CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

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CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6
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RIPPUB
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S
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99
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November 11, 2016
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July 10, 1998
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1
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Publication Date: 
August 1, 1970
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REPORT
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25X1C10b ~ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 C ,... r-, r T August ~ 970 ~r~ pag~a Highlights SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 25X1C10b ~ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/025 ~~-~R.PP79-01194A000400060001-6 Union has been assiduously cultivating relations over the past year in line with its policy of working with what it considers "progressive".military go~;~ernments. k~l Although the Soviet airlift is reputedly the largest dis- aster relief operation undertaken outside .the Soviet Union, the amount of aid i.s modest, about $1 million, compared to the $20-30 million already donated by some 20 free world countries, including the United States, which has contr~.buted $10 million in funds alone. c) The use of aircraft rather than ships to carry Soviet relief supplies and equipment is obviously de- signed for propaganda purposes which include countering the propaganda im- pact of the considerable flood-aid that Western nations gave Rumania, as well as trying to offset the Soviets' own tardiness in offering aid .to Peru. Sea delivery would have been less expensive, less complicated, and as it turns out, probably faster. The several hundred tons of Soviet supplies would not have filled even one cargo ship, which would have taken about two and one ha,?f weeks from the Soviet Union to Peru. As of mid-July, only five flights had arr:i_ved in Peru, having met supply and fueling problems. The airlift had.. been scheduled to arrive ten days earlier in a spectacular wave, with groups of eight landing at intervals of ten minutes. I:n contrast, by the first of July, the U.S. had made 44 flights to Peru and 1,564 within the country. These flights alone carried over three million pounds of re- lief supplies, with the bulk of equipment going by ship. (See attached article for further details.) Spanish-Soviet Warmup. If any treatment of the above story should sup- port the theme o:f Soviet efforts to warm up their relations with military regimes and/or dictatorships, it may be pertinent to also remind audiences of Moscow's growl.ng rapprochement with General Franco's regime: (at the same time as Soviet propaganda media lambasts 'the,"capitalist imperialists" for "supporting the Fascist Spanish" regime.) Eeonomi.caZZz~ -- Spanish-Soviet trade volume jumped from $14 million in 1966 to $34 million in 1968. Early this year the Spanish government held out the possibility than a Soviet fuel agreement (for th.e Soviets to sell natural gas to Spain) could double Spanish- Soviet trade to $80 million yearly over the next three years. -ipZomatieaZZ~ -- In April. this year the Soviets opened a merchant marine office in Madrid and established a four-man "maritime mission" wherein two of its members have diplomatic passports. Recall that ,just six years ago diplomats were aflutter over the news that the Spanish and Soviet ambassadors in Paris had drunk a toast to the future establishment of diplomatic relations between their countries Indicative of Soviet eagerness is the story of Spanish Foreign .Minister Sr. Lopes Bravo's enforced detour to Moscow while on :his way to Manila in December last year: Sr. Lopez Bravo's plane was scheduled to re- f'uel in Tashkent but it was diverted to Moscow at .the request of Soviet au- thorities to permit Soviet Foreign Ministry officials to meet with Sr. Lopez Bravo while he "happened" to be in the Soviet capital. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 NEW YO1~K TIMES ~_~+ July 1970 soviETrosTPaN~s PARTY'SCONCRESS UNTILNEXTMARCH Delay Comes as a Surprise,: Since Brezhnev Said It _' -Would Convene in'70 -.. ECONOMY MAY BE CAUSE, .Planners Believed to Need More Time to Draft News Five-Year Program By-JAMES F. CLARITY '` C PYR~ HT . 