tanzania, but not in Zambia, and remained in the country for several months. Although their report, in Chinese and Swahili, turned out to be of little help, the Chinese indicated a willingness to undertake a more comprehensive survey and even to build the railroad. While Tanzania concentrated on seeking Chinese Communist aid, Kaunda continued to seek aid from the West because of his preference for Western financing and his concern over Chinese political intentions in Africa. Finally in September 1965 -- just two months before Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence,-the UK and Canada agreed to finance a $420,000 feasibility survey Approved For Release 1999/09 02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 which was carried out by?three firms headed by Maxwell' Stamp Associates, a British economic consultant firm. The survey was: completed in August 1966, and the resultant Stamp report recommended that the project be undertaken and concluded that the high capital investment was justifiable on economic grounds even if there were no political objec- tions to using Rhodesia Railways. To handle the increase in Zambian, traffic assumed by the report, the -Rh*ode'sia system itself would have to make a large capital increase. The Stamp report put the cost of construction and rolling stock for the Tan-Zam Railway at $353 million, in addition to $33 million required to enlarge the harbor at Dar es Salaam to handle annually an estimated 2.5 million tons more of cargo. Thus the total cost would be $386 million on the assumption that the railroad were built by :modern construction techniques. On the. basis of assumptions that (a) the line would be completed by the mid-1970's; (b) almost all of Zambia's non-fuel traffic would be transferred from existing routes through Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola to the new line, bringing total freight on the line to more than 4 million tons by 1981; and (c) operating costs per ton-mile would rank among the lowest of the world's railroads and would be nearly 30 percent below those of Rhodesia Railways, the report estimated that by 1981 revenues would reach about $100 million and profits almost $52 million. Complete comparisons of railroad versus road systems have not been made, but copperbelt experts have pointed out that most of the rail traffic would travel the full 1,000 plus miles, of the railroad. American and Western European arguments for the superiority of roads assume that traffic will be picked up and let off at many points along the route, an assumption which is not valid for the Tan-Zam Railway. On the: basis of the Stamp report, Zambia'hoped that a consortium of the UK, US, West Germany, Japan and the IBRD could be formed to pay for an engineering survey and even- tually for; construction of,the railroad. It was largely this hope which kept Zambia -- and through Zambia, Tanzania from pursuing any Chinese offer of assistance during 1966. Early in 1967 the Starr report was submitted to the African Development Bank (ADB) and to the IBRD for joint review and financial assistance. This was the second time that the IBRD reviewed the project. Experts from the United Nations Development Program were also asked to review the report. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 In March 1967 the.ADB and the IBRD issued.a report sharply criticizing the Stamp surveys economic analysis and recommending a re-examination of its findings. Addi- tional technical studies were also suggested for both the railroad and the-port of Dar, es Salaam before a decision could be taken to finance an engineering study. Zambia and Tanzania indicated their willingness to allow the IBRD and ADB to undertake further technical studies, but they refused to permit a re-examination of the-projectts economic feasi- bility. The United Nations Development Program experts reached conclusions similar to those of the ADB-IBRD review. Stamp's traffic projections and revenue forecasts for the proposed railroad were overly optimistic. Zambia is unlikely to transfer all of its non-fuel traffic to the new line as many of its imports will continue to come from South Africa and Rhodesia because of lower prices. More- over, Rhodesia is likely to insist on a share of Zambian traffic in exchange for low railway rates on coal shipments and other goods. As a result, revenues would be substan- tially less than Stamp estimated. The IBRD, for example, estimates that roughly 50 percent of Zambia's imports and about 20 percent of its exports will continue to be shipped over existing routes. The IBRD believes that the railroad would carry less than 3 million tons of freight in 1981 and that revenues would be roughly one-half those estimated by Stamp. The lower traffic levels would result in higher operating costs per ton-mile because,of high fixed costs. The low operating costs envisioned by Stamp seem to be .m- realistic in the light of experience on the Rhodesia Railways, which now.handles the bulk of the traffic to be, carried by the new line and which is an efficiently run system. The anticipated revenue of the line does not provide an adequate basis for financing the project. The railroad would result in few economic gains for Zambia and Tanzania. Zambia's northeastern region, through which the railroad would pass, has little development potential. The area is sparsely populated and for the most part the land is infertile and can support little more than subsistence agriculture. Although deposits of manganese, coal, copper and a few,other minerals are located along the proposed right of way, they are small. While Tanzania would earn some foreign exchange from transit services provided to Zambia, few other benefits may be expected. The government's scheme to develop the relatively fertile Kilombero Valley in the southwest would require large investment and numerous skilled personnel -- both of which are in critically short supply in Tanzania. Also, much of the area through which the railroad would pass is infested Approved For Release 1999/0992 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300050001-8 with Tsetse fly, and the population is small and widely scattered. Some minerals are located in southwest Tanzania, including the Songwe coalfields, but the deposits are generally of poor quality and not commercially exploitable, even with relatively low-cost rail transport. Zambian goods are expected to account for almost all the railroad's tonnage. Tanzanian traffic would'be very small because southwestern Tanzania is largely unpopulated and the country does not have the capital or skilled man- power needed to develop the region. Some traffic would also come from the Katanga copperbelt, but the amount would not be very great. Congolese exports over Rhodesia Railways now total less than 10,000 tons annually, and it is unlikely that all of this traffic would be diverted to the Tan-Zam railroad. Outbound traffic on the railroad would consist almost entirely of copper, and the inbound traffic of a wide variety of imports. The railroad would not carry POL for Zambia, because of the Italian-built, 1060-mile 8-inch petroleum pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Ndola on the copperbelt can carry the required POL. Also, the coal needed to operate copper smelters in Zambia would probably continue to be imported from Rhodesia because the Wankie Colliery is the cheapest source of coal for Zambia. 2. Chinese Offer After the negative review by the ADB and the IBRD of March 19.67, Kaunda finally realized that Western support for the-railroad was not likely to be forthcoming. More- over, Zambian efforts to develop other railroad transport routes which would avoid Rhodesia had proved equally unrewarding. Thus the long-standing Chinese offer became more attractive. Overcoming his inner doubts, Kaunda sounded out Communist China regarding its willingness to construct the Tan-Zam Railway. Encouraged'by the Chinese response, Kaunda visited Peking in June 1967. Shortly afterwards, negotiations began between Tanzania and Zambia on the one hand and China on the other, and on 5 September 1967 an agreement was concluded. Tanzania and Zambia see the 5 September agreement as a firm commitment by Peking to follow through with the project. According to the tripartite agreement, China was to finance building a railroad through an interest-free loan with no strings attached. If current Chinese aid practices continue, loan repayment is likely to extend over Approved For Release 1999/09/025: CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 a very long period and.might well include at least partial payment in Zambian and Tanzanian goods. These terms would be highly favorable by Western and even Soviet standards. In addition, the agreement called for China to provide technical assistance for surveys and construction of the railroad. The agreement was necessarily vague on the size of the over-all Chinese loan and the number of Chinese technicians to be involved because accurate'estimates were not available at the time the agreement was signed. In any case, this very simple contractual form is often used by China. According to the agreement the project was to pro- ceed through three stages: (1) preliminary investigations; (2) engineering and design surveys, for which the Chinese pledged a $14 million interest-free loan; and (3) construc- tion. Discussions among the three governments will take place between each stage, and more detailed agreements will follow. Present Chinese planning is reported to call for a single-track railroad between Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia, and Kidatu, Tanzania, a distance of about 960 miles. Other reports have indicated that the Chinese will extend the line from Kidatu tD Dar es Salaam to avoid transshipping at Kidatu. All rolling stock, signalling and communications equipment will be supplied by the Chinese. The railroad engineers will be provided by the Tanzanians and Zambians, but maintenance of line and equipment will be handled by the Chinese for at least 10 years after the completion of the railroad. During this period the Chinese will train Tanzanian and Zambian maintenance teams. The construction loan will be for 10 years with the terms and dates of repay- ment to be determined after the railroad is in operation on the basis of capability for repayment by Tanzania and Zambia. The estimated Chinese cost for the construction of the railroad is reported to be $60 million for the Tanzanian section and $20 million for the Zambian section if maximum use is made of Chinese materials and labor. The Chinese estimate is between 20 and 25 percent of the best Western estimates. 3. Chinese Survey Starting in December 1967, a nine-man Chinese team of railroad and construction experts carried out preliminary investigations of the Zambian section of the Tan.Zam Railway, similar to the 1965 preliminary study of the Tanzanian section. ; A 600-man team of Approved For Release 1999/002 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Chinese technicians began the detailed railroad survey in Tanzania in February 1968 and a 350-man team began the Zambian section of the survey in November 1968.. The Tanzanian' portion of the survey is already completed and the Zambian portion should be completed before the end of 1969. At present the number of Chinese in Tanzania is estimated at up to 1,200 and in Zambia between 500 and 700. As a result of unfortunate experiences in Southeast Asia as well as in Africa resulting from excessive local Chinese revolutionary zeal, the Chinese attempted initially to keep their presence unobtrusive and their visibility low. Indeed, at the outset in Tanzania and Zambia, they sought to present an image of hard-work and austerity with an almost total absence of adornment and frivolity. In support of this image, the Chinese railroad surveyors keep to them selves, carefully refraining from fraternization with the local population except for group meetings sponsored by the Chinese embassies in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. The only regular and continuing contact with the locals is main- tained by Chinese public relations men or medical tech- nicians. As a result of this low-key approach, the Chinese surveyors. have made a generally favorable impression on the Tanzanians and Zambians whom they meet in the bush during their surveying work. Shortly after their arrival in Zambia, the Chinese surveyors established three base camps as regional head- quarters for the railroad survey. The base camps are located at the Mkushi River Hotel in Mkushi, the Crested Crane Hotel in Mpika, and a large building in Kasama. Security is very strict at all the camps, which are surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by Chinese personnel. Local Zambians who are employed as guides and manual laborers live outside the camps. Visitors are discouraged, and even official visits are only reluc- tantly permitted. All visitors, including government officials:, are closely questioned before admittance, All activities in the camps, including even simple domestic routines, are discontinued until the visitor departs. Living conditions in the base camps are very crowded with most: of the workers living under roofs with only the spillover in tents. (All personnel in'the field camps live in floorless tents set up over sand.) In the headquarters buildings, 8 men sleep in rooms 8 feet by 12 feet on tiers of bunks. Each room has a wash basin, but the entire building uses the same toilet facilities, which are filthy. Meals are eaten in-the bedrooms because what used to be the dining rooms are used as sleeping quarters for additional Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Chinese. The bedrooms are also used as offices during the day. The food is almost all canned and imported from China. There is little variety. Occasionally, vegetables are obtained from local markets, but so infrequently that the Chinese are planting their own gardens. Life in the camps is austere and monastic.. There is group study of Mao's thoughts in the morning before work and singing of revolutionary songs in the evening. Each man carries with him into the bush his book of Mao's thoughts. Each member of the survey teams does his own washing and a certain amount of manual labor, regardless of his position. The only women with the survey teams are attached to the medical staffs. There have been unconfirmed, reports of the Chinese taking Zambian women into their camps at night and of engaging in homosexual practices with local men. r Although most Chinese in the camps are not permitted to move about on their own, conditions are different in Lusaka, and the Chinese there are rapidly becoming as evident as those in Dar es Salaam. Groups of six or seven Chinese may be seen in most hotels, with the Ridgeway Hotel apparently the Chinese favorite. The Chinese in Lusaka are always seen in groups and do not talk to or mix with the local popula- tion. They are apparently free to come or go into the city as they please, using any form of transport -- road, rail or air.. The activities of the Chinese medical technicians attached to the survey teams have been especially rewarding from the Chinese point of view. Originally these techni- cians only accepted patients for treatment in clinics set up at the camps of the railroad surveyors, but when the Chinese saw how popular their medical work had become among the local population, the medical technicians began moving 'out among villages in the bush to increase the number of. prospective patients treated. Local government officials have been included among their clientele. The primary method of treatment of the Chinese medical technicians is acupuncture -- a method of treatment invol- ving the puncturing of a part of the body with needles two or three inches long. This treatment is combined with.the passage of drugs to the patient. Although stories of miraculous cures have come -out of the bush, other reports indicate that the general inattention to basic sanitary .procedures by the Chinese "doctors" may well result. in acupuncture practices inducing infection as well as cures 8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 in the patients. Dissemination of Chinese propaganda accompanies all the medical technicians and provides a channel to get propaganda into the remotest corners of Tanzania and Zambia. Initially the Chinese were more agressive in their propaganda efforts in Tanzania than in Zambia. Several sharp rebuffs from the government of Zambia to'the Chinese embassy in Lusaka and a written protest by Kaunda to Chou En-lai served as?a temporary check on Chinese distribution of propaganda in Zambia. With the recent large influx of Chinese into Zambia, however, Zambian government capability to monitor and control the activities of Chinese propagan- dists has declined.. This decline is apparent in the villages where unsuspecting schoolteachers are provided with propaganda materials by the Chinese and even in the cities where the Chinese employ seemingly innocent accounts of the activities of the surveyors to insert into local med.ia pro-:Chinese and anti-Western and anti-Soviet propaganda.. The Chinese attacks on the USSR have inspired Soviet counterattacks. for example, the newspaper, Times of Zambia, on 6 May printed a Radio Moscow broadcast which claimed that the policies of Mao had caused a drop in the Chinese standard of living. Again on 7 May the Times reported a Moscow broadcast on the "armies of Ma This same issue of the Times also included a reply from the Chinese embassy in Lusaka to the Soviet blast of the previous day. Thus, Zambia is becoming a propaganda battle- ground for the Chinese and the Soviets. The gradual step-up of Chinese propaganda output in Zambia began in February 1969 with the arrival of a top NCNA propagandist whose objective was to gain wide play in Zambian media for news of the ostensibly beneficial activities:of the surveyors. The new visitor was immedi- ately successful, and favorable local coverage of the surveyors immediately increased. Coverage'by the Zambian press, radio and TV, and the Zambian Informati-on Service became frequent and friendly. Subsequently the Chinese undertook several surveys, to assess the impact of their overt propaganda in Zambian media and their covert dissemi- nations in the bush. They have been reported to be pleased with the results of these surveys obtained to date. In addition to Chinese propaganda activities, the governments of Tanzania and Zambia have experienced, as a result of the Chinese presence, problems in other fields including labor and security. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 The Chinese engineers and workers on the survey teams are setting labor norms that disturb the trade unions of Tanzania and Zambia. Surveying in some of the most diffi- cult terrain in East Africa, the Chinese teams work ten hours every day, including Sunday, for a base pay less than that of local trade unionists and with no overtime or extra allowances. The Chinese eat frugal five-minute lunches and flaunt their spartan work methods before the -locals. They are virtually self-sufficient in all their requirements, having brought them from China almost everything that they believed they would need, ranging from dustbrooms and gasoline tanks through electricity-generators and engineer- ing equipment to trucks and Chinese-style landrovers. They service all their equipment themselves. The Chinese take advantage of the inability of the governments of Tanzania and Zambia to keep a close watch and control over the activities of the railroad surveyors. It is very likely that these governments do not even know the actual number of Chinese surveyors ih their countries. Several techniques are employed by the Chinese to infiltrate more of their people than show up on airport manifests or transient rolls. Under one technique, after the arrival of a plane full of Chinese, a single Chinese will sign the manifest for large numbers of his incoming colleagues who mill about the airport. He will write a Chinese surname -- for example, Li -- and beneath it write a dozen or so ditto marks. Another technique was first observed in Mali. To obfuscate the local custom authorities, an incoming group of Chinese surveyors is met at the airport by a large group of Chinese already in the country. The two groups mingle in a spirit of exuberance and make a mass exodus past the bewildered customs officials. Other Chinese activities may be more serious in the long run. These activities in the movement of arms into Tanzania and Zambia for passage to African liberation movements and the unobserved use made of the freedom given the survey teams to survey and map an enormous area of Zambia, much of it previously uncharted. It seems certain that the Chinese will be able to prepare detailed military topo- graphical maps of Tanzania and Zambia as a byproduct of the survey. Such maps could prove invaluable if the Chinese ever undertake large-scale military support of the liberation movements located in Tanzania and Zambia. The extra-curricular activities of the Chinese survey teams have greatly disturbed President Kaunda, who on numerous occasions has publicly expressed his fears and Approved For Release 1999/09/6 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 frustrations resulting from these unauthorized Chinese activities in Zambia. Even President Nyerere of Tanzania, considered by many to be more lenient to the Chinese than Kaunda, noted in a press interview on 5 May in Mwanza that he was aware of the dangers of a policy of close relations with Commuryrst China. He made clear his understanding of the anxiety of the outside world since his policy "might let the Chinese into their sphere of influence," but China was willing to build the Tan-Zam Railway which Tanzania wanted and the West had refused to build it. Nyerere added a warning to China. "'We are a stubborn people,," he said, "The Chinese will learn that if they want to control us they will :get into trouble,* 4. Possible Chinese Gains The Chinese offer of assistance for the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway is unprecedented for Communist China and represents by far China's single largest foreign aid project to date. It would be the third largest foreign aid project in all Africa, outweighed only by the billion- dollar Aswan High Dam, where the USSR provided about one- third of the cost in credits, and by the Volta Dam in Ghana which was mainly financed by the US. On they basis of the Stamp report estimates of cost (see page 3, above), if