CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 122A(414414NrCIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Propaganda
PERSPECTIVES
JUNE 1971
COWUNIST PATHET LAO DEFECTIONS
DISSIDENCE AT THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS
HOW TO STAGE-MANAGE A CONGRESS
THE TWO FACES OF "DISSIDENT" COMMUNISTS
YUGOSLAVIA: CAN MOSCOW TOLERATE AN INDEPENDENT MARXIST STATE
THE COMMON FACTORS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM
NORTH KOREAN SUBVERSIVE DIPLOMACY
DATES WORTH NOTING
SHORT SUBJECTS
RE-STALINIZATION AT THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS?
ULBRICHT BOWS OUT: "PLUS eA CHANGE..."
CHOLERA: A NEW DISEASE FOR AFRICA
RED ELEPHANT FOR EQUATORIAL GUINEA
25X1C3b1
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
25X1 C1 Ob
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY June 1971
NORTH KOREAN SUBVERSIVE DIPLOMACY
The North Korean subversive activities in Ceylon and the
North Korean involvement in training Mexican guerrillas have
served to put the spotlight on other North Korean subversive
activities around the world. Last month in Ceylon, Prime
Minister Madame Bandaranaike, closed the North Korean Embassy
and expelled its staff; this, less than a year after her
government had recognized North Korea. Earlier, Mexican authorities
rounded up 19 Mexicans who had received financial assistance
and guerrilla training from North Korea. The Mexicans had
been recruited at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow and
had been sent with Soviet assistance to Pyongyang for
training. Five Soviet diplomats were expelled from Mexico
City because of Soviet complicity in this venture. There is
no North Korean diplomatic mission in Mexico.
During India's general elections in March the Indian
authorities found it necessary to warn the North Korean mission
to cease its interference in the election campaign. And
most recently the Indian Government told officials of the
North Korean Consulate General that they will be expelled if
they persist in the "undersirable activities". These
"undesirable activities".include organizing meetings aimed at
giving instruction on guerrilla warfare and spending
extravagant sums on propaganda.
In mid-April officials of the North Korean Embassy in
Bucharest, Rumania made a spectacular attempt to kidnap the
Belgian Ambassador in broad daylight. The Belgian Managed
to escape, as he was helped by the crowd attracted by the
struggle between three North Koreans and the Ambassador.
At about the same time the North Korean Embassy in
Bangui, Central African Republic was forced to close.
President Bokassa's suspicions had been aroused because of
North Korean diplomats' illegally crossing the border between
the Central African Republic and the Congo. Later when the
CAR's Ambassador in Pyongang was subjected to surveillance and
harrassment, President Bokassa broke off relations and is
now reported to be preparing to recognize South Korea.
Elsewhere in Africa several countries have refused to
agree to the establishment of diplomatic relations with North
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4-
Kbrea. Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta and Mauritius resisted
a major drive for diplomatic recognition by North Korea during
1969. Upper Volta was particularly annoyed when a North
Korean delegation refused to leave after having overstayed
its visit. And on the island of Mauritius, the North Koreans'
heavy-handed attempts to gain recognition visibly annoyed
the Prime Minister and other officials, Although Zambia
agreed to recognize North Korea, the Zambians have consistently
rejected North Korean scholarship offers to young political
leaders because they want to avoid extended Communist political
indoctrination of these future leaders.
Officials in Ghana broke off relations with North Korea
shortly after Nkrumah was ousted in 1966. Also in 1966, Uruguay
expelled a North Korean trade mission because of subversive
activities. The Chilean newspaper La Prensa claimed on
April 7, 1971 that North Korea was now one of the principal
centers for training insurgents from Latin America and other
countries. Nationals fpan Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, Chile,
Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela were all said to
have attended guerrilla schools there.
North Korea has maintained close contact with the
Palestine guerrillas. George Habbash, leader of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine visited Pyongyang last
September to "learn and assimilate the experience of North Korea's
great revolutionary struggle," And just before Hhbbash's
visit, the North Koreans received a special envoy from Yasir
Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization. It was in
September that the Palestine guerrillas engineered the mass
hijacking of three commercial airliners. At least one of
the guerrilla officers responsible for the hijacking had been
trained in North Korea.
The Economist magazine in its issue of May 8, 1971 said:
--05717047--
"ThP trirnnp nf nirgnfcz prnhahl 7 thA
most *portant and certainly the most dangerous
aspect of North Korea's revolutionary programme.
Since 1966, the Koreans have run a dozen training
camps for foreigners: three in Pyongyang, two
in NaMpo, two in Wonsan and five scattered, else-
where which train North Koreans as well. Rebels
from 25 countries are said to have been invited
to Korea for courses lasting between six and
18 months; 1,300 from central and south America
lnd 700 fr m Afrca "
All the incidents and activities described above almost
defy a rational explanation: Why does North Korea pursue
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
a worldwide program of support to guerrilla struggles which,
in some areas, outdoes similar operations by Moscow and Peking?
The explanation is in part ideological and in part emotional.
Since 1945 North Korea has moved from the status of a Soviet
satellite to become first, anally of China, next a critic
of both the. USSR and China, and most recently a wary ally of
both Communist powers. Emotionally, the leader of North
Korea for the past 25 years, Kim Ii Sung, has had one
persistent compelling motivation and that is tb:.eStablish
himself as the leader of all Korean Kim believes that the
highest form of struggle for freedom is fevolutionary violence.
He considers himself the equal of Marx, the ideological
successor to Ch 6 Guevara and Ho Chi Minh and the only challenger
to Mao. Kim's pursuit of unification and self-reliance
is financially supported by both the USSR and China.
There is one interesting angle on the question of Soviet
financial sponsorship of the North Korean activity in Asia.
According to this theory the Soviet Union reached a conclusion
that it could not hope to compete with the image of Mao Tse-
tung in Asia and the Middle East and therefore extended aid
to the North Koreans so that they could finance local subversive
organizations. The Soviets hoped that by backing North
Korea they could build up Kim Il Sung's image to the extent
that he might somewhat deflect from Mao's appeal. The Soviets
believe it is essential to reduce the influence of Mho even
if they are unable to make Kim Il Sung support Soviet causes.
In choosing between the two Communist powers at any given
moment Kim is swayed by realistic considerations, not by
ideological niceties. In other words, Kim's revolutionary
facilities are for sale to the highest bidder. Without the
financial aid and other assistance received from both Moscow
and Peking, Kim cannot maintain North Korea in the Revolutionary
vanguard. On the other hand, among the many faces of international
Communism, both the Soviets and Chinese clearly welcome, and
encourage the fanatic, bruising brand of primitive Communist
that Kim Il. Sung represents.,
Approved For Release 1999/09/0i : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
7pRoqie'S For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
ECONOMIST FOREIGN REPORT
1 May 1971
NORTH KOREA'S INVOLVEMENT
The Ceylon crisis has also served to put the spotlight on the subversive activities of
tho North Koreans in various parts of the third world. North Korea's mission In Ceylon
was closed by Mrs Bandaranaikc on 15 April, less than a. year after her governm,ent
had recognised the Pyongyang.regime..'The North Koreans are unofficially reported to
have given lectures to the insurgents and may also have helped to finance the rebellion.
? ,Though it received comparatively little publicity in the world's press, the Mexican
Government announced about six weeks ago the capture 'of a number of guerrillas
who had been trained .in Pyongyang. Mexican extrmists are said to have contacted
the North Korean. Embassy -while in Moscow under a Soviet scholarship scheme.
The North Koreans promised to provide financial help and politico-military training;
and the first group of Mexicans left for Pyongyang in '1968. Two other groups have
followed..
In the Middle East, North ' Korea has sedulously tried to establish influence in
Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, South Yemen and the Lebanon. Friendship
societies have been sct up, and there have been exchange visits by delegations of trade
unionists, journalists, lawyers and health experts as well as politicians and military
chiefs. A number of technical co-operation agreements have been signed, one of 'the
most recent being with South Yemen in the field of broadcasting:
North Korea has also shown: interest in the Palestinian Liberation' movement.
George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; spent
some time in Pyongyang last September 'learning and assimilating the experience of
your ? [North Korea's] great revolutionary struggle', according to the North Korean
Central News Agency. A few weeks previously thc North 'Koreans received a special
envoy from Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Other
contacts included a visit last year by the North Korean deputy 'chief-of-staff to Al Fatah
bases, during which he was reported by the newspaper Fatah to have expressed North
Korea's :fill support for the Palestine revolution. '
Ceylon's' experience with North Korea inevitably raises questions about the extent
, .
to 'which the Pyongyang 'regime might be .using 'diplomatic activity as a cover for
subversion. The North Korean embassy in Tanzania. has 'already provided corses for
dissidents from independent African countries such as KehYa, Cameroun and Burundi.
In addition', African 'freedom fighters' from colonial territories are among 'those
who have been trained at North Korean training Centres which were placed at the
disposal of 'guerrillas. This followed the decision of the 'Cuban-sponsored Afro-Asian-
Latin American Solidarity Organisation (AALAPSO) in. 1966 to set' up a number of
such centres. The Chilean newspaper, La Prensa, claimed on 7 April that North Korea
was now one' of the 'principal 'Centres' for training insurgents .from Latin America and
, ,
other developing countries. ?
? ? .
0 WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED 10t THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD. ' ' ' ' ? ' ' . ? l' ' . , ? ' i, ., .,1. a i ' r -
?FOREIGN REPORT' IS SUPPLIED ON THE CONDITION THAT IT 1E1 REGARDED AS CONFIDENTIAL BY THE RECIPIENT, .
IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY THE CONTENTS 13E REPRODUCED WHOLE OR IN PART.
PRINTED BY WATERLOW a SONS LTD. LONDON. FOR THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD.. LONDON, ILW.I
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
iI
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
C PYR G RICINDON TIMES
7 May 19 71
Kidmipping, spying and organizing guerrilla war in Asia and
Latin America
North Korea's dip! mate6 dirty tricks'
The Indian Government have now
told officials at thc North Korean
Consulate-General in Delhi that
they will be expelled if they per-
si in their " undesirable activi-
ties ". The North Korean mission
has been put udder watch.
This warning follows by some
three weeks the sudden expulsion
fruit Ceylon of the North Korean
Amba-'dor and members of his
st ff at the height of the left-wing
ii ing. 'Plc reasons for their ex-
tol lsion were not disclosed. The
/sl'arth Koreans were reported to
have given lectures to the insur-
gl rite and are believed to have
helped to finance the rebellion. It
was noted that the Chinese
Ambassador was at the airport to
w sh them. farewell.
As for "undesirable activities"
by North Koreans in India, they
have since last autumn spent what
w-...re for than inordinately extra-
VI gant sums on hostile pro a-
guide in newspaper advertising
cianpaigna?S54,000 according to
a complaint by .Mr. Song C:hoi
Woon, the Consular-General of;
South Korea?and have also orga-
nIzed meetings aimed at giving in-
struction on guerrilla warfare to
dose who attended.
These incidents in Ceylon and
Jodie hove 'focused attention on
North Korean diplor. ats
rz Hy and from a survey of inci-
dents it is clear enough that for
the last two yews at least North
Klorea ilea been working with
Clink or for China, in subversive
artivities all over the world. ? In
p ces where China has no diplo-
matic representation of her own
or in some places where she has,
notably Ceylon, North Korea has
been acting as front-runner or
agent for China, on a scale
greater than she could have bn
ee
expected to do on-her own and
presumably, therefore. with
Chinese funds.
That at least is the inevitable
conclusion to be drawn from in-
.
stanees of irregular and costly
. activity by North Korean diplo-
mats in Asia, Africa. Europe or
Central and South America.
The "undesirable activities" in
which North Korean diplomats
have been indulging inolude the
organization pf guerrilla training
and the financing of guerrilla
action, spying and kidnapping. To
this may be added the more?legiti-
mate tasks of advertising their own
brand of revolution and the grant-
ing of inlereat-fras loans in poli-
tically , important and sensitive
area's.
The organization of.guerrilla
training has been going on for at
least two years. Clear evidence of
this was produced in 'March this
year by the Mexican Government
who announced the capture of a
number of Mexican guerrillas who
had been trained in Pyongyang.
Mexican extremists sent to Mos-
cow on Soviet scholarships are
said to have contacted the North
Korean Embassy there and been,
?promised financial help and!
politico-military training, The first
group of Mexicans left for North
Kore.a in 1968. Two other groups
have followed.
The Chilean newspaper ? La
Prerisa claimed on April 7, 1971
that North Korea was now one of
the " principle centres " for train-
ing insurgents from Latin America
and other develdping countries.
Nationals from Guatemala. Peru,
Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia,
Colombia and Venezuela, were all
said to have attended in additicin
to the Mexicans. North Korea also
developed close ?'contacts with
leaders of the Palestine guerrillas
last autumn When the crisis be-
tween the guerrillas and the Jor-
danian Government was corning
to a head.
Dr. George Habbash, Secretary-
'General of the Popular Frorq for'
the Liberation of Palestine, waS
.visiting North Korca at the time
of the hi-jacking of British, Amen--
can and Swiss aircraft on Septem-
ber 6. He remained there during
the negotiatiena on the rejease of
!the prisonors; was apparently
much fete0 and was reported to bc
seeking aelistance from North
Korea, North Vielnarn and China.
!Previously the North Korean
deputy chief of staff visited Al-
:Fatah bates in Jot clan.
? In Africa the' North Korean
'Entbassy in Tanzania has provided
. courses for dissidents from hide-
? pendent African countries 'such as
Kenya. Cameroo.n and Burundi
and African Freedom Fighters
have been trained at the North
Korean guerrilla training centres.
Cases of kidnapping or attempted
kidnapping by North Korean
representatives have been reported
over the ? last two years from
Indonesia where the North
ECONOMIST
CPYRG May 19 71
.Aforth Korea
Revolution
as Kim does it
e or reans may oe me IaSL
true revolutionary mavericks. Their
involvement in Ceylon's insurgency,
which led to their expulsion from
Colombo last month, was anything but
a one-shot escapade. It wp part of
a world-wide programme of support
for guerrilla struggles which in some
areas out Vatig. telffs
CPYRGHT
Koreans launched an expensive
advertising campaign, and from
Bucharest where last month the
Belgian A mbassador,
Adriacnssen, was struck and kicked
and 'nearly abducted after his car
had been hemmed in by two
unknown vehicles. He managed.
however, to escape, taking numbers,
of the ears concerned which turned
out to be North Korean.
Lass sensational but , perhaps
equally bizarre. was the North
Korean decision last month to join
China in an interest-free loan to
Ma un ta ma.
In the Middle East North Korea's
search for friends has covered
Iraq. Algeria. Syria, Sudan,
U.A.R.. South Yemen and
Lebanon and has included thc
establishment of " friendship
societies" and tale exchanges of
nunterous delegations (trade
unionists. journalists. lawyers and
health experts as well as political,
economic and military ,representa-
? fives).
, la Africa, North Korea has now
established diplomatic relations
with Congo-Bramville, Guinea,
Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, Burundi,
Mauritania,. tho Central African
Republic and Somalia. and she is
'establishing diplomatic relations
also with Chad, Equatorial Cruinca.
Ghana and Uganda.
Indeed in the light of North
Korea's real current needs hot
extreme?activity in the diplomatic
field, if it 'is f() purely legitimate
reasons. requires 'some exPlaihitn-'
A;NI. Rendel:
Moscow and Peking. And the Koreans
a,e far less inhibited than either the
Russians or? the Chinese by commit-
ments to conventional diplomacy.
1hey have fewer diplomatic partners
?only i i non-communist ones?and
wer vested interests. In 'short, they
h we less to lose.
What do they have to gain? North
E orea's campaign seems. fuelled to a
rge extent by the ego of that
"genius of revolution," Kim II Sung.
The cult of Kim in North Korea today
r overreaches the diminishing Mao were distributing vast quantities of the
last autumn Kim's eulogists ? were
awarding him the very same position,
of ore-eminent marxist theoretician
that the Chinese have long claimed for
Mao, though, perhaps recognising their
hubris, they have stopped short of that
lately. But they keep on proselytising
?for Kim well beyond their borders'.
The Ceylon government has' not
.come up with real evidence that the
North Koreans had given the Ceylonese
rebels arms, m6ney or i-nilitary train.:
ing. But there is no question that they '
1.49.1?/M2aFtlYREgbilieitsbki 94Affittebt*ocrenbe which c?%141
2
CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
pass -for manuals in guerrilla warfare.,
' They had get uP over 50 branches of
. so-called Ceylon-Korea 'friendship
: societies throughout the island and
these !,..rved as distribution centres.
The North Koreans ? now have
friendship associations " in More than
40 countries, all of which presumably
perform similar functions. The Indian
government protested last week that
a Korean house of culture" in
suburban Delhi was serving as a centre
of subversion. In the ten months
'after December, 1969, the North
Koreans 17'.:iced 130 advertisements in
Indian newspapers at a cost of some
$5oo,000.,'.,, The Indian pressE has also
accused the North Koreans of inter-
fering openly in India's recent general
election by doling out another $500,000
to candidates receptive to the thoughts
of Kim.
Two other Asian countries, Malaysia
and Indonesia, cracked down on
Korean propaganda activities some
i
time ago. And, just before the Ceylon
rebellion, the Central African Republic
expelled its North Korean embassy
and is now reported to be prepar-
ing to recognise South Kdrea. The
North Koreans have recently lost
face in Latin America too, and there
It is for the much more serioni 'offence
'of. training , and financing Mexican
guerrillas.
The training of insurgents is
probably the most important. and cer-
tainly the most dangerous aspect of
North Korea's revolutionary pro-
gramme. Since ig66, the Koreans have
run e. drwen training V2'mpa for
foreigners :? three in Pyongyang, two
in Nampo, two in Wonsan and five
scattered elsewhere which train North
Koreans as well. Rebels from 25
countries are said to have been invited
to Korea for courses lasting between six
and 18 months ; 1,3oo from central
and south America 'arid 100 from
Africa.
The North Koreans also provide
some military training abroad: their
embassy in Tanzania has provided
courses for dissidents from other
African countries, including Kenya,
Cameroon and Burundi. The Cubans
paid Pyongyang to send six instructors
in guerrilla warfare to Cuba two years
ago and close Cuban-North Korean
co-operation is thought to be respon-
sible for the large numbers of Latin
Americans undergoing training in
Korea. Last month the Chilean news-
paper La Prensa asserted that North
Korea was a "principal centre" for
'training Latin American insurgents.
The Koreans have also lent strong
moral and probably' material support
to the Palestinian guerrillas.
Although the main thrust of North
Korean activity has been support for
.insurgencies, Pyongyang has also spent
millions on conventional-seeming aid
projects like a match factory in Congo-
Brazzaville, tractors for Mauretania
and import credits for Syria, Liberia,
South Yemen and Egypt. Where
does the money. come'frorn ? The icale
of North Korea's international activi-
ties has led people to assume that the
Koreans must be acting as a conduit
Cl c It ia e.3t,l tIM ti
Chinese do give the Koreans some
financial help. But it would bo wrong
to see the Chinese as the instigators of
all Korean actions.
Kim II Sung is obsessively concerned
with proving his independence and he
has done so highly successfully before
?as when his men captured the
Puebla and shot down an American
plane to the applause of none of
North Korea's allies. The Chinese
And Koreans have had a dramatic
rapprochement since these episodes.
But the interests of Peking and
Pyongyang are still not identical. One
difference was revealed at the anni-
versary celebrations of the Indochinese
summit conference in Peking last
month. The North Koreans pointedly
repeated the warning issued by Peking
in the heat of the Laos invasion, but
the Chinese dropped it completely.
And the Pyongyang press has yet to
report on the great American ping-
pong tour.
One recent escapade of the North
Koreans should prove that they are
nobody's puppets, least of all Peking's.
This was their attempt to- kidnap the
Belgian ambassador to Rumania?
presumably to embarrass the
Rumanians in their dealings with the
common market. The Chinese who
have veiy, close relations with the
Rumanians and are counting on
Belgian -diplomatic recOgnition before
next autumn's UN vote, could only
regard' this 'al'a spoiling operation. The
North Koreans may be in 'trouble in
another quarter before long.
WASHINGTON POST
17 April 1971
!'
CPYRGHT N. Koreans
I
Associated Press
Diplomatic sources said yes-
terday an American embassy
?car carrying diplomatic pouch-
es was nearly run off the road
in Bucharest a week ago by
a pair of cars from the North
Korean embassy.
The same two cars \were in-
volved in another incident
Sunday, in which the Belgian
ambassador to Romania was
stbpped and dragged from his
car to another vehicle. A,
trowd drawn by the eommo-
Chase U.S.
Linn appal. en tly bcaled tne
North Koreans away, the
sources said.
They said the ambassador, J.
M. Adriacnssen was driving
alone into Bucharest when two
cars made several attempts to
stop him by criss-crossing Lir
front of his car. Finally halt-
ing Adriaenssen, the sources
said, the North Koreans.
dragged him from his car. A-,
third car blocked his autcf
from the rear and the assail-
ants tried to wrestle him into
Courier I
me last venicie.
But the gathering of a crowd
apparently frightened the
agent's , and they drove off,
leaving Adriaenssen.
The diplomat's said the rea-
son for the two incidents was
unclear.
The U.S. embassy car was
not halted, though it appeared,
the sources said, that the
North Koreans were attempt-
ing to either collide with it oil
atop it.
ppruvu rur rwIctbU
300090001 4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
17 April 1971
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT,
? NORTH K I 11.1EAN.
LEAVE CEYLON
FOR MOSCO
By IAN WARD In Colombo
WE entire. NorthEmean Embassy staff
flew from Ceylon aboard,ajhisgan
Aeroflot jet airliner last night?expelled, by'
the Prime Minister, Mrs Bandaranaike, just
ten months after Colombo and Pyongyang
exchanged full diplomatic recognition.
So far the Ceylonese Government has failed to
provide an official reason for their forced departure.
But the root cause is the unmistakable hand of North
Korea in the "Che Guevarist:" rebellion currently (1L.,-
rupting the island.
Ceylonese police have solid
evidence linking ideological
direction and finance of the
youthful movement to the
North Korean representation
in the capital.
For the past week the North,
Korean Embassy has been i
under constant military guard
by a detachment of Ceylonese
infantrymen.
Led by the Ambassador, Mr
Hwang Icing U, the North
Koreans arrived at Colombo's
international airport three hours
before the Ilyushin jet that was
taking them to Moscow..
The departing diplomatic
group of eight men, four, women
and six children, was ushered
into the airport's VIP lounge,
guarded inside by uniformed
police and otrtside by armed
troops. ,
New phase
The Communist Chinese
Ambassador and seven of his
staff saw them off and observers
regarded the presence af the
Red Chinese diplomats as a
serious snub to Mrs Bandara-
nailcel Government.
They believe it could usher In
a new phase of chilly relations
between Peking and Colombo. .
Earlier, -Russian diplomats I
paid their final calls at the ,
North Korean Embassy while
the officials carried out last-
minute packing.
Shortly, before the North
Koreans left Ceylon last night,
the Government issued a brief
communiqu?It said: "The
Government has decided in its
own interest that all Korean
staff and their families in the
Embassy of the Democratic
-Peoples Republic of Korea In
Ceylon should leave the country_
immediately.
"This decision was cony
to the Ambassador by flir
Permanent Secretary of De-
fer"' nod External Affairs cin
April '13. The Ambassador V44111
,reqUested to wind up the affairs
of the mission and arrange for
departure of all Korean per-
sonnel in the mission by Aero-
flot leaving at 7.30 p.m. on
?Aprill 16."
Serious set-back
The comm,unigue added :
"This does not imply disrup-
tion of diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries which
will remain for the present."
Western diplomats expressed
scepticism over the phrase "for
the present" and privately pre-
dicted that relations between
Colombo and Pyongyang would
soon be severed.
In fact, Ceylon, which restricts
overseas diplomatic posts for
'financial reasons, has no mission
In North Korea. Her interests
there are handled by the
!Chinese Communist mission.
! Political observers in Colombo
!regard the exnulsion as a serious
set back for North Korea which
has been engaged in' some hard-
sell diplomacy throughout Asia.
And, although ordered by her,
the expulsion is a deep embarrass-
'ment to Mrs Bandaranaike's
'foreign policy. This ? has been
"geared to enliancing, Ceylon's
'" min-alignment " by" cour mg
'Conmiunist Governments Ike
'North Korea. North Viet m.
And, South Vietnam's National
rLiberation Front..
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :4CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM
January-April 1971
CPYRGHT
Pyo ya
for Le iti
g's Search
acy
'CPYRGHT
By Joungwon A. Kim
quarter of a century has r-..,ed since Kim
II-song returned to Pyongyang with the Soviet
occupation forces to become the leader of
the northern half,of a divided Korea. The long dura-
tion of Kim's leadership, the continued Stalinist
pattern of the controls he has imposed on North
Korean society, and the invariable dullness of the
political sloganeering still emanating from Pyong-
yang twenty-five years later all tend to give the
impression of immutability and to obscure the very
real changes which have occurred in both the
foreign and domestic policies of this isolated half-
nation on the eastern fringe of the Communist world.
Externally, North Korea has moved since 1945
from the status of a Soviet satellite to become first
an ally of Communist China, next a bitterly antago-
iistic critic of both the USSR and the CPR, and most
.ecently a wary ally of both Communist giants. In-
-ernally, Kim II-song has relentlessly purged from
-he Korean Workers' Party and the North Korean
government all but those most loyal to him, gradually
,liminating the veteran Communist leaders with
domestic roots predating Kim's return, as well as
the factions with strong ties to either the USSR or
the CPR. The North Korean society of some 13
million people has experienced the full effect of
ocial mobilization in the form of agricultural col-
l?.ctivization, rapid industrialization and expanded
Education, even while the life style of the individual
citizen has radically changed as the result of his
being inducted into a multitude of state-sponsored
inions, associations and groups.
Behind all these changes there lurks a persistent,
c)mpelling motivation?the necessity to establish
aid substantiate Kim H-song's claim .to be the
legitimate leader not only of the North, but of all
A Research Fellow in East Asian Legal Studies at
Harvard University, Mr. /elm has contributed articles
to variouk (04 FiqyftioieAwdisegie9102
Affairs arfa Mums.
Korea. The urgency of this aspiration can only be
understood in the context of the Korean heritage?
the history of a state which enjoyed 13 centuries
of undivided, uninterrupted nationhood until sub-
jugated by Japanese imperialism at the outset of
the current century. The eclipse of Korean nation-
hood lasted until the Allies' triumph over Japan in
World War II. That victory, however, did not bring
unity to the Korean nation; rather it resulted in the
division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel
into separate Soviet and US occupation zones in
which competing North and South Korean states
emerged?creating an unstable situation in which
both Korean governments feel their existence threat-
ened by the existence of the other. Each must foster
and enhance its own self-image as the legitimate
ruler of the Korean people or face the threat of
extinction.1
The legitimacy Issue Is often overlooked by
analysts who view North Korean actions and policies
largely in the context of the Sino-Soviet controversy.
They tend to see Pyongyang as a victim of geopol-
itics, caught between two warring Communist giants
and forced to frame its policies in response to the
vicissitudes of that struggle.2 But, while Moscow and
Peking hold overwhelming resources of power with
which to threaten or seduce Pyongyang, Seoul holds
One need not rely alone on Kim's incessant propaganda to Judge
the continuing urgency of the legitimacy and unification issues
in Korea. As reported in The Economist (London) of Dec. 5, 1970,
p. 39, President Park's recent suggestion that negotiations on
reunification be initiated reflects the aspiratiOn of 90 percent of
the South Koreans polled. Full results of this poll, undertaken by the
National Unification Board, appeared in the Dong-A llbo (Seoul),
Feb. 20, 1970. For an English-language report, see The Korea Times
_f
For example, see Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations,
A sian Survey (Berkeley), August 1968, pp. 708-22; Joseph C. Run,
? North Korea: Between Moscow and Peking," The China Quarterly
: g79.01$94
(London), July-September 111:6,14mitniugjoaret ScalapIno
ClAbROP
fr.
.J1.... 1383 oop. 30-J0
I ?
CPYRGHT
5
1 CPYRGproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
UNIFICATION THROUGH REVOLUTION
Comrades, the territorial partition and national split
caused by the US imperialist occupation of South Korea
have not only spelled unbearable miseries and sufferings
for the South Korean people, but brought great national
calamities to the entire Korean people and created a serious
obstacle to the coordinated development of Korean society
as a whole.
To reunite the divided fatherland is a great national duty
of all the Korean people at the present stage. It is our most
urgent task, and we cannot forget it even for a moment. The
policy of our party for the unification of our fatherland Is
already known widely throughout the world.
?Kim Il-song's speech to the Fifth Korean Workers'
Party Congress, Radio Pyongyang Domestic Service,
Nov. 2, 1970.
The oppressed and exploited popular masses can win
freedom and emancipation only through their own revolu-
tionary struggle. Therefore, the South Korean revolution
should, in all circumstances, be carried out by the South
Korean people on their own initiative. But the people in the
northern half, being of the same nation, have the obligation
and responsibility to support and actively encourage the
South Korean people in their revolutionary struggle.
?Summary of Kim Il-song report to the Fifth Congress
of the Korean Workers' Party, Pyongyang, Korean
Central News Agency, Nov. 3, 1970.
a far more vital asset in the Korean scheme of
things?a strong alternative claim to be the legiti-
mate government of the Korean people.
Kim II-song initiated his quest for legitimacy from
a most disadvantageous position. After the Japanese
surrender in 1945, the most prestigious of the na-
tionalist leaders returning to Korea naturally gravi-
tated to Seoul?the national capital?where even
the "domestic" Communists (the name generally
used to refer to those Communists who had stayed
in Korea during Japanese rule) initially endorsed
the naming of Syngman? Rhee as President of a
"People's Republic." 3 Kim's regime in Pyongyang
was clearly a puppet of the Soviet occupation forces,
to which it owed its existence. The insecurity of the
North Korean government was further demonstrated
in 1948 when it refused to permit United Nations
supervision of elections north of the 38th parallel.'
