Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 11, 1998
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 1, 1971
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4.pdf8.29 MB
Approved For Release 122A(414414NrCIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Propaganda PERSPECTIVES JUNE 1971 COWUNIST PATHET LAO DEFECTIONS DISSIDENCE AT THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS HOW TO STAGE-MANAGE A CONGRESS THE TWO FACES OF "DISSIDENT" COMMUNISTS YUGOSLAVIA: CAN MOSCOW TOLERATE AN INDEPENDENT MARXIST STATE THE COMMON FACTORS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM NORTH KOREAN SUBVERSIVE DIPLOMACY DATES WORTH NOTING SHORT SUBJECTS RE-STALINIZATION AT THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS? ULBRICHT BOWS OUT: "PLUS eA CHANGE..." CHOLERA: A NEW DISEASE FOR AFRICA RED ELEPHANT FOR EQUATORIAL GUINEA 25X1C3b1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY June 1971 NORTH KOREAN SUBVERSIVE DIPLOMACY The North Korean subversive activities in Ceylon and the North Korean involvement in training Mexican guerrillas have served to put the spotlight on other North Korean subversive activities around the world. Last month in Ceylon, Prime Minister Madame Bandaranaike, closed the North Korean Embassy and expelled its staff; this, less than a year after her government had recognized North Korea. Earlier, Mexican authorities rounded up 19 Mexicans who had received financial assistance and guerrilla training from North Korea. The Mexicans had been recruited at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow and had been sent with Soviet assistance to Pyongyang for training. Five Soviet diplomats were expelled from Mexico City because of Soviet complicity in this venture. There is no North Korean diplomatic mission in Mexico. During India's general elections in March the Indian authorities found it necessary to warn the North Korean mission to cease its interference in the election campaign. And most recently the Indian Government told officials of the North Korean Consulate General that they will be expelled if they persist in the "undersirable activities". These "undesirable activities".include organizing meetings aimed at giving instruction on guerrilla warfare and spending extravagant sums on propaganda. In mid-April officials of the North Korean Embassy in Bucharest, Rumania made a spectacular attempt to kidnap the Belgian Ambassador in broad daylight. The Belgian Managed to escape, as he was helped by the crowd attracted by the struggle between three North Koreans and the Ambassador. At about the same time the North Korean Embassy in Bangui, Central African Republic was forced to close. President Bokassa's suspicions had been aroused because of North Korean diplomats' illegally crossing the border between the Central African Republic and the Congo. Later when the CAR's Ambassador in Pyongang was subjected to surveillance and harrassment, President Bokassa broke off relations and is now reported to be preparing to recognize South Korea. Elsewhere in Africa several countries have refused to agree to the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4- Kbrea. Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta and Mauritius resisted a major drive for diplomatic recognition by North Korea during 1969. Upper Volta was particularly annoyed when a North Korean delegation refused to leave after having overstayed its visit. And on the island of Mauritius, the North Koreans' heavy-handed attempts to gain recognition visibly annoyed the Prime Minister and other officials, Although Zambia agreed to recognize North Korea, the Zambians have consistently rejected North Korean scholarship offers to young political leaders because they want to avoid extended Communist political indoctrination of these future leaders. Officials in Ghana broke off relations with North Korea shortly after Nkrumah was ousted in 1966. Also in 1966, Uruguay expelled a North Korean trade mission because of subversive activities. The Chilean newspaper La Prensa claimed on April 7, 1971 that North Korea was now one of the principal centers for training insurgents from Latin America and other countries. Nationals fpan Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela were all said to have attended guerrilla schools there. North Korea has maintained close contact with the Palestine guerrillas. George Habbash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine visited Pyongyang last September to "learn and assimilate the experience of North Korea's great revolutionary struggle," And just before Hhbbash's visit, the North Koreans received a special envoy from Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization. It was in September that the Palestine guerrillas engineered the mass hijacking of three commercial airliners. At least one of the guerrilla officers responsible for the hijacking had been trained in North Korea. The Economist magazine in its issue of May 8, 1971 said: --05717047-- "ThP trirnnp nf nirgnfcz prnhahl 7 thA most *portant and certainly the most dangerous aspect of North Korea's revolutionary programme. Since 1966, the Koreans have run a dozen training camps for foreigners: three in Pyongyang, two in NaMpo, two in Wonsan and five scattered, else- where which train North Koreans as well. Rebels from 25 countries are said to have been invited to Korea for courses lasting between six and 18 months; 1,300 from central and south America lnd 700 fr m Afrca " All the incidents and activities described above almost defy a rational explanation: Why does North Korea pursue Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 a worldwide program of support to guerrilla struggles which, in some areas, outdoes similar operations by Moscow and Peking? The explanation is in part ideological and in part emotional. Since 1945 North Korea has moved from the status of a Soviet satellite to become first, anally of China, next a critic of both the. USSR and China, and most recently a wary ally of both Communist powers. Emotionally, the leader of North Korea for the past 25 years, Kim Ii Sung, has had one persistent compelling motivation and that is tb:.eStablish himself as the leader of all Korean Kim believes that the highest form of struggle for freedom is fevolutionary violence. He considers himself the equal of Marx, the ideological successor to Ch 6 Guevara and Ho Chi Minh and the only challenger to Mao. Kim's pursuit of unification and self-reliance is financially supported by both the USSR and China. There is one interesting angle on the question of Soviet financial sponsorship of the North Korean activity in Asia. According to this theory the Soviet Union reached a conclusion that it could not hope to compete with the image of Mao Tse- tung in Asia and the Middle East and therefore extended aid to the North Koreans so that they could finance local subversive organizations. The Soviets hoped that by backing North Korea they could build up Kim Il Sung's image to the extent that he might somewhat deflect from Mao's appeal. The Soviets believe it is essential to reduce the influence of Mho even if they are unable to make Kim Il Sung support Soviet causes. In choosing between the two Communist powers at any given moment Kim is swayed by realistic considerations, not by ideological niceties. In other words, Kim's revolutionary facilities are for sale to the highest bidder. Without the financial aid and other assistance received from both Moscow and Peking, Kim cannot maintain North Korea in the Revolutionary vanguard. On the other hand, among the many faces of international Communism, both the Soviets and Chinese clearly welcome, and encourage the fanatic, bruising brand of primitive Communist that Kim Il. Sung represents., Approved For Release 1999/09/0i : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 7pRoqie'S For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 ECONOMIST FOREIGN REPORT 1 May 1971 NORTH KOREA'S INVOLVEMENT The Ceylon crisis has also served to put the spotlight on the subversive activities of tho North Koreans in various parts of the third world. North Korea's mission In Ceylon was closed by Mrs Bandaranaikc on 15 April, less than a. year after her governm,ent had recognised the Pyongyang.regime..'The North Koreans are unofficially reported to have given lectures to the insurgents and may also have helped to finance the rebellion. ? ,Though it received comparatively little publicity in the world's press, the Mexican Government announced about six weeks ago the capture 'of a number of guerrillas who had been trained .in Pyongyang. Mexican extrmists are said to have contacted the North Korean. Embassy -while in Moscow under a Soviet scholarship scheme. The North Koreans promised to provide financial help and politico-military training; and the first group of Mexicans left for Pyongyang in '1968. Two other groups have followed.. In the Middle East, North ' Korea has sedulously tried to establish influence in Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, South Yemen and the Lebanon. Friendship societies have been sct up, and there have been exchange visits by delegations of trade unionists, journalists, lawyers and health experts as well as politicians and military chiefs. A number of technical co-operation agreements have been signed, one of 'the most recent being with South Yemen in the field of broadcasting: North Korea has also shown: interest in the Palestinian Liberation' movement. George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; spent some time in Pyongyang last September 'learning and assimilating the experience of your ? [North Korea's] great revolutionary struggle', according to the North Korean Central News Agency. A few weeks previously thc North 'Koreans received a special envoy from Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Other contacts included a visit last year by the North Korean deputy 'chief-of-staff to Al Fatah bases, during which he was reported by the newspaper Fatah to have expressed North Korea's :fill support for the Palestine revolution. ' Ceylon's' experience with North Korea inevitably raises questions about the extent , . to 'which the Pyongyang 'regime might be .using 'diplomatic activity as a cover for subversion. The North Korean embassy in Tanzania. has 'already provided corses for dissidents from independent African countries such as KehYa, Cameroun and Burundi. In addition', African 'freedom fighters' from colonial territories are among 'those who have been trained at North Korean training Centres which were placed at the disposal of 'guerrillas. This followed the decision of the 'Cuban-sponsored Afro-Asian- Latin American Solidarity Organisation (AALAPSO) in. 1966 to set' up a number of such centres. The Chilean newspaper, La Prensa, claimed on 7 April that North Korea was now one' of the 'principal 'Centres' for training insurgents .from Latin America and , , other developing countries. ? ? ? . 0 WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED 10t THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD. ' ' ' ' ? ' ' . ? l' ' . , ? ' i, ., .,1. a i ' r - ?FOREIGN REPORT' IS SUPPLIED ON THE CONDITION THAT IT 1E1 REGARDED AS CONFIDENTIAL BY THE RECIPIENT, . IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY THE CONTENTS 13E REPRODUCED WHOLE OR IN PART. PRINTED BY WATERLOW a SONS LTD. LONDON. FOR THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD.. LONDON, ILW.I Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 iI Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 C PYR G RICINDON TIMES 7 May 19 71 Kidmipping, spying and organizing guerrilla war in Asia and Latin America North Korea's dip! mate6 dirty tricks' The Indian Government have now told officials at thc North Korean Consulate-General in Delhi that they will be expelled if they per- si in their " undesirable activi- ties ". The North Korean mission has been put udder watch. This warning follows by some three weeks the sudden expulsion fruit Ceylon of the North Korean Amba-'dor and members of his st ff at the height of the left-wing ii ing. 'Plc reasons for their ex- tol lsion were not disclosed. The /sl'arth Koreans were reported to have given lectures to the insur- gl rite and are believed to have helped to finance the rebellion. It was noted that the Chinese Ambassador was at the airport to w sh them. farewell. As for "undesirable activities" by North Koreans in India, they have since last autumn spent what for than inordinately extra- VI gant sums on hostile pro a- guide in newspaper advertising cianpaigna?S54,000 according to a complaint by .Mr. Song C:hoi Woon, the Consular-General of; South Korea?and have also orga- nIzed meetings aimed at giving in- struction on guerrilla warfare to dose who attended. These incidents in Ceylon and Jodie hove 'focused attention on North Korean diplor. ats rz Hy and from a survey of inci- dents it is clear enough that for the last two yews at least North Klorea ilea been working with Clink or for China, in subversive artivities all over the world. ? In p ces where China has no diplo- matic representation of her own or in some places where she has, notably Ceylon, North Korea has been acting as front-runner or agent for China, on a scale greater than she could have bn ee expected to do on-her own and presumably, therefore. with Chinese funds. That at least is the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from in- . stanees of irregular and costly . activity by North Korean diplo- mats in Asia, Africa. Europe or Central and South America. The "undesirable activities" in which North Korean diplomats have been indulging inolude the organization pf guerrilla training and the financing of guerrilla action, spying and kidnapping. To this may be added the more?legiti- mate tasks of advertising their own brand of revolution and the grant- ing of inlereat-fras loans in poli- tically , important and sensitive area's. The organization of.guerrilla training has been going on for at least two years. Clear evidence of this was produced in 'March this year by the Mexican Government who announced the capture of a number of Mexican guerrillas who had been trained in Pyongyang. Mexican extremists sent to Mos- cow on Soviet scholarships are said to have contacted the North Korean Embassy there and been, ?promised financial help and! politico-military training, The first group of Mexicans left for North Kore.a in 1968. Two other groups have followed. The Chilean newspaper ? La Prerisa claimed on April 7, 1971 that North Korea was now one of the " principle centres " for train- ing insurgents from Latin America and other develdping countries. Nationals from Guatemala. Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela, were all said to have attended in additicin to the Mexicans. North Korea also developed close ?'contacts with leaders of the Palestine guerrillas last autumn When the crisis be- tween the guerrillas and the Jor- danian Government was corning to a head. Dr. George Habbash, Secretary- 'General of the Popular Frorq for' the Liberation of Palestine, waS .visiting North Korca at the time of the hi-jacking of British, Amen-- can and Swiss aircraft on Septem- ber 6. He remained there during the negotiatiena on the rejease of !the prisonors; was apparently much fete0 and was reported to bc seeking aelistance from North Korea, North Vielnarn and China. !Previously the North Korean deputy chief of staff visited Al- :Fatah bates in Jot clan. ? In Africa the' North Korean 'Entbassy in Tanzania has provided . courses for dissidents from hide- ? pendent African countries 'such as Kenya. Cameroo.n and Burundi and African Freedom Fighters have been trained at the North Korean guerrilla training centres. Cases of kidnapping or attempted kidnapping by North Korean representatives have been reported over the ? last two years from Indonesia where the North ECONOMIST CPYRG May 19 71 .Aforth Korea Revolution as Kim does it e or reans may oe me IaSL true revolutionary mavericks. Their involvement in Ceylon's insurgency, which led to their expulsion from Colombo last month, was anything but a one-shot escapade. It wp part of a world-wide programme of support for guerrilla struggles which in some areas out Vatig. telffs CPYRGHT Koreans launched an expensive advertising campaign, and from Bucharest where last month the Belgian A mbassador, Adriacnssen, was struck and kicked and 'nearly abducted after his car had been hemmed in by two unknown vehicles. He managed. however, to escape, taking numbers, of the ears concerned which turned out to be North Korean. Lass sensational but , perhaps equally bizarre. was the North Korean decision last month to join China in an interest-free loan to Ma un ta ma. In the Middle East North Korea's search for friends has covered Iraq. Algeria. Syria, Sudan, U.A.R.. South Yemen and Lebanon and has included thc establishment of " friendship societies" and tale exchanges of nunterous delegations (trade unionists. journalists. lawyers and health experts as well as political, economic and military ,representa- ? fives). , la Africa, North Korea has now established diplomatic relations with Congo-Bramville, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, Burundi, Mauritania,. tho Central African Republic and Somalia. and she is 'establishing diplomatic relations also with Chad, Equatorial Cruinca. Ghana and Uganda. Indeed in the light of North Korea's real current needs hot extreme?activity in the diplomatic field, if it 'is f() purely legitimate reasons. requires 'some exPlaihitn-' A;NI. Rendel: Moscow and Peking. And the Koreans a,e far less inhibited than either the Russians or? the Chinese by commit- ments to conventional diplomacy. 1hey have fewer diplomatic partners ?only i i non-communist ones?and wer vested interests. In 'short, they h we less to lose. What do they have to gain? North E orea's campaign seems. fuelled to a rge extent by the ego of that "genius of revolution," Kim II Sung. The cult of Kim in North Korea today r overreaches the diminishing Mao were distributing vast quantities of the last autumn Kim's eulogists ? were awarding him the very same position, of ore-eminent marxist theoretician that the Chinese have long claimed for Mao, though, perhaps recognising their hubris, they have stopped short of that lately. But they keep on proselytising ?for Kim well beyond their borders'. The Ceylon government has' not .come up with real evidence that the North Koreans had given the Ceylonese rebels arms, m6ney or i-nilitary train.: ing. But there is no question that they ' 1.49.1?/M2aFtlYREgbilieitsbki 94Affittebt*ocrenbe which c?%141 2 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 pass -for manuals in guerrilla warfare., ' They had get uP over 50 branches of . so-called Ceylon-Korea 'friendship : societies throughout the island and these !,..rved as distribution centres. The North Koreans ? now have friendship associations " in More than 40 countries, all of which presumably perform similar functions. The Indian government protested last week that a Korean house of culture" in suburban Delhi was serving as a centre of subversion. In the ten months 'after December, 1969, the North Koreans 17'.:iced 130 advertisements in Indian newspapers at a cost of some $5oo,000.,'.,, The Indian pressE has also accused the North Koreans of inter- fering openly in India's recent general election by doling out another $500,000 to candidates receptive to the thoughts of Kim. Two other Asian countries, Malaysia and Indonesia, cracked down on Korean propaganda activities some i time ago. And, just before the Ceylon rebellion, the Central African Republic expelled its North Korean embassy and is now reported to be prepar- ing to recognise South Kdrea. The North Koreans have recently lost face in Latin America too, and there It is for the much more serioni 'offence 'of. training , and financing Mexican guerrillas. The training of insurgents is probably the most important. and cer- tainly the most dangerous aspect of North Korea's revolutionary pro- gramme. Since ig66, the Koreans have run e. drwen training V2'mpa for foreigners :? three in Pyongyang, two in Nampo, two in Wonsan and five scattered elsewhere which train North Koreans as well. Rebels from 25 countries are said to have been invited to Korea for courses lasting between six and 18 months ; 1,3oo from central and south America 'arid 100 from Africa. The North Koreans also provide some military training abroad: their embassy in Tanzania has provided courses for dissidents from other African countries, including Kenya, Cameroon and Burundi. The Cubans paid Pyongyang to send six instructors in guerrilla warfare to Cuba two years ago and close Cuban-North Korean co-operation is thought to be respon- sible for the large numbers of Latin Americans undergoing training in Korea. Last month the Chilean news- paper La Prensa asserted that North Korea was a "principal centre" for 'training Latin American insurgents. The Koreans have also lent strong moral and probably' material support to the Palestinian guerrillas. Although the main thrust of North Korean activity has been support for .insurgencies, Pyongyang has also spent millions on conventional-seeming aid projects like a match factory in Congo- Brazzaville, tractors for Mauretania and import credits for Syria, Liberia, South Yemen and Egypt. Where does the money. come'frorn ? The icale of North Korea's international activi- ties has led people to assume that the Koreans must be acting as a conduit Cl c It ia e.3t,l tIM ti Chinese do give the Koreans some financial help. But it would bo wrong to see the Chinese as the instigators of all Korean actions. Kim II Sung is obsessively concerned with proving his independence and he has done so highly successfully before ?as when his men captured the Puebla and shot down an American plane to the applause of none of North Korea's allies. The Chinese And Koreans have had a dramatic rapprochement since these episodes. But the interests of Peking and Pyongyang are still not identical. One difference was revealed at the anni- versary celebrations of the Indochinese summit conference in Peking last month. The North Koreans pointedly repeated the warning issued by Peking in the heat of the Laos invasion, but the Chinese dropped it completely. And the Pyongyang press has yet to report on the great American ping- pong tour. One recent escapade of the North Koreans should prove that they are nobody's puppets, least of all Peking's. This was their attempt to- kidnap the Belgian ambassador to Rumania? presumably to embarrass the Rumanians in their dealings with the common market. The Chinese who have veiy, close relations with the Rumanians and are counting on Belgian -diplomatic recOgnition before next autumn's UN vote, could only regard' this 'al'a spoiling operation. The North Koreans may be in 'trouble in another quarter before long. WASHINGTON POST 17 April 1971 !' CPYRGHT N. Koreans I Associated Press Diplomatic sources said yes- terday an American embassy ?car carrying diplomatic pouch- es was nearly run off the road in Bucharest a week ago by a pair of cars from the North Korean embassy. The same two cars \were in- volved in another incident Sunday, in which the Belgian ambassador to Romania was stbpped and dragged from his car to another vehicle. A, trowd drawn by the eommo- Chase U.S. Linn appal. en tly bcaled tne North Koreans away, the sources said. They said the ambassador, J. M. Adriacnssen was driving alone into Bucharest when two cars made several attempts to stop him by criss-crossing Lir front of his car. Finally halt- ing Adriaenssen, the sources said, the North Koreans. dragged him from his car. A-, third car blocked his autcf from the rear and the assail- ants tried to wrestle him into Courier I me last venicie. But the gathering of a crowd apparently frightened the agent's , and they drove off, leaving Adriaenssen. The diplomat's said the rea- son for the two incidents was unclear. The U.S. embassy car was not halted, though it appeared, the sources said, that the North Koreans were attempt- ing to either collide with it oil atop it. ppruvu rur rwIctbU 300090001 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 17 April 1971 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT, ? NORTH K I 11.1EAN. LEAVE CEYLON FOR MOSCO By IAN WARD In Colombo WE entire. NorthEmean Embassy staff flew from Ceylon aboard,ajhisgan Aeroflot jet airliner last night?expelled, by' the Prime Minister, Mrs Bandaranaike, just ten months after Colombo and Pyongyang exchanged full diplomatic recognition. So far the Ceylonese Government has failed to provide an official reason for their forced departure. But the root cause is the unmistakable hand of North Korea in the "Che Guevarist:" rebellion currently (1L.,- rupting the island. Ceylonese police have solid evidence linking ideological direction and finance of the youthful movement to the North Korean representation in the capital. For the past week the North, Korean Embassy has been i under constant military guard by a detachment of Ceylonese infantrymen. Led by the Ambassador, Mr Hwang Icing U, the North Koreans arrived at Colombo's international airport three hours before the Ilyushin jet that was taking them to Moscow.. The departing diplomatic group of eight men, four, women and six children, was ushered into the airport's VIP lounge, guarded inside by uniformed police and otrtside by armed troops. , New phase The Communist Chinese Ambassador and seven of his staff saw them off and observers regarded the presence af the Red Chinese diplomats as a serious snub to Mrs Bandara- nailcel Government. They believe it could usher In a new phase of chilly relations between Peking and Colombo. . Earlier, -Russian diplomats I paid their final calls at the , North Korean Embassy while the officials carried out last- minute packing. Shortly, before the North Koreans left Ceylon last night, the Government issued a brief communiqu?It said: "The Government has decided in its own interest that all Korean staff and their families in the Embassy of the Democratic -Peoples Republic of Korea In Ceylon should leave the country_ immediately. "This decision was cony to the Ambassador by flir Permanent Secretary of De- fer"' nod External Affairs cin April '13. The Ambassador V44111 ,reqUested to wind up the affairs of the mission and arrange for departure of all Korean per- sonnel in the mission by Aero- flot leaving at 7.30 p.m. on ?Aprill 16." Serious set-back The comm,unigue added : "This does not imply disrup- tion of diplomatic relations be- tween the two countries which will remain for the present." Western diplomats expressed scepticism over the phrase "for the present" and privately pre- dicted that relations between Colombo and Pyongyang would soon be severed. In fact, Ceylon, which restricts overseas diplomatic posts for 'financial reasons, has no mission In North Korea. Her interests there are handled by the !Chinese Communist mission. ! Political observers in Colombo !regard the exnulsion as a serious set back for North Korea which has been engaged in' some hard- sell diplomacy throughout Asia. And, although ordered by her, the expulsion is a deep embarrass- 'ment to Mrs Bandaranaike's 'foreign policy. This ? has been "geared to enliancing, Ceylon's '" min-alignment " by" cour mg 'Conmiunist Governments Ike 'North Korea. North Viet m. And, South Vietnam's National rLiberation Front.. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :4CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM January-April 1971 CPYRGHT Pyo ya for Le iti g's Search acy 'CPYRGHT By Joungwon A. Kim quarter of a century has r-..,ed since Kim II-song returned to Pyongyang with the Soviet occupation forces to become the leader of the northern half,of a divided Korea. The long dura- tion of Kim's leadership, the continued Stalinist pattern of the controls he has imposed on North Korean society, and the invariable dullness of the political sloganeering still emanating from Pyong- yang twenty-five years later all tend to give the impression of immutability and to obscure the very real changes which have occurred in both the foreign and domestic policies of this isolated half- nation on the eastern fringe of the Communist world. Externally, North Korea has moved since 1945 from the status of a Soviet satellite to become first an ally of Communist China, next a bitterly antago- iistic critic of both the USSR and the CPR, and most .ecently a wary ally of both Communist giants. In- -ernally, Kim II-song has relentlessly purged from -he Korean Workers' Party and the North Korean government all but those most loyal to him, gradually ,liminating the veteran Communist leaders with domestic roots predating Kim's return, as well as the factions with strong ties to either the USSR or the CPR. The North Korean society of some 13 million people has experienced the full effect of ocial mobilization in the form of agricultural col- l?.ctivization, rapid industrialization and expanded Education, even while the life style of the individual citizen has radically changed as the result of his being inducted into a multitude of state-sponsored inions, associations and groups. Behind all these changes there lurks a persistent, c)mpelling motivation?the necessity to establish aid substantiate Kim H-song's claim .to be the legitimate leader not only of the North, but of all A Research Fellow in East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard University, Mr. /elm has contributed articles to variouk (04 FiqyftioieAwdisegie9102 Affairs arfa Mums. Korea. The urgency of this aspiration can only be understood in the context of the Korean heritage? the history of a state which enjoyed 13 centuries of undivided, uninterrupted nationhood until sub- jugated by Japanese imperialism at the outset of the current century. The eclipse of Korean nation- hood lasted until the Allies' triumph over Japan in World War II. That victory, however, did not bring unity to the Korean nation; rather it resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel into separate Soviet and US occupation zones in which competing North and South Korean states emerged?creating an unstable situation in which both Korean governments feel their existence threat- ened by the existence of the other. Each must foster and enhance its own self-image as the legitimate ruler of the Korean people or face the threat of extinction.1 The legitimacy Issue Is often overlooked by analysts who view North Korean actions and policies largely in the context of the Sino-Soviet controversy. They tend to see Pyongyang as a victim of geopol- itics, caught between two warring Communist giants and forced to frame its policies in response to the vicissitudes of that struggle.2 But, while Moscow and Peking hold overwhelming resources of power with which to threaten or seduce Pyongyang, Seoul holds One need not rely alone on Kim's incessant propaganda to Judge the continuing urgency of the legitimacy and unification issues in Korea. As reported in The Economist (London) of Dec. 5, 1970, p. 39, President Park's recent suggestion that negotiations on reunification be initiated reflects the aspiratiOn of 90 percent of the South Koreans polled. Full results of this poll, undertaken by the National Unification Board, appeared in the Dong-A llbo (Seoul), Feb. 20, 1970. For an English-language report, see The Korea Times _f For example, see Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations, A sian Survey (Berkeley), August 1968, pp. 708-22; Joseph C. Run, ? North Korea: Between Moscow and Peking," The China Quarterly : g79.01$94 (London), July-September 111:6,14mitniugjoaret ScalapIno ClAbROP fr. .J1.... 1383 oop. 30-J0 I ? CPYRGHT 5 1 CPYRGproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 UNIFICATION THROUGH REVOLUTION Comrades, the territorial partition and national split caused by the US imperialist occupation of South Korea have not only spelled unbearable miseries and sufferings for the South Korean people, but brought great national calamities to the entire Korean people and created a serious obstacle to the coordinated development of Korean society as a whole. To reunite the divided fatherland is a great national duty of all the Korean people at the present stage. It is our most urgent task, and we cannot forget it even for a moment. The policy of our party for the unification of our fatherland Is already known widely throughout the world. ?Kim Il-song's speech to the Fifth Korean Workers' Party Congress, Radio Pyongyang Domestic Service, Nov. 2, 1970. The oppressed and exploited popular masses can win freedom and emancipation only through their own revolu- tionary struggle. Therefore, the South Korean revolution should, in all circumstances, be carried out by the South Korean people on their own initiative. But the people in the northern half, being of the same nation, have the obligation and responsibility to support and actively encourage the South Korean people in their revolutionary struggle. ?Summary of Kim Il-song report to the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, Pyongyang, Korean Central News Agency, Nov. 3, 1970. a far more vital asset in the Korean scheme of things?a strong alternative claim to be the legiti- mate government of the Korean people. Kim II-song initiated his quest for legitimacy from a most disadvantageous position. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the most prestigious of the na- tionalist leaders returning to Korea naturally gravi- tated to Seoul?the national capital?where even the "domestic" Communists (the name generally used to refer to those Communists who had stayed in Korea during Japanese rule) initially endorsed the naming of Syngman? Rhee as President of a "People's Republic." 3 Kim's regime in Pyongyang was clearly a puppet of the Soviet occupation forces, to which it owed its existence. The insecurity of the North Korean government was further demonstrated in 1948 when it refused to permit United Nations supervision of elections north of the 38th parallel.' In the same year UN-supervised elections took place ?Dae-sook Su-h, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918.1948, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 298. in the South, 4 and the UN General Assembly r6tog- nized Rhee's government in the following words: There has been established a lawful government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and In which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside . . . the only such government in Korea.5 Disillusioned with Kim's harsh rule and spurred by the growing awareness that Korea was likely to remain divided Indefinitely, North Koreans fled south- ward, their total number reaching two Million or more, some 20 percent of the North Korean popula- tion, between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.? Desperate Gamble In light of this embarrassing mass emigration, Kim II-song's attempt to unify the country by force in 1950 appears to have been less a reckless venture than an essential gamble to assure the survival of his regime. The result, however, was nearly dis- astrous. The United Nations labelled North Korea the "aggressor" In the conflict, and 16 nations sent troops to help in the defense of South Korea., The Pyongyang regime was saved only by the intervention of the Chinese Communist "volunteers," and the war ended in a stalemate. Rebuffed In its attempt to conquer the South by force, North Korea turned to rebuilding its military The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea supervised elections south of the 38th parallel on May 10, 1948, in which 75 percent of the eligible voters and more than 95 percent of the registered voters participated. The Commission resolved that "the results of the ballots . . . are a valid expression of the free will of the electorate In those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea." (UN Press Release No. 70, June 30, 1948). 3 UN Document A806, Dec. 12, 1948. *US Department of Stale, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Take Over, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 12. Nations contributing forces to the UN Command, in addition to the Republic of Korea, were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, TurkeyP,Ire UMW, of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the US. India and Norwitni provided noncombat assistance. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRG/Wproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 and e_onomic might, aided generously in the effort by both the USSR and Communist China. Starting with what remained of the impressive pre-World War II Japanese industrial base in the North, Pyong- yang undertook to industrialize at a breakneck pace. In 1958, doubtless influenced by the Chinese Great Leap Forward, Kim launched the "Ch'ollIma (Flying Horse) Movement." Like its Chinese counterpart, this movement counted on mass enthusiasm to spur production, but unlike Mao's economically disastrous program, the Korean movement also placed heavy reliance on technical expertise, which may explain its superior results.9 Successes in internal political mobilization and indoctrination in the North during this period were also impressive. In fact, the gains registered by the North during the second half of the 1950's caused grave concern in Seoul, par- ticularly in view of the difficulties encountered in the last years of the Rhee government. The 1960's, however, witnessed a shift in the power balance in Korea and a curious countertrend in the legitimacy contest. These developments were triggered by the fall of the government of the aging Syngman Rhee in April 1960?an event which was precipitated by student riots reflecting internal dis- content with Rhee's repressive policies, two years of Washington-Seoul friction over these policies, re- duction in US aid, and an accompanying sharp down- turn in economic growth.9 Regardless of the merits or failings of his government, Rhee was the nation's most famous independence leader?the man who had formed a provisional government during the abortive 1919 uprising against the Japanese. Thus, when he fell, the South Korean state lost the key symbol of its continuity with the Korean independ- ence movement. For a little more than a year the successor civilian regime in Seoul grappled ineptly with its responsibil- ities. But in 1961, the Army of the Republic of Korea seized power in order to put a stop to the chaos and factional infighting in Seoul, which threatened to weaken further the power of South Korea vis-a-vis See the analysis of North Korean economic development during the 1950's and early 1960's in Joungwon A. Kim, North Korean Economic Progress, an unpublished monograph reproduced by the US Department of State, 1963; and "The 'Peak of Socialism' in North Korea: The Five and Seven Year Plans," In Jan S. Prybyla, Comparative Economic Systems, New York, AppIeton-Century-Crofts, 1969, pp. 412-28. For studies of the causes of the student revolution, see C. I. Eugene Kim and Ke-soo Kim, "The April 1960 Korean Student _Movement," The Western Political _quarterly (Salt Lake City), March 1964, pp. 83-92, and Kim Song-t'ae, "Sawol slpkultul slmnlhak" (Psychology of April 19), Sassanggye (Seoul), April 1961, pp. 80-81,. the North. By imposing firm central control and initiating broad reforms (including the introduction of economic planning and reform of the tax struc- ture), the new military regime made substantial strides towards putting the South in a position to compete, both economically and militarily, with the Industrial North.'? However, these gains were achieved at a significant cost, for the coup which brought the regime to power had clearly broken the continuity of "legitimate" government originally es- tablished by the UN-sponsored elections of 1948. In addition, the new South Korean leaders bore the stigma of having received their military training under the Japanese. Meanwhile, emboldened by North Korea's eco- nomic advances in the late 1950's, Kim II-song moved vigorously during the following decade to demonstrate his independence and to bolster his own claim to leadership of the Korean nation. Al- though his immediate response to the 1961 coup in the South was to negotiate bilateral mutual-defense treaties with Moscow and Peking, Kim soon showed signs of shifting to a fiercely independent foreign policy, even at the risk of antagonizing both Com- munist allies and at the cost of losing, at least temporarily, their economic assistance. Pyongyang's assertion of independence first from Moscow and then from Peking, the 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo and other acts of anti-US belligerency, and the cultivation of an exorbitant cult of Kim II-song 10 See Joungwon A. Kim, "Korean Kundaehwa: The Military as Modernizer," Journal of Comparative Administration (Beverly Hills, Calif.), November 1970, pp. 355-71; and Emerson Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea," Foreign Affairs (New York), April 1969. SOVIET SABOTAGE The anti-party elements within the party and their supporters abroad, revisionists and great-power chauvinists (i.e., the CPSU?Ed.), lined up as one in opposition to our party and resorted to subversive activities In an attempt to overthrow the leadership of our party and government.. . . The attack of the opportunists on our party became most glaring be- tween 1956 and 1957. . . The modern revisionists . . . opposed the socialist revolution in our country, prattling that it was as yet premature; they opposed our party's line of socialist industrialization, the line of construction of an independent national economy in particular; and they even brought economic pressure to bear upon us, inflicting tremendous losses upon our socialist construction. ?Kim ll-song, Selected Works (English edition), Vol. II, Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, pp. 515-16, 57E40. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 7 : C1A-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 cpyRdffroved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 both at home and abroad all appear to have been a direct outgrowth of the contest for legitimacy and survival. 4.11.01011?0 Mil?NOMM.N00.? Pyongyang vs. Its Allies In dealing with the USSR and Communist China, Kim has had to reckon not only with the diverse efforts of the two to interfere in his policies, but also with the reality that neither of them attaches great significance to Kim's goal of unification. In choosing between the two Communist powers at any given moment, the North Korean leader has been swayed by realistic considerations of self-preservation and -not by ideological niceties. Already in 1951, Pyongyang resented the Soviet decision to bring about early Korean armistice nego- tiations, feeling that the only likely outcome would be an intolerable recognition of the division of Korea, the very situation which Kim had sought to eliminate by his attack on the South. Subsequently (after the Korean armistice).Kim's regime?evidently convinced that the USSR would not support any further unification efforts?set out to build a strong and independent economic, political and military base which would enable it, at some future time, to launch another unification attempt on its own." It was because of these independent policies of North Korea that the Soviet Union in 1956 instigated a "destalinization" campaign In Pyongyang with the goal of undermining Kim's position in the North Korean regime. However, Kim had crushed this challenge by 1958. Because of Kim's insistence on independent policies, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang continued to deteriorate despite the signing of the 1961 mutual assistance pact, and in 1963 the USSR terminated its economic and military assistance to North Korea in retaliation for Kim's independent behavior. A factor contributing to the Soviet discontent was Kim's growing friendship with Peking. Yet the latter relationship also had its areas of disagreement. Kim Il-song saw the widening Sino-Soviet rift as a threat to the defense capability of the Communist world, and hence of North Korea, and his resentment at Ma :ist policies grew particularly intense as a consequence of Chinese obstruction of Soviet aid shipments to North Vietnam in 1966. Furthermore, ,China proved unable to fill adequately the aid,vacuuM left by the Soviet suspension of assistance to North "See Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy In North Korea," World Politics (Princeton), January 1970, pp. 237-54. Korea in 1963?a matter of great concern to Kim as he witnessed the growth of South Korea's military power. Finally, Mao's strident Claims to the leader- ship of the world revolutionary movement conflicted with Kim's own ambitions, When the Soviet Union reversed course in 1965 and restored the flow of economic and military assistance to Pyongyang, the Chinese Communists showed their displeasure by mounting wall posters in Peking denouncing Kim Il-song as a "fat revisionist" (for having sold out to Moscow). By 1966 relations between North Korea and the CPR were so chilly that neither country main- pined an ambassador in the other's capital. This kstrangement was evident as late as April 1969 when Pyongyang pointedly refused to send a delegate to the Ninth Congress of the CCP." Since North Korea's troubles with its allies sprang from Soviet or Chinese policies that put restraints on Pyongyang's military and economic capacity, or which cast shadows on Kim's image of independence in formulating foreign policy, and not from basic ideological issues, reconciliation was a relatively simple matter once the objectionable policies were renounced. Thus, when Moscow offered to restore aid to North Korea in 1965, Pyongyang promptly re- sumed cordial relations with the Soviets. And it was with equal pleasure that Kim accepted China's truce offering when Chou En-lai visited Pyongyang in April 1970 to assure North Korea: In the future, we will, as always, support and assist each other and fight shoulder to shoulder." The two countries concluded a trade agreement shortly thereafter. Not to be outdone, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea sought to cement Mos- cow's renewed ties with . Kim by declaring, on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the Korean- Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in July 1970: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, and the entire Soviet people fully sup- port the Korean people in their righteous struggle to chase the US imperialist aggressive troops out of South Korea and to achieve national unification on a democratic basis." "A brief summary of the PekIng-Pyengyang feud and rapproche- ment may be found In L. F. Goodstadt, "Patchwork in Pyongyang," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), July 23, 1970, pp. 6-7, and In Koji Nakamura, "For Chou, a Peking-Pyongyang Detente," ibid., May 7, 1970, p. 18. "ibid. 14Korean Central News Agency radio broadcast, July 8, 1970. ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 8 ?CPYIA9Kved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Thus, by the end of 1970, relations between Pyongyang and each of its two major Communist E- 'lies seemed reasonably amicable. As far as the Sino-Soviet conflict was concerned, Kim II-song pparently saw no contradiction in maintaining cordial relations with both countries simultaneously. However, Pyongyang saw fit to exercise Caution in making sure the visiting delegations from Peking cr Moscow di u not cross paths while they were in North Korea." Kim welcomes the support of the USSR and the CPR because of a genuine fear for the security of North Korea, which seems to him to be threatened loth by an increasingly strong South Korea and by E possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. Few Koreans who lived through the trying years of Japanese colonialism and who confronted Japan's ighly efficient military rule and (political) "thought" once can dismiss the nagging fear that it could all appen again?however unrealistic this may seem t) foreign observers. The recent announcement by tie United States of plans to reduce its forces in .outh Korea has brought forth warnings from Pyongyang that Japan may try to move into the US role in South Korea?warnings which have been tr-npathetically echoed in Peking. Kim and World Revolution While turning to Moscow and Peking to secure his ngime against real or imagined enemies, Kim II-song I-as not hesitated to challenge the revolutionary leadership of both major Communist centers. As early as 1965 (prior to the resumption of Soviet aid to North Korea), Kim delivered a thinly-veiled attack 4gainst Moscow, accusing the Soviet leaders of being "tevisionists" bent on preventing North Korea from securing economic independence and on overthrow- ing his regime." Kim also seems to be trying to outdo Mao in bidding for leadership of the world's r wolutionary movements, basing his appeal on a Elorification of the tactics of violent revolution. On tie 50th anniversary of the unsuccessful nonviolent anti Japanese uprising of 1919, Kim stated: 7 he greatest lesson of the historic anti-Japanese "The Chinese (and not the Soviets) on July 25, 1970, attended II e commemoration of the outbreak of the Korean War; the S wiets (and not the Chinese) attended the 25th anniversary of K rean independence from Japan. There was no report of either being n resented at the Fifth KWP Congress last autumn. "Kim II Sung, Selected Works, English Edition, Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, Vol. II, p. 513. movement is that the highest form of struggle to freedom Is revolutionary violence." Thus, Kim has Identified himself with the movements of Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh and apparently seeks to promote himself as their ideological suc. cessor. The North Korean leader 6eemIngly strikes a responsive chord among some of the world's new revolutionaries?e.g., the American Black Panther Jeader Eldridge Cleaver visited Pyongyang in 1969 and voiced praise for Kim's revolutionary leadership." Kim's appeals to revolution are hardly likely to win recognition of North Korea as a member of the established international community. Ever since the Korean War, the Pyongyang regime has been,/ in effect, an international outlaw. Only 29 nations recog- nize Kim's state, compared to 93 nations which -recognize the government in Seoul." Kim adamantly refuses to recognize the competence of the UN to deal with the Korean problem. This defiance of the International body?to which the USSR is, at least in part, committed?may explain the visit of the Soviet and Czechoslovak UN Ambassadors to Pyongyang in August One may surmise that they went to discuss possible new initiatives on behalf of North Korea at the impending session of the UN General Assembly which opened in September. But it would take extreme changes in the UN's position vis-a-vis North Korea to convince Kim II-song that he could more effectively gain national and international pres- tige through the world organization rather than by trying to win a following among revolutionaries every- where. Closely related to Kim's efforts to achieve stature both at home and in the world revolutionary move- ment is the cultivation of an extravagant personality cult of Kim Il-song. Advertisements for a recent English-language version of his official biography presumed to call Kim "the Hero of [the] 20th Century." 21 The cult seeks to provide Kim with an impressive set of revolutionary credentials?more impressive, in fact, than the, facts would support. His father, Kim Hyong-chik, is now credited by the Pyongyang regime with bringing about the 1919 anti-Japanese uprising.22 To those who have observed the rapid rise of Kim's younger brother, Kim Yong- 21 Pyongyang Radio broadcast, April 17, 1969. 10A series of articles on Kim II-song was published in Black Panther (New York), Jan. 3, 10, 17, 25, and March 15, 1970. "The Economist (London), Dec. 5, 1970, p. 34. itoPyongyang Radio broadcast, Aug. 4, 1970. II The New York Times, Oct. 29, 1969. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 cpyRdytproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 FOLLOW COMRADE KIM The revolutionary ideas of Comrade Kim ll-song, the brilliant Marxist-Leninist, are the great Marxism-Leninism of the present times?an era of great struggle In which a fierce class struggle is being waged on an International seals and all the exploited peoples and oppressed nations on the globe are turning out to participate in the liberation struggle, an era of the great revolutionary storm and an era of the downfall of imperialism and the victory of socialism and communism on a worldwide scale. ?From speech of Comrade Pak Song-chid at the Fifth Korean Workers' Party Congress, broadcast by Pyong- yang Radio, Nov. 3, 1970. chu, in the party hierarchy, this exercise In revolu- tionary genealogy appears aimed not only at prov- ing the nationalist credentials of Kim 11-song, but also at laying the groundwork for the political suc- cession in North Korea.25 To explain why the 33-year old Kim deserved to become the leader of North Korea in 1945, the regime has embellished and distorted the record of his prewar exploits against the Japanese in Man- churia, then under Japanese domination as the puppet state of Manchukuo. It is claimed that when Kim moved to Manchuria from Pyongyang at the age of 14, he organized an independence movement among fellow Korean students at his middle school, joined the Korean Communist Party, and helped found numerous independence organizations, e.g., The Kirin Student-Friends Association and the Fatherland Restoration Association. Further, it is implied that the guerrilla band which Kim came to lead was almost singlehandedly responsible for the ultimate liberation of Korea. All evidence of Chinese Communist or Soviet support for Kim and other Korean guerrilla leaders Is passed over." n Nodong Shinmun of March 1, 1970, claimed: "With the March First Uprising as the occasion, the seeds of the anti-Japanese patriotic ideas and revolution sown by Mr. Kim Hyong-chik, an anti-Japanese revolutionary fighter and ardent patriot, kindled violent flames everywhere." 'The possibility that KIM Yong-chu (who is 10 years younger than his brother Kim II-song) might succeed his brother was suggested by the author In the article, "Divided Korea 1969: Consolidating for Transition," Asian Survey, January 1970, p. 41. For Kim Yong-chu's rise through the party ranks, see the charts In Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," foe. cif., pp. 252-54. Among those subsequently agreeing with this hypothesis Is VI Tong-jun, a defector from North Korea,: see his "Kwolyok t'ujaeng-ul chinsang" (The Real' Power Struggle), Chungang (SWOT, June 1970, pp. 67-81. 4 w Balk Bong, Kim il Sung Biography, Tokyo, Miraisha, 1969. The true picture of Kim's record emerges in such works as Dae-sook Suh's study of the Korean Com- munist movemerit.25 Kim did, indeed, attend middle school in Japanese-COntrolled Manchuria, but there were hardly enough fellow Koreans in his Chinese- run school to constitute an "independence move- ment." Organizations which Kim allegedly founded were, in fact, founded by others; his name does not even appear in accounts of such organizations by former participants or in Japanese intelligence and police records. As a matter of fact, the Korean Communist Party had no organization in Manchuria at the time Kim claims to have joined it. Extensive Japanese records show that Kim 11-song and his companions in the present North Korean regime were only minor participants in the Chinese Com- munist underground resistance movement in Man- churia. Furthermore, Kim's biography completely omits the four-year period (1941-45) which he spent in training in the USSR, emerging as a major in the Soviet Army.26 The fact that his fledgling regime drew insignifi- cant national support in 1945 has also troubled Kim. At the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, held in Pyongyang in 1956, Kim bitterly denounced those Korean Communists who had endorsed the Rhee government in 1945. Immediately prior to the 1956 Congress, Kim purged from the KWP the vast majority of South Korean Communists who had come north prior to and during the Korean conflict (many of whom had joined in the earlier endorsement of Rhee)." Kim 11-song also has claimed that prominent Korean independence leaders such as Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik had endorsed the Pyongyang regime? significantly, neither man is around to refute it (Kim Ku had shared the limelight with Rhee in Seoul as a leader of the exile Provisional Government estab- Suh, op. eft (Assessment of the Suh and Balk accounts is provided at greater length in B. C. Koh's review of the two volumes on p. 82 of the present issue of Problems of Communism.?Ed.) Tsuboe Senjl, Hokusen no kalho Junen (Ten Years of North Korea's Liberation), Tokyo, Nikkan Todotsushin-sha, 1956, pp. 24-26; Kim Ch'ang-sun, Yoksaul chungln (History's Witness), Seoul, Hanguk asea pankong yonmaeng, 1956; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gendal Toe Jinmel-kan (Current Biography), Tokyo, Toho Kenkyu-sho 1950, p. 101. Japanese intelligence reports during the war locating Kim's unit (and most of the major current North Korean leaders) In the USSR include "Kyohl Kin Nichisei Kika shiso honcho no kenkyo" (Arrest of a Group Leader of the Thought Section under the Communist Bandit Kim II-song), Tokyo gall! geppo (Tokyo), February 1943, and "Habarosuku ye-el gakko no jolcyo" (Condition of the Field School In Khabarovsk), Galli geppo (Tokyo), November 1942, pp. 85-86. w Choson Nodong-dang chaesemcha munhonfip (Documents of the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party), Pyongyang, Nodong-dang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1956. Approved For Release 1999/09/04n CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 cpyRARproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 lished in 1919 and was assassinated in 1949; Kim Kyu-sik was apparently abducted by the North Koreans during the Korean War and is presumed dead)." Entrenched and Isolated The ability of the North Korean regime to fabricate and propagate such a fulsome cult of Kim II-song is itself a symptom of the extreme consolidation of power in Kim's hands. This is a far cry from the situation in the early days of the Communist regime, when North Korea was ruled by a coalition of Soviet- Koreans, Yenan-trained Koreans, domestic Korean Communists, and the Manchurian-Korean partisans centered around Kim II-song." Step by step Kim eliminated all competing factions, a process which culminated at a leadership conference of the Korean Workers' Party in October 1966, at which Kim suc- ceeded in placing his own followers in every major KWP post. Party organization work was entrusted to Kim's younger brother, Kim Yong-chu. This mono- lithic control was further tightened in subsequent purges," and was most recently confirmed at the Fifth KWP Congress, held November 2-13, 1970.'At- this congress Kim Yong-chu was elevated to the Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee as the sixth-ranking party officia1.31 3? Kiln Il-song chochak sonlip (Kim Il-song's Selected Works), Pyongyang, Choson Nodong-dang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1968, pp. 87-88. 29 The Soviet-Koreans were SOviet citizens of Korean descent who had spent the better part of their lives In the USSR, most of whom were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)?an affiliation which some retained even after joining the Korean Workers' Party in North Korea. This group was distinct from the Manchurian-Koreans around Kim II-song, who had spent most of their lives In Manchuria and only resided In the USSR In the 1941-45 period. The Soviet-Koreans originally endorsed Kim II-song as leader of the North Korean party, but It was on Soviet orders, and Kim had no control over this group. The Yenan Communists were those who had spent their exile in China, most recently in Mao Tse-tung's Yenan stronghold. The "domestic" Korean Communists were those i who had remained in Korea and had suffered persecution and Imprisonment under the Japanese?a factor which prevented any effective organizational development. Kim II-song refuses to credit any of the other three factions for their pre-1945 independence efforts. 39 Among high-ranking party end military leaders purged since the Kim group completed Its consolidation have been Pak Kum-ch'ol, Kim Chang-bong, Ho Pong-hak,:Kim Chong-t'ae, Kim To-man, Vim Ch'un-ch'iu, Ko Hyok, and Ho Sok-san. See VI Tong-jun, toc. cit. For information on earlier purges of the regime, see Pukhanul papol runaeng-sa (Factional Struggle in North Korea), Seoul, Naeoe munje yonguso, 1962. n Members of the new Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee were listed as follows: Kim ll-song, Choe Yong-gon, Kim II, Pak Song-chol, Choe Hyon,- Kim Yong-chu, 0 Chln-u, Kim Tong-gyy, So Choi, Kim Chung-him, and Han 1k-au (North Korean *elle b. ead..a.t, No.. 14, 1978). While consolidating his personal control of the party, Kim II-song has also tightened the regimE's controls over North Korean society to ensure that no voice of dissent can be raised against his leadE r- ship. Collectivization of agriculture was completed In 1958. By 1970 nearly 50 percent of the population of 13 million lived In urban areas (compared to about 20 percent in 1945), and illiteracy had been virtually eliminated?both developments facilitating political mobilization of the population. Some 4-0 percent of the population is employed in the inths- trial sector of the economy,32 as compared with 12,5 percent at the end of 1946. Through party membE r- ship, employment In the bureaucracy, and membE r- ship in the many diverse and overlapping state- sponsored mass organizations, a very large propc r- tion of the population has been absorbed into roles which commit the individual to active support )f the Kim leadership and thus link his personal destiny with that of the regime. Nearly 14 percent of the population are members of the KWP; 1.3 million citizens serve in the "Workers' and Peasants' Red Guard" (a nationwide mass militia, organized into self-contained armed regiments); and 10 to 15 .percent of the working population are bureaucratic employees of the regime. The Communists have also sought to differentiate and isolate society in the North from that in the South?this despite the professed goal of unification. Nearly three-fourths of the 13 million North Korea is have spent all but perhaps their preschool years under Communist rule and indoctrination. The or ly information they have about possible alternativ comes covertly from their elders, and as in a iy society undergoing rapid modernization and change, the relevance of the views of the older generation is generally felt to be marginal. Few people in tie North, moreover, have any firsthand knowledge of life below the 38th parallel since 1945?not only hs the refugee flow been almost unilaterally toward tie South, but most of the South Korean Communits who went to the North prior to or during the Korean War were purged during the 1950's. In another move clearly designed to ensure that the populace was insulated from undesirable out- side influences, Kim eliminated the Chinese writing system soon after gaining power, replacing it with the Korean phonetic alphabet. Consequently, fE w North Koreans could even read the South Korean el See Pukhan hilpnyon (North Korea's Twenty Years), Seoul, Kongkebw shesagwk, 19CE. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02: press (which employs the mixed Chinese-Korean writing system) if it suddenly were made available. This insulation of North from South has made it easier for the regime to forge ahead with its policy of giving top priority to heavy industrial development at the expense of consumption. By and large, this policy has produced impressive results, although the temporary suspension of Soviet economic assistance from 1963 to 1965 forced Pyongyang to abandon annual targets of the 1961-1967 Seven Year Plan. Following the resumption of Soviet aid in 1965, Pyongyang reactivated the plan and extended the target date for its completion to 1970. The recent Fifth KWP Congress announced the successful com- pletion of the plan and promulgated a new Six-Year Plan for the 1971-76 period, with continued empha- sis on heavy industry (although there was new emphasis on light industry, mechanization of agri- culture and technological development). Despite the dip in performance in the mid-1960's, North Korea has built up a formidable economic potential. It produces most of the rifles, mortars and ammuni- tion required by its army, and it also outproduces ;the South in electricity, coal, steel, chemical fertil- izer, and cements' Two and a half decades after its creation, the Pyongyang regime appears to be politically stable rIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 and militarily and economically strong. Nevertheless, it continues to face the same critical questions of how Korean nationalism, communism, and a divided Korea can be reconciled. How can a viable political system be maintained over 13 million Koreans in the North while the remaining two-thirds of the nation (31 million) oOntinuas to flourish under an alterngte regime in the South? It is not so much the peculiar personal predilections of North Korea's strong-arm ruler as it is the pressures arising from these ineluctable circumstances that have transformed North Korea into what has appropriately been termed a "garrison state," 34 with its leader advocating revolutionary violence and constantly trumpeting invective against enemies and allies alike. So long as a genuine aura of national and international legitimacy continues to evade Kim ll-song's regime, these pressures will continue. " Ibid.; and Kim Un-hwan, "Tongnan lohlpnyonhuul pukhan Silchong: KyongJeul hyonhang kwa chonmang" (Economic Situation and Prospects: North Korea's Situation Twenty Years after the Korean War), Chungang, June 1970, pp. 80-88. Statistics on the economy of South Korea may be found In Korea Annual 1969, Seoul, Hapilong News Agency, 1969. - B. C. Koh, "North Korea: PrOflie "tif Garrliolt State," ? 'Problems el Communism, January-February 1969, pp. 18-27. PROBLEMS OF CONMUNISM January-April 1971 CPYRGHT Cult-iv By B. C. Koh Kim BAIK BONG: Kim II Sung: Biogra- phy (3 Vols.). Tokyo, Mirai- sha, 1969 and 1970. DAE-SOOK SUH: The Korean Com- munist Movement, 1918- 1948. Princeton, N.J., Prince- ton University Press, 1967. THE MOST STRIKING feature of contemporary North Korean poli- tics is the all-pervasive personality cult centered about Kim II-song,4 ? 