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August 1, 1969
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25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 THE WASHINGTON POST 28' June 1969 . By Harry Trimborn Los Angeles Times SAIGON-Teachers I a r,e', ,murdered by Vietcong terror fists or killed by the crossfire' of soldiers. Students are torn from their studies to join it, stream of refugees. Schools become military barracks or shelter for the homeless. Classrooms, text- books and libraries vanish in, Such is the impact of war on being taught by more teachers, in more classrooms than at' any other time in the short,` turbulent history of the 'na-' tion. In 1954, the year Vietnam, was split into a northern and southern zone, the number of children attending elementary numbered 500,000. This year 11 year age group. Hopes for Future The Ministry of Education ,hopes to increase the figure to, 85 per cent by 1970. In the last four years more; than 700 classrooms were de-' stroyed in the fighting. Yet in' the past two years alone, nearly 14,000 new classrooms 'Pave been built throughout he country. Since 1967, about 15,000 ele, mentary schoolteachers have been trained, to bring the total number of teachers in the nation to over 35,000.. There Avvr(q dlfW. znentary achers in 1854. makes up for the numerical logs of teachers due to the war. According to government figures, 289 teachers were kid- iiapped and 107 were killed by the Vietcong between 1960 and 1967. During the 1968 Commu- Kist offensives, another 31 teachers were killed. Desire for Education The relatively healthy state! of education in the midst of a .war is due largely to the de- sire of the people to have :their children educated. "This . is the most thrilling aspect of the whole educa- tional program in this coun- 'try," said Harold Winer, who as assistant director for educa- tion for the U.S. AID program here is the chief American co- ordinator for joint U.S.-Viet- namese educational programs. "I have never seen a people of any country in which I have worked over the years respond so willingly and so unselfishly to the needs of education. They will do anything, they will give their last piaster to get a school going in their community." It is this zeal, according to 'Winer, that keeps the Viet- cong from mounting any large-scale, concerted, efforts to disrupt governmental edu- cational programs. Early in War "In the early days of the war, the VC made strenuous efforts to disrupt educational programs," Winer said. "They would destroy schools, kill and Intimidate teachers." The terrorism against teach- ets was part of the Vietcong policy of rooting out pro-gov- ernment leaders in hamlets ,and villages. And teachers, by ? virtue of their positions, were at least potential community leaders. Where there was no direct violence against teachers, the Vietcong would often force them to witness the executions: of other Communist victims. The terror tactics were largely limited to the elemen- tary schools in rural communi- lease 19? ere generally spared acts of ter-, rrorism. 1 Unlike elementary schools in remote and vulner ble i areas, high schools and of-1 ,leges are located in c ies which generally remain in firm control of govern ent forces... Fallen Off Yet violence against sell ols and teachers in the re ote areas has fallen off in the ast few years because, according to Winer, the Vietcong as learned that such action is "counter-productive." "I know of nothing that as aroused the hatred of the co- pie 'toward VC activity as e destruction of a classroom or the killing of a teach r," Winer said. "The people ill. sometimes gloss over of er disruptive activity, but of when it comes to educat on and the opportunities it off rs for a better life for their c il- dren." While teachers may no longer be singled out or death by the Vietcong, he fear remains. Winer said it was difficult to induce tea h- ers from the cities to take as- signments in remote haml is because of Vietcong activity No VC ? Program Winer insisted that contr ry to published reports there is i no evidence that the Vietco g has established an educatio al program for the people, o it- side the purely political find c- trination courses. "We have yet to find a y- place where: the VC have r- ganized a fully operati gI school program,"? he said. ` n contested areas there is gen r- ally nothing going on at 11. However, in some of the ar s where the government s control by day and the VC y night, we do conduct clas s during the daytime." In the secondary scho is and in the colleges and u i versities, the Vietcong mak s some attempt to infiltrate t e student body for propagan a 01194A(' ql9 lu~tlkly s s pressed, Winer said. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 THE WASHINGTON POST, 20 July 1969 CPYRGHT inistates A-p aise hat , Oualifies as a C Abdul Sattar doubles as rep- 'kpeace - loving." Theoretically By Robert H. Estabrook weehlnston Post Forelrn 8er,fee UNITED NATIONS-What is the definition of a nation? That, essentially, Is what the United States has asked the Se- curity Council to decide by pro- posing that it take up the ad- mission of ministates to the United Nations-without arous- ing any detectable enthusiasm for the question on the part of the other 14 council members. The United States has in mind suggesting in closed ses- sion to the Council membership committee an as yet undis- closed checklist based on popu- lation, area and economic re- sources by which the suitability of potential applicants might be judged. At the root of the problem is that some of the smaller among the 126 present U.N. members can barely afford the $50,000 minimum annual cost of representation. There 'are vast differences in population, area and resources among cur- rent members-Yet under the doctrine of sovereign equality each has an equal vote in the General Assembly. For example, India, popula. tion around 480 million, has nearly 4700 times as many peo- ple as the Maldive Islands, population 103,000. The Mal- dives now operate an embassy in Washington and Ambassador resentative to the U.N. But for a time business with both the U.S. and U.N. was conducted from the Maldives' philatelic agency in New York. Yet there is a strong possi- bility that 25 or more additional states, some of even smaller population, may soon seek full U.N. membership unless some other-status is devised. This was one of the con?I siderations behind the July 14 letter from U.S. Ambassador William B Buffum to Secur ity Council President Ibra hima Boye of Senegal. Buffum noted that former U.S. am- bassador Arthur J. Goldberg had raised the issue in Decem- ber, 1957, and that Secretary General U Thant had taken it up on several occasions. The letter endorsed Thant's call for a "study of the cri- teria for membership with a view to laying down the neces- sary limitations on full mem- bership for the emerging states which are exception- ally small in area, population and human and economic re- sources, while also defining other forms of association which would benefit both the 'micro-states' and the United Nations." Under the U.N. Charter no membership diterion is estab- lished except that a state be Pacific dependency of "Mu- tiny on the Bounty" fame with a population of about 90 persons, is eligible for mem? bership. The General As- sembly's colonialism commit- tee appears to urge full In- dependence for Pitcairn in a resolution annually submitted to the Assembly. No one seriously expects this. Some smaller independ- ent entities have deliberately decided not to take on the obligations of U.N. member- ship -- among them Andorra, Llechstensteln, Monaco, Auru, San Marino and Western Sa- moa. Moreover, size is not neces. sarily an index to usefulness and influence. Malta, with only twice the area and far less than half the population of the District of Columbia, proposed the study of the sea- bed that now occupies the world's g r e a t nations at Geneva. But there are rumblings that less qualified applicants may be in the offing-for example, in the West Indies, where the British-sponsored associations are encountering some of the strains of other recent federa- tions. Grenada, with only about 90,000 -population, has inquired about observer status 111- * " 201d" LIVA ratry? at the U.N. Anguilla, the Ca- ribbean Island of 7000 where British troops intervened this spring, had spoken similarly. From the American stand- point, a potential worry is the Pacific Trust Territory of Mi- cronesia, where several en- tities might seek separate status without an inducement to association. The colonialI re committee already claims jurisdiction over the Virgin Islands, Guam and America Samoa. What accounts for the lac of enthusiasm In the Security Council about taking up the question ds that some new countries, jealous of their pre- rogatives, fear that an attempt may be made to institute system of weighted voting i the Assembly. There is little chance. an such change would be ap proved on its face. But big powers have bee reluctant to risk offendin smaller delegations who s votes they may need on obhe Issues by seeming to propos a limitation. A genuine problem exists but it is hard to find diplo mats from other countries wh believe that the current U.S move stands much greate chance of success than pre vious stillborn efforts. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 CPWRI ITTE, Paris 29 ;6y -;969 According to a Poll Taken by COFREMCA According to an opinion poll taken by COFREMCA from 15 April to 15 May at the request of the French Association for NATO (1), 74.3% of all Frenchmen polled believe that France should stay in the Atlantic Alliance, 11.5% believe she should get out, and 14.2% had no opinion. This poll, which covered 2,250,000 people also revealed that 25.3% of Frenchmen believe that France is still a full NATO member, 21.5% of those questioned failed to answer on this point, and 46.9% of those questioned were in agreement with the statement. "France must remain in the Alliance because, in case of conflict, France has need of the United States." In reply to the question: "Can the military force actually at the disposal of France assure her an adequate defence?" 59.7% of the answers were negative, 29.2% said yes, and 11.1% had no opinion. 51.7% of those questioned believe that it is in the best interests of France to maintain relations with the United States; 37.1% said they were "pretty much in agreement" with the statement and only 3.1% "disagreed com- pletely." The COFREMCA poll also brought out some interesting results on opinions about Franco-German relations. To the question: "Is there at this moment a country that is likely to develop into an adversary of France?" 29.8% of the people answered yes, 7.4% named Germany as the country, which trailed after China (9.5%). This tendency was stronger in the north and east of France where 10.7% of all those questioned feared Germany. Elsewhere 57.2% of French opinion, reflected in the poll, estimate that a foreign country represents an "economic danger" to France and among them, 28.4% believe that Germany is the danger. (l r Rho Ti'ronCl' ~SSGiCZH+Z(.Lf,G17' *hc n~iR in C,~ymmiini+ (4 r r t _185, rue de la Pompe, Paris 16:e. SELON UN SONDAGE DE LA COFREMCA es trois quarts des Francais sont.pour le maintien de la France daps IIalliance atlantique r Selon un sondage d'opinion realise par Is, COFREMCA entre le 15 avril et le 15 mai a ]a demande' de 1'Association frangaise pour la Communaute atlantique (1),~ 74,3 % des Frangais estiment que la France doit rester dans l'alliance, atlantique, 11,5 % pen- sent qu'elle devrait s'en retiree, 14,2 ,% ;n'ont pas d'opinion. N Cc Bondage, qui Porte sur N eux it nauante personnel n errog es, r vele d'autre part que 25,3 S% des Francais croient que la France fait encore pantie de I'OTAN, 21,5 % des personnes interro- gdes ignorant la rdponse a cette question. 