In the same year UN-supervised elections took place
?Dae-sook Su-h, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918.1948,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 298.
in the South, 4 and the UN General Assembly r6tog-
nized Rhee's government in the following words:
There has been established a lawful government
having effective control and jurisdiction over that
part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was
able to observe and consult and In which the great
majority of the people of all Korea reside . . . the
only such government in Korea.5
Disillusioned with Kim's harsh rule and spurred by
the growing awareness that Korea was likely to
remain divided Indefinitely, North Koreans fled south-
ward, their total number reaching two Million or
more, some 20 percent of the North Korean popula-
tion, between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean
War in 1950.?
Desperate Gamble
In light of this embarrassing mass emigration,
Kim II-song's attempt to unify the country by force
in 1950 appears to have been less a reckless venture
than an essential gamble to assure the survival of
his regime. The result, however, was nearly dis-
astrous. The United Nations labelled North Korea
the "aggressor" In the conflict, and 16 nations sent
troops to help in the defense of South Korea., The
Pyongyang regime was saved only by the intervention
of the Chinese Communist "volunteers," and the war
ended in a stalemate.
Rebuffed In its attempt to conquer the South by
force, North Korea turned to rebuilding its military
The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea supervised
elections south of the 38th parallel on May 10, 1948, in which
75 percent of the eligible voters and more than 95 percent of
the registered voters participated. The Commission resolved that
"the results of the ballots . . . are a valid expression of the free
will of the electorate In those parts of Korea which were accessible
to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted
approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea." (UN Press
Release No. 70, June 30, 1948).
3 UN Document A806, Dec. 12, 1948.
*US Department of Stale, North Korea: A Case Study in the
Techniques of Take Over, Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1961, p. 12.
Nations contributing forces to the UN Command, in addition
to the Republic of Korea, were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia,
Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, TurkeyP,Ire UMW, of South Africa,
the United Kingdom, and the US. India and Norwitni provided
noncombat assistance.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRG/Wproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
and e_onomic might, aided generously in the effort
by both the USSR and Communist China. Starting
with what remained of the impressive pre-World
War II Japanese industrial base in the North, Pyong-
yang undertook to industrialize at a breakneck pace.
In 1958, doubtless influenced by the Chinese Great
Leap Forward, Kim launched the "Ch'ollIma (Flying
Horse) Movement." Like its Chinese counterpart,
this movement counted on mass enthusiasm to spur
production, but unlike Mao's economically disastrous
program, the Korean movement also placed heavy
reliance on technical expertise, which may explain
its superior results.9 Successes in internal political
mobilization and indoctrination in the North during
this period were also impressive. In fact, the gains
registered by the North during the second half of
the 1950's caused grave concern in Seoul, par-
ticularly in view of the difficulties encountered in
the last years of the Rhee government.
The 1960's, however, witnessed a shift in the
power balance in Korea and a curious countertrend
in the legitimacy contest. These developments were
triggered by the fall of the government of the aging
Syngman Rhee in April 1960?an event which was
precipitated by student riots reflecting internal dis-
content with Rhee's repressive policies, two years
of Washington-Seoul friction over these policies, re-
duction in US aid, and an accompanying sharp down-
turn in economic growth.9 Regardless of the merits
or failings of his government, Rhee was the nation's
most famous independence leader?the man who
had formed a provisional government during the
abortive 1919 uprising against the Japanese. Thus,
when he fell, the South Korean state lost the key
symbol of its continuity with the Korean independ-
ence movement.
For a little more than a year the successor civilian
regime in Seoul grappled ineptly with its responsibil-
ities. But in 1961, the Army of the Republic of Korea
seized power in order to put a stop to the chaos
and factional infighting in Seoul, which threatened
to weaken further the power of South Korea vis-a-vis
See the analysis of North Korean economic development during
the 1950's and early 1960's in Joungwon A. Kim, North Korean
Economic Progress, an unpublished monograph reproduced by the
US Department of State, 1963; and "The 'Peak of Socialism' in
North Korea: The Five and Seven Year Plans," In Jan S. Prybyla,
Comparative Economic Systems, New York, AppIeton-Century-Crofts,
1969, pp. 412-28.
For studies of the causes of the student revolution, see C. I.
Eugene Kim and Ke-soo Kim, "The April 1960 Korean Student
_Movement," The Western Political _quarterly (Salt Lake City),
March 1964, pp. 83-92, and Kim Song-t'ae, "Sawol slpkultul slmnlhak"
(Psychology of April 19), Sassanggye (Seoul), April 1961, pp. 80-81,.
the North. By imposing firm central control and
initiating broad reforms (including the introduction
of economic planning and reform of the tax struc-
ture), the new military regime made substantial
strides towards putting the South in a position to
compete, both economically and militarily, with the
Industrial North.'? However, these gains were
achieved at a significant cost, for the coup which
brought the regime to power had clearly broken the
continuity of "legitimate" government originally es-
tablished by the UN-sponsored elections of 1948. In
addition, the new South Korean leaders bore the
stigma of having received their military training
under the Japanese.
Meanwhile, emboldened by North Korea's eco-
nomic advances in the late 1950's, Kim II-song
moved vigorously during the following decade to
demonstrate his independence and to bolster his
own claim to leadership of the Korean nation. Al-
though his immediate response to the 1961 coup in
the South was to negotiate bilateral mutual-defense
treaties with Moscow and Peking, Kim soon showed
signs of shifting to a fiercely independent foreign
policy, even at the risk of antagonizing both Com-
munist allies and at the cost of losing, at least
temporarily, their economic assistance. Pyongyang's
assertion of independence first from Moscow and
then from Peking, the 1968 seizure of the USS
Pueblo and other acts of anti-US belligerency, and
the cultivation of an exorbitant cult of Kim II-song
10 See Joungwon A. Kim, "Korean Kundaehwa: The Military as
Modernizer," Journal of Comparative Administration (Beverly Hills,
Calif.), November 1970, pp. 355-71; and Emerson Chapin, "Success
Story in South Korea," Foreign Affairs (New York), April 1969.
SOVIET SABOTAGE
The anti-party elements within the party and their supporters
abroad, revisionists and great-power chauvinists (i.e., the
CPSU?Ed.), lined up as one in opposition to our party and
resorted to subversive activities In an attempt to overthrow
the leadership of our party and government.. . . The attack
of the opportunists on our party became most glaring be-
tween 1956 and 1957. . . The modern revisionists . . .
opposed the socialist revolution in our country, prattling that
it was as yet premature; they opposed our party's line of
socialist industrialization, the line of construction of an
independent national economy in particular; and they even
brought economic pressure to bear upon us, inflicting
tremendous losses upon our socialist construction.
?Kim ll-song, Selected Works (English edition), Vol. II,
Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, pp.
515-16, 57E40.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02
7
: C1A-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
cpyRdffroved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
both at home and abroad all appear to have been
a direct outgrowth of the contest for legitimacy and
survival.
4.11.01011?0 Mil?NOMM.N00.?
Pyongyang vs. Its Allies
In dealing with the USSR and Communist China,
Kim has had to reckon not only with the diverse
efforts of the two to interfere in his policies, but also
with the reality that neither of them attaches great
significance to Kim's goal of unification. In choosing
between the two Communist powers at any given
moment, the North Korean leader has been swayed
by realistic considerations of self-preservation and
-not by ideological niceties.
Already in 1951, Pyongyang resented the Soviet
decision to bring about early Korean armistice nego-
tiations, feeling that the only likely outcome would
be an intolerable recognition of the division of
Korea, the very situation which Kim had sought to
eliminate by his attack on the South. Subsequently
(after the Korean armistice).Kim's regime?evidently
convinced that the USSR would not support any
further unification efforts?set out to build a strong
and independent economic, political and military
base which would enable it, at some future time,
to launch another unification attempt on its own."
It was because of these independent policies of
North Korea that the Soviet Union in 1956 instigated
a "destalinization" campaign In Pyongyang with the
goal of undermining Kim's position in the North
Korean regime. However, Kim had crushed this
challenge by 1958. Because of Kim's insistence
on independent policies, relations between Moscow
and Pyongyang continued to deteriorate despite the
signing of the 1961 mutual assistance pact, and in
1963 the USSR terminated its economic and military
assistance to North Korea in retaliation for Kim's
independent behavior.
A factor contributing to the Soviet discontent
was Kim's growing friendship with Peking. Yet the
latter relationship also had its areas of disagreement.
Kim Il-song saw the widening Sino-Soviet rift as a
threat to the defense capability of the Communist
world, and hence of North Korea, and his resentment
at Ma :ist policies grew particularly intense as a
consequence of Chinese obstruction of Soviet aid
shipments to North Vietnam in 1966. Furthermore,
,China proved unable to fill adequately the aid,vacuuM
left by the Soviet suspension of assistance to North
"See Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy In North Korea,"
World Politics (Princeton), January 1970, pp. 237-54.
Korea in 1963?a matter of great concern to Kim
as he witnessed the growth of South Korea's military
power. Finally, Mao's strident Claims to the leader-
ship of the world revolutionary movement conflicted
with Kim's own ambitions, When the Soviet Union
reversed course in 1965 and restored the flow of
economic and military assistance to Pyongyang,
the Chinese Communists showed their displeasure by
mounting wall posters in Peking denouncing Kim
Il-song as a "fat revisionist" (for having sold out to
Moscow). By 1966 relations between North Korea
and the CPR were so chilly that neither country main-
pined an ambassador in the other's capital. This
kstrangement was evident as late as April 1969 when
Pyongyang pointedly refused to send a delegate to
the Ninth Congress of the CCP."
Since North Korea's troubles with its allies sprang
from Soviet or Chinese policies that put restraints
on Pyongyang's military and economic capacity, or
which cast shadows on Kim's image of independence
in formulating foreign policy, and not from basic
ideological issues, reconciliation was a relatively
simple matter once the objectionable policies were
renounced. Thus, when Moscow offered to restore aid
to North Korea in 1965, Pyongyang promptly re-
sumed cordial relations with the Soviets. And it was
with equal pleasure that Kim accepted China's truce
offering when Chou En-lai visited Pyongyang in April
1970 to assure North Korea:
In the future, we will, as always, support and assist
each other and fight shoulder to shoulder."
The two countries concluded a trade agreement
shortly thereafter. Not to be outdone, the Soviet
Ambassador to North Korea sought to cement Mos-
cow's renewed ties with . Kim by declaring, on the
occasion of the ninth anniversary of the Korean-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance in July 1970:
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet
Government, and the entire Soviet people fully sup-
port the Korean people in their righteous struggle
to chase the US imperialist aggressive troops out of
South Korea and to achieve national unification on
a democratic basis."
"A brief summary of the PekIng-Pyengyang feud and rapproche-
ment may be found In L. F. Goodstadt, "Patchwork in Pyongyang,"
Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), July 23, 1970,
pp. 6-7, and In Koji Nakamura, "For Chou, a Peking-Pyongyang
Detente," ibid., May 7, 1970, p. 18.
"ibid.
14Korean Central News Agency radio broadcast, July 8, 1970.
? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
8
?CPYIA9Kved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Thus, by the end of 1970, relations between
Pyongyang and each of its two major Communist
E- 'lies seemed reasonably amicable. As far as the
Sino-Soviet conflict was concerned, Kim II-song
pparently saw no contradiction in maintaining
cordial relations with both countries simultaneously.
However, Pyongyang saw fit to exercise Caution in
making sure the visiting delegations from Peking
cr Moscow di u not cross paths while they were in
North Korea."
Kim welcomes the support of the USSR and the
CPR because of a genuine fear for the security of
North Korea, which seems to him to be threatened
loth by an increasingly strong South Korea and by
E possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. Few
Koreans who lived through the trying years of
Japanese colonialism and who confronted Japan's
ighly efficient military rule and (political) "thought"
once can dismiss the nagging fear that it could all
appen again?however unrealistic this may seem
t) foreign observers. The recent announcement by
tie United States of plans to reduce its forces in
.outh Korea has brought forth warnings from
Pyongyang that Japan may try to move into the US
role in South Korea?warnings which have been
tr-npathetically echoed in Peking.
Kim and World Revolution
While turning to Moscow and Peking to secure his
ngime against real or imagined enemies, Kim II-song
I-as not hesitated to challenge the revolutionary
leadership of both major Communist centers. As
early as 1965 (prior to the resumption of Soviet aid
to North Korea), Kim delivered a thinly-veiled attack
4gainst Moscow, accusing the Soviet leaders of being
"tevisionists" bent on preventing North Korea from
securing economic independence and on overthrow-
ing his regime." Kim also seems to be trying to
outdo Mao in bidding for leadership of the world's
r wolutionary movements, basing his appeal on a
Elorification of the tactics of violent revolution. On
tie 50th anniversary of the unsuccessful nonviolent
anti Japanese uprising of 1919, Kim stated:
7 he greatest lesson of the historic anti-Japanese
"The Chinese (and not the Soviets) on July 25, 1970, attended
II e commemoration of the outbreak of the Korean War; the
S wiets (and not the Chinese) attended the 25th anniversary of
K rean independence from Japan. There was no report of either being
n resented at the Fifth KWP Congress last autumn.
"Kim II Sung, Selected Works, English Edition, Pyongyang,
Foreign Language Publishing House, Vol. II, p. 513.
movement is that the highest form of struggle to
freedom Is revolutionary violence."
Thus, Kim has Identified himself with the movements
of Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh and apparently
seeks to promote himself as their ideological suc.
cessor. The North Korean leader 6eemIngly strikes
a responsive chord among some of the world's new
revolutionaries?e.g., the American Black Panther
Jeader Eldridge Cleaver visited Pyongyang in 1969 and
voiced praise for Kim's revolutionary leadership."
Kim's appeals to revolution are hardly likely to
win recognition of North Korea as a member of the
established international community. Ever since the
Korean War, the Pyongyang regime has been,/ in
effect, an international outlaw. Only 29 nations recog-
nize Kim's state, compared to 93 nations which
-recognize the government in Seoul." Kim adamantly
refuses to recognize the competence of the UN to
deal with the Korean problem. This defiance of the
International body?to which the USSR is, at least in
part, committed?may explain the visit of the Soviet
and Czechoslovak UN Ambassadors to Pyongyang in
August 1970.gu One may surmise that they went to
discuss possible new initiatives on behalf of North
Korea at the impending session of the UN General
Assembly which opened in September. But it would
take extreme changes in the UN's position vis-a-vis
North Korea to convince Kim II-song that he could
more effectively gain national and international pres-
tige through the world organization rather than by
trying to win a following among revolutionaries every-
where.
Closely related to Kim's efforts to achieve stature
both at home and in the world revolutionary move-
ment is the cultivation of an extravagant personality
cult of Kim Il-song. Advertisements for a recent
English-language version of his official biography
presumed to call Kim "the Hero of [the] 20th
Century." 21 The cult seeks to provide Kim with an
impressive set of revolutionary credentials?more
impressive, in fact, than the, facts would support.
His father, Kim Hyong-chik, is now credited by the
Pyongyang regime with bringing about the 1919
anti-Japanese uprising.22 To those who have observed
the rapid rise of Kim's younger brother, Kim Yong-
21 Pyongyang Radio broadcast, April 17, 1969.
10A series of articles on Kim II-song was published in Black Panther
(New York), Jan. 3, 10, 17, 25, and March 15, 1970.
"The Economist (London), Dec. 5, 1970, p. 34.
itoPyongyang Radio broadcast, Aug. 4, 1970.
II The New York Times, Oct. 29, 1969.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
cpyRdytproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
FOLLOW COMRADE KIM
The revolutionary ideas of Comrade Kim ll-song, the brilliant
Marxist-Leninist, are the great Marxism-Leninism of the
present times?an era of great struggle In which a fierce
class struggle is being waged on an International seals and
all the exploited peoples and oppressed nations on the globe
are turning out to participate in the liberation struggle, an
era of the great revolutionary storm and an era of the downfall
of imperialism and the victory of socialism and communism
on a worldwide scale.
?From speech of Comrade Pak Song-chid at the Fifth
Korean Workers' Party Congress, broadcast by Pyong-
yang Radio, Nov. 3, 1970.
chu, in the party hierarchy, this exercise In revolu-
tionary genealogy appears aimed not only at prov-
ing the nationalist credentials of Kim 11-song, but
also at laying the groundwork for the political suc-
cession in North Korea.25
To explain why the 33-year old Kim deserved to
become the leader of North Korea in 1945, the
regime has embellished and distorted the record of
his prewar exploits against the Japanese in Man-
churia, then under Japanese domination as the
puppet state of Manchukuo. It is claimed that when
Kim moved to Manchuria from Pyongyang at the age
of 14, he organized an independence movement
among fellow Korean students at his middle school,
joined the Korean Communist Party, and helped
found numerous independence organizations, e.g.,
The Kirin Student-Friends Association and the
Fatherland Restoration Association. Further, it is
implied that the guerrilla band which Kim came to
lead was almost singlehandedly responsible for the
ultimate liberation of Korea. All evidence of Chinese
Communist or Soviet support for Kim and other
Korean guerrilla leaders Is passed over."
n Nodong Shinmun of March 1, 1970, claimed: "With the March
First Uprising as the occasion, the seeds of the anti-Japanese
patriotic ideas and revolution sown by Mr. Kim Hyong-chik, an
anti-Japanese revolutionary fighter and ardent patriot, kindled
violent flames everywhere."
'The possibility that KIM Yong-chu (who is 10 years younger
than his brother Kim II-song) might succeed his brother was
suggested by the author In the article, "Divided Korea 1969:
Consolidating for Transition," Asian Survey, January 1970, p. 41.
For Kim Yong-chu's rise through the party ranks, see the charts
In Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," foe. cif.,
pp. 252-54. Among those subsequently agreeing with this hypothesis
Is VI Tong-jun, a defector from North Korea,: see his "Kwolyok
t'ujaeng-ul chinsang" (The Real' Power Struggle), Chungang (SWOT,
June 1970, pp. 67-81. 4
w Balk Bong, Kim il Sung Biography, Tokyo, Miraisha, 1969.
The true picture of Kim's record emerges in such
works as Dae-sook Suh's study of the Korean Com-
munist movemerit.25 Kim did, indeed, attend middle
school in Japanese-COntrolled Manchuria, but there
were hardly enough fellow Koreans in his Chinese-
run school to constitute an "independence move-
ment." Organizations which Kim allegedly founded
were, in fact, founded by others; his name does not
even appear in accounts of such organizations by
former participants or in Japanese intelligence and
police records. As a matter of fact, the Korean
Communist Party had no organization in Manchuria
at the time Kim claims to have joined it. Extensive
Japanese records show that Kim 11-song and his
companions in the present North Korean regime
were only minor participants in the Chinese Com-
munist underground resistance movement in Man-
churia. Furthermore, Kim's biography completely
omits the four-year period (1941-45) which he spent
in training in the USSR, emerging as a major in the
Soviet Army.26
The fact that his fledgling regime drew insignifi-
cant national support in 1945 has also troubled Kim.
At the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party,
held in Pyongyang in 1956, Kim bitterly denounced
those Korean Communists who had endorsed the
Rhee government in 1945. Immediately prior to the
1956 Congress, Kim purged from the KWP the vast
majority of South Korean Communists who had come
north prior to and during the Korean conflict (many
of whom had joined in the earlier endorsement of
Rhee)." Kim 11-song also has claimed that prominent
Korean independence leaders such as Kim Ku and
Kim Kyu-sik had endorsed the Pyongyang regime?
significantly, neither man is around to refute it (Kim
Ku had shared the limelight with Rhee in Seoul as
a leader of the exile Provisional Government estab-
Suh, op. eft (Assessment of the Suh and Balk accounts is
provided at greater length in B. C. Koh's review of the two volumes
on p. 82 of the present issue of Problems of Communism.?Ed.)
Tsuboe Senjl, Hokusen no kalho Junen (Ten Years of North
Korea's Liberation), Tokyo, Nikkan Todotsushin-sha, 1956, pp. 24-26;
Kim Ch'ang-sun, Yoksaul chungln (History's Witness), Seoul, Hanguk
asea pankong yonmaeng, 1956; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Gendal Toe Jinmel-kan (Current Biography), Tokyo, Toho Kenkyu-sho
1950, p. 101. Japanese intelligence reports during the war locating
Kim's unit (and most of the major current North Korean leaders)
In the USSR include "Kyohl Kin Nichisei Kika shiso honcho no
kenkyo" (Arrest of a Group Leader of the Thought Section under the
Communist Bandit Kim II-song), Tokyo gall! geppo (Tokyo),
February 1943, and "Habarosuku ye-el gakko no jolcyo" (Condition
of the Field School In Khabarovsk), Galli geppo (Tokyo), November
1942, pp. 85-86.
w Choson Nodong-dang chaesemcha munhonfip (Documents of
the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party), Pyongyang,
Nodong-dang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1956.
Approved For Release 1999/09/04n CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
cpyRARproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
lished in 1919 and was assassinated in 1949; Kim
Kyu-sik was apparently abducted by the North
Koreans during the Korean War and is presumed
dead)."
Entrenched and Isolated
The ability of the North Korean regime to fabricate
and propagate such a fulsome cult of Kim II-song
is itself a symptom of the extreme consolidation of
power in Kim's hands. This is a far cry from the
situation in the early days of the Communist regime,
when North Korea was ruled by a coalition of Soviet-
Koreans, Yenan-trained Koreans, domestic Korean
Communists, and the Manchurian-Korean partisans
centered around Kim II-song." Step by step Kim
eliminated all competing factions, a process which
culminated at a leadership conference of the Korean
Workers' Party in October 1966, at which Kim suc-
ceeded in placing his own followers in every major
KWP post. Party organization work was entrusted
to Kim's younger brother, Kim Yong-chu. This mono-
lithic control was further tightened in subsequent
purges," and was most recently confirmed at the
Fifth KWP Congress, held November 2-13, 1970.'At-
this congress Kim Yong-chu was elevated to the
Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee
as the sixth-ranking party officia1.31
3? Kiln Il-song chochak sonlip (Kim Il-song's Selected Works),
Pyongyang, Choson Nodong-dang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1968, pp. 87-88.
29 The Soviet-Koreans were SOviet citizens of Korean descent who
had spent the better part of their lives In the USSR, most of whom
were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU)?an affiliation which some retained even after joining the
Korean Workers' Party in North Korea. This group was distinct
from the Manchurian-Koreans around Kim II-song, who had spent
most of their lives In Manchuria and only resided In the USSR
In the 1941-45 period. The Soviet-Koreans originally endorsed
Kim II-song as leader of the North Korean party, but It was on
Soviet orders, and Kim had no control over this group. The Yenan
Communists were those who had spent their exile in China, most
recently in Mao Tse-tung's Yenan stronghold. The "domestic"
Korean Communists were those i who had remained in Korea and had
suffered persecution and Imprisonment under the Japanese?a
factor which prevented any effective organizational development.
Kim II-song refuses to credit any of the other three factions for
their pre-1945 independence efforts.
39 Among high-ranking party end military leaders purged since
the Kim group completed Its consolidation have been Pak Kum-ch'ol,
Kim Chang-bong, Ho Pong-hak,:Kim Chong-t'ae, Kim To-man,
Vim Ch'un-ch'iu, Ko Hyok, and Ho Sok-san. See VI Tong-jun, toc. cit.
For information on earlier purges of the regime, see
Pukhanul papol runaeng-sa (Factional Struggle in North
Korea), Seoul, Naeoe munje yonguso, 1962.
n Members of the new Political Committee of the KWP Central
Committee were listed as follows: Kim ll-song, Choe Yong-gon,
Kim II, Pak Song-chol, Choe Hyon,- Kim Yong-chu, 0 Chln-u, Kim
Tong-gyy, So Choi, Kim Chung-him, and Han 1k-au (North Korean
*elle b. ead..a.t, No.. 14, 1978).
While consolidating his personal control of the
party, Kim II-song has also tightened the regimE's
controls over North Korean society to ensure that
no voice of dissent can be raised against his leadE r-
ship. Collectivization of agriculture was completed
In 1958. By 1970 nearly 50 percent of the population
of 13 million lived In urban areas (compared to
about 20 percent in 1945), and illiteracy had been
virtually eliminated?both developments facilitating
political mobilization of the population. Some 4-0
percent of the population is employed in the inths-
trial sector of the economy,32 as compared with 12,5
percent at the end of 1946. Through party membE r-
ship, employment In the bureaucracy, and membE r-
ship in the many diverse and overlapping state-
sponsored mass organizations, a very large propc r-
tion of the population has been absorbed into roles
which commit the individual to active support )f
the Kim leadership and thus link his personal destiny
with that of the regime. Nearly 14 percent of the
population are members of the KWP; 1.3 million
citizens serve in the "Workers' and Peasants' Red
Guard" (a nationwide mass militia, organized into
self-contained armed regiments); and 10 to 15
.percent of the working population are bureaucratic
employees of the regime.
The Communists have also sought to differentiate
and isolate society in the North from that in the
South?this despite the professed goal of unification.
Nearly three-fourths of the 13 million North Korea is
have spent all but perhaps their preschool years
under Communist rule and indoctrination. The or ly
information they have about possible alternativ
comes covertly from their elders, and as in a iy
society undergoing rapid modernization and change,
the relevance of the views of the older generation is
generally felt to be marginal. Few people in tie
North, moreover, have any firsthand knowledge of
life below the 38th parallel since 1945?not only hs
the refugee flow been almost unilaterally toward tie
South, but most of the South Korean Communits
who went to the North prior to or during the Korean
War were purged during the 1950's.
In another move clearly designed to ensure that
the populace was insulated from undesirable out-
side influences, Kim eliminated the Chinese writing
system soon after gaining power, replacing it with
the Korean phonetic alphabet. Consequently, fE w
North Koreans could even read the South Korean
el See Pukhan hilpnyon (North Korea's Twenty Years), Seoul,
Kongkebw shesagwk, 19CE.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02:
press (which employs the mixed Chinese-Korean
writing system) if it suddenly were made available.
This insulation of North from South has made it
easier for the regime to forge ahead with its policy
of giving top priority to heavy industrial development
at the expense of consumption. By and large, this
policy has produced impressive results, although the
temporary suspension of Soviet economic assistance
from 1963 to 1965 forced Pyongyang to abandon
annual targets of the 1961-1967 Seven Year Plan.
Following the resumption of Soviet aid in 1965,
Pyongyang reactivated the plan and extended the
target date for its completion to 1970. The recent
Fifth KWP Congress announced the successful com-
pletion of the plan and promulgated a new Six-Year
Plan for the 1971-76 period, with continued empha-
sis on heavy industry (although there was new
emphasis on light industry, mechanization of agri-
culture and technological development). Despite
the dip in performance in the mid-1960's, North
Korea has built up a formidable economic potential.
It produces most of the rifles, mortars and ammuni-
tion required by its army, and it also outproduces
;the South in electricity, coal, steel, chemical fertil-
izer, and cements'
Two and a half decades after its creation, the
Pyongyang regime appears to be politically stable
rIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
and militarily and economically strong. Nevertheless,
it continues to face the same critical questions of
how Korean nationalism, communism, and a divided
Korea can be reconciled. How can a viable political
system be maintained over 13 million Koreans in the
North while the remaining two-thirds of the nation
(31 million) oOntinuas to flourish under an alterngte
regime in the South? It is not so much the peculiar
personal predilections of North Korea's strong-arm
ruler as it is the pressures arising from these
ineluctable circumstances that have transformed
North Korea into what has appropriately been termed
a "garrison state," 34 with its leader advocating
revolutionary violence and constantly trumpeting
invective against enemies and allies alike. So long
as a genuine aura of national and international
legitimacy continues to evade Kim ll-song's regime,
these pressures will continue.
" Ibid.; and Kim Un-hwan, "Tongnan lohlpnyonhuul pukhan
Silchong: KyongJeul hyonhang kwa chonmang" (Economic Situation
and Prospects: North Korea's Situation Twenty Years after the
Korean War), Chungang, June 1970, pp. 80-88. Statistics on the
economy of South Korea may be found In Korea Annual 1969, Seoul,
Hapilong News Agency, 1969.
- B. C. Koh, "North Korea: PrOflie "tif Garrliolt State,"
? 'Problems el Communism, January-February 1969, pp. 18-27.
PROBLEMS OF CONMUNISM
January-April 1971
CPYRGHT
Cult-iv
By B. C. Koh
Kim
BAIK BONG: Kim II Sung: Biogra-
phy (3 Vols.). Tokyo, Mirai-
sha, 1969 and 1970.
DAE-SOOK SUH: The Korean Com-
munist Movement, 1918-
1948. Princeton, N.J., Prince-
ton University Press, 1967.
THE MOST STRIKING feature of
contemporary North Korean poli-
tics is the all-pervasive personality
cult centered about Kim II-song,4
?
1 Kim li-song is the romanization of the
name according id the, McCune-Relschauer
system. The North Korean spelling, however,
Is Kim II Suna.
Approved For Release
the 58-year old Premier of the
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and General Secretary of the
Korean Workers' Party. In an ap-
parent attempt to establish and
enhance the legitimacy of his '
patently harsh one-man rule, Kim
has sought to generate an image
of himself as the greatest man
Korea has ever produced. Article
after article and volume after vol-
ume have glorified the "revolu-
tionary accomplishments" and eu-
logized the "lofty virtues" of the
_North Korean leader.