1 Kim li-song is the romanization of the name according id the, McCune-Relschauer system. The North Korean spelling, however, Is Kim II Suna. Approved For Release the 58-year old Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party. In an ap- parent attempt to establish and enhance the legitimacy of his ' patently harsh one-man rule, Kim has sought to generate an image of himself as the greatest man Korea has ever produced. Article after article and volume after vol- ume have glorified the "revolu- tionary accomplishments" and eu- logized the "lofty virtues" of the _North Korean leader. The three-volume biography of - 1Sigi9blat2B:13544161/Alt-1511 lished by a bona fide commercial publishing house in Japan, repre- sents an unmistakable attempt to spread the adulatory legend of Kim beyond the borders of North Korea.2 Indeed, as the "translation .committee" points out in notes ap- pended to each of the three vol- umes, the book is an English translation of Baik Bong's Korean- language biography, General Kim II Sung: the Sun of the Nation, published in 1968 by Inmun It Is noteworthy that In June 1970 Yoshio Nishltanl, President of Miraisha (the ' Japanese publisher of the biography), and his wife visited_Rorlh_Korea and met Kim. 944000200,0:090.L1429, 1910. CPYRGHerpproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Kwahak-sa, a North Korean gov- ernment publishing house. When full-page advertisements of the book appeared in The New York Times and The Times of London late in 1969, North Korea has- tened to claim that the world's press had published laudatory "articles" on Kim.3 Even as an unabashed propa- ganda document, the book never ' ceases to amaze the reader with its fantastic claims and fulsome superlatives. For example: -General Kim II Sung, the great Leader of the 40 million Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious, iron-willed, brilliant commander and one of the outstanding leaders of the in- ternational Communist movement and working-class movement . . . a legendary hero . . . who is capa- ble of commanding the heavens and earth, an unrivaled brilliant commander who, as it wer,e, can shrink a long range of steep moun- tains at a stroke and smash the swarming hordes of enemies with one blow. Kim is portrayed as devoid of human frail ities and endowed with every imaginable virtue and strength, a man who was destined by history to save the Korean peo- ple from the miseries suffered under Japanese colonial rule as well as under bourgeois and feu- dalistic exploitation. Suct.,1 a Messiah, of course, could only have been born into an uncommon family, and we are told that Kim's was a truly "revolu- tionary family," studded with pa- See the lead story in Nodong Shinmun (Pyongyang), Nov. 23, 1969. For the advertisements, see The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1969, and The Times (London), Nov. 3, 1969. For a more recent claim in the same vein, see the article entitled "Korea Has Produced (the) Hero of the 20th Century," in The. Pyongyang Times, June 8, 197a. Approved For Release triots and revolutionaries, begin- ning with the very founder of the clan, Kim Key-sang. Although space does not permit even a brief summary of Kim's feats, nar- rated with tedious redundancy In 1,800 pages, a few of the astound- ing allegations merit passing men- tion. Having "read with great in- terest many classics of Marxism- Leninism, including Das Kapital," by the age of 15, Kim reportedly became a confirmed Communist revolutionary and organized nu- merous revolutionary groups and activities among students, peas- ants, and workers in Manchuria. By the age of 19 his feats had allegedly earned him the title of "General" among his ardent fol- lowers, as well as a new name-- II-song (meaning "becoming the Sun") in place of his original name, Song-ju. After the 1931 Manchurian Incident, Kim founded an anti- Japanese guerrilla "army" which is claimed to have waged a "heroic struggle against the Japanese," culminating in the liberation of Korea. The book also states cate- gorically that it was not the United States, but the Soviet Union, to- gether with the guerrilla forces commanded by Kim, that defeated the Japanese in World War II. The book asserts that the Americans and British induced the Soviets to bear the brunt of the fighting, and then "brazenly" tried to claim credit for the victory. This, however, is the last favor- able mention of the Soviet Union one encounters. In its effort to portray Kim II-song as the greatest figure in all Korean history, the book credits him with all good things that transpired in North Korea since 1945. He almost sin- giehandedly "won" the Korean War of 1950-53, which allegedly was started by "American imperi- alistic aggressors and their South Korean lackeys." Conspicuously absent in this chauvinistic account 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Is any mention of Soviet military assistance or of the "Chinese ' People's Volunteers" to whom North Korea owes its survival. Likewise it was Kim's "revolution- ary ideas" and "Ingenious leader- ship"?not assistance from the Communist bloc?which subse- quently transformed the war- devastated country into a "self-re- liant" industrial nation. The volume imputes "epochal" , significance to Kim's ideas, of 'which juche constitutes the pivotal 'concept. Translated as "independ- ent stand," the term is defined to mean "abiding by the principle of solving all problems of the revolution and construction inde- pendently, in accordance with the actual conditions of one's own country and -primarily- bi one's own efforts." Having "demon- strated" the inestimable efficacy of?juche in the North Korean con- text, the book presumes to apply the concept on a global scale. This entails repudiation of both "the right-wing opportunism" of Moscow and "the left opportun- ism" of Peking' in favor of form- ing a united Communist front to crush "American imperialism." Somehow, the author never ex- plains how such a course of action is related to an "independent stand" for North Korea. Nor is there the slightest recognition of the colossal contradiction between the notion of independence and the exhortation not only to the Korean people but to all leaders of the Communist orbit to heed ?the wisdom of Kim II-song. Who is the real Kim, the man behind this image of an omni- scient and omnipotent leader of all 1Korea and the savior of mankind? For the best available clueslo his Although neither Moscow nor Peking are explicitly mentioned, Kim's words leave little doubt as to the Identity of those whom he is attacking. 13 CPYRWOroved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 true identity, one must turn to T.lae-Sook Suh's meticulous study, The Korean Communist Move- ment. Originally prepared as a Ph.D. thesis at Columbia, the study makes extensive use of Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and Russian sources to present an im- pressively credible picture of the trials and tribulations of Korean Communists who struggled long and hard, only to be eclipsed and then ?inihilated by Kim II-song, a man who had played only a peripheral role in the Korean in- dependence movement. Of par- ticular interest is the last quarter of the book, dealing with the rise of Kim II-song. Relying heavily on , Japanese police records of the ' 1930's and 1940's, the author shows that Kim was neither a com- plete impostor nor a major revolu- tionary figure of the stature of a Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh. The available evidence estab- lishes that, prior to World War II, Kim led a Korean anti-Japanese guerrilla force in Manchuria which inflicted sufficient damage to cause the Japanese to initiate a determined campaign to annihilate his forces. On the other hand, Suh makes c!ear, Kim's force was at this time only part of a Chinese Communist guerrilla army, in which he rose to the rank of divi- sion commander. Despite this im- pressive title, Kim probably never commanded more than 300 men at a time. Nor was he the only Korean to command such a "divi- sion." In fact, at least two Koreans rose to the position of "army commander"?a full rank higher than Kim?in this struggle.' Under stepped-up Japanese pressure, Kim and his surviving comrades-In-arms fled to Siberia in 1941. Whether he subsequently received Soviet military training and served as an officer in the Red Army, as many sources claim, is not verified in Suh's study. What, clear, however, is that he came to North Korea with i the Soviet occupation troops after the Jap- anese surrender. in 1945 ? pd, with the apparent blessing of 'the Soviet Union, began a series of maneuvers culminating. in seizure of power in Pyongyang. Suh underscores4h.e,.point that Kim did not owe his Ase exclu- sively to the Kremlin. Of crucial importance were the miscalcula- tions and follies of the "old Com- munists," such as Pak kon-yong, who lingered too long in the An important source on Kim's guerrilla activity has recently come to the reviewer's attention: Manshu nl kansuru yoheitekl kansatsu (Observations on Military Tactics In Manchuria), Tokyo, Fukuinkyoku Shiryo Seirika, Vol. 12, 1952. The volume comprises recollections by former Japanese Army officers who participated in or had access to classified information about Japanese counterinsurgency operations in Manchuria. While corroborating much of Suh's account of Kim's revolutionary past, this Japanese source links Kim and his guerrillas, not with the Chinese Communists, but with the Soviet Union, from which they are said , to have received the bulk of their arms and ammunition, and which provided them with refuge when they fled across the Siberian border under Japanese pursuit. It also includes a number of photographs of Kim Il-song In guerrilla' attire and states that Kim was extremely popular among Koreans In Manchuria, who acClaimed him as a "hero of Korea" and gave him "material and moral suppOrt." I am grateful to Mr. Key P. Yang, of the Oriental's Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., for giving me access to this rare source. American-occupied South, where :the chances of a Communist take- over? were nil, instead of rushing to the North where establishment ,of a Communist government was a foregone conclusiOn. When Pak and his associates finally headed north under duress, Kim was al- ready firmly entrenched and, soon had his rivals exterminated as American spies. Kim's political takeover was due in no small measure to his political acumen and Machiavellian tactics?fac- tors which have been equally in- strumental in perpetuating his monolithic political contr4for the past two decades. As one leaves the bizarre legend of Kim II-song, one wonders why Kim and his sycophants persist in their Herculean efforts .to create a mountain out of a molehill. Pos- sibly they believe, with Hitler, the dietum: "the bigger the lie, the better." More probably, Kim may be the unwitting victim of his own personality cult?a man who not only derives satjsfaction from the interminable cries of "Long Live Comrade Kim II-song" but has really come to believe in his own "unrivaled greatness" and "his- toric mission" to lead 'men both in- Korea and beyond. One shud- ders at the thought that Kim, thanks to Moscow and Peking, commands considerable resources to pursue that "mission." Approved For Release 1999/09/021:4CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 BALTIMORE SUN 12 May 1971 CPYRGHT 55 More Pathet Lao Defect To Vientiane JM ISun Stall Correspondent aigon, May 11?Fifty-five mbers of the 11th Pathet Lao lBattalion have defected to the Huai Lao government, accord- in reliable reports from the Laitian capital of Vientiane. The defectors, led by their co nmanding officer, are the thwd group of Laotian Commu- ni t soldiers to defect since March. They said there are more than a thousand other Pa- that Lao soldiers in southern LAOS ready to join the govern- in. nt, ? rhe Vientiane reports said the 5Z soldiers, including a lieuten- art colonel, two captains and two first lieutenants in addition to their commander, surren- lifted yesterday at Ban Itou, which Is about 20 miles east of the southern city of Pakse. The soldiers turned in their weapons and volunteered to aid government troops in recruiting more defectors and in hunting for supply caches and North Vi- etnamese base camps in south- ern Laos. In March, 150 members of the 25th Pathet Lao Battalion, many with their.families, defected to the government side, complain- ing of oppression by the North Vietnamese. April, Surrender In April, 18 Pathet Lao sol- diers surrendered as a group near the central Laotian town of Paksane, also complaining about their North Vietnamese advisers. Diplomatic observers in Vien- tiane have described the grow- ing Pathet Lao defections as ! probably the most significant change in recent months in the seesawing war in Laos. The defection of large num...! !bers of Pathet Lao, Western dip-; Iomats assert, will significantly ' reduce the Communists' influ- ence and undermine their claim to be patriots rather than front I men for the North Vietnamese. ; _ Propaganda Is Effective _ -The latest group of defectors ! said a major factor in their deci-i (skin to change sides was the! government's propaganda caw, ,paign publicizing the other i groupsof Communist soldiers! , . . . who joined the government. , That campaign included radio broadcasts, air-dropped leaflets and speeches by earlier defec- tors broadcast from slow-flying planes over loud-speaker sys-1 tems. ! Observers in Vientiane believe the North Vietnamese are now finding themselves in the posi- tion of clamping down upon the Xathet Lao allies in an effort to 'halt the -defections but possibly; causing more or of ignoring the situation and risking widespread Lao desertions. In several cases in the last three months, individual defec- tors and small groups of Pathet Lao have said they had to fight -their way out of North Vietnam- 0a6 camps to defect. PYRGHTALTIMORE SUN 12 April 1971 Vientiane Says Defections By Pathet Lao Are Mounting Vientiane, Laos, April 11?Big trouble appears to be brewing isetween the Communist PatHet loo and their North Vietnamese , allies here. Nearly 150 Pathet Lao?a rec- ord number?have defected to tie neutralist government of Premier Souvanna Phouma Ole last month, according to government figures. Had To Kill Advisers Some of thenrsaid they had to Lill their North Vietnamese ad- visers .in order to Make their %sray to government lines, Amen: can fighter-oombers were sent ast week to aid a battalion of -Intliet Lao repoi-cally trying to ight their way past North Viet- aamese units to defect. "The Pallid Lao have come to ?ealize that they arc being used )50! the North Vietnamese who Eir mama. !ARNO ,Sun Staff Cotreapandettl' "We have had rallicrs before, ting Increasing numbers of Lao-1 but they have come in ones, two tians into forced-labor gangs in 1 and threes. Here we have whole the Communist supply network,' companies, whole battalions A number of Pathet Lao off i. coming over en masse. It is the cers who: protc,.stcd this harshi most hopeful sign we have had treatment of civilians were exe- in years." leuted hy their North Vietna rrit:as Aid In Air Strikes ;advisers as "politically unrelia- The defectors have joined gov- 'tile," according to Mr. Lien. ernment troops around the Bo- Pathet Lao Commander lovens Plateau to guide them to Among the reported victims Communist bases and supply de- was the widely respected Pathet pots in the last 10 days. They also have provided information for American and government air strikes. The immediate cause of the Pathet Lao disaffection scums to be a new hard line taken by the North Vietnamese toward civil-; ians in southern Laos. 13oua Lien, the commander of the 25th Pathet Lao Battalion,1 eral actually was executed. "We , the source of most of the defec- had reports three or four times! are out to conquer Laos, tors, said the North Vietnamese b a month all last fall that he had; LAO commander in southern Laos, tien. Pliernina Douangma.-1 ? la, who the Pallid Lao believe; was assassinated late last year.; Two Pellet Lao colonels ap- pointed to replace him also were dismissed after protesting' North: Vietnamese treatment of civil- ians, the defectors said. , An American official here said It is uncertain whether the gen- djApiell 4%6 Prince Sisoutlipromtfor otAhr--." tetiitto itrRnpurosiniriparo ihe acting d se m n ster, trade and travel and were put- "Whatever happened, it's appar-I said. ent the Pathet Lao don't believe the North Vietnamese explana- ? tion." Government officials and oth- er.observers here theorize that relations between the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese? who outnumber the local Com- munists by 40,000 to 11,000?be- gan to deterioraee seriously last spring when the Vietnamese be- gan a large drive to expand the Ho Chi Minh trail supply system after the closing of the Cambodi- an port at Kompong Som and U.S.-South Vietnamese attacks on their Cambodian sanctuaries. "Until then, the North Viet- namese had generally taken care to pay for what they took, to be honest and fair in. theft, governing and to limit the amount of forced labor required of civilians," one intelligence of- ficer said. "As a policy, they had been 0090800104 reactions of the :Laotians and had been guided lby the advice of the Pathet Lao. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT That mnis te than. . when large groups of villagers were abducted last year to work on the trail." `So far, the feud betiyeen the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam- ese has been more intense In southern Laos, the Area of tke trail, than In the north. But Indk vidual defectors from around the Plain of Jars reported that, disaffection is growing there as well. Communist sources here ac- knowledged "a serious morale' problem" among the Pathet Lao, but said that dozens of gov- ernment soldiers defect to the Pathet Lao each week. The Pa- thet Lao representative in Vien- tiane. Soth Pethrasy, said steps ? g taken to "rrinbtill a correct attitude" for relations between the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese. ? Independent observers here believe the large-scale defec- tions pose a serious problem for the North Vietnamese hi that, any ieprlhats taken against the Pathet Lao to curb further defections will only exacerbate4 the situation, while if nothing is done, whole Pathet Lao battal-? Ions may continue to defect. ? Prince Souvanna, meanwhile, has welcomed all Pathet Lao defectors, saying the "door is rdpen in the government" for in, ividtuds or the Pathet Lao us Approved For Release 1999/09102 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY June 1971 HOW TO STAGE-MANAGE A CONGRESS From the 24th Congress of the CPSU 30 March - 10 April, one surprise.calls for explanation: the uniform silence on the part of visiting delegations speaking at the Congress concerning the Soviet invasion and "normalization" of Czechoslovakia, the major issue (among other, derivative issues) that has given rise to criticism of the Soviet Union by a large number of important and lesser Communist parties of the world. It is hard to find even the word Czechoslovakia mentioned in the speeches of the 101 delegations (some non-Communist) said to have attended the Congress. Several interrelated issues have been argued and debated more or less heatedly since the invasion (more often for home consump- tion but also at Soviet-sponsored gatherings of the world's Communists): the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty, the primacy of "proletarian internationalism" (read: obedience to Soviet dictates) over the right of national sovereignty of socialist countries and independence of Communist parties, the mandatory subjection to general "laws" of socialism (i.e. the Soviet "model") versus the right of Communist parties to develop their "own road to socialism" based on their national peculiarities. Suddenly, at the Congress, these issues seem to have dis- appeared. Reading various versions of the speeches of visiting delegates, one would hardly know that there were such issues of contention in the Communist world -- and perhaps that is precisely the point. Aware of the image of disarray in the world Columnist movement (WCM), the Soviets needed desperately to restore at least the appearance of unity in the movement. Hence, they somehow contrived to suppress the voices of dissent and impress the world Communist movement with a picture of harmony and unity restored. Some delegates may even have been convinced there never had heel, any basic disagreement. It mattered less that one or another dele- gate returning home might speak to their own countrymen in disan!)rcval of certain Soviet acts or methods -- the important thing was that these disagreements not be given currency or additional momentum in the world Communist movement by being aired at the Congress in Moscow. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 There is every reason to believe that the Soviets took special precautions to insure that the views of known dissidents not come before the Congress. Some were no doubt pressured or persuaded to refrain from objectionable comment: the threat of withdrawal of Soviet financial support can be a persuasive weapon to many parties. But special measures to stage-manage a Congress have a well-documented precedent in the case of the 10th Congress of the Communist front JUS (International Union of Students) held last February in the out-of-the-way location of Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. First, it was held behind closed doors; all correspondents but two from the Soviet youth newspaper were excluded from the proceedings. Careful guard checks were made on all those entering the immediate area of the Congress; unauthorized persons were prevented from talking with the delegates. By various devices, objectionable delegates were precluded from expressing their views. Some were refused visas to get there in the first place, others were sent back on arrival, others were harassed by the police. Dissident delegates present could not make their views or protests known. Their proposals were either ignored and passed over in silence, or at one point, the simultaneous translation facilities conven- iently broke down. The full range of devices for suppressing dissent, and, more important for the Soviets, ensuring the appearance of complete unity, is described in the account by French delegate Henri Verley as published in the French Comnunist dissident weekly Politique Hebdo (see attachment). Judging by scattered accounts from various delegates on their return home, similar measures were taken to stage-manage the 24th CPSU Congress, with the primary aim of preventing delegates from getting a picture of what divides the movement and of presenting the delegates with a picture of monolithic unity. It, too, was a closed session with foreign correspondents excluded. Various measures were taken to isolate visiting delegates known for their dissident views from reporters and from the Soviet population. Dissident delegations had difficulty gaining access to translation facilities and efforts were made to prevent them from distributing their speeches among other delegates. Their speeches, according to some accounts, were submitted to a special bureau which simply deleted or modified highly objectionable passages, so that while a delegate; might deliver his own version of the speech in his native language, the Congress would hear in translation only the expurgated version. CPYRGHT uasningLun PidA MbsLow LuilupuiluCAL, AtithCriy trac an, vas - ? able to report one example, apparently among many, of the censcr- ship procedure. Chilean Communist delegate Luis Corvalan, speaking in Spanish, at one point proudly announced that his Marxist government nas recognized both Cuba and Communist China. Since the simultaneous translation simply omitted mention of China, the delegates 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 duly applauded 'Chilean recognition of Cuba. Somewhat puz'zled at the response, Corvalan repeated his statement, and this time, for some reason and after a moment's hesitation, the: interpreter included mention of iifi?Dead silence from the audience. Corvalan must still be puzzlen at what happened. (See the attached Astrachan article.) The cynical, methodical planning that went into controlling the expression of deviant views on the part of supposedly fraternal delegates at the 24th CPSU Congress i% at oncea measure of the erosion of the Soviet ideological the WCM and of Soviet fears that the -6rosion will gather momentum and affect organizational control as well. Hence, the effort not so much to eradicate dissent, but to prevent the WowId Communist Movement, from hearing about it. Strong disapproval Of Soviet leadershi0 of the world movement has been expressed, and is still being expressed, in their home environments by Communist parties of Italy, France, Austria, Spain, Great Britain, Japan, Australia, India, Venezuela, Mexico, Romania, and Yugoslavia (to mention only some of the better known ones). Yet, the Soviets succeeded in mounting a Congress in which hardly a word of disapproval reached this assembly of the world's Communists. instead they heard the delegates' paeans of praise for the achievements of the Soviet Union and resounding expressions of their solidarity with an alien power and its leading force, the CPSU. 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris 25 February 1971 BEHIND THE SCENES AT A CONGRESS ?14- ofthe International Union of Students Little has been said about the 10th Congress of the International laion of Students (IUS) held in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia 3-10 February this year, and for good reason. A closed meeting was proclaimed from the very first session, and no journalist was admitted to follow the proceedings. The correspondents of l'Humaniterand the l'Unita'fourV no more favor in this respect than representatives of the bourgeois press and only the Komsomolskaya Pravda representative followed the proceedings. The fact is that the gOviet delegation had taken care 70 include him in its ranks. It was out of the question to try to approach the 'delegates. Three successive control points had been arranged: two by the police, ?Tx at the entry of the Park of Culture, the other at the entries of the building where the sessions were held. The third control, at the very door of the meeting roam, was secured by Czechoslovakia students. The hotels where the delegates were lodged were kept under"very close surveillance." The reasons for such a closed door meeting are clear. The IUS, like other international organizations of the same type, are considered by the Soviet directors as a transmission belt for propagating their siDgans, their policies, and their ideology and to insure in return the support cftheir strategy. Thus it WAS of extreme importance to them that tie IUS should appear to be a bloc without cracks fully ranged behind their line. If confrontations were foreseen --- and they were --- it was necessary to prevent their becoming public -: "Unity" reappeared in tle sphere of resolutions, which were adopted in a mechanical fashion (there were 125 of them!) by an absolute majority. Fabricating a Majority The first task is to insure such a. majority. It is an undertak_ng lure and more difficult despite the variety of means employed and the lick of scruples in using them. Thus certain delegations, like that froth tie Congo-Kinshasa, were turned back on their arrival at the airfield. Oilers, as was the case of the representative of the Greek students of the interior, were able to get as far as the hotel but were expelled the day before the Opening of the proceedings. For others, the UNEF [French Student Union] and the delegations from Guadeloupe and Martinique, ertry vLsas were simply refused by the embassies or consulates. As for the Guatemala and Hdnduran. delegations, the organizers simply "forgot" to send them their:air tickets two fa pal or y e ? 1 ? ? ? .1 I I Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT Added to these radical measures were police provocations such as those to which two Belgian delegations became victim the very night of their arrival. Arrested at their hotel, then taken to the police station, they were interrogated for four hours continuously on the pretext that an automobile registered in Belgium was supposed to have distributed in the streets of the city pamphlets "hostile to the Czechoslovakia people." Finally released, they escaped from the interrogation only by the threat that their delegation would raise the matter at the Congress itself. The Czechoslovak authorities apologized, and that was that.... Singular Practice To cap it all, the credentials committee did its job. Thus it classified among the "observers" two delegations which were not only members in good standing of the IUS but actual members of the secretariat: the VVS of Belgium and the FUA of Argentina. It should be added that the executive committee, which had met some weeks before the Congress, had been convoked under totally irregular circumstances: Madagascar, for example, had not been given a chance to attend. There is nothing surprising in these anti-democratic practices, in these manipulations. The new fact --- and an important one --- is that they met with considerable opposition within the Congress. On the second day, some ten delegations (Argentina, Mexico, Spain, Salvador, Ireland, Belgium (Walloons and Flemish), Federation of Students of Black Africa in France, and Malagasy students in France) protested to the Congress presiding board in a joint resolution. They presented eight questions concerning the facts which we have detailed above, and showed moreover tha a quorum had not even been assembled for the Congress to be able to deliberate validly. The presiding board of the Congress (it was installed without being elected, on the pretext that the directors of the IUS --- Czechoslovakia, Sudan, Iraq --- assume it traditionally) didn't bother to given an answer to these questions. To the contrary, throughout the proceedings the board tried to prevent the dissidents from speaking. It should be added, to understand the attitude of the Iraq and Sudan delegates --- and it is true for the majority of the Arab countries and for a number of African countries --- that this was a matter of students who were studying in the USSR, in the GDR, Poland, Hungary or in Czechoslovakia. A, particularly significant incident took place during the Congress ratification of the Credentials Committee report. The first protest arose concerning the fact that the delegates were confronted with a SO-page Committee report five minutes before the discussion was opened. But theiivelist exchange took place concerning the representativeness of the two opposing Argentine delegations. The 5 December F.U.A. (the date of its Congress) represents 60 university centers out of 69. Approved For Release 1999/0i/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT Party, born of a schism in the Argentine CP. The 15 November F.U.A. represents only nine university centers. But as it is composed of orthodox Conmunists, it was vehemently supported by the delegations of the East European countries. The discussion of a motion by the ' Cuban delegation --- providing for sending a committee to Argentina to determine the real representativeness of each of the rival organiza ions --- was interrupted because the simultaneous translation facility opportunely broke down, and that happened at the level of the Soviet delegation. This "technical accident" was used to advantage for "visi of the East European delegation to the Cubans. But the latter upheld their motion, which was adopted. Despite this vote a USSR representat saw fit to accuse the F.U.A. of anti-Sovietism. The Argentine delegat s in a mark of protest, then left the Congress. But they did it to the applause of a certain number of delegations and were accompanied to th exit by the Spanish delegates. A Political Battle Behind these bitter procedural skirmishes, it was evident that a political battle was developing. The divergency appeared with special clarity at the time of the general discussion, and in fact when the order of business was discussed. Thus the Spanish proposal to set up a committee for studying the struggle of students in West Eurdpe and in the higher developed capitalist countries was rejected by the'Sovie Bloc. Similarly rejected was an amendment, also Spanish, proposing the addition, as the first order of business, among the task of the IUS th Struggle "for national and social liberation" (the text says merely: "the struggle against imperialism"). In contrast, by a vote of 21 (Spain, Romania, Korea, Cuba, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia, et al.) again t 18 (USSR and others), an amendment was adopted affirming international student solidarity with the anti-imperialistic struggle of the Arab peoples and students, and especially with the struggle of the Palestin an peuple and students. Similarily, the Soviets opposed in vain a Cuban amendment denouncing imperialist penetration of the universities. Brought for consideration by several