46,9 % des personnes interrogees sont d'accord avec l'affirmation,: ((II Taut que la France reste dans l'alliance, car on a besoin des Etats-Unis en cal de conflit.> A la question : e La force mi- litaire dont In. France dispose actuellement peut-elle assurer efficacement an defense ?v, les reponges donnent 59,7 % non, 29,2 % out et 11,1 % sans opi- nion. 51,7 % des personnes interro- gdes estiment que Pinter@t de la France lui commande de rester en relations avec lea ." t s< plutot d'a.ccord> avec crt opinion ; 3,1 ' seulemenl disent ((pas du tout d'accord . Le sonrlage do la COFREI'C fait encore a.pparai.tre des r sultats in.te>ressan.ts a pt o des relations franco-allr ma.- tip t. A la quest ion : s Y a t-il moment un pays susrcpti! d ) devenir no adversaice I France ? > , .Sur 29,8 9. e' sonnes a y a n. t repondr on 7,4 % estinrrnt que ce , l'Allemo0;'. qui vient airy, i aprds in .:tinc (9.5 %). c.?tt tendonce est encore plea accu see dans le nord et l'c de I France, oit 10,70 % >l> . person nes interrogdes craignent l'Al lemagne. D'autre part, 57.2 ? des Frangais, scion ce sondag estiment qu'un pays etrange reprdsente un a danger econ.o Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIAI QRZ "-~1j A#A, i 0 a la France 185, 'rue as to Pompe, Paris-18'. , l'Allemagne constitue ce danpe Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001..3 BOGOTA DOMESTIC SERVICE 3 July 1969 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT PRE?IDENT CARLOS LLERAS RESTREPO'S FIRESIDE CHAT (Excerpts) I wish-:to devote tonight' to two. principal subjects. ,First, to comment on my visit to the United States, and second,; to refer to my meeting with the members of the..political.:directorates and the committees which were formed to prepare parliamentary work. I will merely emphasize some of the chief aspects of Colombia's position, with which I believe the opinion of-my countrymen is identif but which I hope will become firmer in the consciences of all, because I believe that they constitute a good path for the future. I have not felt it convenient for Latin America, particularly not for Colombia, to weaken the inter-American system, but on the contrary to strengthen it. The truth is that within this inter-American system there is a large power--the United States--highly superior because of its resources, population,- and means, to all the other members of the Pan American community. But we are playing within certain rules of the group which recognize the juridical equality of states. Experience has shown that there have been deviations and that the principles-of the inter-American system have not always been followed faithfully. Within this system the deviations can be corrected, seeking perfection, and this is what we must do. The consequences of an economic policy of continental complementation would be extraordinary, because it is not the same to join poor markets through economic integration as it is to have access to a market of the immense buying capacity of the United States. I fail to see why, when there are protests against international injustices, against the wide gaps between highly industrialized nations and those undergoing development, these protests are directed against the United States, as if there were no other industrialized nations with different political ((word indistinct)). Our problem- -the gap--does not only exist with the United States, it also exists with the USSR, France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and with all highly industrialized nations. Naturally, the constant increase of open-end latent unemployment gradually created a vast social problem. It increases this gap, this inequality, it causes--as I said in the United States--prosperity to be divided, making a sector of the world very prosperous and making another poorer and more backward. What can we do to reduce this gap? Attack the United States, or cooperate within the inter- American system to seek the development of a better policy? On this, I wish to say something which seems elemental, but which people do not consider. When the United States is mentioned. people tend to personify the United States as if it involved one individual- - the old image of Uncle Sam with his striped trousers, high hat, ed, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : PIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 CPYRGHT ,: it the price of coffee, the granting of loans, tariffs, the conditions imposed on navigation, and so forth. We must abandon this simple idea and convince ourselves that in our relations with the United States we must start out with the idea that we are facing a country of extreme complexity. There is not a single will deciding all things. There is an executive branch which is quite strong, there is a Presidential regime, but there is also a Congress which has special powers and whose will is decisive in many cases-and which naturally is influenced by the different sectors and interests of the U.S. people. The United States is like everywhere else; there are capital, labor, and regional interests ,which make themselves heard, which pressure their representatives, the members of the House of Representatives and the senators. There are pressure groups such as those'existing among us and in.other nations. Therefore, we must work to change our situation, not by saying "the United States simply does not want to give us this or that," but on finding out what we can do in each case, what we can change with the executive branch, and what we must do to create a good public image in the United States. I have proposed a congress of U.S. and Latin American unions to study the problem of unemployment. The gravity of unemployment in Latin-America is a reality which the U.S. workers and union leaders should clearly understand, because their understanding will contribute to the forming of public opinion. I have proposed this congress because I am confident in the generosity of criteria of the U.S. union leaders. Today I agreed with the labor minister to meet him on Saturday and with the Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CTC) and the Union of Workers of Colombia (UTC) to see if we can arrange to hold this Pan American congress of labor unions in Bogota this December. This idea has been met favorably by Colombia workers and I'think it will be met favorably by the workers of Latin America. I think that to oppose this-.-a policy seeking to open more markets in the nation with the largest buying capacity--is a chauvinistic foolishness ((This opposition would come)) out of hatred for the United States, because it is said that we-"will depend more on the United States if we sell them ore. Why are we complaining? We want to sell more, we want to export more. We must seek, through every means, an easy access to U.S. markets, because one has to sell to he who can buy, not to he who cannot afford to buy. It is foolish to think that to create a climate of solidarity to gain more markets means iricreasi our dependence, that it is sacrificing national. autonomy. The internat economic policy of Colombia cannot be oriented along those liners and, I repeat, we want to conduct it not only through embassies and foreign ministries, but by contacting the U.S. public and its different sectors and explaining the problem-of the nations undergoing development in the continent. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 August 1969 August 16-23 Helsinki Youth and Student Conference on Vietnam, sponsored by the (Communist) International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. August 18-28 Liege, 7th General Assembly of the (non-Communist) Belgium World Assembly of Youth. August 20-21 Czechoslovakia lst Anniversary of the invasion of Czecho- slovakia by Soviet, East German, Hungarian, Polish and Bulgarian forces of the Warsaw Pact. August 24 NATO 20th Anniversary, NATO Treaty (signed April 4) which went into effect in 1949. August 24 Soviet Union 30th Anniversary of the Soviet-Nazi Non- Aggression Pact. August 25 France 25th Anniversary of the Liberation of Paris by French and U.S. forces, 1944. August 28 Czechoslovakia 25th Anniversary of the Slovak uprising against the Nazi German occupation, 1944. September 1 30th Anniversary of the beginning of World War. II -- Germany invaded Poland from the West September 1; USSR invaded Poland from the East, September 17, 1939. October 1 China 20th Anniversary, Chinese Peoples' Republic which wasl proclaimed 21 September 1949 and has since been celebrated 1 October. October 10-12 Vienna Conference on European Security sponsored by (Communist) World Council of Peace. October 17-31 Budapest 7th Congress of (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions -- the front. that publicly protested the invasion of Czechoslovakia last year (and has since avoided the issue). October 23 Budapest Anniversary of 1956 Hungarian Revolution. November 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 IST- London No Partnership with HIM It is pretty clear that we are. getting close to the limits-of coexistence with.Mr Brezhnev's Russia This paper said in November, 1965, that President Johnson ought to -take a calculated risk : It is a choice between an old priority and a new one- to put it bluntly, between picking the Germans as the main people to do business with, and picking the Russians. . . . This paper thinks that on balance the best and most adven- 4urous course for President Johnson to follow in 1966 will be to try to do business with the Soviet Union. We therefore agreed with his decision to drop the' idea of putting German sailors. aboard a fleet of missile=carrying ships. We welcomed the speech in October, 1966, in which Mr Johnson oficred in effect to accept the existing division of Europe in the hope of encouraging a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. That policy has borne some fruit : it has produced, among other things, the non-proliferation trcacy. But it seems clear that, for the time being at least, it is now approaching the end of its usefulness. The Soviet Union has changed a great deal since 1965. 'it has decided that it is not going to tolerate---as it then appeared it might-the hesitant experiments with reform that were beginning to take shape in parts.of eastern Eoro fee. It has dropped the lid on its own intellectuals. It w reasonable to hope in 1965 that the tide of events in Russia and therefore in the countries Russia controls, was movin in the direction of a more liberal form of communism tha could work in partnership with the capitalist democracie of the west. It has turned out that it was not. The issue let it be emphasised, is not primarily a moral one. It i not the unpleasantness of the way things are run in M Brezhnev's world that makes-it hard for the west to co-operas with Russia. It is the fact that the policy of repression t which Mr Brezhnev has committed himself at home inevitabi affects the course of action he follows abroad. That shows itself in Czechoslovakia last August. It will presumably sho itself just as clearly in the other causes he supports an opposes around the world. If Mr Brczhnev's chief aim i life is to perpetuate the existing power-system in the corn munist world-and that is surely the explanation of h' insistence in calling this month's conference to Moscow-h is unlikely to be an amenable man for the rest of us t deal with. So long. as this state or things continues-and that mean until Mr Brezhnev changes Russian policy, or is replace by somebody who will-it is bound to be reflected in th way the west handles its relations with the Soviet, Union, There 'are only two sorts of subject on which, in these circun stances, it will quite certainly be right to go on negotiatin with the Russians. The first is the sort in which no gre issue of ideology is involved.. That means, above all, th Russian-American talks about missiles ;. since