The three-volume biography of -
1Sigi9blat2B:13544161/Alt-1511
lished by a bona fide commercial
publishing house in Japan, repre-
sents an unmistakable attempt to
spread the adulatory legend of
Kim beyond the borders of North
Korea.2 Indeed, as the "translation
.committee" points out in notes ap-
pended to each of the three vol-
umes, the book is an English
translation of Baik Bong's Korean-
language biography, General Kim
II Sung: the Sun of the Nation,
published in 1968 by Inmun
It Is noteworthy that In June 1970 Yoshio
Nishltanl, President of Miraisha (the
' Japanese publisher of the biography), and
his wife visited_Rorlh_Korea and met Kim.
944000200,0:090.L1429, 1910.
CPYRGHerpproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Kwahak-sa, a North Korean gov-
ernment publishing house. When
full-page advertisements of the
book appeared in The New York
Times and The Times of London
late in 1969, North Korea has-
tened to claim that the world's
press had published laudatory
"articles" on Kim.3
Even as an unabashed propa-
ganda document, the book never
' ceases to amaze the reader with
its fantastic claims and fulsome
superlatives. For example:
-General Kim II Sung, the great
Leader of the 40 million Korean
people, peerless patriot, national
hero, ever-victorious, iron-willed,
brilliant commander and one of
the outstanding leaders of the in-
ternational Communist movement
and working-class movement . . .
a legendary hero . . . who is capa-
ble of commanding the heavens
and earth, an unrivaled brilliant
commander who, as it wer,e, can
shrink a long range of steep moun-
tains at a stroke and smash the
swarming hordes of enemies with
one blow.
Kim is portrayed as devoid of
human frail ities and endowed with
every imaginable virtue and
strength, a man who was destined
by history to save the Korean peo-
ple from the miseries suffered
under Japanese colonial rule as
well as under bourgeois and feu-
dalistic exploitation.
Suct.,1 a Messiah, of course,
could only have been born into an
uncommon family, and we are told
that Kim's was a truly "revolu-
tionary family," studded with pa-
See the lead story in Nodong Shinmun
(Pyongyang), Nov. 23, 1969. For the
advertisements, see The New York Times,
Oct. 27, 1969, and The Times (London),
Nov. 3, 1969. For a more recent claim
in the same vein, see the article entitled
"Korea Has Produced (the) Hero of the 20th
Century," in The. Pyongyang Times,
June 8, 197a.
Approved For Release
triots and revolutionaries, begin-
ning with the very founder of the
clan, Kim Key-sang. Although
space does not permit even a
brief summary of Kim's feats, nar-
rated with tedious redundancy In
1,800 pages, a few of the astound-
ing allegations merit passing men-
tion. Having "read with great in-
terest many classics of Marxism-
Leninism, including Das Kapital,"
by the age of 15, Kim reportedly
became a confirmed Communist
revolutionary and organized nu-
merous revolutionary groups and
activities among students, peas-
ants, and workers in Manchuria.
By the age of 19 his feats had
allegedly earned him the title of
"General" among his ardent fol-
lowers, as well as a new name--
II-song (meaning "becoming the
Sun") in place of his original
name, Song-ju.
After the 1931 Manchurian
Incident, Kim founded an anti-
Japanese guerrilla "army" which
is claimed to have waged a "heroic
struggle against the Japanese,"
culminating in the liberation of
Korea. The book also states cate-
gorically that it was not the United
States, but the Soviet Union, to-
gether with the guerrilla forces
commanded by Kim, that defeated
the Japanese in World War II. The
book asserts that the Americans
and British induced the Soviets to
bear the brunt of the fighting, and
then "brazenly" tried to claim
credit for the victory.
This, however, is the last favor-
able mention of the Soviet Union
one encounters. In its effort to
portray Kim II-song as the greatest
figure in all Korean history, the
book credits him with all good
things that transpired in North
Korea since 1945. He almost sin-
giehandedly "won" the Korean
War of 1950-53, which allegedly
was started by "American imperi-
alistic aggressors and their South
Korean lackeys." Conspicuously
absent in this chauvinistic account
1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Is any mention of Soviet military
assistance or of the "Chinese
' People's Volunteers" to whom
North Korea owes its survival.
Likewise it was Kim's "revolution-
ary ideas" and "Ingenious leader-
ship"?not assistance from the
Communist bloc?which subse-
quently transformed the war-
devastated country into a "self-re-
liant" industrial nation.
The volume imputes "epochal"
, significance to Kim's ideas, of
'which juche constitutes the pivotal
'concept. Translated as "independ-
ent stand," the term is defined to
mean "abiding by the principle
of solving all problems of the
revolution and construction inde-
pendently, in accordance with the
actual conditions of one's own
country and -primarily- bi one's
own efforts." Having "demon-
strated" the inestimable efficacy
of?juche in the North Korean con-
text, the book presumes to apply
the concept on a global scale.
This entails repudiation of both
"the right-wing opportunism" of
Moscow and "the left opportun-
ism" of Peking' in favor of form-
ing a united Communist front to
crush "American imperialism."
Somehow, the author never ex-
plains how such a course of action
is related to an "independent
stand" for North Korea. Nor is
there the slightest recognition of
the colossal contradiction between
the notion of independence and
the exhortation not only to the
Korean people but to all leaders
of the Communist orbit to heed
?the wisdom of Kim II-song.
Who is the real Kim, the man
behind this image of an omni-
scient and omnipotent leader of all
1Korea and the savior of mankind?
For the best available clueslo his
Although neither Moscow nor Peking are
explicitly mentioned, Kim's words leave
little doubt as to the Identity of those whom
he is attacking.
13
CPYRWOroved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
true identity, one must turn to
T.lae-Sook Suh's meticulous study,
The Korean Communist Move-
ment. Originally prepared as a
Ph.D. thesis at Columbia, the
study makes extensive use of
Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and
Russian sources to present an im-
pressively credible picture of the
trials and tribulations of Korean
Communists who struggled long
and hard, only to be eclipsed and
then ?inihilated by Kim II-song,
a man who had played only a
peripheral role in the Korean in-
dependence movement. Of par-
ticular interest is the last quarter
of the book, dealing with the rise
of Kim II-song. Relying heavily on ,
Japanese police records of the '
1930's and 1940's, the author
shows that Kim was neither a com-
plete impostor nor a major revolu-
tionary figure of the stature of a
Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh.
The available evidence estab-
lishes that, prior to World War II,
Kim led a Korean anti-Japanese
guerrilla force in Manchuria which
inflicted sufficient damage to
cause the Japanese to initiate a
determined campaign to annihilate
his forces. On the other hand, Suh
makes c!ear, Kim's force was at
this time only part of a Chinese
Communist guerrilla army, in
which he rose to the rank of divi-
sion commander. Despite this im-
pressive title, Kim probably never
commanded more than 300 men
at a time. Nor was he the only
Korean to command such a "divi-
sion." In fact, at least two Koreans
rose to the position of "army
commander"?a full rank higher
than Kim?in this struggle.'
Under stepped-up Japanese
pressure, Kim and his surviving
comrades-In-arms fled to Siberia
in 1941. Whether he subsequently
received Soviet military training
and served as an officer in the
Red Army, as many sources claim,
is not verified in Suh's study. What,
clear, however, is that he came
to North Korea with i the Soviet
occupation troops after the Jap-
anese surrender. in 1945 ? pd,
with the apparent blessing of 'the
Soviet Union, began a series of
maneuvers culminating. in
seizure of power in Pyongyang.
Suh underscores4h.e,.point that
Kim did not owe his Ase exclu-
sively to the Kremlin. Of crucial
importance were the miscalcula-
tions and follies of the "old Com-
munists," such as Pak kon-yong,
who lingered too long in the
An important source on Kim's guerrilla
activity has recently come to the reviewer's
attention: Manshu nl kansuru yoheitekl
kansatsu (Observations on Military Tactics
In Manchuria), Tokyo, Fukuinkyoku Shiryo
Seirika, Vol. 12, 1952. The volume comprises
recollections by former Japanese Army
officers who participated in or had access to
classified information about Japanese
counterinsurgency operations in Manchuria.
While corroborating much of Suh's account
of Kim's revolutionary past, this Japanese
source links Kim and his guerrillas, not with
the Chinese Communists, but with the
Soviet Union, from which they are said
, to have received the bulk of their arms and
ammunition, and which provided them
with refuge when they fled across the
Siberian border under Japanese pursuit. It
also includes a number of photographs of
Kim Il-song In guerrilla' attire and states that
Kim was extremely popular among
Koreans In Manchuria, who acClaimed him
as a "hero of Korea" and gave him
"material and moral suppOrt." I am grateful
to Mr. Key P. Yang, of the Oriental's
Division of the Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., for giving me access to
this rare source.
American-occupied South, where
:the chances of a Communist take-
over? were nil, instead of rushing
to the North where establishment
,of a Communist government was
a foregone conclusiOn. When Pak
and his associates finally headed
north under duress, Kim was al-
ready firmly entrenched and, soon
had his rivals exterminated as
American spies. Kim's political
takeover was due in no small
measure to his political acumen
and Machiavellian tactics?fac-
tors which have been equally in-
strumental in perpetuating his
monolithic political contr4for the
past two decades.
As one leaves the bizarre legend
of Kim II-song, one wonders why
Kim and his sycophants persist in
their Herculean efforts .to create
a mountain out of a molehill. Pos-
sibly they believe, with Hitler, the
dietum: "the bigger the lie, the
better." More probably, Kim may
be the unwitting victim of his own
personality cult?a man who not
only derives satjsfaction from the
interminable cries of "Long Live
Comrade Kim II-song" but has
really come to believe in his own
"unrivaled greatness" and "his-
toric mission" to lead 'men both
in- Korea and beyond. One shud-
ders at the thought that Kim,
thanks to Moscow and Peking,
commands considerable resources
to pursue that "mission."
Approved For Release 1999/09/021:4CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
25X1 C1 Ob
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
BALTIMORE SUN
12 May 1971
CPYRGHT 55 More Pathet Lao Defect To Vientiane
JM ISun Stall Correspondent
aigon, May 11?Fifty-five
mbers of the 11th Pathet Lao
lBattalion have defected to the
Huai Lao government, accord-
in reliable reports from the
Laitian capital of Vientiane.
The defectors, led by their
co nmanding officer, are the
thwd group of Laotian Commu-
ni t soldiers to defect since
March. They said there are
more than a thousand other Pa-
that Lao soldiers in southern
LAOS ready to join the govern-
in. nt,
? rhe Vientiane reports said the
5Z soldiers, including a lieuten-
art colonel, two captains and
two first lieutenants in addition
to their commander, surren-
lifted yesterday at Ban Itou,
which Is about 20 miles east of
the southern city of Pakse.
The soldiers turned in their
weapons and volunteered to aid
government troops in recruiting
more defectors and in hunting
for supply caches and North Vi-
etnamese base camps in south-
ern Laos.
In March, 150 members of the
25th Pathet Lao Battalion, many
with their.families, defected to
the government side, complain-
ing of oppression by the North
Vietnamese.
April, Surrender
In April, 18 Pathet Lao sol-
diers surrendered as a group
near the central Laotian town of
Paksane, also complaining
about their North Vietnamese
advisers.
Diplomatic observers in Vien-
tiane have described the grow-
ing Pathet Lao defections as
! probably the most significant
change in recent months in the
seesawing war in Laos.
The defection of large num...!
!bers of Pathet Lao, Western dip-;
Iomats assert, will significantly '
reduce the Communists' influ-
ence and undermine their claim
to be patriots rather than front I
men for the North Vietnamese. ;
_
Propaganda Is Effective _
-The latest group of defectors !
said a major factor in their deci-i
(skin to change sides was the!
government's propaganda caw,
,paign publicizing the other
i groupsof Communist soldiers!
, . . .
who joined the government. ,
That campaign included radio
broadcasts, air-dropped leaflets
and speeches by earlier defec-
tors broadcast from slow-flying
planes over loud-speaker sys-1
tems.
! Observers in Vientiane believe
the North Vietnamese are now
finding themselves in the posi-
tion of clamping down upon the
Xathet Lao allies in an effort to
'halt the -defections but possibly;
causing more or of ignoring the
situation and risking widespread
Lao desertions.
In several cases in the last
three months, individual defec-
tors and small groups of Pathet
Lao have said they had to fight
-their way out of North Vietnam-
0a6 camps to defect.
PYRGHTALTIMORE SUN
12 April 1971
Vientiane Says Defections By Pathet Lao Are Mounting
Vientiane, Laos, April 11?Big
trouble appears to be brewing
isetween the Communist PatHet
loo and their North Vietnamese
, allies here.
Nearly 150 Pathet Lao?a rec-
ord number?have defected to
tie neutralist government of
Premier Souvanna Phouma
Ole last month, according to
government figures.
Had To Kill Advisers
Some of thenrsaid they had to
Lill their North Vietnamese ad-
visers .in order to Make their
%sray to government lines, Amen:
can fighter-oombers were sent
ast week to aid a battalion of
-Intliet Lao repoi-cally trying to
ight their way past North Viet-
aamese units to defect.
"The Pallid Lao have come to
?ealize that they arc being used
)50! the North Vietnamese who
Eir mama. !ARNO
,Sun Staff Cotreapandettl'
"We have had rallicrs before, ting Increasing numbers of Lao-1
but they have come in ones, two tians into forced-labor gangs in 1
and threes. Here we have whole the Communist supply network,'
companies, whole battalions A number of Pathet Lao off i.
coming over en masse. It is the cers who: protc,.stcd this harshi
most hopeful sign we have had treatment of civilians were exe-
in years." leuted hy their North Vietna rrit:as
Aid In Air Strikes ;advisers as "politically unrelia-
The defectors have joined gov- 'tile," according to Mr. Lien.
ernment troops around the Bo- Pathet Lao Commander
lovens Plateau to guide them to Among the reported victims
Communist bases and supply de- was the widely respected Pathet
pots in the last 10 days. They
also have provided information
for American and government
air strikes.
The immediate cause of the
Pathet Lao disaffection scums to
be a new hard line taken by the
North Vietnamese toward civil-;
ians in southern Laos.
13oua Lien, the commander of
the 25th Pathet Lao Battalion,1 eral actually was executed. "We ,
the source of most of the defec- had reports three or four times!
are out to conquer Laos, tors, said the North Vietnamese b a month all last fall that he had;
LAO commander in southern
Laos, tien. Pliernina Douangma.-1
? la, who the Pallid Lao believe;
was assassinated late last year.;
Two Pellet Lao colonels ap-
pointed to replace him also were
dismissed after protesting' North:
Vietnamese treatment of civil-
ians, the defectors said.
, An American official here said
It is uncertain whether the gen-
djApiell 4%6
Prince Sisoutlipromtfor otAhr--." tetiitto itrRnpurosiniriparo
ihe acting d se m n ster,
trade and travel and were put- "Whatever happened, it's appar-I
said.
ent the Pathet Lao don't believe
the North Vietnamese explana- ?
tion."
Government officials and oth-
er.observers here theorize that
relations between the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese?
who outnumber the local Com-
munists by 40,000 to 11,000?be-
gan to deterioraee seriously last
spring when the Vietnamese be-
gan a large drive to expand the
Ho Chi Minh trail supply system
after the closing of the Cambodi-
an port at Kompong Som and
U.S.-South Vietnamese attacks
on their Cambodian sanctuaries.
"Until then, the North Viet-
namese had generally taken
care to pay for what they took,
to be honest and fair in. theft,
governing and to limit the
amount of forced labor required
of civilians," one intelligence of-
ficer said.
"As a policy, they had been
0090800104 reactions of the
:Laotians and had been guided
lby the advice of the Pathet Lao.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
That mnis te than. .
when large groups of villagers
were abducted last year to work
on the trail."
`So far, the feud betiyeen the
Pathet Lao and North Vietnam-
ese has been more intense In
southern Laos, the Area of tke
trail, than In the north. But Indk
vidual defectors from around
the Plain of Jars reported that,
disaffection is growing there as
well.
Communist sources here ac-
knowledged "a serious morale'
problem" among the Pathet
Lao, but said that dozens of gov-
ernment soldiers defect to the
Pathet Lao each week. The Pa-
thet Lao representative in Vien-
tiane. Soth Pethrasy, said steps
? g taken to "rrinbtill a
correct attitude" for relations
between the Pathet Lao and the
North Vietnamese.
? Independent observers here
believe the large-scale defec-
tions pose a serious problem for
the North Vietnamese hi that,
any ieprlhats taken against the
Pathet Lao to curb further
defections will only exacerbate4
the situation, while if nothing is
done, whole Pathet Lao battal-?
Ions may continue to defect.
? Prince Souvanna, meanwhile,
has welcomed all Pathet Lao
defectors, saying the "door is
rdpen in the government" for in,
ividtuds or the Pathet Lao us
Approved For Release 1999/09102 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
25X1 C1 Ob
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY June 1971
HOW TO STAGE-MANAGE A CONGRESS
From the 24th Congress of the CPSU 30 March - 10 April, one
surprise.calls for explanation: the uniform silence on the part
of visiting delegations speaking at the Congress concerning the
Soviet invasion and "normalization" of Czechoslovakia, the major
issue (among other, derivative issues) that has given rise to
criticism of the Soviet Union by a large number of important and
lesser Communist parties of the world. It is hard to find even the
word Czechoslovakia mentioned in the speeches of the 101 delegations
(some non-Communist) said to have attended the Congress.
Several interrelated issues have been argued and debated more
or less heatedly since the invasion (more often for home consump-
tion but also at Soviet-sponsored gatherings of the world's
Communists): the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty,
the primacy of "proletarian internationalism" (read: obedience
to Soviet dictates) over the right of national sovereignty of
socialist countries and independence of Communist parties, the
mandatory subjection to general "laws" of socialism (i.e. the
Soviet "model") versus the right of Communist parties to develop
their "own road to socialism" based on their national peculiarities.
Suddenly, at the Congress, these issues seem to have dis-
appeared. Reading various versions of the speeches of visiting
delegates, one would hardly know that there were such issues of
contention in the Communist world -- and perhaps that is precisely
the point. Aware of the image of disarray in the world Columnist
movement (WCM), the Soviets needed desperately to restore at least
the appearance of unity in the movement. Hence, they somehow
contrived to suppress the voices of dissent and impress the world
Communist movement with a picture of harmony and unity restored.
Some delegates may even have been convinced there never had heel,
any basic disagreement. It mattered less that one or another dele-
gate returning home might speak to their own countrymen in disan!)rcval
of certain Soviet acts or methods -- the important thing was that
these disagreements not be given currency or additional momentum
in the world Communist movement by being aired at the Congress in
Moscow.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
There is every reason to believe that the Soviets took special
precautions to insure that the views of known dissidents not come
before the Congress. Some were no doubt pressured or persuaded
to refrain from objectionable comment: the threat of withdrawal
of Soviet financial support can be a persuasive weapon to many
parties. But special measures to stage-manage a Congress have a
well-documented precedent in the case of the 10th Congress of the
Communist front JUS (International Union of Students) held last
February in the out-of-the-way location of Bratislava, Czechoslovakia.
First, it was held behind closed doors; all correspondents but two
from the Soviet youth newspaper were excluded from the proceedings.
Careful guard checks were made on all those entering the immediate
area of the Congress; unauthorized persons were prevented from
talking with the delegates. By various devices, objectionable
delegates were precluded from expressing their views. Some were
refused visas to get there in the first place, others were sent
back on arrival, others were harassed by the police. Dissident
delegates present could not make their views or protests known.
Their proposals were either ignored and passed over in silence,
or at one point, the simultaneous translation facilities conven-
iently broke down. The full range of devices for suppressing
dissent, and, more important for the Soviets, ensuring the appearance
of complete unity, is described in the account by French delegate
Henri Verley as published in the French Comnunist dissident weekly
Politique Hebdo (see attachment).
Judging by scattered accounts from various delegates on their
return home, similar measures were taken to stage-manage the 24th
CPSU Congress, with the primary aim of preventing delegates from
getting a picture of what divides the movement and of presenting
the delegates with a picture of monolithic unity. It, too, was a
closed session with foreign correspondents excluded. Various measures
were taken to isolate visiting delegates known for their dissident
views from reporters and from the Soviet population. Dissident
delegations had difficulty gaining access to translation facilities
and efforts were made to prevent them from distributing their speeches
among other delegates. Their speeches, according to some accounts,
were submitted to a special bureau which simply deleted or modified
highly objectionable passages, so that while a delegate; might deliver
his own version of the speech in his native language, the Congress
would hear in translation only the expurgated version.
CPYRGHT
uasningLun PidA MbsLow LuilupuiluCAL, AtithCriy trac an, vas
- ?
able to report one example, apparently among many, of the censcr-
ship procedure. Chilean Communist delegate Luis Corvalan, speaking
in Spanish, at one point proudly announced that his Marxist
government nas recognized both Cuba and Communist China. Since the
simultaneous translation simply omitted mention of China, the delegates
2
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
duly applauded 'Chilean recognition of Cuba. Somewhat puz'zled at
the response, Corvalan repeated his statement, and this time, for
some reason and after a moment's hesitation, the: interpreter included
mention of iifi?Dead silence from the audience. Corvalan must
still be puzzlen at what happened. (See the attached Astrachan
article.)
The cynical, methodical planning that went into controlling
the expression of deviant views on the part of supposedly fraternal
delegates at the 24th CPSU Congress i% at oncea measure of the
erosion of the Soviet ideological poAffion.in the WCM and of
Soviet fears that the -6rosion will gather momentum and affect
organizational control as well. Hence, the effort not so much to
eradicate dissent, but to prevent the WowId Communist Movement,
from hearing about it. Strong disapproval Of Soviet leadershi0 of
the world movement has been expressed, and is still being expressed,
in their home environments by Communist parties of Italy, France,
Austria, Spain, Great Britain, Japan, Australia, India, Venezuela,
Mexico, Romania, and Yugoslavia (to mention only some of the better
known ones). Yet, the Soviets succeeded in mounting a Congress in
which hardly a word of disapproval reached this assembly of the
world's Communists. instead they heard the delegates' paeans of
praise for the achievements of the Soviet Union and resounding
expressions of their solidarity with an alien power and its leading
force, the CPSU.
3
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
25 February 1971
BEHIND THE SCENES AT A CONGRESS
?14- ofthe International Union of Students
Little has been said about the 10th Congress of the International
laion of Students (IUS) held in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia 3-10 February
this year, and for good reason. A closed meeting was proclaimed from
the very first session, and no journalist was admitted to follow the
proceedings. The correspondents of l'Humaniterand the l'Unita'fourV
no more favor in this respect than representatives of the bourgeois
press and only the Komsomolskaya Pravda representative followed the
proceedings. The fact is that the gOviet delegation had taken care
70 include him in its ranks.
It was out of the question to try to approach the 'delegates. Three
successive control points had been arranged: two by the police, ?Tx at
the entry of the Park of Culture, the other at the entries of the building
where the sessions were held. The third control, at the very door of the
meeting roam, was secured by Czechoslovakia students. The hotels where
the delegates were lodged were kept under"very close surveillance."
The reasons for such a closed door meeting are clear. The IUS, like
other international organizations of the same type, are considered by
the Soviet directors as a transmission belt for propagating their siDgans,
their policies, and their ideology and to insure in return the support
cftheir strategy. Thus it WAS of extreme importance to them that tie
IUS should appear to be a bloc without cracks fully ranged behind their
line. If confrontations were foreseen --- and they were --- it was
necessary to prevent their becoming public -: "Unity" reappeared in
tle sphere of resolutions, which were adopted in a mechanical fashion
(there were 125 of them!) by an absolute majority.
Fabricating a Majority
The first task is to insure such a. majority. It is an undertak_ng
lure and more difficult despite the variety of means employed and the
lick of scruples in using them. Thus certain delegations, like that froth
tie Congo-Kinshasa, were turned back on their arrival at the airfield.
Oilers, as was the case of the representative of the Greek students of
the interior, were able to get as far as the hotel but were expelled the
day before the Opening of the proceedings. For others, the UNEF [French
Student Union] and the delegations from Guadeloupe and Martinique, ertry
vLsas were simply refused by the embassies or consulates. As for the
Guatemala and Hdnduran. delegations, the organizers simply "forgot" to
send them their:air tickets two fa
pal or y e
? 1 ?
? ? .1 I I
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
Added to these radical measures were police provocations such as
those to which two Belgian delegations became victim the very night of
their arrival. Arrested at their hotel, then taken to the police station,
they were interrogated for four hours continuously on the pretext that
an automobile registered in Belgium was supposed to have distributed
in the streets of the city pamphlets "hostile to the Czechoslovakia
people." Finally released, they escaped from the interrogation only
by the threat that their delegation would raise the matter at the Congress
itself. The Czechoslovak authorities apologized, and that was that....
Singular Practice
To cap it all, the credentials committee did its job. Thus it
classified among the "observers" two delegations which were not only
members in good standing of the IUS but actual members of the secretariat:
the VVS of Belgium and the FUA of Argentina. It should be added that
the executive committee, which had met some weeks before the Congress,
had been convoked under totally irregular circumstances: Madagascar, for
example, had not been given a chance to attend.
There is nothing surprising in these anti-democratic practices, in
these manipulations. The new fact --- and an important one --- is that
they met with considerable opposition within the Congress. On the second
day, some ten delegations (Argentina, Mexico, Spain, Salvador, Ireland,
Belgium (Walloons and Flemish), Federation of Students of Black Africa
in France, and Malagasy students in France) protested to the Congress
presiding board in a joint resolution. They presented eight questions
concerning the facts which we have detailed above, and showed moreover tha
a quorum had not even been assembled for the Congress to be able to
deliberate validly.
The presiding board of the Congress (it was installed without being
elected, on the pretext that the directors of the IUS --- Czechoslovakia,
Sudan, Iraq --- assume it traditionally) didn't bother to given an answer
to these questions. To the contrary, throughout the proceedings the
board tried to prevent the dissidents from speaking. It should be added,
to understand the attitude of the Iraq and Sudan delegates --- and it is
true for the majority of the Arab countries and for a number of African
countries --- that this was a matter of students who were studying in
the USSR, in the GDR, Poland, Hungary or in Czechoslovakia.
A, particularly significant incident took place during the Congress
ratification of the Credentials Committee report. The first protest
arose concerning the fact that the delegates were confronted with a
SO-page Committee report five minutes before the discussion was opened.
But theiivelist exchange took place concerning the representativeness
of the two opposing Argentine delegations. The 5 December F.U.A.
(the date of its Congress) represents 60 university centers out of 69.
Approved For Release 1999/0i/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
Party, born of a schism in the Argentine CP. The 15 November F.U.A.
represents only nine university centers. But as it is composed of
orthodox Conmunists, it was vehemently supported by the delegations
of the East European countries. The discussion of a motion by the '
Cuban delegation --- providing for sending a committee to Argentina
to determine the real representativeness of each of the rival organiza ions
--- was interrupted because the simultaneous translation facility
opportunely broke down, and that happened at the level of the Soviet
delegation. This "technical accident" was used to advantage for "visi
of the East European delegation to the Cubans. But the latter upheld
their motion, which was adopted. Despite this vote a USSR representat
saw fit to accuse the F.U.A. of anti-Sovietism. The Argentine delegat s
in a mark of protest, then left the Congress. But they did it to the
applause of a certain number of delegations and were accompanied to th
exit by the Spanish delegates.
A Political Battle
Behind these bitter procedural skirmishes, it was evident that a
political battle was developing. The divergency appeared with special
clarity at the time of the general discussion, and in fact when the
order of business was discussed. Thus the Spanish proposal to set up
a committee for studying the struggle of students in West Eurdpe and
in the higher developed capitalist countries was rejected by the'Sovie
Bloc.
Similarly rejected was an amendment, also Spanish, proposing the
addition, as the first order of business, among the task of the IUS th
Struggle "for national and social liberation" (the text says merely:
"the struggle against imperialism"). In contrast, by a vote of 21
(Spain, Romania, Korea, Cuba, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia, et al.) again t
18 (USSR and others), an amendment was adopted affirming international
student solidarity with the anti-imperialistic struggle of the Arab
peoples and students, and especially with the struggle of the Palestin an
peuple and students. Similarily, the Soviets opposed in vain a Cuban
amendment denouncing imperialist penetration of the universities.
Brought for consideration by several delegates in the course of
general discussion --- Romania, Japan (Zengakuren), Spain, Madagascar
Black Students in France, etc. --- was the very nature of the IUS
(yureaUcratic organization), its policy (the anti-imperialist struggle
was defined only in a narrow and superficial way) and its practical
activity (solidarity is expressed only in words or telegrams). In pla e
of this concept, the dissidents proposed the IUS as a true center of
information and exchange of experience, a center for coordination of
struggles and of genuine solidarity.
The unfolding of the proceedings reveal existence existence against
the Soviet BlOc:of a regrouping of several delegations (Spain, Mexico
the two Bel Ian Salvador Bolivia Federation of Students of Black
Africa in France Madagascar) supporte
y Romania, ugos avia, or orea,
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
Japan, Venezuela, and, on several occasions in the course of the voting,
by Cuba and North Vietnam. The events of the last day -- at the time
of the "election" of the directing organs --- demonstrated the gravity
of the crisis in the IUS. The single list method of elections provoked
lively protest from several delegations (notably Venezuela and the
Dominican Republic). It also provoked the spectacular withdrawal of
the Spanish delegation from the Congress.
To be sure, a position has been reserved within the Executive
Committee to replace People's China (after hard debate) , UNEF, Spain ...
it remains to be seen how these seatS ," Nticant-fromrnow-on ;-will be - fill c . .