delegates in the course of general discussion --- Romania, Japan (Zengakuren), Spain, Madagascar Black Students in France, etc. --- was the very nature of the IUS (yureaUcratic organization), its policy (the anti-imperialist struggle was defined only in a narrow and superficial way) and its practical activity (solidarity is expressed only in words or telegrams). In pla e of this concept, the dissidents proposed the IUS as a true center of information and exchange of experience, a center for coordination of struggles and of genuine solidarity. The unfolding of the proceedings reveal existence existence against the Soviet BlOc:of a regrouping of several delegations (Spain, Mexico the two Bel Ian Salvador Bolivia Federation of Students of Black Africa in France Madagascar) supporte y Romania, ugos avia, or orea, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT Japan, Venezuela, and, on several occasions in the course of the voting, by Cuba and North Vietnam. The events of the last day -- at the time of the "election" of the directing organs --- demonstrated the gravity of the crisis in the IUS. The single list method of elections provoked lively protest from several delegations (notably Venezuela and the Dominican Republic). It also provoked the spectacular withdrawal of the Spanish delegation from the Congress. To be sure, a position has been reserved within the Executive Committee to replace People's China (after hard debate) , UNEF, Spain ... it remains to be seen how these seatS ," Nticant-fromrnow-on ;-will be - fill c . . Henri Verley POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris 25 February 1971 LES BESSOUS D'Uti C.EIGNE'S On a peu pane du be oongres de l'Union Inter- rationale des Etudiants, cui sdest tenu a Bratislava (Tchecoslovaquie) du 3 au 1) fevrier beipayiRfflficinur cause. Le huis clos a ete rroclarne d4 la premiere ance, et aueun journaliste r'a ete admis a suivre les t ravaux. Les correspon- c ants de l'Humanite et de 1 Unita n'ont pas plus trou- ?race que les represen- t ints de la presse hour- g eoise, et seul l'envoye de la Komsomolskaia Pravda Pu assister au congres : i est vrai que la Mega- t on sovietique avait pris svin de l'inclure dans ses rangs. Quant a. tenter d'appro- cher les delegues. '1 n'en tait pas question ; trois controles successifs avaient t.e organises : deux par la rolice, l'un a rentree du Parc de Ia Culture, l'autre l'entree du batiment ou e tenaient les seances. Le troisieme, a la porte meme c e 1 salle, etait assure par logeaient les delegations, us etaient tres a etroitement surveilles ). _ Les raisons d'un tel huis clos sont evidentes. L'U.I.E. ? comme les autres orga- nisations internationales du meme type ? est conside- ree par les dirigeants- so- vietiques comme une cour- roie de transmission desti- ne a propager leurs mots d'ordre, leur politique et leur ideologie, et a assurer en retour le soutien de leur strategie. II importe donc essentiellement pour eux que l'U.I.E. puisse appa- raitre comme un bloc sans fissure tout entier range derriere leur ligne. Si des affrontements sont previsi- bles ? et ils l'etaient ? II faut empecher qu'ils soient publics, l' a unite reap- paraissant au niveau des resolutions, adoptees de f a- con mecanique (ii y en a eu 125 '!) par une majorite in- conditionnelle. FABRIQUER UNE MAJORITE majorite : entreprise de plus en plus difficile, mal- gre la diversite et le man- que de scrupules d e s moyens employes. C'est ainsi que certaines delega- tions ? comme celle du Congo-Kinshasa ? ont ete refoulees des leur arrivee l'aeroport ; d'autres ? c'est le cas du representant des etudiants grecs de l'in- terieur ? ont Pu arriver jusqu'a leur hotel, mais ont ete expulsees la veille de l'ouverture des travaux. A d'autres ? l'UNEF, la Gua- deloupe, la Martinique ? les visas d'entree ont tout simplement ete refuses par les ambassades ou les con- sulats tchecoslovaques. Quant aux delegations du Guatemala et du Honduras, on a ornis ) de leur faire parvenir les billets d'avion (deux places par delegation sont normalement payees par l'U.I.E.). A ces mesures radieales se sont ajoutees des provo- cations policieres comme celle dont ont ete victimes EY111:./. :TS 'amen& au commissariat, us y furent interroges qua- tre heures durant sous le , .pretexte qu'une voiture im- matriculee en Belgique au- rait repandu dans les rues de la ville des tracts hos- tiles au peuple tchecoslo- Enfin relaches, us n'echapperent a de?nou- veaux interrogatoires que par la menace de leur de- legation de porter l'affaire a la tribune du congres ; tes autorites tcheeoslova- ques s'excuserent, et tout en demeura SINGULIERES PRATIQUES fl restait, pour couron- ner be tout, a la commission des mandats de faire son office. C'est ainsi que cette derniere rangea parmi les c observateurs 2. deux dele- gations, n o n seulement c es etudiantAlatishecoslovaz deux ay belges la membres de plein droit de tittles. Quant ravggl kpr Rteileaselit Qa 9e9A39t0Zs:t t- 9eClatireAoMM3000M0611114 encore mem- donc de s'assurer une telle Arretes I leur hotel, puis bres du . secretariat la 6PYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 V.V.S. de Belgique et la d'Argentine. Encore faudrait-il ajouter que le Comite executif, qui s'etait reuni quelques semaines avant le congres, avait ete convoque dans des condi- tions tout aussi irregulie- res Madagascar, p a r exemple, n'avalt pas ete mis eh mesure d'y assister. Ces pratiques antidemo- cratiques, ces manipula- tions n'ont rien pour sur- prendre. Le fait nouveau ? et important ? c'est qu'elles ont rencontre, au sein du congres, une oppo- sition non negligeable. Des le second jour, une dizaine de delegations (Argentine, Mc.% ique, Espagne, Salva- dor, Irlande, Belgique (Wal- lons et Flamands), Federa tion des Etudiants d'Afriquis Noire en France, et Etu- diants malgaches en Fran- ce), protestaient par une resolution commune aupres de la presidence ; elles po- saient huit, questions repre- nant les faits que nous avons relates, et montrant de surcroit que le quorum n'etait meme pas . atteint pour que le congres puisse valablement deliberer. La presidence du congres ? qui s'etait installee sans avoir ete elue, sous pre- texte que c'est traditionnel- lement la direction de l'U. I.E. (Tchecoslovaquie, Sou- dan, Irak) qui l'assume ? ne daigna apporter aucune reponse ii ces questions. Par contre, tout au long du deroulement des travaux, elle s'efforga de couper la parole aux contestataires. faut ajouter id, pour comprendre l'attitude des delegues de l'Irak ou du Soudan, qu'il s'agit ? et c'est vrai pour la plupart des pays arabes et pour nombre de pays africains ? d'etudiants qui poursui-; vent, leurs etudes en U.R. S.S., en R.D.A., en Pologne, I en Hongrie ou en Tcheco- slovaquie. Un incident particuliere- ment significatif devait se produire au moment de la ratification par le congres des propositions de la com- mission des mandats. De premieres p r o testations a'elevarent a propos du fait que les delegues etaient saisis du rapport de la commission (50 pages) cinq minutes avant l'ouverture de la discussion. Mais les &changes les plus vifs eu- rent lieu A propos de la re- presentativite des deux de- legations argentines q u s'opposaient. La F.U.A. di- te du 5 decembre (date de son congres) represente 60 centres universitaires sur 69 ; elle est, entre autres, animee par des adherents .du Parti Communiste Revo- lutionnaire, ne d'une scis- sion du P.C. argentin. La F.U.A. dite du 15 novembre ne represente que 9 centres universitaires ; mais corn- me elle est animee par des communistes orthodoxes. elle a ete vehementement soutenue par les delega- tions des pays de l'Est. La discussion d'une mo- tion d'ordre deposee par la delegation cubaine - et vi- sant a l'envoi d'une com- mission en Argentine pom determiner la represcntati- vite reelle de chacune des organisations rivales ? fut interrotnpue parce que cabl,, de traduction fut t)p- portun6ment rompu, et il le fut a la hauteur des rangs de la delegation so- vietique. Cet c incident technique ? fut mis A pro- fit pour des a visites ? des delegations des pays de l'Est aupres des Cubains. Mais ces derniers, main- tinrent leur motion qui fut adoptee. Malgre ce vote, un representant de l'U.R. S.S. crut bon d'accuser la F.U.A. d'antisovietisme. Les delegues argentins, en si- gne de protestation O quitte- pprove or e ease rent alors le congres ; mais us le firent sous les applau- dissements d'un certain nombre de delegations, et accompagnes jusqu'a la sortie par les delegues es- pagnols. UNE BATAILLE POLITIQUE Derriere ces Apres escar- mouches d e procedure, c'est evidemment une ba- taille politique qui se livrait. Les divergences apparurent avec une particuliere net- tete lors de la discussion generale, et d? a propos :de la fixation de l'ordre du jour. C'est ainsi que La pro- , position espagnole de cons- tituer une commission char- gee d'etudier la lutte des etudiants en Europe occi- dentale et dans les pays capitalistes hautement de- veloppes fut repoussee par le bloc sovietique. De la merne fagon fut re- pousse un amendement ? espagnol egalement ? pro- posant d'ajouter, au pre- mier point de l'ordre du jour, parmi les taches de l'U.I.E. la lutte a pour la liberation nationale et so- ciale (le texte porte seu- lement la lutte contre l'imperialisme). Par contre, fut adopte par 21 voix (Es- pagne, Roumanie, Coree, Cuba, Vietnam du Nord, Yougoslavie, etc.) contre 18 (U.R.S.S. et autres) un amendement affirmant la solidarite etudiante inter- nationale avec la lutte anti- imperialiste des peuples et etudiants arabes, et, spe- cialement, avec la lutte du peuple et des etudiants pa- lestiniens. De meme encore, les Sovietiques s'opposerent; en vain, A un amendement cubain denongant ? la pene- tration imperialiste dans les universites ). Ce qui fut mis en cause, au cours de la discussion denehts Mulsiea legations (Roumanie, Ja- pon (Zengakuren), Espagne, M ad a gascar, Etudiants noirs en France, etc.) c'est la nature mettle de l'U.I.E. (organisation bureaucrati- que), sa politique (la lutte anti-imperialiste n'est Mi- nha qua de Wan Waite at superficielle) et sa prati- que (la solidarite affirm& ne s'exprime que par des paroles on des telegram- mes). A cette conception, les contestataires oppo- saient celle d'une U.I.E., veritable centre d'informa- tion et d'echange d'expe- riences, de coordination des luttes, et de solidarite ef- fective. LC deroulement des tra- vaux a mis en evidence l'existence, face au bloc so- vietique, d'un regroupe- ment de plusieurs delega- tions (Espagne, Mexique, les" deux Belgique, Salva- dor, Bolivie, Federation des Etudiants d'Afrique noire en France, Madagascar) appuyees du dehors par la Roumanie, la Yougoslavie, la Cork du Nord, le Ja- ' pon, le Venezuela, et,. A plu- sieurs occasions, an COWS des votes, par Cuba et le Vietnam du Nord. Les incidents du dernier jour ? lors de l' a election ? des organismes dirigeants ? montrent a l'evidence la gravit?e la crise de l'U. I.E. Le mode de scrutin re- tenu ? une seule liste ? provoqua les vives protesta- tions de plusieurs delega- tions (Venezuela et Repu- blique Dominicaine notam- ment), et le retrait spec- taculaire du congres de la delegation espagnole. Certes, un poste a ete garde au sein du Comite Executif pour la Chine Po- pulaire (apres de durs &- bats), pour l'UNEF et pour l'Espagne... Reste a savoir Si et comment ces sieges desormais vides seront oc- cupes... Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 WASHINGTON POST 10 April 1971 "Animation" But No Thigh-Slapj)ing A Few Anecdotes Culled From the 24th Party Congress CPYRGHT Insrow?Thp delegates to the 24th Con- gress of the Soviet Comthunist Party heard Leonid Brezhnev's central committee report with "joyful, excitement," Sharaf Rashidov of Uzbekistan announced the other day. Joy, excitement, color, even humor have been hard for Western eyes to find in the excerpts of the congress proceedings vouch- safed by the press agency Tass, newspapers and Soviet television. They were certainly conspicuous by their absence from the faces of leaders s:town on television tapes of Pre- mier Alexei Xosygin delivering his lengthy report on the new five-year plan Tuesday. Party leader Brezhnev sat writing; ideolo- gist Mikhail Sitslov appeared to be reading a magazine; Politburo. member Gennady Vo- ronov tapped a pencil; Mstislav Keldysh, president of the Academy of Sciences, gnawed his thumb. When the camera panned over the mass of delegates, several were caught glancing at their watches. Real emotion was visible, however, in the closing moments of the Congress Friday. Brezhnev choked up while he was still speak- ing and the te1evision showed tears in his eyes as the delegates sang "The Interna- tionale," which is still the par,ty?though not the state?anthem. Other leaders on the dais were wiping their eyes, too. rv.s EARLIER, Tass seemed to feel an occa- sional need to try to put some gaiety into its reports. One congress speaker was a weaver named A. V. Smirnova from the Yakovlev- sky flax mill in Ivanova Region, northeast of Moscow. Among other things, she told So- viet writers, pPinters and filtn-makers that they should put more textile workers into their creations. "You know how many good songs have been composed about girl spinners who in olden times worked in small, dark rooms. But now my contemporaries who have clever fingers and ardent hearts, intelligent and beautiful, are not given worthy atten- tion .by poets and . composers," Mrs. Smir- nova said. Toss reported "animation in the .hall." (Old. Moscow hands bestirred their mein- By AnthonyAstrachan I ens of jokes about Lenin in the preparations Washington Post Foreign Service for Lenin's centenary a yeu). ugu. c+3 odes; animation, even commotion, in the hall were reported frequently during Nikita TO FOREIGN observers, one of the few Khrushchev's Secret speech denouncing the truly human moments of the congress In the. crimes of Stalin, at the 20th Party Congress absence of anecdotes was unintended. in. 1956). Pravda, a more official record than I ean Luis Corvalan, speaking in Spanish, re- counted how quick excerpts, reported only ap. counted how his Marxist government had re- ' versed a bourgeois practice and recognized plause for Mrs. Smirnova's appeal.? Tass and Pravda both reported "applause ! the Republic of Cuba and the People'f Ra public of China." and laughter" at a. sally by Mikhail Sholok- The interpreter put only the mention of, boy, the Soviet establishment novelist, last Cuba into Russian, and the audience, duly Saturday. He denounced the Austrian "right-sving re- visionist," Ernst Fischer, as an opponent of Socialist realism in the arts. Tass carefully noted that "Fischer" is the German word for "fisherman" before' reporting that Sholok- hov said, "This fisherman and other foreign anglers are trying to cast their lines with quite rotten flies, banking on catching as many gullible carp as possible with this bait in the muddy waters of the so-called realism , .without riverbanks." This, too, produced "animation In the hall." Sholokhov then added that there were too few gullible carp in the Soviet arts pond, so the "clever" anglers would pull out only small fry. The record then noted both ap- plause and laughter. NJ, SATURDAY was a big day for congres- sional humor: Foreign Minister Andrei Gra rnyko deadpanned a bureaucrat's joke in his foreign policy speech, unreported bY Tass. After recounting the foreign policy activi. ties of the Politburo, central committee, Su- preme Soviet and government, Gromyko said, "Our Soviet diplomacy is also fulfilling Its duty as helper of the party and govern- ment. I almost said our army of diplomats, but then I remembered that the appropriate personnel offices might pick on it, which might be bad for us guys." Pravda recorded applause but no laughter at this sly reference to bureaucracy's pe- rennial interest in reducing "surplus" per, sonnel lists. Significantly, nobody has reported hearing. any good "anecdotes" mocking the congress ? the true SOViethumor that produced doz- cued to applaud all references to the gallant Caribbean ally, burst out clapping. Corvalatt did not realize that the Inter- preter had deprived Peking of equal time. He looked 'surprised, since he knew that many speakers had been applauded for at- tacking Peking. But in one of the few spon- taneous actions by a congress speaker,' he. decided that if his listeners liked it, he would give it to them again. , He repeated that Santiago had recognized Cuba and China. This time, according to Western Communists who were in the Pal- ace of Congresses, the interpreter slowly in- cluded China in his translation. The audi- ence, finally clued in, sat on its hands. Cor- valan looked quizzical and continued. Approved For Rdlease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY June 1971 THE TWO FACES OF "DISSIDENT" COMMUNISTS In commenting -on the "negative phenomena" of revisonism and nationalism in the international Communist movement, Brezhnev in his address to the Congress singled out for specialcensure Roger Garaudy of France, Ernst Fischer of Austria, and Teodoro Petkoff of Venzuela_ They have all been read out of their parties. Their sin is not only to sneak out against various Soviet faults and malpractices but to do so consistently, regardless of the occasion. In this sense they may be regarded as true dissidents. BreZhnev did not go on to condemn Berlinguer and other Italian Communist leaders, Marchais of the French Communist Party, Carrillo of the Spanish Communist Party, Aarons of the Australian CP, and a host of.others, who also have from time to time criticized Soviet policies, particularly the invasion and "normalization" of Czechoslovakia- Such leaders have learned the limits of tolerable criticism of the Soviet Union and deserve to be called pseudo-dissie dents, as their behaviour at the 24th CPSU Congress illustrates. The 24th Party Congress showed that leaders of Communist parties of the world need considerable agility to walk their fine opportunistic line in trying to satisfy two conflicting political requirements, those of their Moscow Losses and those of the home electorate -- they bow to the bosses and try to deceive the homefront. The 24th CPSU Congress, held in Moscow from 30 March to 10 April, heard most foreign party delegates speak in innocuous cliches, concealing far more than they revealed of the divisions they have expressed between themselves and the CPSU. All pledged allegiance to proletarian internationalism (that Communist euphemism for submission to Soviet-dictated policies). Many who have for years vigorously claimed to oppose Soviet foreign policy and Soviet - dominance, extolled the vietues of both. After the Congress, the Communist and non-Communist populace may not have noticed the degrading spectacle of some delegations scurrying home to reassert their nationalism, independence, and their anti-Soviet positions which were to prove to local suporters that they didn't really mean what they said at the Congress! There are two mutually supporting explanations for this paradoxical behaviour. There is good reason to believe that the Soviets used various devices to control the expression of dissent Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 by delegates to the Congress, including some manner of censorship of "objectionable" passages in the speeches of visiting delegates. But since leaders seem not to have complained about any Soviet tampering with their speeches or about Soviet pressure on them, they in effect acquiesced in Soviet demands that there be no criticism at the Congress, Then, back home, they tried to mend any. damage done to the sensibilities of their constituencies by reiterating their earlier "principled" criticism, As a matter of political expediency, they play the game two ways in the face of conflicting political requirements. When in Moscow, that fountain- head Of money, organizational support and ideology, each Party makes obeisance to the CPSIJ Back home it changes the mask to appear in the guise most pleasing to its supporters who are their only hope Of reaching political power_ All the bravewords about autonomy, separate roads to socialism, and disapproval of Russian militarism are necessary at home in order to reassure any-fellow countrymen who mayhave heard the party leaders in Moscow declaring themselves in liege to a foreign power. This dichotomy of behaviour, in and out of Moscow, which can be illustrated in numerous instances, is particularly clear in the following three examples: George Marchais, Acting Deputy Secretary General of the Soviet- line Communist Party of France (PCF), declared in Moscow that "proletarian Internationalism_ is a sacred duty," Not a Word about the political trials- in Czechoslovakia which Husak promised not to hold and Marchais promised to denounce, Instead he praised the "cOnstant struggle waged by the CPSU and the Soviet state for the independence of oppressed peoples," Even before the Congress had adjourned he scrambled back on the right side of his own constituency by declaring to:the French Communist daily L'Humanit6 that his delegation "had not thought it wise," as guests of the Soviet leadership, to mention their "well known and unchanged" position toward military "intervention" in Czechoslovakia, In fact, he said, Czedi servility at the Congress embarrassed the French Party! Marchais told L'Humanite he "regretted" as "alien" to PCF principles Husak's abject adfhission to the world Communist movement gathered at the Congressthat the Soviet military intervention was after all a fraternal act in response to the "request" of Czechoslovakia, If Marchais' reproach of Husak were anything but an opportunistic tactic, Marchais would have expressed his 'regrets" before his world Communist audience at the Congress, The largest non-ruling Communist Party of them all, the Italian Communist Party (PCI), feels itself closest to that charmed circle of government and is therefore in greatest need of the facade of an independent are truly national party. The PCI has been most Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 vociferous in denouncing the Czech invasion and occupation and the Stalinist management of Poland which led to the 1970 riots. But all these critical judgments, which have the ring of sincerity in PCI publications, were left outside the door of the 24th Congress. None of the Soviet delegates or the 101 delegations ftaM 99 countries heard a word of disagreement or disapproval from Deputy Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer. He did not mention the fate of Czechoslovakia or the Brezhnev Doctrine which requires Czech- type treatment for any Communist regime which the Soviets deem to be practicing the very reforms that the PCI calls- for from the safety of non-Communist Italy. Berlinguer returned to Rome before the Congress adjourned. There he said defensively in exact if unconsious imitation of Miarchais, that the PCI's views on problems due to "Czech events" were "already well known'.' He assured his audience also that the PCI is "for a line of complete independence" and then their "path toward socialism.., will necessarily be different from those which other socialist countries have pursued..." (L'Uhita, 8 April, attached) The Australian Communist Party (CPA) _hag, been a persistent and outspaen critic of Soviet paicies, particularly on Czech- oslovakia. It has gone so far as to refuse to sign the June 1969 declaration of the World Communist Conference and has even invited the renegade Frenth Communist Roger Garaudy to'address its members, But National Secretary Laurie Aaron's speech to the 24th Congress contained nothing about the Czech tragedy. He mentioned none of the CPA-CPSU differences over the latter's domination in the name of proletarian internationalism, he said nothing df the hated Brezhnev Doctrine which he has frequently ctititized. The Soviet Party may have assured his silence by threatening to split the CPA as Aarons himself predicted they might do. Thus, like the other leaders, Aarons seems to have one party line for Moscow and another for the home crowd. But available accounts in the CPA daily (see attached) are equally innocuous and do not reiterate "well-known CPA positions," but do contrast drathatically With Aarons' ptevious criticisms. Whether the Communist and non-Conmunist populace of the various countries is fully aware of the extent of self-serving hypocrisy practiced by their Mbscow-ridden CPs is debatable. But it certainly has not escaped Soviet attention. At the opening session of the Congress, Brezhnev expressly warned the Parties against going too far and making too many compromises in order to win parliamentary power. Certain renegades, he said, show themselves as anti-Soviet in order to be declared "real Marxists" and thus fully independent. Although most parties are beyond the reach of Soviet arms and thus of the consequences of the Brezhnev Doctrine, few could survive in 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 isolation and therefore need to pay attention to such Soviet warnings, at least at international Communist gatherings. (Attached are excerpts from the Congress speeches of Georges Marchais, Acting Secretary General._ of the PCF, Enrico Berlinguer, Deputy Secretary General of the PCI, and of Laurie Aarons, National Secretary General of the CPA along with their remarks for home consumption, contrasting their fawning praiSe of the Soviet Union and ambiguous references to independence during the Congress with their more outspoken statements made for home conSpmption.) 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 AT THE CONGRESS Excerpts from speech to the 24th CPSU Congress by Georges Mhrchais, Acting Secretary General of the French Communist Party on 31 March 1971: "Dear comrades, I bring to the 24th CPSU Congress the warm greetings of the PCF and of its general secretary, Comrade Waldeck Rochet. Like every one of your party's congresses, this 24th congress is an impor- tant event for the communist and international movement.. But it is also an event of great interest for world opinion as a whole. This is so because your party, which has made triumph the ideals of the Paris Commune, whose centenary we have just celebrated, was the first to lead the socialist revolution to victory and to create the first socialist state in history. This is so because since that time the activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state has played a determining role in the service of socialism and peace in the evolution of the contemporary. world. This role is due first of all to the economic successes and the total achievements whose balance sheet is being convincingly presented at your congress and of which the Communist Party and the Soviet people can be proud. But your congress also attracts attention because it is resolutely turned toward the future. Comrade Brezhnev's report is ,permeated with the idea that the communists do not and cannot remain in the same place, that it is always necessary to advance with an acute sense of what is new and with creative initiative.... "...anti-Sovietism, no matter in what form it presents itself and no natter where it originates, constitutes a crime against the interest of the working class and the peoples. We are combating it and will con- tinue to combat it with ever increasing vigor.... "Dear comrades, bonds of brotherhood, solidarity, and cooperation have always existed between the PCF and the CPSU, and no trial has ever been able or will ever be able to sever them. We are determined to further consolidate, to consolidate ceaselessly, the relations between our two parties, which are rightly called fraternal parties....We attach great importance to the principle of the independence and sovereignty of all parties and to our principles being respected in our relations with fraternal parties. But at the same time, we believe that proletarian internationalism, the joint action of all the communist parties on a Marxist-Leninist basis, is a sacred durty and, indeed, the prerequisite for the success of our struggle.... "Long live the 24th CPSU Congress! Long live the friendship, solidarity, and cooperation between the PCF and the CPSU!... ,,Long live the united action of all the workers and peoples struggling against imperialism! Long live communism!" Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 AT HOME L'HUMANITE, Paris 2 April 1971 CPYRGHT Lmax Leon interview wizn ueorges Aarenalb In MVSUUWm 1 Avvi1 19(1] [Text] PCF Deputy Secretary General Georges Marchais, who is leading the French Com- munist Party delegation to the 24th CPSU Congress, was kind enough to comment for L'HUMANITE on some aspects of the work now in progress at the Palace of Congresses. Here are his answers to our questions: .1 Question: What are the initial impressions of our party's delegation after the first 3 days of the congress? Answer: So far we have been Mainly impressed by the emphasis put on the prospects for improving the living stanaard and increasing the prosperity of the Soviet peoPle, emphasis apparent both In the report submitted by L. BroZhnev, the speeches of - Most of the delegates. Obviously this is their main concern and it will leave its mark on the next 5-year period. L. Brezhnev's report ha.a also stressed that the main activities of the CPSU concerning the organization of society were directed at "develogng socialist demoeracy? in all its aspects, ? AIM have also noted with great interest thenew purpose marking the approadh to economio.:... and social questtAns. Of course the production ratios mid the econoMic laws of Soviet spoiety are essentially the same as 40 years ago?that is, of a socialist type--but the standard.reaehad by this sooialist society is now considerably higher.. -This, creates new problems which require new solutions. I shall mention only. one of these problems as an example, a problem which has justly been described in the report as being of "historic significanoe." I refer to the question oecombihing the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of the 'socialist economic system: The opportunities afforded in this sphere are boundless. What the congress has brought out even now is a clear and passionate reaffirmation of the Soviet Union's Will for peace. The, proposals formulated or renewed by the Soviet Union in this sphere can only insure the support of all men and women aspiring to peace, security, and disarmament. And finally, we cOMpletely agree with the idea expressed in the report on the activities of the CPSU Central Committee that the cohesion and the unity in action of the world communist movement is a complex but especially imperative task at a time when the : imperialistslare intensifying their aggressive activities against the freedom-loving peoples. Question: Al]. observers have noted that the number of foreign delegations participating in the congress has been larger than ever before, ShOUld any special significance ,be attached to that fact? Answer: Absolutely. Over 100 delegations from communist parties and patriotic and revolutionary organizations are present. This representation is due to the great prestige enjoyed by the. CPSU among the workers ar peopleB Of all olontinents. pprovea ror elease 1 uuu/uu/az : CIA-KUlatU-U11U4AUUUJUUUUUUU1-4 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT 8ut we believe that it is also the to the will or the communist parties to present a united front in the struggle against imperialism, irreepective, of some differences , of opinion. m, Well) this is an idea dear to the French comeunisto. Obviously, We believe that more, an be no unity without principles. our *trona aimatil at the unity of the entire world communist movement go hand in hand with our continual struggle on two fronts: against rightist opportunism and against leftist opportunism. We recalled this yesterday in our greetings to the congress. having said this, our. 19th congress has emphasized that neither any differences in . .the conditions under which the struggle is waged nor the very existence of differences concerning some problems must weakem or hinder in any way the necessary unity of action of all the communist parties. ;It was with this in Mind and in-order to avoid any polemics that, in accordance with its mandate, our delegation decided to-avoid recalling, in its greetings to the congress of a fraternal party of which it is a guest, the well-known and unchanged attitude of the PCP ta,the August 1968 military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Obviously, every delegation says what it wants but our delegation believes it regrettable Cha'rihe CPCZ delegation has thought fit to devote the main part of its greetings to an .eXpose of its views on this problem, an exposd several aspects of' which impliea-criticisms of our own attitude. shall add with parti.ellar reference to the questien of the sovereignty of the socialist state that the thesis formulated by the Czechoslovak delegation seems to us alien to the principles .jointly determined by the'communist parties in the state- ment issued by the June 1969 Moscow conference. For our part, wd are firmly adhering to these principles. Speaking in more general terms, we shall pursue our efforts with perseverance, calm, and patience, ethert-e-aimed at unity of action of all communist parties on the basis both of the indet;endence,of every party and of proletarian internationalism. L'HUMANITE, Paris 2 April 1971 FJfITIIIIITIPTDE GEORGES MARCUM. raumanite CPYRGHT NAOSCXYU, ler am! (par tempnone). Georyub secrittairt ganeJA adjoint du Parti Communiste Francais, qui dhign In ddlegniion au 24'ConqrOs du Pnrfi Communistedellirlion Sovieiique, a lairJa vouhi uJnumifir:r pour altunnoite quelques aspects dos travaux en cours au Palais dos Gongres. Voic Ir r{;ponses dull sfahes e,epPei que5tions. QUE5TION (Wiles f;0111, ICS premieres im- pressions 40 la (*lega- tion de netre I' a rti .apree iroie jours de APcsAIRP eiggee frappe le pitie Our rine- tent, rine ee :telt dans le blement, c'est le solid do- rapport. present?ar minant qui marquera le L Ltreinev on dans les in- proehain quinquennat. terventions de la plupart des delegues, c'est l'accent De metne, le rapport de rnis teir les perspectives L. Brejnev a Indtque forte- .4 etre des Sovietiques. Visi- Parte Commeniete de 1 CPYRGHipproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Minion Sovietique touchant l'organisation de la seelete etait 4, le c16Arc1oppe,neni, trt la democratte suclaliste et melt dans tous ses as- pects, Nous relevons egalenient avert ttn nrind MONA Is ens du nouveau qui carne- terise l'approche des ques- tions economiques et so- dales. then entenclu, les rapports de production, les lois economiques de la so- clad sovietique sont fonda- mentalement les memes qui) y a en ans, c'est-a- dire qu'lls on de type so- cialiste. Mats le niveau at- teint par cette societe so- elaliste est considerablement plus eleve aujourd'hui.D'ou les problemes nouveaux. qul appellent des solutions nou- velles. Je ne citerat, titre d'exemple. qu'un seul d ces problemes, dont le rapport dit avec raison quil posse- de un e poree liistorique 11 s'agit de reallser la Jonc- tIon de la revolution sclen- tiflque et technique avec les avantages du system eco- nomique socialiste. Les pas- sibilites offertes dans ce doinaine sont immense. Ce qui ressort encore des niaintenant du congres, c'est la reaffirmation claire et passlonnee de la volonte de pals de l'Union Sovietique. Les propositions formulees ou renouvelees par le. Patti Communiste de l'Unlon So- vletique a cet egard ne peu- vent qu'entrainer l'a d h - son de tous les hommeS et les femmes qul asplrent hr. pais, a la admit& au desarmement. Enfin, nous sommes pro- fondement d'a ccord avec l'idee exprimee dans le rap- port d'activite du Comite Central du Parti Comme- niste de l'Union Sovietique que la cohesion, l'uutt? d'action tin mouvement communist? Mondial eat une Mein complexe, mats particullerement imporieuse au moment o? les imperia- listes intensifient !curs ac- thdtee agressives contre les peoples eprls de liberte. QUESTION : Tons iles observateurs ont note qu'uft nombre jamais atteint de delegations' etrangires participent an congris. Dolt-on at- tribuer sine significa- tion particullere oe fait REPONSE : Abeolument. PIM de cent delegations de partis communistes et d'or- ganisations patriotiques et revolutionnaires sont pre- sentee. Cette represe.ntatlon tient au.grand prestige du PCUS pitrmi les traVailleurs, Petiplee de .to lee conti- nents. Mats, selon nous, cute tient, aussi a la volonte des pants eommunistes de presenter, par-dela crines diffe- rences d'oninlons, un front uni tl lutte contre l'impe- rialisme. blen, c'est la un e 1dee qui est there aux conirnu- nistes francals. Naturcllement, pour no/13, 11 ne peut s'agir d'une uni`e sans principes. Nos ef1ort7, en faveur de l'unite de tout le mouvement communistr mondial vont de pair avec tine lutte permanente sur Ins deux fronts, centre l'un- porturilline dO 'Unite nt, Von- portunistne de geuche. Nous l'avons rappel liter dans notre salutation au congres. Ceci rift. notre 19 Con gr souligne que la divcrsite des conditions d I U t t l'existence meme des diver- gences stir certaines queg- tions ne doivent en nueun eas affatblir ou entrover la neeessaire unite d'action dr tous les partts coninitinf3tes. C'est en partant de ccs idees et pour eviter la po- lemique, que notre delega- tion, comme elle en avait mandat, n'a pas Juge bon de rappeler, dans sa salutation au congres d'un parti here dont elle est Plite, la posi- tion bien connue ? et in- changee ? du Part' Corn-. muniste Francais sur l'in- tervention 1968 en Tcheeoslovaquie. Evidemment, chum,. dic.