3pecfel do The New York Timex . ' MOSCOW, July i3. -The: om Committee announced today, that the' 24th psrtY congress would be postponed to next lYiarch. The decision, disclosed by Tass, the official press agency, surprised the diplomatic com- munity because as late as July 2 the party chief, Leonid I. Brezhnev, said in speeches that the congress would be held "this year." Western diplomats attribute the postponement to economi problems, possibly complicate by political maneuvering in th Central Committee and th . Politburo. But the diplomat said the speculation that. fac lions were forming in the pa in opposition to Mr. Brezhne of Premier Aleksei N. Knsygi or both, might be premature. It is more likely, the dipl mats said, that Soviet planner Ihave asked the leadership fa 'more time to formulate t -five-year plan. Revitalizing Is Urged In recent months, Mr. Brezh- nev has ca]led far new efforts and increased p%uty discipline to improve the slpggtsh ecano- my. To a lesser extent, Mr. Kosygin hAs also spoken on economic problems. When Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin de- ,posed Niltita S. Ifhrushchev s's head of the party and the goo-. ~ernment in October, 1964, they promised economic reforms: ;chat would presumably correct the shortcomings in Mr. lUhrush- (chev's policies. The rules of tile, party require 'that a congress be held every four years. But it is not un- usual for ~a congress to be delayed. The 23d congress was com~ened in March, 1966. The 22d congress met in Octobe>' '1961.. The Tass anitouncernent of the Central Committee decision, made in a plenary session to? day. did not note that the new date amounted to a postpone- ment. The agency gave no rea- son, but said Mr. Brezhnev had made a speech on this question. Tass alsn said that Mr. Brezh- nev and Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin would.: address the March congress:- Mr. Brezhnev, Tass said, will deliver the Cen- tral Committee's main report and Mr. Kosygin will discuss the next five-year plan, ~whioh starts in 197t. 7'he ~announcemept that Mr. Kosygin would. address the congress in Morels vvas consid- ered confirmation that hey would be renaaned Premier bye the newly elected Supreme, Soviet, the_ national legislature, which convenes. tomorrow. t7nder the Cpnstitution, Mr. Kosygin and lis Government submit their resignations to the Parliament, which. either ac-~, cepts them ar renames thee. same government. Any decisions to replace Mr. Kosygin would normally have to be first ap- proved 'by the party's ruling; 11-member Pol3tbiu'o and thei Central Committee, which has ~aboiri 190 members. CPYRGHT The Soviet economy, West- ern analysts have said, is suf- fering from low labor produc- tivity in industry, unpredictable agricultural productx~n and widespread shortage of con- sumer gods. The economy is also under strain, the analysts said, from the maintenance of its military capabid.ities. On July 2, Mr. Brezhnev, in a report approved by the Cen- tral Committee, condemned agricultural mismanagement, acknowledged food shortages and promised increased produc- lion in the five years beginning in January. Some diplomats speculated that Mr. Brezhnev might want more time to improve his leadership record, thus strength- ening his chances of being re- elected general Secretary in March. The diplomats said that,, in addition to the solution of economic problems, Mr. Brez- hnev might want to present the congress with achievements in foreign affa>rs. These would include, the diplomats said, accelerated im- provement in relations with West Germany, lessening of tensions that could ~invalve the Soviet Union more deeply in the Middle Fast, positive se-' suits in the Chinese-Soviet border talks being held in Peking, and next year the hold- ing of a European security con- ference, proposed by the Kremlin. Speculation that changes !would be made in the Soviet leadership has continued spo- radically since spring, when several Politburo me+nbers were ill, including Mr. Kosygin, who 'was hospitalized for influenza. Mr. Brezhnev, according to a Tass announcement, did not go to Bucharest last week for the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian friendship treaty because he had a respiratory ailment. But he was seen a few days after the announcement at a soccer game on a cool, rainy night. Mr. Brezhnev, who is fi3, is also said to be suffering from high blood pressure. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved FcRelease/ 199"'9/0 CI 79 1 0 , 4~ WASHINGTON STAR '. i ~ 1~ ~I ~ ~ a ~ l'~ Tnly ~Q`Tn CPYRGHT ~'o ~~r~ S~~r~ S~ec~iafiao~ Fty Via Arctic By JERI;h1IAII O'LEARY r a r or 'The Sovie Union yesterday sent the first plane in a 65-flight relief airlift from Russia to earthquake-torn Peru, arousing considerable speculation in Washington about whether the gesture opens a broad new area of Eastern interest in the West? ern Hemisphere. Officials were considering what relationship, if any, the Soviet airlift had to the recent non-stop flights from Mur- mansk to Havana by military reconnaissance Bear aircraft. The flights to Peru will be made by AN12 and 22 civilian model long-range transports bearing numbers similar to the ones painted on the tails of planes used by the Russian national airline Aeroflot. Some observers believe the Bear flights to Havana had several motives: To familiar- ize Russian pilots with a~r- ways that are new to them; to indicate Soviet solidarity with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and t~ let the United States know none too subtly what Russian aviation can do. EL COMERCIO, Lima, Peru duly 1970 The Bear flew a ong og cg route over the Antic Ocean be- tween the Greenland-Iceland echannel and hooked around Cuba to approach Havana from the south. The mercy flights to Peru were delayed until this week- end because the flrghts cannot be made non-stag and the Rus- sians had asked for far more flight clearances and alf.erna- tive landing sites than some South A m e r i o a n countries thought were justified. Reports reaching Washing- ton were that the Russians asked for at least seven altel'- nate landing tields, including several in Brazil, Washington sources said the clearances now issued for the Russian relief planes will pro- vide for fuel stops at GandCr and St. John's, Nfld.; Havana; and Barranquilla, Colombia. The project is said to involve a shuttle of planes totaling 65 flights. Communist Cuba has al- ready sent about 25 special flights to Peru to assist the relief efforts of government o! Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado. CPYRGHT Primary Mission ates a wholo new dimension in the relationship of the Soviet Union to South America. No one seems to doubt that primary mission of the airlift is earthquake relief. The Rus- sian cargos will include food, medical supplies, roadbuitding eqquipment; helicopters, ports- b1e"tFansmitters, components for 100 prefabricated homes?a 200=bed hospital and three nurseries. "`~ The planes may bring as~ many as 500 Soviet personnel, including 325 crew members, 75 doctors, 25 geological engi- neers and an unannounced number of nurses and con- struction crews. The total Soviet contribution to Peru will be about 700 tons. The Cubans sent 200 doctors, nurse's and technicians and, about 10 tons of cargo per flight, including five field hos-~ pitals, blankets and blood pease ma. In addition, a'Cuban refri~-; erated trawler, the Camaron,, recently arrived at the Peruvi--' an ;cork of Callao with shoes` and mobile kitchen equipment. Aid Sent by U.S. States made a ~ $lo million re- lief grant; sent more than 4,000 tons of food and medicine and dispatched the helicopter carrier Guam to Peruvian wa- ters to aid the relief effort. Mrs. Richard M. Nixon made a flying visit to Peru to show the U.5. concern for the suf- ferings of the Peruvian people. The bid question on the Rus- sian airhft is whether it is a one-shot proposition or wheth- er it signals a new dr~e for increased relationships and communication with South America. At present the Soviet Union has diplomatic representatives in eight Latin countries, not counting Cuba which survives because of $1.4 million per day in Russian assistance. These countries are: Peru, Argentin- a, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Uru- guay. The total of Russian diplo- matic representatives in the, eight countries is 265, of whom an estimated 50 percent are intelligence personnel. In- formed sources believe this is twice as many a:. the intelli~;- ence roster in ,.'