Henri Verley
POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
25 February 1971
LES BESSOUS D'Uti C.EIGNE'S
On a peu pane du be
oongres de l'Union Inter-
rationale des Etudiants,
cui sdest tenu a Bratislava
(Tchecoslovaquie) du 3 au
1) fevrier beipayiRfflficinur
cause. Le huis clos a ete
rroclarne d4 la premiere
ance, et aueun journaliste
r'a ete admis a suivre les
t ravaux. Les correspon-
c ants de l'Humanite et de
1 Unita n'ont pas plus trou-
?race que les represen-
t ints de la presse hour-
g eoise, et seul l'envoye de
la Komsomolskaia Pravda
Pu assister au congres :
i est vrai que la Mega-
t on sovietique avait pris
svin de l'inclure dans ses
rangs.
Quant a. tenter d'appro-
cher les delegues. '1 n'en
tait pas question ; trois
controles successifs avaient
t.e organises : deux par la
rolice, l'un a rentree du
Parc de Ia Culture, l'autre
l'entree du batiment ou
e tenaient les seances. Le
troisieme, a la porte meme
c e 1 salle, etait assure par
logeaient les delegations, us
etaient tres a etroitement
surveilles ).
_ Les raisons d'un tel huis
clos sont evidentes. L'U.I.E.
? comme les autres orga-
nisations internationales du
meme type ? est conside-
ree par les dirigeants- so-
vietiques comme une cour-
roie de transmission desti-
ne a propager leurs mots
d'ordre, leur politique et
leur ideologie, et a assurer
en retour le soutien de leur
strategie. II importe donc
essentiellement pour eux
que l'U.I.E. puisse appa-
raitre comme un bloc sans
fissure tout entier range
derriere leur ligne. Si des
affrontements sont previsi-
bles ? et ils l'etaient ? II
faut empecher qu'ils soient
publics, l' a unite reap-
paraissant au niveau des
resolutions, adoptees de f a-
con mecanique (ii y en a eu
125 '!) par une majorite in-
conditionnelle.
FABRIQUER
UNE MAJORITE
majorite : entreprise de
plus en plus difficile, mal-
gre la diversite et le man-
que de scrupules d e s
moyens employes. C'est
ainsi que certaines delega-
tions ? comme celle du
Congo-Kinshasa ? ont ete
refoulees des leur arrivee
l'aeroport ; d'autres ?
c'est le cas du representant
des etudiants grecs de l'in-
terieur ? ont Pu arriver
jusqu'a leur hotel, mais ont
ete expulsees la veille de
l'ouverture des travaux. A
d'autres ? l'UNEF, la Gua-
deloupe, la Martinique ?
les visas d'entree ont tout
simplement ete refuses par
les ambassades ou les con-
sulats tchecoslovaques.
Quant aux delegations du
Guatemala et du Honduras,
on a ornis ) de leur faire
parvenir les billets d'avion
(deux places par delegation
sont normalement payees
par l'U.I.E.).
A ces mesures radieales
se sont ajoutees des provo-
cations policieres comme
celle dont ont ete victimes
EY111:./. :TS
'amen& au commissariat,
us y furent interroges qua-
tre heures durant sous le ,
.pretexte qu'une voiture im-
matriculee en Belgique au-
rait repandu dans les rues
de la ville des tracts hos-
tiles au peuple tchecoslo-
Enfin relaches, us
n'echapperent a de?nou-
veaux interrogatoires que
par la menace de leur de-
legation de porter l'affaire
a la tribune du congres ;
tes autorites tcheeoslova-
ques s'excuserent, et tout
en demeura
SINGULIERES
PRATIQUES
fl restait, pour couron-
ner be tout, a la commission
des mandats de faire son
office. C'est ainsi que cette
derniere rangea parmi les
c observateurs 2. deux dele-
gations, n o n seulement
c es etudiantAlatishecoslovaz deux ay belges la membres de plein droit de
tittles. Quant ravggl kpr Rteileaselit Qa
9e9A39t0Zs:t t- 9eClatireAoMM3000M0611114 encore mem-
donc de s'assurer une telle Arretes I leur hotel, puis bres du . secretariat la
6PYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
V.V.S. de Belgique et la
d'Argentine. Encore
faudrait-il ajouter que le
Comite executif, qui s'etait
reuni quelques semaines
avant le congres, avait ete
convoque dans des condi-
tions tout aussi irregulie-
res Madagascar, p a r
exemple, n'avalt pas ete
mis eh mesure d'y assister.
Ces pratiques antidemo-
cratiques, ces manipula-
tions n'ont rien pour sur-
prendre. Le fait nouveau
? et important ? c'est
qu'elles ont rencontre, au
sein du congres, une oppo-
sition non negligeable. Des
le second jour, une dizaine
de delegations (Argentine,
Mc.% ique, Espagne, Salva-
dor, Irlande, Belgique (Wal-
lons et Flamands), Federa
tion des Etudiants d'Afriquis
Noire en France, et Etu-
diants malgaches en Fran-
ce), protestaient par une
resolution commune aupres
de la presidence ; elles po-
saient huit, questions repre-
nant les faits que nous
avons relates, et montrant
de surcroit que le quorum
n'etait meme pas . atteint
pour que le congres puisse
valablement deliberer.
La presidence du congres
? qui s'etait installee sans
avoir ete elue, sous pre-
texte que c'est traditionnel-
lement la direction de l'U.
I.E. (Tchecoslovaquie, Sou-
dan, Irak) qui l'assume ?
ne daigna apporter aucune
reponse ii ces questions.
Par contre, tout au long du
deroulement des travaux,
elle s'efforga de couper la
parole aux contestataires.
faut ajouter id, pour
comprendre l'attitude des
delegues de l'Irak ou du
Soudan, qu'il s'agit ? et
c'est vrai pour la plupart
des pays arabes et pour
nombre de pays africains
? d'etudiants qui poursui-;
vent, leurs etudes en U.R.
S.S., en R.D.A., en Pologne, I
en Hongrie ou en Tcheco-
slovaquie.
Un incident particuliere-
ment significatif devait se
produire au moment de la
ratification par le congres
des propositions de la com-
mission des mandats. De
premieres p r o testations
a'elevarent a propos du
fait que les delegues etaient
saisis du rapport de la
commission (50 pages) cinq
minutes avant l'ouverture
de la discussion. Mais les
&changes les plus vifs eu-
rent lieu A propos de la re-
presentativite des deux de-
legations argentines q u
s'opposaient. La F.U.A. di-
te du 5 decembre (date de
son congres) represente 60
centres universitaires sur
69 ; elle est, entre autres,
animee par des adherents
.du Parti Communiste Revo-
lutionnaire, ne d'une scis-
sion du P.C. argentin. La
F.U.A. dite du 15 novembre
ne represente que 9 centres
universitaires ; mais corn-
me elle est animee par des
communistes orthodoxes.
elle a ete vehementement
soutenue par les delega-
tions des pays de l'Est.
La discussion d'une mo-
tion d'ordre deposee par la
delegation cubaine - et vi-
sant a l'envoi d'une com-
mission en Argentine pom
determiner la represcntati-
vite reelle de chacune des
organisations rivales ? fut
interrotnpue parce que
cabl,, de traduction fut t)p-
portun6ment rompu, et il
le fut a la hauteur des
rangs de la delegation so-
vietique. Cet c incident
technique ? fut mis A pro-
fit pour des a visites ? des
delegations des pays de
l'Est aupres des Cubains.
Mais ces derniers, main-
tinrent leur motion qui fut
adoptee. Malgre ce vote,
un representant de l'U.R.
S.S. crut bon d'accuser la
F.U.A. d'antisovietisme. Les
delegues argentins, en si-
gne de protestation O quitte-
pprove or e ease
rent alors le congres ; mais
us le firent sous les applau-
dissements d'un certain
nombre de delegations, et
accompagnes jusqu'a la
sortie par les delegues es-
pagnols.
UNE BATAILLE
POLITIQUE
Derriere ces Apres escar-
mouches d e procedure,
c'est evidemment une ba-
taille politique qui se livrait.
Les divergences apparurent
avec une particuliere net-
tete lors de la discussion
generale, et d? a propos
:de la fixation de l'ordre du
jour. C'est ainsi que La pro-
, position espagnole de cons-
tituer une commission char-
gee d'etudier la lutte des
etudiants en Europe occi-
dentale et dans les pays
capitalistes hautement de-
veloppes fut repoussee par
le bloc sovietique.
De la merne fagon fut re-
pousse un amendement ?
espagnol egalement ? pro-
posant d'ajouter, au pre-
mier point de l'ordre du
jour, parmi les taches de
l'U.I.E. la lutte a pour la
liberation nationale et so-
ciale (le texte porte seu-
lement la lutte contre
l'imperialisme). Par contre,
fut adopte par 21 voix (Es-
pagne, Roumanie, Coree,
Cuba, Vietnam du Nord,
Yougoslavie, etc.) contre
18 (U.R.S.S. et autres) un
amendement affirmant la
solidarite etudiante inter-
nationale avec la lutte anti-
imperialiste des peuples et
etudiants arabes, et, spe-
cialement, avec la lutte du
peuple et des etudiants pa-
lestiniens. De meme encore,
les Sovietiques s'opposerent;
en vain, A un amendement
cubain denongant ? la pene-
tration imperialiste dans
les universites ).
Ce qui fut mis en cause,
au cours de la discussion
denehts Mulsiea
legations (Roumanie, Ja-
pon (Zengakuren), Espagne,
M ad a gascar, Etudiants
noirs en France, etc.) c'est
la nature mettle de l'U.I.E.
(organisation bureaucrati-
que), sa politique (la lutte
anti-imperialiste n'est Mi-
nha qua de Wan Waite at
superficielle) et sa prati-
que (la solidarite affirm&
ne s'exprime que par des
paroles on des telegram-
mes). A cette conception,
les contestataires oppo-
saient celle d'une U.I.E.,
veritable centre d'informa-
tion et d'echange d'expe-
riences, de coordination des
luttes, et de solidarite ef-
fective.
LC deroulement des tra-
vaux a mis en evidence
l'existence, face au bloc so-
vietique, d'un regroupe-
ment de plusieurs delega-
tions (Espagne, Mexique,
les" deux Belgique, Salva-
dor, Bolivie, Federation des
Etudiants d'Afrique noire
en France, Madagascar)
appuyees du dehors par la
Roumanie, la Yougoslavie,
la Cork du Nord, le Ja-
' pon, le Venezuela, et,. A plu-
sieurs occasions, an COWS
des votes, par Cuba et le
Vietnam du Nord.
Les incidents du dernier
jour ? lors de l' a election ?
des organismes dirigeants
? montrent a l'evidence la
gravit?e la crise de l'U.
I.E. Le mode de scrutin re-
tenu ? une seule liste ?
provoqua les vives protesta-
tions de plusieurs delega-
tions (Venezuela et Repu-
blique Dominicaine notam-
ment), et le retrait spec-
taculaire du congres de la
delegation espagnole.
Certes, un poste a ete
garde au sein du Comite
Executif pour la Chine Po-
pulaire (apres de durs &-
bats), pour l'UNEF et pour
l'Espagne... Reste a savoir
Si et comment ces sieges
desormais vides seront oc-
cupes...
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
WASHINGTON POST
10 April 1971
"Animation" But No Thigh-Slapj)ing
A Few Anecdotes Culled From the 24th Party Congress
CPYRGHT
Insrow?Thp delegates to the 24th Con-
gress of the Soviet Comthunist Party heard
Leonid Brezhnev's central committee report
with "joyful, excitement," Sharaf Rashidov
of Uzbekistan announced the other day.
Joy, excitement, color, even humor have
been hard for Western eyes to find in the
excerpts of the congress proceedings vouch-
safed by the press agency Tass, newspapers
and Soviet television. They were certainly
conspicuous by their absence from the faces
of leaders s:town on television tapes of Pre-
mier Alexei Xosygin delivering his lengthy
report on the new five-year plan Tuesday.
Party leader Brezhnev sat writing; ideolo-
gist Mikhail Sitslov appeared to be reading a
magazine; Politburo. member Gennady Vo-
ronov tapped a pencil; Mstislav Keldysh,
president of the Academy of Sciences,
gnawed his thumb. When the camera
panned over the mass of delegates, several
were caught glancing at their watches.
Real emotion was visible, however, in the
closing moments of the Congress Friday.
Brezhnev choked up while he was still speak-
ing and the te1evision showed tears in his
eyes as the delegates sang "The Interna-
tionale," which is still the par,ty?though not
the state?anthem. Other leaders on the
dais were wiping their eyes, too.
rv.s
EARLIER, Tass seemed to feel an occa-
sional need to try to put some gaiety into
its reports.
One congress speaker was a weaver
named A. V. Smirnova from the Yakovlev-
sky flax mill in Ivanova Region, northeast of
Moscow. Among other things, she told So-
viet writers, pPinters and filtn-makers that
they should put more textile workers into
their creations.
"You know how many good songs have
been composed about girl spinners who in
olden times worked in small, dark rooms.
But now my contemporaries who have
clever fingers and ardent hearts, intelligent
and beautiful, are not given worthy atten-
tion .by poets and . composers," Mrs. Smir-
nova said.
Toss reported "animation in the .hall."
(Old. Moscow hands bestirred their mein-
By AnthonyAstrachan
I ens of jokes about Lenin in the preparations
Washington Post Foreign Service for Lenin's centenary a yeu). ugu.
c+3
odes; animation, even commotion, in the
hall were reported frequently during Nikita TO FOREIGN observers, one of the few
Khrushchev's Secret speech denouncing the truly human moments of the congress In the.
crimes of Stalin, at the 20th Party Congress absence of anecdotes was unintended.
in. 1956). Pravda, a more official record than I ean Luis Corvalan, speaking in Spanish, re-
counted how quick excerpts, reported only ap. counted how his Marxist government had re-
' versed a bourgeois practice and recognized
plause for Mrs. Smirnova's appeal.?
Tass and Pravda both reported "applause ! the Republic of Cuba and the People'f Ra
public of China."
and laughter" at a. sally by Mikhail Sholok-
The interpreter put only the mention of,
boy, the Soviet establishment novelist, last Cuba into Russian, and the audience, duly
Saturday.
He denounced the Austrian "right-sving re-
visionist," Ernst Fischer, as an opponent of
Socialist realism in the arts. Tass carefully
noted that "Fischer" is the German word for
"fisherman" before' reporting that Sholok-
hov said, "This fisherman and other foreign
anglers are trying to cast their lines with
quite rotten flies, banking on catching as
many gullible carp as possible with this bait
in the muddy waters of the so-called realism ,
.without riverbanks." This, too, produced
"animation In the hall."
Sholokhov then added that there were too
few gullible carp in the Soviet arts pond, so
the "clever" anglers would pull out only
small fry. The record then noted both ap-
plause and laughter.
NJ,
SATURDAY was a big day for congres-
sional humor: Foreign Minister Andrei Gra
rnyko deadpanned a bureaucrat's joke in his
foreign policy speech, unreported bY Tass.
After recounting the foreign policy activi.
ties of the Politburo, central committee, Su-
preme Soviet and government, Gromyko
said, "Our Soviet diplomacy is also fulfilling
Its duty as helper of the party and govern-
ment. I almost said our army of diplomats,
but then I remembered that the appropriate
personnel offices might pick on it, which
might be bad for us guys."
Pravda recorded applause but no laughter
at this sly reference to bureaucracy's pe-
rennial interest in reducing "surplus" per,
sonnel lists.
Significantly, nobody has reported hearing.
any good "anecdotes" mocking the congress
? the true SOViethumor that produced doz-
cued to applaud all references to the gallant
Caribbean ally, burst out clapping.
Corvalatt did not realize that the Inter-
preter had deprived Peking of equal time.
He looked 'surprised, since he knew that
many speakers had been applauded for at-
tacking Peking. But in one of the few spon-
taneous actions by a congress speaker,' he.
decided that if his listeners liked it, he
would give it to them again. ,
He repeated that Santiago had recognized
Cuba and China. This time, according to
Western Communists who were in the Pal-
ace of Congresses, the interpreter slowly in-
cluded China in his translation. The audi-
ence, finally clued in, sat on its hands. Cor-
valan looked quizzical and continued.
Approved For Rdlease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
June 1971
THE TWO FACES OF "DISSIDENT" COMMUNISTS
In commenting -on the "negative phenomena" of revisonism and
nationalism in the international Communist movement, Brezhnev
in his address to the Congress singled out for specialcensure
Roger Garaudy of France, Ernst Fischer of Austria, and Teodoro
Petkoff of Venzuela_ They have all been read out of their parties.
Their sin is not only to sneak out against various Soviet faults
and malpractices but to do so consistently, regardless of the
occasion. In this sense they may be regarded as true dissidents.
BreZhnev did not go on to condemn Berlinguer and other Italian
Communist leaders, Marchais of the French Communist Party, Carrillo
of the Spanish Communist Party, Aarons of the Australian CP, and
a host of.others, who also have from time to time criticized Soviet
policies, particularly the invasion and "normalization" of
Czechoslovakia- Such leaders have learned the limits of tolerable
criticism of the Soviet Union and deserve to be called pseudo-dissie
dents, as their behaviour at the 24th CPSU Congress illustrates.
The 24th Party Congress showed that leaders of Communist
parties of the world need considerable agility to walk their fine
opportunistic line in trying to satisfy two conflicting political
requirements, those of their Moscow Losses and those of the home
electorate -- they bow to the bosses and try to deceive the homefront.
The 24th CPSU Congress, held in Moscow from 30 March to 10 April,
heard most foreign party delegates speak in innocuous cliches,
concealing far more than they revealed of the divisions they have
expressed between themselves and the CPSU. All pledged allegiance
to proletarian internationalism (that Communist euphemism for
submission to Soviet-dictated policies). Many who have for years
vigorously claimed to oppose Soviet foreign policy and Soviet -
dominance, extolled the vietues of both. After the Congress, the
Communist and non-Communist populace may not have noticed the
degrading spectacle of some delegations scurrying home to reassert
their nationalism, independence, and their anti-Soviet positions
which were to prove to local suporters that they didn't really
mean what they said at the Congress!
There are two mutually supporting explanations for this
paradoxical behaviour. There is good reason to believe that the
Soviets used various devices to control the expression of dissent
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
by delegates to the Congress, including some manner of censorship of
"objectionable" passages in the speeches of visiting delegates.
But since leaders seem not to have complained about any Soviet
tampering with their speeches or about Soviet pressure on them,
they in effect acquiesced in Soviet demands that there be no
criticism at the Congress, Then, back home, they tried to mend any.
damage done to the sensibilities of their constituencies by
reiterating their earlier "principled" criticism, As a matter of
political expediency, they play the game two ways in the face of
conflicting political requirements. When in Moscow, that fountain-
head Of money, organizational support and ideology, each Party makes
obeisance to the CPSIJ Back home it changes the mask to appear in
the guise most pleasing to its supporters who are their only hope
Of reaching political power_ All the bravewords about autonomy,
separate roads to socialism, and disapproval of Russian militarism
are necessary at home in order to reassure any-fellow countrymen
who mayhave heard the party leaders in Moscow declaring themselves
in liege to a foreign power.
This dichotomy of behaviour, in and out of Moscow, which can
be illustrated in numerous instances, is particularly clear in the
following three examples:
George Marchais, Acting Deputy Secretary General of the Soviet-
line Communist Party of France (PCF), declared in Moscow that
"proletarian Internationalism_ is a sacred duty," Not a Word about
the political trials- in Czechoslovakia which Husak promised not to
hold and Marchais promised to denounce, Instead he praised the
"cOnstant struggle waged by the CPSU and the Soviet state for the
independence of oppressed peoples," Even before the Congress had
adjourned he scrambled back on the right side of his own constituency
by declaring to:the French Communist daily L'Humanit6 that his
delegation "had not thought it wise," as guests of the Soviet
leadership, to mention their "well known and unchanged" position
toward military "intervention" in Czechoslovakia, In fact, he said,
Czedi servility at the Congress embarrassed the French Party!
Marchais told L'Humanite he "regretted" as "alien" to PCF principles
Husak's abject adfhission to the world Communist movement gathered
at the Congressthat the Soviet military intervention was after all
a fraternal act in response to the "request" of Czechoslovakia,
If Marchais' reproach of Husak were anything but an opportunistic
tactic, Marchais would have expressed his 'regrets" before his world
Communist audience at the Congress,
The largest non-ruling Communist Party of them all, the
Italian Communist Party (PCI), feels itself closest to that charmed
circle of government and is therefore in greatest need of the facade
of an independent are truly national party. The PCI has been most
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
vociferous in denouncing the Czech invasion and occupation and the
Stalinist management of Poland which led to the 1970 riots. But
all these critical judgments, which have the ring of sincerity in
PCI publications, were left outside the door of the 24th Congress.
None of the Soviet delegates or the 101 delegations ftaM 99
countries heard a word of disagreement or disapproval from Deputy
Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer. He did not mention the fate
of Czechoslovakia or the Brezhnev Doctrine which requires Czech-
type treatment for any Communist regime which the Soviets deem to
be practicing the very reforms that the PCI calls- for from the
safety of non-Communist Italy.
Berlinguer returned to Rome before the Congress adjourned.
There he said defensively in exact if unconsious imitation of
Miarchais, that the PCI's views on problems due to "Czech events"
were "already well known'.' He assured his audience also that the
PCI is "for a line of complete independence" and then their "path
toward socialism.., will necessarily be different from those which
other socialist countries have pursued..." (L'Uhita, 8 April, attached)
The Australian Communist Party (CPA) _hag, been a persistent
and outspaen critic of Soviet paicies, particularly on Czech-
oslovakia. It has gone so far as to refuse to sign the June 1969
declaration of the World Communist Conference and has even invited
the renegade Frenth Communist Roger Garaudy to'address its members,
But National Secretary Laurie Aaron's speech to the 24th Congress
contained nothing about the Czech tragedy. He mentioned none of
the CPA-CPSU differences over the latter's domination in the name
of proletarian internationalism, he said nothing df the hated
Brezhnev Doctrine which he has frequently ctititized. The Soviet
Party may have assured his silence by threatening to split the CPA
as Aarons himself predicted they might do. Thus, like the other
leaders, Aarons seems to have one party line for Moscow and another
for the home crowd. But available accounts in the CPA daily (see
attached) are equally innocuous and do not reiterate "well-known
CPA positions," but do contrast drathatically With Aarons' ptevious
criticisms.
Whether the Communist and non-Conmunist populace of the various
countries is fully aware of the extent of self-serving hypocrisy
practiced by their Mbscow-ridden CPs is debatable. But it certainly
has not escaped Soviet attention. At the opening session of the
Congress, Brezhnev expressly warned the Parties against going too
far and making too many compromises in order to win parliamentary
power. Certain renegades, he said, show themselves as anti-Soviet
in order to be declared "real Marxists" and thus fully independent.
Although most parties are beyond the reach of Soviet arms and thus
of the consequences of the Brezhnev Doctrine, few could survive in
3
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
isolation and therefore need to pay attention to such Soviet
warnings, at least at international Communist gatherings.
(Attached are excerpts from the Congress speeches of Georges Marchais,
Acting Secretary General._ of the PCF, Enrico Berlinguer, Deputy
Secretary General of the PCI, and of Laurie Aarons, National
Secretary General of the CPA along with their remarks for home
consumption, contrasting their fawning praiSe of the Soviet Union
and ambiguous references to independence during the Congress with
their more outspoken statements made for home conSpmption.)
4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
AT THE CONGRESS
Excerpts from speech to the 24th CPSU Congress by Georges Mhrchais,
Acting Secretary General of the French Communist Party on 31 March 1971:
"Dear comrades, I bring to the 24th CPSU Congress the warm greetings
of the PCF and of its general secretary, Comrade Waldeck Rochet. Like
every one of your party's congresses, this 24th congress is an impor-
tant event for the communist and international movement.. But it is
also an event of great interest for world opinion as a whole. This is
so because your party, which has made triumph the ideals of the Paris
Commune, whose centenary we have just celebrated, was the first to lead
the socialist revolution to victory and to create the first socialist
state in history. This is so because since that time the activity of
the CPSU and the Soviet state has played a determining role in the
service of socialism and peace in the evolution of the contemporary.
world. This role is due first of all to the economic successes and
the total achievements whose balance sheet is being convincingly presented
at your congress and of which the Communist Party and the Soviet people
can be proud. But your congress also attracts attention because it is
resolutely turned toward the future. Comrade Brezhnev's report is
,permeated with the idea that the communists do not and cannot remain in
the same place, that it is always necessary to advance with an acute
sense of what is new and with creative initiative....
"...anti-Sovietism, no matter in what form it presents itself and no
natter where it originates, constitutes a crime against the interest
of the working class and the peoples. We are combating it and will con-
tinue to combat it with ever increasing vigor....
"Dear comrades, bonds of brotherhood, solidarity, and cooperation
have always existed between the PCF and the CPSU, and no trial has ever
been able or will ever be able to sever them. We are determined to
further consolidate, to consolidate ceaselessly, the relations between
our two parties, which are rightly called fraternal parties....We attach
great importance to the principle of the independence and sovereignty of
all parties and to our principles being respected in our relations with
fraternal parties. But at the same time, we believe that proletarian
internationalism, the joint action of all the communist parties on a
Marxist-Leninist basis, is a sacred durty and, indeed, the prerequisite
for the success of our struggle....
"Long live the 24th CPSU Congress! Long live the friendship, solidarity,
and cooperation between the PCF and the CPSU!...
,,Long live the united action of all the workers and peoples struggling
against imperialism! Long live communism!"
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
AT HOME
L'HUMANITE, Paris
2 April 1971
CPYRGHT
Lmax Leon interview wizn ueorges Aarenalb In MVSUUWm 1 Avvi1 19(1]
[Text] PCF Deputy Secretary General Georges Marchais, who is leading the French Com-
munist Party delegation to the 24th CPSU Congress, was kind enough to comment for
L'HUMANITE on some aspects of the work now in progress at the Palace of Congresses.
Here are his answers to our questions: .1
Question: What are the initial impressions of our party's delegation after the first
3 days of the congress?
Answer: So far we have been Mainly impressed by the emphasis put on the prospects for
improving the living stanaard and increasing the prosperity of the Soviet peoPle,
emphasis apparent both In the report submitted by L. BroZhnev,and.in the speeches of
-
Most of the delegates. Obviously this is their main concern and it will leave its mark
on the next 5-year period.
L. Brezhnev's report ha.a also stressed that the main activities of the CPSU concerning
the organization of society were directed at "develogng socialist demoeracy? in all its
aspects,
?
AIM have also noted with great interest thenew purpose marking the approadh to economio.:...
and social questtAns. Of course the production ratios mid the econoMic laws of Soviet
spoiety are essentially the same as 40 years ago?that is, of a socialist type--but
the standard.reaehad by this sooialist society is now considerably higher.. -This, creates
new problems which require new solutions. I shall mention only. one of these problems
as an example, a problem which has justly been described in the report as being of
"historic significanoe." I refer to the question oecombihing the scientific and
technological revolution with the advantages of the 'socialist economic system: The
opportunities afforded in this sphere are boundless.
What the congress has brought out even now is a clear and passionate reaffirmation of
the Soviet Union's Will for peace. The, proposals formulated or renewed by the Soviet
Union in this sphere can only insure the support of all men and women aspiring to peace,
security, and disarmament.
And finally, we cOMpletely agree with the idea expressed in the report on the activities
of the CPSU Central Committee that the cohesion and the unity in action of the world
communist movement is a complex but especially imperative task at a time when the :
imperialistslare intensifying their aggressive activities against the freedom-loving
peoples.
Question: Al]. observers have noted that the number of foreign delegations participating
in the congress has been larger than ever before, ShOUld any special significance
,be attached to that fact?
Answer: Absolutely. Over 100 delegations from communist parties and patriotic and
revolutionary organizations are present.
This representation is due to the great prestige enjoyed by the. CPSU among the workers
ar peopleB Of all olontinents.
pprovea ror elease 1 uuu/uu/az : CIA-KUlatU-U11U4AUUUJUUUUUUU1-4
2
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
8ut we believe that it is also the to the will or the communist parties to present a
united front in the struggle against imperialism, irreepective, of some differences ,
of opinion. m,
Well) this is an idea dear to the French comeunisto.
Obviously, We believe that more, an be no unity without principles. our *trona aimatil
at the unity of the entire world communist movement go hand in hand with our continual
struggle on two fronts: against rightist opportunism and against leftist opportunism.
We recalled this yesterday in our greetings to the congress.
having said this, our. 19th congress has emphasized that neither any differences in .
.the conditions under which the struggle is waged nor the very existence of differences
concerning some problems must weakem or hinder in any way the necessary unity of
action of all the communist parties.
;It was with this in Mind and in-order to avoid any polemics that, in accordance with
its mandate, our delegation decided to-avoid recalling, in its greetings to the
congress of a fraternal party of which it is a guest, the well-known and unchanged
attitude of the PCP ta,the August 1968 military intervention in Czechoslovakia.
Obviously, every delegation says what it wants but our delegation believes it
regrettable Cha'rihe CPCZ delegation has thought fit to devote the main part of its
greetings to an .eXpose of its views on this problem, an exposd several aspects of'
which impliea-criticisms of our own attitude.
shall add with parti.ellar reference to the questien of the sovereignty of the
socialist state that the thesis formulated by the Czechoslovak delegation seems to
us alien to the principles .jointly determined by the'communist parties in the state-
ment issued by the June 1969 Moscow conference.
For our part, wd are firmly adhering to these principles.
Speaking in more general terms, we shall pursue our efforts with perseverance, calm,
and patience, ethert-e-aimed at unity of action of all communist parties on the basis
both of the indet;endence,of every party and of proletarian internationalism.
L'HUMANITE, Paris
2 April 1971
FJfITIIIIITIPTDE GEORGES MARCUM.
raumanite
CPYRGHT
NAOSCXYU, ler am! (par tempnone). Georyub secrittairt
ganeJA adjoint du Parti Communiste Francais, qui dhign In ddlegniion au
24'ConqrOs du Pnrfi Communistedellirlion Sovieiique, a lairJa vouhi uJnumifir:r
pour altunnoite quelques aspects dos travaux en cours au Palais dos Gongres.