- legation intervIcnt comrne elle l'e n ten d. Cependant, noire delegation juge re- grettable cote la deltgatirm du Pilaf Communistede Tchecoslovaqule aft ern de- voir consacrer l'essentlel sa salutation it l'expos6 de sa position sur cette ques- tion, expose dant plusleurs aspec ts impliqualent tine critique de notre propre position. J'ajoute qu'en ce qui con- cerne phis partletilierement la question dela. sciiverrq-, bete .tie l'Etat suciallste,P. these formulec par la delee Ration tchecoslovaque noes apparalt etrangere nix prInCipes definis en corn- mull per )e$ porta eotninu. nistee dans la declaratirn tie la Conference de Moe- cou, en juin 1969. Pour notre p art. not s nous en tenons fertnement h cos principes. Plus generalement, nor..s poursuivrons avec perseve- rance, calme et patience. nos efforts en. faveur d'action de tous les partls communistes sur 1-t double base de l'Indepen- dsunee de chsente Partt et de lintetriationtliento Proleta. rte". ' THE GUARDIAN, Manchester 3 April 1971 CPYRGHT French re ullie for Czech view of 1968 invasi rt From ANATOLE SNUB, Paris, April 2 The French Communist Party leader, M. Georges Marchais today rebuked attempts at the Soviet ,Party Congress in Mos- cow to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In an interitiew with "L'Humanite," he attacked the Czechoslovak leader,'Mr Husak, for raising the question at the CIngress. M. Marchais said the French delegation at the congress had not thought it wise, as guests of the Soviet leadership, to recall " the well known ? and unchanged" positien of tho French party toward the Rus- sian "military intervention." ITherefore, French Communists regretted that Mr Husak had devoted most of his speech to the subject. "Several aspects" of Mr Husak's speech, "implied a criticism of our own position.'% Furthermore, Mr Husak's justi- fication of the Soviet interven- tion "appears to us alien to the principles defined together" at the Moscow conference of Com- munist Parties dn June 1969. Thge A969st:nordiferenc&ecivit:osidie!' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDpigilliaeAfekiAORY054600 1-4 ApproveGWN6ii6ase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 by the Italian. French, Rumanian and other parties to the Soviet line. ? Washington Post. In Moscow, the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, told the congress that the forces of reaction "were preparing to unleash terrible war," Dut the Soviet Union would win such a war with missiles that could hit anything. We are strengthening our army not for attack but for defence," he said. "However, our armed forces are always ready to chastise the aggressor, and fight on that territory from which he dares violate our borders." According to UPI, Western analysts thought Marshai Groehko was referring in WI warning to the United States, not China. His speech Was con. sidered " routine rocket4 rattling." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 5 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 AT THE CONGRESS Excerpts from speech by Italian Communist Party Deputy Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer at the 1 April session of the 24th CPSU Congress. "Dear Comrades, I bring you, delegates at the 24th CPSU Congress, and all Soviet comrades, the fraternal greetings of Italian communists and of the Secretary General of our party, Comrade Luigi Longo. To the communists and to all peoples of the Soviet Union, we express the sincere hope that the decisions of this, your congress, may advance in all fields your socialist society and the building of the material and technical basis of communism. It is noteworthy that in the economic 5-year plan which has just begun there is expressed the aim to achieve a substantial increase in the material and cultural living standard of the Soviet peoples. This appears to be.an_important sign. We know that this effort for a further economic mansion is accompanied by the growing aid of the Soviet Union to all those peoples who are fighting for their own independence and freedom, in the first place to the heroic people of Vietnam and the Arab countries. All this indicates not only the scope and solidarity of the victories already achieved as*viell as the immense potential of your socialist society, but also the fundamental contribution made by the Soviet Union to the defense of world peace and the building of a world free from imperialism, hunger, and war. "Our solidarity with your party, with the Soviet Union, with all socialist countries, has always remained alive and active. Our interna- tional solidarity does not and cannot mean our full identification with the choices which each socialist country, and more generally each communist and workers party, has made and is making on its own responsi- bility, but it means a basic solidarity with a country such as your own, with the other socialist countries, with a whole world which, through its own existence and victories, has already changed the fate of mankind. "Our internationalism is founded on the recognition of the full independence of each country and each party and leaves the way open, as has already happened and as can always happen, to moments and circumstances cf dissension and divergence, without in any way, as a result of this, weakening solidarity and duty in the struggle for the great aims which unite us. "In the course of a long and difficult progress, our party has put down deep roots among the working masses of the Italian people. It has, emerged as an important national force. From Lenin, first of all, and then from Gramsci and Togliatti, we have received the teaching which has shown us fight to open for our people a path toward socialism which correspond to the particular historic, social, and political Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 _04 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 conditions of our country, as well as the conditions in which there develops conCretely the world struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism. "We are also seeking to state .the major outlines of the socialist state which we wish to build in Italy, together with the contribution of the other forces of the working class and the people. It is obvious that even on the general problems of socialism, of socialist thought and of the international workers movement, our party, while it is attentively studying the results of the practical and theoretical work of other parties, is working to make its own specific contributions, arising from its own experience and ideas. At the same time, we firmly reject any solicitations to break or weaken our internationalist duty within the great world revolutionary communist movement of which we are part and of which we will always be part, as a result of a free choice made by us on the basis 6c Marxist-Leninist principles by which we are inspired and on the basis of the deepest interests of the working class and our people. Within this framework, we have fought and we will always fight any manifestation of anti-Sovietism...." AT HOME L'UNITA, Rome 8 April 1971 CPYRGHT PCI Deputy General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer statement on CPSU congress ....At the congress, Berlinguer added, we had the opportunity of noting once again the existence of assessments which were different from our own on certain important questions concerning the international workers movement, relations between communist parties, and the develop- ment of socialist thought. It is not only a matter of problems raised by the Czechoslovak events, our positions on those are already well known, but also of more general questions like, for example, the one relating to the necessity of full respect for the independence of every party, every state,? and every socialist state, which remains a fundamental question for us. "Our line is clear, and we have confirmed it at every point: We are in favor, of a strong internationalist commitment, side by side with all the socialist countries, communist parties, add anti-imperialist forces. "At the same time, we are for a line of complete independence both with regard to the struggle and the quest which we are conducting in Italy for a path toward socialism and for a socialist building -- which Approved For Release 1999/09/027: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 are and will necessarily be different from those which other socialist countries have pursued and are pursuing -- and with regard to the judgment of and the way in which we are operating within the great international alinement to which we belong. "This remains the substance of our position. We are aware that our enemies would prefer to be faced by a PCI which is a servile imitator , of other models and devoid of the capacity to.autahomously formaate and defend a policy of its own or else by a PCI wiiiEh has ceased to be an internationalist force. "Instead, autonomy and internationalism are and will remain inseparable aspects of our way of operating within the reality of our country and of the international workers movement. Whoever hopes that we will deviate from this line in one direction or another will always be deluded. "Regarding the speculations and falsifications made recently, it is only necessary to repeat that UT communists are certainly not seeking the applause or recognition of our opponents: What we are interested in is that the substance of our positions should be understood by the workers, the democratic forces, and all earnest people." L'UNITA, Rome 18 April 1971 L'UNITA interview with PCI Politburo member Gian-Carlo Pajetta on 24th cODORAIK-Ts. "Comrade Gian-Carlo Pajetta, who was a member of the PCI delegation w.liCh attended the 24th CPSU Congress, has granted us the following interview on its proceedings and results. "Question: Would you first give, us a general opinion on the congress? "...Comrade Berlinguer has already expressed a first opinion in his interview on returning from Mbscow. We have had a report in the party d_rectorate, we will widely disseminate the documents which have been published recently, and we will continue the debate and the study at party meetings and in confrontations with others. Odrs is a positive opinion, at the same time, it also aims at a critical-eXdminatidn-bf-a fundamental experience. We do not want a description '5raft adVertisement of some kind of a 'model,' as if we had attended an international elibition and as if we were faced with the problem of importing a finished product to be used here in our country. Approved For Release 1999/9/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT "Question: 'Returns' and 'rehabilitations' had been expected. Have these fore-Casts been confirmed? "Answer: I believe that for an opinion on the congress and on the prospects which it opens it is necessary to go back to the debate which ' been going on almost everywhere in recent months and to which such great amount of space has been devoted in the international press. Ale remember, for example, the reverberations caused by a question put to a West European communist party leader about his reaction were the 24th congress 'to disavow the 20th' and how his answer that 'in this :ase, his party would not approve it' seemed courageous and aroused sensation. "Question: Could you tell us something about the way in which the oroblems of the articulation of society and of the economic and social development were presented? "Answer: A Central Committee document appeared on the eve of the congress which stresses the function of the Soviets and provides a more specific base to their greater autonomy by means of greater powers in the economic field and by means of more conspicuously autonomous budgets. At the congress, and particularly in Brezhnev's and Kosygin's reports, there was no lack of references for workers' participation and democratic life, also seen as prerequisites for greater efficiency, references which were intentionally accompanied by appeals for discipline and organizational efficiency. Thus, although the theme of the trade unions was certainly not a central one, the reference made to them did not stop -- as some people believed they could simplify it -- at the 'transmission belt' formula but stressed their duty to represent and to defend the interests of the workers. "It is not possible to speak about a turn and perhaps not even about a deepening in connection with the themes of democracy and of the insti- tutions The intention here was to stress the continuity, but recalling that this means a condemnation of theillegalities of the 'personality cult' period and a desire to overcame what was arbitrary, improvised, and personal during the period of 'subjectivism.' "I intentionally refer to the two terms in quotation marks because the fact that complicated phenomena are being schematized and almost concealed by .a label appears to us as a limitation of research and political debate and therefore as a limitation of the congress. It is as if a kind of modesty (a dangerous political modesty, we believe) prevented a pore open political debate which would certainly be fruitful and would take place in the direction in which it was intended to move and in which things were moving. When a congress seems as if it were dominated by the concern for unanimity and for the proclamation of monolithism, a part of its effectiveness seems to become lost, as if the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001 -4 CPYRdffroved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 meeting of experiences and the recognition of the problems were being tarnished by elements of liturgy. "This was felt perhaps in more than one speech, but it must be stated clearly that it was not a characteristic of the reports. At this point we must ask the reader to show an attentiveness which political observers seem to have lacked, particularly those who were concerned with providing a daily comment aimed at serving preconceived theses rather than pro- viding information.... "The profound disagreement between the Soviet Union and China re- mains like a painful wound in the international workers movement, and the polemical positions of the CCP also remain acute. The polemic was taken up again on the eve of the congress, and no one could hope for sensational gestures of pacification. Naw then, if there was an echo of the polemic and a sharp answer to the attacks at the CPSU congress and if the positive, albeit limited results in interstate relations were stressed, here also, although no progress was made, there was no move backward, nor has the conflict sharpened.... "The theme of the defense of the socialist countries was stressed, and there was a.return -- and no one could expect things to happen differently -- to insisting, even quite strongly, on the justification of Czechoslovakia's occupation. We have maintained and have declared and recalled in this respect a view point which did not come close to or offer any rapprochement. "Question: We would like you to examine finally the meaning and the value of the international representations at the 24th congress. "Well, we must say that the presence of 101 delegatiohs provides the answer, and in a direction which appears to us to be the right one. There were not only different organizations and countries with absolutely clIfferent curcumstances but also voices which, because they represented different situations and conditions, could not all have the same accent. We Italians stressed this in Berlinguer's speech and we spoke clearly, in our own way, and in our own style: That is, Italiana. interna- tionalist at the same time. There was no lack of attention at the congress, nor of stimulation for the debate and the confrontation, even in the many meetings which took place between various delegations.... "When we were among Soviet workers and soldiers, even with other delegations, one thing always seemed clear to everyone: It was useless to ask us to be different from what we are, but it was impossible to doubt the internationalism of the Italian communists. Unity in diversity: Perhaps not everyone says it and admits it, but for everyone this is a fact to be accepted. When I was asked to speak about our party's policy to students from every part of the world who were gathered in their university, no one thought that a voice which, perhaps, would not repeat the same words included in their textbooks could be inopportune. Approved For Release 1999/Q8/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 t9Rincl-For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 And when a written question in Arabic, and another one in Spanish, both of them interested and polemical in connection with our position with our position on Czechoslovakia, were handed to the rostrum, it appeared tome that speaking to those 500 young people and calling things by their name was the most natural thing in the world. It was also natural For them to listen and to seek to understand although they did not all reply with applause, but this is no less natural." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : gl1k-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 AT THE CONGRESS PRAVDA, 143 scow 9 April 1971 CPYRGHT Australian Communist Party National Secretary Laurie Aaron s greetings &peecn,a e unspecified] :Text] Dear comrades: Australiats communists greet the working people of the Soviet Inion on the occasion of the 24th CPSU Congress, an important event in the life of ioUr country. (applause). We wish great successes to the congress and to all the workers, kolkhoz members, and representatives of the intelligentsia, who, at the price of their 'leroic labor and privations over the past 53 years, have transformed their motherland, iespite the embittered hostility of imperialism and some aggressive wars. (applause) %t the 24th CPSU Congress plans are being discussed which provide for new achievements in the"sphere of industry, agriculture seience, and culture, the raising of the living standard of the working people, and for the development of socialist democracy. Following Lenin's traditions of proletarian internationalism, the 24th CPSU Congress has again confirmed the readiness of the Soviet people to give support to the national liberation struggle of all peoples of the world ggainst American imperialism. The peoples of Indochina, who are heroically resisting the U.S. imperialists and its puppets and satellites, are in the vanguard of this worldwide movement. (applause) The remarkable victories won by the peoples o7 Indochina in the struggle against all the military and technical might of the United States immeasurably strengthen the struggle of all the peoples for liberty. (applause) .J The Australian Communist Party ppposes the capitalist class of its own country, which .s,willingly playing the role of ponfederate of the United States in its aggressiv.e war against the peoples of Indochina. This is our international duty and, at the same 7ime, a main factor in the preparation for revol.utionary actions against Australian nonopoly capitalism and against American domination of political life, and 'oreign policy of Australia. Che Australian communists are actively participating in the broad and ever growing antiwar mmvement. This coziitionbof different social and political forces is opposing 'tar, demanding the withdrawal of all Australian and American forces and of military squipment from Indgehina, and is striving to prevent the drafting of young Australians into the army to wage this unjust war: (applause) At the same time, the Australian 3ommunist Party is conducting its independent campaign by exposing imperialism as the nalprit for war,(and is supporting all popular forces fighting in Indochina. The com- nunists support the proposals advanced by the DRV and the PRGRSV. (applause) Certain groups of more conscious -Australian workers are already waging strikes under the slogan, "No normal business life while the war lasts." In May adSeptember 1970 more than 120,000 people who went out onto the streets of the country's chief cities parti- cipated in mighty protest demonstrations against the war. Together with other peace- loving forces, the communists will do everything to involve as many people as possible in the most active forms of the antiwar actions. We consider it our dliti?flY7oppose primarily "our own' capitalism. (applause) We also 'consider the struggll'against.Australials colonial pressure against the developing national liberation struggle in New Guinea and support for the demands of the oppressed itradtiagegeeeVettA4Va*MoLPOW1110-21MqpilkalOrcw4" r4.:1 .1 CAilVi644-E1 For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 In Australia we are striving to struggle against such ideas engineered by the capitalist system as racism, militarism, the sense of hopelessness and alienation, and against false moral values. Such ideas are the unseen force which cements the system of oppres- sion in the developed capitalist countries. The theoretical and practical struggle against these bourgeois ideas is the main task of the Australian revolutionary movement. The workers movement in Australia is putting forward ,new demands and is devising new methodic of waging a struggle against the monopolies and for their economic, sooiel, and political demands. The growth of resistance to the attempts to transfer the burden of inflation and other difficulties of the capitalist economy to the shoulders of the workers And poorest strata of the population and also the growth of the movement of democratic rights to counteract the aspiration of the ruling classes to limit democracy even further are of particular significance. Reaction is preparing for an offensive for the purpose of stopping the strike movement of te workers, fettering the trade unions, disrupting demonstrations, and crushing the' protest movement against war and military rvice. We consider that there are prospects in Australia for developing the class struggle and ibr even greater fusion of the workers movement with the antiwar movement and the move- ment for new moral .values, ma word, with those movements .which are fundamentally anticapitalist and can .issue a socialist challenge to capitalist domination in Australia Comrades: The policy and practical activity of the CPSU are of enormous signifie canoe for the world revolutionary prodecc and have a positive influence on?the forward movement of all mankind.' We once again wish the congress success in all spheres. (stormy mm10.11.30) TRIBUNE, Sydney 21 April 1971 CPYR (Eon Leozric-- 4 (irons- Moscow) THU 24th Congress of the Communist Party of thL Soviet Union ended on April .10 with the unanitri- otz election of a new Cen- taa Committee of 245 members, with 150, ,alterrir ate members. The old Om- tri Committee had 139 -members:.? ?..-- The new Political Bureau has 15 members, With four al entities as against 11 mem- bers with four alternates on the previous Political Bureau. Ar the previous 11 members were re-elected, Western press speculation about major changes in the Scviet party Icatiership, and a power struggle within the leadership. hate(' proved false, provecHattrbRelease congress would "rehabili- tate" Stalin, rezhinev's mat the Chinese leaders "demand- ed that we ithould abandon the line of the 20th Congress and the program of the CPC.IU." 'Le also dealt with art and litiTature, saying: "1.11 tate ?development of our art, there were complicating factors of another order. There were some pivmle who ;Knight to mince the diversity of pro- seot-day tioviet reality It, problems that have irreversi- bly receded into the past tus a main.: of the work (lonLt by im.ety to surtnoist the consequmicel of the person- silty cult. 'Anotiwr extreme was, the attirrapt to whit,cwW1.' past phenomerst which the party had subjected ?;:o emphatic and prineiptcd criticism, cre- ative element; which the arty 'ha, Introduced Into its 9 9 9/KM it;atiAlkc5el5litgb 1 .1 The COrPZIIZEI devoted its main attontIon to the mom- omY, and the planned develop- ment of industry and o.grictl- titre, with large capital vestments and extensive a i- ,plicatIon of science and tegi- nology, It decided that growth rate of industries po:)- due,Ittig consumer goods wet Id. :be faster than that of heivvy industry. The Congress decided tI at by 1975 "the average month- ly wage of workers and. of- fice employees will rine to 1G- 149 rubles, and the remun T- alton of collective fur/rum" labor to Ed) rubles." The mot- 'mum wage is to Ilse to 79. ruWeo. The 1570 harvest. VMS a me- ord lac million tons, and lie Nun, cans for an aver tge grain output of 195 million ttSltm in the last five years, nOo 94Acitigi biaLuft metres of? new lOUUVOG)041-4uill, in the tiovlet thlit)11 The lass for UM million MI Woo Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT 350 LII 0 17,01 teL10 AY at yr _re. ilin)nrvertierit in Hetet; ataiitaaraa A. quite Ail PI:t..:AarVi, the:, ;;Airilittet, i'i COntfreait, inaltatteat rto eatotantial. enarigee Soviet I ()reign ;)olley. Stress was laid. On the peaceful aims of tiais policy. Congress adopted state- ments on Indochina iind the Middle Feast, declaring ropport for the Indochinese and Arab peoples e.gainst imperialism. On relations with the USA, Ilrethrlea said: In the recent period, the US Adminietra- tion has taken a more rigid atance on a rounber of inter- natiorutl isattea, including name which have a beitring on the int.ereato a the Soviet Union." tt 1/' irt i US policy are V.ttateCtf.:(1 W11;11 ct>nt'Ic oltU araiee, breztinev mild: "We preorael eastanptioa that, it is possible to improve rela- tions lktween the Miran erta the 1.11.1A, telt we haVo ter eon., elder whether we are dealing wit,11 st. req1.1 (11'1;in, (.0 mate: iseueri tI, the reetotiatire; table." 1.ireZtlrieV*14 report juatined. the A moist I Int Warriaw Peet intervention in Cale:lea atiovelia, quoting from a re- cent doemeent ta? the Czecho- alove.k Comment:a, Party, In his final ripeech he mild that Cotigreee /nu' evert that fra- ternal parte% 11I Ili.fl1fll()U$Iy Iffoved Min COM/ lima iseeirien the ritual:merit by Preneti commtiniet leader eheorgea Whirr:halo Mame:10a net the French. pertv from the CZ4whooloyak into:ref:talon, Italian committal(' apoltestnan nitric? lierlinguer gave an in- terview In Norsk clearly Mat- ing Um Italian Communist I'arty's critical views on this and Other Wawa, . Very few one the eireecluie delivered na the Conffers re- ferred to Czechoslovakia and not many were critical of. China. Australian conununist dele- gates had discuons with other delegations, including the Vietnam Workers' purty and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Wo informed the Vietnantese of anti-War actions in Australia, and handed over money col- lected on the aka:eon of the 25th arraiversary of the Democratic Republic of Viet- UL aelatanuer z a token .of eolidarity. Altair the talka, the Vietnam Workers' arty sent a letter to the .Austrealan delegation saying Your delegation's apeech at the 24th Congresn or the ClalitT ban weal twain Iiittiwrt the militent aolidarity of your party witit our just atruggle, enci .your retiolute action egainat the AMerleitrl imperialiats for the withdraw- al, without any conciitiona, of all US and satellite' f orcas from Indochina." The Australian delegation also had talks with the dale- gateo of the Communiet Party of Japan. They estimated the recent municipal election as a big advance for the party. (See report, p. 9). TRIBUNE, Sydney 20 January 1971 CPYRGHT A delayed newt from Perin ,ii lii the: nett week. The meeting, caned hY iAie Jane !ry 5 Committee witielt vitrioun Iereneb Left lA Menden, Wit' IttlAtritted by n (ire than 200e fieoPle. It: wen withers:led by Per- raer lending members of the meet Comm unint Petty, I / Oaraurly and Cherie:1 7111071, and by the well-known Czechorilovak comm unlet I eoler Jirl Pelikan, now In t Another exiled Czechonlo- yak communirit, Eduard inadraucker, sent a me:triage from London, where he In now living, Mr. Aarorue meesage Raid: 'The Communint Party of kuntralla maintainn its stand of Auguet al, 1968, that, the occupation of Czeehoelovaltia by armtel rorcea of the USSR and four other Witreaw Pact poyaze wits urklustiMPRIVVElltibittO flable. Our 22nd Congress, held th March, ,1970, over- JJOflS message on Czech plight A message scat by Mr Laurie Aaron, national sec- retary of the Coynmonist Party of Australia, to 0 meet- ing 451 solidarity will* Czechoslovakia held in Paris on November 26, 1970, was adopted as a resolution by Me meeting. whelmingly reaffirmed this Mond. "The Communist Party of Czechoeloyakta on .Tanuary 1068, set out on a new course f?nocialist democracy and workers self - management. This course won great popu- lar support from workers, fkaeants, intellectuala and students in the Czech lands and Slovakia,' The CPA W- c'rnC t es a mont import- ant development for the in- ternational communist move- ment and for the world re- volutionury precess. "The juattfieetionit allarept. ed ror the occupation were !Mee end without foundation. The occupation damaged the altet cause in Cztchoelo- vakfa tiaelf, nnd all over the, were!, and. Indeed, itermed the preetlee or the went rieif rind the other countries Involved, "Ilttbeemient eventa in Cze- chefiloyakia by the occupa- tion is striving the break the resistance of the broad masses by telling them they are isolated and abandoned, and that there is nothing for them to do but r6sign them- selves to this soet,alleda. new reality. As if they have f or- e,etten Ulna we became com- munists andoecialists.not in ordei t.o accent 'reality' but precisely in order to change It. "Your actilm in all the more linportant since our people are noting with some alarm arid bitterness the confusion and the discouraging silence of many of those. to whom we are bound by the sante noc- ialist purpose' and who, al- though they condemned the military interventlo.n in Ang- lin 1963. are beginning little by little to accommodate thetreirilven to lia co .riiittneeft." ROIEtVge,40401,00,10Z:C chum," dome but rather les- 14 "The only porune courae In Mint which reliever to tim- bal:it, principles of interna- tional ritIntions, first ranted by Merx anti developed by Le?In; the immediate with- drawal of en occupying troops, restoring natiounl in- dependence end 8(qt-deter- mination to the Czech and ? Slovelt nation, tottheir Com- munlat Party, ??trade union movement end all popular ? organinations, for return to the path of socialait renewal mid democratic advance," Mr. Peliknn told the meet- ing: Tour action ls all the more Important alnce.the pre- sent regime Imposed on Cze- MuiliM4A06300090001-4 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 relations began warming. The Arab-Israeli confrontation of 1967 again brought Moscow and Belgrade closer together. A, year later, events in East Europe once more destroyed the tenuous Soviet- Yugoslav rapprochement. 