Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 11, 1998
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 1, 1971
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7.pdf11.04 MB
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 25X1C10b 25X6A 25X1X6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Note: -.Pages'.1-15 - - - Moscow's Sweet Life, The Soviet Elite's Daily Life Approved For Re ease 1999109102 . CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Pages 15-25 *? L~Inti ite..des.J itres de L'U.R.S.S. Pages 26-27 - - Conversation in Russia DER SPIEGEL, 24 May 1971 Hamburg (Excerpts) Moscow's Sweet Life CPYRGHT The Soviet Elite's Daily Life, by *** ..Since Nikita Krushchev's abdication -- he appreciated contacts ith the outside world and opened the Kremlin's gates to strollers -- he Soviet Union's top officials again keep themsell~es aloof from the eople as they did in Stalin's time. When the elite come to work in the morning or ride home at night, hey never get out of their official cars. They live in residential reas, their leisure time is spent in country estates and clubs, ccording to strict protocol. When they make official trips they use pedal trains and only planes that take off from special airports like liDscow-Vnukovo II and land at special airports -- perhaps near Sochi. People do not see them and hardly know them. On 1 May or on November, the anniversary of the revolution, when the officials tand on top of Lenin's tomb and review the parade, Red Square is losed off. Only those marching by see their leaders, but they ee them only as the leaders want to be seen: from afar and on high. The: pfctizres.,.that are carried past and which decorate the fronts f houses on holidays show the faces of the top officials like icons in pose that has been established for years (and long outmoded). In ewspaper photos and on TV the faces also appear with the same established, sked expression, bare of emotion. No Soviet reader learns anything about the private life of the viet elite from his press. He was not told that Premier Kosygin eceived the news of the death of his wife Klavdiya while reviewing he L May 1967 parade (Kosygin remained on the tribune); he hears othing about his rulers' children or illnesses. Yet probably the remlin leaders live much further apart, are more isolated from the eople and are much more old fashioned than Soviet citizens imagine. Hardly any jokes are told about Brezhnev or Kosygin. When a Soviet citizen talks about his government he. says: "They decided...," "They are" -- they up there. In the morning between 9:00 and 10:00 those who are interested can ee their rulers -- if they want to. That is when the Kremlin leadership oes to work... ...Since Lieutenant Ilyin's attempt to fire a pistol at Brezhnev's ar from behing the Borovitskiy gate on 22 January 1969, security precau- ions have been strengthened. Police sentries along the customary Ap ted ffiar" isiedsea.19 /BZs .C IA1 RDRff %-r1t*9"Q0 6W'k;7 approaches, all other traffic is immediately halted and the traffic light Ap~Pd *br Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 on the Borovitskiy gate is switched to red. Politburo members' cars can be recognized by the blank plate they carry on the front bumper. The four-place license number beginning with 11, is carried only in the rear and is frequently changed in order to make identification difficult.... ....On Moscow's big through streets the convoys use a special center lane---a system introduced by Stalin. It is for special vehicles belonging to the police, the fire department, ambulances and -- a rather unusual privilege in the modern world -- for-the elite. Since 1967 the center lane has been widened a few centimeters at each spring renovation.... The Moscow Telephone System Was Siemens Perhaps it is their conservatism that makes the Kremlin politicians prefer black limousines with curtained windows and the timeconsuming land route. Even the car telephone as a means of communication is not yet widespread in the Soviet Union's leadership circles. Politburo members' official cars have them, and also the vehicles of the top generals and State Security Police (KGB). But a department minister, a division administrator or a regional party chief does not yet have such equipment. In the large antechamber of the Moscow chief mayor, Promyslov, in the City Soviet House on Gorkiy street, there are two large tables. On them stand over a dozen phones-(with dials). The Moscow telephone system was made by the German Siemens company which was already in- stalling long distance communications systems in the time of the czars and whose Petersburg branch manager was Leonid Krasin, a well-known Bolshevik. Later he ran the young Soviet state's foreign trade; he died as ambassador to London in 1926. The most modern technology however, is concealed between the battlements of the Kremlin walls. 'IV cameras installed there survey Red Square day and night. This centrally controlled surveillance system cannot be seen from outside. It serves to spot incipient rioting on the Square, unauthorized demonstrations and even assassination attempts. In 1967 the security organs were unable to prevent an old Lithuanian farmer from blowing himself up with a home-made bomb in front.of Lenin's tomb. He probably,wanted to protest the Soviet government's minority policy. In Moscow they said the assassin wanted to destroy Lenin's body but had been kept from doing so when a West German tourist group approached; in order not to a endanger the visitors he had run outside with the ticking bomb.... Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 2 . CAWPI@M ffd For.., Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7 ...On the first floor of the Kremlin are Brezhnev's and Kosygin's private offices in addition to those of Politburo members Masurov, Polyansky (both vice premiers), Podgorny. (chief of state) and Suslov, (Central Committee Secretary). Even Anastas Mikoyan, honorably discharged from the Politburo, still has an office in the Kremlin as member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Parliament of the USSR. During breaks in the sessions, Mikoyan takes a constitutional T in the court next to St. George hall: 50 paces back and forth, for ten minutes. His bodyguard marches in the opposite. direction. During sessions of the Supreme Soviet the top officials can easily be observed close at hand. About 100 of them sit on raised govern- ment benches behind the speaker's rostrum. To.the right- of'Brezhnev,' Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov have their seats. Behipd them sit the rest of the Politburo members in the order of rank. Almost all wear dark suits. Only chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov sometimes appears in an elegantly tailored light gray flannel suit; his choice of ties is in excellent taste. While individual speakers are at the rostrum, the Politburo members usually unabashedly converse together. Brezhnev -- with the golden stars of Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Work and Hero of the USSR on his chest -- likes to tell funny stories, which make Kosygin and Podgorny break out into wide grins. Pelshe, the 72 year old Latvian, oldest member of the Politburo and chief of the party court system, stares steadily ahead. He laughs only when the others do. Thick bundles of documents are considered status symbols of industriousness. Kosygin's overwork and nervousness show through his constantly moving fingers and his playing with a pencil. t e ~artr.'L`eader Cart Cry ,When N tossa Several rows behind Brezhnev sits his closest confidant, Central Committee Secretary Katushev. He busily leafs through papers. When he writes he looks like a diligent grammar school boy. He has a habit of covering the paper in front of him with. his arm and hand as if . he ,`tpre~titrying to prevent his neighbor , from,_ copying .. ; ... , Ukrainian party chief Petr Shelest, separated from-Brezhnev by, an aisle, usually sits with his elbows spread wide apart on his desk and broods., Besides Kosygin, Podgorny and,Suslov, Central Committee Secretary Kirilenko is the only one who dares to address Brezhnev, the chief. Politburo members Shelepin; Masurov and Polyansky show definite restraint. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-O1194AOOO3OOO6OOO1-7 CPYRGHT, prove or a ease 1999709702 : - The fate of the Soviet Union is decided almost inci enta y -- pro forma. In this pseudo-parliament, the Supreme Soviet, the defense budget is passed something like this: The chairman explains to the 1517 deputies: "We now come to defense expenditures. Any remarks? No. All in favor of passing the defense budget?" All deputies raise their hands. Without looking up the president continues: "Opposed -- none. Abstentions -- none." Within 20 seconds the Supreme Soviet has approved the 20 billion ruble budget (80 billion marks) for the USSR's military might. Anyone who has an opportunity to observe party-chief Leonid I Brezhnev more frequently in public gets the idea that he consciously acts like a sovereign. His face seems bloated, his eyes swollen. At public occasions in the early morning, Brezhnev looks as if he hadn't had enough sleep,and suffers from hangovers. He often vainly combs his hair. At the Bulgarian party congress in Sofia in the middle of April, before beginning his speech of greeting he brushed his hair back with both hands. Brezhnev is a man who can cry at the right time. As in Bratislava in 1968, when they played the "Internationale," and at the Kharkhov tractor plant in the spring of 1970 when managers and workers cheered him, there were tears in his eyes. The widespread Russian and Ukrainian custom of kissing on meeting and leaving is especially marked in Brezhnev. The secretary does not confine himself to the traditional kiss on the cheek, but also tends to kiss.heartily on the mouth. A-?comparison of the various Politburo members' techniques shows that none can kiss like Brezhnev. Brezhnev's mixture of a certain polish -- he wears well-cut, single-breasted suits -- manly brutality and affability in his official appearances, is usually quite effective with women. A woman observer once said that Brezhnev had the charm of a St. Bernard. Married to a plain woman, he has the reputation of not being particularly fastidious. In Moscow they say that there is a liaison with Lyudmila Sytsila, a popular, very stately, buxom, "merited singer of the people." She is no longer young. She was already known during the war for her work entertaining troops. Brezhnev also likes to be surrounded by young girls, dancers, but not from the Bolshoy Ballet -- from folk dance groups and operetta cc anies. His daughter Galina, in her early thirties, can be seen at the May and November parades on the tribune for the elite in front of the Kremlin walls in an expensive fur coat.- Ga.linaf?r ywears has had a yen for the circus. j_S . was..f rst married_._to, anj nu l- trainer,--was_- divorced, and then was friendly with a trick marks. - -- - - -_ state with: a magician fr- a Moscow fAt_ .present s h e e goes ar?jund circus. The party leader is supposed to have told his daughter several times that she should finally pick out and marry a decent man AIPP&Wk o i ial circles or the military hierarchy. 4V f Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT Brezhnev's city apartment is in a house that was built right after the war at number 24 Kutuzovskiy prospect. It is on the right side of the prospect and looking from the Hotel Ukraina it is directly behind the second traffic light. Trustworthy middle echelo# officials also live in the same building, Brezhnev's apartment has five rooms on the fifth floor. Below him, on the"fourth,floor, lives KGB Chief Andropov, and on the sixth floor is Minister of the Interior Shchelokov. Brezhnev Cooks for the Chief of the'Secret Police and is Enthusiastic out Soccer A limousine with watchful KGB agents is always in front of the apartment house. In the courtyard are military guards and a telephone in the sentry box. In addition security police keepwatch on the ground floor of the stairwell. Unauthorized visitors have no chance to pass through the'iron gate which is taller than a man. Brezhnev often spends his spare time with Andropov and Shechelokov, the holders of all police power. The three are considered as of one heart and mind. Frequently there are also officials and friends whom Brezhnev knows from his days as a party official in the ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk. The group is spoken of as the "Dnepropetrovsk Mafia." Brezhnev keeps open house for these friends. He likes to cook for guests. He stands in the kitchen in his shirtsleeves preparing foods which he himself serves with either vodka or Armenian cognac. Leonid Brezhnev is an enthusiastic soccer fan. He rarely misses ne of the big soccer games in Moscow. His favorite team is the Moscow r o. The party leader watches out of town games on TV. The world hampionship between West Germany and Italy was carried live from exico. This was at his personal request, since he did not want to iss the game. World championship games in which the Soviet Union 's not involved are usually not sent direct. Box seats are always reserved for Brezhnev and his guests in the 1enin Stadium. The starting whistle blows only after Brezhnev is eated. He has been known to come as-much as 20 minutes late -- and the ame then starts 20 minutes late! Brezhnev loves to hunt as do his colleagues Podgorny and Kosygin. e often drives into the forest area around Zavidovo, 120 kilometers orth of Moscow, on the upper Volga, east of the Leningrad highway. his area is closed to Russians and .fougners..wittheexception,of eing the vacation "base" for foreign diplomats and journalists. It s a collection of carefully fenced in weekend houses with a restaurant. guard opens the padlock on the fence only after the visitor has hown a pass. When Finnish Chief of State Kekkonen visits the Soviet Union, rezhnev,.Kosygin and Podgorny usually go hunting with him in?the vidovo forest. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT At these times Yuri Andropov, Met o the Politburo candidate is not allowed to show his face. He earned his fame with Kuusinen, the Finnish-Russian communist. During the war Andropov was head of Komsomol, the party youth organization in the Karelo-Finnish Soviet republic and Kuusinen was chief of state. After Stalin's death Andropov, the Russian who knew how to get along' with non-Russians, was ambassador to Hungary -- a post he also held during the 1956 uprising. Brezhnev's other friend, Minister of the Interior Lieutenant General Nikolay Shchelokov, is head of the uniformed police (militia) and of the criminal police. It is known that as a music lover he likes to play the piano; he is an ardent admirer of Soviet cellist Mstislav Rostropovich, with whqm he also has a persol)al friendship. A Criminal Police Agent Helped in a Bank Holdup On 12 November 1970, Rostropovich, 44, sent an open letter defending author Alexandr Solzhenitsyn to the editors-in-chief of Pravda and Izves~~tyya__ and to two other papers. In it he criticized o icial Sovievie ultural policy. Solzhenitsyn is currently staying in the dacha given the cellist by the state organs for his artistic services. The dacha is in Shukovka, 20 kilometers west of Moscow. Sol- zhenitsyn moved there after being expelled from the writers' union. Rostropovich told him: "As long as I live and as long as I have this dacha, you will be my guest." Shchelokov.maintains friendly contacts with Rostropovich and other artists and writers. He also has troubles with his son who last year finished his studies at the Institute for lNvrld Economics _. and International Relations. In 1969Shchelpkov,_Junior,_got friendly.. with a Russian woman who was about ten years his senior. She is not of higher circles, had been married, and was divorced because of the younger Shchelokov. The interior minister's son was determined to marry his girl friend against his parents' wishes. The father sent in the police over which he was in charge. The woman was several times ordered to break up her relationship with the young man. Both were shadowed by the police. They continued to meet in secret. Finally the woman was threatened with deportation from Moscow and with "still other difficulties.'! When even these threats proved to no avail, young Shchelokov was t ken into the diplomatic service and after brief training, was sent to the Soviet embassy in Australia. His boss now is Ambassador Yiesyatsev, until recently chairman' of the Radio and Television Committee. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : C64-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Ap CPYRGHT i Interior Minister Shchelokov often criticized 6e Soviet police in articles and speeches. At the Moscow writers club he explained last year that when he took over the job he had had to fire some 500000 policemen for inefficiency. The militia's prestige needed improve- ment. Special care be given to the selection of police recruits. In the future only the best of the working class will be trained as police candidates. Especially, he said, "they must know how to read and write." Soviet papers never report big crimes. Thus, nothing was said in November 1968, when burglars broke into world famous violinist David Oistrakh's apartment while he was on tour abroad with his wife. The burglars made off with works, jewelry and cash worth 40,000 rubles (1,60,000'marks). Even West German Ambassador Allardt was not immune from burglars in his apartment at 46 Vorovskiy street. The thief was caught, although it is not know whether he was working on his own or for the KGB. As the year 1968 ended, a motorized gang held up a savings bank branch in Moscow. In the ensuing fire-fight the bandits were captured; one of them was a member of the Moscow criminal police. Pretty young Russian girls are generally afraid of being attacked in Moscow. Young ladies want to be escorted not just to the front door, but right up to their apartments. They are afraid of being attacked in the apartment house elevator. People yearn for law and order. This however is not symbolized by Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev. His reputation does not have a very high rating. Rather it is Prime Minister Kosygin of whom many Russians speak with a great deal of respect. Kosygin is considered the only Politburo member seriously concerned about the people, especially about improving their standard of living.... Kosygin Collects Jazz Records and ]discusses With Intellectuals Kosygin regularly maintains a salon in his apartment. There are lively discussions with intellectuals from the Soviet establishment. This circle of regular visitors includes Jewish prima ballerina Playa Plisetskaya and -- until he became seriously ill - Novy Mir editor-in- chief Tvardovskiy, besides author Konstantin Simonov - who pleaded for publication of Solzhenitsyn's latest novel August 1914 in West Berlin in April and who also criticized Soviet censorship. Kosygnr, so they say in Moscow, has a predeliction fo, jazz. He has 'a large collection of Cool Jazz records. He is a well traveled man -- not like Brezhnev who has never been to the west. Of all the Politburo members he has the most contact with the outside world. His son-in-law is Zherman Gvishiani, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology. The urbane Gvishiani, whose father was a police general under Stalin, speaks fluent English and often travels abroad. Always dressed in the latest western styles, he may be the only man in the Soviet official elite to wear a blue button-down shirt. 4SrW PPIe6?96J62SaIRfRt'1'94A~d0801 sales brad Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT manager in a minute." Gvishiani says that the best way for him to rely is to sit behind the wheel of a car. He maintains that he owns only One Volga. This is surely an understatement. It is known that the parking place for the elite has many foreign vehicles. Very much in keepY g with the Lenin tradition, Leonid Brezhnev prefers a Rolls Royce "Silvercioud." Recently he has been using this vehicle more frequently, even on official occasions. Until now the Moscow elite wanted to be seen oiofficial occasions only in Soviet Vehicles. However, at the end of April Brezhnev appeared at a state visit in Sofia in a Mercedes 600. Baybakov, head of the are time. in his s l I p a mpa Planning Committee, drives a Chevrolet President Podgorny prefers a Mercedes 600 for his private trips. Two such Mercedes limousines were Ueiivt L GU W L.,I~ years. However, Daimler-Benz service crews who go yearly to the ct these vehicles... i d nspe to West German embassy in Moscow are not allowe Even Top Officials Have Only Hearsay Knowledge About the West ...Politburo members spend their hot summer vacations away from The unconventional ra r Ga hi in S g . o oc Moscow on the Black Sea children of the elite travel to the Baltic countries where one can watch Finnish TV... ...Most top officials have no idea of what life in the west is p,tl matic l di h 4; o p e like. They themselves never were there and members of t Emissaries h ear. service tailor their reports to what Tloscow wants CO t information apparatus are often not believed; journalists h e secre of t who are occasionally sent out on important missions to take soundings 01 h hi {1 c give distorted ideological interpretations. Public opinion, w does not exist li sm, could correct the official picture of capita and could not even work, as long as Soviet citizens are not permitted to travel in the west in greater ntmibers... . "Kremlyovka Provides Servants and Dachas" es are related to their jobs - and il i ' eg v pr ...Top officials carefully graduated. Servants, official residences, dachas, chauffeurs le call eo h the hi 1 p p c and official cars are provided by a special agency w the "Krel.yovka . " v or Kos in do not have their daily Brezhnev, Ifiriienko, Yg f th e o e o needs taken ~_CLL and the Central Committee there are special stores which the Russians call "Spetsmagazin." These are no ordinary stores. They are in buildings that from the outside look like offices or residences. They also have no number. Admission is only by special permission. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7 CPYRGHT Special stores are divided into commissaries fox food supplies, luxury goods, clothing, furniture and leather goods.'. They have every- thing that can be found in western department stores:e A privileged person pays an administrative fee of 50 rubles-on the first of every month at his special food store. The payment of this registration fee entitles him to draw all the food supplies he needs for his household in any quantity and without cost. It goes without saying that these stores are extremely well stocked, and have all the goods that the people have to do w#hout. An order of three kilograms of caviar, 10 bottles of French cognac, whiskey, path de foie gras, lobster is no problem here. The orders'are delivered free. Articles like English suit material,, foreign perfume, records, books, tape recorders and Italian ties are: available here to the elite without difficulty. There are special stores in the Kremlin, near the Defense Ministry on Frunse street, at the Kammeny bridge near the Estrada theater. There are also closed off departments, branches of the special store, on the top floor of the GUM department store. There is also a food supply department here for diplomats and correspondents from the eastern bloc states. This group of people, because they have no hard currency, cannot buy in the hard-currency stores that have recently been set up by the Soviet authorities for the colony of western foreigners. The have-nots with soft currency also include diplomats from the Arab countries. The special GUM section provides this group of people with food and luxury items which, while they are not of as high quality as that available in the foreign currency stores,._are considerably better than that sold in the ordinary Soviet stores... ...Some personages in the Soviet Union's public life, like Heroes f Socialist Labor, bearers of the. Order of Lenin, meritorious writers d artists of the people, have one privilege in common with the ighest officials. This puts them into the communist social order in ich "everyone receives according to his needs" -- without money or proof f accomplishment. These people have an "open account" in the State Bank. o Films and Dior Styles Are Found Only at the "Club" The holder of an "open account" has the right to withdraw any unt of money he wants in rubles. The only condition: these amounts are for personal use only: purchase of a car or dacha, etc.- Those who have these privileges do not live as if they were in he land of milk and honey. They are always afraid that if they abuse he privilege, they will lose it. Thus in practice, the "open account" rks like a checkbook (which is unknown in the USSR). Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7 9 irs CPYFACpPrboved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Besides the party elite, those who have these privileges are mainly those citizens who bring hard currency into the state. Artists like Rostropovich and Oistrakh, Bolshoy Ballet or folk dancers who frequently play abroad, receive part of their pay in?hard currency or more precisely in currency coupons. An administrative order by the State Bank (Gosbank), with no legal regulation, makes 40 percent of the box-office returns available to these people in foreign currency.... ...Soviets who bring in foreign currency are allowed to spend a part of the money abroad for such things as American refrigerators, French clothes and German cars. Their currency coupons are also valid in the Beryoska stroes, reserved for foreigners. These are located in hotels and airports as well as in several special stores where they offer luxury consumer goods. The expensive furs worn for show by the wives of Soviet ambassadors on social occasions, however, come from an entirely different source: the "private distributor," a forwarding department for special purposes that also supplies the Moscow partiarch with delicacies for his reception of foreign guests. This graduated system of privileges causes cynics in informed circles on the Soviet capital to say there should be a large banner spread across the Kremlin wall: "Kt u nas yesty, tozhe yest." -- He who is with us also eats la pun on the word "yest" which means both "to eat" and "to be"]. No Soviet official in Moscow who is particular about his appearance would even think of eating in one of the usually miserable Moscow restaurants. There, in public, is not the place for a Soviet official to be. Celebrations are either private or in a club organized for the various professional groups like the Writers.,Club, House of the Architects, Doctors' Club, Officers' Club, or the House of the Journalists (dom zhurnalistov). There one is among one's equals. Western journalists are admitted to the Journalists Club on Thursdays only. In the corporate clubhouses the kitchen is terribly good and the waiter is friendly. The best steak in Moscow is served at the Journalists' Club. And if you want lobster, then you have to go to the`X om Kino, the moviemakers' club on Brest street. Admittance to this club is restricted to members and their guests. Foreigners are not allowed. Dom Kino is where actors and artists, sons and daughters of officials and ministers, the elegant young world of Moscow all meet. Here: is where movies are regularly shown -- the newest films from the west -- films that will never be shown in ordinary theaters. The young Soviet elite had seen films like "Easy Rider" or "Blow Up" before most of the diplomats of the western foreign community in Moscow. Approved For Release 1999/0W02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 YRGHT Western visitors to Moscow often ask if there are no elegant women in this city of several millions. They can be found at Dom Kino. Here is where you meet Stalin Prize Winner Roan Karmen, director of documentaries on the Spanish War and World War II. Although many young members of the establishment sniff at his last work, Tovarich Berlin, this does not keep them from Admiring his young wife and her pretty daughter by her first marriage, .n the Dior dresses they bring back from Paris. Here is where cosmonauts and Soviet junior diplomats meet when they spend their home leave in the capital. The fine. people of Moscow celebrate in. these clubs. At New Years' parties in; this "classless society" the women wear extremely low necklines, here they unashamedly show their jewelry and furs of excellent taste. A Cooperative Apartment for Officials Costs 24,000 A1a.rks Moscow's "dolce vita" exists only behind carefully closed doors; because of official prudery it exists only in the elite's private residences. Several tall buildings are reserved for middle echelon officials in the inner city. These are cleanly finished, light yellow cinderblock constructions with large picture windows and balconies on Stanislavsky and Tolstoy streets. The lawns around these buildings are carefully tended. The stairways are spotless and the elevators work. Chief mayor Promyslov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, lives in the elite skyscraper on Stanislavsky street. His monthly salary is 500.rubles. That is very little considering that this man is responsible for the fate not just of this city, but that he is also the head of all the housing construction companies, all department stores, all barber shops, all gas stations -- all communal enterprises in the city. But no one who has privileges needs a large salary. Promyslov lives with his wife on Stanislavsky street in a three- room apartment with some 100 square meters (the standard living area per Soviet citizen established by Lenin is 9 square meters). There are two skyscrapers like this on Tolstoy street. This is where Culture Minister Yekaterina Furtseva lives with her husband, Vice Foreign Minister Firyubin who was third secretary of the Moscow city party before his marriage. Her daughter Svetlana was married to the son of the former Party personnel chief, Frol Koslov. She was divorced and then worked at the Novosti press agency where many of the elite's children worked: Brezhnev's. and Kosygin's daughters, as well as Krushchev's'adonted daughter Yulya. The press always has a job for the offspring of a top official if he does not have the ability or ambition to work in the economic adminis- tration, science or even in a Party office. In this society, in which connections mean everything, one's birth protects one from a -social fall. CpApooVed For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Since promotion is predicated on complete adaptation to the rulers, the upper crust always associates with its equals. Seclusion from those below and outside is a basic tenet of this system -- that is why they see to it that the various classes live Closely together. The middle echelon and lower officials in the ministries meet not only at work but also live together. Thus, right by the Kutuzovskiy prospect there is an apartment house -- not as-wefl-iiuilt as the above- mentioned houses -- in which only membefs'of the Foreign Trade_Ministry live. The same system holds for the other ministries and also for the editors of Pravda and Izvestiya. Many officials try to break out of these-areas by buying so-called cooperative apartments -- small private apartments., These can be bought for 6000 rubles (24,000 marks). Half of this amount -- over 20 months' salary -- must be paid in cash. The other half is paid over a long period as monthly rent. Anyone who is someone owns a wooden house in the country, a dacha. If he is very special, he lives in a secluded dacha colony. Some 30 kilometers west of Moscow, on the road to Uspenskoye, in a tremendous wooded area, is a vacation area for the Kremlin elite, surrounded by barrier areas that can be entered only with special permits... ...On the access roads to the colonies are plaster figures of stags and deer painted brown. Politburo members have individual dachas in this tremendous area of woods and meadows. The area around each dacha is enclosed by a wooden fence, usually green, which prevents anyone from looking in. The entrance gates are guarded. In recent years, party leader Brezhnev and his closest colleagues have built themselves modern ranch houses with large picture windows in the style of a California bungalow. These are surrounded by lawns and private swimming pools. This 'kind of building is found nowhere else in the Soviet Union. The construction work was done by soldiers in the engineer corps... ...Several kilometers west of Uspenskoye is Object "Gorky 10." Here is the guarded dacha settlement of the Council of Ministers, for goverment officials who belong to the Politburo or the Central Committee Secretariat. The individual houses were designed by a French architect and furnished with imported Finnish furniture. It goes without saying that Complex Gorky 10 has a swimming pool, tennis courts, athletic fields, a clubhouse. with a restaurant and movie theater, and a special store. Here too admission is by special permit only. Guests must be announced. The family members of this group -- if they have no private car -- have a special bus shuttle service in the morning, at noon and at night during the summer. The busses park along the Kremlin wall near the Spasky gate. Approved For Release 1999/0q/p2 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT An Elevator on the Moscow River Bluff The generals' dacha complex is in Gorky 6, right by Arkhangelskoye, the Yussopov castle from which the Prussian minister ptto von Bismarck sent letters to his wife. This 4s where Marshall Budenny lives at age 88. He drives a Zis made during Stalin's time. He has a colonel as . his adjutant and his own chauffeur. Budenny, a former cavalry general, as inspector general, attends to hourse breeding for the army at a large stud farm near Uspenskoye (once visited by West=;German businessman Neckermann). Until a short time ago Budenny had himself lifted onto a horse every morning. Right on the northwest shore of the Moscow River, close by Uspenskoye, are several modern, whitewashed buildings: the sanatorium of the Council of Ministers and, the Central Committee. A modern swimming pool and gymnasium was finished last fall by army units. This is where top officials, including retired ministers and party secretaries and their wives meet for afternoon tea. The complex is surrounded by a wonderful park with asphalted and illuminated paths. At the Moscow River bluff there is an elevator tower for those who find it difficult to walk. The elevator goes directly down to the river shore. The entire installation is guarded by army its. Once when a western diplomat approached the vacation area he was apprehended and asked to leave the area. Walking in this area was not allowed, the officer explained. When asked what the buildings were or, the officer smilingly answered, "Eto khosyaistvo" -- this is an agricultural enterprise... eat Hits and Bikinis for er Class Daughters In the weekend settlements near the village of Peredelkino is an rtists' colony. This is where Boris Pasternak lived, and that is where e is buried. It is also the Moscow partiarch's summer residence. The access to Peredelkino from the Moscow highway is barred. You lblve to take a roundabout way to get there from Vnukovo. Journalist Victo uis lives in Peredelkino with his wife Janet. Louis, who travels around he western world on KGB assignments, has a wonderful collection of cons, an imported oil heating system, and a swimming pool. His dacha too is surrounded by a high wood fence. Proudly he shows is guests the flood light installation, also imported from the west, or his private tennis court. His neighbor is Valentin Felin, the Soviet 1 nion's new ambassador to Bonn. The Louis and Felin children play. ogether. The village of Uspenskoye lies in the middle of a beautiful mixed rest. Here on the shore of the Moscow River is the so-called ' iplomats' pasture." This is a section of the shore which foreign diplomats and correspondents may use as a bathing beach -- under polite A rveil ce 1999/09/02 --R - - ---------- p The sumier houses in the village itself belong, privately, to authors, artists, members of the Academy of Sciences, journalists, departmental ministers and officials of the middle echelon and ministerial bureaucracy... , ...The tone in the village and at the beach is set by young ,people, the sons, daughters, nieces and nephews of the dacha owners. They do not typify the younger generation of the Soviet Union. The girls wear chic bikinis and tremendous sun glasses,.npt made in the Soviet Union. Cassette tape recorders blast forth.-the' latest beat hits from the west. Kent cigarettes are offered here, and American chewing gum is used. Almost everyone knows everyone else. These young, people are "with it.." They know what is going on in the world. They understand English, French or German, they regularly listen to BBC broadcasts, the Voice of America, or the Deutsche Welle. They read Samizdat, the underground press, discuss Solzhenitsyn, have read First ire and crack jokes about the habits of the anparatchiky-- the Sovie lea ers who are their fathers, grandfathers and uncles. Fascinated they listen to a former classmate, now second or third secretary at a Soviet embassy in Paris, London or Cairo. Their Prefer- red topic of conversation is the west. In the last two years these young people have unabashedly made contacts with the western foreigners on the neighboring diplomatic meadow. Here they have developed friendships. On this beach the Soviet citizens openly read western papers and magazines. The young ladies pounce on the latest editions of fashion papers from France, Germany and Italy. The men leaf through news magazines like Spiegel with interest. And on the other Moscow River shore, Soviet generals gallop by on expensive horses from the Uspenskoye army stud farm. "I Would Like to Go to Rome or London Just Once" The young people are not afraid to invite their foreign acquaintances to their dacha gardens. On weekends they have happy parties there in the late afternoon. The foreigners bring along iceboxes with whisky, gin and tonic and the Russian hosts roast a shashlik on an open fire. A comfortable atmosphere, overshadowed only by the watchfulness of the state organs. The KGB patrols and the militia have not failed to notice this form of fraternization. But the young Russians with emphatic indifference say: "Nichevo.11 'We are Soviet citizens and we can invite whom we want to our dachas." They have coined the phrase "Starshiy Leytenant-Petrov" (First Lieutenant Petrov) for the watchfu], police, But despite this apparent unconcern, they listen carefully when they hear a motorcycle clatter by.' Approved For Release 1999/92/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 r~vGe For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000300060001-7 These young people no longer have illusions. Thry understand communism differently from their fathers. They know about nuclear physicist Sakharov's memorandum, demanding freedom of opinion and a multiple party system. They know that the economic and cultur0. development of their country, which they love, is stagnating. They abhor the regime's ideological twists. Many had set their hopes on the Czechoslovak experiment. They cannot understand the bureaucratic imcompetence of cpntral planning. They know that today's leadership cannot translate t4e wonderful accomplish ments of Soviet scientists into economic efficiency,:' They are most oppressed by the country's self-isolation. They want to travel -- not to the Crimea or to the Baltic.' "I would like to visit Rome or London just once," says a young girl engineer in a bikini, whose father has, just brought l}er back from a scientific congress abroad,in which he had---participated. And then she adds: "But those are rosecolored dreams which can never come true. Here at home nothing will ever change." Another young man says he may be able to travel to Warsaw or Budapest, in a group, of course. "But what kind of life is that. The group leader counts off every two hours, one, two, three, four, five... And then you sit in the bus and hear: 'On the right you see, on the left you see.' No, thanks. I would rather stay in the glorious Soviet Union. If I travel, I'd like to travel my own way." This embitterment and resignation have caused the young people to turn away from politics. Several of them have read no Soviet paper for years: "Nothing but lies in these papers." One says: "I would read a Soviet paper only to learn if war had broken out, but I would probably find out first on the foreign radio./ PARIS MATCH, 7-14 June 1971 L'Intimite des nitres de L'U.R.S.S. CPYRGHT I )ans r/es.ghettos r!'bahit~rtirnl /i r /tu s, drs Brix rear rtvrs a lrur apes, do i-ripitattx et des ecoles sprcialix, la,cactr dirigrawe Jr I'tJnio? .cfn wfirlrtc faun Jr la vie tic guts privilt~gics 4o'% uec dit pruplr: Pour nnoderniscr la stirirte sotWtigttc, fc'litc drzrail retneltre totalcnnr-/1 en gtneslio? Ic rrronopok, dr la penscr ct tic la r/nrnination dit parti, rnais elk a pear de le faire. Aussi, !c nraintieu de Ia soriete do classe existanl est-il drirnct zinc ri\lc d't;7at. L'engtt& que nails pnthhons ci-dcssous a etc? realisrc pour fJrchtlonradrrire alktnancl ? Der Spirgcl? par Uit ol'cervirtr/tr ti hlosrrrti. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT 94 Approved For Reles '~999J09/~ ? Cl P, 117r~-Q 1 O00300060001 .., )epu~., le depart c e t tla ~- of he % c t i e t ronlacts aver t'cxtcricur et fit aussi ouvrir Ics pontes (lit Krein- titt pour qu' nl t puisse s'y promener), tes fonctionnnires - conune nu temps de Staline --- se tiennent de nouveau it heart (ttt penile. Le nutlin, quand its vont to tetir bureau, to eoir. dtinnll It" rentrent chez eux, its ulilisent Icon voilurc 'de servier. its vivent (tans des c ghettos d'habitation *, passent le-ties mo- ntenis do loisirs aver Tears senlbiahlcs' clans des maisons fie cnntpagnc ct des clubs plus on moitis luxueux, scion le rang qu'its occupent (lints la hierarchic. Elio voyage de ser~?icc, its ulilisent des trains spcciaux el des avions spixiaux, dui (16- col-lent d'aerodromes speciaux (leis clue Moscou - Viutkovo 11) et dui atierrissent stir des acroports spi:ciatts -- c?