Voic Ir r{;ponses dull sfahes e,epPei que5tions.
QUE5TION (Wiles
f;0111, ICS premieres im-
pressions 40 la (*lega-
tion de netre I' a rti
.apree iroie jours de
APcsAIRP
eiggee
frappe le pitie Our rine-
tent, rine ee :telt dans le blement, c'est le solid do-
rapport. present?ar minant qui marquera le
L Ltreinev on dans les in- proehain quinquennat.
terventions de la plupart
des delegues, c'est l'accent De metne, le rapport de
rnis teir les perspectives L. Brejnev a Indtque forte-
.4
etre des Sovietiques. Visi- Parte Commeniete de
1
CPYRGHipproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Minion Sovietique touchant
l'organisation de la seelete
etait 4, le c16Arc1oppe,neni, trt
la democratte suclaliste
et melt dans tous ses as-
pects,
Nous relevons egalenient
avert ttn nrind MONA Is
ens du nouveau qui carne-
terise l'approche des ques-
tions economiques et so-
dales. then entenclu, les
rapports de production, les
lois economiques de la so-
clad sovietique sont fonda-
mentalement les memes
qui) y a en ans, c'est-a-
dire qu'lls on de type so-
cialiste. Mats le niveau at-
teint par cette societe so-
elaliste est considerablement
plus eleve aujourd'hui.D'ou
les problemes nouveaux. qul
appellent des solutions nou-
velles. Je ne citerat, titre
d'exemple. qu'un seul d ces
problemes, dont le rapport
dit avec raison quil posse-
de un e poree liistorique
11 s'agit de reallser la Jonc-
tIon de la revolution sclen-
tiflque et technique avec les
avantages du system eco-
nomique socialiste. Les pas-
sibilites offertes dans ce
doinaine sont immense.
Ce qui ressort encore des
niaintenant du congres, c'est
la reaffirmation claire et
passlonnee de la volonte de
pals de l'Union Sovietique.
Les propositions formulees
ou renouvelees par le. Patti
Communiste de l'Unlon So-
vletique a cet egard ne peu-
vent qu'entrainer l'a d h -
son de tous les hommeS et
les femmes qul asplrent
hr. pais, a la admit& au
desarmement.
Enfin, nous sommes pro-
fondement d'a ccord avec
l'idee exprimee dans le rap-
port d'activite du Comite
Central du Parti Comme-
niste de l'Union Sovietique
que la cohesion, l'uutt?
d'action tin mouvement
communist? Mondial eat
une Mein complexe, mats
particullerement imporieuse
au moment o? les imperia-
listes intensifient !curs ac-
thdtee agressives contre les
peoples eprls de liberte.
QUESTION : Tons iles
observateurs ont note
qu'uft nombre jamais
atteint de delegations'
etrangires participent
an congris. Dolt-on at-
tribuer sine significa-
tion particullere oe
fait
REPONSE : Abeolument.
PIM de cent delegations de
partis communistes et d'or-
ganisations patriotiques et
revolutionnaires sont pre-
sentee.
Cette represe.ntatlon tient
au.grand prestige du PCUS
pitrmi les traVailleurs,
Petiplee de .to lee conti-
nents.
Mats, selon nous, cute tient,
aussi a la volonte des pants
eommunistes de presenter,
par-dela crines diffe-
rences d'oninlons, un front
uni tl lutte contre l'impe-
rialisme.
blen, c'est la un e 1dee
qui est there aux conirnu-
nistes francals.
Naturcllement, pour no/13,
11 ne peut s'agir d'une uni`e
sans principes. Nos ef1ort7,
en faveur de l'unite de tout
le mouvement communistr
mondial vont de pair avec
tine lutte permanente sur
Ins deux fronts, centre l'un-
porturilline dO 'Unite nt, Von-
portunistne de geuche. Nous
l'avons rappel liter dans
notre salutation au congres.
Ceci rift. notre 19 Con gr
souligne que la divcrsite
des conditions d I U t t
l'existence meme des diver-
gences stir certaines queg-
tions ne doivent en nueun
eas affatblir ou entrover la
neeessaire unite d'action dr
tous les partts coninitinf3tes.
C'est en partant de ccs
idees et pour eviter la po-
lemique, que notre delega-
tion, comme elle en avait
mandat, n'a pas Juge bon de
rappeler, dans sa salutation
au congres d'un parti here
dont elle est Plite, la posi-
tion bien connue ? et in-
changee ? du Part' Corn-.
muniste Francais sur l'in-
tervention
1968 en Tcheeoslovaquie.
Evidemment, chum,. dic.-
legation intervIcnt comrne
elle l'e n ten d. Cependant,
noire delegation juge re-
grettable cote la deltgatirm
du Pilaf Communistede
Tchecoslovaqule aft ern de-
voir consacrer l'essentlel
sa salutation it l'expos6 de
sa position sur cette ques-
tion, expose dant plusleurs
aspec ts impliqualent tine
critique de notre propre
position.
J'ajoute qu'en ce qui con-
cerne phis partletilierement
la question dela. sciiverrq-,
bete .tie l'Etat suciallste,P.
these formulec par la delee
Ration tchecoslovaque noes
apparalt etrangere nix
prInCipes definis en corn-
mull per )e$ porta eotninu.
nistee dans la declaratirn
tie la Conference de Moe-
cou, en juin 1969.
Pour notre p art. not s
nous en tenons fertnement
h cos principes.
Plus generalement, nor..s
poursuivrons avec perseve-
rance, calme et patience.
nos efforts en. faveur
d'action de tous les
partls communistes sur 1-t
double base de l'Indepen-
dsunee de chsente Partt et de
lintetriationtliento Proleta.
rte". '
THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
3 April 1971
CPYRGHT
French re ullie
for Czech view
of 1968 invasi rt
From ANATOLE SNUB, Paris, April 2
The French Communist Party
leader, M. Georges Marchais
today rebuked attempts at the
Soviet ,Party Congress in Mos-
cow to justify the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
In an interitiew with
"L'Humanite," he attacked the
Czechoslovak leader,'Mr Husak,
for raising the question at the
CIngress.
M. Marchais said the French
delegation at the congress had
not thought it wise, as guests of
the Soviet leadership, to recall
" the well known ? and
unchanged" positien of tho
French party toward the Rus-
sian "military intervention."
ITherefore, French Communists
regretted that Mr Husak had
devoted most of his speech to
the subject.
"Several aspects" of Mr
Husak's speech, "implied a
criticism of our own position.'%
Furthermore, Mr Husak's justi-
fication of the Soviet interven-
tion "appears to us alien to the
principles defined together" at
the Moscow conference of Com-
munist Parties dn June 1969.
Thge A969st:nordiferenc&ecivit:osidie!'
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDpigilliaeAfekiAORY054600
1-4
ApproveGWN6ii6ase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
by the Italian. French,
Rumanian and other parties to
the Soviet line. ? Washington
Post.
In Moscow, the Soviet
Defence Minister, Marshal
Grechko, told the congress that
the forces of reaction "were
preparing to unleash terrible
war," Dut the Soviet Union
would win such a war with
missiles that could hit anything.
We are strengthening our
army not for attack but for
defence," he said. "However,
our armed forces are always
ready to chastise the aggressor,
and fight on that territory from
which he dares violate our
borders."
According to UPI, Western
analysts thought Marshai
Groehko was referring in WI
warning to the United States,
not China. His speech Was con.
sidered " routine rocket4
rattling."
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
5
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
AT THE CONGRESS
Excerpts from speech by Italian Communist Party Deputy Secretary General
Enrico Berlinguer at the 1 April session of the 24th CPSU Congress.
"Dear Comrades, I bring you, delegates at the 24th CPSU Congress, and
all Soviet comrades, the fraternal greetings of Italian communists and
of the Secretary General of our party, Comrade Luigi Longo.
To the communists and to all peoples of the Soviet Union, we express
the sincere hope that the decisions of this, your congress, may advance
in all fields your socialist society and the building of the material
and technical basis of communism. It is noteworthy that in the economic
5-year plan which has just begun there is expressed the aim to achieve
a substantial increase in the material and cultural living standard of
the Soviet peoples. This appears to be.an_important sign. We know that
this effort for a further economic mansion is accompanied by the
growing aid of the Soviet Union to all those peoples who are fighting
for their own independence and freedom, in the first place to the heroic
people of Vietnam and the Arab countries. All this indicates not only
the scope and solidarity of the victories already achieved as*viell as the
immense potential of your socialist society, but also the fundamental
contribution made by the Soviet Union to the defense of world peace and
the building of a world free from imperialism, hunger, and war.
"Our solidarity with your party, with the Soviet Union, with all
socialist countries, has always remained alive and active. Our interna-
tional solidarity does not and cannot mean our full identification with
the choices which each socialist country, and more generally each
communist and workers party, has made and is making on its own responsi-
bility, but it means a basic solidarity with a country such as your own,
with the other socialist countries, with a whole world which, through
its own existence and victories, has already changed the fate of mankind.
"Our internationalism is founded on the recognition of the full
independence of each country and each party and leaves the way open, as
has already happened and as can always happen, to moments and circumstances
cf dissension and divergence, without in any way, as a result of this,
weakening solidarity and duty in the struggle for the great aims which
unite us.
"In the course of a long and difficult progress, our party has put
down deep roots among the working masses of the Italian people. It
has, emerged as an important national force. From Lenin, first of all,
and then from Gramsci and Togliatti, we have received the teaching which
has shown us haw.to fight to open for our people a path toward socialism
which correspond to the particular historic, social, and political
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
_04
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
conditions of our country, as well as the conditions in which there
develops conCretely the world struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism.
"We are also seeking to state .the major outlines of the socialist
state which we wish to build in Italy, together with the contribution
of the other forces of the working class and the people. It is obvious
that even on the general problems of socialism, of socialist thought and
of the international workers movement, our party, while it is attentively
studying the results of the practical and theoretical work of other parties,
is working to make its own specific contributions, arising from its own
experience and ideas. At the same time, we firmly reject any solicitations
to break or weaken our internationalist duty within the great world
revolutionary communist movement of which we are part and of which we
will always be part, as a result of a free choice made by us on the basis
6c Marxist-Leninist principles by which we are inspired and on the basis
of the deepest interests of the working class and our people. Within
this framework, we have fought and we will always fight any manifestation
of anti-Sovietism...."
AT HOME
L'UNITA, Rome
8 April 1971
CPYRGHT
PCI Deputy General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer statement on CPSU congress
....At the congress, Berlinguer added, we had the opportunity of
noting once again the existence of assessments which were different from
our own on certain important questions concerning the international
workers movement, relations between communist parties, and the develop-
ment of socialist thought. It is not only a matter of problems raised
by the Czechoslovak events, our positions on those are already well known,
but also of more general questions like, for example, the one relating
to the necessity of full respect for the independence of every party,
every state,? and every socialist state, which remains a fundamental
question for us.
"Our line is clear, and we have confirmed it at every point: We
are in favor, of a strong internationalist commitment, side by side with
all the socialist countries, communist parties, add anti-imperialist
forces.
"At the same time, we are for a line of complete independence both
with regard to the struggle and the quest which we are conducting in
Italy for a path toward socialism and for a socialist building -- which
Approved For Release 1999/09/027: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
are and will necessarily be different from those which other socialist
countries have pursued and are pursuing -- and with regard to the judgment
of and the way in which we are operating within the great international
alinement to which we belong.
"This remains the substance of our position. We are aware that
our enemies would prefer to be faced by a PCI which is a servile imitator ,
of other models and devoid of the capacity to.autahomously formaate and
defend a policy of its own or else by a PCI wiiiEh has ceased to be an
internationalist force.
"Instead, autonomy and internationalism are and will remain inseparable
aspects of our way of operating within the reality of our country and of
the international workers movement. Whoever hopes that we will deviate
from this line in one direction or another will always be deluded.
"Regarding the speculations and falsifications made recently, it is
only necessary to repeat that UT communists are certainly not seeking
the applause or recognition of our opponents: What we are interested in
is that the substance of our positions should be understood by the
workers, the democratic forces, and all earnest people."
L'UNITA, Rome
18 April 1971
L'UNITA interview with PCI Politburo member Gian-Carlo Pajetta on 24th
cODORAIK-Ts.
"Comrade Gian-Carlo Pajetta, who was a member of the PCI delegation
w.liCh attended the 24th CPSU Congress, has granted us the following
interview on its proceedings and results.
"Question: Would you first give, us a general opinion on the congress?
"...Comrade Berlinguer has already expressed a first opinion in his
interview on returning from Mbscow. We have had a report in the party
d_rectorate, we will widely disseminate the documents which have been
published recently, and we will continue the debate and the study at
party meetings and in confrontations with others. Odrs is a positive
opinion, at the same time, it also aims at a critical-eXdminatidn-bf-a
fundamental experience. We do not want a description '5raft adVertisement
of some kind of a 'model,' as if we had attended an international
elibition and as if we were faced with the problem of importing a finished
product to be used here in our country.
Approved For Release 1999/9/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
"Question: 'Returns' and 'rehabilitations' had been expected.
Have these fore-Casts been confirmed?
"Answer: I believe that for an opinion on the congress and on the
prospects which it opens it is necessary to go back to the debate which
'A.as been going on almost everywhere in recent months and to which such
great amount of space has been devoted in the international press.
Ale remember, for example, the reverberations caused by a question put
to a West European communist party leader about his reaction were the
24th congress 'to disavow the 20th' and how his answer that 'in this
:ase, his party would not approve it' seemed courageous and aroused
sensation.
"Question: Could you tell us something about the way in which the
oroblems of the articulation of society and of the economic and social
development were presented?
"Answer: A Central Committee document appeared on the eve of the
congress which stresses the function of the Soviets and provides a more
specific base to their greater autonomy by means of greater powers in
the economic field and by means of more conspicuously autonomous budgets.
At the congress, and particularly in Brezhnev's and Kosygin's reports,
there was no lack of references for workers' participation and democratic
life, also seen as prerequisites for greater efficiency, references
which were intentionally accompanied by appeals for discipline and
organizational efficiency. Thus, although the theme of the trade unions
was certainly not a central one, the reference made to them did not
stop -- as some people believed they could simplify it -- at the
'transmission belt' formula but stressed their duty to represent and to
defend the interests of the workers.
"It is not possible to speak about a turn and perhaps not even about
a deepening in connection with the themes of democracy and of the insti-
tutions The intention here was to stress the continuity, but recalling
that this means a condemnation of theillegalities of the 'personality
cult' period and a desire to overcame what was arbitrary, improvised,
and personal during the period of 'subjectivism.'
"I intentionally refer to the two terms in quotation marks because
the fact that complicated phenomena are being schematized and almost
concealed by .a label appears to us as a limitation of research and
political debate and therefore as a limitation of the congress. It is
as if a kind of modesty (a dangerous political modesty, we believe)
prevented a pore open political debate which would certainly be fruitful
and would take place in the direction in which it was intended to move
and in which things were moving. When a congress seems as if it were
dominated by the concern for unanimity and for the proclamation of
monolithism, a part of its effectiveness seems to become lost, as if the
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001 -4
CPYRdffroved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
meeting of experiences and the recognition of the problems were being
tarnished by elements of liturgy.
"This was felt perhaps in more than one speech, but it must be stated
clearly that it was not a characteristic of the reports. At this point
we must ask the reader to show an attentiveness which political observers
seem to have lacked, particularly those who were concerned with providing
a daily comment aimed at serving preconceived theses rather than pro-
viding information....
"The profound disagreement between the Soviet Union and China re-
mains like a painful wound in the international workers movement, and
the polemical positions of the CCP also remain acute. The polemic was
taken up again on the eve of the congress, and no one could hope for
sensational gestures of pacification. Naw then, if there was an echo
of the polemic and a sharp answer to the attacks at the CPSU congress
and if the positive, albeit limited results in interstate relations were
stressed, here also, although no progress was made, there was no move
backward, nor has the conflict sharpened....
"The theme of the defense of the socialist countries was stressed,
and there was a.return -- and no one could expect things to happen
differently -- to insisting, even quite strongly, on the justification
of Czechoslovakia's occupation. We have maintained and have declared
and recalled in this respect a view point which did not come close to
or offer any rapprochement.
"Question: We would like you to examine finally the meaning and
the value of the international representations at the 24th congress.
"Well, we must say that the presence of 101 delegatiohs provides
the answer, and in a direction which appears to us to be the right one.
There were not only different organizations and countries with absolutely
clIfferent curcumstances but also voices which, because they represented
different situations and conditions, could not all have the same accent.
We Italians stressed this in Berlinguer's speech and we spoke clearly,
in our own way, and in our own style: That is, Italiana. interna-
tionalist at the same time. There was no lack of attention at the congress,
nor of stimulation for the debate and the confrontation, even in the
many meetings which took place between various delegations....
"When we were among Soviet workers and soldiers, even with other
delegations, one thing always seemed clear to everyone: It was useless
to ask us to be different from what we are, but it was impossible to
doubt the internationalism of the Italian communists. Unity in diversity:
Perhaps not everyone says it and admits it, but for everyone this is a
fact to be accepted. When I was asked to speak about our party's policy
to students from every part of the world who were gathered in their
university, no one thought that a voice which, perhaps, would not repeat
the same words included in their textbooks could be inopportune.
Approved For Release 1999/Q8/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
t9Rincl-For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
And when a written question in Arabic, and another one in Spanish, both
of them interested and polemical in connection with our position with
our position on Czechoslovakia, were handed to the rostrum, it appeared
tome that speaking to those 500 young people and calling things by
their name was the most natural thing in the world. It was also natural
For them to listen and to seek to understand although they did not all
reply with applause, but this is no less natural."
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : gl1k-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
AT THE CONGRESS
PRAVDA, 143 scow
9 April 1971
CPYRGHT
Australian Communist Party National Secretary Laurie Aaron s greetings &peecn,a e
unspecified]
:Text] Dear comrades: Australiats communists greet the working people of the Soviet
Inion on the occasion of the 24th CPSU Congress, an important event in the life of
ioUr country. (applause). We wish great successes to the congress and to all the workers,
kolkhoz members, and representatives of the intelligentsia, who, at the price of their
'leroic labor and privations over the past 53 years, have transformed their motherland,
iespite the embittered hostility of imperialism and some aggressive wars. (applause)
%t the 24th CPSU Congress plans are being discussed which provide for new achievements
in the"sphere of industry, agriculture seience, and culture, the raising of the living
standard of the working people, and for the development of socialist democracy.
Following Lenin's traditions of proletarian internationalism, the 24th CPSU Congress
has again confirmed the readiness of the Soviet people to give support to the national
liberation struggle of all peoples of the world ggainst American imperialism. The
peoples of Indochina, who are heroically resisting the U.S. imperialists and its
puppets and satellites, are in the vanguard of this worldwide movement. (applause)
The remarkable victories won by the peoples o7 Indochina in the struggle against all
the military and technical might of the United States immeasurably strengthen the
struggle of all the peoples for liberty. (applause) .J
The Australian Communist Party ppposes the capitalist class of its own country, which
.s,willingly playing the role of ponfederate of the United States in its aggressiv.e
war against the peoples of Indochina. This is our international duty and, at the same
7ime, a main factor in the preparation for revol.utionary actions against Australian
nonopoly capitalism and against American domination of political life, and
'oreign policy of Australia.
Che Australian communists are actively participating in the broad and ever growing
antiwar mmvement. This coziitionbof different social and political forces is opposing
'tar, demanding the withdrawal of all Australian and American forces and of military
squipment from Indgehina, and is striving to prevent the drafting of young Australians
into the army to wage this unjust war: (applause) At the same time, the Australian
3ommunist Party is conducting its independent campaign by exposing imperialism as the
nalprit for war,(and is supporting all popular forces fighting in Indochina. The com-
nunists support the proposals advanced by the DRV and the PRGRSV. (applause)
Certain groups of more conscious -Australian workers are already waging strikes under the
slogan, "No normal business life while the war lasts." In May adSeptember 1970 more
than 120,000 people who went out onto the streets of the country's chief cities parti-
cipated in mighty protest demonstrations against the war. Together with other peace-
loving forces, the communists will do everything to involve as many people as possible
in the most active forms of the antiwar actions.
We consider it our dliti?flY7oppose primarily "our own' capitalism. (applause) We also
'consider the struggll'against.Australials colonial pressure against the developing
national liberation struggle in New Guinea and support for the demands of the oppressed
itradtiagegeeeVettA4Va*MoLPOW1110-21MqpilkalOrcw4"
r4.:1
.1
CAilVi644-E1 For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
In Australia we are striving to struggle against such ideas engineered by the capitalist
system as racism, militarism, the sense of hopelessness and alienation, and against
false moral values. Such ideas are the unseen force which cements the system of oppres-
sion in the developed capitalist countries. The theoretical and practical struggle
against these bourgeois ideas is the main task of the Australian revolutionary movement.
The workers movement in Australia is putting forward ,new demands and is devising new
methodic of waging a struggle against the monopolies and for their economic, sooiel, and
political demands. The growth of resistance to the attempts to transfer the burden of
inflation and other difficulties of the capitalist economy to the shoulders of the
workers And poorest strata of the population and also the growth of the movement of
democratic rights to counteract the aspiration of the ruling classes to limit democracy
even further are of particular significance. Reaction is preparing for an offensive
for the purpose of stopping the strike movement of te workers, fettering the trade
unions, disrupting demonstrations, and crushing the' protest movement against war and
military rvice.
We consider that there are prospects in Australia for developing the class struggle and
ibr even greater fusion of the workers movement with the antiwar movement and the move-
ment for new moral .values, ma word, with those movements .which are fundamentally
anticapitalist and can .issue a socialist challenge to capitalist domination in Australia
Comrades: The policy and practical activity of the CPSU are of enormous signifie
canoe for the world revolutionary prodecc and have a positive influence on?the
forward movement of all mankind.' We once again wish the congress success in all
spheres. (stormy mm10.11.30)
TRIBUNE, Sydney
21 April 1971
CPYR
(Eon Leozric-- 4 (irons-
Moscow)
THU 24th Congress of the
Communist Party of
thL Soviet Union ended on
April .10 with the unanitri-
otz election of a new Cen-
taa Committee of 245
members, with 150, ,alterrir
ate members. The old Om-
tri Committee had 139
-members:.? ?..--
The new Political Bureau
has 15 members, With four
al entities as against 11 mem-
bers with four alternates on
the previous Political Bureau.
Ar the previous 11 members
were re-elected,
Western press speculation
about major changes in the
Scviet party Icatiership, and
a power struggle within the
leadership. hate(' proved false,
provecHattrbRelease
congress would "rehabili-
tate" Stalin,
rezhinev's mat
the Chinese leaders "demand-
ed that we ithould abandon
the line of the 20th Congress
and the program of the
CPC.IU."
'Le also dealt with art and
litiTature, saying: "1.11 tate
?development of our art, there
were complicating factors of
another order. There were
some pivmle who ;Knight to
mince the diversity of pro-
seot-day tioviet reality It,
problems that have irreversi-
bly receded into the past tus
a main.: of the work (lonLt by
im.ety to surtnoist the
consequmicel of the person-
silty cult.
'Anotiwr extreme was, the
attirrapt to whit,cwW1.' past
phenomerst which the party
had subjected ?;:o emphatic
and prineiptcd criticism, cre-
ative element; which the
arty 'ha, Introduced Into its
9 9 9/KM
it;atiAlkc5el5litgb 1 .1
The COrPZIIZEI devoted its
main attontIon to the mom-
omY, and the planned develop-
ment of industry and o.grictl-
titre, with large capital
vestments and extensive a i-
,plicatIon of science and tegi-
nology, It decided that
growth rate of industries po:)-
due,Ittig consumer goods wet Id.
:be faster than that of heivvy
industry.
The Congress decided tI at
by 1975 "the average month-
ly wage of workers and. of-
fice employees will rine to 1G-
149 rubles, and the remun T-
alton of collective fur/rum"
labor to Ed) rubles." The mot-
'mum wage is to Ilse to 79.
ruWeo.
The 1570 harvest. VMS a me-
ord lac million tons, and lie
Nun, cans for an aver tge
grain output of 195 million
ttSltm
in the last five years, nOo
94Acitigi biaLuft metres of? new
lOUUVOG)041-4uill, in
the tiovlet thlit)11 The lass
for UM million MI Woo
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
350 LII 0 17,01 teL10 AY at
yr _re.
ilin)nrvertierit in Hetet;
ataiitaaraa
A. quite
Ail PI:t..:AarVi,
the:,
;;Airilittet,
i'i
COntfreait, inaltatteat rto
eatotantial. enarigee Soviet
I ()reign ;)olley. Stress was laid.
On the peaceful aims of tiais
policy. Congress adopted state-
ments on Indochina iind the
Middle Feast, declaring ropport
for the Indochinese and Arab
peoples e.gainst imperialism.
On relations with the USA,
Ilrethrlea said: In the recent
period, the US Adminietra-
tion has taken a more rigid
atance on a rounber of inter-
natiorutl isattea, including
name which have a beitring
on the int.ereato a the Soviet
Union."
tt 1/' irt
i
US policy are V.ttateCtf.:(1 W11;11
ct>nt'Ic oltU araiee,
breztinev mild: "We preorael
eastanptioa that, it
is possible to improve rela-
tions lktween the Miran erta
the 1.11.1A, telt we haVo ter eon.,
elder whether we are dealing
wit,11 st. req1.1 (11'1;in, (.0 mate:
iseueri tI, the
reetotiatire; table."
1.ireZtlrieV*14 report juatined.
the A moist I Int Warriaw
Peet intervention in Cale:lea
atiovelia, quoting from a re-
cent doemeent ta? the Czecho-
alove.k Comment:a, Party, In
his final ripeech he mild that
Cotigreee /nu' evert that fra-
ternal parte% 11I Ili.fl1fll()U$Iy
Iffoved Min COM/ lima
iseeirien the ritual:merit by
Preneti commtiniet leader
eheorgea Whirr:halo Mame:10a
net the French. pertv from
the CZ4whooloyak into:ref:talon,
Italian committal(' apoltestnan
nitric? lierlinguer gave an in-
terview In Norsk clearly Mat-
ing Um Italian Communist
I'arty's critical views on this
and Other Wawa, .
Very few one the eireecluie
delivered na the Conffers re-
ferred to Czechoslovakia and
not many were critical of.
China.
Australian conununist dele-
gates had discuons with
other delegations, including
the Vietnam Workers' purty
and the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam. Wo
informed the Vietnantese of
anti-War actions in Australia,
and handed over money col-
lected on the aka:eon of the
25th arraiversary of the
Democratic Republic of Viet-
UL
aelatanuer z a
token .of eolidarity. Altair the
talka, the Vietnam Workers'
arty sent a letter to the
.Austrealan delegation saying
Your delegation's apeech at
the 24th Congresn or the
ClalitT ban weal twain Iiittiwrt
the militent aolidarity of
your party witit our just
atruggle, enci .your retiolute
action egainat the AMerleitrl
imperialiats for the withdraw-
al, without any conciitiona, of
all US and satellite' f orcas
from Indochina."
The Australian delegation
also had talks with the dale-
gateo of the Communiet Party
of Japan. They estimated the
recent municipal election as
a big advance for the party.
(See report, p. 9).
TRIBUNE, Sydney
20 January 1971
CPYRGHT
A delayed newt from Perin
,ii lii the: nett week.
The meeting, caned hY iAie
Jane !ry 5 Committee witielt
vitrioun Iereneb Left
lA Menden, Wit' IttlAtritted by
n (ire than 200e fieoPle.
It: wen withers:led by Per-
raer lending members of the
meet Comm unint Petty,
I /iv.er Oaraurly and Cherie:1
7111071, and by the well-known
Czechorilovak comm unlet
I eoler Jirl Pelikan, now In
t
Another exiled Czechonlo-
yak communirit, Eduard
inadraucker, sent a me:triage
from London, where he In
now living,
Mr. Aarorue meesage Raid:
'The Communint Party of
kuntralla maintainn
its stand of Auguet
al, 1968, that, the occupation
of Czeehoelovaltia by armtel
rorcea of the USSR and four
other Witreaw Pact poyaze
wits urklustiMPRIVVElltibittO
flable. Our 22nd Congress,
held th March, ,1970, over-
JJOflS message
on Czech plight
A message scat by Mr Laurie Aaron, national sec-
retary of the Coynmonist Party of Australia, to 0 meet-
ing 451 solidarity will* Czechoslovakia held in Paris on
November 26, 1970, was adopted as a resolution by
Me meeting.
whelmingly reaffirmed this
Mond.
"The Communist Party of
Czechoeloyakta on .Tanuary
1068, set out on a new course
f?nocialist democracy and
workers self - management.
This course won great popu-
lar support from workers,
fkaeants, intellectuala and
students in the Czech lands
and Slovakia,' The CPA W-
c'rnC t es a mont import-
ant development for the in-
ternational communist move-
ment and for the world re-
volutionury precess.
"The juattfieetionit allarept.
ed ror the occupation were
!Mee end without foundation.
The occupation damaged the
altet cause in Cztchoelo-
vakfa tiaelf, nnd all over the,
were!, and. Indeed, itermed
the preetlee or the went
rieif rind the other countries
Involved,
"Ilttbeemient eventa in Cze-
chefiloyakia by the occupa-
tion is striving the break the
resistance of the broad
masses by telling them they
are isolated and abandoned,
and that there is nothing for
them to do but r6sign them-
selves to this soet,alleda. new
reality. As if they have f or-
e,etten Ulna we became com-
munists andoecialists.not in
ordei t.o accent 'reality' but
precisely in order to change
It.