~o ,region 1.0 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 5X1 C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 A~~roved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 T] T A ('1 TJ'!T'17 /1T TTTT\ TTlY TI T1TTT' [T August 1970 THE COMMUNIST SCENE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968-1970: FROM HUMANE SOCIALISM TO SOVIET ORTHODOXY The Czechoslovaks approach the second anniversary of the 20 August Soviet-led invasion of their country in a state of political subjugation. For-the Czech people the situation is tragically familiar. After the Soviet-run Communist takeover of 19+8, their personal and political free- doms were crushed and the country was rapidly Stalinized. Today all that remains to repeat the process is a re-institution of political show trials. (Whether present Party leader Husak has repeatedly promised there would be no show trials because he deludes himself that he can resist Soviet pres- sures or whether it is a cynical promise made merely to quiet popular fears until fool-proof control is established, matters little now.) In classic Communist fashion, officials and politics of the Dubcek era -are now being blamed for all current ills of the Communist society. Years of Soviet experience and the skillful use of salami tactics -- one slice of liberty at a time in order to avoid arousing open revolt -- paid off as the Soviets wiped out nearly every trace of the most promising experiment ever undertaken in a Communist country. Some of the methods used in what Moscow calls a "normalizing" process are described below. Political normalization was a job of considerable magnitude for the Soviets, given-the popularity and wide ranging nature of political changes which the reformers had achieved as well as the virulence of anti-Soviet feeling. One of the Dubcek regime's more important political innovations was to grant autonorc~y to various, formerly impotent non-Party organizations. Former puppet parties in the Czech National Front, which were established in 19~+$ as a meaningless concession to the non-Communists, were permitted under Dubcek to organize anal formulate programs of their own. The national trade union federation, a mere rubber-stamp front group in any Communist regime, struck out independently, criticizing the regime and supporting the .interests of its worker members. Quasi-political organizations such as KAN, a group of youthful non-Party reformers; the 231 Club dedicated to rehabili- tating some 50,000 former political prisoners; and the newly formed Society for-Human Rights, acted as pressure groups in the body politic. After the invasion these symptoms of democracy were wiped out. The National Front parties were forbidden to organize independently. The leader of the trade union federation, Karel Polacek, was co-opted into the Party leadership, to remove him from trade union affairs and in order to use him as a whip for controlling the workers. The new clubs were put under Interior Ministry control and refused licenses to operate. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 The second essential step in political normalization was remaking the Party. Under Dubcek and popular legislative leader Josef Smrkovsky, Party membership shot up. Many formerly apathetic functionaries became active liberals in the new cause. First they tried force; they kidnapped and imprisoned the top leaders. But no quislings came forward; Dubcek, Smrkovsky and the others were reinstalled for later, more gradual replace- ment. Smrkovsky was removed from leadership of the Federal Assembly (parlia- ment) in October 1969, Premier Cernik was replaced in January 1970, and Dubcek lost one party and governmental post after another until he was finally read out of the Party altogether in June 1970. Hand in hand with the purge of the top leadership went tYie continuing Party purge, also euphemistically called the "exchange of Party cards." Moscow's stated aim is to insure that every member of the Party is interro- gated. ,Under Soviet prodding some 2,000 investigating commis:~ions, abetted by a pervasive informant network, put the purges into high ge-ar in January 197o with the evident aim of reducing the mass Party to rough]_y half its. 1968 strength of about 1,600,000. In addition, great numbers have resigned during the past two years. Progressives, and even moderates, have been replaced at all levels by ultra-conservatives on whom Moscow can depend. The presidium has been reduced from 21 to 11 men. Some 70 members of the 1968 Central Committee have been ousted. The moderates, are now outnumbered by the St aliriists. Normalization of information media got top priority. Freedom of infor- mation, the lifeblood of an open society, had been restored iri February 1968 for the first time in twenty years. The Czech people discovered their own country; television introduced them to their modest new Party First Secre- tary; magazines and newspapers proliferated, reporting the astonishing new Party developments. All government and Party officers were put under the close and critical scrutiny of the free press. Circulation oi' popular magazines like Literarni Listy, Reporter, and Politika rose astonishingly as they. opened