(mune celtti qui esl situc it ltroximitc de Sotschi. Le peuple ne les voil pas et tie les connait qu'a peine:ll,ors- gtt'ils apparnissent Ions (Ito ler mai on de l'anniversaire de is ite-volniion, le 7 novembre, perches not sontmet (lit ?lausolee de Lettine, In Place liouge esl ferince. Seals crux qui defilcttt .voient leers dirigeants, mats its les voient contnte ceux-ci veil- . tent elrc vas it distance et grandis.,: Les portraits qui soot presentes aux jours (lc fetes aux fron- tons des mnisons montrent les visages des hauts.fonclionttaires connate des icones, raidim clans une pose toujours semblahle depais des annces et It visage insensible aux outrages (let; ans. -Sur lea photos des journaux et it In television, le marque csl le m@me, sans aucune manifestation d'individualite. a presse est absoltiment mucttc stir la Vie privee des dirigeants. Ont-its des enfants ? Sont-ils ntalades ? Nut ne le sait. Lors de In parade (lit lei- ntai 1967, le Premier ministre Kossyguine etait a la tribune lorsgn'on lei apprit In. snort (le sa femme, Klavdija. II resin it In tri- bune, figs. La presse ne souffla trot de cc tragigtte in- cident. C'est le matin, entre tl et 10 heures, que les pon- tes du Kremlin se reorient it leur bureau. Leurs voitures pa:sent par les perspectives Kutusovski et Krlininski. Stir I'Ar- bet,'devant le restaurant fc Prague a elies lournent - conlraire- mest au code mais sans la direction de policiers - clans In rue Frunze, passent devant to miniatcrc de in. Defense et s'engouf- frent dens le Kremlin it (ravers Ito porte Boroviziki. Mpais que, le 22 janvier 19CM, tin lieutenant de Leningrad nontmct lljin a tents tie firer aft pistolet stir in voiture de ltrej- n+ev, derriere In porte Doroviziki, les mesures de sccuritc tint Ctc renforcees? Les poiieiers, an centre rte in Ville et lc hmg tic I'itincraire itabituel, ont eti munis d'apparciis de ra- dio :, quand tone voiture de haut fonctionnaire' -- - toujours noire - approche, toot lc trafie est stoppc el les feux tic In ptt`rte 1l3oroviziki, bloqucs not r(mge. Approved For Release 1999/09162,: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 lei ~- tjl~r Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT fin recommit les vnitures dies membres du bureau po)itignr an fait quit l'avant In plaque mincratogique est vierge. l,e? nu- mcro it quatrc ehiffres, conunentttnt ioujours par t L est it 1'arriere et continue?llentent change, pour tie pas perm e(tre .d'idcntiflcallon. - Stir les grandes arteres de degagement de Moscou, les yoittires des pcrsonnalites utilisent the travice spcciale intermkdiaire, gtte scuts ont le droit d'emprunter In police, les ptnnp!ers, les ambulances et - privilege unique Bans le monde mo(Ierne - ies personnalites. I)epuis 1967, lors des travaux de v4iries, a chaque printemps, cettc travee est Margie de quelques centime- tres. Les voitures des membres du bureau politigite sont monies dI'un lclephonc, ainsi quo cellos des'gcneraux et des membres importants du K.g.b. Mais les ministres specialises ou les chefs de services do contite central tie disposent pas de ce !Woven de communication. 11 v a la aussi, hierarchic. Le 1. ~seau t616phonittue de Moscow est cquipc de Siemens, firme allemande, qui deja du temps des tsars fit des installations de ti lecommunicalion en Russie et dont le direc?? teur de filiale a Petersbourg, I'ingenieur Leonid Krassine, fut itn bolcheviste connu. 11 dirigea plus tard le commerce exte- rieur du jeune Etat sovictique et.tnourut, en 1926, ambassadeur a Londres. Mais les oohs du Kremlin recclent to tcehnique In plus mo-, derne : des cameras de television y soot instnllces pour observer, jour et nuit, In Place Rouge. Cc systente de stirveillance, invisible de I'extnrienr, Bert it dkcler tnute tentative de demonstration interditc, toute ten- \tative d'attentnt : en 1967, lea orfanes de x6curit6, devant ~ le Kremlin n'avaient pas rcussi it empecher tin vieux psysan lithttanien de se faire sauter, it !'aide d'une bombe de sa fabri- cation, levant le mausolee de Lcnine. Il vottlait protester contre In politique du gouvernement sovictique.a l'egard des ntlno- rites. Officiellenient, on annonce qu'il s'agissait d'un tnalade mental qui avail essaye de pulvcriser In momic de Lcnine, mais avail ctt derange par I'arrive a de touristes alletnands et aWait enfui avec In bombe deja amorcce. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 ~plediFor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Pendant tine seance du Soviet supreme, les dignitnires se lais- sent observer de pins prigs : tme centainc d'entre eux sont fassis stir Ies banes surcievcs du gotivernetncnt, derriere le piupilre tin itpenltcr. A droite de 13rejnev, Kommyguine, Podgorny Ot Sus- lov. Derriere, les autres niembres du bureau politique pren- nent place. resque bus portent des costumes sombres. Seul l'id o- logue en chef, Michael Suslov,- apparait parfois dans tin costume fie flanelle gris clair, de coupe elegan.te : le choix de ses cravates trahit in eerttiin gout. Pendant qu'un orateur est it la tribune, les membres du bureau politique continuent ode parler entre eux, sans preter attention it ses propos. Brejirev, qui arbore stir sit poi- trine i'etoile ?d'or des heros de I'Union soviclique, in mcdaille de heros du travaill socialists et cello fie heros do Tchecoslovaquie, raconte volontiers des histoires drnles qui font - evideniment - sottrire Kossyguine et Podgorny. Le let- ton Pelsche, 72 ans, le doyen du bureau politique et chef du tribunal du parti se twit et garde le regard fixe levant lid. lI tie rit que Jorsque les autres rient. Les serviettes bourrces apparaissent coniuie symboles 5t'une grande occupation. Le surmenage et In nervosite de Kossy- guine s'exprinient dans I'agitation continue de ses doigis qui, le plus souvent, jouent avec uti crayon. Quelques range derriere Brejnev se tient son plus proche colla- horateur, le seca?etaire du parli conimuniste Kattischcw ; it feuil- lette activement lcs dossiers. Lorsqu'ii ccrit, it a l'hahittide fie cacher la rcuille fie son bras rcplif : comme s'il vonlait eviler qu'on puisse lire ce qu'iI note. Pjotr Schelest, chef du parli ukrqinien, separe de lirejnev par tine trnvice, s'appuie en general stir ses coudcs et mcdile. Outre Kossyguine, Podgorny et Stislow, Kirilenko secretaire du P.c. est le seal qui ose s'adresser de lui-mcnte it Brejnev, le chef. Les metnbres du bureau politique tels qne Schelepin, Alasurow et Poljanski gardent tine retenue certaine. Geux qui out observe Leonid Brejncv en public asses convent, ont pu constatcr qu'iI se contporte comme tin chef absolu el ce, consciemment. Lorsqu'il tape stir 1'epaule do ses collabo- ralcurs, ceux-ci s'epanouissent fl'etre dignes d'un tel honneur_ Son visage -W bouffi, lea yeux gonfles. Lors fie manifestations qui out lieu le matin, id a fair de ne pas avoir assez dormi, d'?avoir In 4 gueul? de boil P. Souvent, it sort tin peigne de tin' puche et se recoiffe. Approved For Release 1999/09/ : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved use 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300660001-7 rejnev est un ho-mnc qui snit et pent plenrer all bon moment : ninsi, it Bratislava, en 1968, lorsque ? L'In- ternationale * a relenti ; ainsi, a I'tisinc de trac`!enrs de Charkow an prinlemps 1970 ; lorsque les foncjionnai- res at le" nuvrierrt Pont acetante, fah larntes Jill ArItH nlnntCes aux veux. liha?bitude qu'ont leg' Busses et les Ukrainiens ie s'em- brasser lorsqu'ils se' retrouvent est specialeM-. ent re- nrarquable chez lui : it ne Sc contente pas. du baiser sur[ila joie, orals pralique le cordial baiser stir ila bouche. Personhe n'eni- brasse cotmne l3rejnev. he nie.langc d'une certaine attention ii cc qui touche..Sa per- sontic -- it porle des costumes bien coupes - et de brutalile masculine et de cordialitc, tors des receptions officielles, ne reste sottveni, pas sans effet stir lcs femmes. Une obset?vatrice a (lit tine foss, tic lui qu'il avail le charme d'tin chien Saint-. Bernarti. ? Marie a tine femme gtii a Pair piut6t K popottc ?, it a In reputation de ne pas @Ire ennenri des plaisirs. On (lit it Moscon gti'il It tine liaison avcc l.jtidniila Syzila, title ? chaitlettse 61116- rile (lit people s, (rem populaire et all baste imposanl. Elie West plus jcunc : dcjit pendant In guerre, elle elait l'une des vedettes du c Theatre aux arnices x. Mais 'l3rejnev aime aussi s'entourer tie ,jeunes fides, de dan- seuses - pas de In troupe du Bolchdi - mais appurtenant it des troupes tie dances folkloriques ou d'opcreltes.. On volt sa fine Galina, 30 ans, fors des parades de mai et octobre, a in tribune officielle, enveloppee de fourrures pre- cieuses. Galina niontre depuis des annees tin goat special pour to cirque. fate fut mcnie niariee it tin domplcur. divor4a et se tin atlas aver tin champion tic fir. four Ic moment. ells vil avec till preslidigiIII leur (III ci'rgttc d'Iaal tie Moscou. Son pore lui tl dejit deuiatidc piusicurs foil de vivre definitivenient avec tin hbmme < convenable ?, mem- bre de la caste des fonctionnaires on officiers de I'arntce. A 1lloscou, 13rcjnev habite dans un inttneuble construit apres la guerre, stir In perspective Kutusowski, an numcro 21 qui, vu de I'ltbtel ? Ukrainia ;o, est juste derriere le deuxieme feu rouge, stir le cote droit de In perspective. Dans ce complexe iabitent aussi des fonctionnaires dignes tie toile confiance. .'appartenient de Brejnev occupe cinq pieces an cingitieme 'take. A 1'etage au-dessous, an quatrienie, lrabitc le clief (lit K.g.b., Andropow ; au sixienie, le ministre de I'interieur,' c li tschelokow. 3rejnev passe souvent ryes moments tie loisirs en compagnie d'Andropow et tie Schtschelnknw. Les trois hrnnmes tint In re- ptiiatitrn d'@tre excellents amis..Souvent, des fnnctinnnnires et Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT App rl'autrrs Hillis viennent s'ajotilcr .i eux, dew Hillis du Irtnps n4i llre iiev Mail fonctionnuire du t'arti (mans In ville ukrninientie de 1)nepropelrowsk. On pane do Is a Mafia de Ul clu(-pr- trowsk Pour ses ninth, Brejiiev nhiue faire In eulslne, Mnnehcs de c1it+? ihise relroussees, it s'HtfHire (tans In cuisine et prepare des plats qu'il sett lui-mcme a ses invites. Les convives tic boil*ent (lie de In vodka on (iu cognac arineitjen. Leonid lircjnev est tin fanatique de football. Ii cat r.prc qu'il rate tin important match a iiloscou. Son club favori eat Ic cltih I)vnatno ?. Lorsque les matches oat lieu en dehors dt Moscow, it les suit a in television. Lorsque, logs, de In Coupe d'(11 Monde, le match entre In Bepuhligtie federate el l'italie fut rtilransmis en direct, cola cut lien a In dcmtinde personnelle de Brcjnev it ne vou'lait pas rater cc tnalch. Sans cola, picnic `pour is Coupe (lit Monde, quand I'Union sovietique ne p-artieipe pas, les matches tie sont, en role generate, pas retransmis en' direct. Au Stade Lenine, des loges sont toujours reservecs pour I3re,j- nev et ses accompagnateurs et le coup d'envoi n'est (tonn6 qu'unc fois qu'il eat installi. I] eat dcja arrive qu'il sit cu vingt minutes de retard - le jeu n'a commence que vingt minutes apres I'horaire prcvu. Tout conune ses collegues Podgorny et Kossyguiite, Brejnev adore la chasse. Souvent, it part Bans is region boiscc de Sawido, a. 120 kin all nord de Moscow, stir le cours superieur de la Volga. Cette region eat ferntce aux Busses coinnie flux strangers, a 1'exception d'un lieu-dit ? La Base i, oil sont re4us diplomates et journalisles. L'autre ami intime de Brejnev, le gsnsral Nikolai Schtsche- lokow, ministre de I'Intsrieur, eat le chef de In milice et do ]a police criminelle. On sail qu'en amateur de musique, ii joue du piano et qu'il est'un admirateur fervent du violoncel- liste Bostropovitch, auquel, d'aillgurs, it eat 116 par une amitls personnelle. Le 12 novembre.1970, Bostropovitch envoys title tettre ouverte 60001-7 ^caa^c, !^ 1.t ^tlaiut[^t tax innniyuc ut-tutClte 7uiletluuruurisee tic ';5 ' I Union sovictique. 11 abrite en cc moment I'ecrivain daps sit ' datcha, qui a ets miss a sa disposition par lee orgi nes officiels. 4+114 f en rscoinpeilse de ses msrites artistiques. Cette datcha est sittise a Schkowka, it 20 kilt a l'onest do Alos- y{Ir~r+', coo. Soljenitsyne s'y rsfugin spree qu'on Tent exclu de I'Union SY.' des scrivains. Bostropovitch a dil a Soljenilsyne e Tcintrytic je vivrai el taut ryue ceite datcha sera it nth disposition, to Cs tali hills. s 1. !'~}l Schtschelokow entretient des contacts nmicnux aver I4 violon- (ciliate et d'autres artistes el ecrivains. Ii a quckines smiris Approved For Release 1999/09!/172 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 ,;,,,, Approvve?'jgGRg1ease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194Aa00300060001-7 avre son his rtrri ;r Icrtrtitte. I'anni.e. drrnierr s;(-.s r,Iitdes :# 1'& Ins- 111111 pour I'rct-nontic'mnndiale ct les relations inl(rnatit rtalrs; a. ~~ hfsr h~ lnlcr-w jitttior?, (till a tine vinfrtainc ti'aiin es, s'ttst rpris 'rime topple (lc dix attnccs lotus itgcee quc ltti, (till nc fait puts ltrirF{tr rStt a; wellIenr ntllfen al a divorrtl i~nur 1tt1, 11 ('Jai( bica (lccidt! it t'cpousc'i, malgrc le refits de ses' parents. Lc pyre a alors mis en branle In police gu'il a sous se$ ordres. 1'lnsicurs fois, in jcunc fetnnie s'est vu intimer l'ordre de con- per tonics relations aver lc jcunc'homme. its fttrent torts les deux surveillis par In police. Its continucrcnt a Sc rencontrer en secret. On finil par menacer In femme de deportaaion ainsi quc a d'nttlres difficulles A. Alois, cotnme les menaces reslaicnt vaines, le jeune homme fut inilic promptement it in vie diplomatique et expedie en Aus- tralie. 1, 1 Schlschclolcow, lres sonvent, adresse de violentes critiques it In police sovielique. L'annee dernicre, it avoun quc depuis son entree en fonctions, it avail ere oblige de licencier 50000 poli- ciers pour incapacitc notoire. lit forme le desir qu'une attention route spcciale soil accordce au recrutement. Avant loute chose, it faudrait que les policiers sachent a lire et ecrire a presse sovieligt& rte parle jamais des delits graves. pourtant frequents. Ainsi, en 19G8, des cambrioleurs ont pille l'appartemenl du violoniste mondialemcnt celebre, David Oistrach, lorsqu'iI etait en tournee avec sa femme it l'Ctranger. Its emporterent- des objets d'art, des bijoux et de ]'argent liquide dune valour de 40 000 roubles (vingt millions d'A'F). La residence de 1'amlrassadeur allemand Allardt n'a pas ere epargnce non plus par Teti cambrioleurs. Le coupable a ele arrete, mais on ne sail pas ire's Bien s'il travaillait pour lui ou, pour le cotnpte du K.g.b. Vet's la fin de l'annee 1968, une bande motorisee attaque une Iarnie d'une caisse d'epargne. Poursuivie par la police, it y cut i?;'htinte de coups de fen. On finit par arreter les bandits. L'un rl'cntre eux faisnit panic de In police crimincl-le' tie Aloscon. Lrs jeunes femmes russes redoulent les altaques dons In rue. i;lles se font accompagner jusqu'a la porte mCme de lour appar- Ivitlent. bans les blocs d'imtne'ubles,_ elles opt pour d'etre atta- gtiees dans 1'ascenseur. I:rtssyguine passe pour le soul membre `du Bureau politique A s'intcresser serieusement an peuple, et surtout, a ]'amelioration de son niveau de vie. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 21 AJ'MPrl or Release 1999/09/09 ? CIA-RDP79-01194A000 000 0001-7 Xnssygtiinc retrofit a a jour fixe s dens son appartemcnt ; cc cola Blurs des discussions tres anini6es nvec les intcilectuels de `[Mnhliwh-nent sovietique. Main Plissetskaia, In grande dan- " uta puive, fait partio du corelo don vinilcurs regulicr4 et -- lu'u sn grave maladic --- Ic =redactcur en chef de R 'Novy r a, Twordowsky, I'ecrivain Konstantin? Sinionov - qui a Aside en avril it Berlin-Quest pour In publication du ?dernier wmnn de Soljenitsyne (ao{it 1914) et a critique hi censure Srirtiquc. On dit it Moscou que Kossyguine a tine predilection pottr In nttisique tic jazz ; it a unc collection tie distjties de jazz-cool Cc grand voyageur - an contraire de 13rcjnev tlui n'a encore jamnis ete en Occident - entretient les meilleurs contacts avec le monde extcricur. Son gendre est Dscher-nen Gwischinni, directeur adjoint du comile d'Etat pour la science et la technique. Toujours moderne et habille a I'occidcntale, ii doit @tre le seul homme de In. caste des fonctionnaires a porter des chemises Buttondown. Berthold Beitz, manager de Krupp, dit de lui. a Je.I'engagerais tout de suite comme directeur des venter. Il dit que sa plus grande detente est trouver lui-mime au volant d'une voiture. Ii affir ne posseder un?e Volga. Ll s'agit la si reuient d'un understatement : on snit que ic part autotno- bile des personnalites sovietiques comprend de plus en plus de voitures etrangeres. Leonid Brejnev, lui, utilise tine Rolls Royce ? Silvercloud Y). II s'en Bert mime de plus en plus, mime lors de manifestations officielles. Jusqu'a maintenant, les hauts fonctionnaires se sont attaches It ce que, Tors des manifestations officielles, seuls soient utilises des vehicules de fabrication sovietique. Mais, fin avril, Brejnev est apparu en Mercedes tom, tors de'sa visite officielle a Sofia. I.e chef du comite du plan, Baibakow, conduit a titre prive tine .,Chevrolet Impala. Le chef d'Etat Podgorny prefere une Mer- cedes 600. Les membres du Bureau politique passent leurs vacances d'ete au bord de la mer Noire, a Sotschi ou Gagra ; les enfants des personnalit6s de moindre importance vont dans des regions de 1a mer Ballique. Il est complttement inipensable qu'un membre du Bureau politique puisse exprimer le souhait Waller passer an vacances familiales a Saint-Tropez on aux Bahamas. On le prendralt pour ton. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 /02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 1 V Approve~F%gofase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 1 our lei; fonctionnaires rnoyens, les privilege$ sort inoindres : ils se limit-,! :t to possihilite de pbuvoir acheler des tissus provcnnnt des pays de l'Est (surtout il.d.a.). Alais nu ? Donn modeli x, ii ), a regulierement des de- fileM de mode pour lea feimnes tie fonclionnni l4s qui veulent se tenir an coi`irant de cc qui se fait de plus nouveaut en Occident en mntiirc de hunts cont ire. Anlre privilege : ?les comples c spcciatts m onverls it in I1nnque. 0111re les pcrsonnalites du parli, les priv;kgies soul ie,% cttovens rani rapportcnt des devises it l'Etat : des artistes c.omme lios- li opovitch el Oistrach on les danscurs stoiles des ballets-du 3o1- clw. qui vont souvcnt en lournee a l'Ctrangcr cl recoivent tine partic de icurs cachets en coupons do change. Sans reglcmcnt ieg!il, siniplentcnt d'npres line ordonnance adminislralivc de la 1-atnriue d'i?tal (In (.:osbmtl( 3~) pour ccs licrsontncs-(a. I0 '; tes_ sontnles gagnees sont disponibles en'cspi'ees 44r;tngeres. Approv "Cc's citoyens sovicliques qui rapportent des devises it I'I:tnt oil le droit d'en depenser tine panic a l'Ctrangeret, par exemple, de faire entrer en U.r.s.s. des rcfrigcratcurs atnericains, des vete- ments franc-ais on ties voitures allemanties. Avec'leurs coupons, its peuvent faire Ieurs achats -dons Ies ? l.Zc.rjoska r, qui, clans les hotels, les asroports, ainsi clue duns cerl:ains inagasins spe- cialises, affront des hiens de consotiitnation do haul niveau. 11 y a aussi lest datchas a, ces villas parfois sinmpincuses oil les nanth du regime pnssent lours vacances. L'entree de Peredelkino, en venant par In route tic Moscow, est ferntec. On arrive it l'endroit par \Vnukowo, en faisant tie longs detours. Le journalists Victor Loitis v vii avec son epousc an- glaise Janet. Louis, qui a voyage en Occident pour le compte tlu K.g.b., a une merveilleuse collection d'icones un chaufrage cen- tral an mazout tl'importation et tine piscine. Sa datcha est egalement ferntec par une haute cloture en plaun- ches. Tres fier, it montre nux visitcurs l'installntion de projec- teurs destines a sclairer son court de tennis, egalement imports d'Occident. Le village Uspenskoje est situe an milieu d'une merveillcuse forCl. Au bond 'de In Aloscova se 'trouve ce qu'on appelle lc c Pre des diplonnates ?, une panic de in rive pie les diplomates strangers et les correspondants peuvent -- sous in surveillance de policicrs - utiliser pour se haigner. A peu .pros a 30 km it l'ouest 'dc Moscou, apres Uspenskoje, se trouve tin lieu de repos pour Ics pcrsonnalites enninentes du Kremlin, en pleine fort-t, all ctrur dune region fermsc. La route qui conduit a cet endroit est en nsphalte, toujours parfaitenient entretenue et balayec de loute neige, inetne en plein biver. C'est ? la piste de course i, de I'elile du Kremlin, surtout pendant le week-end. A tons des croisements importants se trouvent des policicrs. Fn outre, des patrouilles en civil et en unifortiie circtileni. Presque. toutes les deviations vers Uspenskoje wont interdites it in cir- culation norniale. Un panneau rond it raie jaune empCche d'en- trer. Sculs out droit tie passer les vchicules qui tie_rendent thins une datcha biers precise ou porteurs tl'un Inisser-passer. Des.patrouilles de securitc Cloignent tons les visitcurs. In mas- se de is population n'a nucune idea de In mnnicre tout les personnalitims du Kremlin vivent idi. For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Ap99nt,Rr't'& Release 1999/09/07 ? C_IA-RDP7Q-01164A00030110-40601 -7 Les maisons organises en lotissetuenls pernlhltcnt anN 01'g-tnes do securilc (I'ctrc conLinuelletnent infot?mes stir les stllces et . venues (le chacun, sur les relations qui se noucnt. Fans res conditions, t'sventnelle formation de groupes stlbvctsiIs est impossible. A quclqucs kilometres it i'onest tic t)rpenskoje se Irouvp * Gor- ki 10 *. C'est lit clue soul billies les dntahas ties fonelimnn,iires du gouvernement qui ne font pas partic (lit Bnrenn ljolilignr on du sccrctarint (lit Comilc centrn.l, Les mnisons out t.le r4)11- cues par till architecte francnis et soft amsnagses en nteubles finnois -intpot?Ies. 11 va de soi qne le cmnpiexe c Gorki 10 , contprend. piscines, terrains Kle sqirt; courts de tennis, club avec restaurant, cinema cl magasin special. I'a mtssi. on n'entre que muni d'un laisser-passer. *, he contplexe de datchas des gsnsrnux se Irottve a t (torlci 4 tout pros du chateau de russlipotiv, it Archangelskoje. , Sur le rivage nord-ouest de la Aloscova, tout Ares do Uspensko- je, quelques bAtitnents modernes tout Manes : c'est In Innison de repos (lit Conseil des minislres et du Comitc central. tine piscine et des terrains de sport niodernes ont etc construits I'annce dernicre par des unites de l'armec. C'est la que se ren- contrent hauls fonctionnaires, miuistres R la retraite et secre- taires du Parti, pour prendre le the avec leur spouse. Sur Ic bord escarps de la Moscova, un ascenseur conduit direc- tement au bord du fleuve. 11 est surveille par des unites de l'arnttie. Un diplomate occidental, s'stant un jour approchs de cette re- gion, fu( rapidetnent rejoint par un officier (lc garde qui lid intitna l'ordre de quitter ces lieux : it Unit interdit de se promener. Comore Rome et Paris, Moscou a aussi sac (Iolce vita *. Elle se clsroule derriere deg pontes Men fermscs. La vie des fonc- tionnaires ne t; etnle pas en public. On festoic en privy on Bans des clubs qul wont rttscrvss flux spi:cinlisles : - Club (leg ccri- ~vnins, Alttison des arrhilecles, Club des nti:deciny, (:ful) deg offs- siege, Alaison des journalistcs (c Don) Journalistow *), Dens ecs slabs, 1a cuisine eel bonne et to mttitrc ('hi-tel aima- ble. i.e. mcillcur steak (le Moscou est servi all Club des journa? )isles. El alnand on a envic de holnnard, on doit alley all c Dom Kino ,, club des professionnels du cinema, dens In rue de Brest. Au c Dom Kino * se rencontrent Acs acteurs el deg artistes, Ies fits et fines des fonctionnaires et (leg ministres, le jeunc monde elegant de Moscou. Ici, on voit regulii'rentent des films qui ne pascal. jemmy loos leg cinemas soviel.iques. . Les visitcurs etrangcrs de Moscott (lemandent convent W it n'exi:t- te pas daps cette ville snorme des jeunes femmes cleganles. On Ins trouve au c Dom Kino *. On y rencontre aussi des cincas- les co me Roman Karmen, laureal.du Prix Stalinc, metteur en jsrene de fiIin documentalres cur In guerre d'Papagne el Is Approved For Release 1999/09/02. CIA-RDP79-01194A0003Uuuouu01-7 24 (l1~,~1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AOOG300060001-7 CPYRGHT Seconde Guerre tnondiale. I)e nombreux jeunes niembres do I'1?stahtishntent font in moue tluand on lour pane du dernier film de Karmen, ? 1'owaritsch Berlin *, mais vela ne lc, empc- c.lie s d'adntirer sn jeunc femme ct ses filles Bans lairs robes de t)ipaor. Elf In jeunesse, que pease-t-clle do Celle vic close ? O1i1, tlu'eii penlsenl ces his ct ces filles de a Brands x du regime ? Qucis hunt nussi (curs espoirs ? Dams les residences de week-end du village do Peredeiicinn, all hoed (tes piseines, cc son( les enfants ties pcrsonnalLies qni do anent Ic ton. Les filles portent d'clegants bikinis e(,,'(t'cnor- mes lunettes 1de soleil americaines. Ici, on entend les (crnicrs sttcccs des hit-parades occidentaux sortis de mini-came cs. lei. on vows offre des Kent, la, on achete du chewing-gum antricain. Cos jeunes Bens sont a in ?. Its parlent le francais, l'anglais on Palfemnnd, ecoutent regulicrement ICs emission de In la a Voix de I'Antcrique n oil des emissions allemandes, its lisenl In ?presse tle l'underground (a Saniisdat s), its discutenl de SoIjenitsyne, fl s ont in ses o uvres cl blaguent sur les habitudes tits Alpparntschik, les chefs sovietiques, (fui son[ lour pore, gr nd-pore et oncie. Its preferent parler de l'Occident. Ali (Ours de ces deux dernicres annees, ces jeunes Bens ne se son( pas genes pour prendre contact avec ICs Occidentaux fill q l'rc~ des diplomates ? voisin. La, des amilics se sort notices. Sur ces plages des bords tie In Moscova, les citoycns soviclitfnes privilcgics lisent sans vergogne des journnux. et des reviles occidentalcs. Les jeunes femmes se jettcnt surtout stir les der- niCres partitions de mode. vcnaut de France, d'llalic et d'Alle- magne. Ces jeunes Wont plus d'illusions. Its entendent par coin- ntunisnie autre chose (file lours Acres : if,, eonnaissent Ic memo- randum de l'atontiste Sacharow, qui demandai( In lihcrtc d'ex- pression et in systcme autorisant l'existence de plusicurs parlis. Its savent que le developpemertt econoinique et culturel tie leer panne stagne. Its reprouvent In soIerose ideologigtiic du regime. Beaucoup d'entre eux avaient mis tours espe'rances drills l'expe.- rie-nce tchecoslovaque. Pour eux, l'incapacite notoire 'btirenu- crntique de In planification sociale est incomprehensible. e qui leur peso de plus, c'est l'isoletttent de leer pays. Its veulcnt voyager, et pas settlement en Crimcc on sur In I3altirluc. r Je voudrais after it Rome ou it Londres, ne serail-ce qu'une fois x (fit line jeune femme ingC- nieur en bikini, cadeau de son pert qui avail participc it nn congres scientifique it J'etranger. Ht elk ajoute: e M-ais cc sont des roves Wells qui ne se rcaliseroni jamais. lei, rien ne changera jamais., s Celte resignation fait que les jeunes gees se dcsintcressenl de a vie politique. Certains d'entre eux Wont pas iu de journanx soviCtigties depuis des annees. x On lie fail que mentir (Inns es journaux. s L'un d'entre eux m'a dit : a Jc nc lirais tin Jotir- al novietique que s'il ni'apprennit qu'unc guerre a eclnle... 4oh, ga ne serait meme pas In pelne : j'aurais deji npprin in ouvelle, longtemps avant, par In radio ctrangt re... Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 NEW STATESvIAN, 1 January 1971 bbscow (Excerpts) Conversations in Russia CPYRGHT By K.S. Karol Beneath the flat surface of society In Russia, of view of justice, our country is more like failed to make the Russian masses articulate as presents 1 by Trarda, a rich and complex yours: mostly it is the little men who catch because the experiments of Lenin's soviets life abounds but it totally lacks any means of it, the unknown people who don't have pro- were quickly stifled ... expres'ion or communication. We arc not a tectors, who don't even have the means to 'What has changed since your day,' he one-dimensional' society. as Vt'cstcrncrs be- ; slip a bribe in the right quarter. People like continued, 'is that while society then seemed on d tncht ri sey. . the Prevented contrary from we are a communicating with ' you or me or your intellectual friends, reta- to be unified by the Stalinist ideology, today atom emrh other, we have almost no common cri- tivelY well placed on the social ladder, always wit live's numerous lives, atom ere. Everyone will tell y u about his life. teria. Everyone takes hold of a piece of the get oll.'.. experience and interprets - -The gulf between supply and demand in Don't be shocked by his ignorance or his dail hi h f ' y s rom trut t It according to his own lights. The some words consumer goods is vast even in Moscow. petty bourgeois attitude, and above all don that what he tells have a different meaning for each social which, by general agreement, forms a more forget that what he tells you is only one tiny ny f ?.......... only One t conditions we just can't make it serious analy- However, my first impressions about the and, at the most, a dozen of his trends. And its of the real state of al prigsa we try improvement in the standard of dress is in when you write your articles don't cite any- ' tackle the problem in a pragmatic manner er P contradicted by what follows. The one by name. a y by studying what happens at the different no w levels of this closed and, up till now, i eren- Russian enigma begins the minute one 'No longer,' he declared, smiling. 'doe s the arallel' shops Stalinist terror knock in the 'night for both f the i p c o cable society. probes the arithmet ut these points to me is no in which most people buy their smart clothes. great and small. Nowadays from the poi t an why Th rae t to .e l s t, w i mar p e m ~0 Pl ec #re hough opponent of the Soviet regime. He has. an How in fact can a seeretary h a an who eerbovt rcgnla important job in the party apparatus and roubles a 'month. buy even second-hand, cost more than controlled. 'w fter the war hi h , c , surprisin;. 2~ years a frequently travels abroad, where we have w at Sov met many times. He has his own ideas but her monthly salary? he Amittedly rnts are low in Russia, as is and 13 breakth he offers try impose miht me: m e public transport (an underground t cket costs in space. ism- assess is'Econom y Num me e me e a clue that might help asly merely e aree not bread, dear. ever. A by-product of scarcity and the ram- to assess s my my second homeland after an ab- o b flo h d > - p ha ka tatoes and ur sence of 25 years. Since I left Russia after the war I have ITheoretically, a couple who earn 200 roubles pant inflation, it is built in to modern Soviet maintained friendly links with several Rus? a month between them should therefore be life. What is worse, the state distribution sian who travel outside the Soviet Union. able to live economically, although only if system is just as ineffective today as it was ~f+ This party official is one of them, and we they are willing to spend a lot of their time in the past. So the individual takes advantage hop- of the mo cheap - to carry goods on top were talking as we strolled along the im+ queuing tand he resist the Aempt.tion of smear of everythirngnised transport posing and completely new ne gin mo on ping in parallel where , very levard in Moscow. I had telicho all boxhim , ys halfcosts ayrouto 5 ble. Thosescoua kilo and a ples who areecon- h ose where e hey are in short supply. to the my arrival, but from a pubh ins frankly that I would understand per- tent with the basic necessities, who are wit- benefit of his own budgEt. A Georgian for fand to amily rows that Leningrad her will earn tickmare more. featly if he were unable to meet me, in view ling to wear foa r coat for of their >oryears of his official position, buy nothing He laughed at my precautions, but took celebrations, appear to be very rare citizens: from several boxes of touters than he will the record his own: we rendezvoused in the city for a Where then do they find the extra income mah is by smashing all the pros uction records walk. We talked about everything, from the to eat and dress well and where do they tier we`ve became a nation of merchants: is +~ new buildings to the slow improvements in find commodities in short supply? accommodation in Moscow where, happily, For someone who has lived a long time the current joke in Russia. are 'communal' flats are now rarely being put in Russia tha~ltanswer illtculall t toefindues th is itional'cver, thes of enotxploitionlyngtheseEconomy 'trail- Y In metho ' reap ana-criai classes, feeling ;', m Th m d h 2 e on e b . up. But whatever topic we touc y country friend always came back to his central theme, cotwo economics have long existed Number c?Ilften rf nomic ._ the difficulty of grasping Soviet reality. `our side by sides Eo omtstNumi~gidly confficial. trol breakethesecafe from ruleli Hama action u?.--..- of rollecter- ~~. and and --- - - association, for organising communal re wear gether, for getting to know each other m and ber bet 2, which functions according to its own goods taCE0171CS Null, throu taking decisions together, never really existed laws and aHowspeeople rdist nu eth mh wok I was told h at in certain provincial I'I in Russia. the czar and the one money and consumer goods there was nothing; equally, between n o one . selves according to their needs. This Econ- cities two kinds of goods meant for the f state illicit The most a profitable tbusinesse is in f t omy Nutnbtr 2 ce e hi k p p x ng et. ar m the evllecl moujik and another there was not the case of for essential personal relationships.. We were means, except in meat -which is in short supply everywhere and we remain a huge body. colossal m' en' of that political. fabric on which the modern . and in fashionable women's clothes. As ere uilt The Revolution but shapeleass anJkftTV#U-RUfi Iffl~`e?bas`e T9V 1i : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 ~777T ~{~'1~IY'd';bail'~tJ?;'~`IIf~S;'T*iP~Stiyil'A)C iS'd;1T'Y~IT~,{Ill1'4f[~Cd1~7L{hlf".YhIiF~S~lf7rflSN~try~TgYI yJ'tit4_Yit ~;iP1i ;;'rs~ f they put it in, Moscn*: 'In Russia we have any 'officials' or intellectuals - it was a rather to tic cities. ' fn} 9iidd Fil r they etuaases4999Q9/0'2 :aGLA ~RD~t7t&41 At94lAd00needs, 0 000800Dt ,-71 on to oth planning four h'ild' avent captuate. No one denies the existence of Economy Number 2. The official press is full of re- ports of misappropriations and the crimes of thieving citizens. The Central Committee and all ntltar burls( Of the party t:onwtnntly discuss. 'the problem of the struggle against waste and embezzlement'. But these general- ities reveal nothing of the mechanics of the Soviet black market. To know them, one must have lived there as a worker or student, that is to say, to have been part of the Russian rank and, file, as I once was. This is something you can't learn second-hand in the space of a couple of weeks. However, I was able to meet more Rus- sians than I had hoped possible when I set off. Everyone I approached, party members or podpi.rtrhiki intellectuals (those who have signed different protests against government policy) responded as eagerly as my high oiiicial. They invited me to their homes or clubs, to the Writers' House, the Press Club or the Actors' Club. But all these people, whatever their age, their situation or their views, belong in fact to Economy Number 3, the only' one which allows a man to live honestly in Russia without having too many material worries. Their salaries or their royalties are more than big enough to allow them to buy anything they want in the 'closed shops' - from which ordinary mortals are banned - or in the 'foreign currency shops' where they can spend the dollars they have saved during trips abroad. They also have priority for new housing and are able to get, mortgages for flats in the so-' called 'cooperative' housing, or to rent darhas. The bulk of those with access to Econ- omy Number 3 belong to the power Elite - party and state officials, high-ranking officers of police and army and the economic bosses, But the 'creative intelligentsia', writers, film- maker,;. university dons, also benefit to the point of notoriety from the cornucopia of the '11hirt 1:conomy. I met those who were secretly outraged by the situation and spoke indignantly about these volrhelbuave ,nnrag- aziuy (magic shops) where you can find anything, but only if you have dollars, after producing a certificate showing where you got them. 'What separates 911 per cent of the Soviet population from communism,', said one of them, 'is this damned certificate' which presents them from shopping in these luxury stores.' Another declared: 'Our coun- try' humiliates itself by displaying in broad daylight, in full view of foreigners; a whole consumer-goods sector in which our own national currency isn't valid.' But whether the beneficiaries of Economy Number. 3 condone it or condemn it, the fact is that its flagrant privileges contribute to the shut- ting off and fragmentation of Soviet society. I discussed the problem over dinner with an economist known for his advocacy of 'liberal' reforms. We ate in a popular re- staurant where we were unlikely to meet 'My mistake.' he said. 'was to believe too long that our leaders supported reforms to end Economy Number 2 and tackle the coun- try's economic reality. I thought they under- stood. from their experience, that repressive moasttros would never nehiave rosin(( and that they were therefore ready to employ purely economic tools. Now I see there was nothing in it. The state continues to regard every citizen who earns less than 300 roubles a month - 95 per cent of the population - as a potential crook and is content simply to put some obstacles in his way. This cat-and- mouse game results in a totally deformed manpower structure and a crazy organ- isation of work. We force ou' shop assist- ants and waiters to work ridiculous hours so that a check can be carried out at the end of each shift to see if anything has been stolen. In fact, the "controllers" join in the rackets and the whole-system simply increases the number of thieves and lowers pro- ductivitv. `That's not all,' he continued. 'Our leaders refuse any kind of economic rationalisation which would hit the interests of the various lobbies of privileged citizens. They deplore the inflation but they refuse to introduce a tax on high incomes: the state takes more from the tax on alcohol (recently raised) than from all taxes on income. We are sadly short of manpower, to the point where we aren't able to finish certain projects, and yet we make millions of our young people do three to five yt:arc of a military con- scription which is completely irrelevant in the atomic age. ,We still have 44 per cent of the pop- ulation living in the countryside without the freedom to-move about the country and therefore prevented from taking jobs in in- dustry; but all our plans for farm product- ion are systematically undermined by fail- ,c learns any lessons. In uses from which no on my opinion the government accepts this sit- uation because it prefers it to the risk of change. To sum up: the government bene- fits from this fragmentation of our society because it forces the workers individually to resolve their diflicult day-to-day problems and distracts them from politics and from anything touching on public affairs. True, it's a paradox, but the stability of the regime depends precisely on this paradox: What astonished me in Russia was that even the regime's opponents seemed to ac- cept quite calmly a 'socialist' society which is split up into classes and in which glaring privileges and contrasting standards of life, exist. 'Within the framework of our system,' he replied. 'we can only attempt to influence our, leaders by trying to sharpen their sen- sitivity to certain economic and social prob- lems. It's impossible to organise strikes or tq engage in any great doctrinal debate on the nature of our 'society. We have to tackle the most immediate problems; how to lib erate our workers from the degrading necessity to resort to Economy Number 2; errors etc. That in itself is quite a pro- gotptmc.' I objected that it is exactly the limited character of this programme which makes it unrealisahtc because leadership circles riikcly yield to the simple advice of experts. 