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25X1C10b ~ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 r , d For Release 1999/09/OZS:E~I~EF~DP79-01194'?~Ol'~~01-1 Propaganda Highlights HUMAN RIGHTS .AND THE SOVIET' CONS'TTTUTTON 1. The establishment of a Committee for Human Rights in any country save the USSR (and probably Communist China) might almost go unnoticed. But the Soviet Human Rights Committee formed in November by Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his two scientist colleagues is remarkable enough to warrant publicity and appropriate commentary. In discussing or writing about this new Human .Rights Committee, assets should be urged to stress its complete legality within the Soviet system ("a creative association acting in accordance with the laws of the state") and therefore, its faithful adherence to the dictum on socialist legality according to Brezhnev ("everyone must obey the laws without regard to position, grade or rank"). Any repressive action taken, or even threatened, against the committee members would merely expose the Soviet leadership to additional ridicule. In fact, the stated principles of the committee are so aptly and carefully phrased as to indicate that official condemnation of the committee would be practically unimaginable. 2. Concerning the existence of and the crying need for this new Committee for Human Rights, what we want to encourage most pf all is commentary from the left, from the pro-Soviet (or pre- Czechoslovakia pro-Soviet) sympathizers found primarily among free world Communist parties; Communist dissident groups; labor unions, and other organizations --- particularly those which have any direct or indirect connections with the iJnited Nations' accredited non- governmental organizations. The committee's appeal is addressed indirectly to the United Nations, the one forum where world opinion just might carry a little weight with a power-hungry Kremlin. To stimulate such commentary, local promotional efforts might be required to focus wider attention on the existence of the Soviet Committee for Human Rights. 3. Because of the legalistic care with which they were composed, the committee's stated principles make pretty dull read- ing. See the attached English translation. The establishment of the committee, however, affords a peg for reviving the two previous documents with which Andrei Sakharov was concerned -- both of which are also legalistically proper --: Sakharov's essay of June 1968, "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom," SECRET Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 25X1C10b ~ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 A New Soviet Constitution; Is the Issue Dead or IrrQninent? Next January marks the twelfth year since former Premier Nikita Khrushchev told the 21st Party Congress that the time was ripe for making changes and additions to the Constitution of the USSR. While no draft of any new Constitution has appeared, a 97-member Constitutional Conm-ission, whose members are all deputies to the Supreme Soviet, has been at work off and on for the past decade. The. Commission was originally set up by Khrushchev in 1962 and then reorganized by Party Secretary Brezhnev after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. If it is to continue working, the Commission needs another reorganiza- tion: some 19 of its members have either died, been demoted, or lost :out in this year's elections. However, another reorgani- zation of the Constitutional Commission would only underline the government's procrastination in the drafting of the long-.waited new document. One way of avoiding publicity for the present leadership's inefficiency in getting things done, would be to publish a draft for a new Constitution at an early date. This presupposes that the various factions in the leadership will have been able to work out a compromise document. Disagreement over basic provisions is undoubtedly what has held up the draft. Over four years ago the draft had apparently jelled sufficiently for Brezhnev to prophesy the adoption of a new Constitution during the 1967 50th anniversary celebrations In a June 1966 pre-election speech, Bxezhneu said: "All the best that the practice of state construc- tion has given our country must be implemented in the new Constitution of the USSR, which will crown the majestic half- century road of our country." This statement, carried in Pravda, was censored out of the text of Brezhnev's electoral speech wlen it was later published in the two-volume edition of Brezhnev's Works. In 'this year's election campaign speeches, Brezhnev did not mention any Constitution, Instead, he concentrated on the need for well'-written laws "which constitute an intimate, stable and correct 'expression of the processes taking place in our society" and that "everybody must obey without regard to position, grade, or rank,." His statements reflect the leadership's dissatisfaction with the undetected and unpunished corruption and bureaucratic in- effectiveness widespread throughout the Soviet system. They also reflect the leadership's concern over growing disrespect for Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Soviet laws, both among the general public and in the ranks of Soviet officialdom. In a regime which officially scoffs at: the concept of the "rule of law," the anomaly of the role of law is as unsolvable a dilemma for the present leadership as 'it was for all their predecessors. Thus far, the only change following the 1970 elections has been just another step backward and closer to the "planned, controlled justice" of Stalin's day with the revival of the old USSR Ministry of Justice (and thereby, similar ministries in each Republic). Chi the surface at least, the Constitution appears a dead issue. It would seem that the consensus prevails that there is no need at the present time to replace the olcl Stalin Constitution of 1936 which, according to Moscow's own admission. is inadequate even for "building communism." The conservatives among the leadership stand to gain little from anew Constitution since it would represent a step forward along the path of '''the further development of socialist democracy" in the USSR. And this is the path that would threaten their present status. Events in Czechoslovakia in early 1968 must have been a godsend to the conservatives in strengthening their arguments against whatever progressive steps might by then have been proposed by the C;onstitutional Commission. The 1970 pre-election speeches reflected what appear to be serious differences among the leadership about the further develop- ment of Soviet "socialist democracy" and the degree of repression by the KGB compatible with this development. President Nikolai Podgorny was consistent in his advocacy of building "socialist democracy'' by means of extending the powers and functions of the "system of soviets" as the most representative power groups in the USSR. KGB Chief Yuriy Andropov was just as consistent in intimations that any substantial growth of "socialist democracy" in the USSR would merely dilute the powers of the Soviet state and negate the effective functioning of the KGB. And so it wouldR Brezhnev, while careful to avoid statements that might be open to interpretation as indicating differences of opinion, tended to side with Andropov; a truly "new" Constitution would seem incompatible with such thinking. Chi the other hand, if the present leadership wished to avoid exposing itself to ridicule --- something it has not done so far --- this could be an incentive for the Soviet leaders to overcome their differences and work out some sort of compromise. Unless it is cancelled again, the 24th Congress of the CPSU will be held in March next year. The Congress would provide a unique and timely platform from which to present the draft of anew Constitution. ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001C~YRGHT CPYRGHT CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 19 November 1970 ~~~~.~~ ? ? By Charlotte Saikowski Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor The formation here of a Committee for Human Rights by three physicists is a further indication that voices of dissent in Russia grow more and more emboldened. The committee includes the eminent nuclear physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, al- ready widely known in the West for his forthright' please. for freedom of thought,. democratization of Soviet society,- and So- viet-American cooperation. But : a hallmark of this dissent within Russia -limited in extent, unorganized, and with virtually no Political influence - is that by and large the dissenters do not seek the overthrow of the Soviet regime. Nor do they want the establishment of a capitalist society. ' Their immediate concern is the obser- vance of .citizens' rights as guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution. Aims delineated The new committee, according to a type- written copy of the announcement made available to the Western press over the weekend, 'sets these specific aims: ? "Consultative help" to state governing bodies in creating and applying human rights guarantees.' d Assistance to persons studying theoreti- cal aspects of the problem in a socialist society. ' o Legal education, in particular the prop-. aganda of documents dealing with interna- tional and Soviet law on human rights. Political observers here are rather aston- ished by the continued bold efforts of aca- demician Sakharov and other leading sci? entists to challenge some basic policies of the Soviet Government. Presumably because of Dr. Sakharov's stature as a physicist (he developed the Soviet hydrogen bomb) the regime does not appear to have restricted his freedom of action. Political aims denied However, it is difficult to believe that the authorities would allow the committee to tunetion above board---QVrn ehough its tarir,. ciples are carefully couched in legal terms. The founders of the committee, which in- clude physicists Andrei Tverdokhlebov and Valery Chalidze, make clear they are not organizing a political group. The committee is defined as a "creative association" ? that works within Soviet law. Anyone can join who abides by its prin- ciples; but he must not be a member of a political party- or other organization which seeks to govern the state or of any organiza- tion whose principles permit participation in either orthodox political activity or in an opposition. In its study and- "constructive criticism" of the present state of Soviet legal guar- antees of freedom of the individual, the com- mittee states it will be guided by principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Further, it will take into. account "tradi- tions" that have formed here and the stag's "practical difficulties" 'in this field. In practice, no group of any kind is formed in the Soviet Union without the sanction and participation of the Communist Party. If the regime officially suppresses the newly formed Committee, its founders would vi course be in a position to point to this as an -infringement of civil rights. Although there is na organized or united dissent in the Soviet Union, recent years "have seen the emergence of a variety of` miniscule .underground groups. One such unofficial organisation was the Action Group for -the Defense of Civil Rights in the U.S.S.R.; which fought government repres? sions by means of appeals to the United Nations. - The regime has harshly cracked dawn an such groups, however. Problem for the regime . According to the underground Chronicle of Human Events, its members have been' subjected to arrests, imprisonment, deten- Lion _in mental hospitals or, at least, dis? missal from their jobs, interrogations and harassment. When prestigious and needed scientists are involved, however, it becomes a far- -more-worrisome problem for the regime. It should be borne in mind, pf course that the Soviet physicists, mathematicians, and others -who are speaking out on behalf of -civil rights constitute but a tiny fraction of -the entire sciert:.ic ii;telligentsia. Thousands ;more ga about their daily business without Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT participating in open protest or .voicing per- sonal views that conflict .with the official ,policy. Even so, the leadership fs patently irri- tated ' by the growing dlssent anotig 'the scientific community. Last month the party central committee criticized the Lebedev Physics Institute, of which Dr. Sakharov is an associate, for "serious shortcomings" in -the education of the scientific and technical .intelligentsia. Without mentioning any names, the party Criticized institute scientists for poor contact with workers' collectives, for publishing few works on philosophical problems in the na- tural sciences, and for not batting "unscientific, idealistic. conceptions of bourgeois scientists." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT DI.YLsl `i*ELI;GP~lit'li, Lo7don 16 idovomber 170 13y FliAlt'Ii TAYLOR in 1Vloscow ~HREE Soviet scientists, me u tng r n rei Sakharov,; "father " of the Soviet H-bomb, were reported yesterday to have taken the struggle for civil liberties in Russia a significant stage further by forming a committee for human rights. The committee's aims are set forth in a set of prin- ciples, copies of which reached Western correspondents in Moscow last night. It is carefully worded and stresses the Committee's non-political nature and that it seeks to . work within existing Soviet law. The move strengthens the view that. concern for civil 1 rights in Russia is growing among intellectuals. It follows the open letter by . Mstislav Rostropovich, the 'cellist, in which he criticised official control over the arts and literature, the trial? of Andrei Amalrik, the aughor, and the trial of Dr Revolt Pimenov, a mathematician. Dr Sakharov, 49, led a cam? paign of protest last June against the detention in a mental clinic of a fellow-scientist. But his decision. to help found the committee means that one of the most distinguished of Russian scientists has joined the broader struggle for basic human rights as a whole. Interest growing The preamble to the commit- tee's principles declares that: " The problem of the mainten- ance of human rights is impor- tant for the creation of favour- able conditions for r people's lives, the consolidation of peace and the development of mutual understanding." It "notes the growth in recent ,years among. Soviet citizens of an interest in this field " and e~cpresses "satisfaction with suc- cesses achieved in the Soviet Union since 1953'," in this area. Stalin died- in 1953.. The committee says it wants to cooperate " on a consultative basis " with further efforts by the State in creating guarantees for the defence of rights, " taking into account the specific character of the problem in t'-~ conditions of tiie socialise. system and the specihc character of Soviet traditions in this field." In its set of principles, the committee describes itself as a " creative association acting in accordance with the laws of the S [ate." No member of the conuniltee can be a member of a political party or of organisations which allow participation in orthodox or oppositional activity." Legal education The committee also sets out to promote legal education and, in particular, the dissemination of documents on international and Soviet law on human rights. -The set of principles ends: "The committee is prepared for creative contacts with public and scientific organisations, with international non-governmcutal organisations, if in their activities they proceed from the principles of the United Nations and do not pursue the goal of bringing harm to the Soviet Unioa." Dr . Salcharov's signature is followed by those of Andrei Tvyordokhlebov and Valcry Chalidze, who are both physicists. The question immediately raised by the action of the three is-how they intend to publicise the committee in order to get members? Because all information media in Russia are Government-con- trolled they must rely, intern- ally at least, on word of mouth and on the circulation of type- written copies of the principles. Many Russians rely on Foreign radio broadcasts for acquiring news which is either suppressed or disregarded by the controlled Soviet Press, radio and tele- vision.- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGI-approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-O1194AOOO4OOO1OOO1-1 NEW YoRx TzNiES CPYRGHT 31~Y nUSSIA G10VE TO DEFEND RIGHTS Sa6;harov Among Physicists Walo Establish Committee ~ln Personal Freedom By BERNARD GWERTZMAN ' 'SPeMai to The P.