their pages to free-wheeling discussions of long suppressed social topics. This heady climate of public debate inevitably brought charges against the Party for failure to liberalize fast enou?;h and against the Soviet Union for its attempted domination of Czechaslovaki.a. But in the pre-invasion period the popular press gave nearly unanimous support and a "stand firm" edict to Dubcek as he desperately negotiated with the Russians for Czechoslovakian sovereignty at Cierna and Bratislava. Latter, in the five days following the invasion, many magazines and newspapers, including the Party's Rude Pravo, continued publication underground. Twelve mobile TV and radio units kept the people informed of what was happening; radio stations continuously repeated the Party leaders' statement that, despite Soviet propaganda claims, no request had been issued to Warsaw Pact troops to enter the country and no forewarning of the invasion had been given. On 21 August, the Russians tried to clamp censorship on all news media. One by one, publications were suspended or banned, among them the-Czech Journal- ist Union's respected Reporter and the Central Committee's owri weekly Politika. pprove or~Rehease 1"9~1D~~2~ CIA-RDP79-01194 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 The staff of Rude Pravo was entirely replaced as was that of the trade unions Pr ace. The present Rude Pravo chief editor is a militant Stalinist and a member of the Central Committee Secretariat. The new Prace chief editor and the new director of Czech radio were themselves later replaced as Soviet pressure for orthodoxy increased. Purges dug deep into all media staffs, where Soviets correctly feared Czech democratic traditions. Standard Com- munist purge tactics were used: firing, recantations and self-criticism. Journalist groups continued their protests late into 1969 but were even- tually quieted.. Some disbanded rather .than kow-tow. Large numbers now have difficulty finding jobs. Jiri Hochman, formerely well known on the Reporter, wrote friends in June that he is now working as a mechanic and expects to be put on trial after the invasion anniversary. Occasionally a newspaperman is hired by a sympathetic factory manager only to be fired under Party pressure. When he can no longer find any such work, he may be arrested as a "parasite" for not working! Cultural normalization was also a part of Moscow's program. When Dubcek appointed Eduard Goldstuecker, vice rector of Prague's world famous Charles .University, to head the Writers Union and freed it from Interior Ministry control, intellectual expression bloomed freely. Artists wrote, composed, and painted with uncontrolled freedom. Czech film makers earned artistic acclaim in the west. Twenty years of Communist education fell away as students who had led the first mass protests in 1967 became vociferous sup- porters of the progressive Communists, often outreaching Dubcek's stated limitations of freedom. They continued to demonstrate against the Soviet occupation for months after the invasion The invaders quickly reduced artists to the sterility of state-censored "socialist realism" under control of the Ministry of Interior. An occasional film maker still retains limited independence because of the foreign exchange his films earn abroad. But playwright Vaclav Havel, winner of the 1969 Austrian prize for European literature was not permitted even to go to Vienna to receive his award (shades of Boris Pasternak). The purges hit hardest among the Charles University intellectuals whom Moscow has always fea:r?ed. Thousands have now fled or resigned. The new Education Minister opened an inquisition by requiring all higher school officials to report any public statement or act of "rightist opportunism" from school faculties or students during 1968-69. Should any official be reluctant to turn informer, he was assured that the Ministry's own investigation would find him out! At the same time each Ministry emp:Loyee was required to evaluate himself and ten of his colleagues in intimate, personal detail. Nearly all school curricula are now under control. Studies in humanities, such as social sciences, have been banned, all foreign source material prohibited and the granting of all higher degrees in Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) suspended. Auton- orr~y, even for ,higher schools, has been wiped out. Personal freedom has been reduced to the standard of other Communist countries. The security police apparatus has been reconstituted, complete with links to a spy network under the