1'Id`evould only admit I was halt right: '1349n't be, shocked because those students you met the other night asked you about the price of clothes in France and not about the revol- utionary movement there. Don't misunder- - stand these young people because they told you that they had been inoculated against., th~' disease of politics. Until we can get away from shortages our fellow citizcrts will re in obsessed by the consumer goods they cap t get. No one is going to risk the little be has for an uncertain future by doing a bon Quixote. They prefer to wait. The government, for its part, ensures that it will for a ease itputpiduid - ti';t 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY August 1971 THE REACH OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty received its name at the hands of Western journalists from Brezhnev's speech at the Fifth Polish Communist Party Congress on 12 November 1968, when he declared in obvious reference to Czechoslovakia: "It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has done much for the real strengthening of the sovereignty and independence of the socialist countries. However, it is known, comrades, that there also are common laws governing socialist contruction, a deviation from which might lead to a deviation from socialism as such. And when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the development of any socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, a 'threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country, but also a common problem, a concern for all socialist states. "It goes without saying that such an action as military aid to a fraternal country to cut short the threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary, emergency step; it can be sparked only by direct actions creating a threat to the common interests of the camp of socialism." Brezhnev's enunciation of the doctrine was preceded by two authoritative statements: The so-called Warsaw Letter of 15 July 1968 signed by the five Warsaw Pact powers who were to invade Czecho- slovakia six weeks later, and by a full elaboration of the doctrine in Pravda on 26 September 1968 by Sergei Kovalev (the full text of ea is attached.). The Warsaw Letter was drafted at one of the pre-invasion emergency meetings of the Warsaw Pact powers (except Czechoslovakia and Romania) as a warning to the Dubcek leadership to halt the liberalization of Czechoslovakia and abandon its program for creating a new socialism, a "socialism with a human face," The Warsaw Letter is probably the frankest Soviet--endorsed statement of the Brezhnev Doctrine. It includes the following passages: "We did not have and have no intention of interfering in such matters that are purely internal affairs of your party and your state, of violating the principle of respect for independence and equality in relations between communist parties and socialist countries.... We cannot, however, agree that enemy forces should divert your country from the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060061-7 i path of socialism and expose Czechoslovakia to the danger of being torn from the socialist community. This is no longer your affair alone. This is the affair of all communist and workers' parties and all countries which are linked by alliances, cooperation and friendship.... We shall never be resigned to imperialism making a breach in the socialist system, by peaceful or nonpeaceful means, from inside or outside, and changing power relations in Europe to its own advantage... "In your country, a whole series of events in recent months indicates that counterrevolutionary forces supported by imperialist centers, have launched attacks on a broad front against the socialist system.... We are convinced that a situation has arisen which endangers the foundations of socialism in Czechoslovakia and threatens the vital common interests of the other socialist countries? The peoples of our countries would never forgive us our indifference and carelessness in the face of such danger. Our parties bear the responsibility, not only before their own working class and people but before the entire international working class and the communist world movement, and cannot keep aloof from that obligation. Therefore, we must maintain solidarity and unity in defense of our achievement, our security, and the international positions of the entire socialist community,. "We believe,: therefore, that, in the face of the attacks of the anti-communist forces, resolute resistance and determined struggle for the maintenance of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia is not only your task, but ours also." [Emphasis supplied.] Kovalev produced the most comprehensive statement of what later became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. The whole text repays study, but the relevant passage for present purposes reads as follows: "The peoples of the socialist countries and communist parties certainly do have and should have freedom for dete Wing the ways of advance of their respective countries. However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries and the whole working class movement, which is working for socialism. This means that each cortm-unist party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire communist movement. .. The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interest of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement." [Emphasis supplied.] Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Out of the final pre-invasion meeting between the Soviets and the Dubcek leadership in Bratislava 3 August 1968 came a joint communique which contained the most usually expressed version: "Support, consolidation, and protection of [a socialist country's] gains ... is a common international duty of all socialist countries." [Emphasis supp ie . This became Soviet leaders' and propagandists' most frequent way of defining the Brezhnev Doctrine. Soviet and Soviet-oriented leaders and writers have been consistently careful to use only legalistic and "principled" expressions when discussing the Brezhnev Doctrine and to avoid more frank and bruta 1 statements of its real intent. They do not even recognize the legitimacy of the term, and on the rare occasions when they use it, they sarcastically refer to the "so-called Brezhnev Doctrine." The mild, invariably innocuous-sounding terms used by the Soviets to describe the Brezhnev Doctrine are intended to veil the fact that its practical application meant a 500,000-man invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and East German troops on the night of 20 August 1968 and can mean a similar invasion anywhere within the reach of Soviet power. Soviet claims that an internal and external "counterrevolutionary" threat existed and that they had been "invited" by "thousands" of Czechoslovak citizens are patently false. The invasion made a mockery of continuing Soviet claims that they respect "the principles of sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of a fraternal state, and of mutual equality and respect between allies." The fundamental reason for the Soviet invasion was that Czechoslovakia had begun to establish an independent model of socialism that deviated from the Soviet model. The Dubcek regime deviated from the "common laws governing socialist construction" (as defined by the Soviets) in permitting traditional democratic freedoms of speech, press, political organization, etc. and in developing the potential for an independent foreign policy. In a word, the 1968 Czechoslovak leaders sought to exercise the simple right of national sovereignty, a sovereignty they discovered was limited by the Brezhnev Doctrine. As Kovalev explained after the fact: "The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, the world revolutionary movement." Since the Soviets claim to lead and speak for the world socialist movement, Kovalev's statement simply means that a socialist state can Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 be sovereign only so long as it does not act contrary to the wishes and requirements of the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev Doctrine has been at the heart of the tumultuous dissension within the Communist world since the invasion. The battle is between those who insist on the primacy of national sovereignty (like Yugoslavia, Romania, and many free world Communist parties) and those who find it necessary or expedient to support the Soviets in their insistence on the primacy of world Communism. Attached are some expressions of Communist opposition to the concepts of the Brezhnev Doctrine, cast again in doctrinal terms, as are the Soviet views cited earlier. The example of Czechoslovakia raised the question, still tut answered, as to what other deviant socialist states or allies might fall under the purview of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Romania, as a socialist state bordering the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, the original deviant, felt (and still feel) justifiably threatened by the doctrine. And the most prodigious deviant of all, Communist China, was the subject of a threatening article (see attached) by Victor Louis, notorious spokesman of the KGB, the vast Soviet security organization charged with the responsibility for world- wide Soviet espionage and subversion. The post-invasion period is replete with examples of the Soviets' punishing and splitting deviant and independent Communist parties of the free.-World, such as those of Spain, Venezuela, Japan, and Australia, among others. Even non-Communist allies;Of the USSR like Egypt and Finland cannot rest assured that the Soviet Union will not seek to impose its will on their countries in the name and spirit of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Indeed, Finland on many occasions has undergone the experience of the Soviets' placing limits on her sovereignty- In the final analysis; Soviet implementation offthe Brezhnev Doctrine is limited only by the practical matter of how far Soviet power can reach. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 PRAVDA 18 July 1968 CPYRGHT THE "WARSAW LETTER" ' TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK ' COM'IUNIST PARTY ' CENTRAL ' COMMITTEE r comra cx On behalf of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of J tnlgatia, Hungary, the C.J).L. Poland and the Soviet Union, we send you this idter, which is dictated by sincere friendship based on the princi- ples of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and by concern for our common tasks and for strengthening the positions of socialism and the security and socialist commonwealth of the peoples. The developments in your country have aroused profound anxiety among us. The reactionaries' offensive, supported by imperialism, against your party and the foundations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's social system, we are deeply convinced, threatens to push your country off the path of social- ism and, consequently, imperils the interests of the entire socialist system. We expressed these fears at a meeting in Dresden, during several bilateral meetings and in the letters that our parties recently sent to the Presidium of the Czechoslovak. Communist Party Central Committee. A short time ago we proposed to the Presidium of the C.C.P. Central Com- mittee that a new joint meeting be held on July 14, 1968, to exchange informa- tion and opinions on the situation in our countries, including developments in Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, the Presidium of the C.C.P. Central Committee did not take part in this meeting and did not take advantage of the opportunity for a collective comradely discussion of the situation that has taken shape. Therefore we deemed it necessary to set forth our common opinion to you in this letter with all sincerity and candor. We want you to understand us well and assess our intentions correctly. We have not had and do not have any intention of interfering in affairs that arc purely the internal affairs of your party and your state or of violating the principles of respect, autonomy and equality in relations among Communist Parties and socialist countries. We do not appear before you as representatives of yesterday who would like to hinder your rectification of errors and shortcomings, including the violations of socialist legality that took place. We do not interfere with the methods of planning and administration of Czechoslovakia's socialist national economy or with your actions aimed at perfecting the economic structure and developing socialist democracy. We shall vrekome adjustment of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks on the healthy foundations of fraternal cooperation within the framework of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. At the same time, we cannot assent to hostile forces pushing your country off the path of socialism and creating the threat that Czechoslovakia may break away from the socialist commonwealth. This is no longer your affair alone. It is the common affair of all Communist and Workers' Parties and states that are united by alliance; cooperation and friendship. It is the common affair of our countries, which have united in the Warsaw Pact to safeguard their inde- pendence, peace, and security in Europe and to place an insurmountable barrier in front of the schemes of imperialist forces, aggression and revanche. At the cost of enormous sacrifices, the peoples of our countries achieved vic- tory over Hitlerian fascism and won freedom and independence and the op- portunity to advance along the path of progress and socialism. The frontiers of the socialist world have shifted to the center of Europe, to the Elbe and the Bohemian Forest. And never will we consent to allow these historic gains of socialism and the independence and security of all our peoples to be jeopar- dized. Never will we consent to allow imperialism, by peaceful or nonpeaceful means, from within or without, to make a breach in the socialist system and change the balance of power in Europe in its favor. The might and solidity of our alliances depend on the internal strength of the socialist system in each of our fraternal countries and on the Marxist- Leninist policies of our parties, which perform a guiding role in the political and social life of their peoples and states. Subversion of the Communist Parties' guiding role leads to liquidation of socialist democracy and the socialist system. This creates a threat to the foundations of our alliance and to the security of our countries' commonwealth. You know that the fraternal parties showed understanding for the decisions of the C.C.P. Central Committee's January plenary session; they assumed that your party, keeping a firm hold on the levers of power, would direct the whole process in the interests of socialism without allowing anti-Communist reaction- aries to exploit it for their own purposes. We were convinced that you would defend the Leninist principle of democratic centralism as the apple of your eve. Disregard for any aspect of this principle both of democracy and of centralism inevitably leads to a weakening of the party and its guiding role and to trans- formation of the party into either a bureaucratic organization or a discussion club. We have repeatedly spoken about all these questions at our meetings, and we received assurances from you that you were aware of all the dangers and were fully resolved to repulse them. Unfortunately, events moved along a different channel. The forces of reaction, taking advantage of the weakening of party leader- ship in the country and demagogically abusing the slogan of "democratiza- - CPYRGHT tion," unleashed a cam pai gn a %fe PTO q~ t r untry indicates that cadres, with clear intention of u-idat g the part s g g PPo y ing role, der. h~ orce~s o'Fcoun4errrevloluttiioonn, sou rte v~doslist centers, have launched the " Y mining thi sftialist system and pitting Czechoslovakia against the other socialist a broad offensive against the socialist system without encountering the requisite countries, opposition from the party or the people's role. There is no doubt that the The political organizations and clubs that have cropped up lately outside the framework of the National Front have in essence become headquarters for the forces of reaction. The social democrats persistently seek to create their own party, me organizing underground committees and are attempting to split the workers' movement in Czechoslovakia and to secure leadership of the country so as so restore the bourgeois system. Antisocialist and revisionist forces have taken over the press, radio and television and have turned them into platforms far attacking the Communist Party, for disorienting the working class and all tie working people, for carrying out unchecked antisocialist dema- goguery and for subverting the friendly relations between the C.S.R. and the other socialist countries. A number of mass news organs are systematically con- ducting gennim moral terrorism with respect to people who speak out against the forces of reaction or express their anxiety over the course of events. Despite the decisions of the May plenary sessions of the C.C.P. Central Com- mittee, whisk pointed out the threat from rightist and anti-Communist forces as the chief danger, the intensified attacks by the reactionaries have met no rebuff. It was precisely this that enabled the reactionaries to appear publicly before the wiole country and publish their political platform, entitled "The 2,000 Wordty" which contains an open appeal for struggle against the Com- munist Party and against constitutional rule, an appeal for strikes and dis- orders. This appeal constitutes a serious threat to the party, the National Front and the soaalist state and is an attempt to implant anarchy. In essence, this statement is an organizational-political platform of counterrevolution. Let no one be deluded by its authors' assertions that they do not want to overthrow the socialist system, that they do not want to act without Communists, that they do not want to sever the alliances with the socialist countries. These are empty phrasts whose aim is to legitimize the platform of counterrevolution and lull the 'vigilance of the party, the working class and all the working people. This platf ann, which was widely circulated in the crucial period prior to the extraordinary congress of the C.C.P., not only was not rejected but even found outright champions within the party and its leadership, champions who sup- port the anrancialist appeals. centers of international imperialist reaction, which are doing everything pos- sible to inflame and complicate the situation by inspiring antisocialist forces to take action in this direction, have taken a hand in these Czechoslovak develop- ments. Under the guise of extolling the "democratization" and "liberalization" in the C.S.R., the bourgeois press is conducting an incisive campaign against the fraternal socialist countries. F.R.G. ruling circles, which seek to make use of the events in Czechoslovakia to sow discord between the socialist countries. to isolate the G.D.R, and to implement their revanchist schemes, have been espe- cially active in this. Is it possible, comrades, that you fail to see these dangers? Is it possiible,to remain passive in this situation and to confine oneself merely to declarations and assurances of fidelity to the cause of socialism and alliance commitments? Is it possible that you fail to see that the counterrevolutionaries have taken one position after another from you and that the party is losing control over the course of events and is retreating more and more under the pressure of anti-Communist forces?' Was it not to sow distrust and hostility toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that your country's press, radio and-television unleashed a campaign over the stag exercises of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces? Matters have reached the point where a joint exercise of our troops with the participa- tion of several Soviet army units, something customary for military coopera- tion, is being used for unfounded charges that the C.S.R: s sovereignty has been violated. And this is happening in Czechoslovakia, whose people hold sacred the memory of the Soviet soldiers who gave their lives for the freedom and sovereignty of that country. At the same time, near your country's western borders the military forces of the aggressive NATO bloc are conducting ma- neuvers in which the army of revanchist West Germany is participating. But not a word is said about this. As is obvious, the inspirers of this invidious campaign want to confuse the minds of the Czechoslovak people, disorient them and undermine the truism that Czechoslovakia can preserve its independence and sovereignty only as a socialist country, as a member of the socialist commonwealth. And only the Antisocialieit and revisionist forces are defaming the entire activity of the enemies. of socialism could today exploit the slogan of "defending the sover- Communist Party, waging a slander campaign against 'its cadres and discredit- ei y" of the C.S.R. against the socialist countries, against the countries with ing honest Communists who are devoted to the party.! which alliance and fraternal cooperation create the most reliable groundwork Thus, a siimation has arisen that is absolutely unacceptable for a socialist for the independence and free development of each of our peoples. country. We are convinced that a situation has arisen in which the threat to the In this at?spherc attacks are also being made on the C.S.R.'s socialist for- foundations of socialism in Czechoslovakia jeopardizes the common vital in- eign policy, and the alliance and friendship with socialist countries: is being wrests of the rest of the socialist countries. The peoples of our countries would assailed. Voices are heard demanding a revision of our common coordinated never forgive us for indifference and unconcern before such danger. policy with erect to the F.R.G., despite the fact that the West German govern- We live in a time when peace and the security and freedom of peoples more meat invarahly pursues a course hostile to the interests of our countries' than ever demand unity among the forces of socialism. International tension is security. The attempts at flirtation by the F.R.G. authorities and the revanchists not waning. American imperialism has not renounced its policy of force and have found a response in ruling circles of your country. open intervention against peoples fighting for their freedom. It continues a CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 wage a criminal war in Vietnam, support the Israeli aggressors in the Near East and hampers a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The arms race has by no z, cans slowed down. The Federal Republic of Germany, in which the forces of neofasci n have swelled, attacks the status quo by demanding a revi- sion of the borders, refuses to renounce its aspirations either to seize the G.D.R. or to secure access to nuclear weapons and opposes disarmament pro- posals. In Europe, where enormous means of mass destruction have been stockpiled, peace and the security of peoples are maintained primarily thanks to the strength, solidarity and peace-loving policies of the socialist states. We all bear responsibility for this strength and unity of the socialist countries and for the fate of peace. Our countries are bound to one another by treaties and agreements. These important mutual commitments of states and peoples are founded on a com- mon desire to defend socialism and safeguard the collective security of the socialist countries Our parties and peoples are entrusted with the historical responsibility of seeing that the revolutionary gains achieved are not forfeited. Each of our parties bears a responsibility not only to its own working class and its own people but also to the international working class and the world Communist movement and cannot evade the obligations deriving from this.. Therefore we roost have solidarity and unity in defense of the gains of social- ism, our security and the international positions of the entire socialist com- monwealth. This is why we believe that it is not only your task but ours too to deal a resolute rebuff to the anticommunist forces and to wage a resolute struggle for the preservation of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia. The cause of defending the rule of the working class and all the working people and the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia requires: a resolute and bold offensive against rightist and antisocialist forces and the mobilization of all means of defense created by the socialist state; a cessation of the activities of all political organizations that oppose socialism; the party's assumption of control over the mass news media - the press, radio, and television - and utilization of them in the interests of the working class, all the working people and socialism: solidarity in the ranks of the party itself on the fundamental basis of Marx- ism-Leninism, saeadfast observance of the principles of democratic centralism and struggle against those who through their activities assist hostile forces. We know there are forces in Czechoslovakia that are capable of upholding the socialist system and dealing a defeat to the antisocialist elements. The working class, the laboring peasantry and the advanced intelligentsia -the overwhelm- ing majority of the republic's working people - are prepared to do everything necessary in the name of the further development of socialist society. The tasks today are to give these healthy forces a clear perspective, rally them to action and mobilize their energy for a struggle against the forces of counter- revolution in order to preserve and strengthen socialism in Czechoslovakia. In the face of the threat of counterrevolution, the voice of the working class must resound with full strength to the call of. the Communist Party. The work- ing class, together with the laboring peasantry, made enormous efforts in the name of the triumph of the socialist revolution. It is precisely these forces that most cherish the preservation of the gains of socialism. We express the conviction that the Czechoslovak Communist Party, realizing its responsibility, will take the necessary measures to block the path of reaction. In this struggle you may count on the solidarity and comprehensive assistance of the fraternal socialist countries. [Signed:] On the instructions of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the B.C.P. Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; Stanko Todorov, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Com- mittee; Boris Velchev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee; Pencho Kubadinsky, member of the Politburo and Vice-Chairman of the P.R.B. Council of Ministers. On the instructions of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Com- mittee: Janos Kadar, First Secretary of H.S.W.P. Central Committee; Jeno Fock, member of the Politburo of the H.S.W.P. Central Committee and Chair- man of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government. On the .instructions of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany: Walter Ulbricht. First Secretary of the S.U.P.G. Central Committee and Chairman of the G.D.R. State Council; Willi Stoph, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Chairman of the G.D.R. Council of Ministers; Hermann Axen, candidate member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee. On the instructions of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the P.U.W.P. Central Coax mittee; Marian Spychalski, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Polish People's Republic State Council; Josef Cyran- kiewicz, member of the Politburo and Chairman of the P.P.R. Council of Ministers; Zenon Kliszko, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Cen- tral Committee. On the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the, Soviet Union: L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Com- mittee; N. V. Podgorny, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet; A. N. Kosy- gin, member of the Politburo and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Min- isters; P. Ye. Shelest, member of the Politburo of the C.P.S.U. Central Com- mittee and First Secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee; K. F. Katushev, Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. Warsaw, July rg, 1968. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 PRA.VDA 26 September 1968 CPYRGHT "SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES." by Sergei Kovalev In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia the question of the relation- ship and interconsoetion between the socialist countries' national interests and their internationalist obligations has assumed particular urgency and sharpness. The measures taken jointly by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to defend the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of enormous sig- nificance for strengthening the socialist commonwealth, which is the main achievement of the international working class. At the same time it is impossible to ignore the allegations being heard in some places that the actions of the five socialist countries contradict the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the right of nations to self- determination. Such arguments arc untenable primarily because they are based on an ab- stract, nonclass approach to the question of sovereignty and the right of na- tions to self-determination. There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Commu- nist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist coun- tries nor the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this in placing sole emphasis on the autonomy in.t 'independence of Communist Parties lapses into one-sidedness, shirking his internationalist o'l gations. The Marxist balectic opposes one-sidedness; it requires that every phe- nomenon be examined in terms of both its specific nature and its overall con- nection with other phenomena and processes. Just as, in V. I. Lends words, someone living in a society cannot be free of that society, so a socialist state that is in a system of ether states constituting a socialist commonwealth cannot be free of the common interests of that commonwealth. The sovercigm, of individual socialist countries cannot be countcrposed to the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary Wit. V. I. Lenin demanded that all Communists "struggle against petty national narrow- ness, exclusivity and isolation, and for taking into account the whole, the overall situation, for subordinating the interests of the particular to the interests of the general" ("Complete Collected Works" [in Russian], Vol. XXX, p. 45). Socialist states have respect for the democratic norms of international law. More than once they have proved this in practice by resolutely opposing im- perialism's attempts to trample the sovereignty and independence of peoples. From this same standpoint they reject left-wing, adventurist notions of "ex- porting revolution" and "bringing bliss" to other peoples. However, in the Marxist conception the norms of law, including the norms governing relations among socialist countries, cannot be interpreted in a narrowly formal way, outside the general context of the class struggle in the present-day world. Socialist countries resolutely oppose the export and import of counterrevolution. Each Communist Party is free in applying the principles of Marxism-Lenin- ism and socialism in its own country, but it cannot deviate from these principles (if, of course, it remains a Communist Party). In concrete terms this means primarily that every Communist Party cannot fail to take into account in its activities such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between the two antithetical social systems ---capitalism and socialism. This struggle is an ob- jective fact that does not depend on the will of people and is conditioned by the division of. the world into two antithetical social systems. "Every person," V. I. Lenin said, "must take either this, our, side or the other side. All attempts to avoid taking sides end in failure and disgrace" (Vol. XLI, p. 4or). It should be stressed that even if a socialist country seeks to take an "extra bloc" position, it in fact retains its national independence thanks precisely to the power of the socialist commonwealth - and primarily to its chief force, the Soviet Union - and the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries, which cannot be indifferent to this. Thus, the antisocialist forces in Czecho. slovakia were in essence using talk about the right to self-determination to cover up demands for so-called neutrality and the CS.R. s withdrawal f vrn the socialist commonwealth. But implementation of such "sdfdetermination," U, Czechoslovakia's separation from the socialist commonwealth, wild no counter to Czechoslovakia's fundamental interests and would harm the other socialist countries. Such "sdfActermination," as a result of which NATO troops might approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of European .4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-,RDP79-01194A000300060'001-7 CPYRGHT socialist countries would be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital interests of these countries' peoples, and fundamentally contradicts the right of these peoples to socialist self-determination. The Soviet Union and other socialist states, in fulfilling their internationalist duty to the fraternal peoples of Czecho- slovakia and defending their own socialist gains, had to act and did act in resolute opposition to the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia. Comrade W. Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, used a metaphor to illustrate this point: "To those friends and comrades of ours from other countries who believe they are defending the just cause of socialism and the sovereignty of peoples by de- nouncing and protesting the introduction of our troops in Czechoslovakia, we reply. If=_thc.anemy. plants dynamite under''our house, under the common- wealth of sociiatist states, our patriotic, national and internationalist duty is to prevent this by using any means that are necessary." People who "disapprove" of the actions taken by the allied socialist coun- tries ignose the decisive fact that these countries are defending the interests of worldwide socialism and the worldwide revolutionary movement. The socialist system exists in concrete form in individual countries that have their own well-defined state boundaries and develops with regard for the specific attri- butes of each such country. And no one interferes with concrete measures to perfect the socialist system in various socialist countries. But matters change radically when a danger to socialism itself arises in a country. World socialism as a social sytgm is the common achievement of the working people of all countries, it is indivisible, and its defense is-the common cause of all Com- munists and all progressive people on earth, first and foremost the working people of the socialist countries. The Bratislava statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties on socialist gains says that "it is the common internationalist duty of all socialist countries to support, steengthen and defend these gains, which were achieved at the cost of every people's heroic efforts and selfless labor." What the sight-wing, antisocialist forces were seeking to achieve in Czecho- slovakia in s+aent months was not a matter of developing socialism in an original way or of applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism to specific conditions in that country, but was an encroachment on the foundations of socialism and the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. This is the "nuance" that is still incomprehensible to people who trusted in the hypo- critical cant of the antisocialist and revisionist elements. Under the guise of "democratization" these elements were shattering the socialist state step by step; they sought to demoralize the Communist Party and dull the minds of the masses; they were gradually preparing for a counterrevolutionary coup and at the same time were not being properly rebuffed inside the country. The Communists of the fraternal countries naturally could not allow the socialist states to remain idle in the name of abstract sovereignty while the country was endangered by antisocialist degeneration. The five allied socialist countries' actions in Czechoslovakia are consonant with the fundamental interests of the Czechoslovak people themselves. Ob- viously it is precisely socialism that, by liberating a nation from the fetters of an exploitative system, ensures the solution of fundamental problems of na- tional development in any country that takes the socialist path. And by en- croaching on the foundations of socialism, the counterrevolutionary elements in Czechoslovakia were thereby undermining the basis of the country's inde- pendence and sovereignty. The formal observance of freedom of self-determination in the specific situation that had taken shape in Czechoslovakia would signify freedom of "self-determination" not for the people's masses and the working people, but for their enemies. The antisocialist path, the "neutrality" to which the Czecho- slovak people were being prodded, would lead the C.S.R. straight into the jaws of the West German revanchists and would lead to the loss of its na- tional independence. World imperialism, for its part, was trying to export counterrevolution to Czechoslovakia by supporting the antisocialist forces there. The assistance given to the working people of the C.S.R. by the other socialist countries, which prevented the export of counterrevolution from the outside, is in fact a struggle for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's sovereignty against those who would like to deprive it of this sovereignty by delivering the country to the imperialists. Over a long period of time and with utmost restraint and patience, the fra- ternal Communist Parties of the socialist countries took political measures to help the Czechoslovak people to halt the antisocialist forces' offensive in Czechoslovakia. And only after exhausting all such measures did they under- take to bring in armed forces. The allied socialist countries' soldiers who are in Czechoslovakia are proving in deeds that they have no task other than to defend the socialist gains in that country. They are not interfering in the country's internal affairs, and they arc waging a struggle not in words but in deeds for the principles of self-determi- nation of Czechoslovakia's peoples, for their inalienable right to decide their destiny themselves after profound and careful consideration, without intimida- tion by counterrevolutionaries, without revisionist and nationalist demagoguery. Those who speak of 'the "illegality" of the allied socialist countries' actions in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society there is and can be no such thing as nonclass law. Laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle and the laws of social development. These laws-are clearly formulated in the documents jointly adopted by the Communist and Workers' Parties. The lass approach to the matter cannot be discarded in the name of legalistic considerations. Whoever does so and forfeits the only correct, class-oriented criterion for evaluating legal norms begins to measure events with the yard- sticks of bourgeois law. Such an approach to the question of sovereignty means, for example, that the world's progressive forces could not oppose the revival of nco-Nazism in the F.R.G., the butcheries of Franco and Salazar or the reactionary outrages of the "black colonels" in Greece, since these are the "internal affairs" of "sovereign states." It is typical that both the Saigon pup. pets and their American protectors concur completely in the notion that sovet6 Approved- .nrTlele_asP 1.9,9wtwr9/02 : RQP79-01 194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 eignty forbids supporting the struggle of the progressive forces. After all, they shout from the housetops that the socialist states that are giving aid to the Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence and freedom are violating Vietnam's sovereignty. Genuine revolutionaries, as internationalists, cannot fail to support progressive forces in all countries in their just struggle for national and social liberation. The interests of the socialist commonwealth and the entire revolutionary movement and the interests of socialism in Czechoslovakia demand full expo- sure and political isolation of the reactionary forces in that country, consolida- SCINTEIA 22 August 1968 tion of the working people and consistent fulfillment of the Moscow agreement between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders. There is no doubt that the actions taken in Czechoslovakia by the five allied socialist countries in Czechoslovakia, actions aimed at defending the furtda- mental interests of the socialist commonwealth and primarily at defending Czechoslovakia's independence and sovereignty as a socialist state, will be increasingly supported by all who really value the interests of the present-day revolutionary movement, the peace and security of peoples, democracy and socialism. Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania and Secretary General of the POmanian Cbnvm1nhst 'Par-ty Dear comrades, citizens of Rumania. In this difficult moment for the situation in Europe and for the fraternal Czechoslovak people, in the name of the Central Committee, of the State Council, and of the government, I wish to address myself so you and express myself to you and express our confidence in our people, who are aspiring to ensure the peaceful construction of socialism. We know, coatrades, that the entry of the forces of the five socialist countries into Czechoshwakia is a great error and a serious danger to peace in Europe and to the fate of socialism in the world. It is inconceivable in today's world, when the peopks are rising to the struggle to defend their national inde- pendence and for equality in rights, that a socialist state, that socialist states, should violate the freedom and the independence of another state. There is no justification whatsoever, and there can be no excuse for accepting even for a moment the idea of military intervention in the affairs of a fraternal socialist state. Our party-state delegation which last week visited Czechoslovakia convinced itself that the Czechoslovak people, the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and the Czechoslovak workers' class, old people, women, and young people, unani- mously support the party and state leadership in order to put right the negative state of affairs in Czechoslovakia inherited from the past, in order to ensure the triumph of socialism in Czechoslovakia. The problem of choosing the ways of socialist construction is a problem of each party, of each state, and of every people, and nobody can set himself up as an adviser and guide for the way in which socialism must be built. It is the affair of every people, and we deem that, in order to place the relations between socialist countries and Communist es cry w put an end once and parties of for all to tinterference in the affairs is neccessary p is n The measures which the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the State Council hade decided to adopt aim at submitting to the Grand National Assembly a declaration in which we would set out clearly the rations we mean to build, our relations with the socialist countries and with all the countries of the world, based on respect for independence and national sovereignty, full equality in rights, and nonce in inttsrsal affairs, and to base these relations on a truly Marxist-Leninist collaboration which would contribute to the triumph of the ideas of Max, Engels, and Lenin, to the triumph of communism, and to restoring the authority of and confidence in Marxist-Leninist ideas. We have today decided to set up armed patriotic guards made up of workers, peasants, and intellectuals: defenders of the independence of our socialist fatherland. We want our people to have their armed units in order to defend their revolutionary achievements and in order to ensure their peaceful work and the independence and the sovereignty of our socialist fatherland. In our activity, we proceed from the responsibility we have toward the people, toward all the working people regardless of nationality - Rumanians, Hungarians, Germans, and other nationalities; we all -- Rumanians, Hun- garians, Germans, people of other nationalities -have the same destiny and the same aspiration: the forging of communism in our fatherland. We at determined that in complete unity we shall ensure the attainment of our ideals. It has been said that in Czechoslovakia there was danger of counterrevolu- tion; perhaps tomorrow they will say that our meeting has mirrored counter- revolutionary tendencies. If so, we answer to all that all the Rumanian people will not permit anybody to violate the territory of our fatherland. Lout coax rades: Our whole Central Committee, the State Council, and the Government are here. We are all determined to faithfully save the people in socialist enw other states and ot, . . _Approv-eel For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 struction and in die defense of the revolutionary achievements and its inde- pendence. Many of those who arc here are Communists and antifascists who have faced prisons and death but have not betrayed the interests of the workers' class and our people. Be sure, comrades, be sure, citizens of Rumania, that we shall nevu betray our fatherland, that we shall not betray our people's interests. We are confident that the Communist and workers parties will know how to find the way to put the speediest end to this shameful event in the history of the revolutionary movements. We are convinced that no Communist can be found who can accept this military action in Czechoslovakia, that all the Communists would raise their voices to ensure the triumph of freedom, the triumph :of the Marxist-Leninist principles, so that Czechoslovak people, so that the peoples, may be able to build socialist society as they themselves want it. We are determined to act with all our force and with all our responsibility in order to contribute to the finding of ways for the speediest solution of this situation created by the entry of foreign forces into Czechoslovakia, and so that the Czechoslovak people can carry out their activity in tranquility. We are firmly determined to act so that together with the other socialist countries 22 August 1968 and with the other Communist and workers' parties we shall contribute to the elimination of the divergencies and to the strengthening of the unity of the socialist countries and of the Communist parties because we are convinced that only in this way are we serving the interests of the people and the interests of socialism in the whole world. We ask the citizens of our fatherland that, having complete confidence in the leadership of the party and the state and in our Communist party, they should give proof of complete unity and act calmly and firmly, with everyone at his place of work, to increase his efforts to ensure the implementation of the program for the development of our socialist society, and to be ready, com- rades, at any moment to defend our socialist fatherland, Rumania. I thank you, all the citizens of the capital and all the citizens of our father- land for your confidence, for this warm manifestation, and for the attention with which you are watching our party's policy; and we wish you comrades good health and success in your activity for the triumph of socialism in our fatherland. We request you, comrades, that you return to your work and have confidence that we shall keep you informed regarding the unfolding of events. Good-bye. OFFICIAL RU4ANIAN COMNIQUE ON THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 21 AUGUST 1968 CPYRGHT On August at, i968, a joint session of the Rumanian Communist Party entra Committee, of the State Council, and of the government of the Rumanian Socialist Republic was held. In addition to the members of the Central Com- mittee, the State Council, and the government-of the Rumanian Socialist Re- public, the pleurisy session was attended by the leaders of the trade unions, youth organizatiin, and other civic organizations, representatives of the press, and activists wilt responsible state and party jobs. Comrade Niorlae Ceausescu reported about the particularly grave situation created as a consequence of the penetration of the armed forces of some socialist countries into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and presented the conclusions whier were reached by the Executive Committee of the party Central Committee and by the Presidium of the Central Committee in this connection. The Central Committee, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers have unanimously etgwessed their profound concern in connection with this act, stressing that it represents a flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of a fraternal, socialat, free, and independent state, of the principles on which the relations between socialist countries are based, of the unanimously recognized norms of international law. Nothing can lusts this arme action - the occupation ot zee os ov by the troops of these countries. The interference in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak people and of their Communist party, the armed intervention against Czechoslovakia, represents a grave blow for the interests of the unity of the world socialist system, for the international Communist and workers' movement, for the prestige of socialism throughout the world, and for the cause of peace. The party and government, all our people, express their con- viction that the only road for the liquidation of the grave consequences created by the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia is the speedy withdrawal of the troops of the five countries and the ensuring of conditions for the Czeclro-' slovak people to solve for themselves their internal affairs without any outside interference. The party and government, all our people, manifest on this occa- sion, too, all their solidarity with the fraternal Czechoslovak people and with their Communist party and express their conviction that the Czechoslovak workers' class, the Czechoslovak intelligentsia, peasantry, the Communist party, and its leadership elected by the party, the legal bodies of leadership of the Czechoslovak state will successfully solve all the problems connected with the march forward of socialist building in the fraternal Czechoslovak republic. The party Central Committee, the State Council, and the government of the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT ApVX, y,,neoq lTp ~~et t-~ ~~4i 02 : C RPRr?9p9XJ JAq0930006Q~OOmit7 to ensure the peaceful pCU u.. S-:roust Republic hay a i s1~r Presidium and of the Executive Committee of the party Central Committee creative work of the Rumanian people, builders of socialism, the independence, directed toward the promotion of the principles of independence, sovereignty, and sovereignty of our fatherland, were also approved unanimously. noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual respect, the strengthening on It has been decided to convoke for tomorrow, 22 August, the Grand National this basis of the unity of the socialist countries, of the Communist and workers Assembly of the Rumanian Socialist Republic in extraordinary session, parties, and of all anti-imperialist forces. I BORBA 26 August 1968 IRPT FROM THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY 1HE CENTRAL 0ONMITTEE OF THE LEAGEJE OF- CONKNISTS OF Yt VIA-, 23AUQJSf 1968 CPYRGHT The Communists and other citizens of Yugoslavia have in recent days over- whelmingly expressed their. deep indignation and protest against the occupa- tion of CzechWovakia. They have given full support to the people of Czechoslovakia who under'difficult conditions of occupation rallied around their party and state leadership, so unanimously and courageously fighting for the independence and free socialist development of their country. In endorsing the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), our people have once again declared themselves ready to defend uncompromis- ingly their independence, their right to determine their own way of internal socialist develo s ent and to act freely in international relations. They have taken this stand in line with their internationalist responsibility and in solidarity with socialist and all anti-imperialist and democratic forces in the world, in the interests of peace, independence, and the equality of peoples in the interests of socialism. In the stand taken by our people, the LCY sees an inexhaustible source of strength and encouragement for further efforts in the struggle for the development of socialist, democratic, and humane relations among people and for the resolute support to all the forces fighting for the liberation of man and nations from all forms of repression and hegemony. Together with all the people of socialist Yugoslavia, the Central Committee (CC) of the ICY has once again expressed its protest against a violent action, the method and aims of which are directly opposed to the essence and interests of socialism. The CC condemns the policy which attempts to shirk responsibility to the working class and peoples of the whole world, to the interests of _peaa, progress and socialism. No matter what arguments are used to justify the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the fact remains that the governments of the five Warsaw Treaty countries, by applying brute force, have perpetrated an attack against the independence of a socialist country in order to hinder its independent socialist development and to subject it to their will. The peoples of our country, led by the LCY, once again raise their voce in protest, as they have been doing in the matters of American aggression in Vietnam, threats to the independence and independent internal development of Cuba, Israeli aggression against Arab countries, or imperialist violence and intervention in various countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Viewed historically, the action against Czechoslovakia is all the more grave and far- reaching in its harmful effect on progress, peace, and freedom for having been undertaken by socialist countries ostensibly to protect socialism. Striking at the working class and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC), the forces which alone can ensure the progress of socialism, the inter- vention against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) can in no way be described as protection of socialism nor as directed against counterrevolu- tion. Neither can the intervention be justified by any strategic interests; of the struggle against imperialism because, by weakening the position of the socialist countries and socialism, it is, on the contrary, strengthening the positions of the imperialist forces. Finally, this action can least of all be justified by ideological reasons and arguments drawn from the theory of Marxism-Lenin- ism, because it is flagrantly at odds with the ideas of Marx, Engels, and L enin- 499 09300060004-T- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 ')A A?mutt iQ6R CPYRGHT FIDEL CASTRO SPEECH ON CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION; 23 AUGUST ly0~ EXC EWIS FROM considered Czechoslov of all I wish to state that we to be head- . . . First ritiorrtoward capitalism, and into the ing toward a ~errevohr2 arms of imperialism. position toward the action Thus, this is the operative concept in our first Poswe consider that it was carried out by a pup of socialist countries. That is, revcut it from happening at any cost, in one way or another. necessary to p bemuse we propose to analyze this in line with Let us not become impatient, our ideas The essential Discussing the farm is not really the most fundamental thing. or not, is whether or not the socialist bloc could thing, whether vwe accept it political situation which would lead to the permit the development of 'a socialist country and its fall into the arms of imperialism issible, and the sociat loc has the right' breakdown asocial From our vie ewpoint, it is not Penn We Est wish to begin by establishing what to prevent it in one way or another, our opinion is aboac this essential fact' that Czechoslovakia was heading d to Now, it is not enough to accept simply d it is . n and that it b toward a counte i 1ude t imply that the only a ornative was to prevpn it and causes and determine the factors which not enough to coal drastic, and painful remedy? nothing more. We must analyze the d oviola- made possible and necessary such a dramatic, Those arc the facaxs which required international s standards, which have a a often lion of legal pimciples and regarded in served as shields for peoples against injustices and are highly the world. that in the case of Czechoslovakia the What is not appropriate here is to say not violated That would be fiction sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state was and a lie. The vitiation was flagrant. ideas our r ideas s of legal is And this is what we will co ce lerevieon' wpointei~rannat be political principles. From legal quite clear. In air judgment, the decision on Czechoslovakia can plained only from the political viewpoint ofd not from a legal viewpoint. alega. Frankly, it has anmlutely not o Ape revolution What are the [kcumn a difficult situaPcrr the entire world this remedy which places traumatic situation for an ch movement, a remedy which con stitutes a really e ogle - in Czechoslovakia -- s remedy as is the present case implies that an entire nation has to pass through the most unp stances of seeing the country occupied by armies of other countries, although they are armies of the social' socialist countries- How did a situation come about which millions of citizens have to see hee over today circumstances rand stances of choosing either to be passive previous episodes - or to struggle this event - which so much brings to mind comradeship with the in comradeship with pro-Yankee agents and spies, in of W enemies of socialism, in comradeship thwith at thetagents heat of theseG u umsa s all that fascist and reactionary rabble will ions of the sovereignty, patriotism, and try to present themselves as champ freedom of Czechoslovakia? act Logically for the Czechoslovak ,Therefore, sit is no~noughtsimply t" tute a bitter and tragic and even, if you wish, as an elude that it has arisen as an inexorable necessity a and events uestionable obligation of the socialist countries to p heefa ctsuch the ca h e unq e rs of communism in from happening. [One must inquire] what are t circumstances that made iiopos of1c rsone who t roes do not even apps the Czechoslovakia -that a g p Pe her ist anywhere would have request ent the triumph of th~o In rrc ?1uu king Czechoslovakia a and the triumph of the Cuc~e~ vakia frconspiracies of tlu ern' and Czechoslovakia to send their P the commuBiq Aerialist countries interested in tearing hhooss governments of till of socialist countries. the decision of the g? The statement by TASS explaining "The brother nations firmly and Warsaw Pact says in its final paragraph: any threat from abroad, resolutely oppose their unbreakable solidarity against an thle link of the so-a away h even They will never permit We ask-Does this is at m statement include Vietnam? Does this cialist community." socialist ~pDoes it consider thes cannot be statement nt include Korea? Doestli~ks tement include Vietnam, Korea, and Cuba as ns ere sent to snatched away by the imperialists or not? also if tf On the basis of this declaration3 Warsaw sent to V C Warsaw Pact Pdiv be act o visio Slovakia. And w ask, Will Wagainst that country and the pe P the imperialists increase their aggression aof Vietnam ask for this aid? Will Warsaw Pact div attack that tome Korean Democratic Republic if the Yankee imperialists c& .n Approved Fr.Release 1999/09/02 : C A-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT Will Warsaw Pact divisions be sent to Cuba if the Yankee imperialists attack our country, or simply if, in the face of the threat of an attack by the Yankee imperialists, our country requests it? We accept the bitter necessity which demanded the sending of troops to 22 -August 196.8. Th 1UNIf OF THE POLITE` OF T MMUST -P ry OF ITALY 2 -AUGt T"1 ' Czechoslovakia. We do not condemn the socialist countries that adopted this decision; but we, as revolutionaries, and on the basis of principles, have the right to demand that a consistent policy will be adopted in all the other ques- tions that affect the revolutionary movement in the world... . CPYRGHT The Politburo of the PCI met this morning with the participation of the members of the Directorate present in Rome, to discuss the grave situation that has unexpectedly arisen as a result of the intervention of Soviet troops and of troops from other Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia. The Z`iernd--nad Tisou and Bratislava discussions and agreements were greeted by the leading PCI organs with great satisfaction, as they were con- sidered to be fully consistent with their demands for a political solution of the problems that had arisen in Czechoslovakia and with regard to the r+ coons between Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries --- a cola-tion that was to be realized with all due respect for the autonomy of every party and ocean- try, following the line of development of socialist democracy in the spirit of solidarity with the revival process taking place in Ciechoslovakia and in a manner that would effectively strengthen the unity of the rational Com- munist and worloers' movement. In these conditions and given the facts, it is hard to understand how a deci- sion for military intervention could have been taken. The PCI Politburo therefore considers this decision to be unjustified and inconspatible with the. principles of the autonomy and independence of every Communist party and socialist state and with the need to defend the unity of the international Communist and workers' movement. In the firmest and most convinced spirit of proletarian internationalism and reaffirming once again the profound, fraternal, and genuine relations that unite the Italian Communists. with the Soviet Union and the CPSU, the PCI Politburo con. siders it to be its duty to immediately express its strong dissent and to re. serve the. party directorate's right to make a more profound evaluation of the rtttt . awwl its further devckTment=, to make i self the spout of the rsitu and deepest c -cern felt by the workers' movrtt at this memetit; and to reaffirm. its solidarity with the action of renovation undertaken by the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The PCI Politburo expresses its hope that all Italian demara,atie brew will be We to assume a responsible position and to steer clear of emotionalism; it also commits all Communist organizations to hold to the positions of the party's leading organs and to be firmly vigilant against all anti.Communist speculation and provocation. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 L' UNITA 8 September 1968 VIEW GRANI`ED BY LUIGI LONGO SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ITALIAN* COr'NIUNIST J?AIrIY, TO L'AST'R0~4BI0 EXCERPT FROM AN IhTER~ CPYRGHT "DEVELOPMENTS IN LESSONS - LEAPNED ' FROM ' CZECEi 'CRISIS? It is equally true that in that period the CCP was deeply divided, with its the disagree- foreign activity almost halted, by the divergencies of the past and it ments over domestic organizational and leadership problems. But was to unite again on these matters and rally around the new leaders including Dub&k, especially after the encounters at Cierna and Bratislava. It therefore had broad opportunities to defeat rightist and antisocialist facts to It is my opinion that, following those encounters, were indicate that the counterrevolution posed an imminent and inevitable threat and that socialist power was about to disintegrate. I therefore do not believe that military intervention to ward off a hypothetical catastrophe was warranted. And even less do I believe that the situation in Czechoslovakia was such that it warranted that "painful necessity" with which the intervention in Hungary in 1956 had been justified. Because of this, we immediately expressed our disagreement and disap- proval as soon as we heard about the military intervention in Czechoslovakia by the five socialist states, which had sent jointly the so-called July "Warsaw letter." And we expressed our disagreement and disapproval not only for the aforesaid reasons of fact but also for the more general reasons of principle. In fact, we consider the following reasons of principle to be inviolable: the autonomy, independence, and national sovereignty of every state and the autonomy and sovereignty of every Communist party. We hold that the fate and future of socialism in a country are of interest not only to Communists, democrats, and people of the given country but also to the Communists, demo- crats, and peoples of all countries. However, this principle, in our view, cannot be understood in any way as the right of intervening militarily in the internal life of another Communist party and another country. Moreover, this principle was solemnly stated by the government of the Soviet Union itself in a resolution of October 1956 following the Hungarian events. This resolution affirmed clearly that "the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can establish their relations only on positions of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence, and sovereignty, and noninterference in the affairs of others." The resolution also mentioned L'Asrrolabio: Following the disagreements between tie L'ommuntst Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria on the one hand and the Communist party of Czechoslovakia on the other over the "new course" undertaken in Czechoslovakia, there was in May an understood tnme with Kosygin's trip to Karlovy Vary; this was followed by the formal accords reached at Ciern6 and Bratislava. Then came the un- expected military intervention. Why? What do you think of the arguments presented to justify this intervention? Longo: I do not believe, as I have repeatedly stated in recent months, that the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) was in danger, with the "new if it had the counterrevolution even socialist course ovakia could have been overturned the sl tried to attack. In my opinion, twenty-three years of existence and construction of socialism in Czechoslovakia had already sent down, despite shortcomings and errors, such solid roots throughout Czechoslovak economic, social and political life that the country was in the position of facing with security and tranquility any destructive attacks by rightist domestic forces and imperialist and counter- revolutionary foreign forces. On the other hand, the "new course" adopted by the Czechoslovak Com- munist Party proposed precisely to consolidate socialism in Czechoslovakia by overcoming the errors and delays of the past, activating democratic life within the party and the country, and adapting relations between party and state and their relations with the working classes, the popular masses, and public opinion to new requirements. Moreover, the decisions adopted by the Central Committee in January and April, decisions that inaugurated the "new course, were also welcomed by the responsible organs of the CPSU. It is true that the new CCP leadership was subsequently accused of having inadequately reacted to the social-demo- cratic and counterrevolutionary attacks that were directed against the Commu- nist party itself, the socialist foundations, and the international position Czechoslovakia. 11 Approved F.gLReJease 1999/09/02 : E+ r=R 79=01'1V4A0 0 0~ 0 001 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 that "the Twentieth CPSU Congress has condemned with maximum resolu- tion violations and errors and has posed the task of consistent application by the Soviet Union in its relations with the other socialist countries, of the Leninist principles of equality among peoples." The same resolution specified in a very concrete way how the Leninist principles of equality among, peoples were to be consistently applied. "The deployment of troops of this or that signatory state of the Warsaw Pact on the territory of another signatory country of the Warsaw Pact is effected in agree. ment with all the signatory states and only with the concurrent: of that State on whose territory, through its request, these military units are deployed or are to be deploycd." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Radio commentary by Milika Sundic over Zagreb (Yugoslavia radio on 31 anuary For over a year and a halffithe Soviet press has been accusing Western propaganda and the so-called revisionists in the communist and workers movement of having invented the doctrine of the limited sovereignty of socialist countries and, as the organ of the office of the CPSU Central Committee in the RSFSR, Soviet Russia, maintains, of attributing it to the Soviet Union. The acts, jwever, say exactly the opposite. The doctrine of limited sovereignty or socialist community was not invented either by Western propaganda or the so-called revisionists, but by theoreticians and responsible statesmen of the countries whose troops intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The article we mentioned in Soviet Russia clearly confirms this. It says, among other things, thatt the sovereignty of a state not only is a concept of international law but it also has'a class character. This reference to class character actually represents the arrogation by one or more countries of the right to intervene in every socialist country which, by their criteria., is building socialism in accordance with its own specific condition and not on the basis of foreign models. The article in the army paper Red Star which, like Soviet Russia, is dealing with the same problems, s - a so characteristic. Ac oong to that paper, varing models of socialism are not acceptable and deserve only to be condemned because the Soviet experience has allegedly shown that there is only one road to socialism. These theories, naturally, are unacceptable and very dangerous, and the LCY rejects them as dangerous for the unity of socialist countries and the communist and workers movement. It is all the same to Yugoslavia whether the right to intervene in a country is part of the doctrine of limited sovereignty or whatever other name this doctrine might have. What is at stake here is not the name but the essence of the policy. References to the Czechoslovak case, for instance, do not enhance the validity of assertions that Western propaganda and the so-called revisionists in the communist and workers movement have fabricated the doctrine of limited sovereignty and the socialist community. On the contrary, the very fact that the sovereignty of a state is being questioned or the aspect of sovereignty according to international law not recognized refutes the words of the camp press that the doctrine of limited sovereignty was invented by revisionists and' imperialists. This does not, of course, mean that Western imperialism is less dangerous and, even less, that is should appear as some kind of guardian of the independence of small countries.. To dispute the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 13 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 concept of the sovereignty of a country under international law or to make this sovereignty conditional upon the class character of the state represents, in our view, nothing but a modified doctrine of limited sovereignty, the authorghip of which is now being denied by the countries of the camp, but so far only by words and not by deeds. Anyway, what does the assertion'that.proletarian internationalism has been transformed into socialist internationalism mean? Does it .not mean insistence on unity in inequality or on unity of the privileged and the unblemished and of those who are predestined: to sin and who have, therefore, to be taught a lesson? The League of Yugoslav Communists does not recognize such internationalism, which demands the renunciation, of national sovereignty, because this is not internationalism. Such concepts are no less dangerous when they appear inside a country embracing several nations as, for instance, the Soviet Union or, let us say, our country. With regard to the repeated insistence that the intervention in Czechoslovakia represented the fulfillment of internationalist duty, it should be noted that this insistence in present circumstances is something other than an expression of a need to repeatedly criticize those who were not in agreement with the intervention. The case of Czechoslovakia, in our view, is being revived as a continuous threat to others, because, otherwise, why should it be talked about in such- a manner, when even those who are doing this know full well that this is not at all popular? British Communist Party "If the right to break this principle [the '?soverei.- ty of 'Socialist' States] is conceded, who is to decide whhenthe duty to intervene exists? Whd decides whether the situation in a country is endangering Socialism? Has any party or Socialist government the right to intervene in the affairs of another if, in its own opinion, there is such a danger? If such a so-called principle was to be accepted, then it would have universal validity and could be acted upon by any-Communist Party and any Socialist government. This is an impossible proposition and one that could never be accepted by the international Communist movement since it could provide a theoretical basis for war between Socialist States. If on the other hand, it is argued that such a right to intervene belongs only to some parties and some Socialist States, then this is equally unacceptable andc+ampletely alien to every established principle of the Communist movement". (nt,:?5..tlctober 1968.) Approved For Release 1999/09/0&: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Suess Communist Party "The intervention in Czechoslovakia which is qualified as preventative and is claimed to be necessary woul be an exception' to these principles [of Communist Party 'autonomy' and independence]. But the problem i., then to know who has the sovereign right to decide on such as 'exception' so laden with consequences?" (Voix Ouvriere, 4 November 1968.) Japanese Communist Party "If this method [i.e. Soviet intervention] could be approved within the Socialist camp, any Socialist country could carry out any kind of armed intervention in another Socialist country by unilaterally deciding that there was a 'danger of counter-revolution' in it. If so, the Socialist 'principle of completely equal rights, respect for territorial integrity and national independence, and roan-intervention in each others' domestic affairs' as clearly stated in the Declaration and the Statement [adopted by international Communist con- ferences in 1957 and 19601, would be an empty statement. As a result, the Socialist camp would lose its raison d'etre". (Akahata, 21 September 1968.) Australian Communist Party "We join with others in the international Communist movement who ask: if it is permissible to over-ride the agreed principles of self-determination of nations and of relations between Socialist States, on the ground of duty to prevent counter-revolution, who is to decide when the call of such duty has come?" (Tribune, 18 September 1968,) Italian Corranunist Party 0 "4Vho will decide the application of this duty to intervene? Who establishes that there is a counter-revolutionary plot and who takes responsibility for the consequences? Pravda does not say". (L', 3 September 1968.) French Communist Party "one cannot invoke proletarian internationalism in order to interfere unduly in the affairs of other parties". (L'Hunahite, 23 October 1968.) Approved For Release 1999/09/02 ]:S CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7 25X1C10b L 25X6A Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 NEW YORK TIMES 2 July 1971 CPYRGHT Indonesia, Five Years Out of Deep Instability, Is Finding a New oasis for Hope CPYRGHT JAKAKIA, n , Junu 26-"1 wouldn't have believed it," said an Indonesian student who returned to his country, this month after six years of study in Europe. "I got back here, and for the first time X thought to myself that maybe we can make it." He noted that most children now wore clothes instead' of rags, that the roads were less ,bumpy, that steel-reinforced concrete bridges stood over rivo ers where wooden ones had washed out annually. Boys carry transistor radios. Air- lines run on schedule. Beggars are less noticeable. Some of the new businesses give out free books of matches. There are still many pessi- mists in Indonesia-maiy peo- pie who see this nation of is- lands - the fifth largest na- tion in the world in area and population - destined to be a crippled, hungry and angry world dependent. Many of the long-range projections are bleak, and one can still find many families in Jakarta l in sewer pipes. Per capita in- come is still less than $80 a year. Yet five years after an era of seemingly chronic economib and political instability, long- time observers see more hope now than at any other time since the leaders of Indonesia declared their independence ,from their Dutch colonial rulers in 1945.. Travelers returning after a long absence use word9 like "miraculous" and "spec=tacular" ? In describing the 'changes they see, although many of the changes are admit. tedly superficial. The progress has occurred under the leadership of Pres- dent Suharto and the group of generals who assumed power after crushing an attempted Communist take-over in 1965: By force -- some say by severe .repression - they tightened mii~l ry control and pushed po- litical processes into dormanty -in an attempt to create a cliff , .a ate for development In place'. defense. .42 WLXffrAW 6. rof ideological 41-0 . By JAMES P. STERBA .,-4r?m,,-V~ v trgrime. Leaning on the West This year President Suharto loosened the reins ever so slightly. Under careful stage- managing and an overlay of force, about 57 million Indo- nesians are to vote on July 3 in the first national election for representatives since 1955. Gov- ernment officials contend that the election is the first step' toward popular democracy and the gradual end of military rule. Although Indonesia's foreign policy involves active nonalign- ment and she' is seeking re- newed friendships with Com- munist countries, she is also 'leaning heavily toward the West. When Richard M. Nixon be-' came the first American Pres-? ident to set foot on Indonesian' soil two years ago, he ? was pinning on the country his hopes for a resurgent non-Com- munist Asia. Nothing since then appears to have diluted those hopes if anything, eco- nomic progress, under capitalist tutelage, has undoubtedly raised them. Sukarno Spent Heavily From a period four years ago, when inflation peaked at an astronomical level, Indonesia has settled Into ' economic sobriety. The rupiah inflated last year by less than 8 per. cent, a better performance, than that of the United States' dollar. In the nineteen-sixties Pres-, ident Suharto's predecessor, Sukarno, spent vast amounts of; borrowed money on facades of world leadership like military hardware and giant monu- ments while roads and irriga-- tion systems disintegrated. Now Indonesia is spending her; money on rehabilitating roads and communications networks. Into the third year of its first Five-Year Plan, the Gov- :ernment is spending more than a third of its budget on de '.velopment projects and less ,than 3 per cent on defense and this in a nation run by the military. In 1963 Mr. 87 per cent on [Sukarno spent s by a general- Its candidate who fly to rallies on aircraft volatility, have been pouring' in for three years in a quest for vast untapped resources of oil, minerals and timber. Indo- nesians who once sent their earnings out as soon as pos- sible are putting them into banks here in record amounts. The gross national product, it is estimated, jumped 7 to 8 per cent last year. Rice Output Rises Rice production increased to some 12 million tons last year, surpassing expectations, and Indonesia is looking forward to being self-sufficient in rice by the mid-nineteen-seventies. Timber production has doubled, and experts say oil production will It a million barrels a day this year. In the next two' years, export earnings from minerals are ex- pected to shoot up after sev- erNl years' of exploration and construction. Though the economic gains are evident, they do not pre- vent vocal dissatisfaction in the political arena, where critics1 of the Government assert that, the election is little more than' a public-relations stunt to le- gitimize the military's continued- rUle in the guise of democracy. ,' As a Western diplomat com- mented, "This election is in thej great democratic tradition of Taiwan and South Vietnam." But a ranking government of- ficial said: "This is an expert= ment-a small first step. You can't expect us to go from military rule to pure democ- racy overnight." 'Blatant Propaganda' Regardless of motives, the Government makes little pre- tense of staging a "fair" cam- paign or election. Its banner is being carried by a collection of, "functional groups" of laborers,I veterans, heathers, civil ser- vants and the like that one critic terms "hollow, organza- tions without significant fbl- lowings-mostly the products of imagination, wishful think- ing and the blatant propaganda of their leaders." The collection is called the Joint Secretariet of Functional Groups. Its chairman is a lieu- a private airline run by a co - lection of generals, receive no- lice motorcycle escorts and sol- dier guards. Members of the nine opposi- tion parties maintain that 'the Government has used excessive force and intimidation, ranging from threats to remove village: chiefs who do not turn in enough votes to beatings to ru- mors that the Government has devised a way to tell how each villager votes and will be checking up afterward. Nervousness Apparent Despite the heavy-handed- ness, nervousness was apparent among officials as campaigning came to a close yesterday. Pres- ident Suharto has warned that if instability threatens, he will quickly tighten controls. Military dominance stretches from Jakarta to the remotest islands. While only 6 of 22 Cab- inet ministers are generals, the President's key decision-makers' wear uniforms, and 17 of the 26 provincial governors are military men. Military commanders run dozens of businesses from air- lines to nightclubs and movie houses, in many cases with the entrepreneurial talent of ethnic Chinese, who have dominated commerce since. they were in vited in by the Dutch 'to serve as a buffer between them and the Indonesians. The military men say that with the Government provid- ing less than half the funds needed to run a battalion, they have no alternative but to look elsewhere for funds. but this is still a country with President Suharto, who long ago traded his uniform for a business suit, has pledged to reduce the size of the military. Last year he put more than 60 generals on the retirement list, but this is still a ctounry with a state of mind that regards a uniform as a status symbol and requires Adam Malik, Indo- nesia's most prominent civilian, to salute before shaking hands with local officials. Yet officials irysist that a shot has not been fired in anger in years. "It's just tradition," a Oy ,gj Ierrnarked. CPYRGHT p v For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 The military APe9 Sukarno ran up like a house- (With teachers generally earn- their lot steadily Improves they hey are the only group with wife gone berserk on Fifth log less than $10 a month-not will form the grist for a Com- e talent and organizational Avenue with a fistful of credit enough to live on-the qu lity munist resurgence. kills to run the country andj cards. More than $1-billion is or education is dismally sow. The Indonesian Communist ush development. owed to the Soviet Union, most The Department of Education 'party was crushed in 1965 and "I for one would be morel of it for warplanes, ships and estimates that there are ~ no subsequently banned. Hundreds an happy to Sol back CO just other har1waro that now nit laces for more than hig Vdl? of thousand or rorninunista ant sing a soldier,' said Lieut. Idle for lack of spare parts. lion children aged 7 to 15. Innocents, It Is estimated, vJre en. Kemal Idris, military com slaughtered in the nightmare which the Russians have re- Health care is in about the under for Sulawesi, ..but: fused to supply except on a same state. In Jakarta, that followed the attemptdd here are the organizations' the cash-and carry basis. most advanced city in Igdo- take-over. it is believed, how- nd the qualified civilians to Giant Doses of Foreign Aid nesia, with a population of ever, that hundreds of thot} e over our Jobs?" He threw The country is also being kep five million, there is one os sands of sympathizers escaped p his hands. afloat by massive and increas- pital bed for every 1, 00 death of arrest. Mountain of Debts ing doses of foreign aid, the people. The status of arrested s While the critics charge that bulk of it going into develop- Those are symptoms of the pects remains a sensitive iss r. Suharto's Government is ment. major problem - overpopala- at home and a source of inter= pressive and that some of The United States, the major tion. Although experts warn national embarrassment, ' and is aides in uniform are cor- contributor, granted $232.7-mil- that it can overcome the rrlost officials remain hesitant to talk t, it has received good re- lion last ear, of which nears 'successful development effots, -upy y about it. It is conservatively sews for its performance In $102-million was for food. birth-control programs are not estimated that at least 70,000 icking up the pieces of a shat- As the, aid continues to flow, a major priority and have just suspects remain in about 350 red nation and slowly point- corruption and. Inefficiency re'- ;gotten under way. prisons and detention camps g It down the road of de- main as major problems, but on Population Over 115 Million with little hope of a trial. elaPment under the watchful small measure of Ph rogress' is Estimates of the population The Government has released idance and advice of inter- that officials are less hesitant range from 115 million to 123 about 30,000 minor suspects, rational economic specialists to talk about them. million, although the outer but at least that many are Tmhe or anizations such as the Gross misallocations of re- islands lack people - about ro g 1.000 of the 13,967 are poau- believed to remain in confine- d eBank. sources lan ample, the are dozens of evident. of charming For r ing lated-some 73 million people ment. Th relative economic moue -' ample, Indonesia earnestly wants to ty has been built on a own-~ old steam locomotives that puff are compressed onto the island take a place among the im- in of I O.U.'s. The Indone- along the Javanese countryside of Java, which has an area of g fans owe other countries about use teak, a rare and expensive just under 49,000 square miles, portant nations of the world, 4-billion in loans and inter- hardwoodof which Indonesia about the size of New York a place many of her young be- st. Until last year they con- has a large marketable supply State. cause leaders of argue size is and population warranted ntrated on holding off the for fuel. A third of the annum The stability and the eco editors; this year they are harvest is burned in the loco- nomic growth have had little alone. Whether she can do so scheduled to make their first motives and for cooking fires. impact on the daily lives of Is unclear. She is out of the, repayments. Schools in Poor Shane most Indonesians. Observers. hospital bed and looking at the The largest debt is about The educational system is who say they are better clothed sun, and her progress has made $2.5-billiothat the late Mr. In extremely poor condition. and appear more hopeful about her doctors jubilant, but they the future, fear that unless worry about a relapse. JAPAN TIMES CPYRG -V " 1371 'Indonesian Elections The election held Saturday in Indonesia, the second sines The appointed representatives are to insure a strong voice the nation won its independence in 1949, is well calculated to by President Soeharto and his military government in the legis- produce no surprises. The continuance of President Soeharto's latures. But the cautious President has also taken out another :firm control over the government and the nation's destiny Is insurance policy to insure political stability. He organized the :assured. ,.Sekber Golkar, Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, whose ' No one Is even pretending that the elections will convert .members are recruited. from almost every level of society and Indonesia instantly into a civilian-led democracy. But they do from major 'government and nongovernment organizations. It ,represent a first step toward parliamentary " government. , includes fishermen and students as well as Christian and Mos- Whether there are further steps in. the future will depend 'on ;lem organizations among many others. But most important, all 'the performance of the legislatures to be established and the :civil servants are required to join Sekber. Golkar or resign progress the country is capable of, both economically and poll ' ,their jobs. 