the Chinese do eventually construct the railroad, they would be undertaking a project which could equal more than one-third of their total economic aid commitment's since 1956 and almost match all of their actual aid expenditures to date. Since the inception of.the Chinese aid program in 1956, China's total worldwide commitments amounted to somewhat more than $1 billion while actual expenditures were about $400 million. Annual commitments reached a peak of $310 million in 1964 but averaged about $120 million in 1965 and 1966 and declined to under $100 million in 1967. Drawings on aid since 1964 have averaged about $75 million annually. China has had a series of political and diplomatic reverses in Africa since its highwater mark in 1964 when 18 African governments recognized Communist China. Since then, as a result of Chinese subversive activities, Burundi, Dahomey, the Central African Republic and Ghana have broken diplomatic' relations with China; Kenya and Morocco have ex- pelled Chinese diplomats; Ethiopia, which has never had diplomatic relations with China, threw out the local NCNA representative, and China withdrew its mission to_Tunisia. Presently more African states (21) recognize Taiwan than Communist China (14) and more African states have voted against Chinese Communist admission to the UN (20) than Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 11 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 have voted in favor of admission (15). One important objec- tive of the Tan-Zam Railway, therefore, is to permit Communist China to recoup some of its recent losses in prestige and position in Africa and to reassert its interest in Africa's development. The Chinese are publicly committed to a policy of con- tinuing revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries. In the process of constructing the Tan-Zam Railway, the Chinese will improve their access to masses of the local peasantry who may be :"ripe for revolution" as Chou En-lai noted in 1964. The Chinese also will increase their ability to work with members of-southern African liberation movements, far from prying eyes, in remote bush areas of Tanzania and Zambia. In view of previous Chinese performances in Ghana, Congo CBrazzavi.lle) and Mali, the Chinese may very well set up on-the-scene guerrilla train- ing camps, even unknown to most members of the Tanzanian and Zambian governments. Such camps would provide bases for subversion not only against southern African targets but also against Congo (Ki'nshas-a). Once the Tan-Zam Railway was completed, it could provide an artery for sus- taining a large-scale Chinese-supported military effort directed at Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and Congo (Kinshasa). With the availability of the railroad, such an effort could encompass heavier weapons, including artillery, not used to date by the guerrillas., A permanent, secure Chinese position in Zambia would give the Chinese access'to mineral resources of which they are currently in short supply such as copper, gold and diamonds. The potential access to Congo (Kinshasa) would place the Chinese within reach of the world's largest known source of cobalt as well as uranium. In 1962, the Union Miniere du Katanga produced 68 percent of the Free Worlds cobalt. Since the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, the Chinese'have been hard pressed to obtain for their reactors sufficient quantities of suitable uranium and the cobalt required to enrich it. China must rely on labor-intensive methods to build the railroad as it does not.have sufficient construction machinery. Consequently, large numbers of laborers will be required for the period of. construction, a period that should last at least five years. Tanzania and Zambia cannot supply the required labor force, and on the basis of its previous ex- periences, China would not be willing to accept local laborers in large numbers even if they were available. Therefore, China can be expected to import the requisite labor force. In the short run, the impact on the local economics of such a force could be significant and In the long run it could become an ethnic and subversive'prob.lem._ Approved For Release 1999/09/Q?? : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Historically speaking, Chinese railroad workers employed in the US and in Peru and Indian railroad workers in East Africa remained behind. after completion of the projects on which they were employed. Present Chinese plans call for the provision of con- tinuing technical assistance in running the railroad and providing: replacement equipment as necessary. There have been reports that the Czechs and Japanese were willing to supply rolling stock for the railroad, with the Czechs indicating a willingness if necessary to participate with the Chinese in the funding, This Czech willingness predates the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and probably has now given way to sentiments host'i'le to the Chinese, Even if the Czechs were still willing to participate in the railroad, the Chinese are unlikely- to accept them or the Japanese and are likely to induce the governments of Tanzania and Zambia to refuse recent rtali'an offers to provide*operati,ng personnel after the railroad is built, Zambian problems operating present railroad facilities indicate conditions probably will deteriorate further. Therefore, in the absence of other foreign assistance, the Zambians will have to rely increasingly on the Chinese for help in the operation, maintenance and repair of railroads in Zambia In spite of sincereprotestations of non-alignment by Nyerere and of friendship for the West by Kaunda, these African leaders will find themselves increasingly at the mercy of the Chinese once construction of the railroad is well underway. The governments of Tanzania and Zambia, of necessity, will have to curry favor with their Chinese benefactors. They will gradually have to provide special treatment.for the Chinese at the expense of other countries toward which the Chinese are hostile. A partial list of anticipated Chinese gains, based lar ely on precedents established elsewhere, include: (a.)) limitations on the freedom of movement of all foreigners other than Chinese Communists,; (b.) increasing toleration of Chinese efforts to spread propaganda; (c.) favored treatment for Chinese imports, including consumer items which are non-essential or of marginal quality; (d.) growth of Chinese influence in the military, police and other local elements which come in frequent contact with the Chinese (it appears that in the future only th.e Chinese will train the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force); (e.) virtually total suppression of any criticism 'of China and the Chinese in local media and by public officials; (f..) partial Chinese. control over the local economy through long-term loan and barter deals which commit the participating country to import Chinese goods that are not necessarily compatible with national needs at foreign exchange rates set by-the Chinese; on the part of the host countries to look the.otherdwayies Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 while the Chinese use their land as a sprin board for sub- version-against neighboring states; and (h.) support for China in international councils such as the UN. Approved For Release 1999/09/04: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 . Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Railroad A Oil refinery Coalfield Kabwe LUSAKA _ Kafue Sakania KNdola Mbea Tup~maf Chipata J JKARIaA r 'HYDROELECTRIC DAM / r;OribO SALISBURY ZOMBA Bla tyre Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA=RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 ,fs; Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, London January 1970 CPYRGHT Approved CHINESE AII) AND TRADE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES T I-IE decision to build three new Ci nese radio transmitters in Za-nbia following the visit to Peking by Sikota Wirta, Zambian Minister of Information, signifies further evidence of China's growing involvement in Africa and. the revolutionary movements in Southcra Africa and Rhodesia. China has already built two similar transmitters in Brazzaville and Tanzania which have been used to broadcast anti-Wcstern propaganda and revolutionary theory to neighbouring states. The radio stations are only part of the invisible foothold China is gaining in Africa. Visible Chinese influence is evident with the growing number of stores selling Chii;ese goods a --d books and the increasicg army c. :.:r.._i.:1+ .::Z..s.. L..u-uS ?L....-~~+r.~ , C...: ,4a~4az Yore man 300 Chinese personnel are expected in i..vsak to ad+d io f:.:. 340 surveyqrs already employed on the '1,042 milt:. Tanzaaia-Zmb;a railway. Work on the railway is progressing rapidly according to reports from Chinese and African sources. Since the initial survey started it-. D:.ccn~~cr, 1958, the survey-team-is said to have completed the preliminary suvey of the 550 mile main route from Dtr-cs-Salaam to the heart of the copper- belt. The whole project is due to be completed by 1975. By providing an advance of the capital cost of between z:00-?130 million, most of the ]a.bour and ~nrobably all the contract, including rolling stock. China has surprised bona African aid Western observers, a;any of whom declared the project both uneconomic and impractical without massive British and American support. The routo rolls through some of the most difficult terrain in the region, rising from the coast at Dar-es-Salaam to the high, hilly areas-of the Cenral African plateau at 7,000 feet with its bushland and savanah before reaching the Zambian copperbclt. Apart from gaining valuable enginecring expcric:rcc, ('Icarning while oing and doing while le: rnirg' according to Chairman Mao's teaching China is hoping to win friends andinfiucnce enemies. Much has been made n both the Africar, and Chinese news media of the conditions under which he Chinese are employed. The Chu;ese engineers accept what appears to brs onditions similar to the local Africans. They exist separately and frugally hough their standards; arc still considerably better than the average rural i?ican's. Nevertheless-this provides a useful contrast to Europeans work- ng in the copper-mines and expatriate officers in government institutions ho expect to maintain living stauda:als well beyond the means o: tho w affluent Africans. Moreover, it appears than in additioL to their spartan lift the Chinese; rc willing to devote much, of their Sparc time to welfare projects such as epairing bridges, helping with harvests; and according to one N.C.N.A.' eport of March 25, they also provide medical services, acupuncture and ther forms of traditional Chinese medicine for local Africans. Successful rcatnicnt of local ailments includes one outstanding cure of a five-year-old 1c?f mute. Feasibility studics by British firms who laid the permanent way across ndia, South Africa and much of Latin America, found the financial ost of the railway too great and the economic returns too small; on the Cher hand, China has igncre.l tic cost, putting politics to the fore on Ilia assumption that as a prestige project the railway would be an ideal EeF~I's =Ar9 s: I - ~ ~9uOcha 94A0003000500 1-8 CPYRGHT ApproN ,ea or a ease - - Chinese assistance is not only limited to the 1A i way. The Friendship Tcxtild Mill, built with Chinese labour at a cost of ?3 million in the form of an interest-free loan, is turning out 90 million square yards of cloth annually and is expected to make Tanzania self-sufficient in cloth by the end of 1970. The mill, the first of its kind in Africa being fully integrated and capable of printing patterns on cloth spun from locally produced cotton, was completed in 18 months from design to finish and is now operating with the minimum Chinese supervision and is providing employment for 3,000 workers. The Upcnja State Farm in Zanzibar, built on 1,300 acres of arable land with Chinese assistance, is now producing rice, fruit and vegetables and ! poultry-meat on land previously thought unproductive. While in Somalia, a Chinese hydro-geological survey team has been drilling wells and map- ping Inc territory since March. 1969, and Chinese bicycles are on sale in f Mogadishu. This activity adds up to a new rise in Chinese influence in Africa which, following the 1965 Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Algiers,. fell to its lowest ebb and remained ineffective during much of the cultural revolution. The mainspring of China's campaign to gain support in Africa began late in 1966 with the formation of the Sino-Tanzanian shipping line and the. first of a new series of loans to African countries starting with U.S. $17 million to Zambia. African opinion was generally apathetic and prior to 1967 in some states it was positively hostile. Coups in Ghana, Dahomey. The Central African Republic and. Burundi preceded the exit of Chinese personnel accused of sabotage and subversion. Ghana's new Head of State at the time, General Ankvah, emphasised China's efforts had been in setting up spy-schools, military. training camps and instruction in sabotage in jungle camps rather than agro-technical stations and rural industry. Chinese involvement need not, however, be construed as part of a plot. China is publicly committed to revolution in the region, but at the same .time is willing to offer aid to countries who turn their eyes away from U.S.-Soviet sources: The countries falling into this category are still few in number and so quite a small fragment of China's resources allocated for aid . against imperialism .can have a marked erect on recipient territories. In 1968 China budgeted ?750,000 for African liberation move, =cuts. This dual personality China displays in Africa as a provider of aid to non-aligned newly-emerged States on the one hand and as agent- provocateur in the wars of liberation on the other means that no African Head of State can ever be quite sure that the Chinese are on his side or if they .are secretly plotting against him. Thus, Col. Bokassa of the Central African Republic (C.A.R.), himself the recipient. of. a Chinese U.S. $4 } million loan, could say realistically in July, 1967: 'To have peace one must not admit the Chinese Into one's country because they teach subversion. I tell you that the C.A.R. had in its territory a Chinese school for subversion and even a military training camp'. Westerners who tend to see the growing Chinese influence in Africa as a curious mixture of the yellow peril and red menace seem to forget the extent of Western assistance; for every Chinese technician there are ten or twelve Westerners working on joint aid ventures. Perhaps the Africans are more pragmatic than Europeans. China's aid, in any case, tends to be piecemeal. Most aid is-in the form of long-term loans rather than direct';: grants and since 1954 China ,has provided little more than U.S. $950 million. Zambia and Tanzania are the chief recipients of this aid. Since 1961 Tanzania received ?121 million. A further ?I17 million was promised for rural - development. Ir contrast, in 1968 East African countries, ex- cluding Tanzania and Zambia. received from Britain alone approximately U.S. $56 million in bilateral grants and loans. ? D1-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 CPYRGHT China's trade with Africa is not great; in 1962 it registered approximately 4 per cent of her total trade. In 1964 this was valued at U.S. 590 million. By; 1968 this value had dropped to an estimated U.S. $74 million. Before relations were severed with Ghana, trade agreements were signed for inoroasas in two=way trada up to U.S. $12 million. But this sever ma.eria.- lised, despite the exchange of Ghanalan industrial diamonds, grains and cotton for Chinese machinery, fertilisers and agricultural products. Total trade amounted to less than a quarter of the original estimates. Guinea's five-year trade agreement suffered a similar fate. In spite of China's cash -rant of U.S. $2.8 million in May, 1964, relations with Kenya have never been good. Two Chinese diplomats and an N.C.N.A. correspondent were expelled from Kenya for `interfering is Kenya's internal affairs'. In June, 1967, the Chinese Charge d'Affaires was expelled for attacking a speech by Tom Mboya In a Nairobi news- paper. Red Guards retaliated with an attack on the Kenyan Embassy in Peking. a few weeks later. In 1968, China accused Kenya of pursuing a two-China's policy as a result of articles on Taiwan in the Kenyan press. VWhen Tom Mboya was assassinated in July 5, this year, the Chinese embassy was. the only mission that failed to fly its flag at half mast. It is unlikely that China will improve her trading position among African states. Even Chinese low-priced goods are too costly for un- sophisticated rural markets and in any case they tend to compete with local products. In countries such as Kenya where relatively buoyant markets are available, relations have been soured by political failures. Because of this China favours emphasis o--i small but well chosen projects. The TANZAM line is a Jambi-: to recoup in the '70s the lost ground of the, '60s. In the meantima, Peking will continue to focus its aid on favoured recipients- such as the Rhodesian Zimbabwe African National Union (Z.A.N.U.) which advocates hit-and-run tactics across the Zambian border into Rhodesia, and the South African Pan African Congress (PA.C.), trying at the same, time to block all Soviet in,.rference in what China now considers her rightful sphere of infl'ience. This was evident at the International Conference of Solidarity with the Freedom Fighters of South Africa and the Portuguese Colonies, held in Khartoum in January. 19.69. China denounced this meeting as a 'Soviet revisionist plot'. Peking's African allies were conspicuously absent from the meeting. China's future position in Africa hinges on her capability of main- taining friendly relations with African states with hostile political systems. Coups and rumours of coups are endemic in developing Africa. Zambia has had its share of rumours of a coup for some months now, and Peking could be faced with a similar situation to Ghana, but with an expensive railway line on her hands. The truth is that while ? China is trying to sweep Africa with revolution, like the Soviet Union she remains willing to pursue ties with bourgeois and military r6gimes In the economic field China continues to maintain trade worth ?S' million a. year with South Africa. The time has come for, i eking to make up for lost ground. The Chinese now have relations with nine African states south of the Sahara. compare.1 with 12 in 1965. In this respect the railway and other projects are gambles that have to pay off. [Kieran P. Broadbent is a member of the staff, of. the. Commonwealth Bureau of Agricultural Economics.] Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Ap6r8;A r Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 What puzzles Tanzania's friends, and scares its enemies, however, is China's role as arms supplier and military adviser. Up to January of this year ,Canadians advised the army, and trained Tanzania'i pilots. This arrangement was not totally satisfactory because of Canada's membership of Nato- which Tanzania accuses of arming Portugal with weapons to. suppress African guerrillas. Sweden and Czechoslovakia were..mcn- tioned as alternatives, and it was pointed out that Italy is training the Zambian ail` force. It soon-became clear, however,'that it was China. that would fill the gap. Naval and air force personnel 'went to China for training, and Chinese engineers began work on a naval base in Dares Salaam harbour. They had already biuilt'.several army barracks. All these mcasures'nre being taken in preparation for`what Tanzanians believe will be an eventual armed confrontation' with the south. Their greatest fear in fact is of a Rhodesian, South African or Portuguese pre-emptive strike.""(It has been. reported that the Chinese have warned them not to provoke one at this stage; the present low level of 'freedom fighting' in Africa -except in the Portuguese .territories.-- suggests this advice may have been offered, and heeded. President Kaunda even denies harbouring any guerrilla bases in Zambia, although this *is patently untrue. But it would be naive in the extreme to imagine that in the' long run the Chinese will be a restraining influence.) The African guerrillas welcome Chinese help, but they are at pains to point out that they are first and foremost nationalists. Just as President Nyerere tries to balance the Chinese by western advisers, so the guerrilla groups make much of the assistance they receive from private groups in America and Britain, and government contribu- tions from Sweden. . Supporting the guerrilla groups gives the Chinese the.chance to engage in political indoctrination in the training camps, particularly those remote from Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. They undoubtedly have made some useful converts. But Chinese penetra- tion of Zambia may not be as far advanced as some western observers fear. . ,., TIMES OF ZAMBIA 29 October 1970 CPYRGHT In the Western world's Britain to sit ba-cl~ and consistent devaluation dread the myth of of its own political Chinese expansion in TI33'RF is little doubt that the world's eyes will be focussed on Tanzania and Zambia to see if what they expect to happen as a result of the generous gesture by the People's Republic of China to finance a railway link- ing the two countries does, in fact, come about. Indeed, what they are saying is to see to what extent China's manipu- lation of African states; is more crafty than that of people who in erest. have been with us for notions of the West many decades. It is all very well. for ' about the real meaning tbproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001 8 s; us, which imrnedia- telyy gives room to the o v c r - estimation of Chinese effectiveness, we are not competent to intervene. But - we can only say that the West must surely be the best judge of its own capabilities. This thought process of the West must also best be summed up as "condescending" and somewhat insulting in its under - estimi.tinn Africa. Perhaps if the Chinese are as politi- cally crafty as the West credits tlhem, then they in i t h t have already taken a leaf out of the now unscrambled British: Empire The predictable politi- cian does not get very far. The West must have made its predic- tions about Chinese intentions in this part of the world, It cannot of the African leaders' ring true that the ability to choose what ' Chinese would be as they consider to be in ' naive as to give cred- once to the wild their national i t APPr 1Tor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 of their gesture in this railway project. 