5. The Dubcek regime in Prague made no secret of the fact that much of its inspiration came from the successes achieved in Belgrade with the Yugoslav brand of independent Communism. The Yugoslav press bespoke Belgrade's pleasure with developments in Czechoslovakia and many Yugoslav officials privately commented that the Czech experiment might even eclipse the accomplishments of Yugoslavia's self-management program which Prague was using as its model. In contrast to growing criticism of DUbcek's domestic reforms coming from Soviet, East German, and Polish media, in April 1968, Yugoslavia's Borba commented that "The process of democratization unfolding?TE?Czethoslovakia offers sufficient guarantee that its aims can be realized." Sovereignty Denied 6. All indications are that the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia caught the Yugoslays by complete surprise and in Yugoslav eyes, the Kremlin had again reverted to Stalinism and big-power Chauvinism. Yugoslavia saw an even more sinister threat in the post-invasion enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine. This Soviet statement that the internal affairs of each member of the socialist fraternity were the direct concern of all other members, implied possible action against Romania, Yugoslavia's neighbor and the only Soviet bloc nation that supported Czechoslovakia and refused to participate in the invasion. Immediately after the occupation, there was a sudden increase in the number of East European "tourists" who cropped up in Yugoslavia. According to Belgrade these "tourists" were visiting for one purpose to collect intelligence on Yugoslav military preparedness, particularly in Macedonia. 7. Adding to Yugoslav apprehensions were rumors of Soviet military maneuvers held during late August and early September along the Romanian border. At the same time, Bulgarian media began intensifying their agitation over the Macedonian question and the Bulgarian military newspaper echoed the Brezhnev doctrine with a warning by a Bulgarian deputy defense minister that Bulgaria was ready to go "anywhere else" to rescue socialism. The Soviet East German, Polish and Bulgarian press launched bitter attacks against Yugoslavia and against Tito personally, accusing him of having inspired the "revisionist" activity which had made the intervention in Czechoslovakia necessary. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 8. By a series of actions --- some clandestine and some quite open!--- the Soviets have continued since August 1968 to bring pressure on Belgrade and to remind the Yugoslays of their vulnerability. The resultant Yugoslav antipathy for the Soviets has not abated and is still a prominent factor in Yugoslav thinking. In March 1969, President Tito had set the tone for the 9th Yugoslav Party Congress by reviewing the history of Soviet interference in Yugoslav affairs. By 1971, the atmosphere remained unchanged as Tito's May Day speech constantly harked back to danger from external enemies and several times cited foreign intelligence activities, noting that "especially recently we have felt incredible pressure." The Incredible Pressures 9. Fresh instances of foreign meddling in internal Yugoslav affairs have come to light in the past few months.- First, a new species of Soviet-Yugoslav-agent emerged in the form of expatriates who had been studying in Soviet military academies at the time of the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav rupture and who Chose or were pursuaded to stay on in the USSR. Many have readied the rank of major or colonel in the Soviet forces. One such was retired Soviet army colonel Nikola Grujic who was arrested in Belgrade in February 1970 and Charged with, spreading propaganda hostile to the Yugoslav government, Grujic had previously been in and out of Yugoslavia on visits; he had been warned about making anti-regime statements, but refused to be muzzled. According to Tanjug and other Yugoslav press accounts of this incident, the Grujic case is far from being an isolated one. According to some Belgrade source, a number of these military expatriate tourists have been caught trying to recruit Yugoslays for the Soviet secret service (KGB). 10. Yugoslav apprehensions were further sharpened in 1970 with the exposure of a worrisome espionage case. In March, Hans Peter Ruhlmann a correspondnet of the West German weekly, Der Spiegel, was arrested with two Yugoslays and accused of a "criminal act of e-sTionage." The foreign country involved was not named, but infOrmed Yugoslav officials say that the case was run by East German intelligence with the undoubted complicity of the Soviet Union. Charged with RUhlmann were Hilmi Taci, Belgrade correspondent of Rilindija, an Albanian-language paper published in the traditionally nationalist region of Kosovo, and Jovan Turkulja, described as a "functionary of the military establishment." Immediately after the arrests, the East German embassy's press attach was suddenly called home. 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 11. The Ruhlmann investigation and trial, which lasted almost a year, culminated in a six-year sentence for Ruhlmann who was convicted of having procured from his Yugoslav collaborator highly secret materials which he then passed on to a "foreign government and a foreign organization as well as to two representatives of a foreign state." In late April 1971, the Yugoslav Supreme Military Court apparently decided the sentence, as it read, was far too ambiguous. The Supreme Court rejected the conviction handed down by the lower military court and returned the case with a demand for additional evidence and for the name of the foreign power involved. 12. The 'Ullmann case had several ominous implications for Yugoslav officials in addition to simply raising questions about domestic loyalties in the face of apparent renewed Soviet-directed subversion. For one, the fact that an AlOanian was involved with Ruhlmann added weight to Yugoslav charges that the 1968 Kosovo riots were partially brought on by foreign meddling. The part played by Albanian propaganda in stirring up troubles was Obvious, but even in 1968 Belgrade was insisting that "other intelligence agencies" were behind the disorders. Since the 1968 riots, Kosovo, where economic depression and backwardness make the area easy prey for subversion, has been singled out for special attention in the current five-year plan. 13. The Yugoslav leadership is not unaware of the close ties between East German intelligence and the Soviet KGB and assumes, that even if RUhlmann had not been working directly for the USSR, everything he got eventually ended up in Moscow. For the past two years, the Yugoslav press has repeatedly charged Moscow with meddling in her internal affairs. Official statements repeatedly imply that "hostile activity" is being carried out by those who most oppose Yugoslav self-management (the Soviets and the East Germans) and that the foreign adversaries involved are those most concerned about Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy (the Soviets and the East Germans). There has been press speculation that, by using the RUhlmann case, the Yugoslav courts plan to bring matters into the open and to document Soviet involvement in this and other espionage cases. Following the Fascists 14. As noted in a recent article by Paul Lendvai, Vienna correspondent for the Financial Times of London: "It is an ominous sign that the extreme nationalist Croat exiles in the West now claim Soviet support and in their publications offered the Russians airports and harbor facilities on condition that Moscow guarantees an independent Croatia. If one adds the intense activity of Soviet agents in Serbia and Bosnia, it becomes clear that the Soviets are following in the footsteps of Mussolini's Fascist Italy, which successfully used Croatian separatism to destroy Yugoslavia." Approved For Release 1999/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 15. The Yugoslays are convinced, and there is evidence to support their convictions, that Soviet duplicity is behind the recent activation of Croat chauvinism, especially abroad. Two public denials by Soviet spokesmen of Yugoslav allegations that the USSR Was encouraging if not helping emigre anti-Communist Croatian separatists are indicative of Soviet sensitivity to these Charges. Early in 1970, the Italian right-wing-BOr hese reported that Dr. Branko Jelic, a West Berlin physician an leader the extremist Croat "Council in Exile," had secretly conferred. in West Germany with several top level Soviets, an allegation officially denied by Moscow Pravda. It was, however, shortly after this alleged meeting that ac's newspaper began shifting from a staunchly - anti-Communist, anti-Soviet line to one favoring accommodation with the Soviet Union. 16. Then, in April this year the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm protested against a report published in the Stockholm daily Dagens Nyheter concerning Moscow support given to the Ustashi. This is the Croatian extremist group that is held responsible for the 7:April murder of the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden, Vladimir Rolovic. Ironically, before he was appointed to Stockholm., Rolovic was the assistant state secretary for foreign affairs whose job it was to prevent emigre terrorism and anti- Yugoslav propaganda abroad. All of which leads to the assumption that RoloVic's assassination was a well calculated affair.* 17. Dagens Nyheter's Zagreb correspondent, Lars Ake Berling, had referred in a 14 April story to rumors in Yugoslavia that the Soviets were supporting the Ustashi with the aim of causing enough trouble in Yugoslavia to give Moscow a pretext for invading the country after Tito's death. The Soviet Embassy said that "no honest person can entertain any doubts about the Soviet attitude toward the fascist terrorist organization Ustashi, whose members were in the service of the Hitlerite aggressors during World War II." According to some Belgrade sources, however, even within Yugoslavia the Soviets maintain contact with well-placed Ustashi elements. Reportedly, after World War II the Soviets got the namesof former Gestapo confidants, a few of whom now hold key posts in the government and whom the Soviets control by threat of blackmail. * The Western press has reported tnat the assassins of Rolovic were two Croat exiles. In fact, according to the Belgrade weekly, Nedeljne Informativne Novine (NEN), neither was an exile. Both Brajkovic and Barisic were born in Croatia, were traveling on Yugoslav passports, and both had arrived in Sweden as workers in January 1970. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 18. What the Soviets have not officially denied is their possible role in the complete change of mind on the part of Dr. Brank)Jelic who in the past twelve months has become an ardent supporter of Moscow's policies. It is from the tenor of articles published during the past year in Jelic's newspaper Hrvatska Drzava (Croatian State) that evidence comes. In the latest, February-March 1971, issue of Jelic's paper, its ostensible Moscow correspondent, Slavko Novak, reported on a "recent" Warsaw Pact meeting which had confirmed "the Croatian area as an exceptionally important factor in the Warsaw Pact defense concept." Novak also reported a meeting of pro-Soviet Croat exiles in the USSR at width it was decided to "organize propaganda among the Croatian workers in Europe." According to Novak, Tito is being attacked by Moscow for trying to undermine its efforts in Egypt, for "whispering to Enver Hoxha not to accept the Soviet offer to normalize Soviet-Albanian relations," and for making efforts to pursuade Romania to abandon its policy of solidarity of the socialist bloc. Another article in the same issue promotes the concept of "Soviet Croatia" and a third is a piece designed to pursuade Albania to accept Moscow's offers for normalization. 19. As sources in Zagreb point out, not all Croat emigr6s support Jelic's new pro-Soviet line; Croat Communists within the country are unalterably opposed to it. They see in Jelic's activities a dangerous game played against them; the strongest point of the Croat Communists has been their anti-Soviet line. It appears that the Soviets have not been able to infiltrate the Croat Communist Party and are therefore trying to find their allies among the Croat extremists abroad. In so doing Moscow seems to be following in Mussolini's footsteps, whose tactic was to use extreme Croat nationalism to 'destroy Yugoslavia and defeat the Serbs. In this instance, the Soviets would attempt to defeat the Croats and then support the Serbs against the Croats. Alarmism in the Press 20. Derogatory statements by Soviet and some East European officials about "separate roads to socialism" in terms applicable to Yugoslavia have done little to calm Belgrade's nerves. Equally disquieting have been the most recent reflections in media of the Soviet Union and her "allies" which seem to presage a propaganda buildup stressing that Yugoslav socialism is in danger. For example, the 2 May issue of the Warsaw daily Zycie Warszawy claimed there were "alarming signs" regarding developments in Yugoslavia: "For some time now Yugoslavia's friends, concerned with the development of socialism, prosperity, and progress in that country, have watched with apprehension more and more frequent alarming signs." 6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 It went on to blame the "Western press" for suggesting that the Worsening situation would push Yugoslavia from its present road and "open the door to penetration not only of revisionist but of openly capitalist forces." 21. During late April, Radio Zagreb Commentator Milika Sundic had cause to criticize both the Soviet and Polish press for their distorted reporting of Yugoslav affairs. The Soviet Communist Party daily Pravda was accused of slanted reporting in its coverage of President-TIUTS speech in which he had announced an impending high-level meeting at which party unity and economic problems were to be discussed. Tito had said the meeting would not adjourn until matters had been settled. This was the end-of-April special Presidium session in Brioni out of which came agreement to maintain an ideologically unified Communist Party while going ahead with the formation of a radically decentralized government. 22. Pravda's coverage of the Tito speech omitted all passages indicative 3T-3Ptimism and left the impression thatrthe'League- of Communists of Yugoslavia had no prospects of success. "We are not so myopic," Sundic said, "that we cannot see that through its narrow selection Of information, Pravda wanted to suggest that socialism in our country is facing a major crisis and that it should be saved as it was in some other country." Sundic also denounced as fabrication an article in the Polish trade union daily, Glos Praqi, which said that separatist trends were on the increase in Croatia and noted that this was the sane argument being used by other supporters of a "doctrine of limited sovereignty." 23. By way of contrast, 'Western press alarmism" is almost unanimous in its expression of faith that Tito can successfully manage a genuine succession and that in so doing, he will have made another great stride toward achieving a reasonably democratic Marxist society. As noted by The Economist of London (1 May): "...Tito will probably get his constitutional reform...If-he does succeed, there will be no rejoicing in Russia. The Russian leaders have long hoped to increase their influence in a weakened Yugoslavia after his death or retirement; and they have long feared the effect on their own subjects of liberalishig moves in other communist states. But his success will be very welcome everywhere else. President Nixon has recently shown his concern about Yugoslavia's future and his readiness to help it get over these difficult months. So have President Pompidou and Herr Brandt. They are doing it not because they cherish hopes of a capitalist Yugoslavia emerging after Tito; but because there is no visible and attractive alternative to his kind of reasonably stable, genuinely non-aligned Yugoslavia in that turbulent part of the world." 7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CURRENT HISTORY April 1969 YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS PROVINCES A U .S T R ,1 Ar"+ ??????inil,,, ,:\ i ? ?.474., "7..0 ? ...0.7.1,...... ( ...:;,...,.., .4,,. 1. ? l'Aree e1. ,0,...u.i.....i1.z. 1- 1 ?:T1,,;,,.- '''..,V-ii: HUNICAR ?an." suooTicA 0SOMBOR NY. \ Ll 0 E 111. o 11/4 ZRENJANIN % ?.? PICA LGRAD J P. Dom" PULA 4/ * NIIEECEGOVINey " 51MONENGTAix:"i' ). ,s S KostatiZ,...1 - 200 MACEDONIA ?Caas. SCALE 0 SO . 100 SCALE AO 0 40 0 PEEENWriiiQ MILES ..--Iteprinted by imunission from Yugoslavia, by Muriel Hep- pe!! and Frank Singleton. Copyright, 1961 by Frederick A. Praeger,. Inc. EEY ERNO OVER 1600 PEET [7.:3 LAND MO $000 flU Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 WASHINGTON STAR 15 October 1970 MILTON V1ORST CP R Yp\ZIGLI ugosicivs Vicach Russia Warily BELGR via, the Rtssians are an obses- sion. The aewspapers analyze. them, The people think about them, the ?uling circles try to anticipate what they will do. Perhaps ties would be con- sidered a na.:ional psychoneu- rosis ? except that the Rus- Mans' brt ta occupation of Czechosloy ak a in 1968 raised the perfec ly reasonable ques- tion of m heher Yugoslavia would be n !xt. The Yupos avs are not sure what the r useians are up to in the Medit ?Tx anean, but they have a frigate fling theory. The the ail' spreading through r ilig circles holds that the lenf er the Russians remain a cbminating naval presence in the Mediterra- nean, the st rer they are to insist on 1.); ses on the northern shore of the s !a. The Yui os avs reason that the Russia ns, through centu- ries of exr er ence, are orient- ed in thei trategic thinking to the land, even when their objectives Arc maritime. Thus, they will mei er be satisfied to depend o 1 naval bases in Egypt. ? Ultimate y, they will be ',coking for be ses easily readi? - ed by land. ^o Yugoslays this means one thing: The This- CPYRGHT demanding a port and transit rights to reach it. , Furthermore, they don't really believe the demands will stop there. They are suspi- cious enough to think that, sooner,, or later, the Russians will count on swallowing up the whole country. So the Tito government ex- pects, when the time comes, to make clear that not a single Russian soldier will set foot on Yugoslav territory. If that means the Russians will re- spond as they did in Czechoslo- vakia, the Yugoslays will take the chance. And the thinking of Yugo- slav ruling circles on Russian designs doesn't end there. This is a subject on which they are rich in explanations and inter- pretations. They cite, for example, the rn Russian drive that dates from the early Czars to reach warm waters. Russia's attempts to reach the Adriatic through ter- ritory that is now Yugoslavia were, in fact, among the prov- ocations of World War I. They. cite also Russia's sense of military insecurity, which carries with it a need to dominate more and more sure rounding territory. At the same time they point out that I I t, so 1 as leader of the world commu- nist community, has not ad- justed to Belgrade's course of, independence The Yugoslays say it is na- ive to believe that current Russian leadership finds Tite's state less of an afront than Stalin did 20 years ago. If any- thing, the Brezhnev doctrine which exalts Russia's right to intervene in the internal af- fairs of any communist coun- try is more threatening than: anything Stalin ever devised. Within the past year or two, ' intelligent Yugoslays have seen even further reason to beware of the Soviet threat. ; This begins with the obser- vation that beneath the sur- , face, there is growing ferment mithin the Soviet Union, the consequence of diversion of massive funds from civilian to military purposes. The Russians have extrava- gent programs for building a fleet, supp1yi6g the Egyptian; aiding the Cubans and main- taining a front in Siberia, in addition to the normal expense of keeping a huge army, a modern air force and a decent space program. . Only 14 closing its society to outside influences can Russia Yugoslays say. l'Ionetheles ;, disturbing idea! . inevitably seep in. Until 1968, im.\ry of these ideas seeped in Dom Czechs- . slovakia?btit the\ Czechs gc t most of then1 doectly from Yugoslavia. In U E .year or so before the o u ccup-on, Yugo-. slav-Czech relati )is had to-- ? come exceedingly lose. Tito's Yugoslav E may be fl) paradise, say candid members of its ruling circle, but it pro- ? vides its people Mi h far mor gratification, bot a economi ? and political, than the Soviet, Union. ? Yugoslavia is hither front Russia than Cu.': aoslovakia, but as a comma st state i:, 'remains a danget to Soviet ? stability. As this ti .ory has it, Russia ultimately will have te reform ? or decile what i; will do about?the Yugoslays. By-one expIanatxm or anoth, er, Yugoslays thi ik of the So- ,viet drive for do ination a ; all but inexorable. By nature ' not an optimistic people, they ' do not regard theiz reedom a? : permanently assu On the ;other hand, they are deter- ;mined not to be t ten by sur- ; iprise, U and whet the Rus- .sians begin to mows., Approved For Release 1999/09/022: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 '[HE ECONOMIST 11. May 1971 Will he make it? CPYRGHT President Tito is fighting hard against his conservatives for a roform that could change the future of Jugoslav;a These are make-or-break days for President Tito's regime. .1 the constitutional reform which is now being debated gets by without a last-minute hitch, Jugoslavia will become freer than it or any other communist country has ever been before. Its ruling party will be able to claim, with as much justification as Mr Dubcek's Czechoslovakia in 968, that it is a reasonably faithful mirror of its people's aspirationS. And President Tito will go down in history as the first communist leader to have reversed a trend which, for over half a century, has seemed to be going in one direction only?and to have done so without sacrificing his country's indepertdence or handing back the factories to the capitalists. The whole venture may still fail, though failure is less likely to take a dramatic form than to come by slow stages of demoralising delay and postponement. For these reforms, which aim at giving greater autonomy to Jigoslavia's six federal republics and two autonomous p -ovinces and, within them, to individual people and firms, have met powerful opposition within the communist party, just as the previous round of reforms did in 1965 and 1966. No wonder that many Jugoslays are holding ti- eir breath as they watch their leaders prepare for the sl-owdown. Even President Tito appears to be nervous; he has recently made some grumpy speeches in which he ccmplained of indiscipline in the party and hinted that scvne top people may be sacked if they go on resisting pc licies on which agreement has been reached. Last January he had summoned leaders from all the re?ublics and autonomous provinces to Brioni, his island hone in the Adriatic, for talks about the future of the coAntry's economic and political system. He made it clear that he would not let them leave Brioni until they had re iched agr-ement on all the major issues. After two weeks he was able to announce an apparent agreement, and to publish 21 draft constitutional amendments embodying all the major proposals for reform. But only a Jew days later it became clear that his attempt to knock the leaders' heads together had failed. A Croat party leader, Mr Miko Tripalo, accused the Serbs of trying to wr.ggle out of firm commitments given at Brioni. One of these was a promise of more independence for the autono- mc-us provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which are a part of the Serbian republic. Albanian leaders in Kosovo, the majority of Jugoslavia's million-odd Albanians live, have been pressing for this for a long time. Some Serbian leaders angrily retorted that Mr Tripalo was interfering InSerbia's internal affairs. Since then, Croatia's leaders have caused a sensation by demanding an official investigation of their complaint that "certain federal organs" (presumably the security service) had tried to discredit them by forging evidence which seemed to link them with extremist Croat groups abroad that are opposed to the very existence of Jugoslavia. One of these emigre groups was responsible for the recent murder of the Jugoslav ambassador in Sweden. Another, with its head- quarters in west Berlin, has close links with Moscow and advocates Croatia's " liberation " with Soviet help. These polemics have shown that the harmony achieved at Brioni was short-lived. But President Tito is not giving up. This week he has called another party meeting at which he will again try to secure the leaders' support for changes in the constitution. Why is he so determined to push the reform through ? It is most unlikely that he is doing it out of any attachment to the idea of liberalisation. He is a man whose main concern has always been with power and how to keep it, and he has not changed now. But the president's wary instincts told him a long time ago that Jugoslavia would, once he is gone, be exposed to new ? pressures from Russia and its allies. And its most vulnerable point would be its multinational com- position. He sees that it will not be able to withstand these pressures unless all its nationalities have a clear stake in the continued existence of the Jugoslav federal ? state. Until very recently the Croats, the Slovenes and the .Albanians have all felt that they were discriminated against by the central governmeat, pariicularly in the fields of foreign trade and domestic capital investment. By introducing a new system that would make the :federal government responsible only for defence, foreign affairs, broad economio? policies and development aid for areas like Kosovo, President Tito hopes to give the 'non-Serbs a new interest in Jugoslavia. And the preserva- tion of the federal state seems to be his overriding concern as he prepares for his inevitable departure from the leadership. But although the old system.was as inefficient as it was uripopular, its abolition is not proving easy. `In Serbia, in particular, the men in favour of change are having a hard time trying to carry their more conservative and nationalist party colleagues with them. And there are many party officiais.elsewhere who mistrust the constitutional reform anthare .quittly trying tolorpedo it because they see it as a threat to their own power. The anger thc president has voiced in his recent speeches Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT ,is said to be directed primarily at these people, and these 'calculations of self-interest. To organise a really effective conservative opposition to the reforms would, however,, involve making a direct 'challenge to President Tito's still enormous authority. A military coup ? would be remarkably difficult ? to, bring "off in a country Its decentralised as Jugoslavia. But the greatest obstacle to any conservative attempt to put the clock back is the unprecedented wave of democratic enthusiasm that is now visible in the country. this seems to be particularly strong in Croatia, whose relatively liberal leaders appear to enjoy genuine popularity'. A straw in the wind was the recent election at Zagreb university, where the student assembly installed a new leadership which includes non-party members and even practising Catholics.? .Croatia also seems to have something almost 'approaching a free press at the moment. And in other republics, notably Slovenia and Serbia, there is a new toleration of opposition views, including extreme left-wing 'ones. So President Tito ' will probably get his constitutional reform before his recently extended presre I- 1 L _LI Act_ _GA lit expires on August 17th, because there is no alternative to agreement for any except a small minority of pro-Moscow communists. He will be helped by Jugoslavia's precarious economic situation, which demands that the uncertainties surrounding the future of the country's banking and foreign trade system be resolved as quickly as possible. if he does succeed, there will be no rejoicing in Russia. The Russian leaders have long hoped to increase their influence in a weakened Jugoslavia after his death or retirement; and they have long feared the effect on their own subjects of liberalising moves in other communist states. But his .success will be very 'welcome everywhere else. ?President Nixon has recently shown his concern about Jugoslavia's future and his readiness to help it get over these difficult months. So have President Pompidou and Herr Brandt. They are doing it not because they cherish hopes of a capitalist, Jugoslavia emerging after Tito; but because there is no visible and attractive alternative to his kind of reasonably stable, genuinely, non-aligned Jugoslavia in that turbulent part of the world.. ? ? TIME 17 May 1971 CPYRGHT wh y ' presvient Titn en.. CR ug ,ered Sarajevo's magnificent new cul- ural and sports center last week, the Z,300 delegates to an economic con- ference cheered wildly and gave him a standing ovation. Then, as he strode to the rostrum beneath portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and himself, the throng broke into the wartime song of the Yu- goslav partisans, "Comrade Tito, we give you our word, we shall follow you." But will they follow anybody else? Tito, who will be 79 on May 25, is given full credit for making Yugoslavia the most democratic of all the Com- munist states as well as the one with the highest standard of living. Almost all Yugoslays still support the system of "self-management" that Tito intro-. duced 21 years ago, rejecting Soviet- style planning and central control in favor of economic decentralization, which makes managers of factories di- rectly responsible to the workers. Into the Open. Tito, however, may well be the only man- who can com- mand the allegiance of the disparate peo- ples of Yugoslavia's six republics and two autonomous provinces. A Croat in a country dominated numerically by Serbs, Tito has been trying for decades to groom a suitable successor. His first YUGOSLAVIA Working Against Time candidate. Milovan Diilas, wound up in jail after criticizing some of 1 ito's meth- ods in the 1950s; his second, Aleksander RankoviC, was banished from the party in 1966 when he opposed Tito's pol- icies of decentralization and liberaliza- tion. Both men are free today and live comfortably in Belgrade. Last fall, the aging Tito faced up to the fact that something would have to be done soon. "We have entered a stage now where we have no time," he told a party meeting in Zagreb. "Time works not for us but against us." To solve the problem of the succession, he proposed the creation of a collective presidency made up of two or three leaders elect- ed by the assemblies of each republic and one or two by each province. Iron- ically, the national debate over Tito's proposals merely brought the country's separatist tendencies into the open. Deep Resentments. To stem the dis- content, Tito began stumping the coun- try and threatened a party purge and "administrative measures"?a Commu- nist euphemism meaning summary po- lice action?for enemies of the federal system. Two weeks ago, he summoned party leaders to his Brioni Island re- treat in the Adriatic Sea and scheduled a special party conference to convene