'tically. With strong financial backing, the nonpartisan Sekber Golkar Between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m., an estimated 90 per cent of the Is competing against the nine political parties in the election. It nation's 57 million registered voters have filed through polling ' has been accused by its opponents of steamroller tactics in places and cast ballots for three offices in the lower and upper ,bringing in members.- However, many people have flocked to regional legislatures and in the new House of Representatives. i S`ekber Golkar because they see a sure winner. Everyone from Once the lengthy and complicated vote counting is completed, diplomats to opposition party leaders concede that it will prob- t e 460-seat national parliament will convene October 28. These P :,ably sweep the elections. In fact, there is now concern that members will have the added duty of becoming part of the fthe popularity of the Sekber ..Golkar may deter the hopes that People's Consultative -Assembly which will elect a president , multiparty or a two-party system would emerge from the and vice president late next year or In 1973.. elections, despite Government assurances that it had no inten- The voters were not casting ballots for individuals. They tion of establishing a one-party country. Reports from Indonesia say there are virtually no'hational -oted for party or organization slates. According to the per-- *entage of votes won, the representatives will lle'selected from Issues in the campaign: The only possible one would be the na- 'approved .'lists, for the three levels of government. In addition; ' Lion's economy. However, President Soeharto and his military Approximately one fifth of the legislators will be appointed by, and nonmilitary supporters are convinced that their record in he, government and of these the majority will be military rebuilding the economy from the ruins left -by the Sukarno. ffi ra. Approved For Release 1999109/Q 9 1)Vgl? 14ft ftG 001-7 :.. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT Although unemployment and under employment 19 still a serious problem, inflation is now under control, the budget is balanced, export earnings are climbing and the inflow of foreign capital continues. There is optimism over the economy in iridonomia. 'ha lncianeolani: Al'o boginnina to predict that heir country will become the "Japan" of Southeast Asia. The nation always had potential but in the past very little luck. One interesting question that may or rr not be answered In the election is how the underground Coi.munists, still con- sidered a danger, will vote. But most other questions have been answered already. The outsider-but certainly not the Indonesian-might. ask why hould elections be called at this time. However, pressure has en mounting within Indonesia for parliamentary government, nd President Soeharto has felt, it wise to give In to the wishes f his people. His obvious concern, however, is that a parlia- mentary government might set back, if not destroy, the pro= gress made so far through Is policies. After. all, political r,, aos was the result of the only other election in Indonesian ini5tory. In considering the present Indonesian election, it s hard not to recall the late President Sukarno's description of the form of government he 00 ON: "Guided Democracy." unfor- tunately under Mr. Sukar, there was plenty of guiding but no democracy. Considering the conditions and situation in Indonesia, w&, are inclined to accept President Soeharto's gesture toward par- liamentary government in good faith. We hope it truly is the ,beginning of representatives government which will contributet greatly toward stability and progress in Indonesia and South- east Asia. The, decision to `Mold elections does reflect President Soeharto's confidence in the progress of his nation. It is to bd hoped'he will not be disappointed. WASHINGTON POST 5 July 1971 to hidonesia Seektay to Slow _C7 . Population Boom CPYRGHT DJAKARTA -- A bur. eoning population, scarcely dented by a fledgling birth control. program, threatens to undermine the ambitious roject to develop Indone. sia's economy grid ease the widespread poverty. Much of the Increasing output of food, clothing and other, goods will be swal- lowed up by the 3 million persons added to the popula-' tion each year, leaving little to raise living standards for the country's 120 million In- abitants. At the present growth rate of nearly 2.8 per cent a yeas' he population. will double n a little over 25 years, and,', the country's economic de- velopment program will have to run hard lust to keep up in providing schools, Jobs and food. An organized family plali Bing program Is just getting? under way. Planners hope to havr d million women prat: By Donald Bremner Los Angeles TTmss tieing birth control by the, end of 1975, about 22 per cent of all wives in the child-bearing ages. Putting the brakes on pop* ulation growth is especially important for Indonesia, with its combination of low average income, dense popu lation and insufficient rice to feed its people. High birthrates mean a', high proportion 'of children' to be supported by those in the productive ages. Each, 100 Indonesians In the work-y Ing ages of 15 to 64 years must support 100 children and elderly.. In contrast, each 100 working-age Americans sup-. port 64 children' and elderly, and in Japan, which has an effective birth control pro- gram, each 100 in the work- Ing ages. 'support only 45 children' and elderly. This high dependency burden in Indonesia is a major drag on development. and improved diving standards.- Indonesia's population - the sixth largest in the. world after China, India, the Soviet . Union, the United States and Pakistan - might not be such a problem' ,if it were more evenly dis- tributed. But nearly 65 per cent of Indonesians live on the central Island of Java, which has less than 7 per cent of the country's, area. The result is gone of the most densely. populated land in -the world - 1,500 persons.. ' per square mile on Java - an average of about 10 per- sons trying to grow food and live on the equivalent of a city block of mountainous and nonarable land. Little was done about In= donesia's swelling popula- tion until recently. The na- tional family planning Insti- tute was established in 1968, and government spending for birth control, which was 'only $80,000 in 1968, has climbed to $4 million for this year. Foreign aid adds another 82 million. Beginning with 125,000 Is to have 6 million women :practicing birth control' within five years. Nearly ,15,000 field workers and 3,000 clinics will be needed -to carry out the program, the aim of y*hich is to re-. .duce the population's growth rate from Its present level of 2.8 per cent a year to 2.2 per cent. The tradition of large families - four or more -children is the wish of the typical Indonesian couple - and the belief that the Lord s will provide for them are major obstacles to slowing population growth. "People here say that 'when a child is born, its' livelihood is assured, or else it wouldn't have been born- "It's the will of Allah,' " said one Indonesian. "That atti tude will have to change if 'family planning Is to suc- ceed." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 THE WASHINGTCE POST 7 July 19 71 , CPYRGHT HONG KONG, July 6 - In- donesian voters, overwhelm- ingly endorsing the Suharto government and Its economic development program in last week's election, have set the stage for a basic reshaping of the country's system of poiiti?i cal problems. . The result is almost certain to be a party system focused less on communal and reli- gious questions, and more on the issues of building Indone- sia's economy, educating her people and solving pressing social problems, Foreign Minister Adam Malik said only four parties will be left of the 10 political groups which ran in the elec.- tion Saturday. The others will have to merge with the big parties. Dominating the scene will i be Golkar, the government- sponsored organization which ,swept more than 50 per cent 3f the votes In preliminary re- Indonesian Vote to Reshape. .Parties By Donald Bremner Los Angeles Times turns. The 200 or more seats Golkar won, added to the 100 to be filled by appointment of President Suharto, assure it powerful pro-government bloc of nearly two-thirds in the new 460-seat parliament. Golkar, the joint secretariat of functional groups, went into the election as a hastily rejuvenated alliance of more than 200 mass organizations and a nationwide network of government civil servants. Three other parties emerged from the election as-counter- weights weights to Golkar: The main two were Moslem parties, the Moslem Scholars Party. (Nah- datul Ulama) and 'the ihdone- sian Moslem Party (Parmusi). The third, sharply reduced from its previous strength, was the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) founded by for-. mer President Sukarno. Parties surviving the merger will be under Heavy pressure to unite or at least CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 8 July 1971 Top~ ular vote backs licies CPYRGHT i ter or a governor, if he does a; good job," said one well-edu- cased Hindu woman on the is- land of Bali. "There is so much work to do." Corruption in government, particularly among some army leaders, an issue that brought students into the streets last year, was largely ignored as the election neared. Editors who had pressed the issue ear- lier found It expedient to soft- pedal it, partly to avoid giving ammunition to Golkar oppo- nents. The election results may cause a wrench for some of the traditional elements of so- ciety. A prominent Jakarta journalist commented on the eve of the voting: "We're in a period of funda- mental change, and it's pain- ful for everybody. But if we can develop Indonesia, we can lift our own people and be of some help to the whole south= east Asian region." Malik, S.uh~rto big' gainers By Henry. S. Hayward Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor CPYRGHT Jakarta, Indonesia TWO men likely to come out of the Indo? nesian election with enhanced stature are President Suharto and, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, nificant opposition to Golkar. The election, the first since 1955, gave Indonesian voters their first chance to express opinions on national issues with ballots since the trau- matic attempted coup of 1965 and the subsequent decline of the flamboyant Sukarno. There were heavy pressures to vote for Golkar. But basi- cally, the Indonesian voter was endorsing the sense of sta. bility created by the Suharto government, which first curbed rampant inflation and then set about rehabilitating the country's . stagnant, bro- ken-down economy. Misgivings In some quarters ,at military influence in gov- ernment were outweighed by the general belief that Indone? sia needs a strong government to maintain stability and carry through the development pyo- gram. 'q have no objection to a' soldier as a government minis-, in Indoijesia- st,kP in tea a1an4.inn~ m1,in1~ u,oe ~nr nn~ 4innel I and provincial legislatures. But the fact that the government-spon- sored Sekber Golkar group is conceded to have won a sweeping victory nevertheless 709/02: CIA-RbF11F9X61fA00 3G0 fitq himself. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT Compared with his flamboyant predeces- sor, the late President Sukarno, President Suharto sometimes is described as lacking charisma as far as the Indonesian public is concerned. Quiet but firm control But the election outcome demonstrated to the nation at large that General Suharto retains a quiet but firm grasp on the coun- try's affairs, For fastmoving, versatile Adam Malik, his performance as Golkar's star campaign- er demonstrated to ordinary Indonesians and the topmost rulers of the nation that he has impressive political qualifications as well as post experience in leftism, revolu- tion, and foreign affairs. .'His performance may well earn him the vice-presidency as a reward, according to informants here, Especially in his home territory of Su- matra and the outer islands, Mr. MONO proved to be Golkar's foremost speaker dur- ing campaign swings. He seemed to have had the right touch for every occasion, shift- ing his stance easily in different racial or religious areas. Tireless performer Golkar sent out 17 troops or "safaris" to cover. the. provinces. In addition to big Ja- karta government or military personalities, the entourages included dancers, singers, and cultural performers. Among those in- .eluded was "Bing" Slamet, a popular In ,donesian entertainer and Golkar candidate for the Jakarta assembly. The performances proved very popular in 'small villages and towns where amusement Is not easy to find and the election commo- tion was welcome. The tireless Malik, meanwhile, often out- 'ran his younger colleagues while hopping around the country, He was the ranking, civilian in the Golkar organization, yet he managed not to alienate the military machine which was solidly behind Golkar. "Once the generals tended to mistrust Malik," a Jakarta source said, "but his campaign performance was so effective ;there are no generals gunning for him at 4preaent." ,UN presidency likely The conoensus here is that Mr, Malik has the presidency of the United Nations Gen. oral Assembly next fall Just about wrapped up, This will provide him with further ins. ternational exposur i. as well as prestige at home, The assumption is that he can either continue to run the Foreign Ministry by remote control, or temporarily turn over the reins to a deputy. On the domestic side, the Malik cam- ,paign speeches often included scathing de? nunciations of the present nine political parties for their parochial interests, He did much to mobilize intellectuals behind Golkar as an organization that would deal with na- tional policies and programs, rather than represent political or racial groups only. Those who feel the military has too much influence on Indonesian life would look to Mr, Malik in the vice-presidential post to dilute or deflect the military influence when necessary. But they concede this would re- quire all the Foreign Minister's tact and, persuasiveness. When Mr. Malik emerged from a post. election luncheon In a Jakarta hotel, an ad- miring Indonesian whispered to me, "I come from the same place as he does-west Sumatra." Then he bowed as the Foreign ' Minister, looking small in a white western suit, smiled in return. The next day (Wednesday) he was off to Romania to renegotiate Indonesian debts. One felt the election must be well and truly For President Suharto, the Golkar victory practically ensures his own reelection in 1973.,He was appointed to a five-year term in 1968. Few expect the Golkar machine to lose its impetus in the next two years after its impressive trial run. Popular endorsement. ? The victory also indicates that the basio philosophy of the Suharto government is en.. dorsed by the people. That means resisting pressure to make Indonesia Into an Islamic state, remaining nonsecular as the Army prefers, and continuing the dedication to na- tional economic development. It also ensures the election of cooperative national and provincial legislatures capable bf producing legislation desired by the gov- ernment. This means, especially, financial support for government programs. Finally, the election should enhance the vested legitimacy of the Suharto govern. meat, providing it with a better international image and encouraging those to whom In. donesia owes money. At home and abroad, it showed the demo. oratic process is gradually being reinstated in this country, although stilt with careful controls, over if Adam Malik was away again. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : Cl -RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 9 July 1971 Economy improves Oil finds brighten Indonesia's outlook By Henry S. Hayward Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor CPYRGHT Jakarta, Indonesia CPYRGHT ctal u pa i . An earlier discovery by Stanvac in South an in vi Sumatra now has started productioh. Pertamina has accumulated assets of economic progress. here have encountered a number o ogis i- gar a here as an example of what good New oil discoveries, just confirmed by the cal and housekeeping problems, such as management can achieve. General Wutowo mining minister, make it likely Indonesia shortages of office space, of homes for is credited with steering Pertamina to its chieve its target of 1.4 million barrels families, and of schools for children. Weld- present eminence, although some of his ill w a per day by the end of 1972 and 1.5 million in ers, drillers, and other trained workers are methods are considered unorthodox. 1973, in short supply. In addition to oil, other aspects of the The rate of oil production now is 900,000 But prospects for the future are bright; Indonesian economy are showing improve- barrels per day, a sharp increase over the enough so that oil company complaints are ment. Exports are increasing. The price 700,000 produced in 1970. kept to a minimum. At a recent luncheon, a index of essential commodities such as At a sale price of $2.30 (U.S.) per barren, large group of Americdn businessmen, in-, oil income will go a long way toward help. eluding American and other oilmen, raised kerosene, rice, and textiles is going down. ing Indonesia pay off past indebtedness and no questions when Gen. Ibnu Sutowo, head Imports of consumer goods still are rising build for the future. of Pertamina, informed'them his company but not as rapidly as last year, the govern- Foreign oil companies operating on a cost- now is prepared to provide such services as ment says. plus basis for exploration and production, transportation and communications, and to and sharing profits with the government, help with immigration, exports, and even Timber shows potential also stand to make handsome returns in labor relations-all of which the oil com- Gross national product is increasing at this' area. panies hitherto have been handling on an over 7 percent this year. Population increase individual basis. is believed to be a manageable 2 to 2.5 per- Oil wells itemized One central Indonesian organization to cent, although recent statistics are scarce. The latest oil discovery to be publicized handle such problems, General Sutowo Timber meanwhile is shaping up as al- is an onshore strike by Caltex at Riau. said, would be "cheaper and better." He most as rich a potential resource as oil. Half Other new discoveries this year and last. pointed out that Pertamina.has acquired a the timber of Southeast Asia is in Indonesia, as itemized by the mining minister, were: number of planes and helicopters available with 2 million hectares of teak in Java 1. A Pertamina (Indonesian Government to charter not only to oil companies but to alone: East Kalimantan and Sumatra have oil company) field which will start produc- other businesses too. huge reserves of hardwood such as meranti tion by the end of 1972. The general expectation was that the and teak. 2. An offshore well by Iapco in South Pertamina services would indeed be utilized. Sulawesi scheduled to start producing next The value of timber sales in 1970 was October. Assets pile up $100 million, up from,$60 million in 1969. The 3. An offshore well by Atlantic Richfield ; figure is expected to reach $1 billion in the north of Jakarta, also scheduled to 'start Some found it interesting that Pertamina mid-1970 s. production in October. should invest some of its oil profits in air- The Japanese, hungry for wood for build- 4. - An offshore well by Yapex Union Oil .craft, spare parts, communications, etc., ing and paper supplies, take 80 percent of in the. Strait of Makasar, expected to be in Others pointed out Pertamina actually it, Indonesian production. Japan is the biggest aperation by the end of 1911. In a position to provide such -services better timber consumer in a timber-short world. Approved For Release 1999/09/026 CIA-RDP79-01 I94A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 10 July 1971 CPYRGHT Indonesia moves ahead Nothing could be more different than the style of Indonesia's present ruler, General Suharto, and that of his predeces- sor, the flamboyant President Sukarno. The one depended on excitement. He could not settle down under a placid sit- uation. He saw his mission as nation- building and resorted to foreign adven- tures with accompanying bombasts while uniting the people of the vast Indonesian archipelago politically. And he sadly ne- -glected the country's economic needs. By the time of the abortive Communist coup in 1965 and the subsequent downfall .of Sukarno, Indonesia had had enough of excitement. And General Suharto, strong ,but quiet, unemotional, even prosaic com- pared with his predecessor, was the man of the moment - the man needed to re- store the country to a more ? rational sense of values and priorities. General Suharto's first priority was to, concentrate on economic recovery, and in this he has succeeded to a remarkable extent. Galloping inflation has been brought under control. A sound develop- ment program is under way. Foreign in- vestment has responded to the new sta- bility. Now he has reinforced his success on .,the economic front with a political victory :in the first general elections to be held:, in Indonesia for 16 years. Full results of, the elections will not be known until' ,August, but it is already clear that Got-, ' kar, the broadly based political movement backing the government, has won a sweeping victory over the old, traditional political parties still in existence. (The Communist Party was eliminated after the 1965 coup and the intellectually elite Socialist Party was banned by Sukarno.) Golkar's emergence as a new political force is one of the most significant devel- opments on the Indonesian domestic scene. It is not a political party in the usual sense, but a rather loose federation of "functional" groups from all levels of society. Although it has the support of the military, it is entirely managed by civilians. It was formed to carry the gov- ernment's' program to the people, and in this it has met a need for better commu- nication with the people. Much credit for Golkar's success must go to the astute and intelligent Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, who has played a major role in negotiating foreign aid for Indonesia's. economic recovery and in helping rebuild the country's image on the international scene. It is said he may well be rewarded for his part in the elec- tion victory by being given the vice- presidency. The elections represent a first step to- ward the restoration of democracy in Indonesia. There is still a long way to go before the military step down and hand over power to a civilian government. But :under General Suharto Indonesia is set- tling down, and has made significant pro- gress toward meeting the twin requisites of economic and political stability. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : C119-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 U E ECONOMIST 10 July 1971 One cheer for Suharto's d epmocracy The Indonesian election wasn't exactly clean, but that's nothing new in CPYRGHT Asia, and at least the government was prepared to take :a risk The preliminary results of the elections in Indonesia last Saturday show a clear victory for President Suharto, but they do not justify putting out more flags for democracy in Asia. The government's electoral machine, the Sekber Golkar; may have pulled in as many as 66 per cent of the votes, overshooting the sunniest forecasts of its own leaders. Since ` i oo seats in parliament are reserved for official appointees, that would mean that the govern- ment can count on the backing of more than 300 of the 460 members ' of the ' new legislature. It ' would also mean that, when parliament is called upon to - vote for a new president in-103, the generals will not need their tanks to make sure that their man gets elected. But General 'Suharto's victory had its price., The Golkar machine is said to have spent more than $50 mil- lion 'on its caravanserai of charter planes And 'loud- speaker vans, its pork-barrel ' politicking and' its 'roving bands of troubadours: Part of: that was supplied by the affluent Chinese' businessmen whb 'coughed up $5oo a head for places at'American-style' fond-raising banquets. But Go1ka'r's' success 'depended-, on more than: lavish campaigning. The new electoral i Iaws prevented 'the opposition parties from doing most ' of the- things that an opposition is normally supposed to do. For example, they were not allowed to express criticism of.government actions or. to discuss " the religious question." And, especially in the villages,, officials eager to produce sup- port` for the government resorted to strong-arm tactics. There is evidence that some civil servants were threatened with losing their jobs 'unless they joined Golkar, ' that some, opposition rallies were forcibly: dispersed' and that. peasant voters m the tackblocks were herded to the ballot-boxes by military police.: Mr Subchan' the leader of the Moslem Scholars' party (one of the ' ' largest of the nine authorised opposition groups), claimed this week that- on most, of the island of Sulawesi- there was no pretence' of a secret ballot. There will be more corn- plaints. ` The irony - is that` the' elections were partly designed to " win the approval of the outside ' world as a step towards civilian rule. But what happened ' on Saturday" riiust be Out into perspective. ' After ' all, it is 'easy enough 'for, westerners (and above all for Ariglo-Saicons) to forget', that the deiinocratic system is 'a t'arIty; 'and perhaps'even a luxury. The c6j ies of WestmihsteV' that the"Btitish bequeathed tb` Ala.' atld Afriea have had ,oh1 a precarious' existence ; nib* ~f1f teeth -hat given' Way' td` personal'`d1stat6rships, vt =pa ty`l'tit t(triilrtary }uiitas. Thei'lddoi#esiahs' only Approved For Release 1999/09/02 previous experience of a free election came in, 1955, and was soon followe4 by the chaotic personal autocracy of Sukarno-one of that breed of third-world leaders that a French observer has called " demigods." Sukarno substituted the cult of personality for rational planning and an attack on Malaysia for any attempt to come to grips with the country's economic crisis. The men who succeeded him are the survivors of the pogrom unleashed against the army high command by the Indonesian communist party on the night of Septem- ber 3o, 1965. That night has rightly been seen as one of the turning-points in recent south-east Asian history. The fact that General Nasution escaped his would-be assassins and was able to rally the armed forces deter- mined that Indonesia would be ruled today by soldiers rather than the communists. That also had its price. It has been claimed that more than 500,000 people died between 1965 and x967 as the soldiers took their revenge. It will not be easy to bury the enmities of those years, and the men in General Suharto's government who insist that only a new generation will be able to restore the country to full civilian rule may have a point. And who could govern the country now if the generals and Golkar failed ? Their main opposition lies in three places : in the suppressed communist party, which 9611 has tenacious grassroots support in eastern and tentral Java, where land famine and overpopulation are most acute ; in the Nationalist party, which seems to be held together only by regional chieftains like those in Bali and by a diffuse sense if nostalgia for its golden days of affluence under Sukarno ; and in religious groups like the Scholars' party, and others, whose main appeal . is to Moslem chauvinism or Catholic and Protestant fears of Moslem dominance. General Suharto's real claim to power is that he, represents a coalition of interests (the army, the civil servants, the urban professional men) that may be capable, if anybody is, of threading the country's thousands of islands together and getting the economy back on the rails by rational management and by attract- ing foreign investors. And he has not done badly. The rate of inflation has been pushed down to under to per cent, compared with 85 per cent in 1967 and 650 per cent in Sukarno's worst year. The government has coaxed new concessions out of foreign, creditors, including the Russians and the east Europeans, and some $640 million is to be poured in as foreign aid this year. Figures like these mask the problems that remain. CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT There is a gaping trade deficit, and much of the $ i I bil- lion that was invested icy private companies between t 9 7 ttttd WO went into the extractive industries, which do not give jobs to many people. There Is an urgent need to accelerate internal migration away from land-- hungry Java towards the; roomier islands and to create new jobs to soak up the unemployed. If the government did some arm-twisting to get its majority on Saturday, that was partly because there has not been time for the considerable economic progress it has brought about to seep down to the man in the paddyfield. That is why some sympathetic outsiders have sug- gested that General Suharto might have done better to put off the election for a year or two until he could count on more genuine public support. But Indonesia will remain a " supervised democracy "-as the official jargon puts it-for a long time to come. General Suharto has at least managed to widen his political base through Galkar. He has shown that power does not rest solely in the barracks by promoting Mr Adam Malik, the civilian foreign minister, as the main government tub-thumper in the electoral campaign. Small changes, perhaps, but Indonesia was unlikely to sprout a stable party system overnight. One forecast of the country's political future is that General Suharto will be replaced by a retired general who will in turn be replaced by a civilian who, enjoys the confidence of the high command. This will not happen overnight, but one of the hopeful things is that General Suharto does not look to be the kind of 'man who becomes, addicted to office. Before passing judgment on the Indonesians, it is worthwhile looking around the region.- The two-party -system in the Philippines has failed to provide an outlet for some of the explosive, social frustrations that undoubtedly exist there. Malaysian democracy is tine i you happen to be born a Malay, but less satisfactory i you arc Chinese or Indian. The armed forces rind th local oligarchy run Thailand, as they have done for mud of its- history ; and neighbouring Burma is under th slackening thumb of an introverted autocrat who ha fallen prey to a morbid fear of assassination. In Sout Vietnam the politicking for the presidential electio scheduled for October 3rd is going on as intensely ever, despite the war, but then South Vietnam is a ver 'special place because the Americans obliged its leader, to submit themselves to the voters in order to justif, their own presence there. No one really believes that i is possible to hold an entirely clean election in time o internal war. But the paradox of South Vietnam' election is that it really is-possible for the opposition t overturn the government, however much shady busine goes on beside some hamlet polling-booths, whereas the leadership in Hanoi would never contemplate exposing itself to the same risk. Singapore remains an island, in a political as well as a geographic sense, and even here there has been mounting criticism of Mr Lee Kuan Yew's tough treat- ment of his critics, and especially the press. Singapore has become a de facto one-party state without any illegal seizure of power ; which means that despite its booming economic growth it runs the risk of failing to reflect the divisions of opinion in its society. Against this back- ground, it is possible to see the Indonesian generals for what they are : men who are loosening their grip little in search of some kind of political legitimacy. Rousseau believed that democracy could exist only i small republics, like his ideal version of Geneva o Corsica. He had, a narrow view of democracy, but also a necessary - sense of the relativity of political ideals. E. M. Forster thought that democracy was worth two cheers ; perhaps the Indonesian generals deserve one. NEW YORK TIMES :18 July 1971 Indonesia: CPYRGH CPYRGHT decide whlchqWYes F o rd Rte JNgq J? qA(1 O2 to be on the up-slope these munist general in charge of days. It is Indonesia, which is still tabulating the results of a national election held the week'before last. The election made few headlines, and .Indeed this necklace of equatorial islands virtually slipped from the headlines altogether a few years ago, possibly. because no American troops were sta- tioned here. But among the persons known to be watch- ing this fifth largest country in the world with more than passing interest is Richard M. Nixon. If there Is a class- room Nixon Doctrine country, it must be Indon- esia. which "beat Commun- ism" without American ad-1 visers or American lives. In 1965, Indonesia took .what was believed to have been the third largest Com- munist party in the world and demolished it - singlehand- edly and?brutally, but-quick- 'ly and cleanly enough so that -few. people now discuss the ,fact that one of the - worst blood baths, In , history oc- ,curred here. When President "Nixon visited Indonesia two, years ago - he was the first American President to do so ?- he was reported to, have, put his arm around Press- this transformation, and said, in effect, "You're our boy." Because It has a foreign policy of "active nonalign- ment," the Indonesian Gov- ernment does not like to con- sider itself in anyone's pock- et. But the fact Is that In- donesia has moved ever clos- er to the non-Communist. world. The ' major foreign In- vestors In Indonesia are the United States and Japan. Some Eastern European countries are reportedly in- terested in Investing, too, but thus far they have sent only feelers. . Virtually all of Indonesla's -enormous aid requirementsi are met by the West. A con- sortium of aid-granting,: na Lions decides how much to give each year; In 1970, it was about $60-million,' and the United States and Japan were the chief contributors. In'1966, Presided Suharto turned a bankrupt economy, over to a group of Harvard- and Berkeley-educated Indo- nesian economists and West1 ern advisers who, appraisers Ift to say, performed mir- aates. They attracted capital by paying astronomical Inter- est rates (as. much as 6 per CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 21 July 1971 : QJ A 7&Ot;14914W0Q, Q620{ a -Mouse of Indonesian rupiah, infl4ting at more than 600 per cent In 1966, into a respectable Asian currency.,. -- Foreign investors, who -were scared off in the V' am, by the tnetabli#ty of boil rho ,country and the late Presi- dent Sukarno, were lured in- to exploiting one of the larg- 'est natural stores of oil, min- rerals and timber in the world. ':timid at first, they are, now coming lp faster than Iihdon- ' esia's archaic and inefficient administrative apparatup can absorb' them. By this May. companies from two dozen countries had pledged 1$1.4- billion for investment in In- donesia. and $20-million more a month was being offered. Compared to where Indo-' nesia was six years ago, the progress in fundamental de-' velopment has been, enor- mous, so much so, that the Government set out this year, to tackle other,, more tick- lish ills: to reform the poiiti-i cal system, to minimize Ide?? ological and religious dis. got to get out of politics. If. putes and to to begin an ev- we don't start on it now,'; olution toward, Modern demo ;We'll be just like Pakistan. cratic rule. and just'when we get going-' On July 3,' "some 57 million .mod a? -few politfcans who ndoneslan voters went to don't know what they are, the polls (in the first nation- -talking about will ruin it all - al election in 16 yeas) to JAMES P. STERSA elect local councils and SW Indonesian film industry shows signs of growth Special to The Christian Science Monitor CPYRGHT Indonesia's infant film industry is showing. lusty signs of growth. After a period of com- ' plete standstill under Sukarno, production has risen from three feature films in 1968 to 11 in 1969 to.25 in 1970 and a scheduled 40 in the current year.. But growth has not been without its prob- lems. Indonesian film producers have sue-' ceeded in making money and beating foreign competition by the standard formula of sex' and violence. In this predominantly Muslim country, the' reaction from the. mosque and the press has, been predictably critical with much corn-' 'ment against the adoption of Western per,: missiveness and its effect on the. Indonesian Representatives. The Govern- ment-backed party -- "Sek- her Goikar," a purportedly nonpolitical assemblage of nonpolitical, development- ?minded professional and la- bor groups --- bulldozed Its way through the countryside with as much force, its spokesmen say privately, as was needed to win a large majority. That apparently happened. It was not a "fair" elec- tion. That word has little meaning here. It was por- trayed as a controlled hat. step in which the Govern ment hopes to apply to poli- tics the formula that brought economic stability. Critics charged that It was merely a public relations stunt, to preserve military rule. "We must begin it now, because it is going to take at least 12' years," says one of the'Government's chief stra. tegLsts. "The military has got. to be put gradually In its' place. The civil service has-, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 10 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 ? i T PYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT LE MONDE, Paris 12 May 1971 CUBAN REVOLUTION FOLLOWS 'SOVIET WAY' by Charles Bittelheim is Dean of Studies, at 1'Ecol.e pratigVe des hautes etudes. Upon Che Guevara's request, and starting in 1961, he has sojourned in?Cuba on several occasions as an economic development expert. Why did the Cuban government, as we have seen, so publi- cize the Padilla affair and thereby damage its prestige and international authority? Why, was that government led to stage such a sinister affair in which a man -- after more than a month's confinement in Cuban jails -- levels charges as con- temptible as.they are ridiculous,'against Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol? Charges drafted in a "style" that makes it obvious that they were not written by Padilla but entirely by the police authorities? We cannot help asking ourselves these questions. To seek an explanation for this scheme in the Cuban leadership's sensitivity to criticism, does not lead very far. It is true that these leaders do more and more expect to receive. only praise and flattering comments from those who know Cuba's situation. Hence they were rankled by the analyses presented in the Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol books on Cuba. Yet this rancor could not be the sole reason for this worldwide campaign of libel. The importance giv-en the Padilla affair, its large- scale dissemination by the Cuban Press Agency, all clearly demonstrate that apolitical decision was involved, and thus a political explanation is indicated. That politi4'cal, explanation. unfortunately lies in the course taken by the Cuban revolution. After having for several years plotted' ' an ascending curve -- which filled supporters of socialism with.?libpe. -- that' revolution gradually entered a degenerative phase., 'The efforts of those early days with their, promise of a rad'i'cal transformation in. social relationships, the development'of a new type of' democracy, and.the..end to dependence upon fo're'ign markets'?due to.a one-crop economy based- on sugar, all-progressively gave 'way to quite different prac- tices. The Cuban government increasingly assigned priority to "productivist": go'als';. It sought to strengthen sugar's role in the economy, even :to the extent of putting off production activities capable of covering the needs of the Cuban people. In so doing, it increased Cuba's,de facto dependence upon its principal customer and supplier, the Soviet Union. These changes multiplied the difficulties besetting the country. These difficulties are not due to the "inexperience" of the Cuban leaders, as-,the latter 'so readily claim. Their p9% FprJJeljWsg VMQV/QQt61 fSI I4 4itf I 0 