"Your actilm in all the more
linportant since our people
are noting with some alarm
arid bitterness the confusion
and the discouraging silence
of many of those. to whom we
are bound by the sante noc-
ialist purpose' and who, al-
though they condemned the
military interventlo.n in Ang-
lin 1963. are beginning little
by little to accommodate
thetreirilven to lia co
.riiittneeft."
ROIEtVge,40401,00,10Z:C
chum," dome but rather les-
14
"The only porune courae
In Mint which reliever to tim-
bal:it, principles of interna-
tional ritIntions, first ranted
by Merx anti developed by
Le?In; the immediate with-
drawal of en occupying
troops, restoring natiounl in-
dependence end 8(qt-deter-
mination to the Czech and
? Slovelt nation, tottheir Com-
munlat Party, ??trade union
movement end all popular
? organinations, for return to
the path of socialait renewal
mid democratic advance,"
Mr. Peliknn told the meet-
ing: Tour action ls all the
more Important alnce.the pre-
sent regime Imposed on Cze-
MuiliM4A06300090001-4
25X1 C1 Ob
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
relations began warming. The Arab-Israeli confrontation of 1967
again brought Moscow and Belgrade closer together. A, year later,
events in East Europe once more destroyed the tenuous Soviet-
Yugoslav rapprochement.
5. The Dubcek regime in Prague made no secret of the fact
that much of its inspiration came from the successes achieved in
Belgrade with the Yugoslav brand of independent Communism. The
Yugoslav press bespoke Belgrade's pleasure with developments
in Czechoslovakia and many Yugoslav officials privately commented
that the Czech experiment might even eclipse the accomplishments
of Yugoslavia's self-management program which Prague was using
as its model. In contrast to growing criticism of DUbcek's
domestic reforms coming from Soviet, East German, and Polish
media, in April 1968, Yugoslavia's Borba commented that "The
process of democratization unfolding?TE?Czethoslovakia offers
sufficient guarantee that its aims can be realized."
Sovereignty Denied
6. All indications are that the August 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia caught the Yugoslays by complete surprise and in
Yugoslav eyes, the Kremlin had again reverted to Stalinism and
big-power Chauvinism. Yugoslavia saw an even more sinister threat
in the post-invasion enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine. This
Soviet statement that the internal affairs of each member of the
socialist fraternity were the direct concern of all other members,
implied possible action against Romania, Yugoslavia's neighbor and
the only Soviet bloc nation that supported Czechoslovakia and
refused to participate in the invasion. Immediately after the
occupation, there was a sudden increase in the number of East
European "tourists" who cropped up in Yugoslavia. According to
Belgrade these "tourists" were visiting for one purpose
to collect intelligence on Yugoslav military preparedness, particularly
in Macedonia.
7. Adding to Yugoslav apprehensions were rumors of Soviet
military maneuvers held during late August and early September
along the Romanian border. At the same time, Bulgarian media
began intensifying their agitation over the Macedonian question
and the Bulgarian military newspaper echoed the Brezhnev doctrine
with a warning by a Bulgarian deputy defense minister that Bulgaria
was ready to go "anywhere else" to rescue socialism. The Soviet
East German, Polish and Bulgarian press launched bitter attacks
against Yugoslavia and against Tito personally, accusing him of
having inspired the "revisionist" activity which had made the
intervention in Czechoslovakia necessary.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
8. By a series of actions --- some clandestine and some
quite open!--- the Soviets have continued since August 1968 to
bring pressure on Belgrade and to remind the Yugoslays of their
vulnerability. The resultant Yugoslav antipathy for the Soviets
has not abated and is still a prominent factor in Yugoslav
thinking. In March 1969, President Tito had set the tone for
the 9th Yugoslav Party Congress by reviewing the history of
Soviet interference in Yugoslav affairs. By 1971, the atmosphere
remained unchanged as Tito's May Day speech constantly harked
back to danger from external enemies and several times cited
foreign intelligence activities, noting that "especially recently
we have felt incredible pressure."
The Incredible Pressures
9. Fresh instances of foreign meddling in internal Yugoslav
affairs have come to light in the past few months.- First, a new
species of Soviet-Yugoslav-agent emerged in the form of expatriates
who had been studying in Soviet military academies at the time of
the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav rupture and who Chose or were pursuaded
to stay on in the USSR. Many have readied the rank of major or
colonel in the Soviet forces. One such was retired Soviet army
colonel Nikola Grujic who was arrested in Belgrade in February 1970
and Charged with, spreading propaganda hostile to the Yugoslav
government, Grujic had previously been in and out of Yugoslavia
on visits; he had been warned about making anti-regime statements,
but refused to be muzzled. According to Tanjug and other Yugoslav
press accounts of this incident, the Grujic case is far from being
an isolated one. According to some Belgrade source, a number of
these military expatriate tourists have been caught trying to
recruit Yugoslays for the Soviet secret service (KGB).
10. Yugoslav apprehensions were further sharpened in 1970
with the exposure of a worrisome espionage case. In March, Hans
Peter Ruhlmann a correspondnet of the West German weekly, Der Spiegel,
was arrested with two Yugoslays and accused of a "criminal act of
e-sTionage." The foreign country involved was not named, but
infOrmed Yugoslav officials say that the case was run by East German
intelligence with the undoubted complicity of the Soviet Union.
Charged with RUhlmann were Hilmi Taci, Belgrade correspondent of
Rilindija, an Albanian-language paper published in the traditionally
nationalist region of Kosovo, and Jovan Turkulja, described as a
"functionary of the military establishment." Immediately after the
arrests, the East German embassy's press attach was suddenly
called home.
3
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
11. The Ruhlmann investigation and trial, which lasted
almost a year, culminated in a six-year sentence for Ruhlmann
who was convicted of having procured from his Yugoslav collaborator
highly secret materials which he then passed on to a "foreign
government and a foreign organization as well as to two representatives
of a foreign state." In late April 1971, the Yugoslav Supreme Military
Court apparently decided the sentence, as it read, was far too
ambiguous. The Supreme Court rejected the conviction handed down
by the lower military court and returned the case with a demand for
additional evidence and for the name of the foreign power involved.
12. The 'Ullmann case had several ominous implications for
Yugoslav officials in addition to simply raising questions about
domestic loyalties in the face of apparent renewed Soviet-directed
subversion. For one, the fact that an AlOanian was involved with
Ruhlmann added weight to Yugoslav charges that the 1968 Kosovo
riots were partially brought on by foreign meddling. The part
played by Albanian propaganda in stirring up troubles was Obvious,
but even in 1968 Belgrade was insisting that "other intelligence
agencies" were behind the disorders. Since the 1968 riots, Kosovo,
where economic depression and backwardness make the area easy prey
for subversion, has been singled out for special attention in the
current five-year plan.
13. The Yugoslav leadership is not unaware of the close ties
between East German intelligence and the Soviet KGB and assumes,
that even if RUhlmann had not been working directly for the USSR,
everything he got eventually ended up in Moscow. For the past
two years, the Yugoslav press has repeatedly charged Moscow with
meddling in her internal affairs. Official statements repeatedly
imply that "hostile activity" is being carried out by those who
most oppose Yugoslav self-management (the Soviets and the East
Germans) and that the foreign adversaries involved are those most
concerned about Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy (the Soviets
and the East Germans). There has been press speculation that, by
using the RUhlmann case, the Yugoslav courts plan to bring matters
into the open and to document Soviet involvement in this and other
espionage cases.
Following the Fascists
14. As noted in a recent article by Paul Lendvai, Vienna
correspondent for the Financial Times of London: "It is an
ominous sign that the extreme nationalist Croat exiles in the
West now claim Soviet support and in their publications offered
the Russians airports and harbor facilities on condition that
Moscow guarantees an independent Croatia. If one adds the intense
activity of Soviet agents in Serbia and Bosnia, it becomes clear
that the Soviets are following in the footsteps of Mussolini's
Fascist Italy, which successfully used Croatian separatism to
destroy Yugoslavia."
Approved For Release 1999/04/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
15. The Yugoslays are convinced, and there is evidence to
support their convictions, that Soviet duplicity is behind the
recent activation of Croat chauvinism, especially abroad. Two
public denials by Soviet spokesmen of Yugoslav allegations that
the USSR Was encouraging if not helping emigre anti-Communist
Croatian separatists are indicative of Soviet sensitivity to
these Charges. Early in 1970, the Italian right-wing-BOr hese
reported that Dr. Branko Jelic, a West Berlin physician an
leader the extremist Croat "Council in Exile," had secretly
conferred. in West Germany with several top level Soviets, an
allegation officially denied by Moscow Pravda. It was, however,
shortly after this alleged meeting that ac's newspaper began
shifting from a staunchly - anti-Communist, anti-Soviet line to
one favoring accommodation with the Soviet Union.
16. Then, in April this year the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm
protested against a report published in the Stockholm daily
Dagens Nyheter concerning Moscow support given to the Ustashi.
This is the Croatian extremist group that is held responsible
for the 7:April murder of the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden,
Vladimir Rolovic. Ironically, before he was appointed to
Stockholm., Rolovic was the assistant state secretary for foreign
affairs whose job it was to prevent emigre terrorism and anti-
Yugoslav propaganda abroad. All of which leads to the assumption
that RoloVic's assassination was a well calculated affair.*
17. Dagens Nyheter's Zagreb correspondent, Lars Ake Berling,
had referred in a 14 April story to rumors in Yugoslavia that the
Soviets were supporting the Ustashi with the aim of causing enough
trouble in Yugoslavia to give Moscow a pretext for invading the
country after Tito's death. The Soviet Embassy said that "no
honest person can entertain any doubts about the Soviet attitude
toward the fascist terrorist organization Ustashi, whose members
were in the service of the Hitlerite aggressors during World
War II." According to some Belgrade sources, however, even
within Yugoslavia the Soviets maintain contact with well-placed
Ustashi elements. Reportedly, after World War II the Soviets got
the namesof former Gestapo confidants, a few of whom now hold
key posts in the government and whom the Soviets control by threat
of blackmail.
* The Western press has reported tnat the assassins of Rolovic were
two Croat exiles. In fact, according to the Belgrade weekly,
Nedeljne Informativne Novine (NEN), neither was an exile. Both
Brajkovic and Barisic were born in Croatia, were traveling on
Yugoslav passports, and both had arrived in Sweden as workers
in January 1970.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
18. What the Soviets have not officially denied is their
possible role in the complete change of mind on the part of
Dr. Brank)Jelic who in the past twelve months has become an
ardent supporter of Moscow's policies. It is from the tenor
of articles published during the past year in Jelic's newspaper
Hrvatska Drzava (Croatian State) that evidence comes. In the
latest, February-March 1971, issue of Jelic's paper, its
ostensible Moscow correspondent, Slavko Novak, reported on
a "recent" Warsaw Pact meeting which had confirmed "the Croatian
area as an exceptionally important factor in the Warsaw Pact
defense concept." Novak also reported a meeting of pro-Soviet
Croat exiles in the USSR at width it was decided to "organize
propaganda among the Croatian workers in Europe." According to
Novak, Tito is being attacked by Moscow for trying to undermine
its efforts in Egypt, for "whispering to Enver Hoxha not to
accept the Soviet offer to normalize Soviet-Albanian relations,"
and for making efforts to pursuade Romania to abandon its policy
of solidarity of the socialist bloc. Another article in the
same issue promotes the concept of "Soviet Croatia" and a third
is a piece designed to pursuade Albania to accept Moscow's offers
for normalization.
19. As sources in Zagreb point out, not all Croat emigr6s
support Jelic's new pro-Soviet line; Croat Communists within the
country are unalterably opposed to it. They see in Jelic's
activities a dangerous game played against them; the strongest
point of the Croat Communists has been their anti-Soviet line.
It appears that the Soviets have not been able to infiltrate
the Croat Communist Party and are therefore trying to find their
allies among the Croat extremists abroad. In so doing Moscow
seems to be following in Mussolini's footsteps, whose tactic was
to use extreme Croat nationalism to 'destroy Yugoslavia and defeat
the Serbs. In this instance, the Soviets would attempt to defeat
the Croats and then support the Serbs against the Croats.
Alarmism in the Press
20. Derogatory statements by Soviet and some East European
officials about "separate roads to socialism" in terms applicable
to Yugoslavia have done little to calm Belgrade's nerves. Equally
disquieting have been the most recent reflections in media of the
Soviet Union and her "allies" which seem to presage a propaganda
buildup stressing that Yugoslav socialism is in danger. For
example, the 2 May issue of the Warsaw daily Zycie Warszawy claimed
there were "alarming signs" regarding developments in Yugoslavia:
"For some time now Yugoslavia's friends, concerned with the
development of socialism, prosperity, and progress in that country,
have watched with apprehension more and more frequent alarming signs."
6
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
It went on to blame the "Western press" for suggesting that
the Worsening situation would push Yugoslavia from its present
road and "open the door to penetration not only of revisionist
but of openly capitalist forces."
21. During late April, Radio Zagreb Commentator Milika Sundic
had cause to criticize both the Soviet and Polish press for their
distorted reporting of Yugoslav affairs. The Soviet Communist
Party daily Pravda was accused of slanted reporting in its coverage
of President-TIUTS speech in which he had announced an impending
high-level meeting at which party unity and economic problems
were to be discussed. Tito had said the meeting would not adjourn
until matters had been settled. This was the end-of-April special
Presidium session in Brioni out of which came agreement to maintain
an ideologically unified Communist Party while going ahead with
the formation of a radically decentralized government.
22. Pravda's coverage of the Tito speech omitted all passages
indicative 3T-3Ptimism and left the impression thatrthe'League-
of Communists of Yugoslavia had no prospects of success. "We are
not so myopic," Sundic said, "that we cannot see that through its
narrow selection Of information, Pravda wanted to suggest that
socialism in our country is facing a major crisis and that it
should be saved as it was in some other country." Sundic also
denounced as fabrication an article in the Polish trade union
daily, Glos Praqi, which said that separatist trends were on the
increase in Croatia and noted that this was the sane argument
being used by other supporters of a "doctrine of limited sovereignty."
23. By way of contrast, 'Western press alarmism" is almost
unanimous in its expression of faith that Tito can successfully
manage a genuine succession and that in so doing, he will have
made another great stride toward achieving a reasonably democratic
Marxist society. As noted by The Economist of London (1 May):
"...Tito will probably get his constitutional reform...If-he
does succeed, there will be no rejoicing in Russia. The Russian
leaders have long hoped to increase their influence in a weakened
Yugoslavia after his death or retirement; and they have long
feared the effect on their own subjects of liberalishig moves
in other communist states. But his success will be very welcome
everywhere else. President Nixon has recently shown his concern
about Yugoslavia's future and his readiness to help it get over
these difficult months. So have President Pompidou and Herr Brandt.
They are doing it not because they cherish hopes of a capitalist
Yugoslavia emerging after Tito; but because there is no visible
and attractive alternative to his kind of reasonably stable,
genuinely non-aligned Yugoslavia in that turbulent part of the
world."
7
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CURRENT HISTORY
April 1969
YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS PROVINCES
A U .S T R ,1 Ar"+
??????inil,,, ,:\ i ?
?.474., "7..0 ?
...0.7.1,......
( ...:;,...,.., .4,,.
1. ? l'Aree
e1. ,0,...u.i.....i1.z.
1- 1 ?:T1,,;,,.- '''..,V-ii:
HUNICAR
?an." suooTicA
0SOMBOR
NY.
\
Ll 0
E
111.
o 11/4
ZRENJANIN %
?.?
PICA
LGRAD J
P. Dom"
PULA
4/
*
NIIEECEGOVINey
"
51MONENGTAix:"i'
).
,s S
KostatiZ,...1
-
200 MACEDONIA
?Caas.
SCALE
0 SO . 100
SCALE
AO 0 40 0
PEEENWriiiQ
MILES
..--Iteprinted by imunission from
Yugoslavia, by Muriel Hep-
pe!! and Frank Singleton.
Copyright, 1961 by Frederick
A. Praeger,. Inc.
EEY
ERNO OVER 1600 PEET
[7.:3 LAND MO $000 flU
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
WASHINGTON STAR
15 October 1970
MILTON V1ORST
CP R
Yp\ZIGLI ugosicivs Vicach Russia Warily
BELGR
via, the Rtssians are an obses-
sion. The aewspapers analyze.
them, The people think about
them, the ?uling circles try to
anticipate what they will do.
Perhaps ties would be con-
sidered a na.:ional psychoneu-
rosis ? except that the Rus-
Mans' brt ta occupation of
Czechosloy ak a in 1968 raised
the perfec ly reasonable ques-
tion of m heher Yugoslavia
would be n !xt.
The Yupos avs are not sure
what the r useians are up to in
the Medit ?Tx anean, but they
have a frigate fling theory.
The the ail' spreading
through r ilig circles holds
that the lenf er the Russians
remain a cbminating naval
presence in the Mediterra-
nean, the st rer they are to
insist on 1.); ses on the northern
shore of the s !a.
The Yui os avs reason that
the Russia ns, through centu-
ries of exr er ence, are orient-
ed in thei trategic thinking
to the land, even when their
objectives Arc maritime. Thus,
they will mei er be satisfied to
depend o 1 naval bases in
Egypt. ?
Ultimate y, they will be
',coking for be ses easily readi?
-
ed by land. ^o Yugoslays this
means one thing: The This-
CPYRGHT
demanding a port and transit
rights to reach it.
, Furthermore, they don't
really believe the demands
will stop there. They are suspi-
cious enough to think that,
sooner,, or later, the Russians
will count on swallowing up
the whole country.
So the Tito government ex-
pects, when the time comes, to
make clear that not a single
Russian soldier will set foot on
Yugoslav territory. If that
means the Russians will re-
spond as they did in Czechoslo-
vakia, the Yugoslays will take
the chance.
And the thinking of Yugo-
slav ruling circles on Russian
designs doesn't end there. This
is a subject on which they are
rich in explanations and inter-
pretations.
They cite, for example, the
rn
Russian drive that dates from
the early Czars to reach warm
waters. Russia's attempts to
reach the Adriatic through ter-
ritory that is now Yugoslavia
were, in fact, among the prov-
ocations of World War I.
They. cite also Russia's
sense of military insecurity,
which carries with it a need to
dominate more and more sure
rounding territory. At the
same time they point out that
I I t,
so 1
as leader of the world commu-
nist community, has not ad-
justed to Belgrade's course of,
independence
The Yugoslays say it is na-
ive to believe that current
Russian leadership finds Tite's
state less of an afront than
Stalin did 20 years ago. If any-
thing, the Brezhnev doctrine
which exalts Russia's right to
intervene in the internal af-
fairs of any communist coun-
try is more threatening than:
anything Stalin ever devised.
Within the past year or two, '
intelligent Yugoslays have
seen even further reason to
beware of the Soviet threat. ;
This begins with the obser-
vation that beneath the sur- ,
face, there is growing ferment
mithin the Soviet Union, the
consequence of diversion of
massive funds from civilian to
military purposes.
The Russians have extrava-
gent programs for building a
fleet, supp1yi6g the Egyptian;
aiding the Cubans and main-
taining a front in Siberia, in
addition to the normal expense
of keeping a huge army, a
modern air force and a decent
space program. .
Only 14 closing its society to
outside influences can Russia
Yugoslays say. l'Ionetheles ;,
disturbing idea! . inevitably
seep in.
Until 1968, im.\ry of these
ideas seeped in Dom Czechs- .
slovakia?btit the\ Czechs gc t
most of then1 doectly from
Yugoslavia. In U E .year or so
before the o u
ccup-on, Yugo-.
slav-Czech relati )is had to--
? come exceedingly lose.
Tito's Yugoslav E may be fl)
paradise, say candid members
of its ruling circle, but it pro-
? vides its people Mi h far mor
gratification, bot a economi
? and political, than the Soviet,
Union.
? Yugoslavia is hither front
Russia than Cu.': aoslovakia,
but as a comma st state i:,
'remains a danget to Soviet
? stability. As this ti .ory has it,
Russia ultimately will have te
reform ? or decile what i;
will do about?the Yugoslays.
By-one expIanatxm or anoth,
er, Yugoslays thi ik of the So-
,viet drive for do ination a ;
all but inexorable. By nature
' not an optimistic people, they
' do not regard theiz reedom a? :
permanently assu On the
;other hand, they are deter-
;mined not to be t ten by sur- ;
iprise, U and whet the Rus-
.sians begin to mows.,
Approved For Release 1999/09/022: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
'[HE ECONOMIST
11. May 1971
Will he make it?
CPYRGHT President Tito is fighting hard against his conservatives for
a roform that could change the future of Jugoslav;a
These are make-or-break days for President Tito's regime.
.1 the constitutional reform which is now being debated
gets by without a last-minute hitch, Jugoslavia will become
freer than it or any other communist country has ever
been before. Its ruling party will be able to claim, with
as much justification as Mr Dubcek's Czechoslovakia in
968, that it is a reasonably faithful mirror of its people's
aspirationS. And President Tito will go down in history
as the first communist leader to have reversed a trend
which, for over half a century, has seemed to be going
in one direction only?and to have done so without
sacrificing his country's indepertdence or handing back the
factories to the capitalists.
The whole venture may still fail, though failure is less
likely to take a dramatic form than to come by slow
stages of demoralising delay and postponement. For these
reforms, which aim at giving greater autonomy to
Jigoslavia's six federal republics and two autonomous
p -ovinces and, within them, to individual people and
firms, have met powerful opposition within the communist
party, just as the previous round of reforms did in 1965
and 1966. No wonder that many Jugoslays are holding
ti- eir breath as they watch their leaders prepare for the
sl-owdown. Even President Tito appears to be nervous;
he has recently made some grumpy speeches in which he
ccmplained of indiscipline in the party and hinted that
scvne top people may be sacked if they go on resisting
pc licies on which agreement has been reached.
Last January he had summoned leaders from all the
re?ublics and autonomous provinces to Brioni, his island
hone in the Adriatic, for talks about the future of the
coAntry's economic and political system. He made it clear
that he would not let them leave Brioni until they had
re iched agr-ement on all the major issues. After two
weeks he was able to announce an apparent agreement,
and to publish 21 draft constitutional amendments
embodying all the major proposals for reform. But only
a Jew days later it became clear that his attempt to knock
the leaders' heads together had failed. A Croat party
leader, Mr Miko Tripalo, accused the Serbs of trying to
wr.ggle out of firm commitments given at Brioni. One of
these was a promise of more independence for the autono-
mc-us provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which are a
part of the Serbian republic. Albanian leaders in Kosovo,
whz.re the majority of Jugoslavia's million-odd Albanians
live, have been pressing for this for a long time. Some
Serbian leaders angrily retorted that Mr Tripalo was
interfering InSerbia's internal affairs. Since then, Croatia's
leaders have caused a sensation by demanding an official
investigation of their complaint that "certain federal
organs" (presumably the security service) had tried to
discredit them by forging evidence which seemed to link
them with extremist Croat groups abroad that are
opposed to the very existence of Jugoslavia. One of these
emigre groups was responsible for the recent murder of the
Jugoslav ambassador in Sweden. Another, with its head-
quarters in west Berlin, has close links with Moscow
and advocates Croatia's " liberation " with Soviet help.
These polemics have shown that the harmony achieved
at Brioni was short-lived. But President Tito is not giving
up. This week he has called another party meeting at
which he will again try to secure the leaders' support
for changes in the constitution. Why is he so determined
to push the reform through ? It is most unlikely that he is
doing it out of any attachment to the idea of liberalisation.
He is a man whose main concern has always been with
power and how to keep it, and he has not changed now.
But the president's wary instincts told him a long time
ago that Jugoslavia would, once he is gone, be exposed
to new ? pressures from Russia and its allies. And its
most vulnerable point would be its multinational com-
position. He sees that it will not be able to withstand
these pressures unless all its nationalities have a clear
stake in the continued existence of the Jugoslav federal
? state. Until very recently the Croats, the Slovenes and the
.Albanians have all felt that they were discriminated
against by the central governmeat, pariicularly in the
fields of foreign trade and domestic capital investment.
By introducing a new system that would make the
:federal government responsible only for defence, foreign
affairs, broad economio? policies and development aid
for areas like Kosovo, President Tito hopes to give the
'non-Serbs a new interest in Jugoslavia. And the preserva-
tion of the federal state seems to be his overriding concern
as he prepares for his inevitable departure from the
leadership. But although the old system.was as inefficient
as it was uripopular, its abolition is not proving easy.
`In Serbia, in particular, the men in favour of change
are having a hard time trying to carry their more
conservative and nationalist party colleagues with them.
And there are many party officiais.elsewhere who mistrust
the constitutional reform anthare .quittly trying tolorpedo
it because they see it as a threat to their own power.
The anger thc president has voiced in his recent speeches
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
3
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
,is said to be directed primarily at these people, and these
'calculations of self-interest.
To organise a really effective conservative opposition
to the reforms would, however,, involve making a direct
'challenge to President Tito's still enormous authority. A
military coup ? would be remarkably difficult ? to, bring "off
in a country Its decentralised as Jugoslavia. But the
greatest obstacle to any conservative attempt to put
the clock back is the unprecedented wave of democratic
enthusiasm that is now visible in the country. this seems
to be particularly strong in Croatia, whose relatively
liberal leaders appear to enjoy genuine popularity'. A straw
in the wind was the recent election at Zagreb university,
where the student assembly installed a new leadership
which includes non-party members and even practising
Catholics.? .Croatia also seems to have something almost
'approaching a free press at the moment. And in other
republics, notably Slovenia and Serbia, there is a new
toleration of opposition views, including extreme left-wing
'ones.
So President Tito ' will probably get his constitutional
reform before his recently extended presre I- 1 L
_LI Act_ _GA lit
expires on August 17th, because there is no alternative to
agreement for any except a small minority of pro-Moscow
communists. He will be helped by Jugoslavia's precarious
economic situation, which demands that the uncertainties
surrounding the future of the country's banking and
foreign trade system be resolved as quickly as possible. if
he does succeed, there will be no rejoicing in Russia. The
Russian leaders have long hoped to increase their influence
in a weakened Jugoslavia after his death or retirement;
and they have long feared the effect on their own subjects
of liberalising moves in other communist states. But his
.success will be very 'welcome everywhere else. ?President
Nixon has recently shown his concern about Jugoslavia's
future and his readiness to help it get over these difficult
months. So have President Pompidou and Herr Brandt.
They are doing it not because they cherish hopes of a
capitalist, Jugoslavia emerging after Tito; but because
there is no visible and attractive alternative to his kind
of reasonably stable, genuinely, non-aligned Jugoslavia
in that turbulent part of the world.. ? ?
TIME
17 May 1971
CPYRGHT
wh y ' presvient Titn en..
CR ug
,ered Sarajevo's magnificent new cul-
ural and sports center last week, the
Z,300 delegates to an economic con-
ference cheered wildly and gave him a
standing ovation. Then, as he strode to
the rostrum beneath portraits of Marx,
Engels, Lenin and himself, the throng
broke into the wartime song of the Yu-
goslav partisans, "Comrade Tito, we give
you our word, we shall follow you."
But will they follow anybody else?
Tito, who will be 79 on May 25, is
given full credit for making Yugoslavia
the most democratic of all the Com-
munist states as well as the one with
the highest standard of living. Almost
all Yugoslays still support the system
of "self-management" that Tito intro-.
duced 21 years ago, rejecting Soviet-
style planning and central control in
favor of economic decentralization,
which makes managers of factories di-
rectly responsible to the workers.
Into the Open. Tito, however, may
well be the only man- who can com-
mand the allegiance of the disparate peo-
ples of Yugoslavia's six republics and
two autonomous provinces. A Croat in
a country dominated numerically by
Serbs, Tito has been trying for decades
to groom a suitable successor. His first
YUGOSLAVIA
Working Against Time
candidate. Milovan Diilas, wound up in
jail after criticizing some of 1 ito's meth-
ods in the 1950s; his second, Aleksander
RankoviC, was banished from the party
in 1966 when he opposed Tito's pol-
icies of decentralization and liberaliza-
tion. Both men are free today and live
comfortably in Belgrade.
Last fall, the aging Tito faced up to
the fact that something would have to
be done soon. "We have entered a stage
now where we have no time," he told
a party meeting in Zagreb. "Time works
not for us but against us." To solve the
problem of the succession, he proposed
the creation of a collective presidency
made up of two or three leaders elect-
ed by the assemblies of each republic
and one or two by each province. Iron-
ically, the national debate over Tito's
proposals merely brought the country's
separatist tendencies into the open.
Deep Resentments. To stem the dis-
content, Tito began stumping the coun-
try and threatened a party purge and
"administrative measures"?a Commu-
nist euphemism meaning summary po-
lice action?for enemies of the federal
system. Two weeks ago, he summoned
party leaders to his Brioni Island re-
treat in the Adriatic Sea and scheduled
a special party conference to convene
this summer. Last week he stepped up
nis warnings against "llinisc why
be convinced," including "some generals
who sit around the caf?" "megalo-
maniacs who want to become President,"
and intellectuals who have opposed his
recent proposals.
Few nations are as vulnerable to in-
ternal division as Yugoslavia. Two of
its republics, Slovenia and Croatia, were
once linked to the Habsburg empire and
developed as part of the West; the others
stagnated for centuries under Turkish
rule. The cultured Slovene has neither
'language nor heritage in common with
the illiterate Montenegran. The indepen-
dent, expansionist Serbs have dreamed
of a true nation of Yugoslays (literally
"southern Slays"). They formed the
backbone of the wartime resistance; to
this day, they accuse the Croats of hav-
ing collaborated with the Germans. Re-
sentments run so deep that the Yugoslays
have never chosen a national anthem.