the aim IA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 It is time we made our minds up about Mr Brezhnev's Russia. The idea that the Soviet Union under Mr Brezhnev is till basically the same country as it was under Mr Khrush- ch v is no longer. tenable. This week the Russian ambassador in London has apparently been pursuing his government's at .mpt to get two Russian spies out of a British prison by one of the most blatant pieces of blackmail a major po ver has resorted to this century. Back in Moscow Mr Br zhuev has got most of the world's communist parties to sign a document which, though it does not specifically m ntion the invasion of Czechoslovakia, may yet be used by the Russians to justify doing to other people what they di to the Czechs in the name of the " international duty of communists " as laid' down in part two of Tuesday's do laration. It is too simple to say that the post-Khrushchev rc ime in Rumia has reverted to the habits of stalinism. The r,wnans, after their relative relaxation under Claudius, did Mr n get a return to tiberianism. They got Nero ionic: Br .zhnev's Russia has much in common with Nero's n least in the fact that the dominant interest of its ruler ha ~ become the preservation of an impossibly inflexible po rer-structure. The handful of men in the western world who chiefly have to deal with this phenomenon can no longer escape the qu tion of what their policy towards Russia really is. To so c of them this may seem a puzzling question. President Ni on will point out that the United States is already involved in an attempt to work out a joint Russian-American policy fo the T%Iiddle.East, and that it has just told the Russians it will be ready to start negotiating by the end of next month abut the number of nuclear missiles the two great powers should allow each other to have. Herr Kiesinger will say th t his coalition in Bonn, whatever else it has failed to do, h finally dropped Dr Adenauer's old intransigence about c tern Europe. President Pompidou is probably calculating fight now the extent to which he, like General de Gaulle be ore him, will have to buy the quiescence of the French co munist party. by tailoring his foreign policy to Russian in rests.. Don't all these things add up to a policy ? he answer is that they do not, because they are based on an assessment of what is happening in Russia that is no w out of date. No doubt many of the things that the w stern powers are doing at the moment in their relationship wi h Russia are desirable. Some of them are essential. But it no longer possible to believe, as it was in Mr Khrushchev's lw t years in power and in'the brief period when Mr Brezhnev an I Mr Kosygin seemed to be continuing his policies, that th process of negotiation will create its own momentum : th it a deal here, and an 'understanding there, will broaden ou into a general programme of east-west co-operation., The m mentum juSuior Release-1999/09/02 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 CPYRGHT diem talks is to prevent' another round of the arms race, nd to encourage the non-nuclear countries, to stick by the on-.proliferation treaty, it is in both sides' interest that t c meeting both of them have now agreed to should take lace as soon as possible. The second sort of negotiation orth going on with is that which is designed to stop a 1 cat . quarrel turning into a superpowers' war. The one lace where there is any real chance of bringing this off at e moment is the Middle East. It is. remarkably hard to c how the United States can bring Israel-or Russia the rabs-to accept any proposals they might draw up between cm. But the mere fact of having worked out their ideas gether might help the great powers to stay out of a war one came ; and the fact that the local preponderance f power, which would then settle the issue, seems to belong Israel is no skin off Mr Nixon's nose. But that is about it. The recent conduct of the Soviet pion has made it fair to say that, even in these two fields, r Nixon should tread pretty warily. Of course, it would an excellent thing if the missile talks produced an agree- ent, to be enforced by inspection, that neither Russia nor lmcrica will build an anti-missile system or fit multiple vanccads into its rockets. But that is not the same as to rgue, as some of Mr Nixon's critics are arguing, that the nitcd States should unilaterally stop the development of hese two sorts of weapon without some means of checking hat Russia has stopped work too. Not long ago that might ave looked a risk worth taking. Mr Nixon is likely to e more captious now. He will be equally cautious, on he Middle East. The Americans will not want to give their pproval to any formula that did not offer the Israelis effec- ive protection against guerrilla attacks after their hypothe- ical withdrawal from the Suez canal and the Jordan. It will be necessary to handle even these two essential ets of negotiations with considerable care. And when - one ooks at some of the other things the Russians have said hey want to talk about it is even harder to see why the west hould accommodate them. They are still putting an extra- rdinary lot of back-scratching into the attempt to organise hat they call a European security conference. The objection o this is not that they are still trying, as they once were, o stop the United States from attending. They have given hat one. up. It is that the only apparent point of such a amboree would be to extract from the western countries. hat turned up a formal and explicit recognition of the present ivision of Europe, Odcr-liFisseline, Walter Ulbricht and all. ne can we why the Rus cans would. like this they, want o have their east European dependencies wrapped 'up apd aid on the shelf so that 'they-cm, deal,.with China:, it might even be worth taking them up on the idea if they were willing to extend to the west the same degree of co-operation in Asia that they are asking from it in Europe. But there is very little evidence that they are. Their help in bringing the Vietnam war to an end seems, to have been, to - put it generously, marginal. And the suggestion of a " collective security system in Asia "'against China, which Mr Brezhnev threw out last week, is apparently designed to exclude the western powers. The article by Mr Matveyev in Izvestia on May 28th, which first produced the idea, men- tioned only six Asian countries as Russia's possible partners. Unless Mr Brezhnev explains that his ideas about Asia are broader-ranging than that, it will be possible to draw .only one conclusion. The conclusion is that the Soviet Union wants ' to pursue its own policy. in Asia, for its own ends, while it invites the western world to underwrite its failure in eastern Europe. There is not ,to there to attract the west's negotiators. It reinforces the impression created by almost everything else the Russians have. done in the past year. The Brezhnev regime has let itself be frozen into a preoccupation with the salvaging of its own authority. It is motionless at home, repressive where it has the power to be abroad,.and narrowly self-interested in its diplomacy. From such a government. it is unrealistic 'to expect the imagination .that would be needed to: revive . the hopes of real cast-West' co-operation.' So long as it stays in power Mr .Nixon and the, rest of .us will probably,: have' to beckon that we"are pretty ' cloie to the limits bf coexietena: Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1.999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 er .; to pursue the reformist goals of the nalistic experience but with students-and the Party's lower echo- to pay off [lie. $400,000 debt incu lons"Pur'tfie liberals in a mood of red after government support w despair.'he feeling was widespread !cut on. ear I :I - I ij 21, 1968, invasion were finally being meanwhile, has proved much hard er felt; that all the maneuvering in the . to deal with. First the unions ci months between had been diver culated the defiant speech of Frai Lat fh. . t. I . ~ clans. from both Central :ommittee a 12T) 1,1 D S'h R ona anor y . But of late the reformers have Party last May for opposing ti i I PRAGUE S THE FIRST anniversary of the Soviet Invasion approaches, it as become increasingly apparent at Dr. Gustav Husak's attempt to acify Czechoslovakia with a policy f Reafisrnus is beginning to yield. 14 iminishing returns. The question } ow is whether he will respond to pposition from the unions, intellec- als and liberal Communists with onciliation or with an even tougher l ne. Last April, when Husak replaced Icxandcr Dubcek as First Secre- ry of the Communist party, his stem for restoring order seemed' simple and effective that some topic wondered why the Russians ad not thought of it sooner. Where is popular predecessor had wav- red and compromised in an attempt save what he could of the pro- ressivc platform, Husak began at nce to apply "realism" in every cid. That, the 56-year-old lawyer and arty veteran had demonstrated in is eight months as Slovak Party 41. hief, meant realizing the Soviets ave five or six troop divisions in his small country and it would not 1 e wise to oppose them too vigor- usly. Once law and order is re- tored and criticism silenced, it was been cheering up. Husak's repressive Husak line. Kriegel had been chaff actions, they now realize, were man of the National Front befo taken in situations where it was easy . the invasion and was one of t for him to overcome opposition. The negotiators of the Moscow agred- battles he has yet to win involve. ment in August. His resistance much more. complex power rela- the Soviets was so open and fran tions, and there are even some In- though, that he was not permitte stitutional safeguards on the side of to sign that document. Soon after the progressives. ! ward, his picture disappeared fro It was simple, for example, to 'the. capital, the Party ouster bei systematically purge those regional.; merely the delayed end of his carte . Party secretaries and presidium Typewritten copies of Kriegel a members who were too strongly. .,speech were subsequently read t identified with Dubcek and refused? meetings in the big plants in 0 to recant after 1HTusak came to; ' 'trava and around Prague, howevcf, power, In the space of a few weeks, :and packed its much anti Husa no less than 37 presidium members' punch as his original delivery. Th were ousted, including the powerful -regime branded these gatherin Moravian chief, Josef Spacck, who. "anarchistic" and said they wer along with Josef Smrkovsky lost his , based on false Information. post on the national presidium in It was at " this point that Husa the same plenum that demoted Dub- . acted against the students. Unio cek. members in five plants In the Pragu There was a parallel weeding out area reacted with 15-minute strikes at the regional Party newspapers. Again there' were recriminations Over the May Day holiday I called but no decisive action .by the gov on the editors of Nova Svobuda, the :crnment. Party journal in the grimy industrial' Husak can oust regional leaders city of Ostrava in Northern Morn- change entire editorial staffs, an via. All the editors, I was told, were cut off student subsidies, but h enjoying the long weekend. When knows he cannot jail or expel Ili the nation returned to work, neither: tens of thousands of defiant worker . liberal editor in chief' Ladislav Bub- who have taken part in these meet lik nor his leading staff members ings. A skilled politician, he has in were at their desks. They had been cludcd the chairman of the nationa mplicd, thAppMvediff irle F asVA19911/0` Oilht &A [9W'T9t01 1494? 