1n all this there is one man, in addition to the Chinese people, to vj'itiM the %ambian people owe a debt of gratitude. It is Mwali- mu Julius N'yerere, President of Tanzania. He has been unflinching in his determination 4w -get us out of a predi- cament that can only be the inevitable concomitant . to our land-locked geographi- cal position. EAST AFRICAN STANDARD 27 October 1970 Last, but not least, we would draw attention to a recent picture story publshed in an East African news- "The %' ron'~sed L,and." It has the following caption:- "Wall posters in Peking call for volunteers, to go to Tanzania to help build the Tanzania railway line, in this picture issued by the Irsinltua news tr;,ency. Thin poster being ktudied by workers calls for volun- teers to come forward in their thoutsattds. '.Those workers who decide to settle in Africa? after the said task is coin- pleted will reccivo good land and houses for them- Kelvei4 and their fitrniiies. Similar calls for volunteers are taking place through- out China. "This photolfru~)+h was contributed by Dr Eiieg- mund Brauncr, of the German-Af inean Society, which works to build frlndship - between East Africa and East Germany." It may be worth our leaders trying to dis- cover the authenticity .of this article. How they do it is not for us to say. si r'e CPYRGHT Approved For RO Tanzanians and Zarnbiaiis are; naturally jubilant over Tazara, the new name for the Tanzain rail link, and the Chinese join in the general satisfaction. This venture is the most ambitious overseas aid project launched by the Chinese People's Republic and the first of any uia?.nitudo on the African mainland. When fiiniFhcd, in about five years time, the 1,056-mile railroad will be the longest built by the Chinese inside or outside their own country. Paradoxically, it has been left to them ? to carry through a 1>restigioua scheme bandied about by Western concerns for decades, just as the Russians stcpped in, when the World )lank -and the U.S. withdrew, to construct the Aswan Dam. Tho circumstances which gave impetus to the project are widely known - Zambian isolation aftcr the Rhoiicsian U.1) 1. Surveys were undertaken before U.D.L., with the object of linking the Zambian and Fast African networks, c-xpanduhg the opportunities for trade between the two areas. British cthginers commissioned in 1952 to make a survey found no insurmountable obstacle. After all, the British forged the Mombasa- Kisumu railway 70 years ago, without all the modern aids to hearing, excavating, )eveliing, bridging and so on, besides the medical and other welfare facilities for the thousands of workers. The British cng.,ineers relied for labour on Africans and imported Indians, some of whom stayed behind when the work was finished, founding families living chiefly in t{enya. 'this was the origin of the' Asian problem which confronts the Kcnvan and British Ciovcrpntents today. Several thousand Chinese workers have bccn sent to Tanzania and Zambia. There is no reliable evidence to. prove the Chincsc Government has this colonial type of African ;wnetration in mind.' A picture allegedly slhowing Peking wall posters appealing for volunteers to heap build tits railway, and promising land and houses for those ici:o wi>ih to stay on, has bccn denounced as false propaganda, circulated by the C.I.A. and not the Hsinhua News Agency, as indicated in the caption. Whatever the truth of this incident may be, the Gov- crnments of ilia two countries will not be anxious to repeat the massive political and human errors committed in fast Africa, bcyucatlhed on today's independent countries by the British railroad pioneers, even though they acted in good faith and could not foresee the consequences. Both the World Bank and a U.N. study undertaken soon after Tanzanian independence found against the Tanzam project on economic grounds. Zambia would be enabled to export copper, it was argued, but what would the trains carry hack from Dar cs Salaam? It is honied the successful completion of Taira will swell the trade between Zambia and Last Africa, So many items, including agricultural produce, consumed in Zambia today but imported from South Africa because of the special conditions caused by the geographical situation could te~544999/Q81 Tanzania 4A000& l 9@l 60001 to loin. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 (THE ECONC LIST) FOREIGN REPORT 29 October 1970 CPYRGHT Peking's : `Trojan' horse' ?in'' frlca The ceremonies in Dar es Salaam this week to mark the start of construction o t e Tanzania-Zambia railway have put the spotlight on China's mounting influence in Africa. The railway is being financed by a long-term, interest-free loan from Peking of approximately ?169 million; it is the biggest aid project the Chinese have ever under- taken. There is little doubt that China hopes the railway will be both a Trojan horse for Chinese trade and a conveyor belt for the spread of Mao's thinking. To some extent the project marks a' shift in, Peking's ' 15'olicy; towards Africa. -The excesses of the cultural revolution prompted several'African states to sever .diplomatic relations with 1?eking,' on the ground 'that Chinese agents were. engaging in ?subvcrsive activities on African territory. Peking decided at this stage to combat western and Russian influence by concentrating on a few selected countries.' F', Tanzania is -one of the chief of these. 'Even before the railway deal was fixed, -Peking- had become involved in about 20 aid projects in that country. But what the ,Chinese, wanted was' a major prestige' project - something that would :parallel the Russians' building of the;Aswan Dam. The Tanzania-Zambia rail line was the answer. So far the Chinese ~ there are 6,000-of.them -have behaved impeccably in Tanzania and Zambia; they seem content to let their political ambitions wait, for 20 years. if necessary. They were fully aware of the initial handicaps they had to overcome. Indeed, in 1965 the Zambians were so suspicious"ofChina (whose.embassy had been expelled from nearby Burundi for subversion] that, they refused to let the preliminary: rail survey team enter Zambian'. territory; the first report was' confined to 'the Tan-' zanian section. President Kaunda, -dragged his feet for nearly two years, 'I presumably hoping for a late counter-offer from the west, which never came, before entering into an agreement. Today China finds itself the major aid giver to both Tanzania and Zambia, and sole military adviser and chief arms, supplier to 'I'anzania.A'Lcommodity, agreement tied to the railway loan indicates that China will replace Britain as the two African countries' most important trading partner. Meanwhile, the two countries' support for the liberation struggle enables the 'Chinese to maintain close contact with southern African guerrillas. But China's presence is balanced by that of other aid-giving' nations, notably Canada and the Scandinavian countries (whom Dr Nyerere often praises). The Tanzania- Zambia highway is being built by a western consortium including USAID (United States Aid for International Development). And, to underline the Tanzanians' prag- matic approach, an American business efficiency team is , currently advising the Tanzanian state trading corporation and the development planning ministry. There is not a single Chinese adviser in any ministry in either Dar es Salaam or Lusaka. Very few senior officials of any sort go to' China for training, partly because it has been found difficult to integrate them into. the administration when' they return.. Nor are the Chinese particularly popular with local people. They appear humourless and aloof, and they do not mix. Those Tanzanians who have been to' china for training complain of condescending behaviour on the part of their hosts.'; Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :6CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 CPYRGHT Lil?,i;.ed by air, pipeline, road and rail immediately after' U.D.I., we Canadians, British and Americans oivratcd an emergency airlift of oil and 'other vital supplies into Zambia, besides taking out copper. Subsequently, the hell run" started. Tar,z.:ads: and Zambia got to;;;,thcr, with an Italian company. to run articu]a all trucks tr sporting eta $Ua ta$ 12 00i1 to tt a month it the peak. Tho oil pipa1lna was 1a1d, with ital~an help, and the highway from Dar cs Salaam to Tunduma started, with loans from Sweden and the U.S. In addition to the airways, Zambia will ultimately have the combination of the oil pipeline, railway and trunk road as outlets through friendly country to the Indian Ocean, instead of having to 'depend on the ovar]and route via the enemy territories of Rhodesia and i'oru.,guesc-hcid Mozambique or South Africa. After the World Bank had turned down the project, the British and Canadians were approached for help. A joint survey formed the opinion that the railroad was both feasible and an economic proposi- tion. but nothing practical materialised. - It was at this juncture that the two nci~hbours turned to the Chinese. Their tripartite agreement was signed ut Peking a 1'cttte over three years ago. The Chinese had responded with alacrity. Alter the terms had been agreed and the paper work finished. they began at once to scud io 'ocul'ars and technicians, with equipment for the ~rorkshops and buUdirg the line. 1 he cost is estimated at the colossal figure of ?169,000,000, for 4thich the Chinese Goverornen has made available a loan repayable over a p~ricd of 30 years, without interest. The internal costs, includ- ing indigenous labaur sad, wit] amount io rather more than half the total f; cr.:. These will be defrayed by the generation of local crcJit arisi tg from the parcht?se of `tines: goods. Manufactured rd racessed acrict:1hi r.l produce have begun to appear in Ur. a ." i- th shops. Stocks will become greater as more consumer goods are imported and, as a result of the visit of a Tanzanian State Trading Corporation mission to Peking, Chinese vehicles and machinery are bought. It follows-axiomatically that such an enormous increase in imparts from China, to build up 'radii as part of the loan will mean curtailing nmports of similar goads frortt other countries; though Tanzania and Zambia will still hope to continue tradini? with them, or else the Chinese local credit cannot ba created as envrsaged. When repayments start in 1973, the two" countries wit} have their railway for the low cost of about E2,700,00t} annuallyy, which tl+cy will share, roprea(1 ever vcnrti whvn money at today`s valut s will altnnrt certainly i,avu sniaciil:d, WASHINGTON POST 10 November 1970 TANZAM RAILROAD COULD ENHANCE PEKING'S ROLE IN AFRICA CPYRGHT DAR I;S SALAAM, Tanza- nia-Driving a spike into a railroad tic hardly seems like n political act. But it may he so here. The Chinese ,Communists are building a railway through Tanzania Into Zambia that could change the politics of Africa far more than its economics. Ceremonies recently at the two terminals-Dar es Salaam on the Tanzania coast of the Indian Ocean. and Kapiri ?1poshi on the copper belt in Zambia-offi- ciofly Inaugurated .construc- tion of the 1,056-mile rail- road. the greatest foreign aid project ever. attempted act promis$ one simple po? litical gqinatjc;c. It will free black 1,itnil)ia from its de. pendent-4 on white southern Af?iea, especially for the ex?, pord,?nf iTs copper. Isconomi? cally, tile'. of white Af?ic,i;Yhll, do the Job for Zamb'iti . Politically, how. ever, they have become un? pnintabre. For the Chine-se. the ntoti- vatioit 'is not as clear and slmple.,?But the railroad will give the Chinese enormous presence and potential influ. ence ;ifs? nn area that could become vital if there ever is a race war between white and black Africa. other foreign county in the world. In fact, the only larger Chinese Communist groups elsewhere are mili- tary units in North Vietnam and Laos. In strict financial terms, the Chinese project is an ex- ample of extremely gener- ous forcian assistance. The Chinese are financing the project with a $400 mil- lion. interest-free. loan that Tanzania and Zambia will pay back over 30 years, be ginning in 1083. Considering the interest that $400 mil. lion would earn by the 21st Century. the loan is prticti- cally a gift. Fur trite 4 Cricar s, the prof. already have more w ceo? In the past decade, West. Approved For Release 19, 9017 tI1W. A?I 79-d 1~~ ~ 01-8 CkrY49UTd For Release 1999/09/02 - CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Lank, opposed construction of the railway on two rounds: First, Zambia already had an outlet to the sea through the Rhodesian and Portu- guese African rail sgait'tens and, second, an Amertcan- built tarred road from Tan- zania to the Zambian copper, belt, scheduled for comple- tion next year, would enable Zambia to export all the copper it wanted through lack Africa. But these strict economic 8rguments Ignored both pol- itics and history. As a Tanzanian govern- ment press release put it last week, the Western world had "forgotten that elsewhere many similar schemes were undertaken regardless-of immediate eco?. nomic benefits. As an example, the -gov- ernment cited the first rail- road in cast Africa, the Uganda Railway built by the British from the Indian Ocean to Lake Victoria at the turn of the century. That railroad. which moved through undeveloped tribal lands, was derided in the British Parliament at the time as "a gigantic folly" and "a railway with two ends and no middle." The British government, however justified it on polit- ical grounds. Ministers said the railway would end the caravan slave trade and would enable the' British, rather than the Germans, to control the source of the. Vile River. In the end, the railway, had an even more Important political result. It opened Kenya to white settlement" and made that country 'the only "white man's colony in cast Africa. In the opening ceremonies for, the Chinese ra'.lway in liar es Salaam last week,' President Kenneth ICaunda ofZnmbia dealt With one of the major political problems of the railway-ruspielon of the Chinese. Kaunda said Western op- poncnts of the railway had "a rather psychopathic fear of the intentions and objec- tives of the Chinese." He dismissed this, as -arro- gance." '-The Chinese people are our friends," he said, "and they will remain so as loner as it is to the benefit of our respective peoples." Kaunda also told the . Chinese delegation on the platform that the Africans "pledge to fight malicious campaigns being waged against the railway by the detractors." An example of the kind of campaign ICaunda had In mind came up recently In a Nairobi newspaper. The newspaper published a pic- ture that showed a recruiter in :China promising volun- teers free land in Tanzania if they would ' work on the railroad there. The 'Chinese government has denounced the photograph as phony and diplomats here agree. The fabricated photo. graph, -however, did awaken' fears some Africans and many outsiders have about the numbers of Chinese coming to Africa. Already 4,700 Chinese are at work on the railroad alongside 7,000 Africans. The number of Chinese should reach 6,000 by the end of the year. The photo also recalled another historical. problem of railway building In east Africa. To build their railway, the British imported 32,000 In- dian coolies at the turn of the century. Of these. 2,500 died in Kenya and 6..5001)(1- i too sick to work, The British returned the slck- coolies and 16.000 healthy; ones to India. But .7,000.?re mained to settle in cast Af- rica and become the nucleus of the resented Asian minor- ity that controls much of the commerce of cast Africa today. tt'hen the Chinese project was first announced.; many Western skeptics did not he- s lieve they could do the job. It took the British twice, as long as they intended and it cost them twice what they expected to build their rail- way. But the British were slowed by lions that ate 28 Indian workers and two British supervisors. warring tribesmen who stole rails to make spears and telegraph wire to make necklaces, and terrible climate, terrain and disease. . The Chinese also will face difficult problems in push- ing their railway through mountainous terrain a n d trop cal climate. But. they actually are ahead of sched- ule. Although the o f f i c i a l opening was celebrated last, week, the Chinese began work several months ago. More than 100 miles of bridges, culverts and em- banknt'ents have been bulk. all ready for the laying of rail. The belting now is the Chinese will finish the job by their target data of Ia7A._J Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Z ric.h_ _ 8 November 1970 Die c1iiinceische Eieeubahtzx in Herz Afrika s Verbindung des sambischen Copperbelt durch. Tansania mit derv lrulischen 1)zctrri Rasches It ortschreiten der Bauarbeiten CPYRGHT 'Le. Dar es Salaam, Ende Oktober lithe - vor allcni amerikanische - Diplomaten in liar es Salaam mit cincm Ausdruck milder Ueber- legenhcit zur Kcnntnis, wenn von den Chinesen and ihren Pienendie Rede war, eine Uber 1800 knt lange Eisenbahn von der Hauptstadt Tansanias durch das toils sumpfige, teils gebirgige and uner- schlossene Hinterland, kurz durch sehr schwie- rigcs Gclendc bis nach Kapiri Mposhi zu baucn, wo sic AnschluB an das sambische Bahnnetz haben soil. Man zwcifelte daran, ob die Chinesen genu- gend technische Voraussetzungen and technisches Gcrat besitzen, urn ein solches Projekt zu verwirk- lichen, this nach'ciner Studie der Weltbank un- wirtschaftlich sein soil and deswegen als nicht unterstutzungswurdig erachtet wurde. Im ubrigen werde, so wurdc eingewandt, cin gutes Jahrzehnt vergchen, bis die Arbeiter and Techniker Mao Tsetungs den crsten Zug uber these Strecke laufen lasscn konntcn. Was abcr konne alles in dieser Zeit geschchen? Bis dahin werde die Stra a zwi- schen Dar es Salaam and Lusaka, fiber die das Kupfcr aus Sumbia an die Kiiste transportiert wcr- men konne, mit' schwedischer, italienischer and amcrikanischcr Hilfc asphaltiert scin. Im Verlaufc diescr Zcit konntcn der President Sambias, Ken- neth Kaunda, unit scin Kollege in Tansania, Julius Nyercrc, davon ! uberzcugt werden, daB sic mit ihrem Bahnprojekt auf das falsche Pferd gesetzt hetten. Tcchnisc1ic Leistnngsfuhigkcit der Chinesen Damals wic hcute wci13 man im Grunde'recht wenig fiber das kommunistische China. Man denkt in der Regel an gewaltige Hcere von Kulis, die in Fronarbeit mit primitiven Wcrkzcugen uniibersch bare Erdinassen bewcgcn and in technischar Hin- sicht ctwa dort stchen sollen, wo der Wcstcn vor rund fiinfzig Jalren stand. Man hat uber China inrwischcn zwar cinigcs hinzugelernt, zum Bcispicl, da13 seine Techniker Wasscrstolfbomhen herstellen and Lnngstrcckenraketen Uber riesige Distanzen schicl3en k6nnen.; Aber auch wcr Gclcgenheit hatte, die Chinesen self 1967, als die crsten Geologen and Balu-expcrten das Trassec festzulcgen and zu vermessen bega-inen, in Tansania zu bcobachtcn, mutate seine Vorstellung von der technischen R(ick- stlindigkcit der Untcrtanen Maos zicmlich rasch and grundlich revidicren. Inzwischen sand in Ostafrika nach nffi71e11en CPYRGHT gebracht wvrden - and mat ilinen n-ouerncs tcch- nischcs Gerat wie Erdbcwcgungsmaschincn, Trak- toren, Stahltriiger fur Brucken sowic Bohrmaschi- nen fur den Tunnelbau. Schon jetzt sind die Chine- sen mit ihrem Prograrnm betrechtlich weiter voran, Sie haben bereits etwa 110 Brricken fertiggestellt and auf weiten Strecken Demme aufgeschUttet. In der Niihe von Dar es Salaam.soll noch im kom- menden Monat mat der Herstellung von Beton- schwellen begonnen werden, wobci mit cincm tag lichen AusstoB von 2000 Stuck gerechnet wird. Die gegenwertigen Berechnungen schen vor, daB die Strecke in etwa vier Jahren betriebsbereit sein werde. Verpaf3tc Chance des Westens? Am 26. Oktober hat Kaunda vor den Toren Dar es Salaams in Gegenwart des chinesischen Ministers fur auswartige . Handelsbeziehungen, Fang Yi, den Grundstein fur dieses gewaltige Un- tcrnchmen gclegt. Kaunda streifte dabei in seiner Rede kurz die Vorgescl-ichte des Projckts: eine Studic der Weltbank, die zu dem Ergcbnis kam, daB die Balm unokonomisch and den Aufwand nicht wort sci - tine spetcre Studic, die von der kanadisch-amcrikanischcn Firma Maxwell Stamp nngcfertigt wurdc, sci allcrdings zum gegentci- ligen I igchnis gckommen; uber alie Ueherrcdungs- Die dynamische Aktivitet der Chinesen in Tan- Kihin1 1141101 n-ihls pen11141: ill) Wtstcn sc- CC allerorten auf ki hle Ablehnung gcstoBcn. Der Weston habe den Fchler gemacht, das Projekt nur nach wirtschaftliehen Gesichtspunkten zu bcurtei- len, and die besondere wirtschaftliche Lage Sam- bias als Binnenland, das von feindlichen Nach- barn umgeben sci, nicht sehen wollen. Moglichcr- weise sci these ablehnende Haltung auch aus.cpoli- tischen and ideologischcn? Motiven zu erkliiren, aus Rilcksicht auf Sidafrika, Rhodesien and Por- tugal. Besonders GroBbritannien hielt Kaunda die I avested interests im aweiBcnu, sudlichen Afrika vor, die durch das Bahnprojekt gestort wvrden.. Sambia musse sich aber langsam von der wirt- schaftlichen Abhangigkcit gegeni ber dem si d- lichen Afrika losen, wobci mehr die politischen als die okonomischen Faktoren im Vordergrund stn nden. Im ubrigen stehe es Tansania and Sam- bia frei, sich seine Helfer sclbcr zu wahlcn - auch seine Freunde and seine Feinde. Dem Ver- trag mit Peking fiber den Eisenbahnbau liege die Zusicherung Kgegenseltlger Aclitung and Nicht- einmischungzx zugrunde. Also bestche aller An1aB, den Chinesen dankbar zu sein. Es konne kcin Zweifel mchr darubcr bestchen, daB das Projekt verwirklicht werde. pproved For Release 1999/09/02 : C1$F''R'[?