`cw YoYi Tlmea ~' MOSCOW, Nov. I5 - Dr.l n rei a arov, a prom- inent nuclear phys}cist, and two of his colleagues have ,formed a Committee for Human Rights to seek ways .of guar- anteeing personal freedom in the Soviet Union. A statement of principles, signed by Dr. Sakharov, Andrei N. ^R~erdokhlebov and Valery, N. ~sf~~re~~~r~i~~ ~~a~~~~ ~~ ~h~ ~o~i~~ c~~~fi~i~~~~n Three Soviet physicists-Rndrei Mr. Sakharov probably has tsw Sakharov, who at thirty -two illusions about the kind of recep- became one of the youngest mem- lion his move SS Itable to geL In bets of the Soviet Rcademy of Sciences, Rndrei Tverdokhlebov and Yalery Chalidze-announced on November 15 the founding of a committee for the defence of human rights in the. $ovief Union. They are proposing to help the state study the "theoreiicai as- psds of the problem," -and they say- that their research. wiii be guided 6y the principles outlined fn the United Nations declaration of human rights, but will use the "specifics of Soviet. taw" as a starting point. Emphasising the need to take into. account the `"established traditions and real ditticuIfies of the state in this field," they pomi out that the committee will act " in croniormity with the laws of the state" by relusing member- ship to persons belonging to political parties or social orga- nizations involved 7n the actual running of the political apparatus. Membership will also be de- nied to those who might be tempted to use the committee 1 either to criticize the government or as a political tool. They also reject any cooperation- with for- ; eign ozganizat7ons inirnucaI to the Soviet Union. In any other modern, industrial country, an initiative of the sort that lVlr. Sakharov has taken would have gone all but un~ noticed, R Ieading inteI7ecfual- he is referred to as the "father of the lSovie27 H-bomb"-founds an association, as he is fully' enlitIed to do under the Soviet constitution, to facilitate the ap- plication o! the . principles on which the Soviet Union is theoret- icalIy goveined. I.ativfu! successes He points with satisfaction fo "the successes scored since 1953 fn the field of Iaw" and places himself at the regime's disposal so that this fortunate trend may continue. Such being the case, who would possibly find fault 7588 he urged liberalization, sttg- gestinq that the 7fremlin leaders, follow the Czechoslovak example. He was back at if again early this year, openly defending intei? lectuals being prosecuted for non- conformist ideas, among them the biologist I)r. Zhores Medvedev and the mathematician AevoIt Pfinenov. He took the calculated risk of sabotaging his own career, and did apparently lose a few of his posts. Bui he was equally well aware that his actions posed an extremely thorny problem oz t ~e authorities: they could not bring him io trial without touching oft an international scandal and antagonizing the entire Soviet scfentitfc community, The fact is . that the government needs the scientists too much to attack them directly. Mr. Sakharov has thus decided to use his not incons7derable "prestige in the Berrie of those who, like him, are fighting for human sights: laws who have informed the United Nations that they want !o emigrate; bslierers militating for application of the consfitutionalprov7sion guararttee? ing the right of worship; pro- ' testers, from the writer Alexander Ginzburg to Major General Pyotr Grigore>ko, who organized dam-. onsirations that were 7n primoiple . authorized by the constitution, but in fact were repressed by the police and punished by the COUrtS. CPYRGHT struggle is being waged in the mfsisi bt what: Seems, at lease, to be general. p.ublls apa[hy. Mr. Sakha~AY s initiative there. fore smacks of optimism. FIe seems convinced, like the writer RndLei R;malrik, that the, Tiber. alizaifon process begun in 1953 -and sharply braked -of Iate-- is irreversible. The committee he set up wilt be an instrument in the hands. of those who fight for respect for human rights and of? ter help to those who are persecuted. How the authorities will react to this ~uAcomfoziable situation remains to be seen, 13y rejecting help from politically motivated- quarters, Mr. Sakharov has made it Impossible for anyone to ac- cuse his committee of being anti- Soviet. Rt the same time he has created a formidable precedent for the. regime. The Communist Party will put up, with any association so long as it can control it. Mr. Sakharov, like the ce!]ist Mstislav Hostco- pov7ch wlto recently published a letter in defence of author Rlexander Solzhenitsyn, accepts the zegituo, but refuses io play aloaq witjl the system. BERNARD ftci20N ~U$9~@ Op~}OSIt10t1 Many crosifallen m?Iitants are ` now convinced that "opposition within the law" has no chance of succeeding. Having seen how _ their comrades fared is a series of court proceedings that began in 1966, they realize the fuGlify of reminding the Soviet leaders' of the xegime's underlying prin? ciples, and they feel it is prefer-'. able to fight underground, or, fn some cases, simply leave the country, It is true that their Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 25X1C10b ~ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 December 1970 SOVIETS MOVE TO CRi1SH VENEZUELAN AND SPANISH CP DTSSTDENCE The 'Modern" CPSU Leaders Carry on Ancient Stalinist Tradition Whatever differences and similarities observers want to see between Stalin's style of supervising the international Communist movement and that of the 'Ynodern" post-Stalin leadership, at least one motivation has remained essentially unchanged: in exercrszng the Soviet claim to leadership among the world's Communist parties, the CPSU demands from t~iese parties full conformity with Soviet positions in matters of dogma and politics. The price of non- conformity is ejection from the movement. Like Stalin, the modern Soviet leaders eliminate opposition wherever their power can reach, even though it may mean virtually destroying a national movement, as in the case of the Austrian CP during the past year when the expulsion of the liberal faction led by Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek robbed the Party of the little vitality it had. Within the past two months, the CPSU has again demonstrated its fear of non-conformity and innovative ideas by extending its interest out as far as the Venezuelan CP and the small, illegal Spanish CP (whose main operations are carried on underground in France) in an attempt to split each of the parties and destroy the non-conforming faction. The criticism of the Soviet Union emanating from the two parties stems from the realization that the Soviet brand of Communism is alien and inapplicable to their world. The criticism is typical of the feeling being expressed by an increas- ing number of free world Communists. Pravda's Intervention in the PCV The CPSU finally decided to throw the weight of its authority into the smoldering factional struggle going on in the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) by publishing in Pravda on 20 October a crude attack on PCV Central Committee member e~ oi"{coro Petkoff. The Soviets like to use a meat-ax approach when they want to leave no doubt of their disapproval in the minds of any party member, even the most simple of Communist faithful in and out of the Soviet Union. Petkoff 's sin was that he criticized the Soviets in a number of ways in two books: Chechoeslova uia: el Socialismo coma Problema (Czechoslovakia, t e ro em o ocia ism 19 9, and Socialismo ara Venezuela? (Socialism for Venezuela?), 1970. m e first, e fi e oger Garaudy in France) criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and rejected the Soviet Union as a proper model for socialism in Venezuela, and in the second Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 he further criticized the repressive, dictatorial aspects of the Soviet Union as unworthy of emulation by the PCV, presenting his own original theory and program for socialist revolution in Venezuela, a theory departing radically from orthodox Soviet doctrine. The danger that the virus of independent Communism will spread in Latin America as a variation of the same virus that thrives in Europe in the French, Italian, and Austrian parties, among others, apparently was one of the main reasons for t:he Soviet intervention in the PCV. Another compelling reason was that the PCV was moving too slowly to rid itself of the Petkoff faction. Judging by the PCV reaction to the Pravda attack, i.e. publishing pro- and anti-Soviet articles in t eFi i-'r newspaper .Tribuna Popular, the leadership seems to have decided to try to preserve some minimum of unity against the Soviet onslaught which is supported by the conservative, "rightist," pro-Soviet faction which is trying to oust Petkoff (see the Larrazabal article on the Pravda attack, attached). While Petkoff is criticized by the leadersT p for breaking Party discipline, it is in relatively mild, unthreatening terms. The fact is that Petkoff has substantial support not only in leadership circles (see attached articles by Lairet and Adam) but in the relatively large youth organization, and his expulsion would be costly to party strength. The precarious balance of power apparently is held by a moderate, conciliatory, "centxist" faction (see the Gustavo Machado article attached) which at least temporarily is resisting rightist efforts to oust Petkoff. (Petkoff refrained from attacking the Soviets in his contribution to the newspaper. discussion.) It will be interesting to see whether the Soviet politicking in internal PCV affairs succeeds in eliminating Petkoff, regardless of the cost to the PCV, or whether they will have to resoY?t to the ultimate weapon: withdrawal of financial support. The PC;V 4th Congress which has been scheduled to convene early in December may tell the story. CPSU Manipulation of the PCE Another recent target of Moscow's classic strategy of attempt- ing to split any Communist party which attacks its policies is the small, illegal Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista Espanol -- PCE). For two years the PCE has ceaselessly condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In August 1970, when most European parties were submissively accepting "normalization" in Czechoslovakia, the PCE described ousted Czech leader Alexander Dubcek as the "best hope" of socialism: In September Enric{ue Lister, renowned fighter of the Spanish Civil War, stormed out of the PCE Central Committee with four comrades and set uP a rival group which began publishing a Mundo Obrero to rival the PCE's main weekly organ of thE; same name e new publication's orthodox, pro-Soviet line anti harsh 00 -1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 attacks against PCE leadership leave little doubt about the source of their funds. The move is part of a Soviet operation to destroy the independent current Party by replacing it with an orthodox obedient one. The clandestine PCE, nearly 200,000 strong according to Secretary'General Santiago Carrillo's highly inflated claims, (or aboutl5,000 acarrding to more objective observers) includes, says Carrillo, about 5,000 exiles living in the Soviet Union and another 1,000 in Paris. Among those living in the USSR is Dolores Ibarruri? the noted "La Pasionaria" of the Spanish Civil War, who led a strong protest in 1969 against the Kremlin's attempt to split the PCE when it supported the divisive efforts of two Central Committee members based in Russia, Augustin Gomez and Eduardo Garcia. The dominant Carrillo-Ibarruri faction expelled them from the PCE in December 1969. Carrillo, who roams Europe and is especially close to the independent-minded Rumanian and Yugoslavian leaders, publishes Mundo Obrero in France, Nuestra Ba.ndera in Belgium, and operates clan estine Radio Espana n~Tcepen lente REI) from Rumania. Although they are long time critics of the Czech affair, with an eye, no doubt, to their potential constituency in Spain, the PCE complaints about the Kremlin cover an even wider range,:.. They have castigated the Soviet Union for dealing with Franco, who forced the Party out of Spain. They have urged China and the Soviet Union to negotiate their differences instead of fighting. They criticize the ideological stagnation of Communism, its failure to understand economic and social realities in the advanced countries of Europe and have even questioned whether Moscow should be the real center of Communism: As recently as September this year, they published a strong denunciation of Stalinism. Obviously, such heresies could not go unpunished. But the Soviet Union faced a dilemma over the best means of silencing this Spanish criticism and of reducing its effect on other European parties. Cutting off all support to the Party they had harbored in the USSR since the Sp~ish Civil War would unquestion- ably cripple the PCE and ,its publications but the Soviets apparently judged that such a tactic would be too crude and obviously a case of blackmail. By backing PCE Central Committee member Lister (who himself had originally condemned the Czech invasion) in his challenge',to the PCE leadership and then financing his Party faction, the Soviets found a somewhat subtler weapon against their "revisionist" critics. If, as expected, Gomez and Garcia can swing some of the exiles now in the USSR to support of? Lister faction, the Carrillo- Ibarruri group could be noticeably weakened. Whether it can be silenced is more doubtful; the reaction from the European CP's may be crucial. (Articles from Le Monde and the Carrillo-edited Mundo Obrero concern- ing some df these matters are attached.) Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 LE MONDE, Paris 23 October 1970 [Charles Vanhecke article: "A New Garaudy?"] [Text] The Venezuelan Communist Party has its Ciax'audy, His name is Teodore Petkoff, 3$ years old, with an economics degree, former party deputy, and till last year a member oi' its political bureau. Since 1969 he has practically been a dissident, first by publishing a book on the Czechoolovak affair, than a faw wpdtts aga by making a virulent attack on the ideas and the methods of the Venezuelan Communist Party, which is an orthodox of the orthodox, since it abandoned the principles of armed struggle for obtaining power in 196+. Petkoff, who is still a Central Commiti:ee member, has him supporters the Venezuelan Communist Party and his brushes with the '?old guard"--who remain in the ma~oriY.y--giva rise to much st;i.rring among the militants. And so the appeals f~~r unity are increasing in the official party organ TRIBUNA POPL'LA&t as the time for -- the fourth congress, which i.s scheduled for the first two weeks .of December, approaches. General Secretary Jesus Faria has dust denounced the danger of a 11spl:it.91 TRIBUNA POPULAR (1 through 7 October) itself uS95 against-the 11renegade" certain of the arguments which Etienne Fajon (who is quoted by name) used against the author of the "Great Turning Point of Soeialism.i1 In h1.s book "Socia].~sm for. Venezuela2" Taodore Petkoff takes up some of the ideas dear to Garaudy and hurls some particularly venomous darts against the Venezuelan Party apparatus. The attack appeared so serious to the Venezuelan Communist Party Po1.~,tical Bureau ghat it took care in a d~mmunique an 'll August to defend Scself aga:i.nst, accusations cf "corruption" ~.nd "vassaldom. The cornpa:ri.son wzfh Garaudy is all the more ~~:.s*.%fi.ed sines, like the French phi.lusnpher , Petkoff began to question hi.mse7.f about the aond'ztions for a ' revival `tn his country af.i:er analyzing the 1?Prague Spring;`P Has first book "Czechc~s].ovakia, the Problem of Socialism" ~N7a.s in fact .entirely devoT~ed to tine grant crisis of 1968, ~ Tt stated thAt the cris:a.s had destroyed eerta:in of the myths cheri.she:d. by comaiuni,sY.s throughout the world and denounced the attitude cif the Sov:~ets, who, to hf.m, were solely responsible for certain contradictions, certain' and f1,ji.ngoist" positions wk,.ich had arisen in Czechoslovakia under the Dubcek gove.rnment< "Ido, was not then in peril in Czechosloval~ia. It h2d, on the contrary, become stronger,1? he wrote- And after attacking the ?tmonstrous bureaucracy1B of the Soviet Union, which understood that the necessity for economic democratization i.nvoi.ved a political democratization which was harmful to its maintenance in power, Teodoro Petkoff declared it necessary to re,)ect the "Soviet model, which is a specific product of history. 1? Petkoff~s two books were obviously condemned: by'the Venezuelan Communist Party. Several times the former Venezuelan deputy was invited to make a self-criticism, but he refused. He was expelled from the Political Bureau 3.n 1969 and_has been accused of "splitting" intentions f ollowing a recent trip to Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria where, it is alleged, he vainly sought support for an attempt to create a?Venezuelan party .independent of Mosco~i. At one time Petkoff appeared to be able to Count on the neutrality of the former General Secretary Marquez,-with '.Thom he had been imprisoned for more than 2 years under the "democratic" governments of Romolo Betancourt and Raul Leoni for having been one of the supporters, within the Venezuelan Communist Party, of the 11insurrectional1? line. He was imprisoned .three times under the Perez Jimenez dictatorship during -the fj.fties. But Marquez signed the condemnation of Petkoff?s theses on 11 August, Having eliminated him from the leadership of the regional committee of the State of Miranda, 'the Venezuelan communist leaders are trying to think up a "begal way" of excluding him from the Venezuelan Communist Party at next December?s congress. ,P.,. ,i~~,~?'Y> ;441 ,. ,:~1;~ ~'~~';~~ ,u .,, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 L~`~i~'~ve~a~~~ Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT 23 October 1970 Le P:C. venezuelien a son Garaudy; 11 s'o,ppCllo 7oadoro . Petkoff, II a trente-hail ans, it est licencie en sciences scone- . miques, aneien depute de son parti, et it etoit membre, jus- qu'd I'an Bernier, du bureau politique. Depuis 1969, i~l est pratiquement en;,-x. en dissi- dence, d'obord en publiont un livre sur foffotre tchecos!o- vaque, puffs, voila quelques se- moines, uhe nttoque- viru~lente contra les conceptions et les mkthodes du .parti communists . L'nttoque o paru si serieuse au bureau polltlquo du p.C.V. ~. qua, de 1 i seat Bernier, it pre- noit le sein,. dons un carnmu- pique, de se defendre. contra . les accusations de < eorrup-'~ . lion > et de < vossolite >. ?Apres ovate rejete le pluro- lisme des opinions, controire . nux ~ ,princdpes deninistes w du centrolisme democrntique, ,il cffirmo5t en substance < Porlee do < volontk de pou- voir >, cost se referer c des < facteurs subjectifs >, les- ? quefa, sans onoiyso objective . do to situation, conduisent & ' i'aventure. > Le P.C.V. reaf- firmait ensuite sa fidelite b I'internationniisme prolktorien - et denon4ait, dons la demor- ehe" de M. Teodoro Petkoff, .: une tentative de fonder un nouveau parti communists. ? La compnroison avec? ? M. Garaudy est d'autant plus justifies qua M. Petkoff, comma (e ,philosophe fran4ois, a commence b s'interroger sur - ,fes conditions d'un renouveau 'socialists dons son pays apres Quoit analyse le c printemps, de Prague w. Son premier li- vre Tchecaslovaquie, ie pro- . blame du socialismo >, etoit en effet tout entier consacre o la grande cries de 1968. II affirmait qua cefte cries dvnit detruit certains mythes res-.. pectes par 1es communistes du ' monde entier, et denongait 1'ottitude des. Sovietiques, seals responsobles, sel4n lui, de certaines contradicticjns, de ' ' certaines positions negatives et c potriotardes ?w qui ovaient ~pu surgir en Tchkco- ' slovaquie sous le gouvdrne- ment de M. Dubcek. < Non, le soctolisme n'ktait pas aloes en peril en Tcheco- stovoquie, it s'etait renfarce ou controire >, ecrivait-il. E?, apres avoir attaque to < bu- rcaucrntie monstrueuse > de , I'Union sovietique, -qui avail. Bien compete qua lee necessitcs de to democratisation econo- mique entrainoient une demo- . crotisation politique ~efaste a son mointden au pouvoir, M. Teodoro Petkoff procla- :'' mart la nkcessite de renoncer nu < modeJe sovietique, pro- . Bait specifique de i'liistoire >,. Los doux divres de M. Pet- koff a n t k t k kvidemment condamnes par le P.C.V. A ` venezuelien -- orthodoxe por- I mi ~les ~orthodoxes, depuis qu'91 0 obandonne en 1964 les prin- cipes de :Jn lulls armee pour conquerir le pouvoir. M. Petkoff, qui est encode membre du eomitk central, a ses partisans au sein du P.C.V., et ses demi:~ies avec la c vieille garde w --- qui taste majoritaire - suscitent beau- -. coup. de ramous chez les mi- litants. Aussi les a.ppels a Y'unite se multiplient-its dons forgone official du parti, Tri- bune popular, o I'approche du quotrieme congres, qui dolt se tapir dons to premiere quip-. zaine de decembre. Le secre- taire general, M. -Jesus Fario, vient de denoncer la menace c scissionniste w. C'est d'ail- feurs Tribune, popular (dark ~ du 1" au 7 octobre) qui uti- lise, centre le c renegat w, eertoins des arguments qua M. Etienne Fajen, cite nom- . mement, employait . c o n f r e I'auteur du. Grand Tournont du soeialisme. Dons son Bernier livre, in- titule Socialisme pour le Ve- nezuela ?, M. Teodoro Pet- koff'reprend quelques ideas ~, chores a M. Garaudy et lance q des fleches porticulierement empoisonnees contr I'opporeil !, du P.C.V. Apres ~'etre pro-'. nonce pour to di rsite des opinions ou sein du parti, it accuse ditterolement' le P.C.V.. de R scleroso >,~ de . Puffs it pose quelques ; ` ~ questions, souvent lee mamas, ' ~ sour des latitudes diffErentes:~_ ? de P:C. venezuelien a-t-il eu , !a a volontc do conquerir le " pouvoir >, et en a-t-il taunt ~. lee conditions ? Est-it un parti ~ndependont et notional 'ou un parti < attend > et < vassal > T < Un parti qui abdique son in- dopendanao critique sur le plan international ost-il an mes+trm de promouvair une veritable politique revalutionnaire 7 > plusieurs reprises I'ancien de- pate vcsneruelien o ate invite a faire son o.