1M0a80 -8olacek halcyon period. The contradiction . political views. main objectives of the progressives , tractable. Nevertheless, when t 1 i e , 11' was freedom to dissent from 'official' 13ohcmian and Moravian Studcn "icism openly in free speech and a. I Front and thus submit to Party di e ;cN ry free press. ?cipline, it was declared illegal at Husak's initial success in impos- replaced by a new rump orgnniz CPYRGHT ?f coritroll#pPWMiFi R a n aseo& i i'iQ~~iQ~af~ t 4 5 1 19 Q~Q Q~Q-~= too : f opposition gets worse, the labor adcr and his lieutenants can be red. But a purge cannot reach down to he local level without causing grave olitical damage to Husak and the ussians. For in the nine months twecn the advent of the Dubcek cforms and the Soviet invasion, al- ost every factory in, the country ook advantage of tl~e: new free. om and replaced its entire union eadcrship. In public meeting after' ublic meeting, the old bureaucrats were voted out of office. and new: lates put in. The effect of this was immediately oticcablc at the trade-union con-' ress held early this spring. The as- embled delegates demanded not my an economic but a political role or labor, and refused to subordin tc the movement's power to the ommunist party. Adraft bill giving he workers (fir-reaching control in anagement and production dcci ons ' wns,,;passed. - It "is still 'being ushed hack and forth in the gov- rnmcnt and will probably be either ejected or weakened beyond recog- ition. Whatever the ultimate outcome, he congress showed labor's power is well ati its dctcrmination to quit laying the traditional role of trans- nission belt for official policy. The atcr Kricgcl meetings and the soli- arity strikes with the students fur- her confirmed this change. It Husak wants meek and com- laccnt- unions again, there are plenty of unemployed former union leaders who would be glad to get their old posts back. Yet the change would involve another series of pub-, lie meetings and an open vote, and it is likely that most of the progres- sives would be confirmed in their present jobs--or that if they were forced to bow to government pres- sure, the popular outcry would be worse for Husak than the present opposition. Still, the regime has not been stripped of all its weapons. A union outskirts of Prague discussed one type of action it could take against the labor reformers: "They're going to have to make a couple of arrests in the factories. There's no atmosphere of fear like there used to be. No one is afraid to speak out. Of course, this would mean an end to Husak's promises of not returning to the methods of the '50s. But it may be his only way of dealing with the unions." One indication that the use of fear as a weapon is under consideration was the arrest ,of 19 persons, most. of them youths, in, the North Do- hcmian city of Tcplice, in connec- tion with the anti-Soviet rioting that followed the Czechoslovak hockey victory over the Russians at the end of March. The fact that 150 wit- nesses are scheduled to he called at the trial or trials points to maximum publicity and may mean that the fate of the defendants is intended to serve as an example to other unruly elements. Another possible straw in the wind was a recent tough statement by Interior Minister Jan Pclnar against liberals, which evoked mem- ories of the days when the Party leaderships equated any form of criticism with treason. He charged that progressives who have left the country, including Professor Ivan Svitak, now at Columbia, "keep in touch with persons having the same objectives and who remained in Czechoslovakia." In Pelnar's view, the designs of native anti-Party forces are "almost identical" to Western intelligence plans "to dis- integrate the. unity of 'the Socialist camp." It is but a short step from such accusations to charges of treason, as many thousands of Czechs and Slovaks can testify from their own experiences at the trials of the late '40s and '50s. More than 5,000 vic- tims of that period have applied for rehabilitation proceedings, and every week the press has a few lines noting the annulment of a sentence "in memoriam"-to have been )a volved in yet another rigged trial. Tna FACT that Husak has chosen to allow the rehabilitations to continue-one of the very few of the Dubcek programs he has kept- is considered a good sign by those who think he will deal with his op- position without the use or threat of terror. Another good omen, they feel, is Husak's own record as a po- litical prisoner in the 'S0s and his struggle to obtain rehabilitation. A long letter he wrote to former Presi- dent Antonin Novotny in those days had much the same rebellious sig- nificance as the current Kriegel speech. It, too, was circulated in. typescript in the factories. If he has forgotten this, which is unlikely, sonic of his aides have not. Both the pessimists and the op- timists felt that Husak's performance at the recent Moscow meeting of world Communist leaders proved their, point. The pessimists pointed to his lavish and frequent praise of the USSR as "the main pillar of the Socialist camp and of the interna- tional Communist movement." The optimists' argument was more sub- tic, being based on what the Party Secretary did not say, Despite what must have been considerable pros-1 sure, he did not justify the invasion; and even went so far as to tell the' forum that the Soviet action was) based in part on faulty informationf about conditions in the other Par tics. "We are often asked the ques- tion: Did we have sufficient inner' strength to defend Socialist achieve.' ments?" Husak observed. "Yes, we had enough strength!" . Justification of the Soviet action would have had the most serious consequences here. It would have given the Russians the proof they want: branding those who were run-, ning the government at the time, along with the editors of the `clan- destine newspapers and the broad- casters at the secret radio statioas,' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011$4MG1060MG 4 ar1eL, 2 CPYRGH'pproved For Release 1.999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79.-01194A000500080001- sidcrations must have had an I fluence on Husak's decision. Aft r all, he was one of the most impo - rant speakers on the rebel Bratisla a stations, and, as newly elected St vak Party chief, one of the mo t' 'quoted officials In the clandesti c press. Indeed, he used the media n his power struggle against the laborationist former Slovak lead r Vasil Bilak. Of course, there are many e amples in the Communist mov -' ment of men who repudiated the r earlier positions and allies to than e, their course. The pessimists use s their example Poland's Wiadysla Gomulka, who changed from t reformer of 1956-;to the ortho'd Party chieftain of ~ 1969. The' opt - mists like to cite the case of Hu gary's Janos Kadar; who was put i office by the Soviets but has give his people a more liberal regi than any-'other outside Slovakia ; NEW YORK TIME ' CPYROKY 1969 ? ,. 13 July 1969 Czech 0-.r'kU1_. CPYRGH Czechoslovakia tt" yost A C&Ck on., PRAGUE,-July 12 - Work+ rs at Czechoslovakia's biggest1 teel mill posted a letter from.' hess champion Ludvik Pach-, an. that "rudely attacked" ommunist Party chief Gus-' av Husak, the Party daily, uric Pravo reported today. -1 The paper said some work- rs at the Ostrava mill, 1701 riles east of here, stopped ork for two hours to discuss he letter and vote in support f it. Energetic steps would be aken against the factory nion leadership for. this "pro- ocative attempt to affect the fforts of the Party,?' said ude Pravo. Pachman, a reformist who as suspended from the, Com-' unist Party recently for crit? cizing Its current leaders, to the letter to the union after the factory invited hi and other reformists to forum at the plant. His letter, in which he d fended himself, was pinned the factory bulletin boar , Rude Pravo said. _ The paper accused "rightforces" within the unions attempts. "to push the. trail unions Into a unitbd fro t against socialism and irien - ship with the Soviet Union." Rude Pravo also reporte that a group of conscrvati Czechoslovak Communists in t.. .in Brno yesterday and agre ' to enthusiastic applause send a letter to the Soviet ga ?~ rison at nearby Olomou , thanking the Russian army f its help in "liquidating t danger of counterrevolutio = aryoverthrow." ., ; . ~,.,,:a The 'Workers :`Vote' With a Slowdown helpers in some farming coopers- ' PRAGUE-- 17ie next act of the The extent of dissatisfaction fives and factories in Slovakia. Czechoslovakia drama is likely in the party was shown last The official explanation is that to unroll in the coat mines and week when it- was announced the need of many Soviet soldiers that the ruling Presidiutn had foundries of Ostrava and the for training or retraining in civil-' machine shops of Vlsen: replaced the director of its staff ion fobs and Czechoslovakia's and suburban Prague. The -A!, 9- college. The announcement said ' "fort ign centers of anti-Commu- manpower shortages provide a onists are, on the one hand, the splendid opportunity for or fr frater hard line actio- that is at the. nism" had made deep Inroads real cooperation between Social- in the country in 1968 and 1969. 1st nations. r party ontroltus and on the "About one half of all the, The regime seems still hesitant other,. th.i sullen masses of party members In our workshop aboutorening the factory doors workers. have openly let the Communist o factory c0!.-,." a foreman in an tto the hated and despised sart The r,:'w Communist party engineering plant on the outskirts pants. Also in the western part chl^.f, L:. Gustav Husak, and his of the capital reported the other of the country, Bohemia and ultracaiservative allies, who, day:. "Most of the others don't Moravia, industry is far more ad- with Soviet backing seized power, attend party meetings. We hold vonced than in Slovakia and Is- In April, a, talking now in wor- bor s more militant. ried toocs about carrying "rho our own informal meetings In the "If plant morale and discipline struggle against right-wing oppor- canteen, discussing the days news. The crunch will come sink yet a little lower, the [Com- tunist . and anti-Socialist forces when they send us Soviet Sol monist party] leadership may ay de- Into the factories." diers disguised as workers." cide that every workshop needs The workers say little. The . "Volunteer" members of the its platoon of Soviet 'volunteers' trouhle,'.for the regime, is that Soviet forces stationed through- and anything might happen' they work even less. They have out the. country have ahead then," the assistant manager of stopped iA r+ rid t;tRelease 1 8i19~/u& rOIA -0119VIVR '! $?f" no in many plants a d have started re- a is a turning or tearing up Communist hard core Communist but likes n*rty mamharahtn cards. i ? CPYRGHT to define hi AR P4QiVPr i pr R ler4 grin "let's say & techn rat rather ti,n2. a. dop atist Angry Retort When the technocrat -as asked for comment on the f re- man's t~-ie (r names were n .ra- tioned) nP became angry nd said: "Yuu have sot been id the whole story. Tfi6ir cant cr discussions are fine-but t ey hold them when they sh Id stand at their lathes. Our tv k- ern are busy only on Saturd ys and Sundays when they b ild their weekend houses, tic er with'their motorcycles or ino n. light. We are losing a let of X_ port business because we at don't work hard enough and e work lesq and less. Sure, we n me no strike at the plant. But whit's. happening now is-[ hate to se the word--sabotage." Reports reachlok Prague f in many Industrial areas agree it,- deed that production has imp es- sively slowed down since ay., No figures are yet availabie, but Premier OldrichCc, nik ind other spokesmen of,-the regimes %Va already warned that the dro in productivity has reached ale m- ,ing proportions. Doctrinaire: Communists hive been' in charge of the C ,e '- slovak economy longer the in many other Socialist Count ies and incentives for labor have ic. mained few and weak. Hewing, is insufficient and bad, and m ny consumer goods are scarce or shoddy. The liberal refo ers who tried last year to free he economy of the worst constra nts were all too