oge7olution' CPYRGHT sociaiAp b%'4FFcprSRg}ps 1Ja%W~Q4nPs#eRsDiF79tR11MR09 g%gg001-7 Movement's ideology which actually-is still the'dominant ideology. The influence of these factors could have been diminished bit by bit, but the contrary happened because Soviet policy made this' influence even stronger. That policy favored anti-democratic tendencies and Also a course 6f action which.cldsed the door to economic independence for Cuba., .The consequencgs of the course thus taken by the Cuban revolution are-' now bocoMing clearer and clearer: despite the heroic and enthusiastic efforts of the Cuban people, despite years of relentless work and considerable investments, the country has seen its 1970 "zafrn" (sugar harvest), fail -- a harvest proclaimed as the revolution's number one goal. This course has also resulted in a profoundly deteriorated economic situation, daily difficulties in obtaining food and supplies, and the growing alignment of Cuban foreign policy with Soviet policy, as evidenced, for example, by the official posi- tion taken by Cuba on the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russian t1roops. Vis a vis this situation, the Cuban people. are asking themselves how they ever got into this fix. How can it be that so many years of effort have not produced other results, that so many promises have not been kept? The Cuban leaders have given no answers to these questions. They have not even explained how they plan to get the country out of its present difficulties. Only a few indications have been given on this second point, but they are contradictory. On the one hand, in several speeches made last summer, Fidel Castro stressed the need to develop more democratic relations within the country. In fact there was some start made in implementing this new policy line, notably by estab- lishing "production assemblies" at which workers were induced to submit their criticisms and suggestions. On the other hand,. the Cuban leaders were led, not to penly reexamine their policy line and question the one-sided mphasis placed on production, but, on the contrary, to trengthen their "productivist" tendencies, to condemn the 'laziness" of those individuals who do not take a sufficiently ctive part in`praduction efforts -- none of which show evidence f being correctly.oiiented -- and to proclaim-the "virtues" of aylorism, the aystem of standards and controls imposed upon he workers, etc. All ind'3catsions today point to a sudden change in demo- ratization efforts.. In the absence of a radical change in olicy line,.''sbch, a'ddvelopment was inevitable. Democratization oes in fact, open':the door to 'criticisms that could be accepted my by a government following an intensely revolutionary policy ine Allowing +t~he Srank and fil4 'to question leadership ethods, the arbitrary character:bf decisions, and the increas- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 2 For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0003b0060001-7 ing social inequalities; cannot be tolerated by a political leadership determined to make no.changes in these fields. Today, Cuban leaders rely`lupon an administrative apparatus superimposed over the ordinary workers. For years this apparatus has'not been accountable to the workers and has been granted minor and major privileges.. Challenging such a!situation -- which is what development of a real democratiza ion would have led to--- would have upset. one of the regime's ocial bases, and neither the Cuban leadership n'or,'its Soviet "friends" were ready for that kind of upheaval. Under these circumstancEs, all that now remains of last summer's bright prospects are "productivism," Taylorism, and discipline imposed from above. These remains are the police line supported by the Soviet "riends" al.on'g with their friends,. namely the officials of the fo-emer people's socialist party (Communist). In this connects n,-the new political upsurge of this party -- including some of its least popular members, such as Laura Rene for instance highly significant, Thus it is this procosc n? de ;enoration currently affecting the Cuban revolutioi:, that explains the absurd and disgraceful accusations made :-.1,rainst Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol whose books are being circular ed sub rosa in Cuba and being read With interest, especially by ,he revolutionary and student youth wio are worried about their c-untry's serious difficulties. What Cuban readers loo for in these books, are not political slogans or keynote., but those facts and data upon which their national press rk.rains silent, facts which they need to know to prepare anda"r;wer to the questions raised by the country's situation and the ;evolution's retrogression. And so. we can, therefore, understarll the eagerness of the Cuban govern- ment to discredit such book; in the eyes of revolutionaries and young students. Hence that iilly?charge leveld against Karol and Dumont, claiming that tl ey are "CIA agents." Hence also the stress placed on Rene D":.nont's "age"; this angle is directed to the young studei:s. As a matter of fact, it is clear that among the youth a new 3,.volutionary generation is reaching maturity, a generation that is now reappraising the past history of the revolution, the mistf Ies made, and the reasons behind the appearance of new privileged individuals, notably that "Alfacracy"*' whose existence symbolizes the "Soviet way" taken by the Cuban revolution. *For several.years ac;ually, the Cuban government has been importing Alfa Romeos fjr its most "deserving" upper level and-medium level officials." fficials. These imports, made at a time when the country lacksrforei-gn currencies' and its public means of transportation a:eb s,eriousl:,, deficient, 'signal the appearance of a now privi'},eged class'. Approvea or a ease 3 Approved For'Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 LE MONDE, Paris 12 May 1971 41, CPYRGH A C O U R O U O 1 is gouvcrnomeht cubain a-t-11 donn6 la pubticit6 qua Yon salt a 1'affairo Padilla,, portant ainsi prejudice b son prestige at a son a u t o r i t 6. Internationale 7 Pourquol 'ce gouvernement a-t-11 06 conduit a la miss on scene sinistre qui consists A faire porter par . un hommo, pr6alablomont ddtonu pendant plus d'un mots dans sea prisons, des .a c c u s a t l o n s aussi ignobles quo jr i d i c u 10 s confre Rene Dumont of K.S. Karol ? Des accusations formu- lees dens un - style ? qui no dolt visiblement rien A Padilla at qui doit tout. a In plumo des ? pottciers ? On ne petit manquer de se Perot cos .yGC Zlions. Expflqucr tiro fella bn.l:cptit~ p r in susceptibilitd des dlrigeants bubalna dev'ant toute critique ? no mdne pas biett 'loin. If est vral quo, do plus an plus, ides dlrigeants n'attendent do coux qui connalssent to situation de ieu, pays. quo dos 6loges tit dos pro- ,poa flattoura. Los analyses quo Ron6 C ELLE-Ct so trouvo malheureuse- ment? dans Is tours. stltvl -par to revolution c u b a 'f n o. Celts rilvoiution. aprrrs avoir trac4 pendant '{ tti+~.., ~'iit:, t ?t;i bt'tatii? nr ,.1: dantj - qui remplissult d',=potr ice partisans du soclalisme, -- eat entree progressivemsnt dons uno ? phase do d6p6n6rescbnce. Aux efforts du debut? qu laissalent entrevoir une transfor- motion radicals des rapports sociaux, to d6veloppemcntd'uno dtimocr;_tle de ,type nouveau ot,ia fin do Is subordi nation aux marches cxtdricurs, due A la monoproduction sucribro, se sent progressivemsnt, oubsUtu6es des pra- tiques tout autres. ' Le' gouvernement cubain a de plus an plus donne to -priorit6 a des obleetifs - producti- vistes -, If a chorch6 ? a renforcer to poles du socieur suctler. act point de fairo recuter leS producflons suacep- tibloa do 'couvrir`res beaoins du peu- pie cubain ; on agissant do to sorte, if a? accru. to d6pendanoe 'Cs fait do Cuba A regard do son principal Ache- 'teur-at fournisseur : f'Uniot sovidttque. Ces changements ont''muttip116? tea difficult6s : auxquepas to pays a eu A. faire face. Cos' difficuft6s no sent pas dues *I' ? inexpbrionce a des dirk Hi `itlt rtJtsv~liist r^niiiir~@3 f3eirtlete Pafilrment volontiors, Etas ont lour Approved Fo CPYRGHT... Par e a / f ( { CPYRGHT CHARLES BETTELHEIM ('*) dens Ieurs tlvrea sur Cuba.les ont done ulc6rds ; coca no saurait, copon- -dant titre is souse raison de colts cnuvre do dilfamation mondiale. L'am- pleur donnee a 1'affairo Padilla, . so diffusion a grande dchelto par i'Agonco cubatne do prosse, montrent blen qu'il s'agtt d'uno d6cislon poftttque, qui eppello explication politiquo.?' origino' dens un?-iirno politiquo qui s'enracino on partle dans les bases sociates do to revolution at dons fes 1aiWesson do .t'iddotcgle du Mouve- ment. du 28 puitlot, qui -recto, on fait, I'Id6otogto dominanto. L'Inftuenco de cos factours, qui aurait pu pcu a peu titre rdduiie, s'est lrouvee au contratre renforceo par to politiquo sovietique. Celle-ci a favoris6 lea tendances anti- dr mocratlques ainsi qu'une potttlque qui ferma'? A Cuba to vote de son inddpendance dconomique. Les cons6- quences du tours Sinai sulA per In revolution cubatns sent aujourd'hul de plus en plus clatres : on d6pit des efforts hdroiques at, enthouslaste9 du peupte cubain. d'anndes de travail attharnd at d'investissements'considd- rabies. Is pays a connu 1'6chec de Is .? zaire - (rdcolte sucriere) do 1970. proclam6e objectif numdro un de Is revolution, une situation economique profonddment ddgradde, ? des ditfi- cuitds quotidlennes de ravitaillement, I'atignement croissant de to politique extdrteure cubain sur is politiquo eo"ittique, comme I's montr6, par exempla, to prise de position do Cuba tore de I'invaston de Is Tchdcoslova- qule par [as troupes fusses. -["% ACE A cette'situation, to peuple .6U cubain ' se demands : comment an est-on arAv6 la ? Comment, se fait-11 qua tent d'ann4es d'effort Wont pas ports d'aulres fruits, quo 'tent de promesses n'ont pas 6l6 tenues 7 A ces questions, les. dlrigeants cubatns n'or' apport6 aucune r6ponse. tie Wont memo pas pr6c1a6 comment Its comptalent fairs sortir,le pays des difftcull6a qu'ft connalt actuattement. '. Seules quetques Indications ont 6% Rel 79 dopnees sur ce deuxibmn point. mats cokes-cl sont contradietoires. Dune part, dons plusieurs discours prononc6s I'6t6 dernier. Fidel Castro j a instate sur to ndcessit6 de d6ve- Ioppor des rapports plus d6mocra- tiques dens to pays. Celle orientation nouvelle a efreclIvement donne lieu a un debut de r6alisation, nolamment .sous la forme d' - assembldes do ,production ? ou cours desqueltes lea ?. iravailleurs ont 6te amends At formuler des critiques at des suggestions. D'autre part, lea dlrigeants cubatns ont std conduits, non pas A rdexa- miner ouvertement leur Ilgne politique at A mettre an cause 1'accent place unilatdralement sur to production, mais, au contralre, a renforcer lours tendances ? productivistes -. a d6non- cer Is , paresse - de ceux qui no participant pas assez activement A des efforts do production dont rien no ddmontre qu'Ils Solent correctement orlenlds at h proclamer lea - vertus - du taylorisme. do systeme des nor- mes. den contr8les exercds sur les travailleurs, etc. TOUT Indique aujourd'hui quo fes efforts do d6mocratisation tour-' vent court. En ('absence d'un changement radical de ligne, 11 dtait Inevitable qu'il an soft ainsi. La demo- s cratisation ouvre an effet Is Porte A des critiques que soul un gouverne- ment suivant nne l i g n e politique- 'profonddment revoiutionnafre pourrait accepter. La miss an question par Is base des m6thodes de direction, do I'arbltralre dons lea decisions at des Inegalites acetates crolssantes ne peut etre tol6r6e par une direction poll- tique dectdlie A ne rien modifier dens .ides domatnes. Aujourd'hul, lea dlrigeants cubatns s'eppulent our un appareii adminietra- tit ptac6 eu-dessus des simples tra- vallieurs, qui pendant des enn6ea We pas so do comptes a leur rendre at qui b6n4ticle d'une sorts do petits at de Brands privileges. La remise on cause dune tells Situation -- ce A pool aurait conduit to d6vetoppement dune d6mocrattsatlon veritable aurait boulevers6 tine de:; bases aoolal08 du rdpime : nt to direction oubatne nl ses - amlo ? sov16tlquss; W6talent prilte A parelt bouleversement, ' . CPIYRGHT Dans ces conditions, des perspec- tives ouvertes late dernier 11 ne rests plus qua Is - productivisme ', Is - tay- lorismo -, to discipline imposes d'on- haul. C'est' IA i'orlentnlion quo sou tiennont [as ? amts - eovi*tiques at lea nails de too dorlliera I lie cadres de I"a n c I e n parts soclaliste populalre (communists). to remont6e de ceux-ci our Is scone politiquo ?- y compris des moms populalros, comma Lazaro Pena, par example est A cat dgard houtement significative. C C 'EST done he proem do d6g6nd- rescence on tours de Is r6vo- lution cubains qul expfique too accusations a b s u r d a a at Ignoml- nlouses portees condo Rend Dumont at K.S. Karol, dont lea iivres circulent sous to menteau A Cuba at sent 'lus ' avec Intdrdt, notammert par Is Jeu- nosso rdvolutionnaire at etudlante, inqulAle des graves diffieultds do son pays. MIAMI HERALD 14 February 1971 Ce quo Jos lecteurs cubains cher- client dana ccs iivres, co no sont pas des mots d'ordre pofitiques, macs des faits et des donnoes our lesquals In presse nationals est muette, at quits ant besoin de connaitre pour formuter Una r0on114 atix questions pestles per In situation du pays at to roflux de la revolution. Des lors, on comprend I'acharnement mis par to gouverne- ment cubain h d6consid6rer do tels ouvrages aux yeux dos revolution- nacres at do In jeunesse 6ludlante : d'ou l'accusntion inople porteo contra Kardt et Dumont d'Oiro des .. agonls do In C.I.A. d'oir suss] - A I'adresso do Is jeunesse etudianto -- I'Insistance ' , miss our I' - age . de Ren6 Dumont. 11 est ctaie, en eliet, quo c'est au soln. do In jeunesse quo mOrit une nouvelle gAn6rAtion rdvolutlonnatre. uno gdnA- ratloh qui s'intetroge aver paosion stir t'hlstolte passto do to revolution, sur lea erreurs commisos at our los ratsonel'pour tesqualtes sont epparu$ de nouveaux privil6gl6s, notamment CPYRGHT? ? ~ ub-n 's in Dire ~ ~' .~"c~no~n Trouble, CPYRGHT CPYRGHT By FRANK SOLER ? AGRICULTURAL out- t arts Twelve Years Into the Cas- forged ahead as a result con- tro regime, Cuba Is beset by its gravest economic crisis In history. . The dismal picture of the Cuban economy is drawn by veteran Cuba watchers, re- ! cent visitors to the Island, economic experts and arriv- ing refugees and Is reflected In the statements of the Cas- t- vernment itself. ere is no relief In sight. By most estimates' the situa- tion will continue to deterio- rate for at least one year and perhaps t--o despite massive' doses of Soviet aid. Consider. ? INDUSTRIAL produc- tion has been sharply, per- haps Irreparably, disrupted; by the government's all-out: emphasis on agriculture. , tinues to crawl at a snail's pace. ? THE 1971 SUGAR HARVEST, mainstay of Cuba's fragile economy, is not likely to reach 5.5 million tons, the casualty of last! year's Intensive but unsuc- cessful effort to harvest 10 million tons. ? WORKER ABSENTEE- ISM and deliberate produc. tion slowdown by disgrun- tled workers Is widespread,, so much so that the govern- Merit recently decreed an "anti-vagrancy law" in an ef- fort to deal with the problem.' The law provides penalties. which include prison terms for troublesome workers. ? INDICATIONS of he- creasing student discontent.' as demonstrated recently n Oriente, Cuba's easternmost province, where a group or students is reliably reported to have engaged in. an angry, debate with Castro. Specific Incidents - involv-ing rebellious youth have not. been acknowledged by the government, but the serious- ness of the situation has. 1 Government sycophant, Guido Garcia Inclan said In a radio commentary last Sep-.j tember. "Dissension, failure to get to work on time, difficulties raised by them (the youths) when they are of military agej .... doing things they should loot be doing during class hours. Youths always have a derisive joke to make against our revolution .. ," In a later commentary. Garcia Inclan said: "The youth refer to our Central Park as Miami. Why? Be- cause they want to be in Miami. That is their environ- ment, so let them go there. It Is time we cleaned house!" Only In limited sectors has the economy made some progress. The fishing industry con- tinues to grow as does the Cuban merchant marine. Nickel production report. edly increased during the ,past year, bringing some badly needed relief In the form of hard currency through exports abroad. The production of rice she increased and Its ' rationing Celts a{illacrailo ,. (1) dont I'oxlstence syrr,bgJit:o Is , vo:n .^..nv., tlqun - pri e oar Ia( revolution cubs&". tt t puck piusteurs an n 6 e s, -n ' atrtit, tlativaI1it"Ifla i dtihain irfl- patttt es Alia-rtomeo destinr~e?, sax cadres a it p 0 r l n u r a of aux cadres moyeris lea plus a mOritante s. Ces lmport$tlons, que ont lieu alors que le P&W.1.1manque de devises et qua lee mobcns ? de transport publics sont ggrnvcment dCftctcnte sont le signs de 1'npparl'tlon dune n o u v e 11 c classe privlldgloo. .(-)'directeur d'd t u d e s A 1'Ecole prptlgpo des Mutes Etudes. A effect' tub A partlr de 1961, at 1 1s demabde do * (fhe o Guevara, pliialcurs e8jours A Gills cornnre expert des probuirnes de atvnloppement Oconotntque. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 was relaxed Yed For RWe> 109r9/QWA2 :.UA# ?F67 Oi a~9 00 0 0~,~r are few > - Q Q But the plc u as ea very seriously was prompted Cuban. , bedsheets to he found. elsewhere. primarily by Cuba's failure to' Virtually all consuniir A growing amount of med- White the situation is re- harvest 10 million tons of goods have been rationed for Icinal prescriptions go un- garded as "critical It is not sugar from the 1970 c years and wh t ' , , op, a wasn t soopj yet believed critical enough Castro had staked "the disappeared from the shelve to ignite it popular Internet, honor of the Ilavolutlon" a The economic Setbacks of r - revolt. achieving the record 10-mil1 cent months have mode tl? Instead, Cuba is seen as lion-ton crop. Cuba still pro. shortages more acute. becoming even more depen- duced a record 8.5 milliol Long lines of early rising, dent upon the Soviet Union tons, but the massive diver consumers waiting their turn - which already. Is pumping slon of workers and equip to purchase soap, tooth-'. more than $1 million a day- moot for the task caused tht brushes, eggs, medicines and; Into, the Island - during crippling disruption of most even toilet paper became 1971. other sectors of the economy longer. Castro's personal Interven- Subsequently, several toy, . Recently arrived refugees, tion in the administration of Ministers warp anmm*rily ra~ say the ration list Includes resources will probably dl- placed by younger;Castroieer these principal items: minish this year, as-more col- many of them military of- ? Six pounds of rice Veit lective decisions are made firers. month per person. under Soviet pressures. Meat supply, already limit. ? One and one quarter: Responsibility for pumping ed In Cuba, dropped even ounces of coffee per person,.. new life into the wobbly likel will i t ...~ y sans n o milk, beer and even tobacco, experienced hands, such as once the prime Ingredient of those of minister without Cuba's renown d :..-. ,..A... y.+..'_' ' a-aatarD K%atact IRUU- riguez, an economist and Old> Guard Cuban Communist. Regarded as the shrewdest official in the Cuban govern- ment today. Rodriguez has 'perceptibly gained In status over the past several months. The availability of shoes and clothes continues to de- dine. . Quotas for consumer prod- ucts and raw materials for the island's industries are not being met. Havana and -Other cities EVEN CASTRO admits Cuba's economic woes. In a nationwide speech last July, -Castro not only acknowl- edged his regime's economic failures but also placed the blame on himself and others within the government. ' "It would be better to tell .throughout the island have become increasingly dark at night, as the government: shuts off electric power to, preserve the little it has. Ha- vana also has several electric : blackouts during , daylight hours. There is also an acute the people to look for some- water shortage, body else," Castro said. 'The While the Island's econom-. people can replace us when Ic picture becomes progress, ever they wish. Right now N sively worse, so does that of. they wish." + ? Five pounds of sugar Refusing to give her name, per person each month. she said doctors had told her ? One half-pound of lard before leaving the island that per person each' month. but' she was physically In good., availability is Irregular. health. But she disagrees. i Two to three eggs per, 'q am destroyed," she person a week, when they says. are available. ? One quarter pound of Many Cubans from small meat towns in the interior of the per person a week, island used to supplement when available. their rigid diet by picking ? Two small boxes of fruits from fields outside the match es per family each towns, says Mario Rodriguez, week. 47, a storekeeper from a tiny T ? wo packets of cigarets per person each fifteen days. g s 1 po s - ble Soldiers have been post ? One. bar of soap for d . e aM Posts washing clothes and one bar aklrts poi tsetownse ?u, of bathroom soap a month. they confiscate any are distribut- ben y food ed when available, as V it brought IN,- he said. toothpaste. Clothes are dls- rigves arrived with his trlbuted every six months, Fite and Son in Miami last but' underwear 1s extremely week EL,SIGLO, Bogota 8 March 1971 CASTRO'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES INCREASE AMID WORLDWIDE CRITICISM CPYRGHT In Havana last week, Fidel Castro brought together representatives of all the provinces of Cuba in order to report to them on the economy. The chief executive had bad news for them. He warned that unless there is a speed-up in 1971 sugar harvest operations, substantial quantities of cane will go unprocessed. "We cannot," Fidel said, "allot ourselves the luxury of failing to export a single pound of sugar." filled because there are few medicines at drug stores. Deer and alcoholic bever- ages are also rationed. West. em visitors tell of seeing long lines at restaurants where these beverages are served and where meals are composed of items other than rice and beans -- which most Cubans eat today. "I've lost 22 pounds within the past few weeks," says 'a sixtyish-looking housewife' 'from Camaguey Provinep who arrived in Miami aboard the t w I c e-daily Freedom ,Flights last week. The "That is no lon er Apprnveri F"r Release 1999100107 ? r_In-Rr1P79-0I194A000300060001-7 AARMR(O For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Recently, the bearded Cuban leader has been;in stern exhortations. Two weeks ago he wrote to Regis Debray, thq.,French intellectual who had been captured shortly before the Bolivian troops killed the Guevara in 1967 and who was released recently.,; "We are working hard and facing great difficulties," Castro admitted. "It's long road ahead, Debray," he said, "for it is only when we revolu- tionaries have come to power that we realize we are really only just beginning." The various criticisms that have been made of 'Castro for some time now are in agreement that. the economy of his regime is in serious diffi- culty. They point to the serious labor shortage, the excessive absentee- ism, the low productivity, and the calamitous shortage of modern machinery. A United States government analyst said last week: "Something is going completely wrong: wrong priorities,.emphasis on the wrong things, bad administration. In short: chaos." Castro admits as much in his speeches. Last year, for example, he told the nation: "Our enemies say that we have problems, and the truth is that they are right." Surprisingly enough, the sharpest criticism of Castro comes from European leftists who have visited Cuba frequently, talked.with the Cuban leader, and supported his plans. One of their number is the Polish journalist K.S. Karol, who writes for Le Monde and Le Nouvel Observateur of Paris and the New Statesman of reat Britain. His books Las Guerrillas en el Poder: el Curso de la Revolucion Cubana (The errs as in Power: the Course of the Cu. an Revolution) Lpl ura. sic] have been favorite reading among U.S. and Latin American experts. The French agricultural scientist Rene Dumont also criticizes Castro, in his book Cuba es socialista? (Is Cuba Socialist?). Both authors contend-that one of Caatro's biggest mistakes was to have developed, plans' that were incorrect and implemented than with unsuitable procedures. "A country that is surrounded in the way Cuba is cannot allow herself the luxury of gradual progress," Karol acknowledged.:-`M6 sacrifices have gone on (too) long and are becoming unbearable for the people," Dumont commented. Karol found'The Horse (as the farmers affectionately refer to Castro) to be personally sensitive. "Fidel is very restless when he speaks. He is almost-constantly in motion. He gets up, takes a few steps, sits down. His heels tapping, he moves back and forth as if acli and every one of his arguments were in the-nature of a hand-to-nand combat with an astute adversary." Much. of Castro's time is spent playing the role of national polit- ical leader -- Karol complai.rh:3 -- constantly touriiig the country and Leaving the business of governing to the bureaucrats.' "The new roletarian class," Karol reports, [has found it] somewhat difficult o control and to use bureaucracy for its own ends in the way that the urgeoisie used to do." pproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT Approved or Release - - Both observers agree that Castro's worst error iii judgment was what Karol calls "his obsession with sugar" as a means o' paying for the petroleum and Russian aid that is currently arriving;to the tune of 1.5 million dollars every day. Castro called on Cubans to harvest the unpreced.ente. quantity of 10 million tons of sugar. The entire nation was mobilized for the harvest. The Christmas holiday period in 1969 -- and the New Year's in 1970 -- were postponed until the end of the harvester, y There was a monumental error in calculation, howevr. Years before, that veteran harvester Nikita Khrushchev had. ordered hi.- experts to design a cane cutter.. A total of 1,000 of these machines were shipped to Cuba. Whexgas the cutters had worked satisfactorily-when they were tested in the.Ukraine, however, they were a complete failure in. Cuba. Karol blames the hilly terrain, while others contend that the Russian. machinery overheated in the tropical climate. To cope with the avalanche of sugarcane in 1970, approximately 400,000 Cubans had to cut the cane manually to achieve the maximum harvest -- and the majority of them were inexperienced. Castro himself cut cane, instead of governing. The visitors of the Venceremos Student Brigade, composed. of radical American students [one or more lines dropped in Spanish text] of the Soviet defense minister, Andrey Grechko, also went to the cane fields. A total of 8.5 million tons were eventually harvested.. It was an acceptable figure but did not fulfill Castro's plans. It is Karol's contention that this harvest did more harm than. good. Seven million tens of sugar were delivered as part payment en account to the Soviet Union and other communist suppliers. Karol, who was educated. at the University of Rostov, served in the Red Army (and served time im Stalinist prisons), and is intensely. anti-Russian, writes: "The USSR does not really have the moral right to insist on its con- tractual rights and on the superhuman sacrifices that this entails for Cuba." Castro remarked angrily to-Karol that "they do not give us anything for nothing, and then they act as if they were showering us with gold." Because other labors were abandoned in ordero concentrate on the J.0.69-1970 carte harvest, the rest of the economy was damaged. Electric power is now in such short supply that blackouts are continually occurring. "Security patrols composed of small children, " [Karol writes ] , "have been organized to turn off unnecessary lights.,. "Cubans are still having to endure the customary long lines and shortages. In a country that is renowned for its tobacco, Castro warns that smokirng is dangerous to health and limits his people to a ration of two packs of cigarettes and t cigars per week. Rents are low, prices are low, and since there is nothing ;o- buy,' there is more' and more rroney.' The black market prospers, as a result: in costs'90 pesos per bottle, and cigareetes 5 dollars a pack. In the black-market the exchange rate is 7 pesos for a dollar. Consequently, there are many buyers. Other Cubans. stand in line to get into Havana restaurants such as the Wnseigneur, La Torre, and Floridita in order to pay 40 pesos for a goal for two. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 &INPtd1For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000300060001-7 Castro has apparently read his critics. He has referred to them as "these little leftist writers" and as people who "h~--pothet.i.cally construct imiaginary worlds." At the same time, however, he has been making some of the suggested changes. One of these ch nges was to allow the workers more power to make decisions. Cuba has carried out a number of "elections" in labor unions in which a total of 2 million workers elected 148,000 union representatives. These representatives will supposedly be the channel through which workers will be able to transmit their complaints cr to hake suggestions. In the meanstime, the government is putting pressure on the lazy. This year has been called the Year of Productivity. New regulations to control vagrants have been introduced. Cuban men between 17 and 60 years of age who chronically absent themselves from work will have .to spend 2 years on State farms.. Women are exempt, however. "Our people would not understand if we.treated women and men alike," explains Minister of Labor Jorge Risquet. Meanwhile, Castro is purging his cabinet of all those who -- as he states -- "have exhausted them- selves in the revolution." Ominously, every change seems to bring more army officers into ,civilian ministries. Of the 20 ministries, 11 are now headed by captains and majors. No one is suggesting that Castro will soon be overthrown. Most of those who might have opposed him have either left Cuba or hope to on one of the flights that are made 10 times a. week from Varadero to Miami. Even though no exit permits have been granted since 1966, some 130,000 perspns.who obtained their visa before that date are .still hoping to join the 600,000 Cubans who left for what Castro scornfully calls "easy living and a consumer society." These critics are in agreement that socialist Cuba is in deplorable danger. They argue that Castro's charisma has lessened and.that Russian aid will not solve the problems. "One wonders," says Karol openly, "if he has not perhaps mortgaged the entire,future.of the revolution." EL SIGLO, Bogota 8 March 1971 ~ r Ci&bt; ,.GY i;l~' td CPYRGHT Fidel Castro rnuni6 on La I?Ia bana Ia semana pasada a los re' prescptantes do todas las pro vinclas do Cuba para prescator ios un balance ceonOmieo. El Jofe mdxlmo .les tonfa male,' otictas: a menos quo el ritmo a to zafra do 1971, o Ia cose ha' do auicar aumante, advit 16, quodardn sin procesar?con !do,'ables cantidadcs do cans iJo Fidel, "Nosotros no pole` os permltirnos of tuio do dojar In exportar una sofa fibre de P OF. Cfirlos . i~ue?r~.aa,x!;;~ 0r Ultimamente, of barbudo If der cubano so he ontregado at soveras exhortaciones : Hace '2 semanas oserlbi6 a Regis Do bray, of Intelectual francbs cap turado P000 antes de? quo los soidados boilvianos mataran al' ."Cho" Guevara on 1067 y re clentemento le concedieron 11 bertad. "Estamos trabajando du; ro y hiclendo frrnto a grendos rdiflcultados", confesb Castro "La marcha as vordaderamonte. nosotros ; Ios rovglucionarios} -dijo Ia ^emana paaad,: "ciao` anda? conipretamonte m,11 --ma- las prioridades, maloa 6nfasis male administracion- on rosu? Men, coos" Castro admito un tanto on sus discurnos. Par ojemplo, el, ar o pasado manifest6 a la no. 'oibn:11Nuestros 'enemigoa dicen igtAb ;tertomos probiomae .y en. d tamOs comunzando". Las critical quo dosdn haco. ittempo so vienen haclendo a' Castro estfin do'acuerdo on quo Ia econornfa del rigimcn 'esta on series diflcultades. Senalan do In gravo esranoz do mono do obra. el oxccoivo ausenti9 mo is baJa productividad y Ia' calamitosa escasez do maquina' zacer. blarno ?do Ios'Estodos o odes entices a Castro A se #ta Unidos. 9 provlo? A ________ __ J r-__ Re ease rJJJrv~29s~x 9 TI A A'0003000C0001 -1 reailda tienen -razin. Dicen quo hay irritaciones y trer en razon" Sorprand ontemento. Ins m1 s a non do curopoos izgtiicrd(stao quo ban Vi4ftadp fy cuentenieiltL hQopto Convti ~e der cubanb y apoyiido sus pla- nes. Uno do altos (is ol'periodis? to polaco K. S. Karol. g0fen es,. tribe Para Le Mondo y Lo Nou vol Obearvtitour do Perle Y, News Statesman de Oran A?re toria. Sus libros: Las Guerrilla`s on of Podnr:?ei Curso do ta'Ro .volucidn Cubans, lien side let lure favorite, do lore espccia?4 listas nortrsarnerlcanob y Latino anlericonos. El agrdnomo Irancds flenti Du mont tombien Gulps a Castro on su obra: LCuba ? as socia tista? Ambos autoros sostionen quo tmo do los principalos orrurss' Ale Castro fuo haber flJado pia- nos incorrectos Con Impropios procodinilontos "tin pale rodas do corno Cuba no so deborta perinitir of iujo do progresos graduates", admits Karol. "Los sacrifictos qua lion side We. 'masiado) pi;plongados so ostfin haciondo insoportabtes para of pueblo", comenta Dumont. Karol nncontr3 al CahaIIc. --como los campesinos se ro,?. fieren afe.ctuosamonto a Cas- tro--- personalmente vibrante' "Midel so rnuestra muy inqutetc cuando habia. So mueve oast to do of ttempo. so levanta. do unos Pecos pesos "3e :;lento, ta, coney para atras j, adetanta ca mo si cads argumarttu lucre u na espocto do lathe marts 0 mano con un astuto opononte". ci potrdlco y Ia ;;rude rush t;ul, rUhQ,s. ctiitr. u?tlc^ y ~ ' IU.t F ip t, 6EPsten9'999y~W02 r#3FF i~1^AR+E5 e i Ab0( Ofl66001 7+ c nai a e mti on y mudlu i0 ov tua cato acarroo Para Cuba" Motto travii &A +I:ii C ti GC)ai8% tiiarlOS. ; ;cornentti . noJarlanlente K1, do+c5 ...+,uli ir,+l5ivit;r ,{t:0 Castro Ilenid a ills pt rot. "olloa not dcin nrd pot` )as e ii-,cra sIJC;Crvr,cias. no CoGechar Is tie) rnv da c i ri tda It luego oculars will Sf riicriti?uo t,L,tO, o; tided do 10 nlil(ctir;s do forioia? ostuvleran OnG:illtiinc oirno Con' cst y da3 ce azucar. T da i9 i$fa or. Old". ii:,to rni,i l1." SiG,7 movllix r ra In aftndllo, taut Como' pnr docllcnrna of orIrte e171'ru~lil rrrlr "Eli 1010 do Is raft .fiestas do nuvidad did 1669 y do calla 19G9.19"0, so ,~Lr-ndciru r tciiviric.ri Sr.. Ilan i ttrnc: orio nuevo do 1970 se aptaza ron otros trahalos, so pnr'Judicd Jo nuc?r?+s rec;,rl r,;nnr. J contra ron hasty quo se turmiflara, at resto de Ia ecnnomf;s. La e, lo-3 wages. Lc : lino;:iris cub:;nos Poro hubo tin trOnlondo erro- riergia as shots tail ht+Ja 'ql:n da 17 haitL oU silos quo crOl;lca do c5irflio: clues antest f:so vic hay continuos apagO'iCS. PION 0 ac i.u::e+iton dct trails,c jo cosechador - I1ikito Khrusli' "Patrullas do seguridad do pe tondi?iill quc it durant:+) o03 a.ln.l rj -; nc( I :;t.:do, Sia Sra chev noble ordenrdo a sus fix a tas quenos niilos Sc hen rnoviltxa or?tos, disn,lar un,i cortadcrt do pars apagar iucos inn;;i:osa- rrocni'rto {a3 Iraij.: cstya oxen do calla, 1.000 do nata0.wd(jui Has. Los cubanos contin0fin s,ii 03. "fii11Xdo Irr;,tlo lo. corn nas so oinbarcaroti a Cuba. PO? pror deria -I trar,irr,mo a lea poi'iaitrtil 105 ~iiti?t~rrli+;; lat'tf.,: to mtsntras Its cortadt3ras Ira irdll,?ros y a to.-, ilonlot?e3 p0r baiaban :ldecuadamento r?Unrtclo E rims y' IN a,jhsp . t? it till i ~t 1gtrji",., cxplico c n+'r.intro de J farnosrr itur su tabsco. fit,tc; ce ensayartm an ticrania. fella t?fibr,,u Jor~7;5 Fisq;tet. hlttraa roll cor,plaianletitu an Cuba. M, advlbrta quo t;l fumar ab ;iur tauto C i.,,tro 0.i1 s3ncan :11 trot culpa at suelo ntcnt:a6r3o, judicial para to wind y ,raato gauii*et s (10 riqu:lios quc. co mientras otros sostictlcit gtto Is ha q au parrbi cC-n disr.. par.;uii file 1St io seii:lla, "oe Ilan arota maqulnaria ruse se-rentlctitab i too de l:igarr,{la3 y +Jos et,tn do en la revotuciuri'. J troy .cedar :omens. Los arr,10 is. evalancha do tail, de an:- car do In7O. ,uviei-on qua tartar Ca113 a t11n;1n llliaS '+) rU - pros Do Zu minks:rtes. +) ostan ..? dingo. Conte rrtaultacio. pens lc ac;tar:J ;fjf nfrrio ;ii'xtrx. peta ci niorcr+do ncciro. E{ , he oreisrjgido3 per capttsnca y: cuesta a ,000 Is botolfa, Y ,t:osocha, El miam i Castro Gov ciszrripos S fi.00 n! paqucte (i:n to calla en voz do iirnlinis.;rnr, j'lada suciicr`o quo Cc?tro s:.a l t3 ? Los viaital!toa;)ruct:d~rtb3 60 !a of marcado ncyro so an s , pronto ocri?ocacio. Cn In riayuria I3rigada do -C.tu(fianto.; radios pesos par un ddlQt) for nsa aqueiloa quo so pudleron ilabaz ins nnitrk rhos "Vcrir;!-rrtiiv..' Iray niuchos conlpradores. t]tf,+14 opttosto a ci. Ilan dejado?a Cu I t` del ministrn bo',idtiril de deice; as. Andrei Grecliko tanlbi4n flit, i l d C car .,ran a lug campc s a' . re y Irlorldita a gastar S 40 GO Eventuallllentp: fuoroll coso nor i,rs rnmida nary dos nar? CC ~., 7or ,en eua e . , w o a Miami. Aunciuo no so Ilan con Cedido permioos do Salida des ... .?.. ?11+" do 1SGti. alcunas 130.000' per tas Psis tones tdaa, ctFra acr'p? ,tablo porn run ztu llogb a Jos' Castro ap.irentomcnto t1?? Irt 01 aS quo ubtuvicron vi,a On?' planes dg" Gttt3trtt. do i' Iritiras, so ha icfr,rli;f) tts do eso tielilpo, Orin osn:> Tat cPSsr hFi, 13tS94iono Korth critorosn zgii dru sa3titr~ydiya nI,cn o3 quossaiieron 600.00C a ocquo t116' illSl pe i da qua ftrnrfi too ~it'ntc quc "crinstruye Iltpa Castro' dccdonasamontr, Ilan) Gros. State m1il ill fer do tonola, tcticaiilr nto niunr,oa blritlfna "La duke vida y is oricdcd des do :hitter Euston en ties": No oostante, tin. osted+t des a Buena rutt-ta a Is 01,16111 otsnsurilidora". Las crfticas, con" Soiri6ttea y atrak pftsvcCritrles ofoctunndo of misino tigrilpn :.i ? cucrdzn an clfo In :nor ialinzi Cu comunist is: aoribe Karol, t;ulpn 4Junos do Jos carnl,ios sugcrt' ba cstd on dej)lorabls pcligrb',. No educado on Ia Univt:rsidad oo. lino de elios file permttrr i+ ; tiiulic+ttati ti,.. ri.1 CIO Rostov. aattivn on el icJ. r a los trai,suladores olds podor f,''si;ii,i sn/ 'W1 +hi ll, , l+, do doctsidn. Cuba ha reaiiiadc ac uridad Cri is ryil;n rasa tilt Ciao A610 (Y an lat-" prlsionss series do "elecciongs" do unto 'o ''Uno a i, rti5lv.,r5 proUlutitao. stalinls s Yon vFflitbttttitlnen - "Le U. A. S. 9 nca do' trabajadoros on 13d` protluittu", dtre Ki;rol oblertz to anti Svc ~ cuaies dos mittonos de C'i? 1 morlt'i ",^,t :1st sQ ,:t on hril i eil 'no tiono tcalnrlatir bl dsrecho tins aprobaron 140.000 rep o? htpotoc:,do todo of futuro do moral Oars in.~I101r an 'sus der Ociitontes do los sthdfcatos.-11 to r,ivoluctdn". Castro ha' pasado ttemrwo. sir ,vlcndo comp Ildor national. 80 cuoja Karol: stomplc de glras! per. at pats, y dejandn at goblet,, no ,a Los burdcratas, "La,nttova. :lase prolotarla", teporte Karol' "es on pogo dif fell do eontro= tar y usar.Ia buracrecia pare,; sus proplas fines climb antcrtor mOnte is Il:t.:j t fit r;iri t?rlti~fil, Amboy observudores co,?icuor + dan on quo at mss' grando u- rror an of juiclo do Castro. futi' to quo Karol lisma "su obse- sl6n del nzOcar" para pager pot CPYRGHT +111r d misfiles son haste:, In;s ra'. ; Cnri,)05f;nlCnt0, C::da a mbi:i eu0311Qrf MUM coo Vol" . . restauranfes de to Habana ?'a: bo v ri.ip:raiil haccrto ci; Unb ~o Ir.s Cairo Alonr,eignetn, La To- toe vualos qu l so toa,izan is V 1 d If? d ro Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 10 puSgAr RelleaRse 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7 26 April 1971 CPYRGH-Ey Jude Wanniski or a few hours last week, Fidel Cas- a es, even To normalize relations with t e loo tro was in his for a afn. It ?dewas l the while "that monstrous war" in Vietnam United States, which would open ec 10th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, and continues. noniic opportunities for Cuba througho t the Cuban premier, who never tires of It seems reasonable to. speculate, as' the, hemisphere, Castro would sirup y recounting how the nation's heroes specialists in the State Department have, have to renounce the export of revol -? squashed the Yanqui mercenaries, told that Mr. Nixon's comments this month tion. But for him, a compulsive revol the whale blow-by-blow story again in caused Casro additional distress. ,Certain- tionary, this ? would mean admission f a three-hour radio address. ly he reacted furiously. humiliating defeat. He said last wee As usual, it was a fascinating, color- Mr. Nixon, asked In a radio Interview "such a gesture, Mr. Nixon-and we sE Y' ful account that could not have failed if he Is thinking of normalizing rela- this with all the honesty which characte - fu macount, fly stir the tions with Cuba, as he Is In the long Izes this, revolution and Its statement pride' and pas- term" with China, replied that Castro has will never be made." sloe of the 8,500,000 Cubans, at least drawn the line. "He's exporting revolu- Castro also had some unequivocal r - those who bothered to turn on their tion all over the hemisphere. . . As 'marks about the Organization of Amer radios. Yet these remembered vlorina aVVUY raw tit new t;ciualllo,can offer. __.____ .... w!!. Ejv!!llYlV, . a? U4[l4GJ tv:a~~, wnlcn cvlnciaenLau people these days. The decade has anti-American line, we are certainly not met in San Jose, Costa Rica, last week. not been kind to Cuba or Castro. While going to normalize our relations with 1962, and in 1964 after Castro stirred u he remains a folk hero, his charisma Castro. As soon as he changes his line Insurgency In Venezuela. the OAS passe tarnished but intact, his back is getting .'toward us, we might consider It. But it's resolutions excluding Cuba from its a closer to the wa1}.., his move.