+tocritique, ce qu'il a refuse. Exc~lu du bu- Teou politique en 1969, it s'est vu reprocher des intentions scissiotinistes d to suite d'un recent voyage en Italia, en Rournanie, en Yougoslovie et en Sulgorie, ou it aurait eher- clrk --- en vain -des apPuis pour tenter de crest un parti venezuelien independent de ~M.oscou..., Dons un premier temps, ~M. Petkoff semblait pouvoir compter sur to neutra~lite de 1'oncien secretaire genera! du potti, M. Pompeyo Marquez, ?avec qui ii fat emprisonne ~pendont plus de deux ans sous ,Gas gouvernements c demo- - crdtiques w de MM. Romulo Betancourt et Rnoui Leoni, pour avoir ate I'un des parti- ?_ sons, ou sein du P.C.V., de to ' ligne < insurrectionnelle w. II Quoit ate emprisonne o tr`ois ?'?reprises sous to dictature de M. Perez Jimenez, dons lee n n n e e s cinquonte. Mats M. Marquez ~ a signs la tondamnation des theses de ? M. Petkoff de 11 seat Bernier. Et lee diri~leants communistes vehezueliens, apres avoir es- -sayk de I'kiiminer, de da direc- tion du eomite rkgionol~ de -' {'Etas cte Mirondo, soot en train d'imaginer une ~ fa~on Ikgdie w de I'exclure du P.C.V. ? ou congres de decembre pro- ~thGin. ,:iARI.ES VANHECKE. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Four articles from Tribuna Popular, .(organ of the Venezuelan Communist Party), 5-11 November 1970, Caracas.' 1. Alexis Adam, "An Article by Pravda." Pravda, the CPSU Central Committee newspaper, carried an article signed by A. Mosinev in reply to the arguments set forth by comrade Teodoro Petkoff, a member of our party's Central Committee. Because of the ideological discussion we are advancing,- it ,would have been of the utmost desirability and usefulness for us to have found solid arguments which could have been opposed-with scientific seriousness to those submitted by comrade Petkoff as a magnificent contribution to the .progress of the debate and to the task of coming closer to the truth on such vital topics as _ those affecting the international communist movement, the building of socialism, and the development of Soviet'society. However, we are forced to deplore the absence of such critical elements in the article discussed. In his reply to Teodoro, comrade Mosinev displays the same style to which we have been accustomed by those who inside the Communist Party of Venezuela (~V) seek to replace valid discussion and a genuine and broadly democratic confrontation of opinions with a war of "slogans" and attributions based upon irreversible and preconceived positions, and opposed to any critical references. However, despite the style -- which our Central Committee considers to be futile and harmful, we would have~to recognize the right of the author of the article to participate in a public discussion, all the more since it concerns someone who as a Soviet citizen and a CPSU member believes that he has the right to oppose what he considers to be erroneous appraisals, unfounded assertions, or simply .attacks upon his country or the CPSU. In establishing a public discussion, the Communist Party of Venezuela opened the doors to the views of those who inside and outside dur country are interested in participating in the theoretic explanation of the cardinal problems of'the revolution. Such con- tributions are welcome. _" _ ~ -. ~ _- ,... ,,. ..,4 ., ,~ ~a .a_.r ~ .. i i u~1i ~, ti,i~l LlJ u4U, .~~~~~. f(.1.?i l..t~~i 1~7~ ~, ?~. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 That is one thing. It is quite another thing when opinions openly slip onto the ground of internal organizational problems, particularly at a time when our Communist Party is making unusual efforts to surmount a situation that is end.a.ngering its unity. I '~csl3eve that reporter Masiaev is committing this -~r~sst error. It would also appear that his main efforts are not directed toward conducting a polemic with Petkoff, refuting his arguments, and defending the USSR, but rather toward making a statement which can be used within-the framework of our internal strife as in fact it is being used. It-might be convenient to point to a deep]~r rodted feeling among the Venezuelan communists --which was strengthened during the~.polemic with comrade Fidel Castro -- and that is the need for an ~l.ependent party which has the sovereign right to make decisions and to draft its won policy. We are convirn ed that the autonomy of the party is an indispensible premise for the success of our historic tasks. whose action depends upon the opinions of others can look forward to anything except having national roots and being the interpreter and guide of its people. _ The views set forth by Mosinee, and particularly the internal use to which they are being put, violate these feelings and con- victions. That is why we consider it important to make this comment which merely seeks to protect our party's inalienable rights. In conclusion, we would like to express our confidence that despite these accidents, the ~V will continue to assert its national character while it consolidates its internationalism; to strengthen its solidarity with revolutionary organizations in their struggle against imperialism and in their staunch defense of the socialism ,camp; and to develop -- unequivoca]_7tiy -- its ties of friendship and soliderity with the Soviet Union. 'Caracas, 27 October 1970. 2. German Lairet, "Letter from German Lairet." Comrade Gustavo Machado, Director of Tribuna Popular: Dear Gustavo, Tt was, with surprise and displeasure that I read in the last issue of Tribuna Popular a reprint of an article originally published in the official newspaper of a fraternal party in which all kinds of charges are leveled against ~a member of our party's leader ship, Comrade Teodoro Petkoff. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-b1194A000400010001-1 Without going into an ana7~ysis of the reasons behind the editing and publishing of such an article in the CPSU's official newspaper, and while recognizing the full. right of the Soviet. comrades to polemize in whatever tone they consider proper?and to reply to whatever -th~ef -consi~3E~r to ;~e attacks upon their policy, I d,o ~i~ic~ it unpreoede+ntead n.nd censura1ale that thc~ pe.g?s off` Tribune Popular, our Central Committee newspaper, should have been used to reprint the article which amounts to nothing more than an opportunistic use of the pages of our press for the current polemic .that is being waged inside the ~~ -- a polemic in which Teodoro is an imporfcant actor -- as well as an expression of the manifest intention of some comrades to employ such means to in- fluence the results of the Fourth Congress, making illegal use of the authority of the CPSU and the respect it owes all Venezuelan communists. As a member of the Central Committee, I wish to express through 'this letter to the leadership my disapproval of the reprint, which also constitutes a violation of the rules approved by the Central Committee prohibiting the slander of the l~V leadership, and Teodoro Petkoff is sti]1 a member of that leadership. Aware of the spirit of justice and equanimity you have sought to maintain during this difficult internal struggle, I take the liberty, through you, of making my displeasure known, which is also a way of expressing my solidarity with a comrade like Teodoro Petkoff whose path deserves respect, despite the clifferences that may exist with regard to his arguments and concerning whose .revolutionary attitude I have no doubt whatsoever. With Revolution- ary Greetings: 3. Radames Larrazabal, "But, What Tnterference?" The protests against the publication in Tribune Popular of A. Mosinev's article which originally appeared in-the glorious USSR newspaper Pravda come in three varieties. One variety does not reject, but rather excuses the socialist news media for defending themselves against the attacks made by Petkoff in two books of essays and in several newspaper articles over. his signature. However, these same comrades find it unpardonable that a certain "group" participating in the discussion inside the Venezuelan Communist' Party (~V) should seek to profit and to derive benefit . from the Soviet defense. It is a curious dialectic which attempts surreptitiously to disqualify the CPSU's position of principle and to reduc,~ it to a pragmatic "group interest" and to a simple "factional interest". Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 To say that the CPSU is defending itself against imp:Lied attacks would be to equate the quality of the attacks and of the defense with "questionable" intent. This would mean that both could make=errors of procedure or that the punishable error lay in Tribuna Popular's publication. But also there is an attempt to eguate~e ~aet that all "legitimate defense" presupposes, as is the case in bourgeois justice, a legitimate attack, at least until proven otherwise. The CPSU is not on]tiy defending itself with that article, but it is belligerently refuting the slanders and anti-Soviet charges implied not so gratuitously -- in the last analysis "it" :is paid for by the enemy's reception -- by Petkoff.. What is more, and this is very important for anyone with a broad view of proletarian internationalism, it unmasks Petkoff's anti-Leninist and ;~.nti- Marxist stand. But while recognizing recourse to "legitimate defense," alboit formally, these comrades would violently oppose its use as an external bulwark in the internal "struggle of groups." Strangely, those who are basically disgusted by "the interference" now call to the same Soviets in order to advise them so that they will not .allow themselves to be used. What can we Call this? Naivete?_ Stupidity? Ignorance of internationalist practice? Another variety of protest displays more sincere agitation 'than the others by what it calls the "crass Soviet interference in Venezuelan affairs," as if faced with a Russian tank at the doors of `the "Cantaclaro Publishing House." Paragraphs of Mosinev's article-which necessarily refer to the Fourth Congress and to the characteristics of the discussion are taken this way. Another kind of protest upbraids with "national" fury things which, because they are known and recognized, form part o:f the routine, intentionally become subtle accusations of subjugation. I am referring to the arguments concerning 'the need to resolve our problems on our own, in our own way, without borrowing anything. No one questions this, least of all 'the CPSU. These three varieties of protest against Tribune, Popular's publication of the article are bound by the common denominator of a common outcry against an alleged "Russian interference" in our affairs. They all speculate much-and little, directly and indirectly, on the chauvinistic burden which is systematically reinforced by the news media of the pro-imperialist and bourgeois enemy. But, what interference? -~+- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Let us get down to essentials. Did those same persons who are protesting today publicly protest their indignation not only at Petkoff's interference and slanders, but also at his belligerent stand concerning the events in Czechoslovakia that in the last analysis ^Frere provoked by isnp~r3.alSem which made use of rightwang opportunists and other anti-socialist groups as "useful fools"? Did those who are protesting today do so publicly when this same Petkoff repeated in his second book of essays his slanders against the USSR and the CPSU and distorted with revisionist audacity, the cardinal problems of Marxism-Leninism, of the party, of the working class, and of the revolution? Not only they did not protest ,. but they were opposed to the resolutions issued by the national leadership in this matter. However; it is obvious that Mosinev's article does not constitute an attempt to deprive anyone of his right to criticize or to dissent; but it does attempt to let everyone see what the exercise of .the forbidden right to slander and distortion can lead. Pravda did not react to the criticism, but to the slander and to the revisionist efforts. And here there can be no valid protests against "interference." -Have those who today are -- protesting ideological and political interference clearly raised their voice against the real interference in our affairs by the bourgeois and imperialist p-r~:ss, radio, and television? Obviously there is the interference which provokes the sacred outburst of "national feeling that which comes from the socialist world; and the interference which, on the contrary, they claim lends "national distinction and is even anxiously sought: that which comes from the propaganda machines of the ruling classes. Moreover, if we assume the right and the duty of the Soviet comrades to self-defense and to discussion, and if this defense coincides fu]1jr with the viewpoints off' tie ~V Central Committee, why then be alarmed and raise one's voice to demand punishment for the reprinting of the Pravda article on the pages of Tribune Po;~ular? The contrary would be alarming. As things stand at present, our Fourth Congress will have to be an unusually important event in this difficult mission of continuing to forge a Leninist party with the irrevocable and sustained determination to assume revolutionary power at the head of the workers. Circumstances have increased the. fraternal parties' anticipation of this event, and they will be represented either by delegations or by messages. And do not call them "interference"o To this affect, any article by Lenin's party in connection with our Congress should not only command our greatest attention, but Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 we should consider it a duty and a right coming from the pages most concerned with proletarian internationalism. ~+. Gustavo Machado, "Our Opinion." The Political Sureau having studied the commotion caused by the insertioiz of the TASS wire summing up A. Mosinev's article, today we publish the full text of the article and the critical views of Alexis Adam and German Lairet. I must immediately announce that the responsibility far the initial report that was sent by the Soviet news agency appearing in No. 73 of Tribuna Popular was wholly and personaL'ltiy mine . Neither the sutmnarized wire version nor the complete text represents the slightest interference in the internal affa~:rs of the 1~V Venezuelan Communist Party (l~V) . There is no ir~ter- ferenee, firstly because A. Mosinev is resorting to legitimate defense against Teodoro Petkoff's repeated attacks in books, statements, and writings upon the socialist camp, particularly uppn the Soviet Unian; and secondly, no intervention is involver because the Soviet writer limits his observations to material writt;er. and edited by Venezuelan communists. He is informing public opinion in his country on what the Venezuelan Communist Party leadership is thinking and resolving. Do the Soviet comrades not have the right to keep abreast of the situation in our Party? It is. necessary to reject any alleged similarity between Pravda's article and the i~.fficulties that have arisen in t;~e recent past with the Cuban communists. Even if any intent to advise or to sway one way or the other could be detected, and this is not the case, a direct and aggressive interference in favor of a member of a faction for the purpose of dividing the ITV against its national leadership would be quite another thing. In the issue following the one in which the TASS wire appeared, we are publishing an article by Pompeyo Marquez setting fo7:~th with reasonable prudence the doctrine of proletarian internationalism which has been the norm guiding the fraternal relations be-t;ween the PCV and the CPSU in the course of the years with no harm to our sovereignty and with abroad and steady sense of brotherhood on the part of our Soviet comrades. And if we do not publish any article on this topic, it is because there is no room in Tribuna Po ular for attacks-and slanders against the socialist world and ota.r Soviet comrades. Gustavo Machado -6- A~Iproved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 T BUNA POPULAR, Caracas Div AxrzcvL~ ALEXIS ADAM A manc~ra de respuesta a las tesis del camarada Teodoro Pet- koff, miembro del Comite Cen_: tral de nucstro Partido, aparc- cio en "Pravda", _ brgano del CC del PCUS, un articulo bajo la firma de A. Mosinev. Para nosotros hubicra silo de sumo interes y utilidad, en ra- z6n de la discusibn ideologica que adclantamos, encontrar s~- Iidos argumentos que pudieran ser .conti~apuestos con seriedad cientifica, s. los esgrimidos por el camarada Petkoff cotno uri magnifico apoi?te a la elevaci8n del debate y a la tarea de apro_ ximarse a la verdad en tan vita- les temas Como los concernien- tes al movimiento comunista in- ternational, a la construccibn del socialismo y al desarroilo ~e la sociedad sovietica. Tenemos que lamentar, sin embargo, la ' ausencia de tales Elementos cri. ticos en el comentado escrito. El camarada Mosinev, en su respuesta a Teodoro, hate gala- del mismo estilo a que nos tie- nen acostumbrados ~quienes en ei seno ccl PCV . quieren' susti- tuir la discusidn valeder~, la real confrontation de opiniones ampliamente democratica, con la guerra de "slogans" y califi- cativos inspirada en posiciones irreversibles y pretomadas. re_ fractarias a toda rcfe.euc~ cri- tics- Pcro sun asi, pest a tal estilo --considcrado esieril y danino por nucstro CC- irn- driamos que mconccer el dere- cho que le asiste al autor del Esto es una Cosa. Muy disiin_ to es cuando las opiniones ~e deslizan abiertamente al terre. no de los problemas organizati_ vos internos, maxime en momen- tos que nucstro PC realiza inu- sitados esfuerzos ~ fin de supe- rar una situation cargada de pc_ ligros para su unidad. Creo que el periodista ~ Mosinev comcte este gi*an error_ _. Parecier~ incluso, que sus principales esfuerzos no estan dirigidos a sostener La pol~mica con Petkoff, a rebatir sus tc- sis, adefender a la UE1.SS, sino a brindar una referencia que pueda ser utilizada en 7os mQr- cos de nuestra luCha interns, co_' mo en efecto to es. Oportuna- es la ocasibn para destacar un sentimiento profun- damente arraigado entre los co- munisbas venezolanos -fortalc. cido durante la poIemica con el camarada Fidel Castro- coal es la nece~idad de tin ~ partiuo independiente, saberano en la toms de decisiones y en la ;:'.