Unbelievable Pressure. Tito's task of
maintaining unity while solving the prob-
lem of succession is made even more dif-
ficult by the fact that the economy is
rin bad shape because the Yugoslays
have been living beyond their means. De-
spite a 15% devaluation of the dinar
last fall, Yugoslavia's trade deficit rose
Approved For RPIPaCP 1999/n9/n9 ? CIA-RI-W7g-(11 1 94Annnannngnnni-4
4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
62% in the first qua' ter ot the year,
while retail prices soared 12% and the
cost of living 13%.
Two weeks ago, Tito warned his coun-
trymen that foreign agents (meaning pri-
marily Soviet secret police) had been
exerting "unbelievable pressure" on the
government. "We should allow no sixth
column to penetrate our country," he
said. It is possible, of course, that he
had chosen to fight the drift toward sep-
aratism by raising the specter of Soviet
troublemaking. But there is no doubt
that the Soviets would like to see Yu-
goslavia disintegrate. If Tito manages
to arrange a genuine succession, he will
have made another great stride toward
achieving a reasonably democratic
Marxist society. If he fails, Yugoslavia
could splinter under the weight of sep-
aratist feeling and Soviet meddling.
IL FIORINO, Rome
14 May 1971
CPYRGHT
1F1E GERMAN JOURNALIST WAS A SOVIET SPY
Background on the Ruhlmann case in Yugoslavia: THE GERMAN JOURNALIST
WAS A SOVIET SPY.
Vienna, 13 May. According to word reaching here from Belgrade, details' .
revealing of the Soviet hand in espionage activities in Yugoslavia may
soon be forthcoming. Well informed Yugoslav officials have long admitted
privately their strong suspicions that Der Spiegel correspondent Hans Peter
Ruhlmann, convicted last January on charges of espionage involving passage
of Yugoslav military secrets to a "foreign power", was an agent of East
German intelligence on behalf of the Soviets.
Ruhlmann and two Yugoslav collaborators were arrested in March last
year and have been held in custody since. Following an extensive investigation
their trial opened in September, almost immediately went into secret
sessions, and since then, only brief press accounts have given clues of the
trial's progress. In January, Ruhlmann was given a six-year sentence and
convicted for having obtained from his Yugoslav codefendants highly
classified military and official information for a period of two years and
of having passed this information to a "foreign government and a foreign
organization as well as giving part of it to two representatives of a foreign
state." One charge brought out was that Ruhlmann sought and got details
during September 1968 concerning "Yugoslav defense preparations and the
military -political situation during the month of August 1968" (the month
during which the Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia). It also
appears that Ruhlmann was to concentrate on the political military situation
in Croatia and on the unpublicized conflict between Croatia and Serbian
interests.
Last month, according to the Yugoslav news service Tanjug (28 April) the
_
Supreme Military Court over-ruled the conviction handed down by the lower
court and returned the case with a request for more evidence and the name
(or names) of the foreign power involved. In line with oft-expressed
Yugoslav suspicions that Ruhlmann was a Soviet agent, whether directly
or indirectly controlled by Moscow, the Supreme Court now apparently
wants the facts brought out into the open. And there is no doubt that all
his ties in with Yugoslovia's convictions that Mbscow's ulterior motive is
a Balkanized Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
IL FIORINO
CPRE-1P71
RETHOSCIZNA DEL CASO RUM-MANN
'Di JUGOSLAVIA
VIENNA, l 3 maggio?
Second? voci giunte
da Belgrado sarebbe im-'
rninente la rivelazione di
!particolari sulla funzione
preminente dei sovietici
'nelle attiviti spionistiche
in Jugoslavia. Alcuni
funzionari jugoslavi ben
informiti hanno amines-
'so da tempo, in privato,
di sospettare fortamente;
.che ii corrispondente
,dello "Spiegel' Hans Pe-.
?ter .Ruhlmann, condan-
:nato nel gennaio scorso.
per un caso di spionaggio
consisten te nella trasm
sione di segreti militari
jugoslavi a una "potenza
rstraniera" fosse un agen-?
:te dei servizi d'infbrma-
-zione della Germania
lorlentale con incarichi
:pc conto dei soajetici:
? Ruklmann e thig nuni
collaboratori jugoslavi:
furono arrestall l'anno
passato e da Miura dete-
nuU. In beguito una
:vasta indagine II processo
si apri in settcmbre, qua-
si subito coming& a svol-
?gersi a porte chiuse, e dei'
.suol sviluppi si ebbero
sulla stampa solo pochi
accenni. In gennaio
Ruhlmann fu condan-
nolo a mil until per ilver
logo hi ay I, 110 eirftsli fli
tints mod, hiiportio11,10.
5imc inforniazioni di na-.
tura militare e ammini-
::strativa e per averle tra-
smesse a un "govern?,
stranlero e a una organ iz-
zazione straniera come.
pure a due rappresena
tanti di uno stato stranie-
rci" Una. de U e accuse era
che Kuhlmann avevacer-
cato e ottenuto nel set-
tembre 1968 particolari
inf orm az ion i rigu ard an ti
"i preparativi di difesa e
la situazione mil itare-po-
li tic a deli a Jugo si avia du-
rante l'agosto 1968" (i1.
mese in cui le truppe del
Patto di Varsavia invase-
ro la Cecoslovacchia).
Risulta anche che Ruh
mann avrebbe concen-
trato la propria attenzio-:
ne sulla situazione poli,.
tico-militare in Croaziae
sui contrast', passati sot.;
to silenzio, tra gli
ressicroatieserbi.
. Qualche settimana fa, .
come ha riferito l'agen- ?
zia di steppe jugoslava
Tan jug (28 aprile), la
Suprema corte militare
ha ann ulla to la cond ann a
inflitta nal ciudizio di
prim? grado e ha
,Lo I a riapertura dein-
htru florin .on la richieNta
di maggiorl prove t(101
1101110 (0 filA noini) (hila
potenza btranicra
volta. In accordo con I,
-sospetti jugoslavi, ricor-
ren temente espressi, che
Ruhlmann sia un agente
sovietico direttamente o .
indite ttamon to control-
I141 Monca, le fiupro-
me cork: ipport? (10(.100 0
riiii0010
(,II iHpoi..
c(.6,
dubbio che Lotto (potato.,
6 connesso alio convin-
zione jugoslava che 1
scop.o recondito di Mo-,
sca e una Jugoslavia hal-.
canizzata nal period? do.-
Po T.i,tc!to its
.;" ?1?1';.ii! t ?
?.1-? S?11?1
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 May 1971
CPYRGHT
Drama in the Balkans
: t will take a future his=
to' an to get at the details
anu a novelist to put them
into proper form, but the
bare outlines are now dis-
tir guishable of a major
podtical drama in ? the
BE limns.
Some of the elements are
.as follows:
? Josip Broz Tito is 79 years
of age.
de is doing Ms best tO
give his country, Yugo-
slavia, a constitution which
can hold it together after
his strong uttwor
makable ..1-.?1
erihIp ,arit no longer them
Sy 'Joseph C. Hirsch
Old friction
His efforts have been itn-
peded at every turn by
forces arising from the
country's history and per-
haps abetted by outside in-
terests. That "perhaps" is
where the plot gets cofhpli-
cated.
The task, of welding the
south Slays into a single
nation would not be easy
even without any outside
interests.
Serbia was the original
Release ti?996169/64 :
State
of the
'tattoos
c77-1.-fe,2
goslavia. The Serbs are a
proud and warlike people
who consider themselves
superior to the neighboring
Slavic tribes. The friction'
is greatest between_ the
Serbs, who were until re-
cently mountaineers, and
the Croats, who were the
first of the south Slays to
adjust to urban and Indus?.
trial society. It's the old
friction between mountain'
herdsmen and the farmers Split Yugoslavia
and artisans of the plains.
CeraDtrinefinbt?
(MUM/PI:11kt
al
ltle of
Ser'fed
oration. atill_haa tint feel at
ern times by entirely differ-
ent cultural routes. Serbia
was for long a conquered
province in the Turkish Em-
pire. Croatia was for long.
a part of the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire. Hence the
first is overlaid heavily by
the culture of the eastern
Mediterranean. Croatka's
cultural background is Ger-
manic and central Euro-
pean.
CPYRGFAT:sproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
an eastern city. Zagreb
looks Ald, feels like any
city in Austria or southern
Germany.
Here of course is fertile
soil for outsiders desiring
to break up the Yugoslav
federation.
The Germans played upon
the natural and inherited
friction between Serb and
Croat when they were build-
ing Hitler's "Third Reich."
Naturally, they played to
the Croats with the Ger-
manic cultural background
against the Serbs. Russians
have traditionally tried to
exploit Serbian hostilities.
During the month of
April, Tito's spokesmen in
Belgrade accused the Rus-
sians and Poles of trying
to interfere in domestic Yu-
goslav politics. Specifically,
it was alleged that the Yu-
goslav ?gr?olony in
West Germany had now
been taken over by the Rua-
sians and was being used
by the Russians in an effort
to split Yugoslavia apart.
This, if true, would be
both logical and illogical.
The ?gr?roats in
West Germany are left over
from the Ustachi movement
of World War II. The
Ustachis sided with the Ger-
man occupiers of Yugo-
slavia. They are conserva-
tives according to World
War II standards. After all,
they fought Tito's Commu-
nist partisans during the
civil war in Yugoslavia.
But Croat separatism is
the easiest emotion for any
outsider to exploit. Croats
resent being under Serbian
rule. Granted, Tito himself
is a Croat, not a Serb, yet
there is a tendency which
even he has been unable to
break for Serbs to dominate
the bureaucracy of the
federation, particularly the
secret pence.
Even the score
The Russians would, obvi-
ously, like to break up the
Yugoslav federation. It has
been a thorn in their side
an East European Commu-
nist country which refuses
to bend the knee to Moscow,,
or follow the line of Kremlin
orthodoxy!
It would be reasonable WI
expect the Kremlin to con-
sider this moment in history
as their last best chance to,
even the score with Tito and
wreck his great plan for a
lasting constitution which
will bind his various peo.
pies together.
In the West we have no
way of knowing whether.
the Kremlin has actually
,plcked up the old Ustachi,
outfit as an instrument of
its modern purposes. We do
know that the Yugoslav Am-
bassador in Stockholm was
fatally shot five weeks ago
by persons presumed to be
members of the old Ustachi
underground.
And we do know that the
Kremlin regards Tito's Yu-
goslavia as an affront to its
prestige and a danger to
its control over the rest of
Its "sphere of influence" in"
Eastern Europe,,
EVENING STAR, Washington
26 April 1971
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Yugoslav Unity
President Tito's hints of the need for
a purge of separatist elements in his own
Yugoslavian Communist party can only
be disturbing to Western observers. The
disquieting thought is that any such
purge might just postpone the ultimate
showdown among the various nationalis-
tic interests in the country, leaving new
scores to be settled after Tito's depart-
ure.
Tito, leader of the surviving partisan
movement of World War II, is the main
ingredient of the cement that holds to-
gether this collection of territories of the
? old Austro-Hungarian Empire, now in
the form of six republics and a couple of
autonomous provinces, with four official
languages and three religions. But Tito,
78, cannot be expected to perform this
adhesive function for too many more
years. His announcement last year of
plans for a collective presidency, after he
? leaves, was: an attempt to impose a pos-
? thumous unity on the Serbs, Croats, Slov-
enes, Montenegrans and other country-
men who would survive him.
Among recent events that have cre-
o.ted a crisis for Yugoslav unity was the
assassination of the country's ambassa-
dor to Sweden by Croatian separatists. A
continuing source of disunity are the eco-
nomic disparities among various parts of
Yugoslavia, with the industrialized north
resentful about its role in propping up
, less developed parts of the country.
Tito has our best wishep in his effort
to keep his nation together. The main
beneficiary of a Yugoslav split-up would
be the Soviet Union. For the Russians, an
Independent and strong Yugoslavia,
ready to put up a bruising fight if
threatened with the fate of Hungary or
Czechoslovakia, has represented a barely
tolerable insult tO Soviet dominance in
Communist Eastern Europe. But a Yugo-
slavia once again Balkanized, with all
that term implies in the way of political
chaos and weakness, would be easy pick-
ing for the guardians of Soviet Commu-
nist ascendancy.
The Yugoslays, who were able to raise
their, heads after centuries of tyranny,
should understand this better than any-
one. Let's hope they decide to hang to-
gether, rather than go separately to the
Soviet gibbets.
Approved For Release 1999/09/0 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
,PaSHINGTON POST
CPYRGI-2 !may 1971
Tito Says
arty Will
Keep Unity
By Dan Morgan
WarhIngton Pogt rorelirn Service
BELGRADE, May 1?Presi-1
dent Tito today indicated that!
the Yugoslav League of Com-
munists has no intention ofi
giving up its dominant role
during the current period of
political decentralization.
The 78-year-old leader nei-
ther dramatized nor mini-I
mized the country's difficul-
ties. Instead, as he has done so
often during tough times in
the past, he soberly, empha-
sized that Yugoslavia's prob-
lems were solvable and ap-
pealed for national unity.
Hondreds of thousands of
Yugoslays listened to the pres-
ident's May Day speech on
radio and television. It was
'broadcast live from Labin,
near the Italian border. which
is celebrating the 50th anni-
versary of a brief workers up-
rising in 1021.
Tito arrived in the small
coal-mining center fresh from
a three-day meeting with
about 80 top Communist lead-
ers from all over the country
convened by him personally to
try to put an end to regional
quarrels that have marred the
country's unity in recent
Weeks.
He was applauded warmly
and often by a large audience
as he read from notes.
The rivalries between the
regions have sharpened in re-
cent months as a major consti-
tutional reorganization that
will give much more say to
the six Yugoslav republics and
reduce the power of the cen-
tral government nears comple-
tion.
The various local leader-
ships are now arguing over
such complex questions as the
allocation of former federal
funds, the financing of major
regional .projects once subsi-
dized by Belgrade, and other
complex issues.
Tito singled out the Yugo-
slav press and television, uni-
versity professors, and manag-
ers of banks as those who
were Sharpening local rivaV
ries or failing to heed the line
laid down by the Yugoslav
League of Communists, which'
he ?heads:,
'lie said that the league
would he "merciless, in elimi-
nating the deformations in its
own ranks."
In the present decentraliza-
tion some have raised the
qu'estion whether Yugoslavia's
Communists Party is breaking
down into regional parties.
President Tit's answer to
that question today seemed te.
be a stern "no."
He said there had been
agreement that the League of
Communists was "the force to
overcome the difficulties
which are not so big."
We should be merciless to
all deformations. In the league
aild also to those from outside
who wish to introduce splits in
our society, in our masses. We
have placed democracy on a
very high level, on a strong
basis. but there can be no de-
mocracy for the enemies of
our Socialist soricty."
There was applause when he)
criticized the Yugoslav press
far carrying "alander" and in- I
ticauraeies.
In the past few months,
newspapers in Belgrade, the
capital of Serbia and of Yugo-
slavia, and those in Zagreb In
Croatia have exchanged sal-
, vos, and have printed state-
ments and interviews from
persons favoring a much more
radical decentralization of Yu-
goslav life.
In the economy, Tito com-
plained about "megalomaniac"
development plans that could
not be realized, and warned
bank managers to stop making
policy on their own or face ex-
pulsion not only from the
Communist Party but also
from their positions. ?
The semi-independent
b7ks, which are playing an
ev r larger role in financing
Yugoslavia's industrial devel,
optnent, have been criticized
by some party officials for
.usurping the party's role in
planning the national develop.
jt.
CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
2 May 1971
Yugoslavia:
All Tito
Wants Is
A Little
Bit of
Ur4
RGHT
. BELGRADE?Nationalistic ri
valries, the oldest problem ft
'..the Balkans, have risen, again tc
haunt the present and endanger
the future of Yugoslavia and her
brand of Communism.
In an area whose bloody his.
tory has given its inhabitants
'scores of 'reasons to mittrusl
neighborAtlimpboOddVpo
igpactisan movolndnt headed by
Presment Lao was tile nrst sue-
cesAful effort to rally Serbs,
Crc ats, Bosnians, Macedonians,
Slovenes and Montenegrins to a
conunon cause. Now, 26 years
after the victory that made the
mo rement into a government,
the Yugoslav Communist party
that President Tito heads ap-
pews to have lost its unity.
Characteristically, the first
person to acknowledge the crisis
purlicly and seek remedies for it
ma President Tito himself. To-
wa d the end of a fatiguing tour
of the nation's underdeveloped
southern regions two weeks ago.
the 79-year-old Tito began talk-
? ing about selfish, irresponsible
people whose failure to look be-
, yor d their immediate interests
wai endangering the success of
the whole community.
The worst offenders, he con-
eeckd, were party, leaders, , and
romised to pull them quickly
into line or remove those Who
,had slid too far. Yugoslays are
sill waiting to see how success-
_
ritikhleggel 999/09/02
Last weex, at me ena or a
three-day meeting of the party's
11-man Presidium, as well as top
Federal and republic politicians,,
at President Tito's island retreat
of Brioni,' the situation ap-
peared no clearer. A lengthy
communiqu?ssued on Friday
night, as Yugoslays scattered to
the beaches and countryside for
their three-day May 1 weekend,
only restated the party's unified
backing for the process of ad.'
ministrative decentralization and
measures to stabilize the econ-
omy. It did not say what new
approaches would or eould be
taken to achieve these goals and
calm regional in-fighting.
The communiqu?id ask full
support from party members for.
the economic stabilization meas-
ures adopted several months ago..
The measures, including the-
oretical but ineffective limits ofl.
salaries, wages and investments,
have not been respected, but the
communiqu?nly urged the ", cre-
Attion of a social climate for
dr. .940%eCtiiiiitiZbtro3
Dfod thd, the communique
blamed unnamed Yugoslav press
and information media for "op-
posing" the party's course, and
ordered Communists to be more
vigilant against such activity;
said that "Increased foreign, hos-
'tile, subversive 'activity has
arisen" and has profited by
Yugoslavia's internal troubles to
spread mistrust, and disclosed
that party leaders would form-
late a new platform and convene
a conference, similar to one held
here last summer, to review the
party's role.
Before what had appeared to,
be a showdown session, frictions;
between Serbs and Croats, par-i
ticularly, dlad become so intense
that their disagreements ;yew
imperiling plans to restructure
the Yugoslav Federation into a'
looser amalgam of sovereign re-i
publics bound to each other by
acknowledged common interests
and common allegiance to Com-
munism. The gathering momen-;!
turn of change had brought to
the surface old feuds and griev-1
wereingifs4m the practical!
e-fre-PeafF9IFI .4
6
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
n tne latter category?iumped
under the classification of "ro-,
ntic nationalism" ? intellec-
tuals in Serbia and Croatia
tangled with each other over a
va iety of issues. Language was?
on. and Croats claimed that the
inGividuality of their dialect vies
In danger of being submerged
by efforts to promote a common
speech.
.43ehind this emotional smoke-
screen, the re7* efforts to assert
Ci oatian independence lie in the
economic field. Years of central
control; the Croatians maintain,
have meant the channeling, by
Serbian officials, of Yugoslav re-
sources into Serbian projects for
the exclusive benefit of Serbia.
With taxing power and invest-
Mont decision-making adieduled
to. be transferred largely to the
republics, the Croatians also de-
manded an end to Federal sub-
sidy programs that do not bene-
fit them but do aid agricultural.
Serbia, and a new, foreign cur-
rency regime that would permit
Croatian exporters to retain the
dollars they earn. Serbs re-
riponded by arguing that it
would be disastrous to strip Fed-
eral economic institutions of
their leverage when the country
is deep in a serious inflation.
The careers of many promi-
nent party men are now deeply
entwined with these contradict-
ory positions. Getting Serbian.
and Croatian leaders back on co,
operative terms will be no eaS.
matter. '
The only figure whose prestig
remains unblemished is Marsha
Tito.,But having moved to estab
fish a collective Presidency tr
succeed him eventually, he musl
now work hard to promote ths
consensus that will give such a
body an all-Yugoslav outlook,
rather than allow it to become a
forum for republic rivals.
--ALFRED FRIENDLY lc
VAIEURS ACTUELLES, Paris
26 April 1971
LES AUTONOMISTES
DE TITO
CPYRGHT
Le nationalisme renalt en Croatie.
Tito a pour: les Oustachis n'ont pas oublie les massacres de 1944
reclament le minion do l'URSB.
Une purge se prepare en Yougoslavie.
Elle frappera parmi le million de mem-
I ?3 de la Ligue des communistes, et
rieme au sein de son bureau executif.
L'autre vendredi, le 16 avril, Tito
reclamait la vigilance contre les ennemis
Le Pinterieur qui, aides de l'etranger,
cherchaient a semer la discorde entre les
rations yougoslaves. Le 14 avril, ii avait
emande l'expulsion des communistes
c ui agissaient contre Punite de la You-
1?os1avie, federation de six republiques
r tssemblant pres de 20 millions d'habi-
t tnts.
Au cours des deux dernieres annees,
Tito a accumule les mises en garde.
La Croatie semble la plus visee. On
diaserve en effet parmi les Croates deux
lattenomenes de resurgence natlonaliste
apparemment distincts.
L'un concerne la fraction politisee des
460 000 travailleurs croates expatries
elms les pays occidentaux. L'autre, les
4 800 000 Croates, en majorite catholi-
%les, de la federation yougoslave.
A l'etranger, le ? Mouvement de libe-
rLtion croate o et la ? Fraternite revo-
lt tionnaire croate militent pour l'inde-
p !ndance de la Croatie. us se referent
Pr te Paveliitch, fondateur en 1929 des
eustachis, qui restaura le 10 avril 1941,
avec la bienveillance du 'Ile Reich,
l' Etat independant de Croatie, Avant de
ourir a Madrid, le 28 decembre 1959,
d :s suites, dit-on, d'un attentat qui eut
lieu a Buenos Aysiblfadail
lidt2Releas
Le trentieme anniversaire de la Repu-
blique de Croatie a ete celebre l'autre?
samedi, a Munich, au cours d'un ban-
quet organise par le o Comite national
croate que preside Branko Jelic, an-
cien compagnon d'Ante Pavelitch.
Les Oustachis Wont jamais pardonne
a Tito les massacres massifs de 1944 et
de 1945. us l'accusent d'avoir liquid
600 000 soldats et civils croates.
La devise des Oustachis : ? Dieu au
ciel, les ,Croates sur terre Leurs ar-
mes : la propagande, le terrorisme.
A m b as s ad eur de Yougoslavie
Stockholm, Vladimir Rolovitch a suc-
combe le 15 avril a ses blessures. Ses
obseques solennelles se sont deroulees
Belgrade le samedi 17 avril. L'ambassa-
deur avait ete blesse mortellement le 7
avril, a Stockholm, par deux Oustachis.
Le 10 avril, deux autres Oustachis ont
occupe le consulat yougoslave a Gote-
borg. Avant de se rendre a la police
suedoise, ils avaient menace d'executer
trois otages si Tito ne liberait pas l'un
des leurs, condamne a mort a Belgrade
le 7 decembre 1970.
Celui-ci, Miljenko Hrkac, vingt-deux
ans, avait depose le 13 juillet et le 25
septembre 1968 des bombes a la gare
centrale et dans un cinema de Belgrade.
Bilan : 1 mort et 60 blesses. Le sort de
Miljenko Hrkac reste en suspens.
L'appel devait etre rcmis en jugement
21 avril, mercredi dernier.
e 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01
Auteurs le 9 octobre 1934 a Marseille
du spectaculaire attentat contre le roi
Alexandre de Yougoslavie, les Oustachis
se manifesterent a maintes reprises apres
la guerre, surtout en Allemagne de
l'Ouest.
A Paris, tine bombe eclata le 18
fevrier 1968, boulevard Delessert, au
club de l'ambassade de Youloslavie. 11 y
cut 1 mort et 19 blesses. Le 26 novem-
bre 1966, une bombe piacee par deux
Oustachis avait fait long feu dans ce
meme club.
Teleguidage sovletique
En revanche, les attentats du 29 jan-
vier 1967 contre deux ambassades et
quatre consulats de Yougoslavie, aux
Etats-Unis et au Canada, ne semblent
pas engager la responsabilite des Ousta- ?
chis mais celle d'anciens ? Tchetniks g
de Draja Mihailovitch, le chef des parti-
sans serbes fusille en juillet 1946, sur
l'ordre de Tito.
C'est la renaissance du sentiment
nationaliste en Croatie meme qui inquie-
te Tito.
Econorniste et secretaire de la Ligue
des communistes en Croatie, Vladimir
Bakaritch donna le 10 mars 1964 une
Interview remarquee ? Nth *, le plus
grand hebdomadaire de Belgrade. Il
declarait due l'economie etait en pleine
19446440 041091aGal -4forme s'im-
posait.
9
CPYRGHApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
II reclamait aussi le droit pour cheque
republique de participer a l'elaboration
de la politique etrangere du gouverne-
ment federal de Belgrade.
En mars 1967, l'ecrivain croate Miros-
lay lerleza et d'eminents intellectuels de
Zagreb signerent un manifeste pour
1'4111U entre la langue ereateeierbe,
&rite en caracteres latins, et le serbo-
croate, ecrit en caracteres cyrilliques,
qui ne se distinguent pourtant que tres
peu.
Depute de Livno, en Bosnie; Jure
Galitch ne s'y trompa pas. Il nota qu'il
existait une analogic entre ce manifeste
et les theses linguistiques prOnees en
.1941 par e Hrvastki Narod n l'organe
officiel de l'Etat croate independant
d'Ante Pavelitch. Cette affaire entraina
l'exclusion du parti de Vlatko Pavle-
titch, le president des ecrivains de
Croatie.
En mai 1970, a ,V1IS a, Pedition heb-
domadaire de Pori/me de l'Alliance
socianste de Croatie, publiait en feuille-
ton les Memoires a peinc expurges
d'Ante Pavelitch, le chef des Oustachis.
Representant de la Croatie au gouver-
nement federal, le Dr Nikla Miljanic
demissionnait en novembre. Pour pro-
tester contre l'opposition des Serbes I la
mise en ceuvre du programme de stabili-
sation economieue adopte en decembre
1969.
Precdelemment, en septernbret
Croate Mika Tripalo, membre du bureau
executif de la Ligue des communistes
yougoslaves, avait ete plus loin.
11 proposait la nationalisation par la
Republique de Croatie des banques
federales et des entreprises du commer-
ce exterieur implantees en territoire
croate. De meme, 11 invitait a la confis-
cation des investissements realises sur le
littoral adriatique de la Croatie par des
banques de Belgrade dirigees par des
Serbes. Le 16 avril, Mika Tripalo affir-
mait que les Croates etaient insuffisam-
ment representes dans l'armee.
Les cadres de Croatie constatent que
leur republique se depeuple (le taux de
natalite y est le plus bible de la Yougos-
lavie) et que l'emigration entralne le
depart definitif de plusieurs centaines de
milliers d'ouvriera. us relevent que les
emplois laisses vacants sont pris par des
Serbes.
us s'insurgent aussi contre les prets
usuraires accordes aux entreprises croa-
tes par les banquiers federaux de Belgra-
de, et voudraient que Zagreb, capitale
de la Croatie, puisse disposer de la
Mollie des CieVilleli procure?s per le
tourisme et les exportations.
Existe-t-il un lien entre les actions des
Oustachis a l'etranger et les aspirations
a une plus grande autonomic, voire
l'independance, des cadres communistes
Croatie ?
La question a ete posee. Par des
Serbes qui soutiennent y a une
liaison entre la direction de la Republi-
que socialiste de Croatie et l'emigration
oustachi.
Le comite central de la Ligue des
communistes de Croatie s'eleve contre
cette accusation. Le 14 avril, une
commission d'enquete a ete instituee
Belgrade.
A Munich, il y a une semaine, le Dr
Branko Jelic affirmait que sa Republi-
que de Croatie s aurait le soutien de
l'Union sovietique. GIL LES MERM02
NEW YORK TIMES
2 May 1971
cpUo Assails Critics at Home and Abroad
By ALFRED FRIENDLY Jr.
specie to Tha New Tort Mao
BELGRADE, Yugoslavite:, May
1.Ptesident Tito .teday, plaeed
nuch .of the . blame for Yugo-
davia's current political crisis
cn opponents abroad but also
rtimated that he would crack
oown on domestic dissent and
rrobably shuffle both the Gov-
ernment and 'Communist party.
In a rambling, 40-minute
May Day address, broadcast on
radio and television ?from the
tawn of Labin near the Italian
border, the 78-year-old leader
rsserved his sharpest remarks
fr Yugoslav newspaper and
talevision journalists, university
Audents and . professors and
'tnegalontaniac" investors.
These groups have often been
targets for his wrath. ?
But the speech, which re7
s-ealed few details of the three-
e..ay leadership aneeting Presi-
gent Tho held this week, had
a new tone of harshness toward
Icritics at home and abroad.
"We have placed, democracy
on a very high level, on a strong
foundation," the President said
In a reference to the open dis-
cussion that makes Yugoslavia
unusual among Communist na-
tions. "But there cannot be de-
mocracy for the enemies of our
social system who fight against
everything we wish to achieve."
"Up until now we have tol-
erated too much," he said as
applause from the well-dressed
crowd in the coal-mining town
Interrupted him. "We have tol-
erated such enemies and their
actions too much, and they are
at work in many areas."
The President, who will be
79 on May 25, said that, the
mass of Yugoslays still gave
him and ? his associates in the
party full support. On a recent
(trip through backward ems in
the south, he said, he had been
rreceived "with the same faith"
{its was Shown him in after
Wotid Waril, when he turned
liii.Vietoticiut Partisan move-
ment into a government.