this summer. Last week he stepped up nis warnings against "llinisc why be convinced," including "some generals who sit around the caf?" "megalo- maniacs who want to become President," and intellectuals who have opposed his recent proposals. Few nations are as vulnerable to in- ternal division as Yugoslavia. Two of its republics, Slovenia and Croatia, were once linked to the Habsburg empire and developed as part of the West; the others stagnated for centuries under Turkish rule. The cultured Slovene has neither 'language nor heritage in common with the illiterate Montenegran. The indepen- dent, expansionist Serbs have dreamed of a true nation of Yugoslays (literally "southern Slays"). They formed the backbone of the wartime resistance; to this day, they accuse the Croats of hav- ing collaborated with the Germans. Re- sentments run so deep that the Yugoslays have never chosen a national anthem. Unbelievable Pressure. Tito's task of maintaining unity while solving the prob- lem of succession is made even more dif- ficult by the fact that the economy is rin bad shape because the Yugoslays have been living beyond their means. De- spite a 15% devaluation of the dinar last fall, Yugoslavia's trade deficit rose Approved For RPIPaCP 1999/n9/n9 ? CIA-RI-W7g-(11 1 94Annnannngnnni-4 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT 62% in the first qua' ter ot the year, while retail prices soared 12% and the cost of living 13%. Two weeks ago, Tito warned his coun- trymen that foreign agents (meaning pri- marily Soviet secret police) had been exerting "unbelievable pressure" on the government. "We should allow no sixth column to penetrate our country," he said. It is possible, of course, that he had chosen to fight the drift toward sep- aratism by raising the specter of Soviet troublemaking. But there is no doubt that the Soviets would like to see Yu- goslavia disintegrate. If Tito manages to arrange a genuine succession, he will have made another great stride toward achieving a reasonably democratic Marxist society. If he fails, Yugoslavia could splinter under the weight of sep- aratist feeling and Soviet meddling. IL FIORINO, Rome 14 May 1971 CPYRGHT 1F1E GERMAN JOURNALIST WAS A SOVIET SPY Background on the Ruhlmann case in Yugoslavia: THE GERMAN JOURNALIST WAS A SOVIET SPY. Vienna, 13 May. According to word reaching here from Belgrade, details' . revealing of the Soviet hand in espionage activities in Yugoslavia may soon be forthcoming. Well informed Yugoslav officials have long admitted privately their strong suspicions that Der Spiegel correspondent Hans Peter Ruhlmann, convicted last January on charges of espionage involving passage of Yugoslav military secrets to a "foreign power", was an agent of East German intelligence on behalf of the Soviets. Ruhlmann and two Yugoslav collaborators were arrested in March last year and have been held in custody since. Following an extensive investigation their trial opened in September, almost immediately went into secret sessions, and since then, only brief press accounts have given clues of the trial's progress. In January, Ruhlmann was given a six-year sentence and convicted for having obtained from his Yugoslav codefendants highly classified military and official information for a period of two years and of having passed this information to a "foreign government and a foreign organization as well as giving part of it to two representatives of a foreign state." One charge brought out was that Ruhlmann sought and got details during September 1968 concerning "Yugoslav defense preparations and the military -political situation during the month of August 1968" (the month during which the Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia). It also appears that Ruhlmann was to concentrate on the political military situation in Croatia and on the unpublicized conflict between Croatia and Serbian interests. Last month, according to the Yugoslav news service Tanjug (28 April) the _ Supreme Military Court over-ruled the conviction handed down by the lower court and returned the case with a request for more evidence and the name (or names) of the foreign power involved. In line with oft-expressed Yugoslav suspicions that Ruhlmann was a Soviet agent, whether directly or indirectly controlled by Moscow, the Supreme Court now apparently wants the facts brought out into the open. And there is no doubt that all his ties in with Yugoslovia's convictions that Mbscow's ulterior motive is a Balkanized Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 IL FIORINO CPRE-1P71 RETHOSCIZNA DEL CASO RUM-MANN 'Di JUGOSLAVIA VIENNA, l 3 maggio? Second? voci giunte da Belgrado sarebbe im-' rninente la rivelazione di !particolari sulla funzione preminente dei sovietici 'nelle attiviti spionistiche in Jugoslavia. Alcuni funzionari jugoslavi ben informiti hanno amines- 'so da tempo, in privato, di sospettare fortamente; .che ii corrispondente ,dello "Spiegel' Hans Pe-. ?ter .Ruhlmann, condan- :nato nel gennaio scorso. per un caso di spionaggio consisten te nella trasm sione di segreti militari jugoslavi a una "potenza rstraniera" fosse un agen-? :te dei servizi d'infbrma- -zione della Germania lorlentale con incarichi :pc conto dei soajetici: ? Ruklmann e thig nuni collaboratori jugoslavi: furono arrestall l'anno passato e da Miura dete- nuU. In beguito una :vasta indagine II processo si apri in settcmbre, qua- si subito coming& a svol- ?gersi a porte chiuse, e dei' .suol sviluppi si ebbero sulla stampa solo pochi accenni. In gennaio Ruhlmann fu condan- nolo a mil until per ilver logo hi ay I, 110 eirftsli fli tints mod, hiiportio11,10. 5imc inforniazioni di na-. tura militare e ammini- ::strativa e per averle tra- smesse a un "govern?, stranlero e a una organ iz- zazione straniera come. pure a due rappresena tanti di uno stato stranie- rci" Una. de U e accuse era che Kuhlmann avevacer- cato e ottenuto nel set- tembre 1968 particolari inf orm az ion i rigu ard an ti "i preparativi di difesa e la situazione mil itare-po- li tic a deli a Jugo si avia du- rante l'agosto 1968" (i1. mese in cui le truppe del Patto di Varsavia invase- ro la Cecoslovacchia). Risulta anche che Ruh mann avrebbe concen- trato la propria attenzio-: ne sulla situazione poli,. tico-militare in Croaziae sui contrast', passati sot.; to silenzio, tra gli ressicroatieserbi. . Qualche settimana fa, . come ha riferito l'agen- ? zia di steppe jugoslava Tan jug (28 aprile), la Suprema corte militare ha ann ulla to la cond ann a inflitta nal ciudizio di prim? grado e ha ,Lo I a riapertura dein- htru florin .on la richieNta di maggiorl prove t(101 1101110 (0 filA noini) (hila potenza btranicra volta. In accordo con I, -sospetti jugoslavi, ricor- ren temente espressi, che Ruhlmann sia un agente sovietico direttamente o . indite ttamon to control- I141 Monca, le fiupro- me cork: ipport? (10(.100 0 riiii0010 (,II iHpoi.. c(.6, dubbio che Lotto (potato., 6 connesso alio convin- zione jugoslava che 1 scop.o recondito di Mo-, sca e una Jugoslavia hal-. canizzata nal period? do.- Po T.i,tc!to its .;" ?1?1';.ii! t ? ?.1-? S?11?1 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 11 May 1971 CPYRGHT Drama in the Balkans : t will take a future his= to' an to get at the details anu a novelist to put them into proper form, but the bare outlines are now dis- tir guishable of a major podtical drama in ? the BE limns. Some of the elements are .as follows: ? Josip Broz Tito is 79 years of age. de is doing Ms best tO give his country, Yugo- slavia, a constitution which can hold it together after his strong uttwor makable ..1-.?1 erihIp ,arit no longer them Sy 'Joseph C. Hirsch Old friction His efforts have been itn- peded at every turn by forces arising from the country's history and per- haps abetted by outside in- terests. That "perhaps" is where the plot gets cofhpli- cated. The task, of welding the south Slays into a single nation would not be easy even without any outside interests. Serbia was the original Release ti?996169/64 : State of the 'tattoos c77-1.-fe,2 goslavia. The Serbs are a proud and warlike people who consider themselves superior to the neighboring Slavic tribes. The friction' is greatest between_ the Serbs, who were until re- cently mountaineers, and the Croats, who were the first of the south Slays to adjust to urban and Indus?. trial society. It's the old friction between mountain' herdsmen and the farmers Split Yugoslavia and artisans of the plains. CeraDtrinefinbt? (MUM/PI:11kt al ltle of Ser'fed oration. atill_haa tint feel at ern times by entirely differ- ent cultural routes. Serbia was for long a conquered province in the Turkish Em- pire. Croatia was for long. a part of the Austro-Hun- garian Empire. Hence the first is overlaid heavily by the culture of the eastern Mediterranean. Croatka's cultural background is Ger- manic and central Euro- pean. CPYRGFAT:sproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 an eastern city. Zagreb looks Ald, feels like any city in Austria or southern Germany. Here of course is fertile soil for outsiders desiring to break up the Yugoslav federation. The Germans played upon the natural and inherited friction between Serb and Croat when they were build- ing Hitler's "Third Reich." Naturally, they played to the Croats with the Ger- manic cultural background against the Serbs. Russians have traditionally tried to exploit Serbian hostilities. During the month of April, Tito's spokesmen in Belgrade accused the Rus- sians and Poles of trying to interfere in domestic Yu- goslav politics. Specifically, it was alleged that the Yu- goslav ?gr?olony in West Germany had now been taken over by the Rua- sians and was being used by the Russians in an effort to split Yugoslavia apart. This, if true, would be both logical and illogical. The ?gr?roats in West Germany are left over from the Ustachi movement of World War II. The Ustachis sided with the Ger- man occupiers of Yugo- slavia. They are conserva- tives according to World War II standards. After all, they fought Tito's Commu- nist partisans during the civil war in Yugoslavia. But Croat separatism is the easiest emotion for any outsider to exploit. Croats resent being under Serbian rule. Granted, Tito himself is a Croat, not a Serb, yet there is a tendency which even he has been unable to break for Serbs to dominate the bureaucracy of the federation, particularly the secret pence. Even the score The Russians would, obvi- ously, like to break up the Yugoslav federation. It has been a thorn in their side an East European Commu- nist country which refuses to bend the knee to Moscow,, or follow the line of Kremlin orthodoxy! It would be reasonable WI expect the Kremlin to con- sider this moment in history as their last best chance to, even the score with Tito and wreck his great plan for a lasting constitution which will bind his various peo. pies together. In the West we have no way of knowing whether. the Kremlin has actually ,plcked up the old Ustachi, outfit as an instrument of its modern purposes. We do know that the Yugoslav Am- bassador in Stockholm was fatally shot five weeks ago by persons presumed to be members of the old Ustachi underground. And we do know that the Kremlin regards Tito's Yu- goslavia as an affront to its prestige and a danger to its control over the rest of Its "sphere of influence" in" Eastern Europe,, EVENING STAR, Washington 26 April 1971 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Yugoslav Unity President Tito's hints of the need for a purge of separatist elements in his own Yugoslavian Communist party can only be disturbing to Western observers. The disquieting thought is that any such purge might just postpone the ultimate showdown among the various nationalis- tic interests in the country, leaving new scores to be settled after Tito's depart- ure. Tito, leader of the surviving partisan movement of World War II, is the main ingredient of the cement that holds to- gether this collection of territories of the ? old Austro-Hungarian Empire, now in the form of six republics and a couple of autonomous provinces, with four official languages and three religions. But Tito, 78, cannot be expected to perform this adhesive function for too many more years. His announcement last year of plans for a collective presidency, after he ? leaves, was: an attempt to impose a pos- ? thumous unity on the Serbs, Croats, Slov- enes, Montenegrans and other country- men who would survive him. Among recent events that have cre- o.ted a crisis for Yugoslav unity was the assassination of the country's ambassa- dor to Sweden by Croatian separatists. A continuing source of disunity are the eco- nomic disparities among various parts of Yugoslavia, with the industrialized north resentful about its role in propping up , less developed parts of the country. Tito has our best wishep in his effort to keep his nation together. The main beneficiary of a Yugoslav split-up would be the Soviet Union. For the Russians, an Independent and strong Yugoslavia, ready to put up a bruising fight if threatened with the fate of Hungary or Czechoslovakia, has represented a barely tolerable insult tO Soviet dominance in Communist Eastern Europe. But a Yugo- slavia once again Balkanized, with all that term implies in the way of political chaos and weakness, would be easy pick- ing for the guardians of Soviet Commu- nist ascendancy. The Yugoslays, who were able to raise their, heads after centuries of tyranny, should understand this better than any- one. Let's hope they decide to hang to- gether, rather than go separately to the Soviet gibbets. Approved For Release 1999/09/0 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 ,PaSHINGTON POST CPYRGI-2 !may 1971 Tito Says arty Will Keep Unity By Dan Morgan WarhIngton Pogt rorelirn Service BELGRADE, May 1?Presi-1 dent Tito today indicated that! the Yugoslav League of Com- munists has no intention ofi giving up its dominant role during the current period of political decentralization. The 78-year-old leader nei- ther dramatized nor mini-I mized the country's difficul- ties. Instead, as he has done so often during tough times in the past, he soberly, empha- sized that Yugoslavia's prob- lems were solvable and ap- pealed for national unity. Hondreds of thousands of Yugoslays listened to the pres- ident's May Day speech on radio and television. It was 'broadcast live from Labin, near the Italian border. which is celebrating the 50th anni- versary of a brief workers up- rising in 1021. Tito arrived in the small coal-mining center fresh from a three-day meeting with about 80 top Communist lead- ers from all over the country convened by him personally to try to put an end to regional quarrels that have marred the country's unity in recent Weeks. He was applauded warmly and often by a large audience as he read from notes. The rivalries between the regions have sharpened in re- cent months as a major consti- tutional reorganization that will give much more say to the six Yugoslav republics and reduce the power of the cen- tral government nears comple- tion. The various local leader- ships are now arguing over such complex questions as the allocation of former federal funds, the financing of major regional .projects once subsi- dized by Belgrade, and other complex issues. Tito singled out the Yugo- slav press and television, uni- versity professors, and manag- ers of banks as those who were Sharpening local rivaV ries or failing to heed the line laid down by the Yugoslav League of Communists, which' he ?heads:, 'lie said that the league would he "merciless, in elimi- nating the deformations in its own ranks." In the present decentraliza- tion some have raised the qu'estion whether Yugoslavia's Communists Party is breaking down into regional parties. President Tit's answer to that question today seemed te. be a stern "no." He said there had been agreement that the League of Communists was "the force to overcome the difficulties which are not so big." We should be merciless to all deformations. In the league aild also to those from outside who wish to introduce splits in our society, in our masses. We have placed democracy on a very high level, on a strong basis. but there can be no de- mocracy for the enemies of our Socialist soricty." There was applause when he) criticized the Yugoslav press far carrying "alander" and in- I ticauraeies. In the past few months, newspapers in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia and of Yugo- slavia, and those in Zagreb In Croatia have exchanged sal- , vos, and have printed state- ments and interviews from persons favoring a much more radical decentralization of Yu- goslav life. In the economy, Tito com- plained about "megalomaniac" development plans that could not be realized, and warned bank managers to stop making policy on their own or face ex- pulsion not only from the Communist Party but also from their positions. ? The semi-independent b7ks, which are playing an ev r larger role in financing Yugoslavia's industrial devel, optnent, have been criticized by some party officials for .usurping the party's role in planning the national develop. jt. CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES 2 May 1971 Yugoslavia: All Tito Wants Is A Little Bit of Ur4 RGHT . BELGRADE?Nationalistic ri valries, the oldest problem ft '..the Balkans, have risen, again tc haunt the present and endanger the future of Yugoslavia and her brand of Communism. In an area whose bloody his. tory has given its inhabitants 'scores of 'reasons to mittrusl neighborAtlimpboOddVpo igpactisan movolndnt headed by Presment Lao was tile nrst sue- cesAful effort to rally Serbs, Crc ats, Bosnians, Macedonians, Slovenes and Montenegrins to a conunon cause. Now, 26 years after the victory that made the mo rement into a government, the Yugoslav Communist party that President Tito heads ap- pews to have lost its unity. Characteristically, the first person to acknowledge the crisis purlicly and seek remedies for it ma President Tito himself. To- wa d the end of a fatiguing tour of the nation's underdeveloped southern regions two weeks ago. the 79-year-old Tito began talk- ? ing about selfish, irresponsible people whose failure to look be- , yor d their immediate interests wai endangering the success of the whole community. The worst offenders, he con- eeckd, were party, leaders, , and romised to pull them quickly into line or remove those Who ,had slid too far. Yugoslays are sill waiting to see how success- _ ritikhleggel 999/09/02 Last weex, at me ena or a three-day meeting of the party's 11-man Presidium, as well as top Federal and republic politicians,, at President Tito's island retreat of Brioni,' the situation ap- peared no clearer. A lengthy communiqu?ssued on Friday night, as Yugoslays scattered to the beaches and countryside for their three-day May 1 weekend, only restated the party's unified backing for the process of ad.' ministrative decentralization and measures to stabilize the econ- omy. It did not say what new approaches would or eould be taken to achieve these goals and calm regional in-fighting. The communiqu?id ask full support from party members for. the economic stabilization meas- ures adopted several months ago.. The measures, including the- oretical but ineffective limits ofl. salaries, wages and investments, have not been respected, but the communiqu?nly urged the ", cre- Attion of a social climate for dr. .940%eCtiiiiitiZbtro3 Dfod thd, the communique blamed unnamed Yugoslav press and information media for "op- posing" the party's course, and ordered Communists to be more vigilant against such activity; said that "Increased foreign, hos- 'tile, subversive 'activity has arisen" and has profited by Yugoslavia's internal troubles to spread mistrust, and disclosed that party leaders would form- late a new platform and convene a conference, similar to one held here last summer, to review the party's role. Before what had appeared to, be a showdown session, frictions; between Serbs and Croats, par-i ticularly, dlad become so intense that their disagreements ;yew imperiling plans to restructure the Yugoslav Federation into a' looser amalgam of sovereign re-i publics bound to each other by acknowledged common interests and common allegiance to Com- munism. The gathering momen-;! turn of change had brought to the surface old feuds and griev-1 wereingifs4m the practical! e-fre-PeafF9IFI .4 6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT n tne latter category?iumped under the classification of "ro-, ntic nationalism" ? intellec- tuals in Serbia and Croatia tangled with each other over a va iety of issues. Language was? on. and Croats claimed that the inGividuality of their dialect vies In danger of being submerged by efforts to promote a common speech. .43ehind this emotional smoke- screen, the re7* efforts to assert Ci oatian independence lie in the economic field. Years of central control; the Croatians maintain, have meant the channeling, by Serbian officials, of Yugoslav re- sources into Serbian projects for the exclusive benefit of Serbia. With taxing power and invest- Mont decision-making adieduled to. be transferred largely to the republics, the Croatians also de- manded an end to Federal sub- sidy programs that do not bene- fit them but do aid agricultural. Serbia, and a new, foreign cur- rency regime that would permit Croatian exporters to retain the dollars they earn. Serbs re- riponded by arguing that it would be disastrous to strip Fed- eral economic institutions of their leverage when the country is deep in a serious inflation. The careers of many promi- nent party men are now deeply entwined with these contradict- ory positions. Getting Serbian. and Croatian leaders back on co, operative terms will be no eaS. matter. ' The only figure whose prestig remains unblemished is Marsha Tito.,But having moved to estab fish a collective Presidency tr succeed him eventually, he musl now work hard to promote ths consensus that will give such a body an all-Yugoslav outlook, rather than allow it to become a forum for republic rivals. --ALFRED FRIENDLY lc VAIEURS ACTUELLES, Paris 26 April 1971 LES AUTONOMISTES DE TITO CPYRGHT Le nationalisme renalt en Croatie. Tito a pour: les Oustachis n'ont pas oublie les massacres de 1944 reclament le minion do l'URSB. Une purge se prepare en Yougoslavie. Elle frappera parmi le million de mem- I ?3 de la Ligue des communistes, et rieme au sein de son bureau executif. L'autre vendredi, le 16 avril, Tito reclamait la vigilance contre les ennemis Le Pinterieur qui, aides de l'etranger, cherchaient a semer la discorde entre les rations yougoslaves. Le 14 avril, ii avait emande l'expulsion des communistes c ui agissaient contre Punite de la You- 1?os1avie, federation de six republiques r tssemblant pres de 20 millions d'habi- t tnts. Au cours des deux dernieres annees, Tito a accumule les mises en garde. La Croatie semble la plus visee. On diaserve en effet parmi les Croates deux lattenomenes de resurgence natlonaliste apparemment distincts. L'un concerne la fraction politisee des 460 000 travailleurs croates expatries elms les pays occidentaux. L'autre, les 4 800 000 Croates, en majorite catholi- %les, de la federation yougoslave. A l'etranger, le ? Mouvement de libe- rLtion croate o et la ? Fraternite revo- lt tionnaire croate militent pour l'inde- p !ndance de la Croatie. us se referent Pr te Paveliitch, fondateur en 1929 des eustachis, qui restaura le 10 avril 1941, avec la bienveillance du 'Ile Reich, l' Etat independant de Croatie, Avant de ourir a Madrid, le 28 decembre 1959, d :s suites, dit-on, d'un attentat qui eut lieu a Buenos Aysiblfadail lidt2Releas Le trentieme anniversaire de la Repu- blique de Croatie a ete celebre l'autre? samedi, a Munich, au cours d'un ban- quet organise par le o Comite national croate que preside Branko Jelic, an- cien compagnon d'Ante Pavelitch. Les Oustachis Wont jamais pardonne a Tito les massacres massifs de 1944 et de 1945. us l'accusent d'avoir liquid 600 000 soldats et civils croates. La devise des Oustachis : ? Dieu au ciel, les ,Croates sur terre Leurs ar- mes : la propagande, le terrorisme. A m b as s ad eur de Yougoslavie Stockholm, Vladimir Rolovitch a suc- combe le 15 avril a ses blessures. Ses obseques solennelles se sont deroulees Belgrade le samedi 17 avril. L'ambassa- deur avait ete blesse mortellement le 7 avril, a Stockholm, par deux Oustachis. Le 10 avril, deux autres Oustachis ont occupe le consulat yougoslave a Gote- borg. Avant de se rendre a la police suedoise, ils avaient menace d'executer trois otages si Tito ne liberait pas l'un des leurs, condamne a mort a Belgrade le 7 decembre 1970. Celui-ci, Miljenko Hrkac, vingt-deux ans, avait depose le 13 juillet et le 25 septembre 1968 des bombes a la gare centrale et dans un cinema de Belgrade. Bilan : 1 mort et 60 blesses. Le sort de Miljenko Hrkac reste en suspens. L'appel devait etre rcmis en jugement 21 avril, mercredi dernier. e 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 Auteurs le 9 octobre 1934 a Marseille du spectaculaire attentat contre le roi Alexandre de Yougoslavie, les Oustachis se manifesterent a maintes reprises apres la guerre, surtout en Allemagne de l'Ouest. A Paris, tine bombe eclata le 18 fevrier 1968, boulevard Delessert, au club de l'ambassade de Youloslavie. 11 y cut 1 mort et 19 blesses. Le 26 novem- bre 1966, une bombe piacee par deux Oustachis avait fait long feu dans ce meme club. Teleguidage sovletique En revanche, les attentats du 29 jan- vier 1967 contre deux ambassades et quatre consulats de Yougoslavie, aux Etats-Unis et au Canada, ne semblent pas engager la responsabilite des Ousta- ? chis mais celle d'anciens ? Tchetniks g de Draja Mihailovitch, le chef des parti- sans serbes fusille en juillet 1946, sur l'ordre de Tito. C'est la renaissance du sentiment nationaliste en Croatie meme qui inquie- te Tito. Econorniste et secretaire de la Ligue des communistes en Croatie, Vladimir Bakaritch donna le 10 mars 1964 une Interview remarquee ? Nth *, le plus grand hebdomadaire de Belgrade. Il declarait due l'economie etait en pleine 19446440 041091aGal -4forme s'im- posait. 9 CPYRGHApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 II reclamait aussi le droit pour cheque republique de participer a l'elaboration de la politique etrangere du gouverne- ment federal de Belgrade. En mars 1967, l'ecrivain croate Miros- lay lerleza et d'eminents intellectuels de Zagreb signerent un manifeste pour 1'4111U entre la langue ereateeierbe, &rite en caracteres latins, et le serbo- croate, ecrit en caracteres cyrilliques, qui ne se distinguent pourtant que tres peu. Depute de Livno, en Bosnie; Jure Galitch ne s'y trompa pas. Il nota qu'il existait une analogic entre ce manifeste et les theses linguistiques prOnees en .1941 par e Hrvastki Narod n l'organe officiel de l'Etat croate independant d'Ante Pavelitch. Cette affaire entraina l'exclusion du parti de Vlatko Pavle- titch, le president des ecrivains de Croatie. En mai 1970, a ,V1IS a, Pedition heb- domadaire de Pori/me de l'Alliance socianste de Croatie, publiait en feuille- ton les Memoires a peinc expurges d'Ante Pavelitch, le chef des Oustachis. Representant de la Croatie au gouver- nement federal, le Dr Nikla Miljanic demissionnait en novembre. Pour pro- tester contre l'opposition des Serbes I la mise en ceuvre du programme de stabili- sation economieue adopte en decembre 1969. Precdelemment, en septernbret Croate Mika Tripalo, membre du bureau executif de la Ligue des communistes yougoslaves, avait ete plus loin. 11 proposait la nationalisation par la Republique de Croatie des banques federales et des entreprises du commer- ce exterieur implantees en territoire croate. De meme, 11 invitait a la confis- cation des investissements realises sur le littoral adriatique de la Croatie par des banques de Belgrade dirigees par des Serbes. Le 16 avril, Mika Tripalo affir- mait que les Croates etaient insuffisam- ment representes dans l'armee. Les cadres de Croatie constatent que leur republique se depeuple (le taux de natalite y est le plus bible de la Yougos- lavie) et que l'emigration entralne le depart definitif de plusieurs centaines de milliers d'ouvriera. us relevent que les emplois laisses vacants sont pris par des Serbes. us s'insurgent aussi contre les prets usuraires accordes aux entreprises croa- tes par les banquiers federaux de Belgra- de, et voudraient que Zagreb, capitale de la Croatie, puisse disposer de la Mollie des CieVilleli procure?s per le tourisme et les exportations. Existe-t-il un lien entre les actions des Oustachis a l'etranger et les aspirations a une plus grande autonomic, voire l'independance, des cadres communistes Croatie ? La question a ete posee. Par des Serbes qui soutiennent y a une liaison entre la direction de la Republi- que socialiste de Croatie et l'emigration oustachi. Le comite central de la Ligue des communistes de Croatie s'eleve contre cette accusation. Le 14 avril, une commission d'enquete a ete instituee Belgrade. A Munich, il y a une semaine, le Dr Branko Jelic affirmait que sa Republi- que de Croatie s aurait le soutien de l'Union sovietique. GIL LES MERM02 NEW YORK TIMES 2 May 1971 cpUo Assails Critics at Home and Abroad By ALFRED FRIENDLY Jr. specie to Tha New Tort Mao BELGRADE, Yugoslavite:, May 1.Ptesident Tito .teday, plaeed nuch .of the . blame for Yugo- davia's current political crisis cn opponents abroad but also rtimated that he would crack oown on domestic dissent and rrobably shuffle both the Gov- ernment and 'Communist party. In a rambling, 40-minute May Day address, broadcast on radio and television ?from the tawn of Labin near the Italian border, the 78-year-old leader rsserved his sharpest remarks fr Yugoslav newspaper and talevision journalists, university Audents and . professors and 'tnegalontaniac" investors. These groups have often been targets for his wrath. ? But the speech, which re7 s-ealed few details of the three- e..ay leadership aneeting Presi- gent Tho held this week, had a new tone of harshness toward Icritics at home and abroad. "We have placed, democracy on a very high level, on a strong foundation," the President said In a reference to the open dis- cussion that makes Yugoslavia unusual among Communist na- tions. "But there cannot be de- mocracy for the enemies of our social system who fight against everything we wish to achieve." "Up until now we have tol- erated too much," he said as applause from the well-dressed crowd in the coal-mining town Interrupted him. "We have tol- erated such enemies and their actions too much, and they are at work in many areas." The President, who will be 79 on May 25, said that, the mass of Yugoslays still gave him and ? his associates in the party full support. On a recent (trip through backward ems in the south, he said, he had been rreceived "with the same faith" {its was Shown him in after Wotid Waril, when he turned liii.Vietoticiut Partisan move- ment into a government. Toward the end of that trip, Marshall Tito made several angry speeches indicating that nationalist rivalries among leaders of the country's six republics were becoming a danger to Yugoslavia's develop- ment and unity. It was then that he announced this week's leadership meeting, which ob- servers thought would be a major showdown on economic and political issues. In discussing the meeting on his island retreat of Brioni, however, the President said only that "very sharp discus- sion" had ended in unanimity. He did not say how outstand- ing economic questions had been reconciled nor did he point to any change in exist- ing policy beyond "more en- ergetic" application of party and governmental discipline. Greater Autonomy for Republics lStating that Yugoslavia was not in danger of disintegration, be said .the current reorgani- zation giving greater autonomy to the governments of the six republics would strengthen the nation. "We have settled the na- tional question, not only in theory," he maintained. "All that remains is to implement our decisions. There ? is no nationality in Yugoslavia that wants to be outside Yugo- slavia." Part of the reorganization, he added, would probably be a shuffle of federal posts, which many expect this sum- mer. Beyond that, President Tito said, it may prove neces- sary to remove prominent party members from posts that they have become ;"to Weak" to occupy. As for bankers, business managers and others who fol- lbw policies opposed by the Government's economic stabili- ration measures, he declared,' "They will not only be ex- pelled from thor rty but also frOl their lOP."4 . Approved For Release 1999/09/02io CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 11-IE WASHINGTON POST 24 April 1971 CPYRGHT Yugosi v census Reflects Nationality S lit By Dan Morgan Washington Post Foreign Service LGRADE?How many Yugoslays are there in Yu- goslavia? The answer emerging from prelimiary returns in the country's 1971 popula- tion census is: probably not too many. ? For the purposes of the census?and to the anger of , many people who identify themselves with the country as a whole rather than with one of the five national groups composing it?"Yu- goslav" is no nationality at all. Nevertheless, an undis- closed number of respond- ents to the survey ques- tionnaires who consider themselves to be Yugoslays have registered under the category for those of "unde- clared" nationality. A period of economic and political decentralization has rekindled rivalries among