~:x_ boracion do su po]itica. Estamos convencidos de que la autono- mia de] Partido es una premi_ -sa indispensable para alcanzur exito en- nuestras tareas hisi5_ ricas, Un Partidd que Naga de_ ponder su?accion de .las opinio- nes de otro, pods aspirar a cualquier toss menos a tencx raigambre national y a ser i,"~_ terprete y gui~a de su pueblo. Las .opiniones emitidas por ASosinev, y sobre todo la utiliza- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas 5 November 1870 CPYRGHT (GVSTAVO IviACHADU Director de "Tribune Popular", Apreciado -Gustavo: - Con sorpresa y desagrado lei en eT ultimo numero de "TP" la reproduction de un articulo pu- biicado en el organo official de un partido hcrmano .en el cual se hacen lode claw de imputa_ ciones contra un miembro de la direction de nuestro Partido, el camaracra- Teodoro Petkoff. Sin cntrar a analizar las cau- sas que motivan la redaction y publication de tal articulo en e] diario official del PCUS y reco- nocicndo todn el derecho que puodan toner ios camaradas so. vieticos para polemizar en el to- no que consideren conveniente y responder a to quo consideren ataqu~s ~ su politics, me resul- ts si inaudito y censurable quo las paginas de "TP", organo -del Comite Central, se empleen pa. ra reproducir tal al ticulo to cual no es mss quo un t~so ventajista de las paginas de nuestra pren- sa para is actual polemics .quo hoy se Libra en el seno del PCV -polemics en -:a~ .cual Teodoro es actor importante- y expre- sion de la intencibn manifiesta que tienen algunos camaradas de ocher mano de bales recur- sos para influir en Los resulta- dos del IV Congreso, empleando en forma ilegitima la autoridad quo time el PCUS y el respeto quo nos merece a todos ios eo- munistas venezolanos.-, Como miembro del Comite Central quiero con esta Carta a la Direction dejar express cons_ tancia ?de mi dcsacuerdo con tal reproduction, la cual edemas es ~, violatoria do Las normas aprobm. des por el CC quo prohibe deni- grar do la direction del PCV y .Teodoro Pcikoff es haste el pre. sente miembro de esa direction. Conocedor del espiritu de justi- cia y de la ecuanimidad quo has tratado de mantencr durante Fsta ardorosa lucha interne me? permito por to intermedio . ha= cot jxiblico ,'mi , desagraido :q~' es t~mbien Tina manors 'dc 'eX: presar mi solidaridai! eon un ca-. marada ?eomo Teodoro P.etkoff eu,1'a irayectoria merecc ?~pe- to, a poser de bas diverge~eias que se puodan toner alrexiedor de ]as tesis que spstiene, y sc>_ bre el coal no xne' Cabe ciuda al- guna en cuanto a ;su tondici$n cte revoiucionario Con saludos comunistas: CPYRGHT eas Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas CPYRGHT 5 November 1970 Dc tres variantes son las pro- testas dirigidas Contra la publi. cation en "Tribune Popular", del ar?ticulo de A. i-Iosinev ori- ginalmente aparecido en el glo- rioso diario "PRAVDA" de la URSS. IIna de ellas no rechaza, sino que por el contrario perdona, que los medios de comunicacion socialistas se dcfiendan de ]os atacjues que Petkoff ha produ. tide a traves de dos libros de. ensayos y varies sueltos -de prep- sa calzados con su firma. Pero ]n que seria imperdonable, segun estos mismos camaradas, es que determinada ? ?"corriente" ale la discusion que -curse en el PCV iritente en forma ventajista uti- lizer en su beneficio la defensa sovietica. Curiosa dialectica por medio de la coal se baste in- ti?oducir subrepticiamente la descalificacion de la position de principles del PCUS y reducir_ la ' a un, p r a c m a t f c o "interes de Corrientes", a un simple- "interes de fraction". Decir que el PCUS se defien- de de ataques inferidos, seria igualar con intention "cuestiona- doru" la calidad de los ataques y las defcnsas. De ese modo re- ultaria que "ambos pudienan in_ ? aurrir en errores de Procedi- iento o que el error castiga- Ic estuvo en ]a , publfcacion de 'Tribune Popttlar".. Pero tam_ ien se Pretende igualar, por. quello de que toda "lcgitima efensa" supone,_como en Ia jus_ icva bureuesa, un legitimo eta. ue, por to menos haste que no e demuestre to contrario. El PCUS, a traves de ese ar- iculo, esta, no defendiendose era y simplemente, sino rgcha_ ndo beligerantemente -las ca_ umnias y pos~uras antisovipti- as inferidas no de modo tan ratuito -porque ai fin y al abo "ese" se cobra en la recep- ividad que demuestra e] enemi_ o- por Petkoff. Pero ademas, `esto es may importante pare uien tenga uri criterio amplio ceroa del internacionalismo roletario, desenmascara 1 a s osiciones anti?leninistas y anti ~arxistas de Petkoff. RADAMES LARRAZABAC Pero admitiendo .el recurso de ]a "lcgitima defensa", aun etaan- do formalmente, estos Camara. des dicen oponer8e con todas sus fuerzas, a que sc la utilice Como base de apoyo extPrno en la in- terne "lucl~a de_Z?orrientes". De modo extrano, quienes en el fon_ do se hailan disgustados por "la intromisi8n", apelan ahora a ]os mismos Sovi~ticos_ pars ?orientarles en el sentido que ~no se dejen utilizer. ~COmo llamar ese? ;,Ingenuidad?, ~ Necedad? Desconocimicnto de la practice intcrnacionaliste? ' Olra do esas protestas se en- crespa mas sincer~mente que Ias otras variantes, por to que califica "horde intr_omisi6n so- vietica en lose asuntos venezola_ nos", algo asi Como la aparicion de un tanque ruse-a las ?puer- tas del edificio "Cantaclaro". 1?arra[os del articulo de Mosi- nee, donde aludP obligatoria- mente el IV Congreso y las ca. racteristicas de la discusion, Seri tomadas de ese manes. Otra .de esas protestas es la pue enrostra con Earle "patio: pal" cows que. gor sabidas y .ad- , miiidas,. forman parte do Ia re- tina, pero que intencionadas de ese modo, se convierten en su.. tiles acusaciones de vasallaje. Me reficro a los _ argurrentos acPrca de la necesidad de. resol- ver nuestras cuestiones con cri- terio propio, con cabeza propia y sin.trasplantes, Cosa que na- die pone en dude y men+os el PCUS. . Estes tres clasps de protestas ante la publication do '"Tribune Popular", se hall:,n `entrelaza_ des por el dominador comun de la grita comun contra una su-. puesta "ingerencia ruse en noes tros asuntos". codes ellas Ps. peculan macho ? y poco, directs e in,clirect.amente, el fardo clip. vi.;ista que, sistematicamente ee reforzado desde 1os medics de comunicacion -del enemigo pn~-; ;mperialista y burgups, . _; Pero,' ~ coal intromision?_ Vamps al grano. ~ l~s que escs mismos que hoy protestan die. rorr constancia ptiblica a indig- r~ada d? su ~ protesta, ya no solo de la _intromision, ni de' las ca_ ~umrias, sino ademas. de is be_ 'geramente tome de posiciones. de I?etkoff en relation a los su- cesos de Checoslovaquia, pro~zo-' cedes, en tiltlma instancia, por e] impervalismo que utili~.i en calidad de "tontos fitiles" a los oPortunistas de der?echa y de- mas Corrientes anti_socialistas? ~ Es que esos mismos que hoy protestan to lricieron 3? pubtica_ mcnte, cuando el mismo Petkoff reincide en su Segundo ]ibro de ensayos en la comision dc? infa- mies contra la URSS, el PCUS y donde tergiversa can ? uudacia ue revisionista cucstioncs car_ c;inahs del marxismo_]cn::i:::o, ,:d partido, de la clasc obrcra ,? la rcvolucio_n_ ? No s61o no pro_ testaron sino -que se mostr;iron contraries a }as r: sc:':u.:iu^.,~s hroducidas por la dir ~cciu : r~.,.. ;:iontal en este sentido. Sin, embarb~~, esta veto -~c>; eI articulo do Mosinee, c uc no se gala do pisotcarle na,;ie sa de- recl:o de criticar ni do disentir, ;ere side exponer a la vista do ::e todo cl mundo a donde puc_ ?, conducir el ejercicio del . ne- ;ado derecho de ca;umniar y icrgiversar. "PRAVDA" r:o ha rcaccionado~ ante ]a critica, si- no ante la infamia-y los intentos revisionistas. Yen este terrero no hay gritos contra "la intro., mision" que valgan. ~.'s que esos mismos qne .,cy. protestan contra La intromisiL~ ,:.:eolugica y politico hen eleva_ Qo claramente su voz contra la verdadcra intromisiLrr en nues- iras asuntos, de Ia prensa, ~a radio y La television burguesa c im7erialisi;a? Por to visto, hay intromisiones que provocan el estallido sagrado de "s.~nti- micntos nacionales": aqueIlas que proceden del mundo socia_ lists; e intromisiones que_, por- e] contrario, halab+an den "bri_ Ili nacionai" y haste se solici. tan afanosamente: las que pro- ceden de los aparatos propagan_ disticos de Las clasps dominant test Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010~~'4~ GHT TRIBUNA POPULAR., Caracas 5 November 1970 or otra parts, s: amos por supucsto el derecho y el deber ~~e los camaradas sovieticos de :;efenderse y_ discutir y si esa cteftnsa coincid? plcnamente con ]'os" puntos de vista del CC dei PCV; "~ por quc entonces afar. mares y eaagcrar of toms sgllcl- tondo sanclones. for la reps.. duccion del articulo de "PRAV_ DA" en las pliginas do "Tx'ibu- na Popular"? Lo alarmante se- ria lo' contrario, ~ - - " Tal Como ~stan las cosas,, nuestro IV Con~?s?eso habra de ser un jalon inusitad+amcnle isrx. ??ortante eri . esta ardorosa rzxi_ ~?i6n de seguir emI>cnados en la forja de un partido leninista eon is?revocable 3~ sostenida decision . :le asumir el Podcr rcvoluciona. rio a la crabeza de los trabaia-' Pevis cunsideraci3n en el Buro Politico dei revuelo c;au- sado por la inserel6n del telegrams de la Adencia Toss resu- niRcndo cl articulo de ?i,. iliosine~?, hoy publicamos el texto com- pleto y opiuiwxes critical de Alexis Adam y GermSn Lairet. Reba annsncis:r de Insnediato que Ia responsabilidad de qve la in(ornu:cib:s initial trssnxitida por la agencia sovietica spare. tiers en el 1\v 78 de "Tribuna.Ponular", me corresponds in- tegra y persansimente. - - ? Ni en Lx versidn tclebr~fica ressuai3a, ni en el texto com- pleto exists la mbs Ieve intromision en los asuntos imternos del PCV. ]\o hay-ingerencia, primero, porque A. 1. II est e~alement rer:;u +, d' < antimarxtsrra ~ (un prcnan4 un are:.?;at3 natronat ca :,xialismG). ll est egaioment accus5 :ra vou- loin lairs du parts communiste ospagnol un parts a ou- vriar bourgeois ++, en I'intcgrantclans le < nee-capiiatic tae espagnol ~ et ,en le lalsan4 comb6ttre pour < une preten- due demacratisatEOn du .pays s. Le oorc~te central ~u P.C.E., true de sa derniere reu- nlan, a GualrTie de < oatomnles > tes attaaues pe:so::- nelles lancces ~contre M. Ssrtiugo Carriito. Et r~ s'as~ : . QUESTION. - M. Lister nous accuse d'etre ant~izarxiste Parce que vows, pr8nez un m:odele de c communisme .national >... REPONSE. - Je suis partisan 'd'un mod@le de socialisme adapt@ aux r@alit@s de 1'Espagne, ce qui n'a rien ~. voir avec ce qu'on ap- pelle un < communisme natio- nal n ; et je suis, @videmment, marxiste et 1@niniste. Seulement, je pense que 1'unanimit@ des partis communistes, comme elle existait au temps'du Komintern, nest plus passible. Le mouve- ment communiste international. s? Bait de reconnaitre ~ tows. les partis adh@rents le droit ~. la diversite, t=tant donnt;es les dif- f@rences de d@veloppdment de leurs pays respectifs. Pour nous, i'essentiei nest .pas . une unit@ id8ologiqu~e de fagade, mais 1'unitk d'action centre Pimp@ria- lisme nord-am@ricain, 'laquelie n'exciut pas les divergences id@o- logiques, C'est pouiquoi nous som- mes pour le r@tablissement de rapports avec les communistes chinois, comme nous sommes pour 1'alliance, en Espagne, avec toutes les forces anti-imp@rialis- tes. L~ encore, c'est un r@flexe. traditionnel qui am8ne certains camarades ~, penser que le mou- vement communiste d o i t conti- neur d'avoir son centre ~. Mos- cou. Q. - Donc, e'est la rupture avec les Sovidtigzies 1 R. - Pourqu0i ? Le parti com- muniste soul@tique a approuv@, comme nous, en juin 1989, la r@- solution de la conf@rence de Mos- cou disant que les diff@rences, m@me durables, enti?e les P.C. ne doivent pas faire obstacle ~ leur colIaboi?ation. Tl a encore ap- prouv@ notre polityque en avril, en signant, avec Dolores Itrarruri et mo-m@me, un communique bila- teral. Les locaux' du parts com- muniste espagnol h Moscow scut taujours entre nos mains. Sur le n:illier d'Espa~:ols qui vivent ~en Union sovidtique, ' neufa cents ' environ scut avec nous, les au- tres cut @t@ exolus pour leer appui ~, Lister at son groupe. ' Q. - C'est pourta>t bien. 3 Z'instigation et avec l'appui des SaviEtiques que bl, Lister a fond un nouveau P.C. espttgnol et pu- bli~ un autre a 14:und0 obrero A ? R. -Lister et son groupe es- s'lient, aujouxd'hui, en ekploitant nos cuff@rends avec le parts com- muniste de 1'Unian soul?tique, de trouver en Espagne la force qu'ils n'ont pas. Mais, vows savez, ii y ~ un proverbe ruse qui dit :. < Le pine ami de I'homme, c'est fours d@voud..> Les pines amts de 1'Union soul@tique, dans notre pays, ce scut ceux qui se pr8sen- tent comme ses d@fens~eurs les plus farouches: Q. -- Si 1'Union sovidtique dta- blissait des relations diploma"- ques avec le ~ gcnGral Frarc~, quelle serait votre position ? R. - C'est un pas qui aurait @t@ comer@hensible it y y dix ou quinze ans, mais qui ne Pest plus quand le franqusme touche ~, sa fin. Noun pennons que des rela- tions diplomatiques entre des pays socialistes et Franco por- tent prgjudice au prestige de ces . pays aux yeux des masses popu-. . hires. Q. - Si M. Lister a Z'appui de Moscow, comment le parti commu- niste espagnol pours-t-il r~sis- ter dson of/ensive 7 R. -Notre parts, ~lui est in- dependant, a dejz~. r8ole ce pro- bl~ine. La pantie est gan8e a partir du moment oix les c~_ ` onze membres de notre comite central, dont quatre-vingt-dix vi- ' vent en Espagne, approuvent no- tre politique, laquelie est suivie par toutes nos organisations d'i~.s- pagne. Lister n'a que de petits groupes de partisans parmi les @migr@s installes daps un ou deux pays socialistes. En Fra.r,c=~, it n'a qu'une soixantaine dc: sy:n- pathisants parmi p 1 u s de dix 'mille communistes emigr~:?s. Q. -Mais vows avez exciu cez~W qui n'~taient pas d'accor~l avec .vows. Est-ce bien confornze cz vos positions sur le pluralisme id~o- logique 7 ' R. -Lister et son groupe ;,;, scut exclus deux-m@mes en gtat- taut la derniere reunion du co- mit@ central, en septembre, et en fondant u;:e caricature de parts communiste. Toute liberte a Ste laiss8e a certains camarades is d?sapprouver nos prises de po- sition sur la Tch@coslovaquie, mais au moment dhagir 1'unitt? etait n@cessaire. Cela dit, it cs;: vrai qu'il faut trouver ur. :neilleur dquilibre entre cette necessit@-lh et Celle de la d@mocratie' inferno. En septembre, le parts ~or.~mu- niste espa?~nol a adopte pour principe que les divergences pour- raient @tre expos8es h 1'averir dans ses journaux. Mais nous sommes encore un parts iilSgal. La democratic dans le parts se resent du manque de d8mocra- tie dans le pays tout cutler. C'est vrai pour les autres partis d'op- position espagnols, bien qu'ils ne se r@clament pas du centralisme d@mocratique. Q. - Votre position sun la Tchecoslovaquie nest-elle pas une prEcaution destinde d nous conci- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Tier Ia sympathie du rest~e de 1'opposition espagnoie ? R. -Notre politique rationale et internationals ne fait qu'ur tout. Il ne g'~git gas d?Cm'o ~rre- caution, macs du Pond m@me da cette palitique. Sinon, qui pour- rait nous croire quand noes par- fors de socialisme denrocratique ? Nous ne sommes pas pour autant antisovietiques. Nous ne sou s- estimons pas 1'impoi~ance de 1'Unian sovietiq~ie comme puss- sauce anti -imperialists. IvIais nous sommes contre la division du monde en deux blocs militares, contre lies zones d'influence, qui ne servent finalement que I'imp8- rialisme. Q. - Le socialisme nest pttS vatre premier dbjectf ? R. - L'Espagne ne peut Masser directerncnt du ts't~riquismtl au socialisme. I1 faut urb stops. Mais notre objectif est evidem- ment le socialisme - un socia- lisme democratique et indeper- dart, ou le parts Communists pours titre un parts dii~fgeant, znais non dominanii. Un ?abea- lisme qui accepter le ~siuZ?alisnle philosaphique et politique, Ie seul possilrie dons un pays' dBvelQpp~. Nous concevons tres bier une Espagne socialists otY le .chef du gouvernement serait catholique et ou Ie P.C. serait minrSrit2,ire. C'est d'ailleurs la legon ~rtirmi~ de notre histoire. Pendant la guerre civiie, le parts communists aurait pu preridre le pouvoir. - it avast les meilIeures unites miltaires, . it await les blind8s, 1'aviation, - mais it n'a pas Suivi _ceux qui lui suggeraient de Ie'faire. Le gouvernement republicain n e comptait que deux ministres com-. munistes, mass notre pamti await tout de meme un r&le dirig`eant, car ses idees avaient de 1"in- fluence. 