~94804}~0~(+9AflTa~ CPYRGHT AW 9 ecAir rf ~nV~e?i FRO 'den der damalige amerikanische AuBenminister John Foster Dulles nicht zu interessieren war. Der Auftrag zum Dammbau an die Sowjets offnete diesen zunachst den Wag zu eincr wirtschaftlichcn Penetration Aegyptens and schlieBlich zu mili- tarischem and politisehem EinfluB, der nicht nur auf Kairo bcschr5nkt geblicben ist, sondern sich auf die melsten Under des arablselaen Raum?s crstrcckt, dies in eincrn MaBe, daB Moskau sich nicht nur wichtige strategische Basen gesichert hat, sondern auch in der Lagc ist, in der Auseinander- setzung mit Israel ein entscheidendes Wort mitzu- radon. P'est etablierte chincsische Priiscnz Achnlich ki nntcn sich die Dinge in Tansania and in Sambia unter chinesischer Regic entwik- kcln; denn in Tansania beschrankt sich Peking nicht nur auf die Finanzicrung and den Bau ciner Eisenbahn, sondern hat auch andere Projcktc Uber- nommen and bildct schlieBlich die Landarmee, die Luftwaffe and die Kriegstnarinc aus. Peking ist auch auf den Wunsch der tansanischen Regie- rung nach modernen Waffen wie DOsenj lgern gegen mogliche Bedrohungen durch die Portu- giescn eingcgangcn - ein Wunsch, den Endo letzten Jahres cine kanadische Militarkommission ablehnte, da cin solches Instrument vial zu kost- :,pici:g sti, die Ausbildung viel zu lange_daucre 9Gi+iaRp113r ePIVOhFiriANOWiCbhtttlErit? nicht entspreche. Diese Tatsachen Sind sicherlich auch den Chinesen bekannt. Aber wie bci den Sowjets in Aegypten stehen auch bei ihnen in Ostafrika politische Aspekte im Vordcrgrund. Sic werden daher in KUrze Diisenjdger an Tansania liefern, well sie wissen, daB dadurch bis in unab- sehbars Zit Instruktoren, Berater and teehnische Assistenten unerlhBlich scin werden. Man wird daher wohi auf Jahrzehnte hinaus mit einer chinesischen Priisenz in Tansania and Sambia zu rechnen h4ben, die sicherlich auch ihre Ausstrahlungen auf die Nachbarli nder ausubcn durfte. Nicht nur starkt sie den ROcken der Afri- kaner im Kampf gegen die portugiesische Herr- i schaft in Mocambique and in Angola, sondern sie verschafft ihnen in Ostafrika auch eine propa- gatidistische Basis in eutem MaBe, wie as ihncn bisher iri keinem Tail des schwarzen Kontinents zu errichten gelungen ist. Zwar mogen die Zusiche- rungen der cgegenseitigen Achtung and Nichtcin- mischungx, den Priisidentcn Nyerere and Kaundti: geniigen; doch besteht dabei die Gefahr, daB beide sich einem na'iven Wunschdenken hingeben, wenn sie glauben, daB Peking nur aus Motiven briider- licher Nachstenliebc gegenubcr carmen and aus- gebcuteten schwarzen Briidern? handle. Wenn dcrartigo I3esorgnisse in Dar as Salaam geliuBert warden, bckommt man allerdingc von den Tan- niern immcr w`c"'er die :ht unbcrechtibtc Ant- )rt an hi ran, dalI cs der Weston in der and gchabt hlitte, den hincscn den Zugang zu irsperren, daB aber jetzt. ese Chance vertan sci. Subversive Ausstraahlttngcn Arts dent Kongo-Kin- iasa ist aus zuverlas- gen Quellen zu erfah- :n, dab scit Bcginn die- s Jahres schon wicder zinesische Waffen Ober ,an Tanganjikasee zum ':'csttifer im Bercich von "izi geschmuggelt , war- on. in den Jahrcn der ongolesischen Rebellion, as 11cil3t von 1964 bis 966, waren die Chinescn ?ic Hauptwaffcnlicferan- -n tier Aufstlindischen ,nd henutzten Schlcich- tegc ' von Bujumbura in lurundi and von Kigoma .nt Ostufer des Tanga- rjika?,ces aus. Die Halb- nsel vor Fizi am Tanga- ijikasee war das letztc PVidcrstandsnest der Re- ,ctlen, das 1966 von wci- len Siildnern unter dem :iidalrikaner Mike Hoare nach hartem Kampf aus- ;ehohcn wurde. Man `and damals cin gan- tes Arsenal von chinesischen. Waffen: schwere l wird 1859 Kilometer betragen. Man bat die sam- Anschinengewehre, schwere Minenwerfer, Hand- { hindhe S urwcitc von 1,064 Metern gewahlt, was II ~9~O419~1A 941300 9i90A~- - Appr wea Fi?n Re4 ase 1999/09/02 Zwar ist der Kongo-Kinshasa haute gegen Auf- itando nicht mchr so anfiillig. Aber die Chinesen ilanen in alien ihrcn Untcrnehmungen auf lange cit. Und die gegenwiirtigc Lagc im Kongo ki nnte sich auf allzu afrikanischc Art Oar Nacht andcrn. Die a Bcfreiungsbewrgungeno im sud- lichen Tansania, die gegen die Portugicsen in Mocambique opcrieren, werden schon seit Jahrcn _ mit chinesischen- Waffen vcrsorgt, and offenbar hat die tansanischd Regicrung selbst scit langem die Kontrollc dariihcr verloren, wieviel milita- risches Gcriit aus'Pcking in ihr Land gelangt. Von besondcrem Gewicht rind naturlich die wirt haftlichen interessen Pekings. In crstcr Linic is( da der Kupferreichtum Sambias zu erwiihnen; aber auch die noch uncrschlosscnen Eisenerz- and Kohlenvorkoinmen in den siidlichcn Landcstcilcn Tansanias dtirflen mitspiclcn, wie auch die groBe Viclfalt tropischer Agrarprodukte. Durch den An- schlUB an das sambischo Eisenbahnnetz stellt die tacuc Liuie nicht her einc lcistungsfabige Verbin- dung zwischen dam Indischen Ocean and dam sambischen Copperbelt dar, sondern daruber hin- aus noch mit der Schatzkammer des kongolesi- schen Katanga. Zudcm glaubt man in Peking wohl schwcrlich an die Aufrechterhaltung des Status quo ,in Afrika, sondern rilstet sich vermutlich mit Geduld auf einen allmlihlichen Zerfall der weil3en Herrschaft in den Landern sudlich des- Sambesi. - -- - --------- Tcclutische Aspekto Zu der fcieriichen Grundstdinlegung in Dar as Salaam wurden von dem tansanischen Informa- tionsministerium zum erstenmal cinige nahere An- gabcn and Zahlen Ober das Eisenbahnprojekt ver- i ffentlicht. Die Lange der Strecke von Dar es Salaam bis nach Kapiri Mposhi in Sambia, wo sic $DD (] For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 rcil+ hesleltrndrn Oslafriknni+chcn I kenbahn ver- arndel tvc'rden kaum, die fiber c:inc tit)1u?w610 von nur einent Aleter verliil;l. In men offiziellen Infor- nmli+nttihGillrrn winl atevchlit7.t, d:ilt %lie neuo i.kenlwhn rifle Kapazililt unit 1,75 Millirnarn Tim- 1101 1171n?li 1, in l cider Kiehlufl);en werdu hewiilli- gets 01111011. 11'i+hrend der I lulirluw der t,4tal?r]- 1?+tsi?, lell 1 +~,?,t{q~ltn, n nUl' Iatit 611(.11) (iewicht v(1 1) .41 Kilo (+t,ti Nli'wt heln',I,'( werdcu knurl. eull Ilie ncuc Tansania-Zambia Railroad (abgekUrzt Tazara) 45 Kilo l3clastung pro Meter aufnehmen konnen. Man rechnet mit Hochstgeschwindigkei- ten bis zu 100 km/h, wahrend auf den ostafrika-' nischen Linien nicht schnellcr als mit 60 km/h gcfahren wcrden.darf. Abecschen davon, data Sambia nach Fertig-, stcllung der Tazara auf die portugiesische Eisen- bahn nach Beira vcrzichten kann, wird sic.. auch das Hinterland von Tansania erschlicBen, in dem reiche Eisen- and Kohlevorkommen pro- spekticrt worden sired. AuBcrdem erhofft man sich ncuc landwirtschaftliche Anbauflachen im Rufiji- Tal, das bis dahin 'wegen seiner verkehrstech-' nischen Unzugiinglichkeit praktisch brachlag. Am Streckenbau sand gegenwartig nach den offizicllen Angaben insgesamt 12 000 Arbeiter and Techniker beschuftigt, wovon 4700 Chinesen. Man erwartet,. daB sick these Zahi noch auf 20 000 Arbcitcr and {{ Techniker, crhi. hien werde.., Kredit and Im-iportzwang Peking hat Tansania and Sambia fiir den Bahn- b u cincn zinsfreien Kredit von 2 866 000 000 Wn- sanisch. n Shilling (rued 1,5 Milliarden Schweizcr- franken) eingeriiumt. Die Ruckzahlunccn sollcr. 1953 beginners and sick fiber einen Zeiirawn von 30 Jahren erstreeken. Die ortliehen Kosten (fecal costs) werden auf 52 Prozent des Kredites berech- net, die von den Regierungen Tansanias and Sam- bias durch Import chinesischer Waren auf Grund eincs ((Commodity credit agrecmentp aufgebracht werden sollen. Nach den Informationsblattern soil die bereits angelaufene Einfuhr chinesischer Gebraucltsgiiter (Spielzeug, Porzellan, Textilien usw.) nicht erhi ht werden, sondern man will vielmehr sogenannte IKapitalgiiter wie Baumaterialicn importieren, deren Gesamtwert sich etwa auf 200 Millionen tansanische Shilling pro Jahr (etwa 110 Millionen Franken) belaufen dUrfte. Peking wird auch das Rollmaterial fur die Bahn liefern. Die Kosten dUrf- ten etwa 20 Prozent der Gesamtausgaben aus- marten. Die Au'wendungen fur den Ausbau des 11a/ens von Dar es Salaam werden von den Chine- sen nicht finanzicrt.. Gcgcnwlirtig existieren nur drei. Piers Air i tochsceschiffc. Drei weitcrc sind abet bereits im Ilau; zwci zuslitzliche sired geplant. Sobald diu 1?isenbahn in 13etrieb genommen scin wind, 8laubt maul ucht his zelin weilcrc Piers mit t,ticzicllen Vurht{lccinriclUuall en z.u hcui tigen, vor allrm flit Itrutlo Mnn,cnl;tnfratcLlcr, diu hpeziell flit men 'i'rumu+lsnrl Von I:rznn einl,crlcLlcI hind, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich 8 November 1970 CPYRGHTCHINESE GAIN INFLUENCE THROUGH RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION Three or four years ago many western diplomats' in Dar es Salaam, especially Americans, wore expressions of mild superiority while listening to Chinese plans to build a railroad in Tanzania. was to be more than 1800 kilometers long and extend from the Tanzanian capital through hinterland that was either swampy or mountainous or inaccessible, through difficult terrain, to join the Zambian railroad system at Kapiri' Mposhi. There was, some doubt that the Chinese had sufficient technical qualifications and equipment to carry out such a project. After all, following a study showing it to be economically unfeasible, the World Bank had refused financial backing. Furthermore, it was argued that it would take Mao Tse-tung's workers and technicians at least a decade before they could run their first train on this road. How much could happen during that time? By then the Dar es Salaam- Lusaka highway, over which copper could be brought to the coast, would have been paved with Swedish, Italian and American aid. In that time Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda and his Tanzanian colleague Julius Nyerere could become convinced that they had backed the wrong horse in choosing the train project. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 - CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 CPYRGHT Chinese Technical Skill Then as now very little was known about communist China. As a rule we tend to think of tremendous hordes of coolies doing compulsory labor with primitive tools on endless masses of land; we'think of them being technically where we in the west were about 50 years ago. Of course we have learned a little more about them in the meantime; for instance we know that their technicians can build hydrogen bombs and propel long-range missiles over tremendous distances. But anyone who had the opportunity to see the first geologists and railroad experts mark out and survey the line in Tanzania quickly had to revise his ideas about archaic technical knowledge in Mao Tse-tung's subjects. In the meantime, according to official figures, some 4700 Chinese have crossed the ocean. With them they have brought modern technical equipment like earth moving machines, tractors, steel girders for bridges as well as drilling machines for tunnel building. The Chinese are already considerably farther along in their program than western experts had anticipated. They have already finished some 110 bridges and thrown up dams over long stretches. By next month they are sup- posed to start on the manufacture of concrete blocks near Dar es Salaam. and figure on producing 2000 per day. Current calculations picture the stretch in operation in about four years. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 CPYRGHT DAppr&\ edsEaroRelEtasOA99S 9tQ2 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 On 26 October Kaunda laid the cornerstone for this tremendous undertaking at the gates of Dar es Salaam in the presence of the Chinese chairman of the Economics~elations with Foreign Countries Commission, Fang I. Kaunda, in his speech, briefly outlined the early history of the project: a World Bank study had shown that the road was economically unfeasible and not worth the expense;' a later study by the Canadian- American Maxwell Stamp Company had, it is true, come to the opposite conclusion; but all attempts at persuasion had been in vain; the project had been coolly received everywhere and met with refusal. The west had made the mistake of looking at the project only from the economic point of view. It had not considered Zambia's special economic situation as a landlocked country, surrounded by hostile neighbors. Possibly this negative attitude could also be explained by "political and ideolo- gical" motives: they did not want to offend South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. Kaunda pointed especially to Great Britain whose "vested interests" in "white" southern Africa would have been disturbed by the railroad project. But Zambia would slowly have to free itself from dependence on southern Africa and political rather than economic con- siderations were more important here. Furthermore, both Zambia and Tanzania were at liberty to choose their own helpers -- and their own friends and enemies. The contract with Peking to build the railroad was based on the assurance of "mutual respect and non-intervention." Thus there were due grounds to be thankful to the Chinese. There could no longer be any doubt that the project would be realized. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 14 CPYRGHT App rod fpmftke n1 9AQ9?1O-ty ~'xl~ (i'k~ A$A~301 ~Q01-8 ready made several western observers reevaluate their thinking. They remember the Aswan Dam in Egypt in which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would show no interest. The contract with the Soviets to build the dam opened for them the way to economic penetration of Egypt. Finally it led to military and political influence that did not stop in Cairo. It has extended to most of the countries in the Arab sphere, and to such a degree that Moscow has'not only secured im- portant strategic bases but is also in a position to have a decisive say in the dispute with Israel. Chinese Presence is Firmly Established Under Chinese administration, events could develop in a similar fashion in Tanzania and Zambia. Peking has not limited itself to financing and constructing a railroad in Tanzania; it has also taken over other pro- jects and is now training the army, air force and navy. At Tanzania's request, Peking has agreed to supply modern arms such as jet fighters against possible Portuguese threats. At the end of last year a Canadian military commission denied this request on the grounds that such in- struments were too expensive, training would take too long and anyhow the military situation did not warrant it. The Chinese certainly also knew these facts. But just as for the Soviets in Egypt, political aspects are more important to them. Therefore they will shortly deliver jet fighters to Tanzania because they know that this will make it necessary to keep instructors, advisers and technical' assistants there for some CPYRGHT mppi %.# Thus we will have to reckon with a hz.n se p for decades. And this will surely have its effect on the neghboring coun- tries. This not only stiffens the Africans' backs in their fight against Portuguese domination in Mozambique and Angola, but also presents the Red Chinese with a propaganda base in East Africa to a degree that till then they had been unable to secure anywhere on the black continent. The assurances of "mutual respect and non-intervention" may be enough for Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda. Yet they may be giving in to wish- ful thinking if they believe that Peking is acting purely out of motives of brotherly love for the "poor and exploited black brothers." When such concerns are voiced in Dar es Salaam, however, the answer the Tan- zanians give, not without some reason, is that the West had the oppor- tunity to keep the Chinese out butt now it has lost this chance.. Subversive Emanations Reliable sources in Congo-Kinshasa report that since the beginning of this year Chinese arms are again being smuggled across. Lake Tan- ganyika to the western shore of the area around Fizi. During the Congolese' rebellion, that is from 1964 to 1966, the Chinese were the chief arms suppliers for the rebels and used secret roads from Bujumbura in Burundi and from Kigoma on the east shore of Lake Tanganyika. The peninsula at Fizi on Lake Tanganyika was the last rebel nest of resistance. In 1966 it was wiped out after a hard fight by white mercenaries under the South African Mike Hoare.. At that time an entire arsenal of Chinese arms was found: heavy machine guns, heavy mortars, hand grenades, and automatic rifles. Approve ctf t"s@-(dgllpg Ja%%/a9s(02s CIA RDP s9 OP 1b susceptible yo But in all their undertakings the Chinese plan for the future. And the current situation in the Congo could change overnight, as it does so frequently in Africa. The "liberation movements" in southern Tanzania operating against.the Portuguese in Mozambique have been.supplied with Chinese arms for years. Apparently the Tanzanian government itself has long since lost count of the amount of military equipment from Peking in i'ts country. ; . Of especial importance, naturally, are Peking's economic in- terests. The most important to be considered is Zambia's wealth of copper. But of equal importance may be the iron ore and coal deposits in the southern parts of Tanzania which to date have been inaccessible anu also the great number of tropical agricultural products. The tie-in with the Zambian railroad not only provides an efficient connection be- tween the Indian Ocean and the Zambian copper belt but in addition, with the great treasure chest of Congolese Katanga. In this area Peking probably hardly believes in the maintenance of the status quo in Africa, but is probably patiently girding itself for the inevitable disintegration of white domination in the countries south of the Zambesi. Technical Aspects At the festive cornerstone-laying in Dar es Salaam the Tanzanian Information Ministry for the first time published several details and figures on the railroad project. The length of the stretch from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia where it meets the Zambian railroad net will b,ApSb 6xEeireAelea=e Q9/Q21; CPYRGHT Approvea or a ease Zambia. This means that the rolling stock cannot be used on the East African road, which has a one-meter gauge. Official information re- leases estimate that the new road will be able to handle 1. 75 million tons annually in both directions. Whereas the East African roadbed can take only 30 kilograms per meter, the new Tanzania-Zambia railroad (Tazara for short) can carry 45 kilograms per meter. They figure on top speeds up to 100 kilometers per hour as -against a maximum of 60 kilometers per hour on the East African line. Apart from the fact, that Zambia, after completion of Tazara, can dis- pense with the Portuguese railroad to Beira, the road will also provide access to Tanzania's hinterland in which rich iron and coal deposits have been prospected. In addition they hope to win new, agricultural land for cultivation in the Rufiji valley. To date, because technical reasons make it inaccessible, it has been practically a wasteland. According to official reports, a total of 12, 000 workers and technicians, including 4700 Chinese, are at work on the road. It is expected that this figure will rise to 20, 000 workers and technicians. Credit and Export Pressure Peking has. made available to Tanzania and Zambia an interest- free credit of 2866 million Tanzanian shillings (about 1.5 billion Swiss francs). Repayment is to start in 1983 and extend over a period of 30 years. Local costs are calculated at 52 percent of the credit and are to be defrayed by the Tanzanian and Zambian governments through imports of Chinese goods on_the basis of a"commodity credit agreement.!' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 CPYRGHT According to the information releases, the current. importation of Chinese consumer goods (toys, china, textiles, etc) is not to be increased, but rather so-called capital goods like construction materials are to be imported.' Total value may run as high as 200 million Tan- zanian shillings annually (about 110 million francs). Peking will also supply the railroad's rolling stock. Costs may be some 20 percent of the total expenditures. The Chinese will not finance the development of the port of Dar es Salaam. At present there are only three piers for deep sea ships. Three additional ones are currently under construction; two further ones are planned. As soon as the railroad has been put into operation it is thought that an additional 8 to 10 more piers with special loading facilities will be needed, especially for large bulk goods freighters, specially equipped to transport ores. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 NEUE ZUERQiEER ZEITUNG, Zurich 6 December 1970 VEP 0 .71 ~rtt' Auf der Baustelle *der Tansania - Sambia-Eisenbahn Von einem Sonderkorrespondenten CPYRGHT In den Stra(}en Dar es Salaams bringen unter Mtangobaumen. Potentials im jetzt noch unzuganglichen Hinterland. Der Wert des aus dentin jetzt die rcifen Fruchte fallen, fliegende Handler die Bruckenkopfs fur Peking - der m3glicherweise hauptsachlich zur Spruchweisheit des Vorsitzenden Mao an den Mann. Zwischen Subversion im sweillen* . Afrika sfidlich des Sambesi aufgebaut Stadt and Ftughafeli waist cia mit chinesischen Zeichen beschrif? wird - ward wesentlich davon abhangen. ob es sick das Vet-- tetes Schild den Weg zwischen hoci;st;immigen Kokospalmen zum -trauen der. Gastlander find der AnstOBer, die zur ostafrikanischen Yombo Railroad Centre. Und in derv prachtigen Naturhafen der Gemeinschaft gehoren, erwerben kann. Das Mil3trauen etwa Stadt 1;iuft kurz vor Soanenuntergang die clianhuaa aus Banton Kenyas ist wach, Nicht nur gegenuber den guten Worten Maos trait liunderten von Pekings E-'ntwkklungsheIfern ein and macht im roten Bdchlein, das in Nairobi konfisziert wi rde, sondern auch unweit der Luxuskarawanserei des Kilirtandscharo-Hatels felt. gegenuber den nachteiligen Auswirkungen, die der Bau der Bahn Die chinesische Pr?Isenz drangt sich bei eine-n kuren es::c5 . durch den Einstrom chinesischer Waren (deren Gegenwert zur Tansanias. von den geschildcrten Z ufa1lsbco`, c;at:ugen Deckung der prtlich anfallenden Baukosten dient) auf einheimische -bcgegnungen abgesehon, nicht auf. Das H.:upVor"I,em F, kings Industrien im Embryonalzustand habeas kiinnte. In dem behagen schwingen selbst historische Erinnerungen mit: der. Bau der Bau einer fiber 1800 Kilometer langen Verbindungsbaltn der Ostafrikanischen Eisenbahn fuhrte seiuerzeit zu ciner starken zwischen dem sambischen Kupfergiutel find dem Ilafen von Dar, der der asiatischen Bevoikerungt die indischen Gast- cs Salaam, der Tanzania Zambia Railroad (TAZAR) - falit kaum !arbeiter setzten sich im Lando fast. In dio Augers. Die Camps der chinesischen Bautrupps liegen nicht' nur hinter Stacheldraht, sondern zum Tell auch hinter spanischen Es bleibt abzuwarten, ob dio TAZAR fur Peking wird, was der Wanden, die dcm Passanten jeden Blick auf die Materiallager undHochdamm von Assuan ftlr Moskau - e}n FuB zwischen Tar and Baumaschinen sowio die notorisch kamerascheuen Untertanen ; Schwelle. Die Vorgeschichte des Projekts gemahnt an jene des Maas vetwehren. Ebensowenig sind dio eigentiichen Baustellen'Staudamms: Cie Gutachter der Weltbank and westlicher Staaten zug:inglicli. Besichtigungswunsche, bei den tansanischen Behorden, (allerdings auch der Sowjetuuion), zeigten Tansania and Sambia vorgebracht, werden dcm fremden Besucher gerne mit dem Hin-! in Sachen TAZAR die kalte Schulter. 