- tivi.ties. Almost all of the 23 membe 'states 'brok trade The Cuban economy is in disarray Given the fresh currents of coexistence with Castroe But now and ~Iastro is soi weae barely held from collapse by ever-in- around the globe, It seems likely the creasing infections of Soviet aid. And the people of Cuba are not repelled by the ened domestically that his revolutionar notion of normalization. In fact, they exports are almost limited to rhetoric Russians, more and more, are elbowing probably yearn for It. It would be tuff}- and several of the Latin governments, le their way into the direction of econom cult to exaggerate the current economic by Chile, seem prepared to take Castr le planning, understandably appalled at, plight. Castro himself admitted last year' back. But that, too, would be. a humillat ow easily the Havana .government has In the most despondent message he has yet' Ing admission of defeat for Castro, as I managed to waste the $5 billion in Sov- delivered, that the OAS was taking et aid already supplied. privation would remain roke until at least 1975. down Cuban revolution onHee reactn Spotlight on Chile berceiy: n s ns he spiritual leader of the Latin Amer}- Not that there is any starvation. There 1 'the OAS . p is a basic ration of beans and rice, and us into the : How are they going to silo an left has been rapidly declining. Since OAS when we say we are o he Guevara's death In Bolivia in 1967, per persthree-quarters of a on per week. But. there s no fresh the side of the revolutionary govern- he Russians have been restraining Cas- milk for persons over 7 years of age 'and meats? How, when we say the OAS is a ro's more impetuous revolutionary Im- fresh vegetables are rare. And there is filthy, rotten bilge with no honor? How, wises. Now, with Castro-style comma- almost a total absence of consumer goods, when we, say that the OAS causes fits of sm hardly a himself Latin revolution- including' ciothing~ Except for l 500 Alfa vomiting In our country--the name of the' ries, Castro himself seems to be be- Romeos bought by Castro for his senior OAS, that is." owing an embarrassment to the move- government officials, the only automobiles eat. The spotlight belongs to Chile's in Cuba are those Imported before the Russia Grows Weary ewly elected Marxist president, Salva- 1b59 revolution. One visitor reported that If that wasn't clear enough, Castro or Allende, who not only has shown the a pack of American chewing hum was be- went further than he has for years, since ay to peaceful revolution, via the ballot Ing sold on the black market for $5, a Moscow put a leash on him, in pledging ox, but who also pledges that.-his goo- pair of nylon stockings' for $150. Cuban direct support of armed revolution. "At' rnment of not Interfere in thy` internal rum is almost impossible to buy In Cuba the hour and moment that the other broth-' ffairs of its Latin neighbors: Chile will at any price. er revolutionary countries request techni- ot became the Sierra Maestro of the cal assistance, such as technicians or soj ndes," he .declares, the Sierra Maedtras Housing, medical services, education, diers, as soldiers and combatants, as our eing the hills from which Castro con- and utilities are free, or almost free, but most sacred duty we shall furnish them." ucted his C. ')an revolution In 1957-1959. this only completes the cycle of Castro's economic problem. Because what -is not Chances are Moscow was irked by Then, too, Castro finds himself being free Is rationed, or unavailable, money these' remarks. in pursuit of their own erwhelmed by the pace of globaj events. as little value and there is no incentive national interests, the Russians have been At a time of severe economic privation o work. Productivity Plummets. The re-, conducting a gentlemanly diplomacy f r Cuba, all he has left to hold the Cuban gime throughout together is the hatred of Richard produces fewer goods with which; ghout Latin America --- hobnobbing xon and Yanqui the hatlism. Yet here' to earn foreign exchange, hence less ca- gvet- with those - rightist governments, I 'his friend, Allende, still along ;parity to buy consumer goods. The Rus- such . as Brazil's and Argentina's, that' getting islans,, locked Into their political commit- have been going to extrenies to stamp' a fashion with Washington. And here e went, now take up the slack at the rate out radical leftists. Further, the i the People's Republic of China playing of $i, er ~In~t~s}~ 1q~ ,, prevail- A roved For Re lease ?~ /~&8 : di-RD P79_01'k> i~ Ei` ~ Late Depart- pp I of are ~gr~tting' Allende Steals His Thunder T or Cuba's Castro: Memories; Si! Successes, Ivyfons, $150 a Pair "We feel better outside tha a i id CPYRGHT Approve d For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 weary of pumping money n o a osini in recent months, Castro has been taken to condemning specific "counter- proposition like Cuba,. and would, prefei to see Castro get along at least with his atin neighbors. Certainly the Kremlin enjoys having Cuba as a pressure-point In its big-power, rolntionehil) with the United Motto, Every, time It sends a nuclear submarine into Cuban waters the U.S. Government spud. ders. But otherwise, It seems likely that Castro could,become Increasingly embar??. rassing to Moscow. Since he has foreclosed all his other options, Castro can only straighten out the economic mess he has created by stepping up the militarism of his regime. As It Is, 11 of the 24 cabinet posts in his government are held by soldiers; military organization, he seems to feel, Is the only way to discipline the Indolent work force.. Last year Castro put the military in the vanguard of his attempt to harvest 10,-' 000,000 tons of sugar. And then the effort was, a crushing failure; workers from all sectors of the economy were sent, into the; fields and still the harvest fell short by 1,500,000 tons. This year he can not even make his goal of 7,000,000 tons. THE MIAMI HERALD 14 April 1971 CPYRGHT Compiled by our Lom Amitits SIsii WASHINGTON -- Soviet technicians are being sent to towns and cities all over Cuba In what U.S. Officials regard as a novel attempt to' revitalize the island's sag Bing economy. '' "They're actually being In- corporated Into relatively low-level positions," said one U.S. official noting the move is one of several examples of a growing Soviet role in the Cuban economic structure.... an "anti-loafing" law, probably the most repressive In the hemisphere, was put Into effect. "Loafing," or vagrancy, has been made a crime punishable by six months to two years in a "rehabilitation center," a forced-labor camp. 'Stalinization' Under Way? In February, the French press reported that Heberto Padilla, a 39-year-old Com- munist poet, was arrested in Havana. Mr. Padilla supposedly had given manu- scripts critical of the Castro -regime to a French photographer, who was also ar- rested as he was about to leave for Paris with the documents. There have been other reports that Castro recently closed the University of Oriente after stu- dents there publicly called him "an auto- crat." At the University of Havana, the French press also reported, Castro told a student assembly In March that -tellectuaI who engages In counter-revolu- tionary activities will escape the sanc- tions he deserves, and that It does not matter what intellectual, repercussions. are released by the case: The Cuban armed-forces magazine, Verde Olivo, has Str'es have- been convinced a "Staliniza- Lion"~ of Cuba Is well under way. One semlott#cial view of "what's wrong with Cuba" was offered last No- -veMt)er by Castro's ,minister-without- port'olio, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who represented Castro at the Allende inau- guration in Chile. 4t a press conference in Santiago, :Rod. rlgueZ tendered some free advice to the, Chileans: "We must not be bone 4Ient toward ppr enemies-tolerant toward' our eneiiies. The Cuban revolution, which has's been so talked about In Chile, es pecially by mention of the firing squads, sinned in Its early days not by excessive executions, but by being too generous ,with certain elements that had attached themselves to the revolution." There ,were 700: executions. echn~cian,s Spread Ovee*, Cuba Officials say the Soviet Union began taking a viore active rote in Cuba f+fpwing I Premier Fidel Castro's admts- sion last year that his ece- n o rn I c poilcles had not worked. There Is official specula- tion here that assignment of Soviet technicians to as far removed IF ro in Havana may be linked to azt U.S. officials .ere as an affe to. restructure the Cuban eco- -nomy. These officials say the d. to U.S. officials provides for' fort involves tailoring the a more active role In Cuban Cuban economy to comple-. economic planning and for went economies of the Soviet continued economic assts- Union and of ComMunist Lance. Estimates of this assts. East Europe. Lance range between $380: Another element of the million and $500 million an- close cooperation. between finally. __ .. - the signing late last year of Cubs's eight million people bilateral economic coopers. ever the past several years . t l o n agreement, eftectiiive has exceeded 'the entire' 1971 through 1975. U.S. development loan pro- The agreement, recording franc for Latin America's 280 Whion people. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :1C~IA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 23 March 1971 THREAT OF FORCIRD LABOR BY FIDEL C 4STRO IDLENESS AND ABSENTEEISM CII ALAINING RISE IN CUBA CPYRGHT campaign. All over Cuba company meetings are being held_ Production, Fight for Maximum Utilization of the Workdays" d ItLna _.7_i a -_:.. an Cuban economy have reached such proportions that their effects -- according to the official version -_ "se-rim sly d isrupt the natioal" n economy.. The mandatory "debates" center aroun +6- u-"" work. The bill is aimed at two groups._ Theafirstu~rn?n com ass - p es the os or vagabonds, able-bodied m b t en e ween the agesf 1d 60 o an years who are neither in any type of training nor gainfully employed. The weeks, or continued work slowdowns rfollowing ytwofjunheeded warni ngs According t th Cb .oeuan press there are few group continues to grow. It is officially admitted that work loss resulting from this type of absenteeism generally taking off from work now and then at irregular intervals. As motivation for the new bill and Axelanati~? of ad o an isoc n r al cam -c i - - conduct" in Cuba,: the regime is holding moral and ideolo g ical admonitions in. readiness- First of n11- i + wo l .a ?a- - socialist social order allegedly liberated from o ressi pp on exploitation, and alienation.. are sought in har f?l +red{ +, Since officially the problem. is thus viewed as purely political and ideological, the conclusion drawn is that. it can only lye ,overcome through patience and persuas- ion. Mass meetings,, political. education,, and prepared :"discussions".seem: indicated.. Also, the Bill. for ' Pproved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A00030006 I-7 CPYRGA-IT nnrr meat of "asocial elements" is so far preventive in character. Forced` labor -- prettified as "work duty in retraining institutions" -i of up to two years is provided for ya.g~o..s, and up to one year for those guilty of "offenses anted ent to vagabondism." Initially, all seAtenoes are to be suspended. They will be set aside in oa4es where the perpetrator mends his ways or shows remorse. ` Yet, in view of the realities of the Cuban situation, the line of reasoning followed by the Castroit;es in Havann& is nothing but ideological embellishment. The causes for the growing idleness and diminishing productivity in Ctba can by no means be Sought in supposedly degenerate habits ahd traditlonler, They are rooted in economic realities. During the early sears ? of Vidal Castro' a reign revolutionary enthusiasm dotild still move mountainesy The people accepted a radical savrifice- of consumer goods and were sustained by the hope that powerful efforts *Ottld soon enable them to attain a higher state of deVels dent and drastically improved luting conditions. IneeteU, the economic situation continued to deteriorate. TOdt there is nothing to buy except rationed goods. Life boa become bleak and dreary. That there are no longer aim nitres, nor medical or telephone bills to be paid does not alter this fact. Every worker can figure out for himself .that he need only work one week eadh month to have the sum needed. to buy the rationed goods. WYE', then, work longer and harder if the additional wages cannot buy anyt ng, anyway? Absenteeism in places of busi!ieas and factories has become the rule. Faded is Castro' s vision of a "new man in a new society," a man whose values are not based on moo and material wealth but on the criteria of a revolutionary` Utopia. The cautious approach used by the government to combat the waning productivity is indicative of the advanced state of lethargy and idleness prevailing throughout the nation, Though Castro eviientiy still believes. .s charisma and continuous propaganda can once more make him master of the situation, the ueatish is whether the people's disillusionment over Cuba's economic decline hat-not already reached Such proportions to render campaigns 4d threats useless. If that is the o"s forced labor he last resort. All that would r. ' ` of the Utopia of as new, liberal., socialist society old be a heap of MO IC Approved For Release 1999/09/q# : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 -'`. r. ,; I , i. ~ Mm~tr+~V~f~3tc w~th~+,xPAV+hYKSd'fini~F-1-/'Mrfrrl:KSrllfx't-fiiS"Al~tt~flKf,k864i,'d~rTtitwu+.rvl~t?jru't1 YP.i fi7tM1 `E,t~#iPlit"f7,'fl WW6'I,IAM Yt7YtYlrIY, Idr1VA Yl U If s', :A t. ~~r. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 FRANKFURTER ALIJ3EMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 23 March 1971 Fidel Castro droht mit Zwangsarbeit Arbeitsunlust and Absentismus nehmen auf Kuba bedrohliche Former an / Von Harry Hamm CPYRGHT Fidel Castro hat in diescn Wo en erne neue Kampagne bc;onnen. Auf ganz Kuba finden Betrhebsversammlungen statt. Zur Diskussion stchen die The- men:.Kamp? um die Erhohung der Ar-- beitsproduktivitat", ?Kampf um die voile Ausnutzung des Arbeitstages" und? ?Kampf gegen das Vagabundentum". Der Iider maximo" sieht sigh zu diesen, Mafinahmen gezwungen, %bei1 die Ar,=. beitsunlust and der Absentismus in der kubanischen Wirtschaft in einem soichen Umfange zugenommen haben, data sich die Phiinomene - Hach amtlicher Ver- sion in ?bedenltlichem Matte des- organisierend aut die Volkswirtschaft auswirken". Irn M tteipunkt der ahgeordnetca ?Debatten" stcht ein Gesetzentwurf, der barte Sanktionen gegcn diejenigen vor- sieht, die sich systemattsch and hart- nackig einer geregelten Arbeit zu ent- ziehen suction. Von dem vorgesehenen Gesetz sind zwei Gruppen betroffen. Einmal die sogenannten ,,vagos" oder Vagabunden, arbeitsfahige Manner im Alter zwischen 17 and 60 Jahren, die weder In irgendelner Ausbildung Hoch In einem Arbeitsverhaltnis station. Die zweite Gruppe von Personen umfaBt jene, die ein sogenanntes ,Vordelikt des Vagabundentums" begehen. Darunter versteht man das unbegrOndete Fern- bleiben von der Arbeit Ober einen Zeit-, raum von mehr ais zwei Wochen oiler, nark zweimaliger erfolgloser Verwar- nung, fortgesetzte Bummelschichten. Wirklich ?vagos" im Sinne des Gesetzes soil as mach Angaben in der kubani-. schen Presse nur wenige gegen. Die zweite Gruppe sci Jedoch immer grol3er geworden. Offiziell wird zugegeben, da13 der Arbeltsausfall Burch these Art von. Absentismus in der Regol?~ZO'-Prbzent' betragt. Nicht dazu gezghlt sind all die Falle'eines;.weitverbretteten zeitlids?be+' das Regime moralische and ideologische Ermahnungen bereit. Zunachst einmal nchme, onne selbst ent vedcr auch nur den geringstcn odor nur cinen, unvoll- Da es sick somit aus offizteller Sicht um ein rein politisches and idcologisches Problem handelt, zicht man daraus den Schlui.1, es konne nur mit Geduld and 't7 berrcdungskraft uberwunden warden. Masscnversammlungen, Politunterricht and vorgepragte ?Diskussionen"' or- sdhcinen ais der gegebene Weg. Auch der Gcsetzcntwurf zur Bestrafung dot! ,,Asozialen" hat ?zunailtst ?-PravenTtiv- charakter. 'Zwwangsarbeit'L-i'veriiiedli- chend ais ,Arbeitspflicht in Umerzie- hungseinrichtungen" bezeichnet - bis ' zu zwei Jahren ist fur die ?vagos" vor- gesehen, fur diejenigen, die das ?Vor- delikt zum Vagabundentum" begehen,- bis zu einem Jahr. Alle Strafen sollen vorerst bcdtngt verhangt werden. Sic werden ausgesetzt, wenn der Ubeltater sich bessert oiler seine Fchler cinsieht. lichkcit begriindct. In den Anfangs- jahren der Herrschaft Fidel Castros ver- mochte revolutionare Begeisterung noch Berge zu versetzen. Das Volk nahm einen radikalen Konsumverzicht in Kauf. .in der Hof?nung, bald durch eine fie- waltige Kraftanstrengung eine hohere Stufe der Entwicklung erklimmen and die Lebensverhaltnisse drastisch verbes- sern zu konnen. Statt dessen wurde die wirtschaftliche Lsge immer schlechter. 'Heute giht as abgesehen von den ratio-' nierten Waren nichts mehr zu kaufen. as Leben ist We and trist geworden. Daft keine Steuern, keine Arzt- and ke1ne?Tclefonk6sten'meht bezahlt'wer con mussen, iindert nichts an au 'r Tatsache. ?? ? , `1Jeder'Arbeiter kann rich ausrechnen, daft or nur eine Woche in Monat 7.u arbeiten braucht, um die Summe zu vcr- dienen, die fur den Ankauf der zu ze- teilten Waren notwendig 1st. Wozu also Langer and mehr arheiten, wenn der zusatzliche Verdienst doch nicht umge- setzt werden kann? Absentismus in den i3etriehen and Feb01ccn wurde nur Re- gel. Castros Vision vom ?nouen Men- schen in einer ncuen Gesellschaft'?, fur den nicht Geld and materieller Wohl- stand, sondern die Kritcrien einer revo- { lutionaren Utopia Maf3st6be setzen, er- losch. Die Bchutsamlceit, mit der das Regime dem Ubel der absinkenden Produktivi- tat zu Leibe ruckt, 1af3t das Ausma13 der Lethargte and Arbcitsunlust im Volke erkennen. Zwar glaubt Castro offenbar, 'trait seinem Charisma and permamentcr Propaganda We Lage nosh einmal mei- stern zu konnen. Doch fragt sich, ob die Enttauschung Ober den wirtschaftlichen Ntedergang Kubas in der Bev6lkcrung nicht bereits ein soiches Mali erreicht hat. da13 Kampagnen and Drohungen nichts mehr bewirken. Dann mag Zwangsarbeit der letzte 'Ausweg sein. Von der Utopia einer nouen, frethelt- lichen, sozialhstischen Gesellschaft bilebe nur noch?eln Scharbenhaufen iibs?ig. der lcubanischen Situation in Betracht, .erweist sich die Argumentation.der Fi delisten in Havanna a1s eine ideolo i ch g s e Letyten, die bier and da in unreget--' Verbrimung. Die Urmmncon der um'rich mgt3iger Foige blau machen. grolfcndert Arbeitsunlust and absinken-. Zur Motivierung des nouen Gesetzes den Produktivitat auf Kuba sind keines- und zur Erkliirung der Ursachen der;; welts in angoblich' verderbliehen Ge- immer atl;rker urn sich grelfenden anti wohnheiten and Traditionen zu su(hen. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 15 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS 19 May 19 71 ' ;,;,~ .~i.- I oil: oLert S. ARen' & Jo19n 6- o1dsmt; , CPYRGHT Misi UP Ou Te media are saying nothing about it, but Washington Apparently there are a. lot of "social rlminals" who and R vans are currently the scenes of dramatic and pro- ave run, afoul of Castro's new draft. foundl;y significant contrasts on the draft Issue. Id a May lay speech, Labor Minister' Sorge Risquet de- 'In Washington, still in the process of recovering from clared that In the short time the edict has been in effect, more extensive battering and soiling of the communist-instigated , than 100,000 Cuban workers have been arrested and sentenced ,nand directed "anti-mar" disturbances and disorders, a bitter, junder It to "rehabilitation centers." tight is being tivaged,in the Senate against continuance of the RISQUET MADE another equally revealing disclosure-' draft. An assortment of anti-Vietnam doves, paclfists, ultra-,., that these culprits "represent only about one-third of sus- liberals and other militants are furiously I4lbu3tering to de'- : 'pected violators." . d fcat the House-passed bill extending the drift two more years, a The Castro henchman warned that no mercy will be shown. Outcome of this fateful struggle Is uncertain.'TIe exlsthtg' 'those deemed guilty. Menacingly, Risquet declared the gov- Selective Service Act" expires June 30. 4 ernment Intends to rigidly enforce the new draft regardless hleanivhile in Cuba where, as in all of how many are seized and sent to labor camps. Iron Curtain countries, universal military 1 . Representative Richard Ichord (D., Mo.) chairman of the' training is permanent and mandatory, dic- :iinternal Security. Cotnm#ttee_commenting -on this matter,,, tator Fidel Castro, the Idol of radical U. S. noted that'recently several large groups of radical U. S. youth, has put Into effect still another draft youths went to Cuba to- cut cane. He cited these so-called system. " Venceremos Brigades" as graphic examples of "mindless By arbitrary edict-with no debate, con- absurdity." - " sultation or anything else-the bulky despot - has proclaimed. a . so-called "anti-loafer "While these American youths, are voUmtarily going to a. Aimed at work shirkers and similar "so- cial criminals," as they are officially brand. ed, the purpose of this latest terrorism Is to strike at the widespread and increasing absenteeism and idle- .mess among workers. That's nothing new In Red-ruled Cuba, but It, Is the first time Castro has attempted to cope with it by?a so-called lhw. .-UNDER THIS new "law," violators are punished by being That goal In Itself was an acknowledgment of a major set back. LAST YEAR the bombastic Cuban dictator -vainglo?iously '.announced a 10 million ton record. Somewhere between 6 and ;7, million tons was finally squeezed out: Sugar experts say Castro will be lucky ?to wind up with! that much this year. Untimely heavy rains and mounting: labo'r and mechanical difficulties are severely craft pro tltrctlon. .. . , During this time they will be required to."do productive work"-as decided by the communist i?state. Currently, that .means being -sent Into the sugar fields to cut tane. . Right now, that Is admittedly particularly urgegx because' the sugar crop Is running seriously behind schedule. In a blay.?J 'Day speech, Castro Conceded this year's crop is likely tti be, ' '800,000 tons less than his loudly .fanfared goal of 7.S million communist ponce state," said Ichord, "the terrorist rulers of that state have prescribed a new law that says in effect their workers have no rights, not even the right to decline to toll for little pay and comforts." KEY PROVISIONS of Castro's new anti-loafing draft -act are: "In. the new society, work Is a sncn-1''duty for all able- bodied men and women. Loafing may take different forms,-running from those who have no work. connections and are dedicated to'a life-of Idleness and crime, to those who try to disguise their lazy ways with occasional *}ork, quitting one job after another, to those having work, but repeatedly absent. "it Is the duty of the Revolutionary Government to. de. nource and fight such manifestations, and to adopt measures leading to the eradication of loafing and parasitism. "The guilty will be sent to rehabilitation centers for a .period of from six months to two years, during which time 15ey will do productive wont. "The Ministers of labor and the Interior are authorized to take all necessary measures to guarantee the fulfillment of this law. ? . . . - , ? .. ? . ?'AD legal measures which, In whole or in part, block the fulfillment of this law are declared null and void. The law will go into effect as Mn as it k published in the Official Gazette." t :.. b'" _.. ~~.., .; ?t 16 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT TE GUARDIAN 11 June 1971 ff"m /r d By RICIIARD I,VA..NS tinn iry fervour in some ?e - hother to ask the peasants, nu'nt:; or wit 71vc vt, a . f:u?ln' driver in Vinales who wa. nn Inr due note rnnn s a to nu'c s they still believ,! in free enterprise basis. Some ntinati'n in Cuba, but I would the faihlrr? to prur;t:et, the pro- I'id'I Castro. It was for them times he earned as much as 30 snv 1bore is social rllsctintina? jeered r:oal of lu million tons of that the revolution was fought pesos a ntunt.h. But in return he U(,n. t\(- discriminate a;;ainct su:::.r for laid, that is not sur- Intl Ilie. question soenrs had to work one clay a seek in p(.np:e ,+hu do not want to I),., mg. Like runny peoples of ah:urdly irrclevanl. when one fs the local hospital for noth? cork,W'11 tl crnnnnworins. i tlndlor? ` tenipcramvnt, idle invited iMn a house like that ing, tl? it , : ('ub;rns are not about to break helon;tng to Nirnnredes Brien rid h-tw there can he People their backs t+hile the sun still in the flan Andreas district of Were it not for the chronic, like' bent uhf d there is so much shines and the food manages Pinar rlel Itio Province, distribution of food - a sur. to N. doer' " soon how to find its way to the Ttclen, a 50?vear-old black plus of cabbages or whatever lit, nits a Gcrtnan?Ian;nl; a tlhle. fanner, w:1s tolling me how he one week, none the next - one student al the University of in llav:am, where the quality had lived all his life in I hnusc could not help but he trcmcn- llavana. but he got his message of life is a1i+ru.;t as had as tilt, with halm leaves,fo-? a roof and dourly Impressed with the pro. arr'i-. prc-ityl~ul:cinvtly in 1?:n;;? American Right-wing tvnuld -trlrrl for a floor. "I rlcver g'ro'ss in the countryside. Apart 1r.`I1, too. At W:l, he 1?: of lit;- a1;e? MV YOU h., wntil;c..1 dreamed that ....- ?--- I -- - ?-' from the building boom. much roin;u;lrl: 1'llprlUl"i;l ~rh eh :at,' llrgeiy at tho indolent Inc! dis? this," cotnprisecd a t vc?bcd- started two or three years ago rulmdt'd ]1dl'i ('a~lrn's enter- content-mod cif now see-iu near d+e roomed h ll th l t th ti } c er a comp e on. e ouse, a new television g.?nrt from the, Siena \dnestra, ants-loafint, law is aimucd, But it' set. radio, and 'fridge. It had On the perimeter of the newly- 'fhrrr surci.?rc I-rlip( in the t+, ;c Act rr Castro's intention to not cost him a cent. developed green brit around ,, fir rived thrtlrR itofrtthrs p14 if r- Ia `o`+, the seeds of ills revolution Every family in this half?com? Ilavana, two hue dams are tt+eive ~t :Ire;, ,Intl c'astro can in Havana. pl under construction and the \l'alt It, cracked and crtrd new town of some 300 largest, the dlamposton, con. r?r,unt on ti;l-ir continllill;: su;r pccling p op1C had also been given tele? taining .151 million :uoie port. 'l'ire next generation m;iv buildtn4s, Its Spluttering fleet vision sets, primarily as a metres of water, will be be h;ird.,r to plc-:ow. of patc?'rtrd?up American sedans, coIward for being the fir:;! to finished later this year, as will We wert! cUpeu.sing tlu: anti. shops drva,d of all !usury con- In in the new collectivity the ?16 million British-built fer? to:,frn~ II+e wliich t+ac evcntrr., snorer goods and queues for [arming plan, If few other ni:v luau-?111 torn 1,11"'pt (liu?inn .,.ter t.t__a ?4 - hnucis In run-in?. k(t- ? ( .... i tiliser plant at Cienfuegos. a law that now mikes it an ad print of a Secon d tiVorld of Pinar del ]tic, were quite so beneficial e(Tt,ct on lift in poor, nITence; lumnl.hah1e by a ye r'.,; War film. If one took Havana as well equipper!, the people had neglcctccl Havana, but more iorcrd I.,h-mr. to he out of work ;I yardstick, one, coo;d be lulled little to complain about. direct help will also he needed. ur lo he ,tioe-ii from one's lob into believing that Cuba was No one I met was earning Castro's life-style is still 1nr more.Ih,m 15 d. ys 1eithout a ripe for nnnUter Bay of Pigs. hr-'s than 100 simplicity itself. 73ut the fact Peso., a high ? remains that Cubans drrl The yl;twr t rrflrcta both the plater last year, in April and S:nI;Y workers' wa;es go as s hiI' tlecclnired a taste for snperllu- September, the coturier?revohr- as ' 10. With medical care, our wants" and fit Havana. :rt strent;tli and thn weakness of Lion:ii irw in Miami sent over education, rents, children's least, they will not tolerate tht Castro's ('uha 10 years after, miniature invasion forces. The meals at school and some Guh:rs wale a different sea of , second group was told that it workers' lcrnchi-s all free it was total absence of luxury iten s i . for ever would with th fi t t to ee h *......... link t,1. rs s ow tn e r'y could rr,^,Ite ,t ttIr? I:Iy of INn,?s. Its which had supposedly gained spend more than half 't'he h d f an o fti( MINI] ip 5irer11;th is Circle uhvrntts by its local support in Oriente their salary. stretched across a continent very nature. Thera is more than pr-ovince. Thct true results of ."This is one of the prob. from (agile has helped enor- ert iii It ~ m rtt for everyo } inc. NO those expeditions were shown 1emc," one Communist party nrously to boost morale and. ( in a television documentary official told me at Slndino, coupled with other L'ft?wing tally, no Illiteracy ; sufficient' broadcast for the first time another new town. "We are rumblings throughout Latin food for All: compulsory free. during my visit It took the huiliiin America m ih t f . , g a n ay pence o be o t?cluh with crlur,itlon? for all children. form of a trial of the survivors. cabaret and first-class res considerable significance to voluirtary free c' uc, lion for all All were either sentenced to taurant here so that people can Cuba's future. An airline's adults -- these are achfeve? death or 30 years' imprison- have somewhere to spend their service between Santiago and nivots no other I.3tirr?Americanf ment. money." Havana has been fnau;urated country can claim. Nnr, indeed,' It is that kind of openly and there are ru po the Unih'd Statc-s itscif. They failed for lack of what that *make,;; Castro that Cubic attitude that makes' Castro may seis th ? c ent - tut thn very existence of ant made Castro succeed -- the pea- Cuban Communism a anti-loafing law is an a(tmittsion cant support which propelled doctrinaire than little less toe nO visit e rerden of a cert;ttn cooling of rovolu? the original guerrillas 9nto.'i rpevens found as taxi if taxi hinge else, Fidelu could power. Today one does not even teach his new friend a let. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 17 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 9 May 1971 CPYRGHT ecantations in Cuba ecall Soviet Purges By DON BOHNI C; ',has been made public by ~nato?ni~rr r~nw?ee. ant.. ~rnri-ofit^ Latin UIV Cuba's lntellectuafs, under c a eCa an news tionary zeal, are ccontronted ' with growing pressures remi- niscent of the Soviet Union under Stalin Immediately fol- lowing World War U. Government concern, with Intellectual dissidence and ef- forts to counteract It are best dramatized by the case of Heberto Padilla, the prize winning poet and novelist ar- rested March 20 by Cuban authorities. I Subsequent events, lnclud- 4Ing Cuban Prime Minister, 1Fidel Castr6's own remarks,, ;make It clear that the prob- 'Iem goes far beyond Padilla, however. I Padilla, 39, was released .April 26 and the next night he appeared before 100 of his intellectual; colleagues In Ila. vane. THERE, In a remarkable performance, Padilla present. ed a lengthy monologue of self-criticism in which hq ,also chastised several other. 'Cuban . intcllectufls In- Icluding his wife -- for their. 'failure to adopt a p o er rev`, j lutionary attitudes A partial transcript of the imonolo tie and Padl's later exchange with his ,it all reminds me so much tot my first period In Moscow when Stalin cracked down on the intellectuals," says Foy ,Kohler, former U.S. ambassa- Idor to the Soviet Union now associated with the Universt- ty of Miami's Center'fer In- Iternational Studies. KOHLER, in his recetrt b o o k "Understanding the Russians," describes the In- tellectual crackdown In the 'late 191405, as follows: "In the press and In public meetings, writers, authors,. dramatists. actors, compo$- ers, were accused of 'format-, .um' or 'cosmopatftnnii3tn? or 1'bourgoola tandoncles.' The victims either groveled and . S recanted publicly or they dis- appeared Into the Siberian. ilaborcampe." . t ' Padilla chose to recant and t at the same time was used as ,is toot against others whose revolutionary credentials were being questioned. Kohler regards as particu- early revealing In the Padilla confesslon the totbrencet I to state security -- s gent tali he was subjected to strong pyacholog press sure9 - and his "reporting ze . craatlens with e t "UNDER THE GUISE, of._ the rebel writer," said Padilla. in his self-criticism, "I. mere- ly concealed' my discontent with the revolution. But I asked: Was this really dis- content, disaffection? "I discussed this with state security. And. when t saw the number of activities, opinions and judgments that I had en. gaged in among both Cubans and foreigners, and the num- ber of Insults and' defame- ;'tions. I stopped In my tracks and had to saytsincerely;, This is my truth, this is my true size, this Is the man I really was, this Is the man who committed these errors, this is the man who objec- tively worked against the revolution, not for It. . "And It. I say this here be-t, fore you."' Padilla told hit j :colleagues, ,,"It is because I j. see In many of the comrades present here. errors very simi- lar to those I committed." Padilla, near the end of Ills monologue, reflected what appeared, to be the growing -Cuban concern over Intellec- tual dissent. A. CPYRGHT .` "IT, IS MY DUTY to tell YOU HIM. 1 C11110 tv this c us on as uttiougnE o the cultural field," said Pa- tfiila. "That If there is--with exceptions, as ;there always. are - a sector Chat drags Its !heels behind the revolution In a political sense, it Is art 1. and culture. We have not ,been worthy of this revolu. `tion, despite the 12 or 13 dra. matic years we have lived with It" Two nights later, Castro -himself' reflected the same concern In a speech closing a national congress of educa- tion and culture with his ref- erence to "some writers who sire Influenced by oertain ten- ! dencles and who want lo be- come famous -- not by writ- Ing. something, useful for the' country but by serving Impe- rialist Ideological move- ments. "How many times these entlemen. these writers of trash, have won prizes," de- clared Castro. "Regardless of the technical level, regardless of the Imagination required, we as revolutionaries evalu- ate cultural works according. to how valuable they are to tale paopte ... , 'Our evaiuaUon, is.polo 18 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 'Ij MANILA CHRONICLE 17 May 1971 Castro' s Po1itic~l Prisoners f'DEL Castro has always bet that year, and was lock- bc n a believer in "revolution- ed up after a hasty and melo- ary justice", and over the years dramatic trial in which Cas- it as become increasitlly clear tro himself spoke as a wit- ju',t what that ambiguous ness for the prosecution. phrase means. Now Major Matos' wife, According to Amnesty Inter- Maria Luisa,. ' has put her nrtional, there are around 30, name to an appeal sponsor- 000 political prisoners in Cuba e1 by the American branch - a figure that can be com- of Amnesty international that pared with Castro's own ad- calls on five governments that mission that there were at least have diplomatic relations with 20,000 in 1965. Many of these Cuba (including Britain) to pr Boners are being held for intercede on. behalf of the ofl'ences that would not be country's political prisoners. considered "political" in the How much Amnesty will be West. Political prisoners include able to achieve is debatable. people, who have tried to leave That organization has been Cuba in secret, people who attacked from the right and have traded money on the black from the left, and the Russian market, and even people who paper Izvestiya lammed into, have sold places in restaurant it recently on the grounds queues. that "all its frantic activity They also include some of for the protection of, human Castro's . oldest personal rights amounts to stereotype enemies. Major Huber Matos anti-Communist outbursts." has been serving a 20-year But Amnesty's campaign sentence since December is bound to deepen the mood 1959. He was not one of Cis- of despondency amongst tro's earliest comrades (the those'Who started out as ear- barbudos or ."bearded ones" 1 admirers of Castro's revo- who joined in the attack on lution and have since been dis- the Moncada barracks or illusioned by the Govern- sailed on the Granma) but he ment's economic blunders played an important role in and use of repression: In ,the later stages of the Cuban Paris, Jean-Paul Sartre and revolution as the leader of an Simone de Beauvoir have just armed. column. He was always put their names to a petition suspect to Castro's intimates hat condemns the arrest of as a bourgeois liberal with a Heberto Padilla, the celebrat- doctorate in education, and, ed Cuban poet who is rapid- he earned Castro's own dis- ly becoming the Solzhenitsyn trust when he made a speech, of his country. He gave vent in June 1959 attacking the: to his disappointments in a rising influence of Commu- series of poems criticising Rus nists over the new regime. sia and the local regime, and He finally fell victim to the tried to have some of them purge that followed: the ap- smuggled out of the coup- pomtment of Raul Castro as Now it is on the cards Minister of Defence in Octo-. that he will be charged with being a CIA agent, like other Despite repeated offers writers and journalists who from the Americans to grant have been locked up by Cas- asylum for Cuban exiles and tro's police. deported prisoners, the, Cu-' Mario Rivadulla was one bans have shown no willing- newspaperman who wai gaol- ness so far either to loosen ed precisely on those grounds up the emigration controls or 41 and was finally allowed to to barter prisoners. OnF pen- leave Cuba last year. Id exile, at official has said that the he spoke freely about the American offers "merely en- conditions that .prisoners have courage counter-revolutionary to face in Cuba. He claimed prisoners who decline to join that - the institution of habeas the rehabilitation programme." corpus had bL'en. entirely sup-; But, at least in theory, the pressed, that men were, held, Cubans have been stressing indefinitely without trial, and the need to liberalise the pre- that prisoners were subjected: sent prison system - mainly to "cruel and intolerable agri- .through more intensive "re- cultural work." He claimed education" courses. At the that his own trial had lasted inauguration of a new train- 25 minutes, and that he had ing course for prison officials, been allowed only five min- the Minister for the Interior, utes in which to defend him- del Valle, said that "by the self. That is not an isolated quality of our penitentiary story., Broadly speaking, Cuban political prisoners are divided into two categories. The "irredeemables" are those who are considered unregenerate and held in close confine- ment without privileges - they were sent to Batista's prison- island, the Isla das Pinas, Until. 1967, then to La Caba- na fortress outside the capital. Prisoners who are locked up on lesser charges, or con- sidered amenable to political "re-education" ; are classified as rehabilitades and allowed to work their way to freedom through a system of minor privileges and incentives. These prisoners are sent to agricultural work camps, al- lowed regular visits from their wives, and permitted to go. absenteeism and low product home on parole at increasing- ivity among Cuban workers lv frequent intervals. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 19 system, by the flexibility with which we face differing situa- tions, we will bring those who have strayed from the straight path back to the revolution." The Cubans are relying more heavily on psychological tech- niques. The system of "revolution- ary justice" identifies social, as well as political, criminals. Under the terms of the new Anti-Shirkers Law, for ins- tance, males between 17 and 60 years of age are consider- ed guilty of delinquency if they (a) abandon their place of work for 15 days without good cause; or (b) receive two reprimands from their Work Council, composed o loyal party_ members. Thi CPYRGHT n......,.... 0,... M-1---., A eeeiheinn . ('IA Dr1D70 nA A AA Annn4nnn&nnnI 7 The scale of the problem can is where almost half those Legislation or this kind is Is Castro giving the don- be grasped when one learns 90,000 were sent) are weighty. clearly designed to act as a key too much of the stick that by April 1, when the Persons found guilty under kind of moral corset to hold and too little of the carrot? law took force, some 90,000 the Anti-Shirkers Law are Cuban society together. The Economic recovery is a long men had signed on for new either put in rehabilitation can- material incentives that are, way off. And in the men- jobs. The sanctions against' tern or placed under close lacking are replaced by nega? time, Caatro's honeymoon those who refuse to go out supervision. And they can tive compulsions to work. . with his intellectual admirers into the sugar-fields (which be denounced by anyone. appears to have clouded oVerr, PARIS MATCH, Paris 12 June 1971 DEATH C MPS IN CUBA The Revelations of Two Escapees from Castro's Prisons Confirm the Terrible Accusations Leveled against the Island's Regime CPYRGHT by Jean Cau Research by Jerome Duhamel Think back. It was only a few years ago. The wind of great libertarian revolutions was uprooting the rotten trees of the Old World and sweeping up Cuba in a heady whirl. There was passion and style. Berets. Heroic beards. The romanticism of brandished weapons. -Power and government were both in the streets. The word was "hope." Cuba and her "lider maxima" [supreme leader], Fidel Castro, had invented a new way for men. to be free.' Posted on the walls of students' rooms all over the world, the picture of the bearded chieftain, cigar in mouth, excited the dreams of students and the heartbeats of the radicals. Today, Cuba is enveloped in silence and terror. In the past few years, in the past few months, the revolution has been giving the image of the inescapable cog-wheels, of the dizzy. historical fatality which follows days of celebration with days of terror. Castroism has become another Stalinism. My purpose here is not to retrace how this terrible evolution took place, but to lift the veil which hi&-s the hells of Cuba by producing sane testimony. The Prisoners are used as Guinea-Pigs by newly trained Doctors It was not in a "reactiona r" newspaper, but rather in REGENERACION, the rgan of the Cuban libertarian movement, that we read of the recent sub-machine execution of twenty-two political prisoners. The text adds, "Communist civilization has invented the "gavetas" (literally, "drawer"), a cell 70 centimetdrs wide, 1.8 meters low and two meters high. Three men are piled inside without any room to move, and forced to relieve themselves in the cell.... At Prince Hospital, they use sick prisoners in operations rformed by surgical students. Prisoners who are executed by firing squad see their own blood drawn out to be sent as humanitarian gifts from the Approved or Release C P'Y G H'T ?n:.::..:.....~ o... o,.i........ ~nnninmm~ . rin o131279 04 494 nnnnonnncnnne 7 Cuban government to Vietnam and Laos. Women suffer the same treatment..." Similarly, the bulletin of "Democratic University Students," published by Cuban refugees in Argentina, reports the testimony which forty-eight political prisoners in Cabana prison sent to the Commission on Human Rights. What do they say? They say that on the Isle of Pines (in the bay east of the island), over 7,000 prisoners are "concentrated" in four circular buildings, each with a "capacity" of 870 men. They say that life in,the prisons and camps of Cuba consists of beatings, torture, harassment, constant searches, punishments which last for weeks or months, forced labor from five o'c~ock in the morning until seven or ten in the evening, depending on the season Exhausted, starving, decalcified, toothless, the prisoners serve as guinea pigs, for newly certified "doctors." The same report gives a long list of prisoners killed for no reason or dragged from their cells to be tried. The sentence is always the same: death. Recently, eight hundred prisoners went on strike out of hunger and despair. The account states, "It was a horrible sight to see 800 men (on a hunger strike) in a state of total starvation, lying on beds, at the mercy of the unleashed passions of our jailers.... Is this the country, we sufferers cry, which is so admired today by young people all over the world?" On 20 March 1971, the poet Herberto Padilla, winner of the National Poetry Award for 1968, was arrested. Fidel Castro announced that the arrest was his personal decision, and that other intellectuals would suffer the same fate "if they do not fall into line." When students organized readings of Padilla's .poems, Castro immediately ordered the closing of the University of the East cult, ,1111Pcu UL S LuueAiLs of Lo C~1 it il)lliiuay faniis. A bikjo i Ui. i'ie.tL personalities (Marguerite Duras, Simone de Beauvoir, Anne Philipe, Claude Roy, Jean Paul Satre, Jean Daniel, Alain Jouffroy, P. de Mandiargues and Maurice Nadeau) sent Castro a letter expressing their concern over "the suppression of the right of criticism within the Revolution." But on 27 April before the Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba, Iierberto Padilla read a confession written and signed in prison, a confession of which Castro already held a copy. In it, he accused himself of "revolutionary-errors," and exhorted his colleagues present to "overcome their weaknesses" which were leading them to "poll tical?-- and moral degeneration." At his example, other writers soon made their own ,confessions. Then on 21 May, sixty-one Western intellectuals and artists wrote a.letter to Fidel Castro expressing their "shame and anger" at the methods used by Havana to force Padilla to make his confession. This time, they received a reply from Padilla himself. It was a volley of insults launched by the poet in the faces of those who had tried to defend him: "defeatist philosophers". .."reactionaries"... "fierce enemies of Socialism" whose only concerns are "aesthetics, Paris gossip, honors, and theories, which were my most odious faults and which you.represent in the highest degree." In .conclusion, Padilla accused his defenders, "buffoons of the bourgeoisie"?, of `-serving "the C.I.A., Imperialism, and international reactionaries". More than twenty years after the Moscow trials and the "confessions" of Boukharine, for example, it is clear that nothing has changed. Ilore are two documents of-the totalitarian repression which is.strangling Cuba under its yoke. Two eye-witness reports., Their authors have allowed us to use their names. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 21 CPYRGHT 1971o gcia pQcY 8 a &e - 'My name is Antonio Eerro. I am sixty-four years old.' I was born in Santiago do Cuba. At presont I am living in exile in New York. I was a teacher in what corresponds to your primary school, that is to say, of children from seven to eleven years of age. I was anti-Castro, and my opinions were son discovered. One morning, the police came to arrest me right in my, classroom, in' front of the children, to whom the thing was undoubtedly even more overwhelming than to.myself. The unforgiveable thing is not that I was arrested for my opinions, but the fact that I was arrested in front of my !students! I was taken directly to a cell in t Fe central prison of Santiago de `Oka. sere was not even enough room to stand up, although I am not tall. Width: 1.5 meters. I crouched there for nine hours. I suffered agonies. Finally two guards came and pulled me brutally out of the cell by my feet. My muscles stretched all at once, and I screamed. They made me stand, but I fell down. So they supported me and-dragged me into the office of one of the regime's feared inspectors, a sort of sadistic twentieth-century inquisitor. Ile came up to me and struck me in the face-with a little leather whip, three times. I felt blood run down my cheek. He insulted me, called me a traitor, a slave of filthy American capitalism, I don't know what else -- he said anything he wanted to. Then he sat down at his desk for an interrogation which lasted for nearly four hours. I was standing all this time, and receiving whiplashes right in the face when my answers were too slow in coming. Behind me, the two guards made sure to stab me in the sides with the butt of their submachine guts., Finally, in the midst of a fog of words, I heard the charge. I almost laughed: the official reports, stated that I was under arrest for "offenses ,against morality." What a grotesque comedy! This interrogation was my only trial, a seedy-looking sergeant my only tribunal. I was handcuffed and led into.asnother cell, slightly larger than the other, in which two men were already rotting. They greeted me with joy. They had been together, face to face., for two'months. The explained to me the horrible life they led there. Ilse' cell.'was big enough to stand up in, but hardly wide enough to take four steps. There. was np ventilation except through the bars which opened onto the corridor. No sink, no water and no toilet. The prisoners were relieve themselves in the call.- At the end of the day,: a prisoner chosen according to..the cruel whim of the guards had to go along with a huge washpail collecting all this filth with his hands. Many times I saw. the guards push the man and bury his head in the pail of excrement. We were not able to shave either. Once every two weeks we were dragged into the big collective shower roms and piled in fifty at atime. At the entrance we were to undress, put our prisoner's outfit in the box, and take a handful of harsh lye-wash to wash oiselase with. The guards had two favorite games when we were in the water.. One rather tame one consisted of turning on freezing cold and boiling water alternately. The other, frankly horrible trick was to throw large handfuls of sulphur on us. When we came out of the showers, our skin was raw. Then we put an new uniforms, only slightly less dirty than those we had just taken off, which were made of a sackcloth similar to that used for grain bags.. The food was also inhuman. 't>nce a day -- one single time -- the-guards threw a few handfuls of poorly cooked, pebbly rice through the bars right onto the ground, with the dust and filth. This rotten stuff had to be shared by Approved For Release 1999/09D2 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 . T ; ?",~ t ~r :4;iY ~ ~~T6 1r I Y 1'l+; l dcJ d"IRTRTT-W?9 W 61T1'AJT~~$S`di I I I Ili IFlY36.MI Cs' PAN rl ,141 i5?i11 M,'1(/PM 1 fWMMI Ili 17) Off 'i gmlf I (f ZdMi Tad Fnr Release 1999/09/09 ? C_IA-RIlP79-01194A000300060001-7 all three of us, eating with our hands. Personally, I was fortunate enough to have as cellmates two admirable men, both former officials. But we could hear terrible arguments provoked by each food distribution, which were savagely encouraged by the guards. There were cries, screams and blues. You had to understand these men -- they had been reduced to the state 4f animals. One day in the cell next to mine, a man died, killed by his companion, strangled. The guards watched it without saying a word. When it was all over, I' heard them say, "Well, there's some more meat for the doctors!" Later I understood what they meant by that. I understood during my second interrogation. To force me to sign a statement that I was indeed an American agent sent to sabotage the Cuban revolution, the sergeant-judge threatened me with all the atrocities of which he and his stooges were capable.. Nameless atrocities which were nothing short of the best efforts of the German concentration camps. Here is a rough account of the list they gave me: an acid bath; tattooing a hammer and sickle with a red-hot iron; methodical plucking of the hairs of the crotch; stuffing the stomach with pieces of cotton soaked in waste [used] oil; plunging the head into a box filled with bees. What the sergeant told me next, I remember exactly. I do not think I shall ever be able to forget his;words! "In any case, even if you refuse to give us a little signature, you will participate anyway in the training of our young doctors. Now, I can already give you an idea of what lies ahead for you." He opened a large bound dossier. Inside were photographs - terrible photographs. Horrifying documents. They showed yound medical students, wearing the traditional white coat, performing dissections on the corpses of prisoners. Corpses? What am I saying? They were the living dead, the suffering tend sometimes even men who were only wounded. I remember one close-up color photo in which you could see the expression of the man lying strapped to the table, his stomach cut open. In this living stare one could read all the horror in the world -- yes, all the horror in the world. For my part, I admit that I broke down. I signed the statement which the 'sergeant handed me. I admitted everything they wanted. This cowardice saved me. Two weeks later, I and five other prisoners were. freed and put on a plane bound for Honduras. We were given no explanation. 'Thus, I left my country forever. Thank God, I did not leave anyone behind, since my parents died when I was young and I had never married. A few months later, I heard that our release had been in exchange for pro-Castro Cubans imprisoned in the U.S. 'But why me especially, who had actually never had any connections with the United States?. I believe that it was by chance." The second eye-witness account is from Mr. Jose-Antonio Perera, born in Bayamo, Cuba in October 1923. I collected this testimony somewhere in France. "I am an agricultural engineer, and my underground activities before the Revolution won me one of the most important posts in the Castro regime, if you know the importance of agriculture, primarily'sugar cane, in Cuba. I helped to develop the agricultural plan. I traveled all over the country, explaining and convincing the people. I joined in.the harvest, as did Castro himself. And believe me, if Castro did so, it was not out of demagogy, but because Cubans are like Doubting Thomas: they only believe what they can see and touch. Approved'PorRefease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT 1gOC tpupC?V :; q,,,.2 qt'f o 4 .. re moving alone the path of Socialism which we had so longed fob', but also and primarily because we were beginning to see results. The future might be far away, but it seemed open. This lasted until 1967, for me at least. That year, thq country hit a slump. After eight years of unstinting effort, the government and the people were exhausted. Nobody was discouraged, far from it! But everyone needed to catch their breath: It was time for a respite. '!'hcre was only one person who did not understand this at the time: Fidel Castro himself. Ile didn't understand weariness and fatigue. Ile was a charger,' and he wanted to keep charging. Reservations began'pto Appear among the governing group which reflected the feelings of the population. I was one of those who tried to reason with Castro, but in Vain. !e would not listen. Ile hardened his position; gave orders without asking anyone's advice, and imposed laws. However, we did not give up hope of convincing him. We tried seeing him one at a time: no result. We came as a group: again, no result. Finally we gave him an ultimatum: to agree to the reforms which were necessary, or to find himself in total isolation which could only lead to his rbmoval. This was on the morning of 16 September 1967. wring the night, at two o'clock exactly (I remember I looked at my alarm clock), I hoard violent knocks against my door downstairs. Before I had time to put on a bathrobe and go downstairs, the door gave way and men burst into the living room: ten uniformed soldiers, two of them high-ranking officers. I understand at once, and I felt fear -- real fear, for the first time in my life. Fora few seconds I stood face to face with these men, without saying a word. I was surprised not to receive a bullet. They said, "You have ten minutes to get ready, you, your wife and your two children. (At that time my two children, Miguel and Antonio, were thirteen and fifteen years ?ld.) Bring as little as possible. Hurry up!" I knew that it was best not to argue with these men. My wife remained very dignified. We did not speak, but our eyes exchanged all the feelings of two people who love each other and sense impending miffortune. My wife went upstairs to wake the children. She explaino4 to them lust what was going on, without .hiding anything. Fifteen minutes later, we left, in a powerful black American car driven by one of the N.C.O.'a. There were eight of us in the car. We must have driven for nearly four hours. They had,taken away our watches. Dawn was breaking as we arrived at the gates of a sort of gigantic village; made up of small, low pavilions with greyish-white walls,' laid out in impeccable geometric order over an area about one kilometer long and nearly a wide. I had never seen such a thing in my country. The spectacle which presented itself to our eyes astonished us as much as it frightened us. A red sun rose over the roofs. I shall rerer the sight for the rest of my life. At,the gates of the camp, four guards stood with submachine guns slung on their hip. Our car entered without stepping, drove another hundred meters and stopped before a pavilion indistinguishable from the others. Steel bars at the windows. Walls of poured concrete nearly thirty centimeters thick. A single door of metal, barred from the outside by a heavy steel shutter. We. were pushed inside. Only then did my wife give way to tears. Approved For Release 1999/09/g? : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 t5~ nKi 1 t~ n ~r n t ~1 ;i 'nSrTi4!J?Q.f~f1riITTTiSlrrvmaa~~~t4tp1~~;'S~d'Tfi3TT~V 11'I~TF~t~'ti7451(IdP,F~iiP S.lfh~(S~M1ti'~~4~AiY114)Yll`f~ti,1~~T1[b11'1,7.i~1 , -CPYRGHT - The hut in which we found outselves was divided into three small square roans, each three by three meters. with doorless partitions. The ceiling was and a inucot above a Hole. That was al1FI The door closed. We were exhausted from emotion and from the trip: we real asleep on the camp beds. For my part, I only slept for a short hour. \hen I awoke, I forced myself to take stock of the sittion. It did not look promising. I knew only too well the intransigence pf Castro. This snarcu same auventure at the same time as I, or else would do so soon. My only thought, if.1had a meet with someone to ex iEin m p y situation or to hear the reason for my arrest was first and above all to get , my wife and children out of this trap. That was to me the only real matter of urgency. there would be plenty of time later to worry about my own fate. It seemed to me that we were isolated. We heard no noise from the nei hbor n g g We ,heard were far orr, muffled by distance: a motor, a voice, sometimes cries. Another day passed, during which I tried to talk to a guard through the It was not until dawn after a second night more than forty-eight hours , after'our arrival, that the door opened again. A man dressed in civilian clothes he entered our quarters alone. He remained standing before me and saidonly d e i s ?.v& ~ n CL. monotone: air (ne deliberately stressed the -Sir-j, you have committed an offense against the national security and the will of the You will remain here until you are transported to one of the labor camps reserved will resume the work she did before your marriage. ~We will find her31a;position. learn a man's trade. They will leave this evening. Have you any questions?"' "We would like something to eat, and some fresh water to drink!" was my only answer. The man turned on His peel and left. An hour later, we finally ate -- separated. I particularly warned her against the temptation she might feel one she was out of the camp to cry out her indignation, to alert our friends, Rr to try to arouse public opinion. Her silence and docility were our only chance -- if we still had onel I .also told her to stand frequently in front of a statue of Lenin in the'cenrer if our town, which would be our rendezvous place. That evening we were separated. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT Approve or Release 01-7 My wife was taken away in the same car that had brought us. fy two sons were driven off in an old jeep. We said our goodbyes without tears, with an enormous amount of dignity and courage, even if each of us gave way to despair as soon .as we were alone. I was never to sgc my wife again... I learned of her do4th -- that is to say, I guessed her murder -- from a note which I received one morning: "Mrs. J. --A. Percra died suddenly." Two years later, my children escaped from their educational center, and three of my friends?took-them to the United States. I was reunited with them there after I escaped in my turn, with -- extraordinary fact -- the help of a guard, a former engineer like myself. .Twenty-four hours in a tank truck and four days. in the hold of an old tub of a ship got me out of Cuba and into Honduras. An hour after my family left, I was taken to'another barracks already jammed with about fifty'men. The guard pointed to a straw pallet. I was-to remain in this hut for the whole time of my imprisonment, that is, nearly four years. After this, our life was marked only by the. increasingly violent and frenzied rhythm of the mental and physical tortures which were inflicted upon is. We lived in the close, stale air of the dormitory-hut. There were only three small ventilators in the roof. There was one toilet in a corner behind a partition. There was always a line there. Fortunately work was organized in the camp. I sav fortunately, but believe me that in the long run, it was not a blessing in disguise.- The work I did for four years consisted of digging huge pits, then filling them up, d,:rect1y under a Fiery sun. One of the favorite gmas of the guards was to-have each prisoner dig his own grave and carve his name and birth date on a white stone. We were all. forced to obey this macabre order. Even moro macabro, onto tho ravos wore dug, ,the guards forced us to. lie down in them. One day we' were forced to remain there for four hours in burning heat. The result: one dead. The comment of the guard: " "Iie won't have worked for nothing!" His. friends filled the. earth in over him. As far as food was concerned, we were treated as pigs, which, all things considered; the barracks. Every morning at-,six o'clock the guards slopped into them a kind nl -_ __- -1 L___._ L___1._.... .......y . "A n little 'fl19 l fi - without salt, sugar Or any seasonings. In the evening, around Z1UU Hours, we ace mash of old meat scraps, corn and sugar... peakableI For a whole month.I-was sick ., malls clans e Regencrncion s (otganc du motivcnictit 1iberlaire -cubain) que loos npprenons 1'cxecution rccente. I In mitr:tillette. de 22 pri- gnmiicns linliliAi013 iQS0Qa1-Zi file basis or regularly change our governments in- western Europe, soinctinics with results that cause"a good deal of trouble to the Americans, without having to worry about American and other foreign troops coining and telling us to stop it. We cannot help renicmbcrinF what happened in Crccho. slovakia in tgfid, and the Soviet Union's attempts later that, year to provide a justification for it ; and -we reflect on the difference between your position and ours. The point is that each of us-you in eastern Europe and we in western Europe-have to deal with the problem in our own way. In western Europe we are trying to establish a more equal relationship with the United States by the THE GUARDIAN, Manchester 9 July 1971 Comm CPYRGHT Muffled and muted It may he, but all the signs are that Moscow and the East European capitals are also having their "groat debate" on the Com- mon Market. Since the Treaty of Rome was signed In 1957, the Soviet Union has rigidly refused to recognise the exis- tence of the European Econo- mic Community officially. But now that the EEC is not only here to stay but apparently on the verge of expansion, the mood in Eastern Europe has shifted. Poland is shortly to send three senior diplorn,ats to Brussels to make new contacts with the Commission's head- quarters. Although both Hun- gary and Poland have had tech- nical contacts with the Commu- nity on the question of their agricultural exports, the new Polish team will be dealing at a igher level. It Is known that the Poles are envious of the special trade greement which Yugoslavia lade with the EEC last year. Both they and the Rumanians ould probably like to follow uit an as ? to safeguard their ational economic interests as. oon as they can. The Rumanians have been uielly pressing the EEC to eclare e their country a develop. ng area to enable it to get con- cssions from the EEC. But the omm'lssion in Brussels lnsLcts hat the EEC must first be ecognised diplomatically. This something- which neither the' the ideas which the members of that cotnniuriity sf lare about post-Keynesian capitalism in economics and pluralist democracy in politics. I 'do not suggest that this is, or can be, a model for the way you will want to deal with your relationship with the Soviet Union. YOU will have to work that out within the context of your own iiolitirnl and economic system. Certainly we can help each oilier by opening up new points of contact and co-operation betwcc t the two systems, providqd that the meciianisrns we set tip bring real changes and," not just apparent ones, But at bottom each of ut has to solve our problems of indepen- dence by our own will to be independent. mist block in two mi.-nds CPYRGHT By JONATHAN STEELE take such a s p, though it is " Washington and London taking a more ealistic attitude obviously fear the West Euro- compared with he days when it pean states' urge to be Indepen. thought the EC would col- dent in shaping their policies. lapse. There h ve been several Precisely for this reason the changes of atti udes. At first in British leaders, linked with the 1957, the Rus ns published a US by bonds of their notorious series of 17 t ses saying that 'special relationship ' are striv- the EEC was oomed to fail. ing for an early invasion of the Then in 196 the pendulum t;ontlnent to Interfere with the swung and a w series of 32 trend towards relaxation, to theses was fo ulated by Air restore the erstwhile Angio- Khrushchev. Saxon influence, to preserve the These saw t EEC as a new Atlantic orientation of " centre of att ction " capable capitalist Europe, and to per of rivalling the bitted States. It petuate the East-West con- looked almost as though the frontation in our continent." Soviet Union 'ould take the A H l step of recog tion, but then came the Gau ist period. The Russians bega to emphasise similar doubt as de Gaulle about the da get the EEC posed to nati aI sovereignty. The 1965 crisis n the Common Market wa greeted with triumph. Now we ar in the latest phase, which as clearly left Eastern Europ in two minds. The mass me a has carried little about th British entry negotiations. neluding . the Ileath-Pompido meeting. What has been carrie has often been contradictory. to dominate it,, the West The point has een made that Germans or the British ? British entry is Trojan horse If the Ideological and eo- for the further penetration of political Issues which' the EEC American capit Into Europe. poses are still uncertain in The clearest ex resslon of this Moscow's eyes, the economic came In an 'ar cle In " Izves?, ones are not. Although the total tin" by Vladi r Oslpov, !wlio -trade, conducted 'between the in r d l b e ar eco g .?via o e en- is small /less than 10 per-cent nlon does 30 itself. y dent and less !n feed to accept of the EEC's world trade). this Moscow is still trot. toady to American-Britt patronage. proportion is declining. ar to se eir agricultural produce t through he wall of the Common Mar- ket's common agricultural policy. An enlargement of the Market will only make things harder. At the same time the Russians have set their eyes, as ; have the Poles and the Rumanians, on importing advanced technology from Western Europe. Moscow has been stepping up Its large-scale cooperation deals such as the Fiat do.,[ with Italy, or the lorry deal with the West Germans. . . Moscow's other defence mechanism has been to pro- mote Its own form or integra. tion through Comecon. The last two years have produceil a marked quickening of the drive towards so-called Socialist inte- gration, with the Comecon countries moving towards a system of -coordinated national economic planning that will one day become supranational plan. ning. Clearly the Russians will hold the whip-hand within this economic alliance. In March the Hungarian leader, Mr Kadar, said that direct cooperation could be expected between the two groupings, the EEC and Comecon. "Both these groups are a reality and obviously will remain so." That is the most realistic statement on the Com- mon Market to come from Eastern Europe. Yet one result of the expansion of these two European bureaucracies is likely to he a further erosion of the tendous independence of Russia's smaller allies. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 ungar an .broadcast sees the Trojan horse full of Ger? mans rather than Americans. In May a Budapest commentator was saying that Bonn wel- comed British entry because it would ? help West German capital to make large invest. ments in Britain and cooperate with British monopolies against the really dangerous adversary, the American monopolies. So the East Is undecided. Is the Common Market going to be Independent of the Americans. or a Trojan horse for them 7 If Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 LE MONDE, Paris July 1971 CPY.RGHT L'AJUSTEMENT DES POLITIQUES MTRANGORES. DE L'EUROPE dimension T CPYRGHT Par RENE DABERNAT debut du March commun, de a Man ie. France va bientot cesser d'etre le d$ part et d'autre de la Manche meme In tragedie de Mers-El- Comma pour is politique etran seul Etat membre des communau- Pr'oche-Orient et Medlterranee, Kebir. en 1940, ne donne qu'une gore, une action monetaire effi- tes ayant une vocation mondiale theatre de drames franco-anglals We incomplete. Pourtant, des cace des Dix impliquera davan en mane temps qu'europeenne. durant la seconde guerre mon- 1904, 1'entente cordiale etalt con- tage d'integration et non pa Si, comme on le prevolt, la diale. clue ; quinze area plus tard, elle moires. L 'Europe elargle, si ell hambre des Communes approuve reconciliation des deux devait permettre aux democra-. vent s'imposer, devra non soul finalement 1'adhesion, Londres Tine s montrerait egalement, sang ties de sauver la liberte suy lea ment preserver les realisations de netaires du genera4 de Gaulle nt P er,ne quo 1'dares entree de 19, Grande- champs de bataille du continent. Six - sous peine de provoque la responsabilite et lea tentations rats le Marche commun Quoiqu'elle sit rapproche les 9011- ; une arise majeure dommageabi de cette double appartenance, Si- B g vernements plus quo lea nations,: aux membres anciens et nouveaux tuation, de toute evidence, fort porte en germe le retour de l'Eu- elle montre quo la France et la mais, contrairement aux apps differente de Celle qui existait rope en Asie. Dares cette region, Grande-Bretagne savent se re- rences. alter plus loin. lorsque la France vivait aver cinq le, . caution anglaise sera, en trouver au coude-a-coude quand itENE DA13SRhlAT. partenaires dont I'heritage extra- effet, pour lea Dix, ausst impor- des motifs superieurs entrent en la our lea Six arable com i , p sme jeu. Un mecan europeen etait mince comparatt- ta~~rp mss eri route vement all Bien, ou nul. ca n f d dares urea large pent done We partie du continent noir. aujourd'hui. A 1'epoque de la a Petite Il existe, au demeurant, des Europe a, jamais les foucades pia- _' ? facteurs favorables. Sur Israel netaires du general de Gaulle ni Paris et Londres out rapproch4 ?meme la guerre d'Indochine (Al , Theoriquement, Is Communaute leurs vues. Quant aux Six, uIs l'affaire d'Algerie n'ont vraiment ,Margie aux Anglais, aux Danots, parlent pratiquement d'une memo menace la Communaute. La re- dux Norveglens, aux Irlandais, voix avec l'Angleterre, en ce qul conciliation franco-allemande, la ! 'evet, face aux super-puissances, concern l'Ostpolitik. Mais, sur- cooperation etroite avec i'Italie 1'apparence d'un nouveau geant, tout. l'Allemagne, is Grande-Bre-, et le Benelux dependaient essen- par sa population, son poids eco- tagne et in France out aenoncd tiellement, all depart, d'un accord pomique, sa valeur technique, sea l'une apres 1'autre, a jouer Isole- sur les problemes Internes du -ichesses culturelles. En fait, elle ment un role mondial. Autant de continent. Les prolongernents In- restera sans Influence mondiale Gaulle pposait avec :force le postu ternationaux, par exemple mone- determinante aussl longtemps lat de rambition et de la ggran- taires, ont ete is consequence de que survivront entre Franeais et dour nationales, autant MM.. am- dix ans de developpement commu- Britanniques des sequelles dii pidou, Heath et Brandt admettent riautalre, non leur condition passe, ou blen telle ou tells con- qu'ils doivent s'unir pour agir premiere. :tradiction actuelle. utilement stir is scene Snternatio-. vale. A trop regarder vers 1'Oural Avec Londres, all contraire, un Dana le processus europeen, et le feuve Jaune, le general avast accord limite a l'Europe ne suf- chaque decision d'tapprofondisse- fins par negliger l'Hexagane, le fire pas. 11 faudra 1'etendre tres ment ou d'elargissement constitue Rhin, les Alpes et la Manche. . vite a ces parties du globe oil une plate-forme provisoire a par- On apereoit, plus que jamals, la' France et i'Angleterre ont ete tir de laquelle it fact, tot ou tard, apres in deception du dernier si longtemps opposees et le sent aller plus loin, sous peine de c Sommet l- franco-allemand, lea encore, parfots, aujourd'hui. A retomber. consequences de cette tendance a defaut, Von risqueratt de contra- ! . De meme que la controverse placer l'univers avant l'Europe. dire on de defaire, all plan mon- franco-allemande sur 1e mark Pour se limiter aux questions mo- dial, en particulier dans des votes pout selon son evolution, imposer netaires, on rappellera que. lea des Nations unies, ce que lea Dix ou tuer dans 1'eeuf l'union eco- plus vives attaques contre la poli- auraient pu faire a Bruxelles, ail nomique et monetaire, de meme tique americaine sent venues, a plan europeen. lea vieilles rivalites franco-britan- Paris, de.ceux qui refuserent long- niques peuvent-elles Solt favors- temps Is participation britannique all Marche commun. Or l'une des Apres des annees de peripeties, ser tine confederation politique at le de CT66 u n s la Luent qu c es all- elles disparaissent, soft is rendre conditions, non pas sufflsante, n el sent qublent e es reli= impossible A elles subsistent. mais necessaire, d'une riposte de tks nouvelles sem releguees 1'Europe aux Etats-tints consists derriere 1'ecran des satisfactions A-t-on oublie quo le pool char- a dissocier le couple livre-dollar, officielles. Comment no pas voir, bon-aacer n'aurait pas survecu ! base du systeme monetaire inter- pourtant, que Is participation bri- sans is dimension que lot apporta'' national actuel qu'il s'agit de tannique appellera un ajustement le -tl'aite ' de' Rome ? M.. Heath reformer. TAche qui suppose evi- progressif des politiques etran- aura hautement servi 1'Europe si demment Is contours des Anglais gores ? Une querelle entre Paris la dimension anglalse signifle done leur presence data le March. et Londres du genre de celles du entre autre use cooperation dans commun. Biafra, du Quebec libre, des Ii= lea domains jusqu'ici delaisses, Avant de le.recevoir A 1'Elysee, vralsons d'avions francals a la teas que is politique etrangere, ou, M. Pompidou avast demande A. L i b y e , affaibliralt fatalement plus tard, Is defense. M. Heath i'engagement prealable 1'Europe ' elargle. A 1'Inverse, Edouard VII at Delcasse furent do faire passer o ressivement la celle-ci tirerait une vaste au= lea premiers a her un accord sur ! livre du monderdu dollar dans dience Internationale d'un solide les affaires europeentes all regle- celui des monnaies europeennes. accord des deux gouvernements lnent de certains differends d ou Il l'a obtenu. Cola ne ' garantit sur lour heritage d'~u-dose deg tre-mer. a L'achevement do notre nullement des solutions , rapides,_ mers. Et it ne manqque pas de oeuvre coloniale, disait alors Is ni memo satisfaisantes pour la. points stir lesqquels Il so ?revble ministre francais des affaires France, surtout taut que rsiste' pecessaire : Afrique,. oft ftanco= etrangerea, depend de notre en- I'echec gouvern tart ai e presi- phones et anglophones s'opposent tente area rAngteterte.a ' dentist cur le front des prix. Tou- Fachoda de $ouvent rapports avec lea Etats- En 1890 iInetdent fgl Unls et is Can j r ldt '49~99i-'/02? s,Fpg 9ce,_s1.$r s ?0?1300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY August 1971 August 13 Germany 10th anniversary of the Berlin Wall, built by East Germany to seal the border against the flight of East Germans to the West. (In.July 1961 alone, a total of 30,444 refugees were registered at the West Berlin receiving center.) August 19-24 USSR 35th anniversary of the Moscow Show Trial of the "16 Cold Bolsheviks" -- a landmark in Stalin's Great Purge. The trial set in motion a mass witch-hunt for "Trotskyite traitors" in the USSR, which Stalin used to eliminate all rivals and consolidate his absolute power. Chief defendants at the trial, Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, had been co- members with Stalin in the triimvirate that ruled Russia during Lenin's illness. They werq accused of having plotted the assassination of Sergey K'rov, a key Soviet leader killed in December 1934, and of being members of an interna- tional Trotskyite conspiracy that was planning to assassinate Stalin and other Soviet leaders. In fact, it is now widely acknow- ledg_ed that the real conspirators in Kirov's assassination were probably Stalin and members of the Soviet secret police. August 20-21 Czechoslovakia Anniversary of the invasion cf Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces from the LSSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, to put Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 an end to Czechoslovak internal reform in 1968, Explaining the Soviet Union's "necessity" for invading a small neighboring country, Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev announced Communist countries reserve the right to invade other Communist countries to maintain Communist rule. August 21 China 5th anniversary of the start of Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1966 when Chinese teenagers called "Red Guards" entered Peking in a nationwide ideological campaign that brought education to a halt, disrupted industry, revived outmoded forms of medicine, and persecuted the intelligentsia. August 21-25 Santiago Latin American conference on Agrarian Reform sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions. The holding of the meeting in Santiago seems significant, but otherwise the meeting itself is likely to be far less important than Communist publicists will try to make it appear. August 29- Sinaia, September 4 Romania Annual Pugwash Conference of scientists from the Communist countries and the West. August 31- Santiago Meeting of North American and September 3 Latin American Youth and Students in solidarity with Vietnam, Cuba and Chile. Sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Demorcratic Youth and International Union of Students. The holding of the meeting in Santiago seems significant, but otherwise the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 meeting itself is likely to he far less important than Communist publicists will try to make it appear. September 4-5 East Germany The (Communist) World Peace September 15 West Germany Council is to hold two symposiums on European Security, the first in the GDR and the second in the Federal Republic. The WPC is currently trying to publicize a people-to-people approach to European Security so as to create public opinion in Europe that would exert pressure for the convening of a govern- mental Conference on European Security "without prior conditions." September 12-18 Dublin 38t1 International Congress of PEN, the respected writers organ- ization. Representatives from the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries have sometimes attended previous congresses. However, the Secretary of the Board of the Soviet Writers Union, Georgi M.' Markov, told the 5th Soviet Writers Congress in Moscow on June 29th that the Soviet Union would continue to boycott PEN congresses, as it has done in recent years, because of Western criticism of Soviet literary policies, including the impris- onment of unorthodox writers in the Soviet Union. September 13-24 New York UN Preparatory Committee meets for the 1972 World Conference or} Environmental Problems. September 15 Bulgaria 25th anniversary of the Bulgarian Peoples Republic. September 21 New York United Nations General Assembly 26th session opens. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 September 23-25 Santiago lst Latin American Journalists Conference of the (Communist) International Organization of Journalists. The main objective of the conference is to establish a Latin American Journalists Federation affiliated to the IOJ. The conference is also to discuss "freedom of the press" -- although the main organizers of this conference come from Communist countries where freedom of the press is not tolerated (e.g., the beginning of a free press in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was one of the principal reasons why the Soviet Union invaded that country). September 27- Japan Emperor Hirohito is to visit October 13 Europe Belgium, the UK, West Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands, France, and Switzerland. It will be the first trip abroad for a reigning Emperor of Japan. October 30 USSR 150th anniversary of the birth of Fyodor Dostoevski. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 r Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 CPYRGHT LONDON OBSERVER 18 July 1971 DR ZHORES MEDVEDkrV carcerated for some months in all. Concerts are cancelled, per- i e close . vie t hi `c one of those notorious mental formers changed without notice, listed ' not merely by name, but a is .chemchemist, st innp uibyshe''d, b)? the A?linisterIs deprtt), a frofes-, .vor Prokofiev, who said it would he bc.,t if he pleaded ill-health :-- 'The di'4cus:Sieldl began to get heated, I said that Ishou'ld write th,; real reason-dire fact that the Ministry had refused me the, trip. Prakoti.ev became indig- nant and accursed me of lack of patriotism. AtFcording to him an honourable 1;pviet citizeal. would never blame any Government department to foreigners. With this we parted, but, as I found out, the, at once rang up the Rector of the Timrrazev Aeaa- emy and reeon1'rnended that cthic:ational [i.e., disciplinary] mcusua'cs should be applied to nle.' t ' Uespiie tli' bait. Medvedev telegraphed to America that the Ministry 'could not approve' his trip and tln'/t azldressed a nienrorandrun -(fortified by strong appeals to the Ministry by American colleagues) direct to the nrystcyiaiis 'head of the 'Exit Conunissian.' This, he dis- covered. as Warne Other' than the veteran Party Secretary and international eongrets, not an -give a lecture in Sheffield spon towel in Mao's China---whereby l,ers (but not American one." c(u?cr1 by the CiGn Forurdatio all urban brainx?or n. laolit,it-fans} are ?e required to show b Vlell, so it's iruternatioial, desi;vied. to promote inter-' the imasses but if ,thlis international congress ncrtiomi i co-operation in rne?di their solirla c?al th oing nirt uul with labour Wore in West Gprnta:ny, would and chemical research. d o,, ' the morning, I I ,. you still watt to go? This rune the Soviet Ministry illy wstach to British t.inle. qty A cone satwon begun, in .is of I-lecilth we(((ed incapable of lecture was to take platy at the at~1c was no good amen(. To understanding. that 111e Ftturjciq evening session. The monlin^ all my arguments, Fili.povna lion was not a commercial enter- eve f~ite? n ever to two sessions on brought aih~vaishe4lstandarq nc~h 1 tined to repSerrur, led ' edev was sharply problevits of the ageing of. lants. gogi re rr for breaking tht p Shaw th:vk' if Soviet scicritiyt?S regulations about correslhindenee 1 was -bested as chairman of one took with of the n%. In Obninyk, however, a part In in'ternationa'l con- w foreign tarns.' Only when sterner ;track awaited me... . g'r esses it would help t.o ,ra-ise the backed by urgent appeals to the prestige of Soviet science, Fallip. Minister and the State Committee 'That morning, with my coI- ovnct at once rcjeoicd my a?rgu- on Science and Technolo,ty from leagues f,ron1 our laboratory, I mends: "We ? don''t need the Ciba's director and a ru tuber of travelled. 25 kilometres by bus, recognition of A rn e r d c a n his most respected Soviet col- ' c.ut to rhz . State farm. tit pseudo-scientists; w ,. got our leagues was he able to tackle the Shetieid .they were just getting sputniks up first, ." When 1 Central Corrmnirtee on a"higher ready for the first morning ses- remindcd her that The trip was lei%el than before. At fir?u lie was. Sion, son;u:onc else was in the beingpa?id.for bythe O,rgani'sing encouraged byy the'response. All chairman's scat instead of mc, Committee of the Congress, iizr Would be well, he, was assured, while we -ricre carrying baskets a'oaetion was no less swift: " We bitt this time a different technique and star?tin,g to sort the potatoes, don't need, charity from Amer- was used. instead of corrmnittlug moving back and forth along the scan capitali4ts:" W'hen,I asked itself to all outright refusal the fZirrosvs.... The potatoes had to her w'h}i'tnis 'had' happened in relevant section of the Central be colieetc