soon replaced by conservatives. The Soviet-led Invasion nd the fall from power of Alexa def' Dubcek and other popular Ii or- als have demonstrably sa ed working morale, increased sib: en- teeism, loosened plant disCl ine and voided the prestige of the trade unions. Each one of Cz ch- oslovakia's 60 or so unions ar- ries the word "revolutions y In its official title, but they i-r, as revolutionary as the buregtic ats who run the economy. The t de unions are not allowed to organ- ize strikes and expected to re- press wildcat stoppages. Nobody has yet been ahl to prove that the nreseot go-slow strategy i!i the factories has en planned by clandestine Ica rs. It may be the expression f a mood or the re:.ult of an un er- ground movement. Whatever the reason, the pro-Soviet re me CPYRGHT apparatus, and, among ]uur ists, writers, students and In ectuals seems at a loss ho make the disaffected factory na IA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 THE ECONOMIST, London 28 June 1969 Czechoslovakia CPYRGHT Where the workers like the students CORRESPONDENT Student. power -is, in its infancy i Czechoslovakia but the students are learn ing fast. If the Husak regime tries t force student bodies into politic? neutrality, it will discover it has a toug job on its hands. The experience of th past two years has obliged universit students to recognise that political activit cannot be lightly set aside it has becom an integral part of everyday life and, i the words of a student leader, " the quail tative content has been improved." The Czech students' union was out ]awed on June loth because it ha allegedly violated laws protecting the star and made statements, at home and abroa which were " at variance with the polic of the National Front and the Czech slovak government." The ban was th culmination of a running feud whic began last April when the. students' con gress -in Olomouc, attended by represen tatives of 6o,ooo students in' 65 faculties voted against membership of the Nation Front, an umbrella body through whic the party tries to control everything froboy scouts to the non-communist parties The congress left it to the indivjua faculties to decide for themselves whpfhe or not to join the National Front '#n only about half a dozen opted to dq so Economic retaliation followed. The sub sidies to student bodies, which amount a more than 7 million crowns a year were summarily halted after only million had been spent. This week Mr Toman, chairman of thi metalworkers' union,, interceded on thi students' . behalf and tried to- discove more precise reasons for the ban on' their union. He was given four reasons : tha the union refused to join the Nations CPYRGHT Front ; ''that 'it had contacts " with the American agent Siulc" (Tad Szulc, former New York Times correspondent) ; that it had made untrue statements to,the western press; and, lastly, that the students were running commercial enterprises with- out paying taxes. This last charge is cer- tainly true,. although 'the students claim that as a social welfare body they are ex- empt. Before the August invasion, Czech youth was not slow to. recognise the potentials of flourishing profit-making businesses-eight separate enterprises to `be precise-ranging from an employment bureau and the production of souvenirs to a profitable bar and restaurant and a printing plant. As Mr Tonian's attempted mediation shows, the students have continued to maintain liaison with the trade unions in spite of official disapproval. A meeting of Prague locomotive workers has demanded that the ban on the students' union should be rescinded ; and the metal- workers' union was talked out of full- scale strike action only when Mr Toman persuaded them that other methods would be more effective. The presidium of the students' union has condemned the ban as the act of '.' the bureaucratic power centre which has temporarily seized, control in Czechoslovakia' ; and an appea! against it has been filed both in the courts and direct to the Czech minister of the interior.' In that characteristically Czech foot- dragging manner the union continues to. function normally-it is vacation time until the appeal is heard. The party, meanwhile, has announced the formation of the preparatory com- mittee of a new student movement for the party faithful. Of eight members of this committee, six are from military officers' academies and the other two are known party stalwarts. Its aim is to " overcome the deficiencies of, the former student organisation." It seems improbable that this splinter organisation will enjoy any more popular support than the orthodox journalists' union which went straight to the bottom of the creek when it was launched 'over two months ago. 'Much, however, depends on the degrce to which the majority of students place material benefits above the political independence of their dissident organisa. tion ; for the government has wen fit to hit where it is likely Ve hurt most. Approved or Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011 - CPYFRAM 19 Jul 3_-, efi~nt resolve b Czech , students' By. RICHARD DAVY The' full text of the defiant resolution passed by the Czech student parliament on July 2 has now reached, London. It shows that the Union of University Stu- dents of Bohemia and Moravia (S.V.S.) intends to continue work in spite of the ban imposed by the Czech. Ministry of the Interior on June 20. The union has appealed against the ban, which means that. its activities are not officially illegal until the appeal is rejected4 which it almost certainly will be. . A striking point about the document is that it gives full: support to the elected leadership of the union, a -fairly radical group headed by the president, Mr. Karel Kovanda, which did,' not enjoy such solid backing until' it; *A as subjected to clumsy gov ernmcntal pressures and attempts to set up a rival leadership with official backing. These pressures rallied students who were begin- ' ning to drift back into apathy, of who were succumbing - to the financial and other temptations of official approval., The resolution calls on the students .to boycott the officially ?sponsored rival leadership, des., ,cribed as a preparatory commit- tee, and "in' the event of the S.V.S. being liquidated to main-, tain the continuity of the existing organization on the lines of its adopted and generally respected views and organizational struc-s ture, and to discuss forms' and procedures for further action' after the school year reopens ".' The resolution rejects the ofli-i cial . party line adopted by the Central Committee in May, saying; that it negates " the national pro-I ccss of democratization andi humanization of" our society .started after January, 1968, and forcibly interrupted by the inter-' vention of the, Warsaw Pact armies in August, 1968 " It appeals to the trade unions to express their views on the ,attempts to abolish the S.V.S. and to cancel its various agreements with the unions,' signed since August last year. (These agree. meats have been regarded as very significant by students and work- ers. and as very dangerous by tho' party leadership,) over the resolution's call for ape ial meetings to be held in school on International Students' Day November 17, and. for "pion manifestations and meetings i chools" on January 19, the anniversary of the death of Jan alach, the student who set fire t imself in the Wenceslas Square ' protest against the abandon- ment of last year's reforms. The preamble to the resolution ongly emphasizes the socialist nvictionS of the students and heir desire to "engage them- elves through their work in'real- zing the humanistic goals of ocialism" as expressed ? in the arty policy of last year. In a particularly powerful pas- age the resolution condemns pre. ent policies : " Vast purges and he return of discredited personal- ties into responsible positions, he attacks on. culture, including rsonal attacks, the banning of agazines, absurd censorship. c., attacks on the most clemen- ary rights of the working class. anning workers' councils in fac- ories and preparing the abolition, f those already . in existences analysing independent trade nion policy, violating basic civil ights, restricting the right of- ssembly, postponing , elections, ttempting. to replace law with olitical statements, the speechest f 'leading politicia'ns=?all . thi I orces us to reject the present anner of , policy-making, the ain feature of, which As the xciusion of' the working-class rom the making of ' decision rning society as '& whole." ; Cf RISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 10 July 1969 Disaffection:7 rife In Czech 7 va ny.Lric'nourne :1 -; ?uerc Ae a,av aa. cnwa.o..c ... \-. , 'withhold party does. 4n-em- , aree ? Special correspondent of zations this involves up' to 30 percent of th iatianseteneeMonitor ` ~ members. Dr. Husak has admitted to po f ,Widespread disaffection exists within the, !and to make the personnel changes re-; ommunist Party here over the hard course; quired to eliminate "liberal" influence. f events since Gustav Husak took over the4 r There have been refusals to "take aj adership. This is 'officially'admitted,here.] stand" on the leadership's efforts to imple? ment the stern measures sanctioned by the: Party recruitment In the' fir'st! Newly painted slogans ap-l pear on walls in provincial towns and villages: "Dubcek, Smrkovsky, we believed what you" NodwlleUs. We Sun trust re. in bearly.1000 If political and economic order is not soon restored, pole itical experts believe, the con- servative leadership, at pres- ent a minority force, will bed obligated to resort to harsher methods. If replacement of key persons by their own Cho- sen supporters does not bring a change of attitude, they will' be forced into "adm pistrative, measures" a euphe im for Jailing. Strougal this week tools an obvious step in this direction by taking over complete con- trol of the People's Militia and coordination of military and ,secret police services. He also explicitly stated there would have to be greater powers for state prose- cutors, 'adding darkly, "The ranks of, our supporters will grow, but not without certain measures which we may be orced to use," Strougal's reference to his growing number of supporters can be seen on the repeated television accounts of -Party meetings in provincial centers. The missionary zeal of these audiences is written large on their glowing faces-the tana- tacism of a minority group seeing the prospect of It taste of power. t Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 not here we would airOdy havt done some serious d>1thk- !ng" Liquid Egquipment 0 WAl't4 iving reporter see a single portrait or slogan supporting Husak or` Strougal, who assumed power! after the reformers had been worn down by the effects of ion. "Administrative Measures" Bottles of vodka, ellv0vitz,1 .wine and brandy have now be, ': come essential equipment for the majority of offices and factories. One union member t meal caned, In the morning and Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79.-6T4b&6500080001-3 28 June 1969 ' {rag I :gip so erebe1s'caJ1 rday of, ournin From MICHAEL HORNSBY-Prague, June' 27 A remarkable document now circulating in Prague and signed by "students and workers" calls on Czechoslovak ? citizens to observe a 10-point plan' to turn August 21, the first anniversary of the Soviet in- vasion, into a "day of mourn- ing ". It advises against general strikes on the ground that "the treasonous clique" now in power " would make use of them for the further limitation of our free- doms " and recommends instead " boundless scorn for the Moscow overlords, and the . Husak lack- eys It is impossible to say how widely the document is circulating and how much support it has. Many clandestine leaflets of a similar kind have been passing from hand to hand in recent weeks containing speeches of rebel politicians and resolutions of disgruntled workers' organiza- tions. This form of underground information system is the classic Czechoslovak response to times of censorship and was prevalent during the Nazi occupation. DAY OF SHAME The student-worker appeal says : "There are also other-ways of drawing the attention of the world to the fact that we are, fighting still for socialism with a human face. We have agreed on the issuing of directives whose observation will amply demon- strate to the world that we have not forgotten the day of shame and that we shall never reconcile ourselves to such visits [of the Soviet troops].". It is the duty of all "'loyal citizens of our nations to obser ve the following' directives' " on August 21 : " Do not use transportation r' means even to go to work., An a' exception is made for working,, people who have to, -use the) ?