Toward the end of that trip,
Marshall Tito made several
angry speeches indicating that
nationalist rivalries among
leaders of the country's six
republics were becoming a
danger to Yugoslavia's develop-
ment and unity. It was then
that he announced this week's
leadership meeting, which ob-
servers thought would be a
major showdown on economic
and political issues.
In discussing the meeting
on his island retreat of Brioni,
however, the President said
only that "very sharp discus-
sion" had ended in unanimity.
He did not say how outstand-
ing economic questions had
been reconciled nor did he
point to any change in exist-
ing policy beyond "more en-
ergetic" application of party
and governmental discipline.
Greater Autonomy for Republics
lStating that Yugoslavia was
not in danger of disintegration,
be said .the current reorgani-
zation giving greater autonomy
to the governments of the six
republics would strengthen the
nation.
"We have settled the na-
tional question, not only in
theory," he maintained. "All
that remains is to implement
our decisions. There ? is no
nationality in Yugoslavia that
wants to be outside Yugo-
slavia."
Part of the reorganization,
he added, would probably be
a shuffle of federal posts,
which many expect this sum-
mer. Beyond that, President
Tito said, it may prove neces-
sary to remove prominent party
members from posts that they
have become ;"to Weak" to
occupy.
As for bankers, business
managers and others who fol-
lbw policies opposed by the
Government's economic stabili-
ration measures, he declared,'
"They will not only be ex-
pelled from thor rty but also
frOl their lOP."4 .
Approved For Release 1999/09/02io CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
11-IE WASHINGTON POST
24 April 1971
CPYRGHT
Yugosi v census Reflects
Nationality S lit
By Dan Morgan
Washington Post Foreign Service
LGRADE?How many
Yugoslays are there in Yu-
goslavia?
The answer emerging
from prelimiary returns in
the country's 1971 popula-
tion census is: probably not
too many.
? For the purposes of the
census?and to the anger of
, many people who identify
themselves with the country
as a whole rather than with
one of the five national
groups composing it?"Yu-
goslav" is no nationality at
all.
Nevertheless, an undis-
closed number of respond-
ents to the survey ques-
tionnaires who consider
themselves to be Yugoslays
have registered under the
category for those of "unde-
clared" nationality.
A period of economic and
political decentralization
has rekindled rivalries
among the country's five na-
tional groups?the Serbs,
Croats, Slovenes, Monten-
egrins and Macedonians?
and the census has become
embroiled in the contro-
? versey over national identity.
Furthermore, the census
is coming at a time of major
constitutional reorganiza-
tion, in which the federal
government is losing many
of its powers, and there is
fear in some quarters that
the concept of the Yugoslav
multinational state could be
put in question.
In protest against the cen-
sus's emphasis on identifica-
tion with national groups,
.some students at Belgrade
,University reportedly have
listed themselves as Eski-
mos.
One Belgrade woman, a
.Serb, received a visit from a
census taker
AltOrWeldsf 0r
band, also a Serb, was ab-
sent. She listed herself and
their two children as "un-
declared." The husband be-
came furious when he heard
this, telling her hotly, "How
could you do it? You gave
birth to two fine Serbs, and
you call them undeclareds."
The drafting of the census
questionnaire was a one-
year process, filled with po-
litical controversy involving
representatives of the coun-
, try's largest national groups,
the Serbs (42 per cent of the
population) and the Croats.
(24 per cent).
The Croats resisted ef-
forts to permit purely re-
gional identifications in the
census, but in the end three
regional groupings were al-
lowed?those of Dalmatia,
Kordun and Lika. All are in
Croatia, but an estimated
half-million Serbs live in
those regions.
One Croat from Dalmatia,
the Adriatic coastal region
between Dubrovnik and Ri-
jeka, said he had passed up
a chance to declare himself
as a Dalmatian "because I
didn't want to throw away
my vote."
Some persons are unsure
what they are. These are the
children from "mixed" na-
tionality marriages, which
make up 12 per cent of the
total.
The Yugoslav authorities
want to encourage the trend
toward decentralization, but
to check it before it turns
Into regional chauvinism.
They are frankly no encour-
aging any movement toward
Yugoslav nationality.
Laszlo Varga, a federal of-
ficial in charge of relations
among national groups, said:
Yugoslavia is not a unified
national group. It is a ro-
Inliteaggef69 diti9PY2 :
are some who think of Yugo:',
slavia concept as an excuse
for a new hegemony."
After World War II, the
newly installed Communist
government under President
Tito consolidated power in a 4,
rigidly, controlled, central-
ized system under the ban-
ner of a unified Yugoslavia. ,
The decentralization proc-
ess started soon afterward
has now reached new dimen-
sions. So, apparently, has
the fervor of the country's
national groups.
One indication of this is;
the outpouring of volunteer
support in Serbia and Mon-
tenegro for the building of a?
railway between Belgrade
and Bar, a small town on
the Adriatic near the Al- ,
banian border. Bar is now
earmarked for development
as a major port to compete,
with Rijeka, in Croatia.
In the first week of a cam-
paign to raise money for the ,
project, $20 million has ,
poured in from individuals ,
and enterprises. Some
school children in Serbia
have given up milk and
cookies to support the drive,
and some individuals have
taken out bonds for as much
as $1,000.
The project would fulfill
an ancient dream of linking
Belgrade and Serbia with
the Mediterranean. The ap-
peal for funds, similar to the
volunteer fund drive I
launched in Poland for re-
building the royal palace in ,
Warsaw, has caused Serbian
patriotism to well up.
. The plans for the railroad
and.. port? were stalled for
years because of Croatia
and Slovenia's reluctance to
contribute massively to, a
project that would benefit:
mainly Serbia.
Finally in 1966, the it i ?
C !NIRO P M41 1S4 P
proved, with 85 per cent of
the funds covered by the
federal government's fund
for development of tourism
kand shipbuilding
? Two factors have caused
the Serbs to turn now to
their own devices to com-
plete the project. The first
was a cost overrun of some.
$80 million which the federal
'authorities said they would
not make up; the railroad
'bond issue will cover that
:amount. The second was the
trend toward decentraliza-
tion and regional responsi-
bility in carrying out invest-
ment projects.
Serbia, which for years
opposed decentralization,
:has dramatically changed its
policy in the last three
. years, and it is now pressing,
,for greater local autonomy.
Petal; Jovanovic, a leading
'engineer on the Belgrade-
Bar commerce consortium,
says that if the federal role
in financing the projects'
ends, "Serbia has assumed
the obligation to continue."
Negotiations are now un-
derway on the future of the
-federal government financ-
Ing of this and other major
1YugoslaNt projects which
.,Belgradd undertook before
the movement to reduce the
federal role in the economy
? cot started,
0300090001-4
ii
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CURRENT HISTORY
May 1971
CPYRGHT
ff. . . the three closely linked internal problems of regional rivalry,
political secession and unbalanced economic development are creating a
growing concern about Yugoslavia's future. . . ."
Yugoslavia's Future
BY STEPIIEN S. ANDERSON
Associate Prof essor of Government, Windham College
AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT in. Yugo-
slavia's development it seems ap-
propriate to focus attention upon
her internal affairs. This is not because for-
eign relations are currently stagnant or unin-
teresting?indeed some rather significant ini-
tiatives and successes have occurred in the
past year or so?but rather because domestic
affairs appear to be moving toward a severe
test of the edifice of Yugoslav nationalism so
painstakingly constructed during the postwar
era. More specifically, the three closely
linked internal problems of regional rivalry,
political succession and unbalanced economic
development are creating a growing concern
about Yugoslavia's future among both Yugo-
slav:- and students of Yugoslav affairs.
ETHNIC BACKGROUND
Although composed of elements of several
long-established cultures and politics, Yugo-
slavia is a relatively young nation. It was
formed in 1919, in the aftermath of World
War I and the collapse of the Turkish and
Austro-Hungarian Empires. Its formation
was due largely to the efforts of the Serbs, a
numerous and dynamic Balkan people who
had enjoyed national independence since the
early nineteenth century. The other major
group in that original Yugoslav state was the
Croat nation, which had existed for many
centuries to the northeast of the Serbs within
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Cathol-
icism and Western (if not Germanic) orien-
tation of the Croats distinguished them
sharply from the Orthodox and Russian-ori-
ented Serbs, even though both spoke much
the same language. In addition to Serbs
and Croats, Yugoslavia also embraced sev-
eral smaller Balkan Slavic groups: the
Slovenes of the northern alpine regions; the
Macedonians of the extreme south, closely
related, historically and culturally, to the
Bulgarians; the Montenegrins, a mountainous
offshoot of the Serbian nation; and the in-
habitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who com-
prised an uneasy mixture of Serbian, Croatian
and Turkish elements, the last a consequence
of centuries-long inclusion in the Turkish
empire, an experience shared by the Serbs
and Macedonians. Besides these Slavic
groups them were the Shiptars, closely related
Lo the Albanians and inhabiting a region, now
known as Kosmet, bordering Albania, as well
as a melange of Hungarian, Rumanian and
Germanic groups spread across the Voivo-
dina, a plains region to the northwest.
These ethnic patterns have persisted, and
it is impossible to comprehend contemporary
Yugoslavia without an awareness of their
existence. The frictions they produced were
a major cause of Yugoslav impotence during
the interwar period. They deeply influenced
the character of the anti-Nazi partisan move-
ment which Josip Tito created during World
War IL They present perhaps the most
fundamental challenge to the development
of a stable Yugoslav nation-state today.
In considering the problem of regional
rivalry in Yugoslavia, it is well to distinguish
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
12
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
between two rather different sources of ten-
sion, one specifically ethnic and the other
essentially political. Ethnic tensions arise
from long-standing prejudices ("Montene-
grim are lazy," "Serbs ara arrogant," "Slo...
VC11CS are chiselers") and misunderstandings
among the various ethnic groups. In most,
although by no means all, cases these are di-
rected against the Serbs by the other na-
tienalities, and vice versa. Political tensions
have to do with the issue of power: should
power be centralized in the federal govern-
ment or in the republican and other constitu-
ent governments? This issue is, of course,
enormously complicated by the fact that the
seat of federal power, Belgrade, is also the
capital of Serbia, and has traditionally been
staffed largely- by Serbs even when upper-
- echelon positions have been distributed
among the various ethnic groups.
In the early postwar years, the newly-in-
stalled Communist regime's approach to this
problem of regional rivalry was a centralist
one: political and economic control was con-
centrated heavily in Belgrade, and the party
itself was organized in a way that permitted
little autonomy to its republican (i.e. ethnic)
subdivisions. Following the 1948 break with
Moscow, for reasons of both political and
economic expediency, this centralized power
structure was gradually modified to the point
where today it N clear that both the party and
2:overnmenta1 organizations at the republican
level are beginning to rival the authority of
the central government in Belgrade.
For example; in the summer of 1969, a
bitter controversy broke out between Slovenia
and the federal government over the alloca;
lion of highway construction funds. At one
point, the Slovene Premier and most of his
Cabinet threatened to resign if Slovene de-
mands were not met, and the personal inter-
vention of President Tito was required even
In reach a highly unsatisfactory compromise.
;a Kosmet, matters took a still more ominous
mrn during 1968-1969 with the surfacing of
NI. Djekic, "Troubles of Kossovo," Yugoslav
Life, XVI, I (January, 1971), p. 3, and The Econ-
(London), May 2, 1970, p. 44.
The New York Times, February 5, 1970, p. 2.
widespread anti-Serb demonstrations and
agitation for Republic status for Kosmet, in-
stead of its present position as an autonomous
region within Serbia. This demand was
flatly denied and some 30 ShIptars were triad
and sentenced for "fomenting national ha-
tred." At the same time, however, the fed-
eral government took significant steps to im-
prove economic conditions in Kosmet (its
per capita income of $250 is the lowest in
Yugoslavia) and to place more Shiptars in
positions of authority within the region.i
It is in Croatia, however, that ethnic and
political tensions most strongly reinforce each
other and where the most troubling situation
is developing. The Croats have always
chafed at what they consider to be exploita-
tion by the poorer and more backward re-
gions of Yugoslavia?i.e., Serbia, Macedonia,
Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is
only since the mid-1960's, however, that the
political system has been sufficiently liberal-
ized to allow relatively free expression of
these sentiments, not only in public forums
but within the party organization itself. The
gist of the complaint is that Croatia, together
with Slovenia (which is also quite advanced
economically), is being held back in economic
development by grandiose development plans
for the southern parts of the country, fi-
nanced by federal taxes which drain off cap-
ital from the north. The two northern re-
publics, with only a little over a quarter of
the population, account for almost seventy
per cent of Yugoslavia's industrial production
and a like proportion of its foreign trade
rarnin gs.
At the end of 1969 a Plenary Session of
the Croatian League of Communists sharply
condemned the view expressed by certain
Belgrade "hardliners" that "Croatism" (re-
gional nationalism) had developed to the
point where some sort of central discipline
was needed. The Plenum asserted Croatia's
right to manage her internal affairs as she
saw fit. 2 During 1970, demands were voiced
by highly placed Croatian leaders for further
decentralization of the banking system in or-
der to give each republic full control of all
capital resources created within its bounds.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
13
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
This political self-assertiveness in Croatia
has been paralleled by ethnic self-assertion,
centered ixtrticularly on the delicate matter
of language. Serbian and Croatian are very
iimilar, differing mainly in alphabet (Roman
(ot. Croatian, Cyrillic for Serbian), the pro-
nounciaton of certain vowels, and vocabu-
lary. During the postwar era, the official
view has been that they arc dialects of the
same language designated, rather awkwardly,
"Serbo-Croatian." In 1954, the task of pro-
ducing a definitive dictionary of the Serbo-
Croatian language was undertaken jointly by
the official Croatian and Serbian cultural or-
ganizations.
The project never generated great enthu-
siasm, and as regional rivalry began to in-
tensify in the 1960's, it clearly began to waver.
In 1967, furor was touched off when a group
of Croatian intellectuals demanded that
Croatian be recognized as a separate lan-
;nage, equal to Serbian in legal and cultural
;tatus. Serb intellectuals responded by de-
nanding that all Serbs living in Croatia
(about 160,000 persons) should be entitled to
learn and write their language in the Cyrillic
olphabet. At that time, the party stepped in,
with Tito publicly rebuking both sides, but
the tension continued to grow until finally,
in early 1971, the Croatian organization an-
nounced that ii was terminating the joint
dictionary project, because of Serbian un-
cooperativeness.'
THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION
'l'aken by itself, this linguistic controversy
might seem trivial, even ludicrous, but as an
important element in a larger pattern of
;rowing Croat-Serbian animosity it is indeed
disquieting. That pattern is undoubtedly
one of the reasons that President Tito has
openly tried, over the past two years, to create
machinery for political succession capable of
weathering the situation his departure will
create. For there is no doubt that the aging
leader (he will be 79 this year) is one of the
most important factors of cohesion in Yugo-
glavia today. His personal intervention in
3 The New York Times, January 29, 1971, p.8.
the Slovene and Croatian episodes has already
been mentioned, and there have been many
similar situations over the years. Born a
Croat, his career has transcended regional
rivalries, and ha holds the respect of at least
sizable segments of the general public and
the leadership strata in all parts of Yugo-
slavia.
His effort to prepare for the inevitable?
his own departure from the scene?has pro-
ceeded on two levels: party and governmen-
tal. At each level it has taken the form of
arrangements designed to insure (so far as
such things can be assured) a regionally-bal-
anced, post-Tito collective leadership.
The Yugoslav League of Communists ( the
official name of the ruling Communist party)
held its ninth congress in March, 1969. At
this congress, Tito proposed several structural
changes, which were subsequently adopted.
The existing eleven-man Executive Commit-
tee was replaced by a fifteen-man Executive
Bureau, composed by statute of two top
party leaders from each of the six republics,
one from each of the two autonomous re-
gions, and Tito. His position in the Bureau
was designated as unique and will cease to
exist after his retirement or death. Other
changes included the expansion of the next-
lower body from 35 to 52 members, with
representation on a demographic basis, and
elimination of the 154-member Central Com-
mittee entirely, in favor of an Annual League
Conference of approximately 200 party no-
tables.
All this may seem a mere numbers and
semantics game, but there is a clear intent:
to create an ethnically-balanced, collective
party executive, checked by a demographi-
cally-apportioned referent body. About a
year and a half later, September, 1970, Presi-
dent Tito turned his attention to reforming
Yugoslavia's governmental structure at the
federal level. Actually, there had been many
earlier governmental reorganizations, the
most recent example of which was the crea-
tion, in 1968, of a Federal Executive Council.
This 17-man body corresponded to the Cabs-
net of Western parliamentary systems and
was headed by a Premier, initially Mika
Approved For Release 1999/09/02i4CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
coNlimpf?d For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Spiliak. a Croat, :md subserviently Mita
Ribicic, a Slovene. In addition to this
Council, in 1968, there was also created a
Presidency (but no Vice Presidei icy) which
was filled by .Tito himself, While the exact
role and powers of the Presidency were not
- precisely clarified, it seemed to serve primarily
as a position from which Tito could survey
the operations of the federal government and
intervene in politics when necessary, as in the
1968 Belgrade University student strike.
Tim's September, 1970, proposal was to
make this Presidency into a collective body
composed of two or three representatives
from each republic from "the main social-po-
litical groups, including, of course, the Com-
munist party."4 Inasmuch as Tito, in the
same speech, criticized the work of the Fed-
eral Executive Council, it seemed likely that
his intention was to reduce the political role
of the Council and make the new collective
Presidency the real locus of power at the fed-
eral level, together with the Federal Assembly
(Parliament). As public discussion of his
proposal developed during the fall and win-
ter. this supposition received further con-
firmation. Draft constitutional amendments
published in February, 1971, described a
fourteen-man Presidential Council consisting,
like the party's Executive Bureau, of two rep-
resentatives from each republic and one from
each autonomous region, all elected for five-
year terms. This body would choose a
President and Vice President, but for a one-
year term only, with the two offices appar-
ently being rotated among new republics each
year. This Presidential Council would have
the power to propose legislation to the Fed-
eral Assembly, but if the two bodies could not
reconcile any differences within nine months,
both must be dissolved. The Federal Execu-
tive Council, conversely, would become a
strictly administrative organ, charged only
with carrying out policy. Tito would con-
tinue as President of the Republic and in that
capacity would join and head the new Presi-
The New York Times, September 22, 1970,
11. 7.
5 The New York Times, February 28, 1971; and
conversation with Maldin Soic, Director, Yugoslav
Information Center, New York.
(Initial Council, hut upon his retirement that
office would cease tit exist,5
These top-level reorganizations, ?vhich arc
still only in the discussion stage, will probably
not be promulgated until the summer of
1971; they represent only one side of the
effort to deal with impending post-Tito re-
gional problems. Included in the same
package of proposed constitutional amend-
ments arc several whose purpose is clearly to
carry the process of political and economic
decentralization still further and thereby to
placate anti-centralist (and anti-Serb?) senti-
ments in the republics. These amendments
would leave the federal government with full
power only over foreign affairs, defense, and
certain aspects of the economy, such as the
currency system and the regulation of the
unitary market. The only investment cap-
ital remaining in federal hands, for example,
would be a special fund for the use of under-
developed areas, on a revolving credit basis,
to be raised by income taxes levied on all
Yugoslays. Most federal laws and regula-
tions, particularly in the field of economics,
would require the assent of the republics be-
fore they could take effect.
Tito's strategy for dealing with the prob-
lem of succession may now be summarized as
follows: improved consensus-building organs
at the federal level (Presidential Council and
Party Executive Bureau) in combination with
increased autonomy at the republic level.
While on first glance this may seem to be a
bold strategy, it is very likely the only one
available at the moment, for no one, not even
Tito, has the stature or authority to deal with
the problem by the alternative path of politi-
cal recentralization.
Will it work? No one can say for sure at
this point. Edward Kardelj, Tito's closest
political associate, has said that:
the collective presidency will not be a magic
wand to solve all the controversies and problems
that time brings, but it should certainly speed up
the discussion and settlement of such disputes....
Should the presidency be incapable of such in-
itiatives, it would certainly mean that it was not
performing its duty. This would mean not only
that this organ is in crisis, but that the whole
society is in crisis. But our society is not in
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 i5CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Ap_proved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
CPYRGHT
crisis and wc have no reason to doubt that the
presidency will perform its positive role in over-
coming social problems and conflicts.?
Not so sure was Milovan Djilas, a former
member of the party inner circle long in dis-
favor for his outspokenly critical views.
Writing last October in The New York Times
he asserted that:
the economic and ideological crisis has trans-
formed itself into a governmental crisis. Be-
cause of this the proposed reorganization of the
apex of the government?a "collective" presi-
dency instead of a president, will aggravate
rather than lessen the inefficiency of the admin-
istration and the bickering of the already disas-
sociated chiefs.7
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Djilas' remark brings up the third critical
problem mentioned at the beginning of this
article, but so far alluded to only in passing:
the problem of unbalanced economic devel-
opment. This problem has many facets, in-
cluding of course the serious disparity be-
tween the more and less developed regions,
but in recent years the salient fact has been
that both producer and consumer demand
has grown throughout most of the country
much faster than the economy's ability to
satisfy it. One consequence of this was a
strong inflationary trend which shot the cost
pf living up by 11 per cent in each of the
past two years.? Another was the huge and
;rowing foreign trade deficit (excess of im-
-ports over exports) which reached the stag-
oring figure of $1.2 billion in 1970. Foreign
currency receipts from tourists and from
Yugoslays working abroad reduced this to a
balance-of-payments deficit of "only" $370
million, but the fact remained that even such
a deficit indicated a serious shortcoming.
Under a more dogmatic and authoritarian
The New York Times, October 5, 1970, p. 11.
7 The New York Times, October 30, 1970, p. 41.
8 The New York Times, January 23, 1971, p. 6.
Anthony Silvester, "Yugoslavia's Consumers
Call the Shots," East Europe, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan-
Lary, 1971), pp. 23-27, see especially pp. 25-26.
78 Yugoslav News Bulletin, No. 468, January 27,
1971,p. 1.
17 Ibid.
12 The New York Times, January 24, 1971, p.
1/1, and Yugoslav News Bulletin, No. 468, January
77, 1971, pp. 2-4.
regime, central controls over wages, prices,
investments, exports and imports would have
been imposed long ago, in the face of such
trends. Yugoslav central planners hesitated,
and in fact they lacked the authority to
tAmper in such a way with the market..cen.
tered economy established by the 1965 re-
forms. Instead, they attempted to apply a
number of indirect solutions to the problem,
such as negotiations for special trade agree-
mews with the European Common Market
(successfully concluded in early 1970) ; en-
couragement of foreign investment in Yugo-
slavia through partnerships with Yugoslav
firms (enacted in 1967 but disappointing in.
results) ;? toleration of high levels of migra-
tion of both unemployed and skilled workers
(over 850,000 were abroad during 1970,
mostly in West Europe, contributing some
$450 million in remittances to Yugoslavia) ;10
and expanded tourism (foreign tourists
brought in $350 million during 1970).11
Toward the end of 1970, however, it was
clear that more drastic steps would be re-
quired at the federal level. With the ap-
proval of the Federal Assembly, an import
surtax was established, followed in October
by a temporary price freeze and additional
import restrictions. December saw the set-
ting of an 11 per cent ceiling on wage in-
creases to last until April 30, 1971, at which
time the federal government expected to in-
stitute, in cooperation with the republics, a
"comprehensive stabilization program" of an
as yet unspecified nature. Then, in mid-
January, 1971, the dinar was devaluated by
one-quarter of its value (from 12.50 dinars/
dollar to 15.00), a move designed simultane-
ously to improve the position of Yugoslav
tourism and exports, and to discourage the
import of foreign goods."
These are short-term solutions, however,
capable only of providing a breathing spell
in which to deal with the underlying prob-
lem. It is by no means clear at this writing
how the Yugoslays intend to do this, but one
thing is reasonably certain; the solution will
not involve a recentralization of economic
power in Belgrade. The proposed constitu-
tional reforms mentioned earlier have as their
Approved For Release 1999/09/036 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
Ap_proved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
UPYRGHT
central purpose the expansion of the eco-
nomic as well as the political autonomy of
the constituent republics. Here in one Yugo-
slav commentary on the proposals from an
official publication:
The most substantive purpose of the reorganiza-
tion is to deprive the federal state organs of the
right arbitrarily to appropriate to themselves
the social capital accumulation, and to distrib-
ute it themselves, and to play the role of investor
and carrier of enlarged economic reproduc-
tion. . . By abolishing the elements of eco-
nomic statist .domination over the republics, it
is held, not only will the social relations of self-
management be fortified, but the equality and
sovereignty of the republics will gain fresh mean-
Assuming these reforms do go through
without major modification, economic devel-
opment and balance will become the primary
responsibility of the republics, rather than the
federal government. The knotty and poten-
tially disruptive issue of the north-south de-
velopment gap is to be dealt with apparently
by placing even more responsibility upon- the
underdeveloped republics themselves, al-
though long-term development financing will
continue to be available, on a loan basis,
through the Federal Fund for the Underde-
veloped Regions. In effect, these reforms
signal the final demise of centrally-imposed
egalitarianism in economic development and
living standards and will institutionalize the
development gap for many years to come.
As such, they run counter to a significant body
of opinion among the older (and now largely
discredited) members of the party, as well as
some idealistic young people.
Perhaps there is no other choice. If Yugo-
slavia is to remain competitive in the world
market (and thereby steadily to improve her
overall standard of living) she must continue
to release and encourage those sectors of her
economy that can best compete in the world
market. If these sectors happen to be lo-
cated for the most part in the more developed
regions of Yugoslavia, so be it. Perhaps this
harsh policy will somehow stimulate the re-
maining regions to make the efforts and sacri-
fices necessary to "catch up." But one is
" B. Savic, "Self-Governed Federalism," Yugo-
slav Life, XVI, 1 (January, 1971), p. 2.
entitled to wonder if there will continue to be
a Yugoslavia within, which to catch up.
Ultimately the key to Yugoslavia's future
may lie in the realm of foreign relations,
which have not been the focus of this article,
but which may nonetheless provide a con-
cluding thought. For all the prejudices and
resentments which set apart Yugoslays of
differing natioinalities, there is still a strong
loyalty to the "New Yugoslavia" as a polity
that has succeeded in maintaining, over the
past quarter-century, a precarious existence
between East and West. The Yugoslav
strategy of "active non-alignment," while it
has fallen far short of its purpose of creating
a coherent third world force in international
politics, has still established an image of a
unique Yugoslav role in world affairs. Re-
cent successful trade negotiations with both
the European Common Market and Come-
con (the Soviet-bloc counterpart of E.E.C.)
have further enhanced this image, as did the
state visit of United States President Richard
Nixon last fall. The restoration of full dip-
lomatic relations with Communist China, on
the one hand, and the Vatican, on the other,
were two very impressive Yugoslav initatives
on the 1970 diplomatic calendar. President
Tito played a central role in the Third Con-
ference of Non-Aligned Countries held in
September in Zambia. Yugoslavia has
clearly "arrived" as a medium power.
The loyalty which Yugoslays feel for con-
temporary Yugoslavia is difficult to gauge.
It certainly is not strong enough to prevent
internal bickering. On the other hand,
should foreign powers, or power blocs, at-
tempt to take advantage of the internal
strains that surely lie ahead for Yugoslavia,
there would probably be a compensatory rec-
onciliation among the feuding nationalities.
In the last analysis, the future of the new
Yugoslav nation-state may depend more on
its environment than its internal workings.
Stephen S. Anderson formerly taught at
Marlboro College and Boston University.
East European and Soviet affairs are his par-
ticular interest and he has traveled widely
in the Balkans.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
17
Or
Approved For Release 1999/09/0111.4110AIWZ9-01194A000399k9qpil-4
THE COMMON FACTORS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM
1. Political terror has different roots in different places,
but whether in Latin America, Africa or the Middle East, it has
soMe common factors:
a. Unquestionably, the most fertile soil for its growth
is in those countries where not only the possibilities of peace-
ful and legal change within the national system appear to be blocked,
but also where the government shows itself unable to cope with elements
of change and ynrest which emerge within the country.
b. In recent years, and particularly following the failure
and death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in October 1967, rural insurgency
has become discredited as the most effective means of revolution,
and thee has been a cerresponding rise in urban terrorism. In
Uruguay and Guatemala especially, and elsewhere, as in Ceylon and
Turkey, urban guerrillas are severely straining the political and
social fabric of the nation.
c. A third noteworthy and common phenomenon is the increased
student participation in urban terrorist activities. In Turkey, for
example, terrorist action hfis stemmed in large part from an off-
shoot of Dev Genc (Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation). The
moderate leaders of Dev Genc have been replaced by advocates of
militant revolution calling themselves the Turkish Peoples Liberation
Army. It was the activities of this group early this year which
brought about the resignation of the government in March, and this
same group is responsible for the kidnapping and assassination of
the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul.
d. The most significant common factor to the majority of
these urban guerrilla groups is the support and training provided
by established Communist powers. In Latin America, Cuba, and there-
fore by extension the Soviet Union, provides funds, training and
propaganda support, and has even occasionally assigned its amn.
experts to assigt guerrilla groups. The Soviet Union and, as more
recently revealed, North Korea, and possibly East Germany, have also
given training in subversion and armed violence to Latin American
students. In Africa, the Cubans, Chinese Communists and the North
Koreans have all been involved in providing support and training
to members of insurgent groups. In the Middle East, the Soviets
and Chinese Communists have supported and trained Arab commando
uoups, while North Korean activity has recently been uncovered in
Ceylon also. (tor further information on recent North Korean activity,
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP 9-01194A000300090001-4
25X1C3b1
25X1C3b1
Approved For Release 19990161?61DP79-01194A000300090001-4
see the article in this issue entitled, "North Korean Subversive
Diplomacy.") 25X1C3b1
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300090001-4
mommusergairamm.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00030009000