1'etat-tnfljor. ale 1'armee et de la gendarmerie, a condamne la pro- pi'ir~t4 grivea et s'est prononrx4 patu? la luttc des classes, L'Eglian a psis position sur les fusillades de Grenade. Vest daps des cou- Vents que se reunissent souvent les commissions ouvri~res. Commu- rrfstes et cathaliques travaillent eYrSemble-daps ties commissions - nuvric:~es, jraysannes - et clans la Camniis?'ftrri nationals crcec au debut d2 Tonnes. C'est avec 1'ap- pui des eatholiques qu'une Breve de vi~gt-quatre heures a et8 stti- vie, ie 13 octob; dernicr, ;gar 'Vhigt ,milIe ouv~iers aericoics dens 1a province de S;ivile. Sans la po'iitique d'unite avec les ca- tiioligti:es, 1'opposition n'aurait pas pu faire surface. Vous savez, nous aeons souvent fist que le socia- iiame e5pagnol marcherait avec la faucilla et le marteau dons une nz~,fil et la Croix dons 1'autre ! Q. - Que1s sort vos alli8s en Espagne? R. - Tous Ceux qui sort favo- rable5 au rStablissement des liber- tes democratiques, mime s'ils out des buts opposes aux n8tres, meme si, dons Ie passe, ifs ant appuy8 lie regime franquiste. Q. - Mais la classe ouuridre peut-ells accepter une alliance qui engIobe une partie des classes possedantes, ? R. -Vous oubliez que le r@- gime espagnol a garde des formes fascistes, et que notre premi8re Cache, c'est d'en finir avec elles. Pour y arrivei?, nous sommes parts a pactiser avec le diable ! Cela, le peuple le comprend ties Bien. Quand ies communistes frangais out dil lutter contre le nazisme, ifs se 5ont bier allies a. de Gaulle!. L'opposition bourgeoise nous est donc necessaire, et it suffit de Iire la presse espae role pour cons- toter qu'olle exists. Une partie du captalisme ne croft plus au systisme autoritaire; des forces de .plus en plus nombreuses, jusque daps 1"appareil de 1'Etat, ju5que chez Ies militaires, sort prrtes ~ conclure un pacts pour la libertr. Q. - Comptez-nous sur Juan Carlos pour retablir Ia dEmo- cratie 7 R. - Personne, en Espagne, ne compte sur Juan Carlos. La plu- part des militaires n'ont pas confianoe en lui. Franco a 1'auto- rite de celui qui a gagnr une guerre. Juan Carlos n'en a gagTir aucune, il_ n'a aucune autoritr. La monarchie n'a pas beaucoup d'avenir en Espagne. Si Juan Carlos monte sur ie trdne; ce sera" provisoire. Q. -Vous avez fist : < Un chef de gouvernement catholique m. Quells est votre position d regard de Z'Eglise ? R. -? L'Eglise e5pagnale a tits :. la plus intBgriste, la plus reaotian- naire qui snit, ells a tits la farce principals du franquisme. Mais aujourd'hui, ells adoppe des po- sitions qui, aussi timides soient- elles, 1'eloignent du regime. Ells prend encore une rnorme me:spon- sabilitr en ne demand~,nt pas 1'amnistie, ce qui Est indispen- sable pour liquifier la ~tierre cfVile. N:"us else a ~n son sein des courants progressistes puissants, qui peuvent en tame i'Egiise la plus pr?ogressiste du monde. Re- cemment, a; Oviedo, un jesuite, professeur a, 1'Ecole gr?egorienne de Rome, qui a deux freres ttaris Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 LE MONDE, Paris ~+ November 1970 "The Study o#' 1!~~x'X~.~m ~s Nab Our F~?lusiv~ Patrimony" "i~onalitric," "do~:n;atic,n nF:,~, ? E5? gobienlo deberia, ademfis, com- ? ? promet?erse s realizar una politics ex- . terior de paz, independencia y neutra- -~ lidad respecto a. los bloques militares, ?` diversificando sus re~aciones con todos ~ _ ._ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 25X1C10b ~ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Y December 1970 After 6 months imprisonment following his arrest last May at his summer cottage in Ryazan Province, southeast of Moscow, Andrei Amalrik was sentenced on 12 November 1970 to a term of three years in a labor camp under "intensive regime". The trial, which took two days, was held at Sverdlovsk, 900 miles east of the city where he is registered as living -- Moscow. The reason given for the trial's transfer to this Urals city was that copies of his works were found there, but this appears to have been a transparent device to limit publicity of the trial.. Sverdlovsk is off limits to foreigners. Amalrik was tried wider Article 190 (1) of the Russian Republic's criminal code, which makes it a crime to spread "deliberate fabrications. defaming the Soviet State and public order." This article, signed in 1966, is used against dissenters. The prosecution's charges were based on 5 documents: an open letter he wrote to Anatoly Kuznetsov (who defected to Britain last year), transcripts of two interviews with CBS, and two books - Involunt__a__rryy~ Journey to Siberia and Will The Soviet Union Survive n~ti~~~ e order was pu lishe in ugust y arcourt race ovanovich, Inc., 757 3rd Ave. New York, N.Y. 10017, and the latter by Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc:, 49 East 33rd St., New York, N.Y. 10016. This soft cover edition, distributed as a selection by -the Book of the Month Club, contains a preface by Henry Kamm which is a portrait of the author as a dissenter, as well as a commentary about the work by Sidney Monas. In Canada Fitzhenry and Whiteside, Limited, Toronto, has also published an edition, and one has been put out in Russian by the Alexander Herten Foundation, Amstel 268, Amsterdam-C, The Netherlands. The historical vision of the Soviet Union that Amalrik holds is ironic in that at a time of the expansion of the USSR's physical power his attention is riveted on the collapse of the source of that power. What Amalrik sees in his country is the transformation of what was a primal flash of energy in 1917 into a peevish and fearful structure of weak and unimaginative bureaucrats determined to hold on to their privileges and to power for its own sake. Because of their weakness and division they will be unable to take the necessary measures goon enough, or to make them strong enough, to enable Russia to survive the changing situations and pressures. Essentially the author views the Soviet state not as a 50 year old phenomenon but as the final phase of an empire which had its oxigins over 1,000 years ago in the Kievan Rus, and which is less Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 than 14 years from destruction. Beginning as a sober, analytical treatise on the causes and sources of the current difficultiE;s in the Soviet Union, the work evolves into an Old Testament prophecy of a holocaust to come which is contained in the last 26 pagf~s of the book. Among the ideas expressed in the build-up preceding it perhaps the most controversial concerns Amalrik's disbelief in the inevitability of the triumph of liberalism in his country as a result of an increasing standard of living and a concurrent tide of Western influence, such as jazz and miniskirts, with a consequent softening of ideological hostility toward the West, and even its own citizens. As he puts it, "It is possible that we will indeed have a 'socialism' with bare knees someday, but not likely one with a human face." Approved For Release 1999/~~~I -RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Amalrik Says- Soviet Fears.--Ideas By BERNARD CrWlyltTZMAN e-~!!iR{ t+!?t's!!M!a Yerk Tlml1 MOSCOW, Nov. 14 -Andrei Amalrik; the dissident Soviet author, was reported today to have told a court that his trial on charges of defaming the So- viet state reflected "the cow- E ardice of a reginme that regards as a danger the spreading of ;~ any thought, any idea alien to g its top bureaucrats:' # The Sverdlovsk court, in a ~ two-day trial that ended on ' _T~hursday, sentenced Mr. Amal- rik, 32?yeaT~ald author of seveT- k, a1 boales and essays published'I abroad, to three years' confine-'I ment in a da~bor camp. Acode-~ fendant, Lev. G. Uboz~hlca, a :Sverdlovsk student, also re- ceived ~Chree years but in a less strict camp. Mr. Amalrik's friends related 6~is remarks to Western news- :. men. They said the verdict `~ wou1d be appealed. In his final words before being sentenced, Mr. Amalrik said his rtrial was meant to frighten others dntosilence, but "I think that fhe process of ? ideological emancipation that ' has begun is irreversible." f Appears in Good Health ~ 1 read "deliberate fabrication:; R~~'ime s~ Cowardaoe ~ 1 h ~ 1 t DissenterAsserts ainst dissidents. ddition to his books, pub- 1 she only abroad, Mr. Amal- k as also cited for inter- iew he gave to William Cole, co respondent of the Colum- is roadcasting System who as ubsequently expelled from os w. M Amalrik refused to enter pl a of guilty or not guilty, i sis ing-that the-court had no ght to try him _for his views. H repeated his refusal to 'sc s his views in his final ate ent, but said he did wish t a saver the allegations that s atements "were directed ai st ~ my people and my "I seems to me that now thQ' sin task for my country is t u urden itself of the heavy eig t of the past, and for this c iti sm is necessary above all d of glorification," he said. "I hink that I am a better tri t than those who, loudly. cl ing their love for the; oth rland, by love for. thej oth rland mean love for their) o n rivileges. "N ither the witch hunt c rri d out by the regime, nor t is particular example-this t ial arouses in me the slight- e t r sped nor any fear. I un- d rst d, however, ?that -such t 'als are counted on the fright- e any, and many will be f 'gh ned. gut all the same, I t ink the development of ideo- i is 1 emancipation, having is irreversible." lace now can be explained my as the cowardice of a re- ime that regards as a danger ~e spreading of any thought, ny idea alien to its top bu- sucrats." Although the Soviet authari- es talk about an ideological ;niggle, ho said, .they can op- ~se alien ideas only with "the treat of criminal prosecution," "Recognizing theirideologicai ~pelessnass, they cling. in fear ~ criminal codes?? prisons, imps -and psychiatric hospi- tls; ' he said. - "In particular, the fear of my ioughts, of `the facts expressed my books, forces these peo- e to put me in the dock as a ~iminal. -This fear led them so to be afraid of trying me in oscow. They. brought me here, linking that here the trial ould attract less attention." Code Amended in 1966 The Amalriks are legally reg- tered as living in Moscow, here they share a communal iartment.' Sverdlovsk, in the rals,,is off limits to foreigners. ?Amalrik was notified that was being tried in 5verd- sk on the ground that copes his works were found~in that alsz city. Mr. Amalrik and Mr. Ubazhko ~ under Article I90 (1) of Russian Republic's Criminal Mr. Amalrik, a slightly built, bespectacled historian, made it a point to know many for- eigners before his arrest last May at his summer cottage in Ryazan Province, southeast of, Moscow. His wife, Guyzel, a painter, attended the trial as a witness. According to his friends, Mr. Amalrik looked in good health despite the six anonths' confine- .- ment, and he seemed as out- spokenly critical.of the Soviet leadership as in his works. His book "W}'ll tl'ie U.S.S.R. Survive L~til 1984" predicts the down- fall of the Soviet regime be- cause of internal disorders and a war with China. Mr. Amalrik compared the trials of dissidents to .witch trials. of the Middle Ages. "But if one could at least partly .explain the struggle against heretic ideas In the Mid- die Ages as religious fanati-! cism," he told the three-man tribunal, "eve thin talon atr- ng $ ov et state ana Refl~eted by ~'rial, ~ blic order," The article was Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT THE WASHINGTON POST 15 November 197a Sentencing I dew ~s Crime I n I tself, fl malril~ 'Declares By Anthony Astradhan. Washington Poet Foreign 6ervice some are ava,llable through samizdat (self-publishing). At the opening o~ the trial Wednesday, Amalrik gave a punishment, whether ~they,be true or false', seems to me to be a crime in itsolf." So dissident author Andrei Amalrik told the court that sentenced him Thursday to three years in a prison camp, his friends said today. He also accused the Soviet regime of intbllectual coward- ice, that led it to medieval- style? witch hunts, which he said~? could not reverse the ' "process of ideological emancf- pation now under way." ` Amalrik. was charged with violating article 190-1 of the Russian Republic Criminal Code,, which deals with "dis- semination ~ of falsehoods de- rogatory to the Soviet state .and social system." The prosecution based its case on five documents includ- eing Amalrik's book "Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" in which he analyzed the various groups bf dissi- dents'here and predicted the disintegilation of the Soviet empire in a war with China. None oaf these has been pub- lished in tihe?SovietrUnion, but ~' MOSCOW, Nov. 14-"T -CPYRGHT tory," he said. "I also think', that'the truth ar falsehood ?bf any -views put forward pub- licly can be established ogly , by free and 'open discussion, not by. legal proceedings. "No criminal court has a- moral right to sentence any- one for views he has put for- ward..." "I do not consider myself guilty;' 'he added, "but will not try to prove my innocence, for the principle of freedom of speech excludes the question of my guilt" At the end? of the trial Thursday, Amalrik made , .a short final statement in which he comppared the trial to medi= evil r~itCh hunts. He said the regime's ideo~ logical struggle was reduced' to the criminal persecution of ideas. "Recognizing their ideol- ogical_helplessness," he said, "they grope. in fear for the criminal code, prisons, camps, psychiatric clinics." Some 'dis- sidents have been ruled insane .instead of being convicted in criminal trials. Amalrik blamed the regime's fears for his indictment and for his being tPied in Sverd- lovsk, 900 mile east of Mos- cow, so, "that the trial would short stateme>ut in answer to ~ attract less attention." Amalrik said that he wante to:.answor.: the claims that h . made statements "directe , against my people and m country. It seems to me tha the main task of my cauntr just now is to throw off th burden of the heavy past, an for this my country needs fre criticism; not self-glorification - "I think that I am a Bette patriot than those who shou about their love for the- mot erland and who mean by tha love for their privileges, Amalrik added. He concluded, "I understaii ' that such trials are inten~le to scare many people and tha they will scare many people and even so that the proces of ~ ideological emancipatio now under way is irreve~rsibl I have nothing to ask Hof thi court" Amalrik's friends expresso the belief that this final stat ment was what impelled th judge to sentence him to thre years in camp under intensiv regime, when the.prosecuto had asked three years undo the, less severe general r gime. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT THE SUNDAY STAR 15 NoYember 1970 ^ ?YI~~ ~~~o~ ~ Sa s ~re~n~~~ ~~ dears ~'ho~ ~ h~ MOSCOW (UPI) -Russian wr e n re ma ri c, sen- tenced this week to three years in a prison camp, says the gov- ernment is afraid of his ideas and described his trial as part of a Kremlin "witch-hunting" cam-1. paign against dissident intellec- foals. ? In a courtroom speech at the end of his trial in Sverdlovsk, Amalrik said: "I think i am d better patriot than those who, shout about their love for the fatherland but mean, by that,: ]ove for their privileges." Amalrik's speech was made available to western correspon- tents in Moscow yesterday. ' Says He's Not-Afraid "Everything that is going on now can only be explained by the cowardice of a regime which sees dangers in the spreading of any thought, any idea alien to the bureaucratic summit," he said. "Neither the witch-hunting conducted by the regime nor this special example - my trial - evoke respect or fear in me,": the 31-year-old author said. "6uch trials are intended to scare people and many will be scared -but, even so, the proc- ess of ideological liberation now under way is irreversible." Amalrik, author of "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?", was sentenced Thursday for violating article 190-1 of the. Russian republic criminal code dealing with dissemination of "falsehoods derogatory. to the; Soviet state and social system." a 'Moral Rlgktt' Disputed "Tt is the fear for the ideas T { have expressed, for those facts I mentioned in my books, that compel these people to put me on the stand as a criminal," Amalrik said. He added that the authorities are "afraid" to try him in Moscow and brought him. to Sverdlovsk instead, 900 miles to the east. "No criminal count has a mor- al right to sentence anyone for: views. he had put forward," he said. "To sentence ideas - whether they are true or false - ~by a criminal sentence seems to'- ~me to be a crime in itself. "I shall -not discuss my opin- ions here because the court is aot .the right place for it. I only want to answer claims that some of my pronouncements are directed against my country and my people.. . Evidence Listed "It seems to me that the main task for my country just now is to hhrow off its burden of the heavy past and, for this, my country. needs first of all free ''critical discussion and not self- 'praise." In his "1984" Amalrik forecast', war with China that would lead to collapse of the Soviet regime sometime between 1980 and 1985: The book was published in the . West a~ was, his "Involuntary; Journey to Siberia." According to dissident sources, the prosecution based . the case against Amalrik on five. documents, including the two books, his two interviews with the Columbia Broadcasting Sys- tem and an open letter he wrote to Soviet writer Anatoly Kuzne~. sov after the. latter defected to Britain last year. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 25X1C10b ~ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 ?~,-., :W~ ~? . v ~f~~~^~, CPYRGHT i'ublished by The Economist Newspaper Limited 25 St James's Street, London SW1 1 i57 9 July 1970 oc,la an out letnam ave captured the headlines during the pass three months, significant dcveloplnents have been taking place in Hanoi. It is now possible to trace fairly clearly the course of the power struggle that followed the death cf Ho Chi Ulinh ten months ago. no's authority was never challenged, but during his .declining years there. ~verc signs that l:is lieutenants were beginning to skirmish over the succession. On his dea;li the rivals for power and their suppol-tirlg factions were already identifiable; but t.c ~var in the south, and the resulting strains in the north, made it imperative intc- party strife should be avoided. Hence a `collective leadership' was unanimously agreed upon by the party. Wlthlll a rzionth or two, however, it became apparent that this concept was v topian and totally unsuited to the existing situation in North Vietnam. With each passing week the power struggle, particularly between Le Dtr~, the first secretary of the hasty, and' h rt?ng C`,;:~;z, the party's theorctiCian grew fiercer, and the `collective leadcr- ship' less realistic. The two leaders, quarrclicd over several issues, notably: (a) the priorities io. c accorded to winning th;: tuns in the south anti to so~ialist consi.ruction in the r.r~rtl:; (b) the role of material incentives to increase productivity; and (c) the organisatlc,n ob collectivised agriculture. When 'Truong Chinh alleged that capitalist agriculture was being re-established in North Vietnam,` Le Duan countered itirith expressions of sym- pathy far Lenin (who had to face similar charges against his New Economic Policy from ignorant and bigoted comrades.