= train to go to work. it, is; ',- necessary to walk demonstra tively to work. The old and the i sick should avoid unnecessary ,, trips. D onot go to. cinemas and 1,,theatres. In this way we shall ,:,relieve the actors of the need to q act in comedy pieces on-this s day of mourning. ?-,r Refrain from all purchases in A Shops. Buy all the necessary t 'foodstuffs the day before.' , .""Decorate where possible the "graves of all the victims of the r"shameful occupation. Buy no daily newspaper or, magazine. Visit no coffeehouse or res- ?; taurant. Coffeehouses where rf, there is dancing must remain -!:empty so that bands are not obliged to play gay music. " Decorate the memorials of all "Exactly at 12 a.m. cease alb activity at machines and every .other place of work for five minutes to honour the victims of the occupation and the,new r,. terror. Cars should conic to 'a halt r. and put on their lights. Other transport vehicles .should also r'?,be at a standstill. 1' "Inform your friends and rela- tive abroad about the actions o, which are being prepared and .-ask ask them to propagate' similar actions throughout'the. world. "it is necessary to appeal to world institutions ro proclaim August 21 as'. the day,, of shame." ? . ' The signatories of the appear ask everyone who receives .a copy of it to },ass these directives on to at least five of his true friends ". We believe that you will not fail, just as you did not fail in the August days ", it says. The appeal praises Dr. Kriegel, the former Praesidium member recently expelled from the party for denouncing the invasiion, and l other '" modem heroes ' of " our nation" for defending the "liuth eoncerninp the real intentions of the,uninvuted guests", ' We are nearing the sad anniversary of the contemptible occupation of our 'country by the armed forces of our so-called friends. 'Quislings, led by HUSAK, INDRA, KOLDER, and others of their ilk, are trying to pull the wool over the .eyes of the Czech people and to legalize the occupation of August-21 as a fully justified and necessary action by "our friends,," For this reason it has been found necessary first of all to eliminate from the leadership of the state and of public life those individuals who have until now prevented such crassness, even at the price of personal freedom, safety and material security. This new g-:ieration of heroes of our people, led by Dr. KRIEGEL, PACHMAN, ZATOPEK, 1?,'.TF11L, and many others, have proudly and fearlessly taken their place in the front rank of resistance against the mercenaries of the STROUGAL-AUERSBERG! clique, and Ire bravely defending'the holy truth about the real intention of our uninvit-11. guests. Our peoples w l.1 never forget the sacrifice of our dear sons Jan PAIACH and Jan ZAJIC. Their self-sacrifice cannot be in i e firml.A 9ioi d Fiat' Reim* 'Ic toG~ to remain in firm fraternal alliance, in order together to inform the public of the actual sva-re of er'r'o rs. in vain to bring the Czech and Slovak peoples. The .Hisakovites have been abandoned by our fourteen million citizens who have deep scorn in their hearts. The history of the world has firmly shown that treason will not remain unavenged. On the day of the sad anniversary of the occupation of August 21, 1968, we must once more show and remind the world of the shameful deed perpetrated upon us by the Soviet Union. We are not able to defend ourselves with5a weapon in hand. Let us defend ourselves, therefore, with hate, with unbounded contempt for the Soviet overlords and their HusakovitA lackeys. We are not in favor of proclaiming a general strike. The traitors' clique would use the strike for further measures and limitations upon our freedom. We must, however, let the world know that we are continuing our fight for socialism with a human face. We have agreed on a number of measures, which will sufficiently prove to the world that we have not forgotten the DAY of SHAME and that we will never agree to similar visits. It is the duty of all faithful comrades, citizens of our rations, to be guided ,on August 21 by the following rules: 1. On the way to and from work, do not use vehicular transport; the exception is those who have to come to work by train. As a demonstration, the journey to work should be on foot. Old and sick people should forego unnecessary travel on this day. 2. Do not visit cinemas and theatres. In this way, actors will not be forced to perform in comedies on the day of mourning. 3. Do not do any shopping. Necessary groceries can be bought in advance. 4. As far as possible, we.will decorate the graves of all victims of the occupation. Do not buy newspapers or magazines. 6. Do not visit restaurants or cafes. We shall decorate monuments of all famous historical personages. 8. At the stroke of noon, we shall cease work at machines and in all places of work for a period of five m4.nutes to honor the memory of the victims of the occupation and of the new terror. Passenger cars will also stop and turn on their lights (at noon - trans.). Other transport will also stop. 10. As far as we are able, we shall bring the, planned actions to the attention of friends and acquaintances abroad,. and call on them to propagate similar actions throughout the world. It is necessary to call on world public institutions to use their influence that August 21 be proclaimed at the DAY OF SHAME. In order to make this action effective, the guidelines above must be distributed so that they may reach all the people. Censorship and control of the press prevent such action, and therefore it is the national duty of every individual to transmit the guidelines to five real friends. We believe that you will be up to this task, just as you Together toward victory Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-Q1194QQWQ 90Ajkjrs were up to it in the days o August.- Approved For Release 1999/09/0.2_; CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Karel Kynci's Statement at the June 2 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Prague Municipal Committee of the Communist Party. The essential purpose of the recent Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS) ni M i l u c pa Committee meeting in Prague was merely to approve resolutions supporting the decisions of the CPCS sessions. At our April meeting, we passed a resolution declaring our "complete agreement" with the decision of the A ril p Plenum. At that time,.I voted against the resolution. One of the main reasons for my stand was the formulation "complete agreement." As a member .of this body, I was expected to express my complete agreement with something of which I had only very superficial information and with something that I. in. fact, did not know. I did not become a party member yesterday. There were times when I enthusiastically voted for similar formulations without the slightest hesitation. I shall never stop blaming myself for that -- and I shall never do it again. The situation last Saturday was very different indeed. Comrade Simon gave us some facts about the May session of the CPCS CC; how we-are to interpret these facts was very eloquently explained to us by the First Secretary of the CPCS CC on Saturday afternoon, at the meeting of the AKTIV of party officials in Prague 9, at the CKD works in Prague, which took place on the same premises -where, nine months ago, the allegedly illegal party congress was held. On Saturday, I could not say that I did not possess enough information to decide on how to vote. This made my decision much easier: whether I should raise my hand or not; while, on the other hand, awareness of the fact that I was, as a Communist functionary, co-responsible for the future of our party made things much more difficult for me. On Saturday morning, Comrade Husak used "the language of the May Plenum" -- to repeat Comrade Matejka's words when the latter thanked Comrade Husak for his speech. What was the language of the May Plenum, as reflected in the speech of the Comrade First Secretary? At. Prague's CKD works, Comrade Husak analyzed the causes of the critical situation, or to be more precise, situations, through which our party has passed in recent years and especially in recent months. I listened and I could not believe my own ears. I was horrified that a highly educated Marxist -- as Comrade Cernik characterized Comrade Husak in the eulogistic part of his xi. address -- could describe in such shallow, superficial, and cheap words an enormously complicated, and since August clearly. distorted, development. It was unbelievable to me that a highly educated Marxist -- and Comrade Husak is one, despite every-thing -- could so calmly and without blinking an eye pass over such details as, for example, the answer given by our party to the well- known Warsaw Letter of last July. An answer for which he. himself, in fact, voted. I could not believe that, only 10 months later and without the slightest reservation, he could back the content of that letter, with which he had so fundamentally disagreed 10 months earlier. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00500080001-3 Ap o e k# ~ ~ s~ /0 :~3IAa 9 9 ~( ~~1-3 this with merely a brief remark that he had misunderstoo the orce intervention in August of last year, when every child knows that it is one of the fundamental reasons for the crisis in this country and in this party. I was horrified when I heard the highest party representative, who himself went through a bad personal experience in the fifties, compare the weeklies Reporter and Listy with Radio Free Europe. I was horrified to hear from his lips gross invectives against the best representative of our learning and culture while saying at the same time that the CPCS must not isolate itself from our intelligentsia. I was horrified when I heard how Comrade Husak described, in haughty and arrogant terms, the life-long work in the party of Comrades Kriegel, Vodslon, and Sik -- and I literally shuddered when Comrade Husak debased himself by indulging in a tasteless play on words -- "Kraglovani-Krieglovani" (1) doesn't Comrade Husak realize that his own second name lends itself so well to 'a similar play on words. (2) However, form is a matter of personal taste, tact, and civilized behavior. Much graver is the essence of what Comrade Husak said about the work of these Comrades who, in his words, which I do not consider witty, were sent on vacation by the Central Committee. All he had to say about their work, and, I would .like to repeat, specialized work for the party to which they have devoted their lives, was arrogant jokes. I know some of the expelled Comrades well. Permit me to say here, at the Plenum of the Party Municipal Committee, that, in my view, the time will come when these expelled Comrades will be considered to represent one of the few assets which our party will be able to claim before a discriminating public opinion which will be passing judgment on the period in which we now live. Unfortunately, this will not be the first'time. And only last year, after January, Comrade Husak himself represented such a positive asset, after