the country's five na- tional groups?the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Monten- egrins and Macedonians? and the census has become embroiled in the contro- ? versey over national identity. Furthermore, the census is coming at a time of major constitutional reorganiza- tion, in which the federal government is losing many of its powers, and there is fear in some quarters that the concept of the Yugoslav multinational state could be put in question. In protest against the cen- sus's emphasis on identifica- tion with national groups, .some students at Belgrade ,University reportedly have listed themselves as Eski- mos. One Belgrade woman, a .Serb, received a visit from a census taker AltOrWeldsf 0r band, also a Serb, was ab- sent. She listed herself and their two children as "un- declared." The husband be- came furious when he heard this, telling her hotly, "How could you do it? You gave birth to two fine Serbs, and you call them undeclareds." The drafting of the census questionnaire was a one- year process, filled with po- litical controversy involving representatives of the coun- , try's largest national groups, the Serbs (42 per cent of the population) and the Croats. (24 per cent). The Croats resisted ef- forts to permit purely re- gional identifications in the census, but in the end three regional groupings were al- lowed?those of Dalmatia, Kordun and Lika. All are in Croatia, but an estimated half-million Serbs live in those regions. One Croat from Dalmatia, the Adriatic coastal region between Dubrovnik and Ri- jeka, said he had passed up a chance to declare himself as a Dalmatian "because I didn't want to throw away my vote." Some persons are unsure what they are. These are the children from "mixed" na- tionality marriages, which make up 12 per cent of the total. The Yugoslav authorities want to encourage the trend toward decentralization, but to check it before it turns Into regional chauvinism. They are frankly no encour- aging any movement toward Yugoslav nationality. Laszlo Varga, a federal of- ficial in charge of relations among national groups, said: Yugoslavia is not a unified national group. It is a ro- Inliteaggef69 diti9PY2 : are some who think of Yugo:', slavia concept as an excuse for a new hegemony." After World War II, the newly installed Communist government under President Tito consolidated power in a 4, rigidly, controlled, central- ized system under the ban- ner of a unified Yugoslavia. , The decentralization proc- ess started soon afterward has now reached new dimen- sions. So, apparently, has the fervor of the country's national groups. One indication of this is; the outpouring of volunteer support in Serbia and Mon- tenegro for the building of a? railway between Belgrade and Bar, a small town on the Adriatic near the Al- , banian border. Bar is now earmarked for development as a major port to compete, with Rijeka, in Croatia. In the first week of a cam- paign to raise money for the , project, $20 million has , poured in from individuals , and enterprises. Some school children in Serbia have given up milk and cookies to support the drive, and some individuals have taken out bonds for as much as $1,000. The project would fulfill an ancient dream of linking Belgrade and Serbia with the Mediterranean. The ap- peal for funds, similar to the volunteer fund drive I launched in Poland for re- building the royal palace in , Warsaw, has caused Serbian patriotism to well up. . The plans for the railroad and.. port? were stalled for years because of Croatia and Slovenia's reluctance to contribute massively to, a project that would benefit: mainly Serbia. Finally in 1966, the it i ? C !NIRO P M41 1S4 P proved, with 85 per cent of the funds covered by the federal government's fund for development of tourism kand shipbuilding ? Two factors have caused the Serbs to turn now to their own devices to com- plete the project. The first was a cost overrun of some. $80 million which the federal 'authorities said they would not make up; the railroad 'bond issue will cover that :amount. The second was the trend toward decentraliza- tion and regional responsi- bility in carrying out invest- ment projects. Serbia, which for years opposed decentralization, :has dramatically changed its policy in the last three . years, and it is now pressing, ,for greater local autonomy. Petal; Jovanovic, a leading 'engineer on the Belgrade- Bar commerce consortium, says that if the federal role in financing the projects' ends, "Serbia has assumed the obligation to continue." Negotiations are now un- derway on the future of the -federal government financ- Ing of this and other major 1YugoslaNt projects which .,Belgradd undertook before the movement to reduce the federal role in the economy ? cot started, 0300090001-4 ii Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CURRENT HISTORY May 1971 CPYRGHT ff. . . the three closely linked internal problems of regional rivalry, political secession and unbalanced economic development are creating a growing concern about Yugoslavia's future. . . ." Yugoslavia's Future BY STEPIIEN S. ANDERSON Associate Prof essor of Government, Windham College AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT in. Yugo- slavia's development it seems ap- propriate to focus attention upon her internal affairs. This is not because for- eign relations are currently stagnant or unin- teresting?indeed some rather significant ini- tiatives and successes have occurred in the past year or so?but rather because domestic affairs appear to be moving toward a severe test of the edifice of Yugoslav nationalism so painstakingly constructed during the postwar era. More specifically, the three closely linked internal problems of regional rivalry, political succession and unbalanced economic development are creating a growing concern about Yugoslavia's future among both Yugo- slav:- and students of Yugoslav affairs. ETHNIC BACKGROUND Although composed of elements of several long-established cultures and politics, Yugo- slavia is a relatively young nation. It was formed in 1919, in the aftermath of World War I and the collapse of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Its formation was due largely to the efforts of the Serbs, a numerous and dynamic Balkan people who had enjoyed national independence since the early nineteenth century. The other major group in that original Yugoslav state was the Croat nation, which had existed for many centuries to the northeast of the Serbs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Cathol- icism and Western (if not Germanic) orien- tation of the Croats distinguished them sharply from the Orthodox and Russian-ori- ented Serbs, even though both spoke much the same language. In addition to Serbs and Croats, Yugoslavia also embraced sev- eral smaller Balkan Slavic groups: the Slovenes of the northern alpine regions; the Macedonians of the extreme south, closely related, historically and culturally, to the Bulgarians; the Montenegrins, a mountainous offshoot of the Serbian nation; and the in- habitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who com- prised an uneasy mixture of Serbian, Croatian and Turkish elements, the last a consequence of centuries-long inclusion in the Turkish empire, an experience shared by the Serbs and Macedonians. Besides these Slavic groups them were the Shiptars, closely related Lo the Albanians and inhabiting a region, now known as Kosmet, bordering Albania, as well as a melange of Hungarian, Rumanian and Germanic groups spread across the Voivo- dina, a plains region to the northwest. These ethnic patterns have persisted, and it is impossible to comprehend contemporary Yugoslavia without an awareness of their existence. The frictions they produced were a major cause of Yugoslav impotence during the interwar period. They deeply influenced the character of the anti-Nazi partisan move- ment which Josip Tito created during World War IL They present perhaps the most fundamental challenge to the development of a stable Yugoslav nation-state today. In considering the problem of regional rivalry in Yugoslavia, it is well to distinguish Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 12 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT between two rather different sources of ten- sion, one specifically ethnic and the other essentially political. Ethnic tensions arise from long-standing prejudices ("Montene- grim are lazy," "Serbs ara arrogant," "Slo... VC11CS are chiselers") and misunderstandings among the various ethnic groups. In most, although by no means all, cases these are di- rected against the Serbs by the other na- tienalities, and vice versa. Political tensions have to do with the issue of power: should power be centralized in the federal govern- ment or in the republican and other constitu- ent governments? This issue is, of course, enormously complicated by the fact that the seat of federal power, Belgrade, is also the capital of Serbia, and has traditionally been staffed largely- by Serbs even when upper- - echelon positions have been distributed among the various ethnic groups. In the early postwar years, the newly-in- stalled Communist regime's approach to this problem of regional rivalry was a centralist one: political and economic control was con- centrated heavily in Belgrade, and the party itself was organized in a way that permitted little autonomy to its republican (i.e. ethnic) subdivisions. Following the 1948 break with Moscow, for reasons of both political and economic expediency, this centralized power structure was gradually modified to the point where today it N clear that both the party and 2:overnmenta1 organizations at the republican level are beginning to rival the authority of the central government in Belgrade. For example; in the summer of 1969, a bitter controversy broke out between Slovenia and the federal government over the alloca; lion of highway construction funds. At one point, the Slovene Premier and most of his Cabinet threatened to resign if Slovene de- mands were not met, and the personal inter- vention of President Tito was required even In reach a highly unsatisfactory compromise. ;a Kosmet, matters took a still more ominous mrn during 1968-1969 with the surfacing of NI. Djekic, "Troubles of Kossovo," Yugoslav Life, XVI, I (January, 1971), p. 3, and The Econ- (London), May 2, 1970, p. 44. The New York Times, February 5, 1970, p. 2. widespread anti-Serb demonstrations and agitation for Republic status for Kosmet, in- stead of its present position as an autonomous region within Serbia. This demand was flatly denied and some 30 ShIptars were triad and sentenced for "fomenting national ha- tred." At the same time, however, the fed- eral government took significant steps to im- prove economic conditions in Kosmet (its per capita income of $250 is the lowest in Yugoslavia) and to place more Shiptars in positions of authority within the region.i It is in Croatia, however, that ethnic and political tensions most strongly reinforce each other and where the most troubling situation is developing. The Croats have always chafed at what they consider to be exploita- tion by the poorer and more backward re- gions of Yugoslavia?i.e., Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is only since the mid-1960's, however, that the political system has been sufficiently liberal- ized to allow relatively free expression of these sentiments, not only in public forums but within the party organization itself. The gist of the complaint is that Croatia, together with Slovenia (which is also quite advanced economically), is being held back in economic development by grandiose development plans for the southern parts of the country, fi- nanced by federal taxes which drain off cap- ital from the north. The two northern re- publics, with only a little over a quarter of the population, account for almost seventy per cent of Yugoslavia's industrial production and a like proportion of its foreign trade rarnin gs. At the end of 1969 a Plenary Session of the Croatian League of Communists sharply condemned the view expressed by certain Belgrade "hardliners" that "Croatism" (re- gional nationalism) had developed to the point where some sort of central discipline was needed. The Plenum asserted Croatia's right to manage her internal affairs as she saw fit. 2 During 1970, demands were voiced by highly placed Croatian leaders for further decentralization of the banking system in or- der to give each republic full control of all capital resources created within its bounds. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 13 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT This political self-assertiveness in Croatia has been paralleled by ethnic self-assertion, centered ixtrticularly on the delicate matter of language. Serbian and Croatian are very iimilar, differing mainly in alphabet (Roman (ot. Croatian, Cyrillic for Serbian), the pro- nounciaton of certain vowels, and vocabu- lary. During the postwar era, the official view has been that they arc dialects of the same language designated, rather awkwardly, "Serbo-Croatian." In 1954, the task of pro- ducing a definitive dictionary of the Serbo- Croatian language was undertaken jointly by the official Croatian and Serbian cultural or- ganizations. The project never generated great enthu- siasm, and as regional rivalry began to in- tensify in the 1960's, it clearly began to waver. In 1967, furor was touched off when a group of Croatian intellectuals demanded that Croatian be recognized as a separate lan- ;nage, equal to Serbian in legal and cultural ;tatus. Serb intellectuals responded by de- nanding that all Serbs living in Croatia (about 160,000 persons) should be entitled to learn and write their language in the Cyrillic olphabet. At that time, the party stepped in, with Tito publicly rebuking both sides, but the tension continued to grow until finally, in early 1971, the Croatian organization an- nounced that ii was terminating the joint dictionary project, because of Serbian un- cooperativeness.' THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION 'l'aken by itself, this linguistic controversy might seem trivial, even ludicrous, but as an important element in a larger pattern of ;rowing Croat-Serbian animosity it is indeed disquieting. That pattern is undoubtedly one of the reasons that President Tito has openly tried, over the past two years, to create machinery for political succession capable of weathering the situation his departure will create. For there is no doubt that the aging leader (he will be 79 this year) is one of the most important factors of cohesion in Yugo- glavia today. His personal intervention in 3 The New York Times, January 29, 1971, p.8. the Slovene and Croatian episodes has already been mentioned, and there have been many similar situations over the years. Born a Croat, his career has transcended regional rivalries, and ha holds the respect of at least sizable segments of the general public and the leadership strata in all parts of Yugo- slavia. His effort to prepare for the inevitable? his own departure from the scene?has pro- ceeded on two levels: party and governmen- tal. At each level it has taken the form of arrangements designed to insure (so far as such things can be assured) a regionally-bal- anced, post-Tito collective leadership. The Yugoslav League of Communists ( the official name of the ruling Communist party) held its ninth congress in March, 1969. At this congress, Tito proposed several structural changes, which were subsequently adopted. The existing eleven-man Executive Commit- tee was replaced by a fifteen-man Executive Bureau, composed by statute of two top party leaders from each of the six republics, one from each of the two autonomous re- gions, and Tito. His position in the Bureau was designated as unique and will cease to exist after his retirement or death. Other changes included the expansion of the next- lower body from 35 to 52 members, with representation on a demographic basis, and elimination of the 154-member Central Com- mittee entirely, in favor of an Annual League Conference of approximately 200 party no- tables. All this may seem a mere numbers and semantics game, but there is a clear intent: to create an ethnically-balanced, collective party executive, checked by a demographi- cally-apportioned referent body. About a year and a half later, September, 1970, Presi- dent Tito turned his attention to reforming Yugoslavia's governmental structure at the federal level. Actually, there had been many earlier governmental reorganizations, the most recent example of which was the crea- tion, in 1968, of a Federal Executive Council. This 17-man body corresponded to the Cabs- net of Western parliamentary systems and was headed by a Premier, initially Mika Approved For Release 1999/09/02i4CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 coNlimpf?d For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Spiliak. a Croat, :md subserviently Mita Ribicic, a Slovene. In addition to this Council, in 1968, there was also created a Presidency (but no Vice Presidei icy) which was filled by .Tito himself, While the exact role and powers of the Presidency were not - precisely clarified, it seemed to serve primarily as a position from which Tito could survey the operations of the federal government and intervene in politics when necessary, as in the 1968 Belgrade University student strike. Tim's September, 1970, proposal was to make this Presidency into a collective body composed of two or three representatives from each republic from "the main social-po- litical groups, including, of course, the Com- munist party."4 Inasmuch as Tito, in the same speech, criticized the work of the Fed- eral Executive Council, it seemed likely that his intention was to reduce the political role of the Council and make the new collective Presidency the real locus of power at the fed- eral level, together with the Federal Assembly (Parliament). As public discussion of his proposal developed during the fall and win- ter. this supposition received further con- firmation. Draft constitutional amendments published in February, 1971, described a fourteen-man Presidential Council consisting, like the party's Executive Bureau, of two rep- resentatives from each republic and one from each autonomous region, all elected for five- year terms. This body would choose a President and Vice President, but for a one- year term only, with the two offices appar- ently being rotated among new republics each year. This Presidential Council would have the power to propose legislation to the Fed- eral Assembly, but if the two bodies could not reconcile any differences within nine months, both must be dissolved. The Federal Execu- tive Council, conversely, would become a strictly administrative organ, charged only with carrying out policy. Tito would con- tinue as President of the Republic and in that capacity would join and head the new Presi- The New York Times, September 22, 1970, 11. 7. 5 The New York Times, February 28, 1971; and conversation with Maldin Soic, Director, Yugoslav Information Center, New York. (Initial Council, hut upon his retirement that office would cease tit exist,5 These top-level reorganizations, ?vhich arc still only in the discussion stage, will probably not be promulgated until the summer of 1971; they represent only one side of the effort to deal with impending post-Tito re- gional problems. Included in the same package of proposed constitutional amend- ments arc several whose purpose is clearly to carry the process of political and economic decentralization still further and thereby to placate anti-centralist (and anti-Serb?) senti- ments in the republics. These amendments would leave the federal government with full power only over foreign affairs, defense, and certain aspects of the economy, such as the currency system and the regulation of the unitary market. The only investment cap- ital remaining in federal hands, for example, would be a special fund for the use of under- developed areas, on a revolving credit basis, to be raised by income taxes levied on all Yugoslays. Most federal laws and regula- tions, particularly in the field of economics, would require the assent of the republics be- fore they could take effect. Tito's strategy for dealing with the prob- lem of succession may now be summarized as follows: improved consensus-building organs at the federal level (Presidential Council and Party Executive Bureau) in combination with increased autonomy at the republic level. While on first glance this may seem to be a bold strategy, it is very likely the only one available at the moment, for no one, not even Tito, has the stature or authority to deal with the problem by the alternative path of politi- cal recentralization. Will it work? No one can say for sure at this point. Edward Kardelj, Tito's closest political associate, has said that: the collective presidency will not be a magic wand to solve all the controversies and problems that time brings, but it should certainly speed up the discussion and settlement of such disputes.... Should the presidency be incapable of such in- itiatives, it would certainly mean that it was not performing its duty. This would mean not only that this organ is in crisis, but that the whole society is in crisis. But our society is not in Approved For Release 1999/09/02 i5CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Ap_proved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 CPYRGHT crisis and wc have no reason to doubt that the presidency will perform its positive role in over- coming social problems and conflicts.? Not so sure was Milovan Djilas, a former member of the party inner circle long in dis- favor for his outspokenly critical views. Writing last October in The New York Times he asserted that: the economic and ideological crisis has trans- formed itself into a governmental crisis. Be- cause of this the proposed reorganization of the apex of the government?a "collective" presi- dency instead of a president, will aggravate rather than lessen the inefficiency of the admin- istration and the bickering of the already disas- sociated chiefs.7 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Djilas' remark brings up the third critical problem mentioned at the beginning of this article, but so far alluded to only in passing: the problem of unbalanced economic devel- opment. This problem has many facets, in- cluding of course the serious disparity be- tween the more and less developed regions, but in recent years the salient fact has been that both producer and consumer demand has grown throughout most of the country much faster than the economy's ability to satisfy it. One consequence of this was a strong inflationary trend which shot the cost pf living up by 11 per cent in each of the past two years.? Another was the huge and ;rowing foreign trade deficit (excess of im- -ports over exports) which reached the stag- oring figure of $1.2 billion in 1970. Foreign currency receipts from tourists and from Yugoslays working abroad reduced this to a balance-of-payments deficit of "only" $370 million, but the fact remained that even such a deficit indicated a serious shortcoming. Under a more dogmatic and authoritarian The New York Times, October 5, 1970, p. 11. 7 The New York Times, October 30, 1970, p. 41. 8 The New York Times, January 23, 1971, p. 6. Anthony Silvester, "Yugoslavia's Consumers Call the Shots," East Europe, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan- Lary, 1971), pp. 23-27, see especially pp. 25-26. 78 Yugoslav News Bulletin, No. 468, January 27, 1971,p. 1. 17 Ibid. 12 The New York Times, January 24, 1971, p. 1/1, and Yugoslav News Bulletin, No. 468, January 77, 1971, pp. 2-4. regime, central controls over wages, prices, investments, exports and imports would have been imposed long ago, in the face of such trends. Yugoslav central planners hesitated, and in fact they lacked the authority to tAmper in such a way with the market..cen. tered economy established by the 1965 re- forms. Instead, they attempted to apply a number of indirect solutions to the problem, such as negotiations for special trade agree- mews with the European Common Market (successfully concluded in early 1970) ; en- couragement of foreign investment in Yugo- slavia through partnerships with Yugoslav firms (enacted in 1967 but disappointing in. results) ;? toleration of high levels of migra- tion of both unemployed and skilled workers (over 850,000 were abroad during 1970, mostly in West Europe, contributing some $450 million in remittances to Yugoslavia) ;10 and expanded tourism (foreign tourists brought in $350 million during 1970).11 Toward the end of 1970, however, it was clear that more drastic steps would be re- quired at the federal level. With the ap- proval of the Federal Assembly, an import surtax was established, followed in October by a temporary price freeze and additional import restrictions. December saw the set- ting of an 11 per cent ceiling on wage in- creases to last until April 30, 1971, at which time the federal government expected to in- stitute, in cooperation with the republics, a "comprehensive stabilization program" of an as yet unspecified nature. Then, in mid- January, 1971, the dinar was devaluated by one-quarter of its value (from 12.50 dinars/ dollar to 15.00), a move designed simultane- ously to improve the position of Yugoslav tourism and exports, and to discourage the import of foreign goods." These are short-term solutions, however, capable only of providing a breathing spell in which to deal with the underlying prob- lem. It is by no means clear at this writing how the Yugoslays intend to do this, but one thing is reasonably certain; the solution will not involve a recentralization of economic power in Belgrade. The proposed constitu- tional reforms mentioned earlier have as their Approved For Release 1999/09/036 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 Ap_proved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 UPYRGHT central purpose the expansion of the eco- nomic as well as the political autonomy of the constituent republics. Here in one Yugo- slav commentary on the proposals from an official publication: The most substantive purpose of the reorganiza- tion is to deprive the federal state organs of the right arbitrarily to appropriate to themselves the social capital accumulation, and to distrib- ute it themselves, and to play the role of investor and carrier of enlarged economic reproduc- tion. . . By abolishing the elements of eco- nomic statist .domination over the republics, it is held, not only will the social relations of self- management be fortified, but the equality and sovereignty of the republics will gain fresh mean- Assuming these reforms do go through without major modification, economic devel- opment and balance will become the primary responsibility of the republics, rather than the federal government. The knotty and poten- tially disruptive issue of the north-south de- velopment gap is to be dealt with apparently by placing even more responsibility upon- the underdeveloped republics themselves, al- though long-term development financing will continue to be available, on a loan basis, through the Federal Fund for the Underde- veloped Regions. In effect, these reforms signal the final demise of centrally-imposed egalitarianism in economic development and living standards and will institutionalize the development gap for many years to come. As such, they run counter to a significant body of opinion among the older (and now largely discredited) members of the party, as well as some idealistic young people. Perhaps there is no other choice. If Yugo- slavia is to remain competitive in the world market (and thereby steadily to improve her overall standard of living) she must continue to release and encourage those sectors of her economy that can best compete in the world market. If these sectors happen to be lo- cated for the most part in the more developed regions of Yugoslavia, so be it. Perhaps this harsh policy will somehow stimulate the re- maining regions to make the efforts and sacri- fices necessary to "catch up." But one is " B. Savic, "Self-Governed Federalism," Yugo- slav Life, XVI, 1 (January, 1971), p. 2. entitled to wonder if there will continue to be a Yugoslavia within, which to catch up. Ultimately the key to Yugoslavia's future may lie in the realm of foreign relations, which have not been the focus of this article, but which may nonetheless provide a con- cluding thought. For all the prejudices and resentments which set apart Yugoslays of differing natioinalities, there is still a strong loyalty to the "New Yugoslavia" as a polity that has succeeded in maintaining, over the past quarter-century, a precarious existence between East and West. The Yugoslav strategy of "active non-alignment," while it has fallen far short of its purpose of creating a coherent third world force in international politics, has still established an image of a unique Yugoslav role in world affairs. Re- cent successful trade negotiations with both the European Common Market and Come- con (the Soviet-bloc counterpart of E.E.C.) have further enhanced this image, as did the state visit of United States President Richard Nixon last fall. The restoration of full dip- lomatic relations with Communist China, on the one hand, and the Vatican, on the other, were two very impressive Yugoslav initatives on the 1970 diplomatic calendar. President Tito played a central role in the Third Con- ference of Non-Aligned Countries held in September in Zambia. Yugoslavia has clearly "arrived" as a medium power. The loyalty which Yugoslays feel for con- temporary Yugoslavia is difficult to gauge. It certainly is not strong enough to prevent internal bickering. On the other hand, should foreign powers, or power blocs, at- tempt to take advantage of the internal strains that surely lie ahead for Yugoslavia, there would probably be a compensatory rec- onciliation among the feuding nationalities. In the last analysis, the future of the new Yugoslav nation-state may depend more on its environment than its internal workings. Stephen S. Anderson formerly taught at Marlboro College and Boston University. East European and Soviet affairs are his par- ticular interest and he has traveled widely in the Balkans. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 17 Or Approved For Release 1999/09/0111.4110AIWZ9-01194A000399k9qpil-4 THE COMMON FACTORS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM 1. Political terror has different roots in different places, but whether in Latin America, Africa or the Middle East, it has soMe common factors: a. Unquestionably, the most fertile soil for its growth is in those countries where not only the possibilities of peace- ful and legal change within the national system appear to be blocked, but also where the government shows itself unable to cope with elements of change and ynrest which emerge within the country. b. In recent years, and particularly following the failure and death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in October 1967, rural insurgency has become discredited as the most effective means of revolution, and thee has been a cerresponding rise in urban terrorism. In Uruguay and Guatemala especially, and elsewhere, as in Ceylon and Turkey, urban guerrillas are severely straining the political and social fabric of the nation. c. A third noteworthy and common phenomenon is the increased student participation in urban terrorist activities. In Turkey, for example, terrorist action hfis stemmed in large part from an off- shoot of Dev Genc (Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation). The moderate leaders of Dev Genc have been replaced by advocates of militant revolution calling themselves the Turkish Peoples Liberation Army. It was the activities of this group early this year which brought about the resignation of the government in March, and this same group is responsible for the kidnapping and assassination of the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul. d. The most significant common factor to the majority of these urban guerrilla groups is the support and training provided by established Communist powers. In Latin America, Cuba, and there- fore by extension the Soviet Union, provides funds, training and propaganda support, and has even occasionally assigned its amn. experts to assigt guerrilla groups. The Soviet Union and, as more recently revealed, North Korea, and possibly East Germany, have also given training in subversion and armed violence to Latin American students. In Africa, the Cubans, Chinese Communists and the North Koreans have all been involved in providing support and training to members of insurgent groups. In the Middle East, the Soviets and Chinese Communists have supported and trained Arab commando uoups, while North Korean activity has recently been uncovered in Ceylon also. (tor further information on recent North Korean activity, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP 9-01194A000300090001-4 25X1C3b1 25X1C3b1 Approved For Release 19990161?61DP79-01194A000300090001-4 see the article in this issue entitled, "North Korean Subversive Diplomacy.") 25X1C3b1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4 mommusergairamm. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00030009000