} At first the greater publicity accorded to Truong Chinh, and the adoption of several of his political ,proposals, suggested he was gaining the upper hand. -But by mid- February tli~re-were clear indications that Lc Duan was the victor. In a long, authori- tative, and widely published article, Lc Duan confidently laid down the lines along which every major sector of North Vietnamese activity would develop. Significantly, ,his pronouncements were not challenged from any quarter. The emergence of a new leader in a communist state is often the signal for a purge of those elements deemed hostile to him -the victims usually being accused of serious crimes. North Vietnam has run true to communist pattern. Late in March an order for a party purge was published in the party periodical, Hoc ~"ap. This publication is read primarily by senior party members, and the first Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400016'GHT widely disseminated announcement was broadcast by Hanoi radio on 2:i LLApril. The, order took the form of a `politburo resolution,' signed by Le Duan on behalf of that body, and was addressed to all party organs. It charged that numbers of party members were Qf 'inferior quality' or 'inferior character', and were unworthy of party membership. Other elements `displayed very inferior political standards', worked badly, and failed to carry. out their duties. Others again were guilty of `sagging determination to fight', `low ethical standards', -and `inferior political enlightenment'. Nor did the catalogue end there; other allegations were of corruption, bullying, indiscipline, and infringing other peoples' rights. All the culprits, it went. on, would be expelled from the party in a purge lasting one year; their places would be filled by `virtuous' new recruits to be known as the `Ho Chi Minh class' of party members. All party organs were required to submit to the central committee secretariat detailed plans for implementing the resolution, and this is believed to have been completed. A `guiding committee' was set up to supervise the whole operation-and on 19 May the purge started. Though details of-,its progress are kept a, tight secret from all outsiders, articles in the Hanoi press claim"that it is proceeding well. The people are urged to maintain their vigour and enthusiasm. Whatever the truth of,the allegations made about party members in the politbura- resolution -after all, corruption, backsliding, inefficiency, and authoritarianism-are fairly common features in many Asian countries, so the charges may not be far off the mark - it is a safe assumption that those who have opposed Le Duan will form the bulk of the victims. Some notorious offenders may be included to lend an air of verisi- militude to the whole operation. It is still ;foo early to know whether the purge will lead to torture, bloodshed, and mass executions as the .1955 agrarian reforms did. But this grim possibility must be in the minds of all North Vietnamese. Although the objective of the purge is to create a ruling Communist party united under one leader, its short-term effects could be damaging. Quite apart from the burden of waging war in the South, Laos, and Cambodia simultaneously, North. Vietnam's rulers are beset by manifold domestic difficulties. The Hanoi press itself has admitted shortages of food and materials, popular apathy, absenteeism among workers, manpower shortages, black marketeering, and indiscipline. The party, in its present state, seems to be unequal to the task of resolving these .difficulties. Whether Le Duan's purge will ultimately strengthen it, or merely disrupt it feirther, is -one of the many imponderables in -the` confused Indo-China si.tuation., Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Excerpts . ~xomr: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 6 Apxi.l 1970 HANOI'S FO{BMULA: Mixed strategy. Recent fast-moving developments disclose just how Hanoi has used a mixture of political and mili- tart' strategy to capitalize not only on the vague politics of Southeast Asia but on American political unrest as well. Political decisions-not military-led to a halt in U. S. bombing of .North . Vietnam: and to the start of withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. Political maneuvering and military pres- sure are undermining the Government . in Laos. In Cambodia, mass infiltration by Red troops endangers that key na-. lion-without a-shot being'fiied. The current Communist drive for domination over Southeast Asia is not new. The goal was set when the Indo- chinese. Communist Party was formed 40 years ago by Ho Chi Minh: one Red nation composed of what is now Cam- bodia, Laos and all of Vietnam. Says a leading Western expert: "The main point which .always must be kept in mind ~is this: For Hanoi, this war is and always has been` a war to win all of Indo-China, not just South Vietnam. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are not separate carppaigns. They are all parts of the whole.", North Vietnamese are' convinced that they are the only people of the lndo- Chinese: Peninsula capable of ruling. Tough, and clever, the Vietnamese are far more aggressive and resourceful than their Cambodian or Laotian .neighbors. The price to North Vietnam in this unremitting fight for power has been high in money, lives and destruction. The precise cost may never be knn~~n. But U. S. intelligence officers insist t' et' can estimate the toll with 'considera!,le accuracy. ~ To keep the Vietnam war, going, Iia- noi has maintained a standing Army c,F 457,000 men and a people's. militia of about 420,000-a huge force for a nllion of only 21 million. Nearly Half the Re,;- ular Army is based outside North Viet- nam-1.00,000 in South Vietnam, 67,000 in Laos and about 48,000 in Cambodia. "Tremendous drain:' An American officer says: "That is a tremendous d,?ain bn resources. Maintaining troops outside your borders is expensive." Hanoi's cost per soldier is not rated significantly higher in South Vietnam than in Laos. But the Communists are finding it more expensive to support. n{~ to 60,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong infantrymen in Cambodia, -even though they do little fighting there. In South Vietnam and Laos> Reds seize , much of their food from the peasants.. But in Cambodia, Communist units usually pay cash for food .and mediciuc and as bribes to Cambodian officials. Man for man, it is vastly cheaper to maintahr a North Vietnamese soldier, living on rice and getting few benefits, than it is to .support an American CI eating well and in touch with his home- land 10,000 miles away. However, ob- servers consider the relative drain is greater on North Vietnam because its economic base is infinitesimally small compared with that of the U. S: Intelligence sources in Saigon estimate that the Communists have lost more than 600,000 men in combat in South Viet- nam since 1961, many of them txained: company-grade officers and noncommis- sioned officers. During one four-year per- iod in South Vietnam alone, nearly 480,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were killed:. 55,524 in 1966; 86,- 104 in 1967; 181,149 in :1968, and 156,954 in 1969. Three years of U: S. bombin~ of North Vieh~am almost wrecked the civilian economy. Although the attacks have ceased, food still is scarce, housing in short supply, manpower a serious prob- lem. With so many men at war, women of North Vietnam make up about 80 per cent of the farm labor force. Popula- tion specialists say North Vietnam has 1 million "surplus" women because so many men died in war. Says a French expert on Vietnam: "Hanoi doesn't want to do anything now that would bring the war back to North Vietnam. The country is being rebuilt, and the leadership .does not want to risk destruction by bombing- again. The people of North Vietnam are, tired and want the war to end:' ' A sizable part of Hanoi's war costs is :met by Russia and Communist China. Russia and other East Europe:u~ na- tions.provide Hanoi with about 1 billion dollars a year in weapons, medicine, -sayv materials and some food. Most of this aid is in loans which must be ~?e- paid-a major mortgage on Norih Viet- nam's fuhu?e. Red Chinese aid it smaller in amount -and is concentrated in food and weapons. Some Far East experts are convinced that North Vietnam is finc>;ng the war so costly that its fuhn?e military moves will be' "highly selective and designed -even more t$an in the past to get the largest political profit out of the smallest military outlay. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 HAN01 vs. REST OF lNDO-CHINA Outmanned and Outgunned, but .. . POPULATION North Vietnam has 21 million people. -Rest of Indo-China - mouth Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia --has combined pop~ilation of 27 million. TROOPS North Vietnam has 877,000 men under arms. Rest of Indo-China has 1.2 million men under arms. other allies, plus virtually unlimited aid from U. S. ALLIES _ North Vietnam is supported by 150,000 troops of Viet Cong and Pathet Lao, plus generous aid from Russia and Red China. J Rest of Indo-China: !n South Vietnam, anti-Communists are supported by 454,000 U. S. troops, more than 60,000 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT -.101. Vi~tna~n el~ir~d Iri ~Iarve~~~g ice By Lee Lescaze Washington Post FOrlSaA $ervfce ;maintain the wartime mode of life and give fuller play to the new production relations or ie nam once again is exhorting an apparently reluc- tant and undermanned peas- antry to meet the state's rice quotas. 1n numerous broadcasts .this month, Hanoi- Radio has. :complained that the sowing of ?the summer-fall rice crop is far behind schedule:. "A number of localities are still unaware of the urgency of this year's (second) rice crop," the radio said recently. Although rice production is most pressing, it is only -one of the areas in whieh_ the North Vietnamese leadeTShip has been unable to galvanize its :people to meet officially estab= }fished goals. c "We have been striving to :chiefly by relying _on the ar- dent patriotism and the zeal of 'our people," a member of the State . Planning Commission rwrote last January. However, since American ~ bombing was halted in Novem- ber, 1968, North Vietnam's 'peasants have sought to slow down a little. The government launched a rdrive for "intensive cultiva- tion" aiming at production of five .tans of rice on each 2.2 ;acres under cultivation. Ac- cotding to Hanoi broadcasts; ' the drive has achieved- only mixed results. To achieve tihe goal, Radio Hanoi reported, farmers in' some areas have abandoned their poorer rice fields :and: thus reduced their overall pro- cuction while getting -the de- sired yiAld from a few choice plots. .. ~ - _ In addition to compaints :remarkably open 'statements? about corruption in the farm cooperatives. The party direc-; tive on collective ownership is-. sued last. month called for "flrastic" curtailment of em- be2zlement. Vice Premier Do Muoi com- mented .in May that it was necessary, to "implement satis- factorily" the policy of farm-. ers selling their grain to the state, implying that some rice was being Sold privately to: b}ack marketeers. Manpower shortages -have been an additional problem ifor North Vietnam's agricul- tural programs, particularly ~ at harvest times. North Vietnam ~ has been struggling with its food prob- ' lem for years, but the .warn- ipgs that the present planting _ ~is .behind schedule seem to in-' dicate that.Ha~ioi'faces apar-` titularly serious situati?n thiso summer., .~: :. _ . Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT anal Setting Up `Task Farces' >ln .$id to-Spur Lagging~Industry or namsnips ana sacrifices qualitatively" to "replenish fibs ahead, Washington officials say main-force army" and to "com- North Vietnam appears deter- bins economic development sy rA>a,ezucc ~ za? ~ ism.. 'WASHINGTON. Oot. 7 =1new rs~ienal fiareQS mirst auirk- This is the conclusion drawn ,by specialists 'on North Viet- namese affairs from the latest pronouncements by Govern- anent, military and Communist party figures in Hanoi as well as from interval party debates in North Vietnam. The ' angst significant 'new #rend observed in the North Vietnamese conduct of the war and management of the. bat- tered economy is the- effort to create so-called "local military 'talk forces." These are to serve bath as -army reserves and as civilian labor units work- ing to spur what Hanoi ac- kno~vledges publicly is lagging industrial production. 'Enormous Efforts' Asked This, latest North Vietnamese . approach to the problem of sus- taining militarily and economi- cally the strategy of the "pro- ~racted war" -defined by Fla- nai's Defense.Minister, Gen. Va Nguyen Giap, as. a persistent struggle on a low level of ac- tivity designed 40 outlast the United? States with a minimum of North Vietnamese' losses - -was described do detail Aug. 15 in Quan Doi Nhan Dan, North Vietnam's army newspaper. In an editorial, the paper said that North Vietnam must make "enormous efforts" to acceler-' ate production and "stabilize'. the people's. livelihood step by', { step." `Discussing the responsibil-' .'sties of the "local military task', forces,"the newspaper said they must strive "to increase the reconomic and national defense potential" of North Vietnam, to "fulfill aheir duty as the great tear area of the great ~Irontline." do what. American analysts bonsidered an unusually frank admission by Hanoi of its mounting pf~bblems of man- ggoowmr allocation. !between de- ~~ense and the economy Quan Dot Than Dan said khat the y.....,~ va yavaauv.wu~?a+u c rarefy sounded fiheme that e cbilian population hungers fot Peapl's Needs Are Noted "The rate o! development is low," the newspaper -said, "compared to ou; manpower capaciky and to our supply of raw materials, the needs of our people and the export de- mands." "During the first half of this year, the output of a number of handicraft [industry] branch? es and professions in many log cali~ties was at a standstill or even declined;' Nhan Dan said. "The present level of handi- craft production is lower than that of 1964,' it assented.' in a comment on the results of the dispersion of North Viet? riamese industry during the 1965-68 bombings lay the Unt- ed States, the newspaper said that "slang with actively re- storln~g apd fiuilding state- owned industrial factories, it is necessary urgently to restore and develop various small in- dustry and handicraft branches and professions-and to pursue the socialist ~transforma~tion." The theme of further sacri- fices was significantly sounded for the first time in ~tlae official slogans for the-celebrations last month of the anniversary of the 1945 proclamation of the D?mocratic Republic of Vie4- nam. In past years, .sacrifices were not mentioned, but. this year the third of the 17 slo- gans said: "For the~lndependence and freetdom of the fathefland, we are zesolved mo averooma all the difficulties and hardships, persist and e~tep up resistance against United S~bates aggres- sion and work for national sal- vation until tdl~l victory'." ' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A0004000100~~~,RGHT CPYRGHT s~-z~n~lo>~ stnv 3 October 1970 ..~c~oi .~ress~~ ~~~~ 1,~~~~i ~'~;~~ weakening LPadershi.h Could Bring Internal Y~litical Crisis , By l1ICHAF.L F,1RKS [Sacra StaJJ;Corresposdent] Saigon, ,Oct. 2-Beset with se- continued food shortage, North Vietnamese leaders are pressing Communist party members to tighten party ..discipline?and in? grease production: ' If Hanoi's campaign fails, ;some ? senior., western 'analysts ,here Believe, North Vietnam will be plunged into a serious inter- nal ppolitical ctisis. . The same analysts, however,. -are divided on.what this means ~_for the war'. in South Vietna- iiiuand the peace talks in Paris. `Some believe it could lead North ,Vietnam to seek some sort of settlement, others feel Hanoi would just reduce the level of `fighting until its domestic prob- lems are solved. Party Criticism This speculation is based on .the repeated criticism of party ~il4embers sand local officials and ,technicians recently, and Ha- i noi's own admissions that dete- riorating 'party leadership is sapping effol?ts and its industrial and agricultural production. An editorial in the current is- sue of a leading party journal, Hoc Tap, says that the quality of the party's local activities is poor, -that basic political educa- tion : is perfunctory and that, as a result, production and "revo- lutionary progress" are lagging. Last week, the secretary of the Ha Bac prorvince party com= mittee indioted' local leaders for (poor agricultural management: `Ha Bac is at a standstill," he said, "Erroneous Views" "Many party cadres and members ...still cultivate er- roneous .views, lack the spirit of !self-reliance,- are afraid of hard- ships and _ difficulties, are con- servative and are prone to rei~+ on the state andiugher authon- The deputy secretary of the 'Hanoi city party conunittee said this sumniet that many youths in; Ithe capital are bourgeois and (lack "revolutionary ideals and ,socialist enlightenment." Other party leaders repeated-' ly have called for better leader- ~ ship in ..agriculture, production of consumer goods, light indus- try and education. CAmm011 Theme The need for better manage- ment and stronger party lead- ership are the themes of even basically technical articles deal- ing with: fertilization of rice` crops, the planting of potatoes ' and corn and water irregation' projects. I While extensive self criticism! Is practiced in many Commu-! nist-led countries and , is tine equivalent of political debate in the United States, the increasing frankness about shortcomings in ~ North Vietnam and the' calls fora reform are the basis of the west-, ern analysts' conclusion that? (Hanoi is trying to reverse a+ trend that could lead to a com-' plete breakdown iA party disci- pline. One senior analyst comment- ed, It appears that the men in. charge in 'Hanoi have .no idea whether their orders witl be car- ried out: in the provinces once; they are given. That is certainly the implication of those recent' statements. Collapse PrCdicted',~ A British specialist on North ` Vietnamese affairs, P. J. Honey; who was here last- month, said he is convinced that the Commu- nist party in the north is nearing ~an internal collapse. "The war has brought eco= nomic ruin, and that in turn is ;breaking up the country's politi- cal organization and structure,". he said.