years of persecution. What I have just said is also a recollection of the fifties -- a reminder which, according to Comrade Husak, one of those who have now been sent on "vacation" made at the May Plenum. With an enviable disregard for the facts, Comrade Husak described it on Saturday afternoon as mere panic. He declared that not a single person has been arrested in this country or transferred to another job for political-reasons. It is true that nobody has been arrested thus far, but if Comrade Husak says that nobody has been transferred to another job for political reasons, this is not only a disregard for the facts, it is clearly not true. Each one of us gathered here could present a shorter or longer list of people who have been transferred to another job for clearly political reasons, not for reasons of specialization. The list could be headed, for example, by Professor Jiri Hajek or Josef Smrkovsky, who could be following by a number of people from the Ministry of the Interior, and dozens of journalists from the party and other periodicals could bring up the rear. (1) Kraglovat, odkraglovat -- get rid of, assassinate Commnunist character assassination. (2) Huss, -- goose; Husak -- gander Approved For Release 1999/Q9/02 : CIgk-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Are, therefore, the fears that there might be some form of a return to the fifties mere panic, or do they have some foundation? When I listened on Saturday afternoon to the broadcast transmission of the meeting of the AKTIV in Prague 9, I was also reminded of the fifties by something else. When the announcement of the purge in the Central Committee was greeted with wild applause and the chanting of "long live the CPCS," I remembered similar reactions with which many Communists welcomed the reports on the just punishment of the "traitors, conspirators, and bourgeois national- ists," one of whom was also Comrade Husak. Obviously he did not remember this, probably because he did not hear the applause. and the chanting in his prison cell. I should like to-remind him that, at that time, other Party representatives- positively appraised the mood of the party masses, as he did on 'Saturady after- noon. In short, I listened on Saturday afternoon to Comrade Husak's speech and I recalled the Marxist rule that the ends and the means must be dialectically closely linked. The thought of what the ends must be if the means used in his speech are in dialectical unity with them, gave me the shivers. Comrades, the date of my joining the Party is recorded as 1 June 1945 on my membership card. This means that yesterday I have an anniversary: the 24th anniversary of my enrollment in the Party. This is three years more than half my whole life. I realize that my membership in the Party will not outlast this jubilee by much if the speech delivered by Comrade Husak on Saturday really represents the language of the May Plenum, as Comrade Matejka has described it. The reason for this will not be that I shall tear up my membership card in some theatrical gesture. I shall not do this, because I value this card too much. I shall not voluntarily give up my card; rather, those -- as Comrade Husak has described them == "genuine Marxists" will have to take it away from me, those who are now likely to enter the fray with high-flying banners, after this May Plenum. I shall defend my membership card against them -- although I am not so naive as to believe that I am likely to succeed in this. The fray, which they are now apparently about to enter with flying banners, will not be a conflict of ideas and opinions; it will not be a debate in which he will-emerge as the victor. who can defend his views on the grounds of Marxism-Leninism. It will be a normal brawl in which whoever has the most power and wields the biggest stick will gain the upper hand. For these so-called genuine Marxists who talk of nothing else but Leninism are not even able to answer the simplest questions, such as, for instance, how the supposed limited sovereignty of a state and the events of August 21 can be reconciled with the first,constitution?of the USSR, which expressly guaranteed the right of the union republics to self-determination and even to secession. Incidentally, I am not at all surprised about our one-and-only Marxists.. There is no answer to these and similar questions. And it is much simpler to answer them by a punch in the nose. Lastly, I have to reply to an argument which now daily appears in Rude Pravo and which Comrade Husak also used on Saturday afternoon. This is the argument that, before a Party office adopts a decision, a Party member may freely and democratically discuss the problem concerned and express a. differing .opinion, but that once the decision has been made, it becomes as binding as the law itself on a Party member.' The first thing I miss in our Party today is precisely a free and: democratic discussion. Nowadays, decisions are adopted after a parody of free and democratic discussion. 1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 And as f r as the bindin nature of such decisions is concerned, may I ask `q w9ieog 159rGRI S~[u $/09IG2 hc1 79eQ44S 059008 3Df the Party -- as a model who, despite all facts proving the contrary, regarded him fusak, as a traitor and bourgeois nationalist until he was rehabilitated for the sole reason that this was the opinion of the Party leadership and of First Secretary, Comrade Novotny? If he does regard such a man as a model, I am sorry; I would regard such a Party member as an unthinking member of a herd! And another small incident. When I was working as a foreign correspondent I once interviewed a young American who had refused to obey the order to go to Vietnam. He refused-to do the duty of a citizen of the U.S. In his defense, he quoted a part of the judgment of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg which had tried the Nazi war criminals soon after the end of the war. All of the defendants there had said that they were not criminals, since thay had merely carried out the orders of their superiors and acted in accordance with the then valid laws of the Third Reich. The Nuremberg Tribunal, in 'which a Soviet judge also sat, rejected this defense and declared in its verdict that a person who carries out an order that is contrary to the most fundamental principles of humanity, sound reasons, and morality, is Tully responsible fo3~his her a hi ff t t g o y o actions and does not have the right to push responsibili authority. Well -- this young American referred to this judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, but the American court rejected this defense and handed down the maximum penalty. At that time, I expressed great indignation about this in a commentary I broadcast, and I was highly commended by the then highest Party, authorities because of this indignation. My indignation was not meant as a gesture and I have maintained it to this day. Therefore, from the position of this indignation and from the position of Marxism, today I shall vote against any resolution of the Municipal Committee of the CPCS which approves the results of the May Plenum of the CPCS CC. I regard these results as.a tragedy for our Partyan is in power -- as a tragedy for this state. POST WASHINGTON y 1 CPYRGHT Czech journalist .who last month attacked 'Czech news agency CTK re. ~? +ool-ies. were etreu~a , since our Party Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approve Ir ,o ~~g,,~,999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 C RQW9 "Come on, be serious now-the imperialists fear our unity l- er aps sa . . I"QP1KRdR DAILY NEWS Tokyo 6 duty a:09 e as to compete for thsup, of like-minded people. proved n i hy as}~1.194A W(}i~ar tacks (, o usly than they have attacked both fascists and capitalists, e th a because they knew er presented the greater danger to them. Despite Disaster form In the future, the Kremlin ; '-will have to attack the Italian- compeof wle In order to r the a r the alle egiance of d ith it ritfo w Kremlin's Pr~testatiQfls "Western Communists to ? the By Victor Zorza one and only true faith. s us to stress its Italian party' i th o e ways anx For But it is precisely the So- loyalty to the Soviet Union, gravest objection to the dec- LONDON (NANA)-It viet claim to act as the power. announced that the draft of laration is that is "contrary ould?be unfair to ignore 'center of the World Commu-, the declaration to be present- to the type of socialist socle- e Kremlin's insistent nist Movement that has been ed to the conference gave ty which we are asking the laims that the World firmly rejected by the Moscow, clear recognition to the "deci- working class of our own declaration, in common with sive role" of the Soviet Union. country to fight for." ommunist Conference a number of other Soviet perhaps it did, but by the as a striking success. 'claims, thus making it clear time the conference had fin here 'is nothing left, that the final conference docu? 'ed with it, the ' declaration Basic Issue ment comes nowhere near the made no mention of the "decl-., No disagreement could be, herefore, but to acknowi- version that the Kremlin had sine" role of the Soviet more basic .than this. The: age that the estimate been pressing so' long on the, Union, but, Instead, announc- Kremlin already hardly both iven by this, columnist other parties. ed quite n unequiv g ace tern of ere to conceal Its view that eeently of the confer- That Moscow wanted to be "the type of socialist society"i the International Communist that the Italian party proposes ence's prospects was explicitly recognized as the Movement:' Is no better than capitalism.,' wrong. Rome of the Communist The struggle over' this And the Italian party sees the, movement Is' clear, first of net-Stalinist trend in the So-' I had said that whatever all, from the pre-conference formula illustrates the Kreml. viet Union as a betrayal of. at the Moscow meet- warnings by such "opposition" lin's long retreat, durin gCt happened what it regards as true social ing, the Kremlin could not parties as the Romanian and series f of pfie~eaxposed post,,, These are grounds for a' win. If the meeting agreed to the Italian that no Communist ings, political and ideological struck, a joint declaration of prin- party or state could now, Lions which it had chosen so little , this would contain so claim to act as the center for, to get lany declaration at all, gist as alittcommunl m`n the little of what ngg as to Kremlin con- the others. the Kremlin accepted during It- 'thebeen Kremlin demanding for it. And If The debate continued even the prepsamt ddments from the sellf., therthe doflthetIt lian the Kremlin lin d did get the sort during the confer ferenece Itself, dreds.of ,. rties, so that 'party, Luleader igi Longo, id evert of declaration it wanted, 1, when Janos Hadar sought ato, t "opposition pa before the conferencseathat it argued, then a number of IM- convince the "opposition" that not only the Soviet Union'$ was so vague as to be virtual- parties would refuse the proper acknowledgement:.: "role" but many other So- 1.4 meaningless. ns had tl i t l ' e o a viet.inspired?formu to endorse it, thus producing of the role of the Sov The further search for com? a formal split in the World tlnioh was "not merely a ques to be abandoned. During the conference pro- promise at the Moscow Con- Lion of sentiment," but yvasf ade It even more ent gerence m Communist Movem . crucial to the. success of the per, a further 30 amendments vague. As another Itallai p m li i 7fi . a s ted, out of the But the only sense in which struggle against imper . ere this analysis was wrong was In order to' succeed in this w accepted, Communist leader said, ts submitted by various delega- declaration reveals "an opt .,_ ~.......a s exclusive, posslbtllttes - that needed unity, he argues, a?u Kremlin to secure a unani- ?? - mous vote