'Venn die Lektion von weis auf dio Empfindlichkeit and Geheimnistuerei ?uuserer Assuan offenbar in dieser Hinsicht nicht beherzigt worden 1st, chinesischen Freundev abgeschlagen. Aber or braucht nicht lange, kann sic wenigstens In anderer nachtraglich fruchtbar werden: inn herauszufinden, daB so vial Diskretion auch dem einheimf im Verzicht darauf, bei Voraussagen fiber die technlsche Kora- schen Bediirfnis eutspricht. Man hat wenig Lust, Pekings Engage- pctenz der unerwunschten Entwicklungshelfer den Wunsch tart meat an dle groFe Glocke zu hangen. Da and dort 1st sogar dls der Wirklichkeit zu verwechseln. Die Schwierigkeiten des Einsicht vorhanden, daB den, der sich grtln macht, gar leicht dio Streckenbaus im Kipengere-Gebirge sind offenbar gewaltig. Au'-, Ziegen fressen-- auch wenn man dieso Bedenken afrikartischervorlaufig widerspricht nichts der Erwartung, daB Peking das formulieren warde. gesteckte Ziel, einen betriebsbereiten Schfenenstrang binnen funf Jahren, wird erreichen konnen. Die Vorteile, die die Eisenbahn den drei Partnern bringt, liegen Die Weltbank hat seinerzeit ein Darlehen mit der Begrundung auf der I Iand. Sambia ward von der po}it}schen Hypothek fret, abgelehnt, der Bahnbau set unwirtschaftlich. Nun erschent se scin Kupfer auf dem Schienensystem des RweiBen AfrikaA - viaauf der Liste moglicher Kreditgeber fur den Ausbau der Hafea- Rhodesien and Mocambique - an den Indischea Ozean verfrach. ten zu milssen. Tansania wiederum erhofft sich, abgesehen von an!agen von Dar es Salaam, den die - wider besseres Wissen der Verstarkung des Transithandels, Anreize zur ErschlieBung von oder aus hoherer Einsicht, das with sich zeigen, ertrotzte - Bates Koblen- and Eisenerzvorkommen sowie des landwirtschaftlichen notwendig macht. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : C20A-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich 6 December '1970 CPYRGHT PEKING'S AFRICAN BRIDaaM In the streets of Dar es Salaam, under the niango.trees from which ripe fruit is falling now, vendors are peddling the wisdom of Chairman Mao. Between the city and the airport a signboard lettered in Chinese points the way through the cocoanut palms to the Yombo Railroad Center. In the beautiful, natural harbor of the city, shortly before sundown the vessel "Jianhua" from Canton arrives with a cargo of hundreds of Peking development helpers and ties up not far from the luxury caravan- sary of the Kilimanjaro Hotel. On the occasion of,'a brief visit to Tanzania apart from the above-mentioned casual observations and encounters the Chinese presence is not obtrusive. The principal Peking project -- construction of a railroad connection (more than 1800 kilometers in length) between the Zambian copper belt and the harbor of Dar es Salaam, the Tanzania Zambia Railroad (TAZAR) -- is hardly visible. The camps of the Chinese construction force are not only behind barbed wire but also in part concealed by "Spanish walls " which prevent the passer-by from catching a glimpse of the materials stores and construction machinery as well as of the notoriously camera-shy subjects of Mao. The actual construction sites are equally inaccessible. Requests to visit the sites, placed before Tanzanian authorities, are frequently rejected with a reference to the sensitivity and the secretiveness of "our Chinese friends." But the visitor does not need too much time to find out that so much discretion also suits the locals. There is little inclination to broadcast Peking's invdivement. Here and there it is understood that he who makes himself green can easily be gobbled up by the goats -- even if this idiom were to be phrased in a more African manner. The advantages which the railroad brings to the three partners are obvious. Zambia will be rid of its political mortgage of having to ship its copper on the railroad system of "White Africa" -- via Rhodesia and Mozambique--to the Indian Ocean. Tanzania, on the other hand, is hoping that apart from strengthening transit trade it will be able to provide stimuli for uncovering coal and iron ore deposits as well as expanding the agriculture potential of the currently still inaccessible hinterland. The value of the Peking bridgehead -- which is possibly being expanded mainly for purposes of subversion in White Africa south ofthe Zambezi -- will essentially be dependent upon whether it can earn the confidence of the host countries and objectors which are members of the African community. The distrust of, say, Kenya has been awakened. Not only vis-a-vis the good words of Chairman Mao in the little red booklet, which was confis- cated in Nairobi, but also with respect to the detrimental effects which the construction of the railroad could have on native industry which is in the embryonic stage through the influx of Chinese goods (whose value serves to cover local construction costs). Even historical memories play a role in this feeling of malaise. Construction of the East African Railroad had, at one time, led to a strong multiplication of Asiatic peoples; the Hindu workers settled in the land. ApprnviPrl Fnr RPIPact 1 AAAMAM - CIA_RfP7q_nl I Annn %nnn5nnn1 _R 21 CPY ;ved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 It remains to be seen whether TAZAR will become for Peking what the Aswan High Dam is for Moscow.-- a foot in the door. The preliminary history of the project is a reminder of-that pertaining to the dam: the experts from the World Bank and from Western countries (however also from the Soviet Union) showed Tanzania and Zambia a cold shoulder with respect to TAZAR. If the lesson of Aswan was obviously not heeded in this regard it can at least bear fruit in other matters subsequently: refusal, in predicting the technical competence of the unwanted development helpers, to confuse wishes with reality. The difficulties of the construction project in the Kipengere Mountains are obviously horrendous. But for the time being nothing is contradicting the expectations that Peking will be able to accomplish the goal of. constructing an operational rail- road within five years. The World Bank had at one time rejected a loan with the justification that the railroad project was uneconomical. Now it [the Bank] appears on a list of possible lenders for the improvement of harbor facilities at Dar es Salaam which the railroad -- defiantly [built], be it against better ' o r ' r through_a stroke o! higher insight - now makes necessayr Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 22 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London 20 June 1971 CPYRGHT CHINESE DOMINATE TANZANIA C OMMUNIS i Chinese penetration- . of Tanzania, which has long been alarming to her African neighbours,' has now reached danger point. Chinese military person- nel in the country now ex- ceed in number the total slrcnith of tits small Tan- zanian Army, which s itself failing under Chinese cone trot, '!'he latest figures given by tile; 'l'alt7.;ltliall Covct'nnlCnlt reveal that the 50,000-stronf; ]ahour force workingg on the ],200-mil. Tan-%um railway projcca (front the coast ,.hand to Y,anlhi;) now ncludes 1x.000 Chinese " technicians." What Ills figures c,o not reveal is lh;ll chinos., all or thccc tech- nician; arc, in f;lct, soldiers or the Ch6ncsc-1'coplc's Libcratioh Ariu.?, TlivY conic from its ltail- wa Corp. its l:u;:ini^cring Corps and its Si; pal Corils, but have all hall basic military training. This is nt' the fn'st ime that the C:hi(u'se Arnhy has been, used for such major conslruc- ,ion projrcis abroiid. 1'urihcr- moic, t h, s ;,n awkward habit of ,, ,Bing: .,gilt eVeli after its work is conlil:cicd.. ? Thus Cicin2so Army personnel ll Civilian g'ilise, as in 7arizania,. 13,000 Chinese hc:pcrs out of military instructors in 'Tanzania Tanz;utia remains to be seen, . ),ad to be Nvilhdrawn nbruptlY But quite apart from the alarm two years ago, when Preside. It Shi'(:a(ilTig t uouguout East Nycrcro refused to renew his Africa, there are already signs '.training agreement with Ottawa.', of friction between the Chinese Beccnt Chinese arms deliveries and the Tanzanians themselves. have included at least l6 medium llint5 of labour.unt'est and racial' , tanks, similar to the Soviet T-G2 nninho,ily have appeared even class, to reinforce the small in oilicial Tanzanian. reports. arntourccl clement of 12 Chinese 'Thus it is clear that there has; light tanks in the Tanzanian been a head-on clash between; Army. the native labourers and their Artiilcc;V provided has intludc.d Chinese ovcrsccrs oil the rail,vay 24 field guns and sonic six to. over the provision of food. The" eight howitzers. All this equip- Chincsc decided that as tho amen. arrived with a full range Africans' practice of preparing of spares and anlntunition. their own meals wasted far too Large quantities of mortars mach time. they would provide and light arms, together with the food thcntscwcs. - auununiLion, have also been The, nveragc African labourer shipped to liar-es-Salaam in the elms about 170 Tanzanian past fcw months as well as at shillings (CIO) a month and the least 100 military lorries and Chinese started dcductiug 55. large numbers of deep-typo shillings (1:3.24) from this for vehicles. the meals service, .s'oCrEs ; ;tcl j~luries Quite apart from their rescl;t- meat at losing such a chunk of In early April the Chinese their wager, the. Africans found vessel Gui Lilt also off-loaded Illey could not stomach the, two 100-ton Shanghai-class fast o overseers' fond. Piles have conslal patrol boats for the tiny been found thrown away'oti the 'Tanzanian Navy ihringing its construction sites. total sirengtrt up to six patrol The Chincsc are clearly boats. a~care of this mounting domestic T1`king has also undcrtai(ci hostility and of tilt growing un- to (,,Giver to Tanzania two case among Tanzania's six squadrons (about 24) of MiG-17 AI?ricall neighllours. Tltey keep type ' intcrccptorS. ' The first ,their Array teams out of sirltt group of 50 Tanzanian Air Force l ' built the strategic highway link- ing Eatmanclu nnd, Llnasa, tho capitals of Nepal and Tibet. Thom job was finished in, 1967. Still KU. Nepal 13ut ill,-, Chincsc' soldiers are still in, Nepal. They persuaded 11te Nepalese Goycrnnlcnt to., allow then. to remain. for 10 years to "maintain" the 72-mile epalcsc scctiou of the road. Whclher 1'residcnt Nycrcro will need 10 years to get his WAS=Qrk_0 110^00 VA 21 J"` mo 3.971 Approv and their. obit spec a the trainees left for China at camps wilen not working oil the beginning of the year for train- raihvay. inr? in tilt handling of these Their supplies conic in Chinese Chnese-built aircraft. vessels which brhi ia, and ult- { %vcntually, the Chinese have load by? night, equipment foi`r agreed to train 250 Tanzanians 'rainailia's ? own Army, 1hl,- as pilots and technicians. All 10,000-strong "People's Defence. I candidates are being selected by Force." ? : ! the Chinese on the spot and Chinese control of military' subjected. to vigorous examina? supply and training in this force thous by a ' team of,Chineso, became absolute when Canadian doctors in Tanzania. , Scrv:ce to Start Oil I auzain TIZLtilwr?ay Router I 7tailway project, a Tanzanian DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzan-' official said today. ia-Passenger trains will start Tlto section lies wholly in 416 t ` 1 1 02.(5 'Z 4(, -!AyAt 300050001-8 the Chinese-assisted Taman, road link with Zambia.. - Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 RELTTER, Nairobi 17 July 1971 CPYRGHT Dar es Salaam, 17 July (REUTER)--The Tanzanian Government said today REUTERS had misquoted the Zambian finance minister over the cost of the Chinese-tinanoed railway to link Lusaka and Dar es Salaam. "The attention of the Tanzanian Government has been drawn'to a report which was 'circulated by REUTERS news service that Hon. Mwanakatwe, Zambian minister of finance, told the Zambian Parliament on July 15, 1971, that the Tanzam railway now cost 17 milliarL k-iacha. (,nea.rlr iQ? m .1l1orz sterling): more than origiaa.~ estimated.. "The -e=ra cost, the report -stated. .rose :becz use the 'Chinese engineers ,vund tun:eI ing on some sections more difficult than originally thought. The government wants to make it known to all concerned that the report is a complete misquoting of what the Hon. Mwanakatwe is known to have told the Zambian Parliament. This case of misreporting is is unfortunate because the estimated cost of the railway, which the People's Republic of China so generously agreed to assist in financing, still remains the same as agreed between China, Zambia and Tanzania. "The Tanzania Government has information that what in fact the Hon. Mwanakatwe was asking parliament was merely to request for budgetary provision to fulfill Zambia's obligations as agreed on between the three parties," the Tanzanian Government statement said. NCNA 25 June 1971 CPYRGHT NYERERE DENIES RUMORS ABOUT PRO TECHNICIANS Dar es Salaam, June 24 --"Tanzania is ours and we shall defend it for the benefit of Africa," declared Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere when he was addressing armymen of the Tanzania military academy at Mgulani, south of the capital, on June 22, according to press reports here. He said that former colonial powers would like to see Tanzania and other countries in Africa play their former part--the victim of exploitation. Those who colonized Africa would still like to maintain their sphete of influence should they have the opportunity to do so. Tanzania's?resolution to gain independence was therefore not in their Interest and they would go all lengths to ensure that they can continue with their exploitation. Referring to the anti-China rumour concocted and spread recently by the $ritish paper "DAILY TELEGRAPH" about Chinese railway technicians in Tanzania President Nyerere said that this is just one of the ways in which colonialists wanted to pick up-a quarrel with Tanzania in an attempt to exploit it. He said that if the imperialists and exploiters win in one country, they look for another where they can strike a blow. "If they come, they will come seriously, and"we must be' prepared for them by being serious." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 24 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 CPYRGHT The president called on the Tanzanian, soldiers, peasants, and workers to be as barious and tough as the Vietnamese and Chinese in their fight against aggression and exploitation. He said that Viet Jam has been fighting s war of liberation since 1945, firsts with the French who later gave up and withdrew, and later with Americans who will have no alternative but to withdraw. The president oallad on the soldiers to learn diligently at the academy so that they can demand the country! better for the benefit of the whole African Continent. WASHINGTON POST 14 August 1971 Chiaa Trade Fair Planned in Zambia Reuter LUSAKA, Zambia, Aug. 13-China will hold a trade ex- hibition in Lusaka in October in an attempt to boost Zambian interest an. Chinese goods:' Zambia has to import Chinese products worth about $11 million each year under an agreement by which Peking sells goods here to offset the cost. of the 1,000-mile railroad the Chinese are building be-' tween ? Zambia' and Tanzania. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1971 THE RUSSIAN CHURCH IN POLITICAL ACTION If Lenin had felt sure of himself in 1918 he would no doubt have outlawed all forms of worship in the Soviet Union. Instead, he opened a period of religious persecution that still flourishes. Today, churchmen who dare to be outspoken about their constitutional rights to practice religion are imprisoned while those who are politically docile and subservient to the dictates of the Soviet regime are sent abroad for "dialogues" with Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, etc. It is this subservient group that the Soviet regime uses to build up its facade of religious tolerance at home, This "tolerance" embraces some 14 officially recognized church denominations throughout the USSR, the largest of which are the Russian Orthodox and Islamic Churches. In exchange for official toleration, the Soviet regime extracts obeisance from church leaders, support for its foreign and "peace" policies, and uses Communist dialogues with foreign religious groups to promote Communist popular front tactics. Ecumenical Dialogues In the decade preceding the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the USSR was highly successful in utilizing its own subservient church representatives, particularly those from the Russian Orthodox Church, to maneuver supposedly apolitical ecumenical groupings into espousing Soviet foreign policy pronouncements. This was accomplished by working through the Christian Peace Conference, founded in 1958, and by the entrance in 1961 of the Russian Orthodox Church into membership in the World Council of Churches. The failure of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Christian Peace Conference to take any significant action or stand following the invasion of Czechoslovakia (with the exception of individuals such as Russian Orthodox dissenter Aleksandr Levitin-Krasnov, later imprisoned) convinced many world Christian leaders that what they had viewed as positive experiment with a unique East-West dialogue had been fast turning into an Eastern monologue. Mounting evidence of continued religious persecution (as recounted in samizdat publications reaching the West) that goes on behind the facade of official "tolerance" has further increased the wariness of some Communist and most non-Communist religious leaders about Soviet intentions. Christian Peace Conference Since its founding in 1958 by a group of East European theologians in Prague, the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) has functioned as the primary channel through which Communist churchmen reach and try to Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 influence world Christian bodies and public opinion in general, During the first ten years of its existence, the CPC also characterized a new subtlety in Soviet manipulation of Communist fronts and permitted Soviet "peace" propaganda to become an effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy, Before the founding of the CPC, Soviet peace organizations were notorious for their inflexibility in prohibiting either pronouncements or proceedings to deviate in the slightest from Soviet policy. Within the CPC, however, individual Soviets stayed in the background and permitted an impressive degree of freedom in theological discussions so long as they could feel sure that the desired resolution on a given topic (Vietnam, Zionism, West German revanchism, etc.) would be forthcoming. This small degree of permissiveness in organizations such as the CPC greatly enhanced the potential of such groups to attract non-Communist support. The Christian Peace Conference, which prefers to call itself a "movement" rather than an organization, grew rapidly. Only 47 participants (of whom only four came from the West) attended the founding meeting in 1958. During the next ten years, the CPC sponsored three large international meetings called All-Christian Peace Assemblies. The third Assembly, held in Prague 31 March - S April 1968, was attended by over 500 delegates from 55 countries, representing churches of 20 European, 18 African, and 12 American countries, The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was represented by a Roman Catholic theologian. Some 63 observers were sent from organizations such as the World Council of Churches, the Conference of European Churches, and the British Council of Churches. Among non-Christian attendees were representatives from the Buddhist religious societies of Ceylon and the USSR. Conference documents listed the names of 82 newspapers, magazines, and radio-TV reporters accredited to the Assembly, The "Czechoslovak Spring" was at its height during the third Assembly, and for the first time after twenty years of imposed silence, Czechoslovak Christians were free to disclose how their churches had been manipulated and infiltrated by the Communist Party. Four months after the close of the third Peace Assembly, Czechoslovakia was invaded, signaling the beginning of the metamorphosis of the CPC from a quasi-independent grouping to one completely under Soviet control, The president of the CPC, Dr. Josef Hromadka and its general secretary, Jaroslav Ondra, both of whom spoke out against the invasion, were purged from the CPC in the course of its "normalization." Hromadka had been a firm believer in the Soviet socialist revolution, a member of the Soviet-run World Council of Peace, and in 1958 he received a Lenin Peace Prize for "his services to the cause of Communism at home and abroad, and especially in the ecumenical movement." The day after the invasion, Hromadka wrote the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia that "the Soviet government could not have made a more tragic mistake.-O'ly a:- rrmediate withdrawal of the occupying armies can partly mitigate our ceru"or tragedy." The reply came from the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church who, in an angry letter, called Hromadka's views "inadmissible expressions." In a subsequent memorandum written for internal CPC use, Hromadka wrote that the cause of peace could not be served "with views and tasks given to us from outside" and without the "courage to listen to each other and to make decisions freely in real dialogue." This memorandum marked an irrevocable turn in the life of the CPC and eventually forced the resignations of its general secretary and president.. The 15 November 1969 issue of Frankfurter All em~eine Zeitung noted that the CPC as "breaking up," and sai ait~l the vo iet-led invasion some members of the organization had taken "Soviet speeches about peace as genuine and had placed themselves at Soviet disposal as a church program for such propaganda. The invasion shocked many and the work of the CPS has been crippled ever since." Following Hromadka's departure, Metropolitan Nikodim of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) succeeded in gaining almost complete control of the organization and the situation within the CPC rapidly deteriorated. During an early 1970 Working group meeting, for example,'Nikodim's high-handed tactics in the handling of procedural matters and his complete disregard for any opposition within the CPC, caused a walkout by seven of the Western representatives, including those from France and West Germany. By mid-1971, associated groups in most of Western Europe, Japan,, and the U.S. had all but withdrawn from active participation in the CPC as it is run under Nikodim The Fourth All-Christian Peace Assembly is scheduled to meet in Prague this month, from 30 September to 3 October 1971. The prognosis is for a very slim attendance. Nikodim, Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, at 31 and with little theological training, became the youngest Bishop in the ROC and in 1963, at age 34, was elevated to Metropolitan, a rank just below that of Patriarch. As head of the church's Department of External Relations in Moscow, Nikodim directs all ROC foreign relations and is the ROC's representative in the World Council of Churches,, How Nikodim functions as an articulate foreign affairs spokesman for the Russian church, and thereby for the Soviet regime, is described in the attached newspaper clip reprints. After its founding in 1948, the Soviets at first viewed the Geneva-based World Council of Churches (WCC) as "a tool of Western imperialism." But by the mid-1950's and as the WCC grew in stature and size, the Soviet regime began. to see a possibility for using the organization as a co-activist in its own "peace" campaign. Feelers were put out and by the time of the WCC Third General Assembly in New Delhi in late 1961, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) had been admitted to membership. The entry of Russia's largest church into the WCC was hailed by many as a triumph of Christian unity over political disagreement; others were not so sure. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Concerning Metropolitan Nikodim as representative of the Russian church in the WCC, Michael Bourdeaux noted, in his book Opium of the People (1965), that upon Nikodim's entry into the WC- C,he began campaigning for the WCC to play its part in the peace forum, particularly by supporting resolutions adopted by the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference (CPC). If challenged, Nikodim would answer, "By supporting such causes we gain standing in the eyes of our government." Bourdeaux commented that it was "surprising that he never said that it must be a basic Christian concern to further the cause of peace in the world." When asked what contribution the Russian Church could bring to the WCC, "instead of giving me an answer about the richness of the Russian liturgy,.. or saying it would bring a new stream of Christianity into a predominantly Protestant movement., Nikodim started talking of the value to Western Christians of the social experience they would gain from the Soviet Union." As the chief organizational. expression of the ecumenical movement in the world today, the WCC is by dictate of its charter apolitical, Nevertheless, as the ROC became increasingly active, WCC statements increasingly reflected an imbalance in their political orientation For example, following the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the statement issued by the WCC "deplored the military intervention" and called for the removal of the Warsaw Pact troops "at the earliest possible moment." In contrast, WCC statements on Vietnam issued during the same year had adopted standard North Vietnamese-Soviet terminology in calling for "an immediate and unconditional" halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. The U.S. presence in Vietnam, according to WCC statements had brought about "mortal suffering of the Vietnamese people," while the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia was viewed by the WCC as an "ill-considered action." The type of imbalance as reflected in these and other state- ments on East-West political issues has been a source of disillusion- ment to many Western churchmen. The inadequacy, if not lack of response, from the WCC to appeals from those imprisoned in the USSR because of religious persecution is to many an added frustration. Within the ecumenical movement, an increasingly critical eye is being cast on "what it means to be in responsible communication with Christians in Communist societies." (Among the attached clippings are included some which illustrate recent developments of political trends within the WCC.) Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 SAMIZDAT SOURCES' CN RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE USSR The Soviet constitution guarantees each citizen the right to practice religion and states that anyone who prevents him from so doing is liable to punishment. Samizdat* sources, however, ,provide evidence of religious persecution anTTow that Soviet laws are so framed as to enable the authorities to imprison believers for nothing more than the normal practice of their faith. Most samizdat documents on religious matters come from the Russian Or its odo`x -and Baptist sources. Religious protesters tend to concentrate on denominational matters. Only a few individuals, such as Russian Orthodox dissenter and writer Aleksandr Levitin-Krasnov or the late Boris Talantov, have signed non-religious protest documents. Modification of the constitution is one of the Soviet believers' chief demands. Since May 1929, believers do not have the right to teach religion to children or to other adults (except in officially recognized seminaries). Soviet believers have also appealed for their constitutional rights as they stand; they have petitioned the officially approved religious authorities to permit a democratically elected hierarchy and appealed for the registration of so-called illegal sects, such as the dissident Baptists, and for the reinstate- ment of dismissed churchmen and against the closure of churches. Imprisonment Believers are frequently charged under Article 142 of the RSFSR Criminal Code - "violation of the laws on separation of Church from State and school from Church" - for which the maximum punishment is three years' deprivation of freedom. They may also be charged under Article 227 for encouraging religious activities "harmful to the health of citizens" or.inciting people "to refuse to participate in social. activity or to fulfill their civic obligations." Since 1961 this: has carried a maximum sentence of five years deprivation of liberty or exile. The longest known sentence on believers were those of 15, 13 and ten years' imprisonment given to leaders of the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People in Leningrad in 1967 and 1968. This group has produced a political program for democratic reform 'and was engaged in clandestine para- military self-education and organization work. * samizdat translates as "we,publish ourselves," that is, not the - state, but we, the people. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 According to a protest letter sent to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1969 by the imprisoned writers Daniel, Ginzburg and Galanskov, believers are prohibited from receiving any religious literature and may not even have a Bible while in prison. One result of putting so many believers in prisons and labor camps has been that they have sometimes formed religious groups there. Mikhail Sado, serving a long sentence in one of the strict regime prison camps for criticizing Khrushchev, founded the All- Russian Social-Christian Alliance, according to a samizdat document written and distributed by Alexander Petrov-Agatov, himself a prisoner. Dissident Baptists A great deal of documentation about persecution of their members has been provided by the Evangelical Christian Baptists or initsiativniki, who broke away from the Baptist Church in 1965 an have never received official recognition. They have at least two regular samizdat publications - including a monthly, Brats Listok, and a quarterly, Vestnik Spaseniya. The initsiativniki, who had objected to the compromises made by the leaders of e Baptist Church to.placate the Communist regime, are particularly active, and some 500 of them have been imprisoned since 1961. The repressive measures taken against them were described in an appeal to the party leadership by 1,453 women in March 1969. They said their children were victimized' and beaten up at school and sometimes forcibly removed from the parents by the KGB (secret police) and placed in children's homes. They had addressed thousands of petitions to the authorities begging for an end to persecution but it became even harsher: "Fines beyond our means, beatings-up, dismissal from jobs and institutes, confiscation of flats, arrests of fathers, husbands and, improbably as it may seem, mothers - this is the reply we have received so far from you to all our complaints.. Russian Orthodox Church Less is known about the treatment of rank-and-file members of the Orthodox Church but the cases of three leading dissidents have been reported in the underground journal, Chronicle of Current Events. Levitin-Krasnov who was arrested in September, 1969, and subsequently released has signed a number of protests about the abuse of civil rights in the Soviet Union and about the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He was a member of the Action Group for the Defense of Hunan Rights in the Soviet Union. After his arrest, a number of documents were circulated attesting to the excellence Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 of his character and the legality of his actions. A letter from seven Christians, addressed to the World Council of Churches in September, 1969, said: "Anatoly Bmrmanuilevich was doing his duty as a Christian and none of his activities . . . infringed Soviet laws. . ." Boris.Talantov, a lay member of the Orthodox Church, who wrote a series of protest letters about the lack of religious freedom in the Soviet Union, was tried in September 1969, for allegedly publishing "anti-Soviet propaganda." Chronicle No. 10 (October, 1969) reported that he was given a two-year sentence in a labor camp. Neither the charge against the Orthodox priest Pavel Adelheim, arrested in December 1969, nor his sentence in known, but his character was smeared by Pravda Vostoka (the Uzbek Republican newspaper); which accuse him o sadism towards his wife and children. According to Chronicle No. 13 (April 1970) however, his initiative and energy shad enabled believers in Kagan to build a new, stone church. He was '" . . a young, well-educated priest and a good preacher, enjoyed great love and authority among his parishioners. His ecclesiastical activity was beyond reproach from the viewpoint of civil law." Ukrainian Uniate Church Increased activity of the Uniates, who acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope (but have been illegal since 1945), has been matched by increased persecution. According to Chronicles Nos. 7 and 8 ( April and June 1969), priests have been and beaten up by the police. On 18 Ottober 1968, the homes of ten were searched and religious objects confiscated. In January 1969, Bishop Velichkovski, who was about 70 years old and in poor health, was arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment for infringing regulations. (Bishop Velichkovski had been sentenced to ten year's hard labor when the.Uniate Church was forcibly integrated with the Orthodox Church in 1946.) Further information has come from a samizdat essay of January 1970, Chronicle of Resistance, by-Valentin Moroz, a Ukrainian historian. He con epnne e appropriation of religious works of art from a Uniate church in the Kiev area,' which belonged to a strongly nationalistic minority, the Hutsuls. Arguing that religion and national culture had become inseparable in Eastern Europe, he said: "One must inevitably conclude that a fight against the Church is a fight against the culture. The anti-religious struggle is, in fact, a kulturk f. It is more convenient to destroy the foundations o a nation as a whole under the guise of a stru le against ref1' '? Approved Fg r Release 199ikft2 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Sectarians Few Sectarian protest documents have come to light other than those of the Evangelical Christian Baptists, but Chronicle No. 14 (June 1970) reported the case of a woman Adventist from Belorussia who was detained in December 1969, and illegally searched. Her money was confiscated without a receipt. In April 1970, her house was searched and religious literature confiscated. Chronile No. 15 (August, 1970) noted that ten-year sentences had been passed on two women members of the schismatic True Orthodox Church and sentences of ten years and seven years plus five years' exile on two Jehovah's Witnesses. TEIE DAILY TELEGRAPH 12 March 19 71 ~: a a MI A T, .4 ~r ~ Iiristians . wiuma GPY RGHItO t e By Dr, CECIL NORTIICOTT, Churches Correspondent HRISTIANS imprisoned in the Soviet Union for their-faith havefslnuggled out an appeal through their relatives asking for help from', Christians in the West. They claim that children have been taken from parents because of their' religious lLpbringing. The appeal, in the form of letter, bears 45 signatures f prisoners' relatives. The signatures have been ouched for by authorities in ritain who. know the Irr tuation for Christians in ussia: The letter. published in todaj''s hunch of f ucrland Newspaper, ys that during the last months last year, -A1 people spent days each in pr,son for the fcnce of being involved is ayer and worship meetings. Bibles confiscated The Christians concerned be. 1 in gin the Evangelical Christian alpttst groups who actively ropngate the. Christian faith a d distribute Christian literature p isoners ask Christians 3 W. ? ---- --- S-~ " ono. curs[ to Pray lot' them Approve For? Release 1.999/09/,~obQr-'DQ?,~J'Q003 f- The letter asks that children who have been taken away from their -?parcnts..h use of re- ligious 'upbringing should ?be returned. Bibles and * other religious literature confiscated during searches of believers' homes should be given back. The letter says: "Evidence was ' given that hundreds of prayer gatherings have. been broken up by the authorities and worshippers had been bealen.? The tines for attending worship and prayer meetings amounted to over 94,300 roubles (over x40,000)." It adds that "scores of be. - lievers had been expelled from higher and middle educational institutions or had not been allowed in because they were known to belong' to thoso who,' believed in God." ? - The 0050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 CPYRGHT PHILIPPINES HERALD 14 September 1970 Romanian Pastor _ Says Co nrnies Persecuting Christians, with 200,00 a Still in ' Prisons The Rev. Wurmbrand saw the sun or read Ila and the Netherlands. said "communist . coun- newspapers and books Wurmbrand said be hopes :tries Lo about tho free- during my internment. . to set up similar missions dom of, religion. - Thou- Since he was released ? in Japan and o t b o r t sands 'ox people are beinit ; from . prison ;1a Roman' Asian countries. ',"-4 ~ a communist prison has peaking with news- .,declared that communist men, the Rev. -Fr. Wurm- ,countries are persecuting brand claimed that in ;Christians with about 'Communist, c o u n tries. ;200,000 still in prisons. Christians are put into T h a. Rev. Richard prison without reason. ' Wurmbrand, 61, was re- "I myself was put Into .ccntly I:n Japan to attend a prison In 1951 and was the 12th Baptist ' World given a 25-year sentence "Congress, but was order- without reason," the Ro- ed out of the meeting manlan pastor said. when he shouted against "I was chained with a the participation of so- 50-pound chain to my ..'vict de1'et:ates. legs in most of the time In the prison. I hardly ORYO - (AP) -. A.,persecuted every year in 1965. he said he or Romanian pastor who and 200,000 Christiani ganized the Christian. says he spent 14 years In are still in prisons.'?. Mission to the Commun-i CPYRGHT Lsvdi z-Kraynov, a. Critic -of A;itis+:l, Signed Civil Mghts Ap peril to U.N. iz'Flixy Mr. Levitin, a 5- 4-year-cid? in which he said Soviet officials, forester Russian Orthodox p ricst including the sccu - y police, and a writer of articles accusing had tried to persuade him to thr. Soviet Governrnent of sti-I + 1st World -- an under- ground missions to help Christians ,in Communist- countries. He said ? this' mission * helps by sending, -materials such as bibles' and evangelical ' tracts; through secret "couriers! or by balloons. 4 The pastor said he has e s t a b 1 fished mission, branches In 18 countries,; Including the ' United; States, ,Britain, Austra- was Genrikh Altuayan, .who was 'charged last July with anti-Soviet -activity. Fla ? also signed the prtit' to ? t ho United Nations. , The: a:rests have reduced to 12 the number of inenbirs of: the dissident group still at lib-: erty. The sources said.. the fiill- feligious froedoAl, wa.oEu'leglglg/Fgggj~ nCitRo~pityci ~if Il[ 'E30prlgti{Ffp(jgti extensive eco? rly '~T(N"M ki n i- ov a ffdfiffet'fieiotrRallored to Hun- Independent-minded Romania, which was taken by some as garlan conditions, opposes any' Orrao CPYRGHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 I94A000300050001-8 form of Integriition that would result In supranational organi- zation! and decision-making. Aside from the political Im? plications of the Chinese de. velopments of recent weeks, the drive toward British entry, into the Common Market is also likely to have a powerful impact an Comecon thinking. Far more than the United States, whose trade with East. ern Europe Is miniscule, the feast European contries look to Western Europe as a markets' and as a source of technology. The specter of a mnnollthie,' protective West l;uroptttn Coo- NEW YORK TIMES 31 July 1971 REDS' TRADE BLOC SETS INTEGRATION Bucharest Meeting Ends- An Accord on a Convertible' Currency Also Reported to facilitate multinational trad? By JAMES FEROhf within the bloc. Must of 8peelrt to The New York Unto ing WARSAW, July- 30-Eastern Eastern Europe's trade Is bila- teral and the complexity of cur? Europe's trade bloc, the Court, cil for Mutual Economic Assist rencies offers little opportunity, once, has reportedly agreed on to settle accounts between port= a complex plan for economic nets and to make trading ar- Integration, including a conv rangements with third parties. vertibio currency. ? I The agreement is expected to Czech sources said today that be published within a week.' the agreement came at a three. Informants here said that the1 day meeting of Premiere and economic ministers from the eight member countries. The meeting of the council, which is known as Comecon, ended yesterday In Bucharest. nomic grouping, Including, Britain, worries many East Eu. ropeana, Many of them feel that Inte gration could put a stop to; fruitful bilateral contacts at. ready slatted with the Weal and make economic contacts with the Common Market and $cnndinavla more difficult. Achieved Little Despite years of nri,~..~+a. Lions and bargaining. Come. con has failed to achieve a real multilateral economic sys? tern in Eastern Europe. Most contacts between the Commu? nisi countries remain bilatcrat and supranational organtza- Lions have accomplished little. roland and Hungary, for instance, want to move toward monetary convertibility, and a ,monetary system for clearing debts, gradually roplseinsl the old barter system. But less de. veloped countries such as Bul- garls oppose this idea. Also, the lees developed. countries such as Romania and Bulgaria would like to sea Comecon concentrate more on spreading the development funds, rather than on "special., izailolt" which they feet would cultural "specialists" while East Germany, Poland and Crcrholsolvakin moved ahead with advanced technology. ' Price polio, economic modJ ?els and the amount of decen- tralization remain matters for individual countries, ?t As a result, there are algnJfi? .Clint differences over such vital matters as how much' freedom to give the market,l These range from the rigid So., iviet system to Hungary, which its loosening up. i Though Romania has been the most outspoken opponent' of deep integration, Comecon; suffers from other frictions. and Romania is not along L>s1 opposing radical intespratioa.,?ri CPYRGHT oIla. Although some officials, both zechs and others, were skeptl- f over A he reported achieve- ments at the meeting, the one economist as it "milestone" In East European efforts to seek meaningful integration. One of the agreement's goals, he said, Is a convertible cur. rency, possibly a special ruble, preparation and that it would take "several five-year plans to implement."" A communiqud Issued last night at the close of the meet- Ing in Bucharest spoke of "gradual) implementation within national interests an noninter? erence in the intcrnatioal af? fairs of other states." Rumala's President and Come munist party leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, has lohg re9isted So. viet efforts to ? turn Comecon the entire economy of Eastern Europe. But a Czech economist said the new integration program' was intended to harmonize na-! tional economies into an effi- cient trade bloc rather than to force them to adhere to un- realistic programs as part of an over-all plan. The plan is said to Include a multiplicity of subjects, from tourism to scientific-technical agreements. According to ex- ports here, It seems to rcpre- sent a practical effort to over. comp the problems that have; plagued Comecon since Its in? ception two decades ago. The organization is a loose regional association without executive powers. it was found- ed to counter Marshal Plan aid to Western Europe and early Western efforts to isolate they Communist bloc. It has been beset by conflict-' Ing national interests within Eastern Europe, great diversi- ties in local economies, lack of Incentives In the more tightly; controlled economic systems and heavily bureaucraticoro?~ cedures. Attempts by so',et eaders to: use Comecon u .ant nstrumcnt for supranational economic direction have failed. One official here said that `conditions In Eastern Europe 1nnarentlg had rhangnd n,ffi. i n or -e new p an re? ceive unanimous agreement among Comecon members. The passage of time, one Czech economist said, had helped close the gap between Bulgaria and the more Indus. trialized countries such as East Germany' and Czechoslovakia. Other factors ft.was said in- cluded the present political tranquility In Eastern Europe and the continuing growth and probable expansion of the rival trading block, the European Common Market. Division of Production One Czech official said, how- ever, that it remained to be seen whether the ambitious Bucharest protocol would suc- ceed. He said that It might if It included plans for "a practical division of production within the socialist camp." ,No have five countries pro. ducing, automobiles," he said. 