Soviet ambassador. An "emergency" Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 law of indefinite duration allows police to hold a suspect inconununicado and without trial for a renewable period of 21 days, despite the fact that the Czech constitution permits a maximum of only 48 hours. Free: assembly .s no longer possible. Individuals are no longer permitted to travel to the west, a privilege which had been fully restored in 1968, an~i no Czech citizen may live abroad. The Czech border "iron curtain" is being re-built and re-electrified, but an estimated 800 flee the country weekly, mostly through other Communist countries. More than 100,000 have fled abroad since. the invasion. The amnesty law which would permit them to return without punishment has expired. Churches and church schools are again restricted after a brief revitalization and big rise in membership. The Ck~ief Justice of the Supreme Court recently attacked the 1968 law for rehabilitatipn of former political prisoners as "not in harmony with socialist legality" and urged its immediate repeal. The above Soviet program of "normalization" of Czechoslovakia -- on the political, propaganda/information, and cultural fronts, including the severe abridgement of personal freedoms -- offers only a partial picture of the two- year transformation of afresh and humane brand of socialism invitiated during ~:he "Prague Spring" to the bleakness of Soviet orthodoxy. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS 196 Robert Rhodes James, ed. Selected Chronology January-December 1968 S January. Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Com- mittee plenum decides to separate the functions of party First Secretary and President of the Republic, `in accordance with the process of democratization which has begun'. Antonin Novotny, while retaining the Presidency, resigns as First Secretary and is succeeded by Alexander Dubcek, previausiy First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party. 29-30 January. Dubcek pays unaccompanied visit to Soviet Union. The communique at the end of the visit announces `full identity of views on all questions discussed'. 5 March. Czechoslovak Party Praesidium transfers res- ponsibility for ideology from the conservative, Jiri Hendrych, to Josef Spacek. 6-7 March. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact meets in Sofia. 16 March. Dubcek, in a speech at Brno, reaffirms that the alliance with the Soviet Union remains the basis of Czechoslovak foreign policy. 23 March. Meeting in Dresden of Bu?rattan, Czechoslovak, East German, HungariarE, Polish and Soviet party leaders. Communir _ e refers to a forth- coming economic summ`?. tieeting and to agree- ment on practical mews~~es to st.::.,+.hea the Warsaw Pact and its arr.-~~d forces. 26 March. SF4:ch by ;amiaber, Secretary of the SED Central Committee, criticizing Czech policies and Smrkovsky's speeches. (Later the subject of formal exchanges between the Czech and East German Governments.) 1 April, At resumed meeting of the Czechoslovak Party 3 April. 4 April. 6 April. Central Committee Dubcek says: `We ,must continue to build up our army and improve it according to Socialist principles; as a defensive barrier against the enemy outside, the imperialist aggressors. We must build it up as a firm link in the alliance of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty.' Resignation of Czechoslovak Minister of Def- ence, General Bohumir Lomsky. New Praesidium of Czechoslovak Communist Party elected. Oldrich Cernik succeeds Jozef Lenart as Prime Minister. 8 Aprii. New Cabinet announced. 9 April. Czechoslovak Party's Action Programme pnb- lished. 23-26 April, Session of Rumanian Central Committee adopts resolution noting that the Rumanian Party had not been invited to Dresden Meeting at which questions of importance to Warsaw Pact and C M E A were discussed. 24 April. Announcing in the National Assembly the pro- gramme of Czechoslovak Government, Prime Minister Cernik says: `As long as NATO exists, we shall contribute to the strengt'~.: Wing of the Warsaw Treaty, we shall strive to make the Czechoslovak People's Army a firm link of this alliance, and we shall develop greater initiative towards the intensification of the work of its joint - command. The government will ensure the weds of defence in harmony with the possibilities of our State.' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 26 April. 30 April. 