- "There is no doubt in; my mind that they are in very. serious trouble. That is what all these calls for reform are about:. American, South Vietnamese and somb other analysts do not ao as far as Mr.'Honey, but they, too feel Hanoi is scrambimg t regain the control it lost when it decentralized it economy during the American bombings nearly five years ago. The party is admitting an un specified number of new young er members in three phases to replace older members "who ~ are not worthy ....are inferi 'or, whose nature has bee changed and who are useless.' Originally announced in Fels ruary by the-first secretary o the Communist party, Le Duan ' these ousters so far appear to b more a~veeding out of deadwoo ,than the widespread,purgefirs expected. ~ ' ` Stealing From Peasants Party leaders are also attac ing members and cadres wh steal from the ;peasants an workers they are supposed to b ~~leading. To Huu, the party' ce tral committee secretary, sal ~in a recent speech: "There ar party members who live an fight, not for the revolutionar jcause, but for personal irate ests. Some of them take adva toge of their position to ste ' public funds or encroach upo the masses' democratic rights . (others) use he party as tool to obtain promotions or e rich themselves. "On the other..hand, the pa '>ty's oganizational, ''education 1 and control tasks-, have bee loosely carried out: This situ - tion has enabled' a number f bad elements to achieve po - Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A00040001O(~~'Y~GHT 2Ei$? I~AII,Y Y~ObiIURt~ Tokyo 2$ Septemt~e~'? 1170 _ .... ~.. ~.,,.? SOA+i~ t'iilnk that communist' North ir~et~am , can' dai?~y' on ~ the .War indefEnitely. ' Buts ,~ ,? ? Hanoi also- oral massive problems that could. force it Ito the peseta table. 7`he writer de? oblems in a two part, series, the first .of which follows. ' t?`C~?. eciibes some of these pr l 'i'1rt37~it2 ? V inGOV~;..). LIB. ~1GJ ~( +~, . ? Hong Icon (CNS) T'he e < cr rc _ epu e o ? e - nom--more commonly k own. as'North Vietnam--is obse ving ,the ' 35th anniversary. o 'its. founding this .'month: D pate the Eencouragtng official r orts and ? festivities -that sur rind the celebration, the county has i agricultural products. .?? r ins trouble b eakrng cs that- of Two years .ago, in .hope . of selling tom odities on the reaching self-sufficiency in . ice, open oz` .bloc mac?,tet. ,the country ..introduced the Havin; fai ed to eliminate high-yi2lding~ "miraole~ 'cc" the black m. keting .activities strain developed- iri-the P lip- with decrees, Hanoi has now pines (Hanoi claims one o 'its i adppted a, di erenf approach. scientists' Bet~eioped 'the ' ew I The county 's farmers nave rice, but ? in fact the s eds I'came via P"akistan)... Although .yields have' will take ori1~ a' fixed annual poets of .the nroduction~? for not able ~ ?to meet its needs. of , whether tics ?armers? pro- i rigation roger r duos more. Any stirplua dhey " ?witiz Lire o~:t~r - ?.. shorta;es of fertilizet?, and ~ produce may .be stored,. sold to I such s the ie ~~ o ?~;u _ ..~ -- shortcoming. sold to the state. , ~ inevitably a e _, .~ - ?- ? ' Part of the problem,' too, is' In effect; ,these ,measures weariness tivr: the lack of eggate manage- offer. powerful incentives to I ': he . expa..sia.. o. -.? . ~?~ ment and prof ssional expertise', successful cooperatives 'and into Camboc.'a. rr.. r to guide the conomy. A'iost of~ hold tics prospect' of the farm- iher drair on .~c f, ~ t? , the. country's top -management; era bene3tin~ materially from ;manpower resourc.. -,.. .- North' Vietnam Coda i suf- "?` `?-_----- --' - - y -been going in o the war eP.'ort. ; .A simrlar ,measure was adopt' corteni. fering f4?om serious poi tfcal" . ed in the Soviet Union in. 1965,?, ._ . divisions: Econgmically ? Trigs Because of the demands of China any,.'th:: ~vv ~:. ~ the war, and. especially dgring ~yhen ~ -grain ' .prociiremcnt was ; through :hcrr ai:: ~o nmi~r ~._::, havo sgldom been worse, v2n ,the period of US bombing, the .filed at a stafrdard rate for six ~ are i:eepi:rg -the No:h lr:::.- thoui;h' the -United States top- leaders 1n. Ha of loosened their years. The problem the Hanoi rap~es~ econan:;,r rc ed bombin the ?cpuntr ear- ~ f. < P tyro ear a d. Y ideological d mands on the ; .leaders car is th0 pne that ~ lapsing or be'n~ c. Y y g farmers -and : allowed habits arose from -the move in the uncantroll o' f:,i ~ o ~ ~ -; -The expansiora~ of the iet? ;antithetical. t cammunism? to i" Soviet Union: -'the resultant ~ as that aid is rortnco.:.:.:~, .:... Ham war into Cambodia has .creep in: . ' ~ prosperity of the farmers out-' North Vietnarcresv '-ivi : i...~ creatad some .~ important ne N ?~ Basically th s involved letting !stripped. .that o.f and . conse-; starve. prablems..'for .the leader ip ' the peasants ngage in private, quentiy angered those people. i~Hanoi.. ~ capitailst-$tyl, .enter rlses?,as. a; But the picture to a i p livin in Lire urban areas. ligs got shor-. ter. His unit was under constant pressure. Many of? hi rcomrades were discouraged- and talked a( defecting. Kiem did. ? Nguyen VAN Son, 16, Kien Iioa province, became a Viet Cong when he was 12. He was an information agent for his villal;e. One Qf his duties was to blow a horn to broadcast victa- Ties. ''I think I blow lies," he said with a laugh. When ARVpI (South Vietnamese) forces began moving into Kien Hoa f~~ force, Son switched. x ... Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT BAr~a'lo~ sv~t lk ~u1,Y 1970 ~~~i~s Sub V let .I~ed ~'ro~~as ~ui~ rat ~''Lt~ri~~~b '~'uniU~c~iu . _ __ ltp Ai[CHAEL PARKS ~ [Sun Sto/t Correspondent) t Saigon. July 13-Large num?. i his South Vietnamese intcrvicw? idlers are reportedly refusing to; an sanctuaricsl were the only ~fiuht in ('amhodia, according td~ respite we had, and when they ?allied military sources 1?,cre. were gone most of us just gava If so, the allied analysts said,j up." the refusals Dave ruptured the ~ Intelligence officers -cite the generally strong discipline o; sharp rise 1n the number of Viet the regular North Vict,namese ~ Cons and North Vietnamese Ar~iey units. American com? defectors during the Invasion as nianders have occasionally been ~ additional proof of declining en- confroieted by similar refusals, emy morale. M American Intelligence otfi- While? this year's defection car said there has been what he rate is running about 2i per cent called "open agitation to return below the record set in 1969, ii home" in a number of North approached or equaled the com- Victnamese units now. fighting parable weekly rates during in Cambodia. most of May and Jpne. lutinies" 1Zcporteci Requests For Guidance South Victna~ieesc analysts, North Vietnamese field com- spcaking independently and cit? mandces have sent urgent re- ins different sources for .theic quests for guidance on dealing conclusions, said they have evv with the morale problem in gen- deuce of "mutinies" in 13 North eral, and the problems of muti- Victnamese battalions now in ny and defection in particular, Cambodia? . to their headquarters in Kratic, Both the American and the I Cambodia, and to Hanoi, ac- South Vietnanese intelligence ~ cording to intelligence reports. ~ officers attributed the reported irefusal to fight u) Cambodia to ;poor enemy morale following ~ ~ ,the allied invasion of the for?j merly attack?free sanctuaries+~ there. ' The American intelligence of? ficer said captured documents and interviews with defectors ~ 'and prisoners showed that the North Vietnamese soldiers re? 'peatedly Lead been assured by their military and political lead- , ers That the United States and ;South Vietnam would never in- i wade Cambodia, primarily be, icause of the growing anti-war sentiment in the United States..; , i7efector's Story ? i A recent Nord) Vietnamese defector, a senior noncomn)is--~ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGH~proved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400C1~T cam ~~ results EALTIMORE SifiT 6 September 1970 ~,.~ Saigon. - "Ho ~ Chi Min was t e e avort :uncle who dies and- leaves many big s debts and only keepsakes and memories' r with which to pay them, a Communist ;.:diplomat said recently in appraising the? r current situation in North Vietnam. f "That -is what the new collective lead-A r ership in Hanoi has been trying to do-, :pay old debts with memories. Sometimes;, ~!it requires a trip to the pawnshop. They: ' have had some success, but the plans they are- making are. more- important`` `.than what actually has been accom- ~~plished iri the year since Uncle Ho died."' ' When Ho, . already a legend, died a; year ago FThursday at 79, fVorth Vietnam:: r was. faced with its worst. economic cri-; sts since the disasters of the' farm col=; ': lectivization. shortly after independence.:`. t. It had also realized there was little ;,; prospect for a quick victory in the war in r - the South even-with an American with-:~ drawal. Its people were increasingly war ' ...weary, their morale depressed by severe shortages of food and consumer goods. = '`, In the will,. read at his funeral, Ho said ; '`that "the resistance war against United ::States aggression may drag out. Our' -compatriots may have to undergo new,: sacrifices In terms of property and hu-'~ Ynan lives. In any case, we must be resolved to fight against the U.S. aggres-. ~` sors until the final victory." r, To accom$lish that, Ho left a sense of `Y ~ationhaod which he hoped would bring his country .independence and forge a `~ disciplined people. The nation also was? -~-left with-his own emotion-packed image. Rup, >wheat flour; ism parted ~. Ho's successors have attempted to use '". all of th se things in dealing wlth Nortli' '; Vietnams problems, but an the surface:.: { Ilttla has changed.. ..~.... The country still lives frorn baud to mouth, able, to feed its own people only by importing 800,000 tans oi', nice;and wheat flour a year. Consumer goods are still la V?ry short supply despite efforts to increase pr~duotlou--the adult cloth ration is about four yards a person a - year. The war continues with tens of thou- -sands of teen-agers marching off each year, -never to return. The government, increasingly defensive in its public state- 'ments about its war policies, has chided those who: do -not believe its claims of great victories and who ask when the `war will end: The same four men who, rapt the .gov- ' ernment and the war on a day-to-day 'basis under Ho are still runniaig it now. '"Intelligence analysts speculate endlessly about who is in charge and what sort of ' power play put him there. The consensus is that the 62=year-old `first secretary of the G~mmunist party, L'e Duan, is~the do facto leader.. His pragmatism ~ is rapidly becoming the hallmark of the -Hanoi government -and American analysts are just- begin- ~ ,, r Wing to~ recognize.the impact of his prob- lem-solving approach on North Vietnam's :military, economic and political policies. `Rearrangement of power Others in the Ieadership a:re Truong `:Chink, 62, the ch2irman of the. North ~:-Vietnamese .Natiotaal Assembly, Pham Van Dong, also 62, the premier, and Gen. . . Vo Nguyen Gip, 58, the defense minister and Army commander. Ho's successor as` resident is Ton Duc Thang, 82,~ a figure-~ head. Truong Chink, the party's chief theore-. ' tier 'n for many years, is usually cast as.' Le )~uan's protagonist in a hawk-vs.-dove,_ protracted-war-vs.-quick-strike, Peking- `vs.-Moscow power struggle in ?which Le Duan, the soft-liner; triumplier9. A Euro- '`pean diplomat who travels frequently to :'Hanoi suggested that the struggle. was far less dramatic than portrayed in the. 'West. "It was more a rearrangement of power. and- responsibilities than a bitter fight," he said, Yet American analysts especially do -not believe any 'sort of .. -collective leadership can- work without ' devolving into..a;one?man dictatorship. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 EXCERPTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE MEDIA ON LABOR PROBLEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM The North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Workers'): Party newspaper,, Nhan Dan, called on April 10 for a further development of the "productive laDer movemeh~k" which has bQen under why since Becembe~, 1~6g. The aim is to ensure regular attendance by factory workers and an inerea~e in production. There are signs that in this campaign, unlike previous ones, the authorities are not relying solely on appeals to the workers' t1Socialist consciousness", but are also providing material incentives for the majority of industries. _ North Vietnamese workers have frequently been criticized for what Nhan Dan described on October 16, 1969, as the habit of "late to work, early to leave" (though it claimed some. recent improvement) and industrial progress. An editorial in Nhan Dan on November 6, 1969, said that each industrial shift usually h~.d "only four to five really productive work hours" and that machines were actually producing for "only two to three hours". A Ministry of Labor circular on October 22, 196g, 1?aid down strict regulations for working hours, based on eight hours a day for six days a week, extended in some cases to ten hours a day, and with only half an hour's break. But the 1970 State Plan indicated that labor productivity was still not improving. A _. member of?the State Planning Commission, Che Viet Tan, wrote in the, army newspaper, uan Doi Nhan Dan, on January 8, 1970, that the most important requirement for realization of the 1970 State Plan was an increase in output. The productive labor movement, although it had been referred to in the Press since December, 1969, wtts officially inaugurated by a Gouncil of'Ministers resolution, broadcast by Hanoi Radio on February 12, 1970. The mobilization of all labor resources, to increase their. efficiency and output, was to be achieved by increasing party leadership over labor, strengthening "the Socialist laws and State discipline", and consolidating "educational ,?, ideological and political workv? . Behind these orthodox Communist remedies were indications that ideological purity was being neglected in favop[r of the only measures that might ensure greater enthusiasm among workers - material incentives. Le Thanh Nghi, a Deputy Prime Minister and one of North Vietnam's chief economic planners, recently told building workers to strengthen discipline and return to a full eight-hour day, but also advocated a ?1piece-work ,payment system" (Hanoi Radio, February 17). Hanoi Radio quoted him on February 19 as telling chemical workers that '=the intensive use of contract and piece-work systems is highly important as a means off' increasing production and improving living conditions"; he added that the "ideological leadership tasks?P must not be carried out 9Pin a general and unrealistic fashion19. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194~4~Ob04~Ori (~0~1-1 A directi~Ve from the Prime Minister s Office, Carrie y on February 21+, 1970', called for a reorganization of the wage system, which would be aimed ~,t "turning the salary into a real incentive for labor efficiency". On March 17, Khan Dan criticized labor management and the practice of "squandering labor forces and equipment"~, and advocated an "appropriate form of wages and bonuses, especial:L_y the system of paying wages according to goods produced". Althpug)1 the need for material incentives has been mentioned before in the North Vietnamese Prays, nmtalaly cy pa~'ty Fixnt Seoratary Le Bunn in Nov~+'-~ar, :L967, there has been little evidence of their being put into effect. The chief party theoretician and Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, Truong Chinh, made it clear in a speech in 1968 that he abominated such forms of "rightist thinking", and that ideological . orthodoxy came first in all economic matters. However, the present trend appears to indicate that economic efficiency has taken precedence over ideological correctness, although the party is clearly keeping a firm grip on tk~e political education of its members. North Vietnamese workers, however, do not appear to be inspired with more enthusiasm than in the past. Nhan Dan, on April 10, complained that "a large obstacle to be eliminated is the working method of small producers and managerial civil servants", wha "rely on old experiences", end fail to .see;"new factors in seeking ways to exploit latent capabilities". 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 December 1970 THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE FEEBLE INTRUDER The Intrusion On 21 October 1970 Major James Russell landed his small Army transport on an obscure airfield on the Turkish-Soviet border near a town which he took to be Kars. This misconception was dispelled at once by the sight of a red star painted on the side of a helicopter parked to one side of the strip. Major Russell had landed his passengers (Generals Scherrer and Mcauarrie of the US Military Assistance Mission to Turkey and Colonel Cevat Denli, a Turkish Liaison officer) in Leninakan in Soviet Armenia. It was there that the four officers were held and interrogated for 20 days. This was the somewhat pedestrian incident which precipitated one of the noisiest Soviet propaganda outbursts since the U-2 episode in 1960. The reasons for this peculiar magnification of an inadvertant navigational gaffe provide some intriguing clues to the climate of thinking in the Kremlin. The Feeble Intruder The factor which is central to the whole episode is the nature of the aircraft used. What Soviet propaganda treated as some sort of advanced, sophisticated, high-performance penetration and reconnaissance weapon was in effect nothing more than a business aircraft incorporating features of a modern airliner and seating from 6 to 9 persons. The plane was a Beechcraft Oueen Air 65-80 with an Army designation of U-8. Powered by two conventional 380 HP Lycomng engines it boasted a maximum speed of 252 MPH (406 KMH) at 11,500 feet and a maximum ceiling of 29,000 feet (8,840 meters) Other relevant operational attributes were a maximum cruising speed of 230 MPH (370 KMH) at 15,000 feet and a maximum economy-speed~cf~189 MPH (304 KMH) at the same altitude. Although it was a military aircraft the plane was unarmed; its function was simply to serve as transportation. 