'his is madness. Until. ?we diversify properly. we cannot prosper an dwe wots't compete in the,W06V 7 was Premier Aiekset N. K03y lI'he communlqub appeared to gin. The other countries repre- contain a gain for Rumania in sented were East Germany, Po? its reference to Comecon's goals land, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Ias including "respect for-state Hungary. Rumania. and Mon? sovereisnty, independence, and, Heading the Soviet delegation CPYRGHT ' Approved For Release 1999/09/42: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 WASHINGTON POST 31 July 1971 CPYRGHT soviet Bid for Econoinic Union Seen Slowed by East Europeans By Dan Morgan Washington Fast Foreign Service BELGRADE, July 30-The Communist bloc's prime minis- tens agreed yesterday In Bu- charest to work for closer co- operation and integration over a 20-year period, but along lines that were left noticeably vague In their final commu? nique. After meeting for t h r e'e full days In the flag-festooned Romanian government build- ing, the governmental leaders of the eight countries of Come- con, the Soviet bloc economic, organization, said that "Social-! 1st integration is not equatable WASHINGTON POST 2 August 1971 CPYRGHT with the foundation of supran? ational" organization. This phrase, which Incorpor. ated a basic policy premise of Independent-minded Romania, appeared to rule out at least for the Immediate future any dramatic Impetus toward an East European version of the Common Market. This also suggested to West- ern analysts that there had been no basic change in the; preference of the East Europe-! ans for bilateral rather than: multilateral solutions to their economic problems, which are now being highlighted by shortages of investment capi- tal and modern machinery. Diplomatic and Romanian observers in. Bucharest said; this week that whatever en thustasm may have existed for a strong, centralized grouping, In the East had probably al-! ready been dampened by the prospect that the West Eurp-1 pean unit may soon be ex panded to include Britain and: its partners. ; This is because the East Eu. ropean countries, particularly' Romania, are trying to expand links with the West. Most of them think this trend would only be made more difficult by transforming Comecon from a loosely knit organization into a rival economic bloc. Details of the program worked out and adopted this week will not oe furry Known until publication of an 8O?page- document later. But the word. ing of the communique sug? !gested a disappointment for the Soviet Union which has led the movement for Into. gration. Pomailia Says independence Nt Affected by Bloc TaCt' VIENNA, Aug. 1-Romania said tonight its agreement.tol "Integrate" Its economy more' closely with the other Com- munist nations does not mean It has surrendered any .inde- pendence to them. The agreement. announced Thursday. was hammered out by a three-clay session in Bucharest of Comecon, the Communist common market. It said the seven nations had worked out a 20-year program of "cooperation and iniegra. tion." but' the details shave 'not been released yet. Scintela, the Romanian Com- munist Party newspaper, anti. cipated this release tonight with an editorial stressing that Romania's independence was still Intact. It singled out the points in the announcement that talked of "sovereign and equal social. 1st states . . which self-de- pendently decide on the basis of full sovereignty on all prob. lcros pertaining to their eco. 1 nomic and social develop-~ I ment." "The program," Scintcial said, "clearly specifies that the socialist economic integration proceeds on the basis of fully free consent"-meaning that any nation can opt out of any step of the integration process. It said, the program "does not affect the questions of, Internal planning"--althoughi one agreement reached was! to set. up a central commft? tee to coordinate the annual plans of the Comecon mem. hers. Scinteia .indicated that a battle arose at the Comecon meeting over the issue of "nc- tionai independence and sov- ereignty." It said this issue "has been the object of mul- tiple concerns, and discussions within which various opinions and views have been ex- pressed." Although Scintcia did not refer to China by name, the !paper said that bcsirk' th 'Comecon countries, Romania considered it "its lofty duty" 410 expand cooperation with all the socialist states which are mot member. of Cocoa. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 11 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 NEW YORK TIMES 3 August 1971 Soviet Bloc Holds Parley;' China Seen as'Key Topic CPYRGHT By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Speelel to The New York TI, .. . 201 tvy r,- But Todor Zhivkov, the Bu l- callers of all ? the Soviet-bloc garian leader. only yesterday untrles except Rumania held was presiding. at a meeting in one-day meeting today and Bulgaria marking the 80th an- ssued a communique de. niversary of the Bulgarian ouncing deviations from Mos. party, and 'thus had to travel 's line and expressing to the Crimea to participate. . The Soviet Union was rep. 'grave alarm" over the anti- resented at the meeting by ommunist campaign in the President Nikoiai V. Podgorny udan. as well as Mr. Brezhnev. Two 'Diplomatic sources here be- days ago, Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Podgorny were reported to ieved that the meeting, attend. have met with the Hungarian d by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the leader, Janos Xadar, who was evict Communist party leader, also present today.. Others as called at Soviet Initiative listed as attending were Erich o discuss primarily the latest Edward r of East Germany, EdwarGierek of Poland and evelopments in China's rela. Gustav Husak of Czecho. Ions with the United States, slovakia. and to agree o na joint posi. It was the first time Rumania tion. has been absent from one of the It was believed that the Ru? Warsaw Pact's top-level meet. ings since 1968 when Mr. Ceau- manian President, Nicolac, sescu refused to join In the Ceausescu, who recently visited anti-Czechoslovak actions being China, boycotted the session planned by the rest of the bloc since alone of Russia's allies to end the liberal 'regime of Alexander Dubcck. . in. the Warsaw Pact organiza. The communiqud itself did not tion, Rumania strongly sue- mention China and} was limited ports the moves to improve to affirmation of well-known. Chinese-American ' relations. Soviet position. But to Commu- o gathering was held some. nists, the wording was clearly where in the Crimea the south- anti-Chinese in nature and could also be interpreted as critical of em area of European 'Russia Rumania. adjacent to the Black Sea. The declaration highly praised In Soviet parlance, "left- the meeting of world Commu- In parties held in' Moscow In g opportunism" generally June, 1969, which in Soviet refers to the policies of China. analyses has consistently been On occasion, "right-wing op. interpreted as having attacked portunism" can refer to Ru. Peking's policies, a point of mania or to Yugoslavia, which view disputed by Rumania. Is not a member of the'Warsaw "Experience bears out the his- Is significance of the confer- Pact. ence'for further strengthening Another Communist country the unity of the world Commu- not a member of the pact, Mon- nisi and workers' class move: golia, was represented at the ment on the basis of Marxism- meeting by its leader, Yumzha- Leninism and the struggle was preparing to relax its in On Tsedcnbal, a further in- against right-wing and left-wine sistence on sovereignty guar. dication that China was a major opportunism and for rallying all antees for Comecon countries, subject of discussion, since progressive and national libera- under Soviet pressure, ap- Mongolia plays a strategic role tion forces to the anti-imperialist! reared to be removed by an, in Soviet military preparations struggle," it said. I agreement to respect the sovI along the Chinese border. ' Presumably, Mr. Brczhnev; creignty, independence and To avoid drawing attention explained the Soviet osition p ! National interests or members. t6pvl Ruman ia's absence, Tass, the on the new turn in Chinese. Dllutual Dependency vict press agency, described United States relations. That _ Outside Links I Despite these problems, the) athering as "a friendly position, as expressed in, 'The prime ministers agreed , Comecon countries last year l ceng of leaders Aow Pravda eight 'days ago. caiis that the further consolidation took an initial step towardondtheir Vacation IX the for. careful study of the devel? , s~ i>~olrl ~C elq~{ et Union.Approved Flo1"1'lI~W '199W0 i9 s 1te a Q} !iMQ 1gogf a [ban on' attack on China and the United States so long as their im. proved relations are not di. rected against the Soviet Union, Regarding the situation in the Sudan, the participants ins the meeting "expressed grave alarm in connection with the ruthless terror unleashed against the Communist party and other democratic organiza. tions." Mey strongly condemn the lawlessness and arbitrariness, Perpetrated by the Sudanese authorities, which is exploited by the forces of imperialism and reaction against the inter. ests of the Sudencso people," the communique said. But the seven countries gave continued 'backing to the Arab side in the Middle Eastern cld? sis, ? as well as to the Indo- chinese Communists. The communique ,said the participants "stressed the par. ticular importance of the ef- forts to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the Socialist. community, the international working class and Communist movement" as part of the ef- fort to insure "new victories of the working class and of the, cause of Soolalism"' In the So. vie[ interpretation, improving' the "cohesion" of the Commu? nist movement usually moans closer adherence to Soviet. policies. , 'Though this movement has' received support from some countries, such as Poland, which feels it would gain from specialization in industrially., advanced branches, it has met' :opposition from Romania and to some degree, from Hungary Ca unity and cohesion of the Socialist countries." But the eight leaders also' left the door open to links from the outside with Come- con, and vice versa. They agreed that outsiders could "take part totally or partially" in Carrying out the program and. conversely, pledged to ex. Band links both with underdo. veloped and with capitalist countries. . The Bucharest meeting cul. minated two years of work on a long range program. This has been beset from the begin. ning by such basic questions as how to coordinate planning among countries that take dif. ferent views on the relative Importance of the market and the planning process In the economy. Hungary, for instance, has been experimenting with de centralizing and allowing some prices to 'find their own level on the market, while the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania all retain rigid cen? tralized planning systems. While Poland and Hungary favor moving by stages away, from the present financial sys.' Lem, the Soviet Union has op- posed this. Yesterday's com- munique made only a general reference to "improving coin. modity-monetary relations." East Europe and the Soviet Union lack a convertble cur- rency of their own, a fact which has political 'signifi- cance because it has impeded efforts of smaller countries to establish links with the West and has complicated bbth trade : and financial coopera. tion. Poland ana Hungary favor moving away from the present system of clearing debts by commodity deliveries and to-i Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 CPYRGHT which countries can draw for hard currency to finance Western purchases. The "unanimous" agreement of the Comecon prime minis- -tore to support the general principle of closer links ex?, TIME 16 August 1971 CPYRGHT presesd the recognition by. each country that they are deeply dependent on each other at this stage. of develop- ment. Even RomanJa whose natu- ral resources make It the most It was quite a coincidence. The way Moscow tells it, the Communist Party boss of every nation in the Soviet bloc -with one notable exception-just hap- pened to be vacationing on Russia's Crimean peninsula last week. Since they were all on hand anyway, even Mon- golia's Yurnshagin Tscdcnbal, why not get together for a little fraternal talk? The missing party chief was Ruma- nia's independent-minded Nicolae Ceau- sescu, who was sunning himself on his country's own Black Sea coast. Was he deliberately overlooked by the Kremlin, or did he refuse to attend what was in re- ality a Communist summit conference? The question was asked with some ner- vousness in Eastern Europe last week; in August 1968 the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia was preceded by two, Warsaw Pact summit meetings from which the leaders of Prague's "Spring- time time of Freedom" had been excluded. There are other ominous parallels. The 1968 meetings were accompanied by military maneuvers, and last week a new Warsaw Pact exercise dubbed Opal 71 began in Hungary, uncomfortably close to Rumania's western frontier. Ear- ly next week full-scale war games are scheduled to begin in Bulgaria, near Ru- mania's southern border. Cozy Relations. Moscow is irritated with Ceausescu for a number of rea- sons. Rumanian combat units have not participated in Warsaw Pact maneuvers for more than three years. Under a law that he concocted shortly after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, foreign troops may not cross Rumanian terri- tory without permission ;from the Na tional Assembly. As it happens, the As sembly suddenly went into recess a few, days. ago. That means that Moscow will have to fly three full divisions, totaling self-sufficient next to the So? viet Union, depends on' Aios? cow for iron ore supplies for its vast steel works. However, each country is seekingg to expand trade aaod other Ilnks with the West. COMMUNISTS The Crimean Summit as many as 40,000 men, to the im-' pending war games in Bulgaria, or ship them across the Black Sea-unless it wants to risk marching them through Rumania without official permission. What most unsettles the Kremlin at the moment, however, is Ceausescu's cozy relations with China, particularly now that Peking and Washington are be- ginning to speak to one another. The Russians believe that the Rumanian lead- er helped to open Peking`s door to Rich- ard Nixon both before and during his own trip to Peking in June. With 600,000 Russian troops stationed along China's borders and no sign of an end to the Sino-Soviet feud, Moscow considers Ceausescu's conduct a grave breach of Socialist solidarity. Usual Secrecy. Accordingly, ever since Ceausescu returned from China, the Soviets have been seeking an op- portunity to get the Warsaw Pact coun- tries together to censure him for his Asian indiscretions. Two weeks ago, the Soviet Ambassador to Bucharest handed Ceausescu a letter from Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev. Foreign dip- lomats in Rumania believe that the let- ter advised Ceausescu that a Communist. summit was going to be held in the Cri- mea but they disagree over whether Ceausescu refused an invitation or was snubbed. But as one high-ranking Ru- manian official put it, "If we had been in- vited, we would have participated." The meeting was surrounded by the usual secrecy; non-Communist observers are not even certain whether it was held at Sochi or 40 miles away at Pitsunda. Presumably, the conferees touched on a wide range of foreign policy problems -Berlin, the Soviet setback in the Sudan, China. What most interested Kremlinologists was the final conference communique containing a short but sharp denunciation of "left-wing and Steps are under Hungary and Rom~?=:.K to: ~~ foreign firms Into join. ven- tures In Which III*, . Jttide company would prc,vido work. adA-pltal. , right-wing opportunism." Translated,' that means China on the left and Yugo- slavia and Rumania on the right. Ceausescu's Law. In view of such crit- icisms, how has Rumania's leader man- aged to survive? For one thing. he has remained markedly conservative in do- mestic affairs. That has made it im- possible for the Soviets to accuse him of unorthodoxy. According to what Western observers call Ceausescu's Law, the more daring the foreign policy, the more rigidly conservative the domestic climate. Accordingly, Ceausescu fol- lowed up his Peking trip with a tough crackdown on those "invidious Western influences" that the Soviets regularly criticize as bourgeois and decadent. Rumanians dubbed the new policy, which was announced only two weeks after Ceausescu's return from China, the mini-culturalh, after Peking's Cul- tural Revolution. Among the casualties so far have been acid-rock music on state radio and in youth clubs (too West- ern), the movie Midnight Cowbny (per- verted) and the American TV series The Untouchables (too violent). Ccau- sescu evidently believes that the mini- culturali, begins at home; his teen-age son Valentin appeared last week with his formerly long locks closely shorn. He explained to friends that his father had ordered the haircut. Will Nicolae Ceausescu's cultural pu- rity save him from Russia's wrath? In all likelihood, the Russian-Rumanian 1ri- sis will prove to be nothing more than a Soviet campaign of intimidation. The situation is significantly different f roni Czechoslovakia in 1968; the Russians know that the Rumanians, like the Yu- goslavs, would fight if they were at- tacked. Even so, the current war of nerves is an uncomfortable reminder to many East Europeans of that terrible August three years ago. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 13 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 THE WASHINGTON POST 29 July 1971 Soviets Plan CPYRGHT BUCHAREST, July 28- Well-informed sources said this week that the Soviet Union plans to send three alk~,n Exercises By Dan Morgan Waohinaton Pont Purelan aervlee ment because it has no terri. torial or political differences with any other Balkan coon. try. They have said that a se- curity arrangement could army divisions to Bulgaria fori consist of mutual renunciation maneuvers in August, the first, of force and open discussion time Since 1967 that Russian of differences, . troops would enter the Pal-! Raikan Cooperation k.tns for such exercises. Speaking in the Black Sea However, the sources said port of Constanta last Friday, that Romania has given no Romanian President Nicolas Ceausescu called for the Bal. sign that it will permit the de-' kien countries to "seek the tachments to crops Its territory' path of cooperation", and be, to reach their destination. As said this should mean dotfig a result, the troops presuma- away with foreign military hly will have to he transported bases In'the area, / He A140 called.!efan end to by ship across the Black Sea. the old policy-followed by lln+ Under legislation passed by perlalist powers of "dividing the Romanian national assem- the Balkan countries and gen. bly after the 1968 Invasion oft erally the small countries" Czechoslovakia, only the as- and of "inciting a people Sembly Itself can authorize against another." the entry of foreign troops ! Though Imperialism is gene-1 into the country. With the par. rfaliy used In connection with! liament now on a lengthy sum. the United States, political Although there is no evi- dence that the maneuvers themselves are more than rou- tine, diplomatic observers say they clearly have politlepaI re- levance to the larger issue of long-range Balkan security. Romanian officials have i been emphasizing that their' government Is In an excellent also could be Interpreted as a reference to the bad relations between Yugoslavia and Bul- garia, which some feel could be exploited by the Soviet Union in the future. In an area composed of in-, dependent-minded Romania, a Warsaw Pact member, nona- ligned Yugoslavia. Pro-Chinese Albania and the NATO coun position to press for some sort tries Greece and Turkey, Bai- of regionnl security arrange. THE WASHINGTON POST 4 August 1971 'Around the World CPYRGHT Xarise units to exercises held by the', Warsaw Pact. Last fall, for In. stance, when the Warsaw Part' held the exercises code-named "Brothers In Arms" In Ea a t? Germany, Romania sent a rria.' jor as an observer. The surces here said they believe Roma. nia will probably send staff of- ficers to the Bulgarian maneu- vers, In which three Soviet and two Bulgarian divisions will participate. While apparently remaining firm In refusing to participate fully in the ' military opera. tions of the Warsaw Pact, Ro? ipania has joined discussions at the political level. More- over, there have been signs that Romania is anxious to avoid becoming isolated from 'its Communist neighbors, as Yugoslavia did after its break with Stalin to 1948. This week, for Instance, the primemInist? ers of Comecon, the Conanu nist economic organization, are meeting here to discuss closer forms of cooperation. The sources here suggested that the planned Bulgarian maneuvers may have been scheduled In the place of simi. lar exercises planned f or Southern Hungary in late July. The Yugoslav .government, In connection with those ma? neuvers, said that It bpposee war games on the soil of other European countries. ins i~'Hungary . BUDAPEST-The Warsaw appeared to be a political vers haci gotten under ways garia later this month. Pact launched surprise- game of pressure on neigh. ont cave no after midnight n as The maneuvers take on tactical maneuvers invoiv boring Romania and Yogos-, ; political significance in the' 'Ing Soviet, Czechoslovak Pavia. the size ,of the forces being light of recent Warsaw Pact A terse onnougcerpent byj .deployed. Dip 1 o m a t i c ', critictam of ktornagian Presi? and Hungarian troops lIn . e ,the official Hungarian news Sources reported earlier that dent NIaoIae Ceausescu,$ Hungary yesterday. The wat? (agency MTl said the maneuo; Warsaw Pact forces would, ;friendly policies toward frames code-named Opal 71 - also hold, war games In But, a. Approved For Release 199910 9109 CIA_RDP79_01d 94A000300050001_f2'' garia stands out as the most loyal Soviet ally. However; Bulgaria's relations with 'Greece and Turkey.have Im. proved recently and Bulgarian leaders have also advanced the idea of exchanging secu? rity declarations to cover the region. Two weeks ago, the Yugo. Slav' government protested strongly to Bulgaria over the alleged overflight of its tern. tory by two Bulgarian aircraft. The matter of Balkan secu- rity will also be underlined this October, when Yugoslavia stages its biggest military ma? neuvers in recent years. Bel- grade sources say they are aimed at demonstrating Yugo- slavia's military preparedness for any aggression. and, Indi- rectly, at stressing the army's role as a stabilizing domestic element after a period of some political unrest. Yugoslav Maneuvers At present, there are no So. viet troops stationed In Hul. garia. Although a member of the Warsaw Pact, Romania has long opposed the division of Europe Into military block, and has. publicly opposed "cross-border" military manetr?' vers at the Geneva dlsarmn? ment conference. It has also declined to send 14 Approved For, Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London 27 June 1971 CPYRGHT commission of the Yugoslav Com-' monist party has met in Y~gosl~via fears ussian threat By STEPHEN CONSTANT, Communist Affairs Staff TITO ATTACKED The Russian official Press was Belgrade to discuss anti 1 =used Mof-,comparing 4th vpre- Yugoslav activities by ~ slavia with that which existed in Russia.. Czechoslovakia before the inva- Among those who took Part intended "too abresss comparison need clearly 1 the discussions was Mr. comes onding action to be eljko Misunovic, Yugoslavia ,s taken' mbassador to Russia, and the; untry's Deputy State Secre' Russia was attempting to iso- try for National Defence. ' . late Yugoslavia on the inter- According to Yugoslav re national scene. She was encour. orts, the discussions were aging subversion by Yugoslav rather pessimistic." Ever since Cominformists forces. ussia and her Warsaw Pact The term " cominformist " is llies Invaded Czechoslovakia in used by Belgrade to describe 68 "relations have not ? imr,? anti-Tito Yugoslavs who sided oved in any way." with Stalin at the time of the postwar Stalin-Tito break. The accusedpRussia ofmltucouuagging WASHINGTON STAR 27 July 1971 tin cominformists" Yugoslav "Geographically, Yugoslavia emigres living in Moscow to give situated in the most sensitiv public lectures attacking Pre- part of Europe. We are?washe sident Tito and his policies. One y waves from all sides. In th lecturer was a former Yugoslav Past We successfully repelle partisan and now a Litut.