4-5 May. 6 May. 6-7 May. Czechoslovak-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendshila` Co-operation and Mutual Assistance renewed. Prati~da carries account of Czechoslovak pro vincial party meetings, quoting fears expressed by conservatives of consequences of lifting o$ Press and TV censorship and expressing anxiety over subversive attacks against the Action Pro- gramme. Dubeek accompanied by Cernik, Smrkovsky and Bilak had what Tass describes as a `brief friendly meeting' with Soviet leaders in Moscow. Le Mande reports a CPSU meeting of 23 April Brezhnev described as worried over Czech devel- opments and believing Dubcek a prisoner of `reactionary and anti-Communist elements'. General Epishev (head of the political control department of the Soviet armed forces) quoted as speculating on appeals for intervention from "faithful communists' in Czechoslovakia. Should this happen the Red Army would be `ready to do its duty'. The same article claims that a similar line is prevalent in Bulgarian Party circles. Polish Government protests to Czechoslovakia about `anti-Polish campaign'. New Czechoslovak Ambassador to Moscow, Vladimir Kouchy, presents credentials; Fresident Podgorny refers to `anti-Socialist' elements in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Hajek, visits Soviet Union. Czech trade union newspaper, Prace, takes up Epishev's remarks, saying it is `unbelievable' that Soviet Central Committee would consider military intervention. ' Meeting in Moscow of leaders of Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian parties. There is little publicity and no communiqu6. Statement by Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly, Josef Smrkavsky, as Dutcek's visit to tYf asco~v, says: `We must under- stand the fears of the Soviet Union which has in mind not only (:'zechoslovakia but the security of the whole Socialist camp. Even so, the Soviet comrades declar~.~d that they do not want to, and wilt not, interfere in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs.' 17-22 May. Soviet Defence Prlinister, Marshal Grechko, and General Episheti~ visit Czechoslovakia. Commu- nique states, intr=r olio, `...concrete steps have been outlined for' the further development of the friendships betv,~een the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak Pt~ople's Army and the strengthen- ing of their co-c,peration within the framework of the Warsaw 't'reaty'. 17-25 May. Soviet Prime Minister, Mr Kosygin, visits Czechoslovakia for cure and consultations. 18 May. Czechoslovak protest to East Germany about, article in Berliner Zeitung of 9 May alleging US and Western Gc;rman military units in Czecho- cv Slovakia. 19 May. Czechoslovakia news agency, CT'K, reports denial by General Epishev of Le Monde report on possible Soviet Army assistance to Loyal communists. 24 May. Announcement in Prague that Warsaw Fact command staff' exercises wilt take place in Czechoslovakia in Lune. 7 May. 8 May. 15 May. 30 May: Novotny dismis-~;ed from the Party Central Cc*nz- mittee and suspended from Party membership. 1 June. Czechoslovak twentral Committee decides to convene an extraordinary party congress on 9 Septembee. 3-IS June. Czechoslovak ~l'dational Assembly dele;ation, led by Smrkovst:y, visits Soviet Union. 4 June. Dubcek, addressing meeting of party activists at Brno, says: `Anti-party and anti-Communist tendencies exist ... what do we mean by the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6 12 Juae. 16 June. 20 June. 26 June. 27' June. 2 July. 4 July. 5 July. In a note to the West German Government, the Soviet Union refers to the `enemy states' articles in the UN Charter. Smrkovsky criticizes the `2,000 Words' for `political romanticism', while admitting the `honour;:ble intentions' of its author. 8 July. Czechoslovak Communist Party Praesidium issues a statement expressing willingness to confer bilaterally with any of their allies. $-10 July, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Hajek, visits Bulgaria. 9 July. Bill granting every Czechoslovak citizen right to obtain a passport without restrictions passed by National Assembly. General Dzur, Minister of National Defence, announces that 35 per cent of the troops in the Warsaw Pact exercises have returned to their permanent gamsons. l0 July. Czechoslovak General Vaclav Prchlik announces that a `new situation' had developed since the original official statement that the troops in the Warsaw Pact exercise would be withdrawnimma diately on July 2. The Soviet Literatur~raya Gazeta attacks `2,000 Words'. 11 July. Article in Pravda attacks `2,000 Words' and compares situation with that in Hungary in 1956. Prague Radio br