'This, then, was the awesome weapon that triggered the Soviet propaganda circus. To conceive of this plane being used to penetrate Soviet airspace on a reconnaissance mission in the face of sophisticated radar, rocket and supersonic interceptor defenses is somewhat on a par with betting on a Bleriot monoplane in a contest with a Messerschmidtt. Certainly there could have been no real suspicion in the minds of the Kremlin realists that the incident was anything more than an inadvertent intrusion of a totally non-military character. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Before proceeding with speculation as to the Soviet leader- ship's reasons for launching the propaganda campaign, it might be useful to examine some of the recent history of navigational problems which have bedeviled non-Soviet airmen in this geographical area On 27 June X958 and American C-118 transport: on a cargo run from Adana in south-central Turkey northeast to. Trabizon on the Black Sea, some 100 miles west of the Soviet border, was jumped by Russian P~IIG jets. The crew parachuted safely while the pilot landed his burning plane. After their eventual release by the Soviets the pilot reported something seemed to go wrong with the radio-navigation equipment as they neared Trabizon. The next episode occurred on 2 September 1958 when a U.S. C-180 transport plane was sent out to check radio beams on a triangular course from Adana to Trabizon and right to Van on a course parallel to the Soviet border, but never closer torn than 100 miles. Near Trabizon the .plane completely disappeared. After 10 days' silence, Soviet authorities announced that the "intruding" aircraft had crashed 25 miles insid? Soviet Armenia To probe these two diversions the U.S. Air Force sent a specially equipped test plane along the same triangular course as above. Sure enough, over Trabizon the radio direction finder was deflected by a signal stronger than that of the local control towez? onto a course that would have taken the test plane toward the Soviet border and to Yerevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia. 'This mission was flown in good weather, the pilot was alert to the possibility of false signals, and he relied on visual :landmarks for navigation. If he had relied on his instruments, he would have been led into the USSR. Beaming false radio signals to misguide fliers, called "spoofing"~, is a cunning trick which dates at least as far back as World War II. All pilots flying in Turkey, Germany, Japan and other areas near Communist borders have been warned about it. Soviet use of this tactic since 1958 has been generally unsuccessful, at least up until the incident of General Schemer's misadventure, and the evidence here is inconclusive. The element of bad weather was present, forcing the pilot to rely on navigational aids during the crucial time of his approach to Kars. When the cloud deck did break sufficiently to permit visual navigation, he misread landmarks and so descended to Leninakan. Whether or not the Soviets induced this intrusion electronically cannot be proved one way or the other, but when it did occur Soviet propaganda mechanisms seized upon it. The multiplicity of possible reasons why they did so (and then quite suddenly backed away from the controversy without using Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 the four officers as bargaining counters to retrieve the recent Soviet skyjackers being held in Turkey) suggests a confused and divided Kremlin leadership. The affair may have been the outgrowth of a "dove-hawk" struggle among them with 'the various elements, each with vested interest in the matter, vying with each other to gain advantage from the incident. The overall effect is one of a curious and fragile balance between aggressiveness and passivity. The Curious Case The reasons for the Russians' magnification of the episode, once it 'was underway, are both political and military. There may have been the overriding desire i.n certain quarters to make judicious use of the incident to weaken fhe-'U.S. position in Turkey. Since Stalin's death the Soviets have adopted a "good neighbor" policy toward the Turks. Now thay see an opportunity to suggest that the presence of these U.S, bases on the soil of a NATO ally is an unfriendly act toward the Soviet Union. They probably see as a minimum objective. restrictions placed in the way of the continued operation of these bases. Simply publicizing these bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union provides a rationale for Soviet electronic snooping off the coasts of the United States, and for the creation of overseas military bases for themselves. But this outcry could also be indicative of strong feelings of insecurity among the top members of the ruling elite. To men whose positions are legitimatized only by the Divine Right of Stalin the world must look threatening. Pressures being generated within the system for change endanger their powers and privileges, and the legitimate, representative governments of the West must appear to them as another source of infection and military menace. Hence, the Kremlin's maneuvering could reflect genuine fear of any Western forces ranged close to their pressure-sensitive borders. Then again, it is just possible that for an unfathomable tangle of interconnecting, Byzantine reasons having to do with the Sino-Soviet dispute, dissenters at home, the SALT talks, rapprochement with the West, and what have you, elements in the Kremlin may feel that the rush of events must be slowed to a manageable speed, that the time is at hand when a measure of Cold War chill should be injected into the international arena. They don't want their image to go too soft. Or, maybe they want to examine further President Nixon's reactions under stress. Thee remains one passible reason - or speculation, really - which tiffs in neatly with the Soviets' current foreign preoccupation, their drive toward the Suez Canal and the oil of the Middle East. Nothing would facilitate their drive more than land access to Syria and Iraq through eastern Turkey. The Soviets may plan to Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 achieve this peacefully by drawing the Turks into increasingly closer cooperation, demonstrating that the U.S. is the only irritant precluding a complete rapprochement, and so alienating them from the U.S.~and ultimately from NATO, to such an extent that the former will be evicted and all ties wzth the latter severed. Then ~ the promise of economic and military aid could be traded for the guarantee of secure and continuing overland access to the Middle Eastn On the other hand they may not have ruled out a power play to achieve the same result. If so, the initial removal of the U.S. presence would substantially reduce the -risks in such a gamble. The launching of this sort of power play. to obtain the land routes either by force or the threat of force would require a a considerable logistical build-up in Soviet Armenia. Therefore, the magnified reaction to the intrusion of General Schemer's plane may reflect a desire to mask significant changes in the Soviet order of battle within the staging area from any threat of low-level surveillance. CPI~RBNpY'oved For F~elease 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 N]'sW XORK TIlt~ 2t3 Oc~~ber 1870 A~x~bival~ence in ~oscoya There as een a cur,ous am va ence?--sugges ?~~ ? inte:nsc debate at high l~reml{n levels---in the 5ov~ ?~. re- astien to the aoo{riei46Ci1 landing an S?viet territory ni 'an unarmed plane clrying two Amerlcan generals, i ~r pilot znd a Turlcish afficer. A hard lino has been implied by the failure to release tl;e plane's passengers ~s well as by the harsh tone of the Soviet notes to tl~e United Stages and Turkey on the subject. Amore sensible course has been implied by the peranission given American diplomats to visit the strayed afficErs and the substi.quent report that the detained men .are being treated decently though still denied release. Afo doubt there are those in Moscow wino urge that 'the Four detainees be held as hostages tQ exert pressure on Turkey to return the two men echo recently hijacked a Soviet plane. Rut sucl a.policy might well harden thz:9 Turks' attitude, `while it would create. an unfortunate' impression . in this country. Such' petty opportunism. would also be ?tvidely interpreted here and ei'sewhere as a negat{ve Kremlin reaction to President: Nixon's .United.. Nations appeal 'for Saviet-American? cooperation. 1"here can be ho serious accusat{on that the,.pIane was: .guilty of anything more horrendous than a navifational error, 'but continued failure tb release its occupants could blovr,ihis still-mirMor 9rieide~lt into an uaneceasary'. and harinf source?of'exaceirU~itiorl i~t'So i,et-Americana ,relations.;:..,:, .... _ ' N~,.. x ~;..,.:... ~.~:~. #~~. . ' , . CP~RGHT THE NEW YORK TIMES 8 November 1970 Hostages in Leninakan oscow s genius o n :toward it in this country is exhibiting itself again in Soviet .failure to release the two American generals it ;has been holding prisoner for over two weeks. From the beginning, it was patent that a 'navigational error was responsible -for the landing at' Leninakan in c Soviet Armenia of a light, unarmed American plane ;,carrying the generals, their pilot and a Turkish escort ?~ officer. Even the heavy-handed 'and professionally sus- '.picious,Soviet security apparatus has made no formal "charge of espionage- or the like against the plane's occupants. Yet despite repeated .Washington requests for their release, the four men involved are still im- prisoned. Soviet propaganda- has sought to draw lurid parallells x? between the plane and the U-2 shot down over the Urals almost a decade ago, though the facts in the two cases .are entirEly, different. The point of this psycho- logical warfare is presumably to remind the West that the U;2'pilot was exchanged for a Soviet spy, thus. hint- ing that. only a similar .exchange now will free the four prisoners. Presumably the human trading material Mos- cow wants is the. four Soviet citizens who recently escaped to Turkey in hijacked planes. There should be no surrender to this effort at black- ; mail. Washington reduced and downgraded its delega- tions at celebrations of the Russian Revolution as one . means of emphasizing its displeasure. No doubt the State Department is prepared to resort to stronger measures, ;if necessary, such as proceeding against Soviet fishing vessels-many equipped with elaborate electronic gear- :which sometimes inadvertantly enter-American waters. The wiser. course, for Moscow would be to release the '`generals and thus avoid blowing-this accident into ~ new 'and growing source of tension with- Washington. Thera are encouraging rumors that the Russians are about to do just- that. It .is past time. f Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 C1~tISTIAN SCIENCE 3 November 1970 nn border finks I~~? .DoE>tn K. Cooky Beirut, Lebanon CPYRGHT That recent flurry of unscheduly a "Presidency" of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a form of collective leadership in which all republics and nationalities are to Yiave real representation. What precise shape this concept will take remains to be seen but its real importance rests on the fact that there is wide- ranging and free discussion about it among the citizenry as well as among political figures, a phenomenon in Cormnunist-controlled countries. In another innovation, the League of Yugoslav Communists (LCY) held a first "Conference" (29 - 31 October) similar to the more familiar institution of Party Congresses, except that the Conference will be convened annually for discussions on more pressing national questions, while the Congresses will continue to be held every five years Here again, more important than the institution is the fact that delegates really debated issues, disagreed openly and vigorously Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 with one. another, engaged in frank criticism of national policies, etc., rather than observing the standard Communist procedure of rubber stamping decisions made by a handful of the top. leaders. These two events represent the most recent in a continuation of the gingerly, experimental evolution of Yugoslavia started after her separation from the Soviet Bloc in 1948, an evolution that has moved in the direction of individual and institutional freedom. Though perhaps slight, these genuine moves toward democracy loom as gigantic strides compared to the immobility of Soviet society, where ever since Stalin's death such changes have been for the most part more apparent than real. Thus, while change in Yugoslavia represents evolution, in the Soviet Union it may be regarded as involution (in the biological sense, i.e. degeneration). Where the Bell (Almost) Never Tolls for Thee. Westerners who blame t e union o mo ern e ectronres wlt impersona corporations for maddeningly inefficient mechanized service, with its frequency of determined misdialings and the lunatic nonsequiturs of prerecorded answering services, might profit by pondering the plight of the Soviet telephone customer. The weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta conducted a series of experiments on the efficiency o e oscow to ephone system and published a report which could not have surprised their readers: the system is not efficient. The New York Times of 25 October 1970 reported that the Gazeta's attempts to reac t e desk of the Hotel Rossiya on Red Square ai e , so a reporter was sent by car to find out why. There he found the desk's three phones off their hooks while the two girls assigned to answer them argued heatedly over what shift each would take next. In another test a dispatch center for taxis was called, but there was no answer after repeated attempts and a total of 100 rings. A motorized investigator found that the Vavilov Street dispatcher's office had 5 telephones serviced by two dispatchers and one driver who had volunteered to help. None of the three bothered to answer because they were busy eating watermelons. One of the chief problems noted was the length of time needed to find a telephone number. Moscow is unique among major world cities for its lack of a complete directory service. The last comprehensive directory was published 19 years ago. During Litera_turn~aya Gazeta'slexperiments, which were conducted on average mornings; it t o two 12 calls to get through to information, and then a wait of 7 rings for an answer. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 ~~~~~~ Chile's Christian Democrats Start Opposition to Allende P~ro~ram. It is notewort y t ia.t t e L~iristian mel~ocratic Party, w oi~se -support was vital to the election of Salvador Allende, has started to oppose some of the government's measures which affect their interests, and they have apparently been successful in their first test of strength with the coalition government. Because those civil servants who are also Christian Democrats have been finding it increasingly difficult to keep their jobs in the face of leftist pressures, the party suggested legislation to protest them. The government yielded to this request by announcing it would send such legislation to Congress. This underlines the importance of Christian Democratic support to the government, and should serve as a useful reminder that just as Allende needed the seventy-four votes of the Christian Democratic bloc in Congress to become president, so will he need those same votes if he is to carry out his program within Chile's constitutional framework -- as he has promised to do. However, at the same time that the Christian Democratic party position has stiffened, the more extreme members of the coalition are urging President Allende to undertake even stronger measures against particular Christian Democratic interests, and a leftist columnist has already begun to hint that "rightists" within the Congress are trying to ?under- mine the government's program. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1 CPYRGHT N]?:Gt YOR;C TLS 5 October 1970 `~W~~~~~ I ~ ~Ll~~ ~o~~T~o~ o~ RU~~ ~oest?'tito Joint Presidsnay to Cot Now Head Annuafjy ? By AL)l:1tED FR1ElYUL~ Jr. 6~*eirt to T'he Ncw lost T1mB~ BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, tlct. e ommu is ;official announced here today that the collective presidency that i~tarsiiai Tito has proposed, as his, eventual successor wo-~ld~ headed by a different snarl each year. . dpening_official and detailed .:discussion on she succcsoion 'titan first outlined by President Tito in a speech in .Zagreb on, dept. 21, Eduard Kardetj, a leading member of the party ' ? Ifoitburo, $aid Ilia new body Woufi+?l contain the most power-- ' !md end representative political 'leaders in the country. filte actual chairmanship of the group, he told rnemDcrs of~ the Presid'-um of the League of Com unists in a long speech, should be rotated annually, giv- ing each of the siz Yugoslav republics a turn at having its man. in the top job. An excepfton, will be made; -for President Tito himself, Pdr.; Kardel)' soil. He implied than the '?8-year,-old leader would remain rr- the presidency for the rest of l?is Irfe. "It is Ai?Vltlu5," said Mr. Kardetj, who was one of 1lttar- shal'Tito's closest collaborators in tt,e wartime partisan move-! ment, "that Yugoslavia most crucially needs the participation of Comrade Tito in this whole undertaking'? , 'Not a Magic Wand' Stressing a point that had beers made by Marshal Tito in disclosing the collective 5uc- cessbrs'hip plan, Mr. ?Kardel] maintained that the new 'body would ~Isring in the two or three' rnos~ influential leaders of each; republic to participate in the +federal decision-making pro-; cols. 'l'ice collective presidency, he said,- "will slot be a magic Wand to solve all the problems and controversies that lime brings, but It should certainty speed up the discussion and settlement of 'such disputes." Historic fiends pitting the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia against central d~bmittation by Serbia now take the fiorm of a alive eca? nemi~ a