- these waves and in the futur Colonel in the Soviet Army. we must do this even mor One lecture was given on successfully." President Tito's birthday. It Tito was clearly referringg t attacked him in "particularly Russia and the "cominformists severe terms." when he mentioned the dat The most significant of the 1948 the year of the Stalin-Tit special commission's findings was row and the expulsion of Yug that Russia was advocating that siavia from the Cominform. Yugoslavia should be dealt with Recently certain . peo41 in the same way as Czechoslo. have even rejoiced at difficultie vakia. in our country, thereby indicat A few days ago at a meeting ing their wish that we ghoul with Yu oslavian sportsmen not succeed ko as to prove tha President Tito spoke of unnamed in 1948 and later we were moron enemies " who do not want a in the choice of our path strong and united Yugoslavia. sodatW~ developimeat;"' ,. tl t, t THE YUGOSLAV, MOSAIC-2 al. Hers vrepare CPYRGHT ussia invades By A1`1DIti:JV BOROWIEC slipped the l into his hip pock- Star Statt writer et, walking out into the sun-liti, BELGRADE - The young streets of B~rade. nn browsing in a bookstores Hundreds f thousands- If, had fashiopably long hair and not millionsi*- like him form as clad 1r' a sportshirt of tht the vast Ytcoslav territorial atest Itallnn design. army, trained In guerrilla tac. lie glanced at an array of tics over since Soviet tanks, rolled into Czechslovakia in Second,oi 5 Articles 10G8. ble well chosen points of this rugged country. A casual tourist basking in the warm sunshine of this country can discern few signs of tension or fear. Yet the concern bb t S t t i t a u ov I rg fident they could resist suc. cessfully any invatlon from the Soviet bloc, causing a fes-' tering Vietnam type situation; in the heart of Europe. Country Unanimous e n cn- "Let the Russians try," Is lions mates official circles, facto- ' the phrase repeated through- ries and villages, irrespective out ? the republics forming the Few Signs of rear of Internal nationality feuds precarious Yugoslav mosaid. Western comics and gtrlg and economic problems ? Dislike - and a certain do- magazines es and selected two Organized in compact re p piled crudely colored small formats gional units with handy am-' up before this country. gree of contempt - of the y There is no fear. The sturdy. Russians is widespread. booklets. . 1 munition and weapons dumps, "Tito (Marshall Josi Broz One was entitled "$I~t sa; the territorials can be mob. s tough and proud Yugoslavs t) t succpped in Ilomba" (1 ~JilflpmcVl of fi3drl),Itl(~r i 9jVetQca~,Cl.,~;; r a i a#fc~'0t6"3 "'e' et Union if it Mow, n sixura ey h " i ot er Rucn Bacac (Ba- Nazi rmany. They are con- Was onl his idea," one Yugo. zooka) Ile maid and camallw assume positions in in numera- stay eai CPYRGHdpproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 . ,in this respect, the whole country Is unanimous. Our conflict with the Russians did not start when they expelled us from the Cominform in 10,18, but even before the war,- when Tito defied Soviet efforts to dominate our Communist party." "The Russians," said anoth er, "have always wanted a lot from us - without giving any-. thing in return." Today the Soviet Union con- stitutes the biggest single out-. side threat to Yugoslav sover ' eignty. +7his threat haunts the. Yugoslav leadership, the cadres of the Communist par- ty and the ordinary citizens. To the Russians, the success. of the Yugoslav economic ex- periment in workers self management Is overshadowed by the country's persistent ef- forts to solve its nationalitie problems. Currently consisting of six republics and two autonomous provinces, Yugoslavia is im-. plementing a far-reaching pro-; ,gram of accentuating the au-. tonomy of the various regions .under loose federal leadership., If this succeeds - and ,more Yugoslavs feel it,. can - it would constitute an enormous threat to the seeth- Ing nationality problem in- creasingly plaguing the Soviet -Union. That is why Russia Is the biggest single enemy of this venture in Yugoslavia, often ideseribed as the first country =ln modern history to become a confederation of sovereign states. The constitutional amend- ments gradually put into ef- fect call for a large degree of autonomy for the republics, reserving for the federal gov- ernment the management of defense and foreign affairs plus some over-all economic guidelines. Whispering Campaign A rising whispering cam- paign against the new form of federation is in progress, fer- mented by Soviet agents and orthodox Yugoslav Commu- nists, many of whom left the country in 1948. Some are now returning clandestinely, ap- parently preparing for the time when Tito leaves the scene. In keeping with its liberal image, the Yugoslav government has no intention of limit,. Ing the free movement of per. sons In and out of the country. But to cope ? with the iacreas% 14 underground threat, secret Police services are being bol. stered and the population of some areas Is believed under increased surveillance. In ringing speeches at mass rallies, politicians are stress- Ing "bratstvo" (brotherhood) -and "dinstvo" (unity). These- are a weak points of the multi-national Yugoslav state on which Russia has been cen- tering its efforts to subvert. "Titoism." ' However, during the past 20 ,ears the Soviets have mis judged the country's internal situation on more than one oc- casion. Their often crude ant[-; Yugoslav policies have con tributed to the dissipation of, Soviet leverage here. As far as the West is con cerned, the maintenance and success of the Yugoslav exper- iment is of paramount impor? tance. A strategic country occupy' Ing the hearts of the historical. ly unstable Balkan peninsula,, Yugoslavia as a nonaligned country in a way protects the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.' Its collapse would shattc- the equilibrium in the Mediterra-. Wean and further contribute to the instability in the Middle East. That Is why the United. States has been bolstering this ,country with aid and grants. totaling nearly $3 billion over. .the the past 20 years, including $700 million in military; assistance. The vaguely Marx. tat ideology of the regime and ,the omnIpro n 'Communist fred star appear~ot no impor. tance. First Lino of Defense Nonalignment constitutes Yougoslavia's first line of de- fense, backed by an ambitious foreign policy program and aid efforts throughout the countries of the "third world." In his efforts to buttress the country internally against the possible Soviet threat, Tito has not hesitated to use tough, un- compromising measures. Among the vicitms are former Vice President and secret po- lice boss Aleksander Rankovic and one of Tito's early asso. ciates now turned bitter critic, Milovan Djilas. Rankovic was dismissed In, ]9GG because Tito felt he was. the only man capable of taking over the country. It was not so much the takeover by Ranko? vie that Tito feared but the fact that in order to cope with Yugoslavia's precarious con- struction, R a n k o v i c would have to rely on outside props, presumably provided by Rus sta. This would mean an and to "titoism" and an end of, Yugoslav freedom. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : f lA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1971 Scholarships for Subversion: A Footnote. The recent announce- ment that e Mexican-Soviet Cultural c tinge Institute has dis- continued scholarships to Patrice Lunumba University in Moscow is an appropriate footnote to the disclosuresthat followed the recent arrest of the North Korean trained members of the Mexican guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR). The cancellation, which applies not only to students already accepted but to future applicants as well, is obviously connected with the discovery that the MAR guerrillas were recruited while studying at Patrice Lumumba University. With the expulsion from Mexico of five Soviet diplomats in connection with this scandal, the Soviet Union is now rightfully, if embarrassingly, linked to North Korea in the business of promoting world-wide revolution.. Thus it has apparently seen fit to lower its profile until this affair blows over.. (See Perspectives issues of May and June 1971 for articles on Lumunba University North Korean subversion.) Can The New Svetova Literatura Accept Solzhenits ? From 1956 until May 1970, Prague's eon publishing house urns ed its Czech intellectual audience with- a bimonthly literary magazine designed to fill the void created by regime-imposed isolation from both Western thought, and that of dissidents within the Bloc and the Soviet Union. Edited by prominent critics and writers this magazine, Svetova Literatura, exposed Czech poets and writers to the stimu "provided by the experimentation and innovations of proscribed Soviet authors -- Anna Aehmatova, Boris Pasternak, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, etc. -- as well as the work of Russian emigres such as Ivan Budin and Vladimir Nabokovo Predictable suspension carne in May of 1970? The Czech muse was dead; but not quite. At. the beginning of August this year Svetova Literatura reappeared -_ like Anne Boleyn atop the walls of the Towerof Lon on, "with her, head tucked underneath her arm," The new editorial board was revealed to be made up mainly of dogmatists from the 1950's including the man who liquidated the Union of Czech Writers, Karel Bousek of the Ministry of Culture. The new editorial board decreed in its policy statement that it will be the task of the revived periodical "to portray the progressive trends and phenomena in world literature from commited socialist positions and in the most accurate manner possible. Svetova Literatura will be a literary revue of socialist orientation. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 According to this policy, the revived periodical has every right to sustain the exposure it so long accorded to Solzhenitsyn in,such tributes as the one in issue no. 4, 1968, when the magazine drew attention to the author's moral greatness. We have appended a copy of Solzhenitsyn's challenge to the Soviet Security Police as it appeared in the 18 August 1971 issue of The Washington Post. The letter gives no evidence that it is the work of a person who has renounced socialism; it cannot be said to deviate one iota from socialist legality. Indeed, any strengthening of the legal aspects of socialism must surely be a progressive trend or phenomena of the sort that Svetova Literatura's directors wish to emphasize. And no one can maintain that t e letter does not present the facts with the utmost clarity. Warsaw Intercontinental On Its Way. The Intercontinental Hotel Corporation, a British construction fii and the Polish tourist agency Orbis in mid-August signed a preliminary agreement for the construction of a 450-room hotel in Warsaw. Orbis will manage the hotel when it is completed, probably by mid-1974. The agreement while still tentative, ends a long period of Polish inaction on a project in which the Poles first expressed interest over two years ago. It can be taken to indicate that the Gierek regime is willing to conclude agreements with Western firms which had evidently been rejected by the Gomulka regime as too bold, and thus to catch up with the less timid Warsaw Pact countries. Bucharest and Budapest already are graced by Inter- continental Hotels. New "Legal System" for Cuba. There has been a little-noted but significant development in-Cuba in the recent declaration that a new legal system, that recognizes only "the power of the revolution" will soon be adopted, Known as the "Organic Law of the National Legal System," the new code officially subordinates the country's legal system to the Council of Ministers, headed by Castro himself. Although this subordination has in fact existed since Castro took over the government in 1959, it has now been officially codified and provides an opportunity to point out that Castro will use every means possible to strengthen his personal grip on the government. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 WASHINGTON POST 18 August 1971 Solzhepitsyn's Challenge to the. Police "Fine methods you have," he said to those who conducted him. -, "We are on an operatiogt, and on an opera- Following is t7ie text of the 1'et iw Nobel Prize winder Alexander Soizte- nitsyn sent Aug.' t3 to Yuri V.'Andr$ov, . To the minister of government security of the U.S.S.R. Andropov For many years I have borne In silenca .the lawlessness of your employees: t:ha. Inspection of all my correspondence, the confiscation of half of it, the search of my dcorrespondents' homes and their official and administrative persecution, the spying .around my house, the shadowing of visitors, the tapping of telephone conversations, the drilling holes in ceilings, the placing of re- :cording apparatus in my' city. apartment and ,garden plot, and a persistent slander cam. paign against me from speakers' platforms when they are offered to employees of your ministry. longer be silent. My country house village of Rozhdestvo, ' Naro-Fominsky Rayou was empty, and the eavesdroppers counted on my absence. Having returned to Moscow be. cause I was taken suddenly ill, I had asked my friend Alexander Gorlov to go out to `the country house for an automobile part. But it turned out there was'no.lock on the house and voices could be heard from inside. Gor- lav stepped inside and demanded the rob? hers' documents. In the small strueturfy, where three or four can barely turn around, there were about ten of them, in plain clothes. On the command of the senior officer To the woods with him and silence him'=--they "bound Gorlov, knocked him down, and dragged him face down into the woods and beat him. cruelly. Simultaneously, others were running by a circuitous route. through 'toe bushes, carrying to their car packages, papers, objects perhaps also a part from the `apparatus they had brought themselves. However, Gorlov fopght back vigorously and ,yelled, summoning witnesses, neighbors from other garden plots came running In re- sponse to his shout$ and barred the robbers' way to the highway and demanded their doe- 'uments. Then one of the robbers presented a red identification card and thepeighbors let Mted and his- suit torn to ribbons, to the car. tkn we can do anything." Captain-according to the documents he peoserted to the neighbors-Ivanov, accord- iii to his personal statement first took. Gor- ?.i lov to the Naro-Fominsky millta, where. the f local officers greeted "Ivanov" with defer- ence. There, "IvanoV" demanded from Gor-' lov written explanation of what had hap pened. Although he had been fiercely,, beaten, Gorlov put in writing the purpose of a his trip and all the circumstances. After that the senior robber demanded ? that Gorlov: sign an oath of secrecy, Gorlov flatly re- fused. Then they. set off fors Moscow and on the { mad the senior robber bombarded Gorlovj vyith literally the following phrases: "If Sot-. zhenitsyn finds out what took place at. the 4 Dacha,, it's all over with you, Your officiat career t Gorlov is a candidate of. technical. sciences and has presented his doctoral dis tertation for defense, works in the Institute ; Giprotis of Gosstroya of the ;U.S.S.R.] will go no farther, you will not be able to defend' any dissertation. This will affect your family: and children and, if necessary,, we will put yiiu in prison." Those who know our way of life know the full feasibility of these threats,, But Gorlov1 dill not give in to them, refused to sign the pledge, and now he Is threatened with re-; prisa1. I demand from you, citizen minister, the public naming of all the robbers, their pun- { ishment as criminals and an explanation of.; this incident. Otherwise I can only believe that you sent them. 13 August 1971. To the Chairman of the Council of Minis- ters U.S.S.R., A. N. Kosygin. I am forwarding you a copy of my letter to the Minister of State Security. For all of'- the enumerated lawless actions I consider him lieraonally responsible. If the govern- hr:ent of the U.S.S.It does not share In these se'rions of Minister Andropov, I will expect l3tt iuvestigtztion. A. SOLZHENITSYN. 13 August 107L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : -01194A0668b&9o0b1738 INDEX TO PERSPECTIVES January-August 1971 SUBJECT DATE Communism Soviet Orthodoxy vs. Domestic and Foreign Dissidence January Fight on Among Venezuelan Communists February The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union February Kim 11-Sung Has His Problems February The 24th CPSU Congress (Special issue) 1 March The Soviet Model: Forced Labor Colonies and Other Prisons April Australia: Communist Dissidence "Down Under" April Cuba: The Soviet "Model" of Socialism in Latin America April Inside the 24th CPSU May Czechoslovakia: Showcase of Soviet Colonialism May Dissidence at the 24th CPSU Congress June Yugoslovia: Can Moscow Tolerate an Independent State ? June Third Anniversary of Invasion of Czechoslovakia July Czechoslovakia: The Soviet Protectorate July The Reach of the Brezhnev Doctrine August Sweet Life Under the Soviet Third Economy August The Sovietization of Cuba August Developing Countries Chile as a Marxist State: It's Nature and Threat January The Indonesian Success Story August Economics Lenin's Farmers January Poland January Cuba's Economic Outlook Continues Bleak February Pollution in the Soviet Union May The Petroleum Offensive of the Soviet Union July The European Community Challenge and Soviet Response August Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-D1194A000300050001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : 94A000300050001-8 International Conferences and Fronts East-West Affairs: Much Diplomacy--Few Results January The Soviet Security Conference Offensive May Literature, Arts and Sciences Khrushchev Remembers Soviet Orthodoxy vs. Domestic and Foreign Dissidence Subversion and Aggression January January Viet Cong Terrorism February COMMunist Officials Abroad: Those in Trouble Last Year February Soviet Complicity in Sudanese Genocide March Soviet Manipulation of Angela Davis Case March Soviet Relations with the Arab Socialist Union March Patrice Lumumba University: Training in the "Science of Revolution" May East Pakistan: Sino-Soviet Battleground May The Common Factors of Political Terrorism June North Korean Subversive Diplomacy June Soviet Setback in the Sudan (Special issue) August Africa Soviet Complicity in Sudanese Genocide March The Petroleum Offensive of the Soviet Union July Soviet Setback in the Sudan (Special issue) August Europe East-West Affairs: Much Diplomacy--Few Results January The Soviet Security Conference Offensive May The European Community Challenge and Soviet Response August Far East Hanoi's Prisoners : Dignity and Worth January Vietnam January Viet Cong Terrorism February Approved For Release 1999/09 Q9 - P79-01194A000300050001-8 {-?. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 4A000300050001-8 Kim Il-Sung Has His Troubles February U.S. Troops Withdraw from South Vietnam March POW's: The Long Captivity April Australia: Communist Dissidence'"Dowh.Under" April Communist Pathet Lao Defections June North Korean Subversive Diplomacy June Prisoners of War--A New Twist July The Indonesian Success Story August Near East Soviet Relations with the Arab Socialist Union March East Pakistan: Sino-Soviet Battleground May Soviet Orthodoxy vs. Domestic and Foreign Dissidence January Poland January Lenin's Farmers January Khrushchev Remembers January Communist Officials Abroad: Those in Trouble Last Year February The 24th Congress of the CPSU February The 24th CPSU Congress (Special issue) 1 March The Soviet Model: Forced Labor Colonies and Other Prisons April Patrice Lumunba University: Training in the "Science of Revolution" May Inside the 24th CPSU May Czechoslovakia: Showcase of Soviet Colonialism May Dissidence at the 24th CPSU Congress June Yugoslovia: Can Moscow Tolerate -an. Independent Marxist State? June Third Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia July Czechoslovakia: The Soviet Protectorate July The Petroleum Offensive of the Soviet Union July The Reach of the Brezhnev Doctrine August Sweet Life Under the Soviet Third Economy August Western Hemisphere Chile as a Marxist State: It's Nature and Threat January Fight is on Among Venezuelan Communists February Cuba's Economic Outlook Continues Bleak February Cuba: The Soviet 'Model" of Socialism in Latin America April The Sovietization of Cuba August 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/0 94A000300050001-8