on the declaration., principle and concrete facts' a "correct relationship" with, either the declaration would which shows an inability 01 be unsatisfactory to the the Soviet Union-the recognl rote--was' Had it not been for these' the part of the Communls At ' the p ng I lea ve Kremlin, or that it would be Lion of its oncession, there would ha movervent to adapt Itself t satisfactory to it but some the necessary basis of such c--&-t-l- 1?.ppn more than 14? new mndltions. He had ii ' ind and, the invasion o It. What happened in the end Hadar was quite right In chief objective was' to bring Ignty .was that the declaration was saying that this was not It the Italians back into the, : Czechoslovakia, . and man; both profoundly unsatisfactory sentimental Issue-it is, indeed, fold, and its failure to achievei other such inconsistencies, Ii to the Kremlin, and that a a basic issue of the power this Is a measure of the discs both foreign and doinestl number of parties refused to relationship in 'the Commu- ter which has befallen the policies of Communist coup r t ht For . e - Communist movemen : tries. sign It., nist world. In the JLUVV I The refusal to sign by such national Communist t D Declare= the Italian party, in opposing' The Spanish Communi t ! parties as the Italian, the ion,. all the parties acknowl- the idea of a single centers art declared before long played with the' p y d that the Soviet Union h the I Is a t if the a C as ge ge British, and others, an ca signing "with reservations" by was "the universally recogniz- notion of 'many centers" of coferenbre etwc tha or is a matter of vanguard of the Worid which Rome -the true R l ome, `ghat appears to threality e declar ed thers ll ' , o sti and the Krem- 'Communist Movement, and ,,,-,might perhaps even- Y. Bon, then this document w I ? ublic record h , p apologists can do nothing this gave, the Kremlin t Q ;become one. be compromised from 0 11, to to disprove It. basis for its frequent attempts This would lead to a forrn'1 start." will o the other i Fourteen out of the seventy- to impose its wan fern there for e, { "Polyeentrism'! - in which the' And so, Indeed; It Is, meeting comprise this new that this , dAnent could return to the 8??-1 - right, and itlon." this mainly from the terly disputed during the pre- cial democratic tradltionsI lio~ clalm that as a great suoce: right, leaves out of Aerations for ' the Moscow ,from which it had sprung. As' ~t are welcome to it. J ade o account the Chinese and other . conference. Communists have always m : well-wtah ought to parties on the extreme left.. The challengers seemed to clear, they fear social demos" this ma-wisher In 'se 6 Ideologically the Russl&m M ve lost much ground when cy more than any other po% a oete. s 17; $ , main at applo red Forte s 9~~9 0~?. b~~bOv 0 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 NEW STATESMAN, London ,a~6g- was a piece of propaganua mat coot. A be taken seriously. Finally, he said th wn a c at oscow Twas preparcu to sign only Me section 77 proclaimed the need for a struggle ,gains {imierialism; in other words, he took th K. S. KAROL stance of the proverbial preacher who wa `against sin'. Fortwelve days, the delegates of 75 com? foreign comrades to abandon their reticent So, at a glance, the conference ended u muc is parties debated in the Kremlin's St posture, and the conference machinery began' pretty badly for the Soviet leaders. The George's Hall behind open - or nearly open to grind once more. But the preparatory came away neither with a condemnation o China ?- door. Accredited Moscow correspondents, meetings in Budapest and Moscow were norwith silence on Czechoslovakia all they got was the publication in their prey used t4 ~ the monolithic mystery of preceding laborious to,say the least, and time passed of a number of 'subversive' ideas, contain confer nces, were staggered by this change 1,without a date being fixed. By last summer, in summaries of speeches from rcbclliou in the customary habits of (he Communist however, they seemed on the verge of agree. delegates. However, Mr Brezhnev must hav world. They learnt that several parties had ment: and then Soviet troops invaded dared publicly to announce that they dis- ''Czechoslovakia. The idea of a conference figured out the risks he was taking i agree with the Russians, and that the fires once more seemed hopeless; but the Russians assembling this conference, and probably h of cx ommunication did not descend on were committed to it, and offered a new is less disappointed than most people think He knows that the Soviet people have shot their f cads. The like had not been seen in compromise. The meeting would not con. memories. Togliatti's famous memorantlu Moscow for 40 years; it was a striking,, demn anyone; not the Chinese, nor the Indeed a spectacular, advance. But never, in Albanians, nor the Yugoslavs. It would not pre published in Pravda, but this did no tall th se 40 years, has the communist even he asked to approve the Warsaw Pact's prevent Brezhnev from driving all those wh move ent been shaken by so profound a 'fraternal assistance' to Czechoslovakia. This backed the Italian - viewpoint out of Eas crisis. With all due respect for the new compromise appeared to close the on goer was holding forth in Moscow, the metho Is it is, above all, the content of the any discussion whatever, reducing the confer-- were hard at work in Prague expelling me dcbatc which must concern us. once to a kind of formal demonstration of like Frantisck Kriegel and many others wh The ixe of the crisis was illustrated by the unity by arties whi h ill ill i d p c were w y-H y t e were saying no more than the Italian dde compo ition of the conference. In 1960, at to Moscow. . _ . - ( the o ed t O th d p n e secon . ----1 ?.,,. ,... n cow, nonconformist intellectuals are in jai that ill re were 36 million communists in the day an illustrious unknown, Mr Macielle for the same offence. When the Sovic world. n 1969, parties representing at least (in the name of a party which is not exactly leaders called the conference, they had 20 mi ion members - from China, Viet- famous for its vigorous approach to theoreti- nam, orca, Japan, and Indonesia (since cal questions, the Paraguayan CP) spoke of ' precise purpose: they wanted to get wort then, course, decimated) - were missing, 'the great Chinese problem'. Later the same .communists to swallow their pill, and in thi The at ern had spent five long years arguing day, the Australian delegate, Aarons, equally ,they succeeded - though on conditions wheth it was worth meeting at all. It all rashly raised the Czechoslovak question. Mr ,terms. In the friturc, they will be able t started in fact, in February, 1964, when Ceausescu's appeals to the comrades to keep, invoke 'scientific Marxism' to justify thei ,Mikha Suslov presented his party's Central to the rules went unheard. Mr Brezhnev then repressive internal measures and their anti Comm ttce with a long 'theoretical' report Fred 9 series of red bullets against the Chinese crusade. After all, nobody at th on the aoist heresy. Krushchcv sent copies -Chinese - 'who want war' - and his Warsaw conference queried their credentials as com to all he communist parties, including the Pace allies could hardly do less. Tongues monists. Nobody protested when they takee Chines , and invited them to attend a confer- were loosened at last, and by the end of the about the struggle against imperialism whit once in Moscow on 15 December of the same conference cvco the San Marino delegate. throughout acting' as watchmen of the status qu year. he Chinese replied that he was not Gasperoni, speaking In the name of a big throthe world, empow red to call conferences, and made a party in a very small country', was arguing '+. floe we have a glaring insight into Ill( few u ricndly comments on the tiresome openly with the faithful Latin-American poverty of all the speeches made during lies cgs days of free dcbatc. Logically, th Soviet habit of handing out decrees to cohorts who, as we all know, are very small , dozctt foreign communists. The other Asian parties 'parties in big countries. In the end, paying delegates in St George's Hall should hav reacted in similar fashion. Togliatti?s mem? homage to 'great socialist China', he refused concentrated on the condition of the Sovic orandu on the subject, published after his to sign three-quarters of the final document, bloc, since they agree to link their fate wk death i 1964, said squarely that the confer-. The delegate from the Dominican Republic it and to undergo the vicissitudes of it enco could not hope to resolve internal went even further, announcing that ho career. Now, ever since 1960 the' bloc his diffcrc es, but would only aggravate them, would sign nothing and that the communi- consolidated itself. by abandoning thi weaken ng the anti-imperialist movement 'qud was'fit for priests and social democrats'. promises of the period of de?Staiinisation which ceded Chinese participation- more There was not much respect. and no re- Nobody talks any more about the age o than ev r. Two months later, Krushchcv fell ligion, left in St George's Hall. It was the affluence which' was supposed to usher in a and his plan seemed to have been shelved, Italian CP that inflicted the most grievous communist society by 1980, nor about the e It w , however, resuscitated by his suc- wound on Mr Brezhnev. This, after all, advent of democratisation. As a friend from censors n March 1965, since c when the parties Is a big party in a big country, and askg Mr said to e Brczhnev to npublshwthe uJght have exchanged, literally, tons of comes- lkra ponden c. It was not until January 1965 that, its intellectual prestige among communists which he presented to the Czechoslovak CP the plan took on a more concrete form. This. everywhere has been enormous since the last August, for it tells us far more than all was the moment when Red y ds were be. ' days of Antonio Gr.imsci. Now its delegate, the speeches on polycentrism about where G sieging he Soviet Embass n Rely in Peking and Enrico Berlinguer, demolished stone by stone' the USSR stands today. One might also have thu R signs, outraged, called on their the ideological edifice so carefully built up asked Mr Ceausescu about the hours of ir by the earlier conferences. He pointed out anguish through which he lived while Soviet foreign comrades for Assistance. They ein. listed o a choice between these 'hooligans: with regret that there had been no mention troops were massed on his frontiers. But who, ha lost all sense of-respect. and li the of contradictions within socialist society. nobody talked about that. The dissidents mother) nd of - the October Revolution. that no concern had been shown over the were cool about the final document, dirt. Chinese d manners helped to persuade the principles outraged by the invasion of claimed responsibility for' any future Soviet Approved For Releas4 t 1dWU `.1't~I -~'t'E3~?fl '0'~1 J+ AO ~-0~01at . :- n~, ~. t LAS ANGELES TIMES 22 Jurl 3.96 `as a vicious class ~enemyr parties. The unifying ' GHT anti-i would be "but implied that meanin theme . . 10.41 4,0.341 !, ' L.Ub L U Ga t l i +G corned. f perialism is the bogcyR Forced to Concede .mainly the United States. ~~ d~y" k z : Faced with growing poi But if the - s t r u g g l e ' own camp, the Kremlin Moscow Summit Showed Above All That; leaders, if nothing else, were forced to concede' World Parties Are Going Their Owrt Wag' that Communist parties must now resolve their I3Y. RICHARD RESTON own problems in different y ways. All parties have is staff writer Tim MOSCOW-Reformation, ries of communism and, requal rights and "there is the tiresome attacks. on ,no leading center of the; brought religious revolu? . 'international Communist=the tion to the Church in the Moscow summoned this movement; states the So-; 16th century and political' conference to demonstrate. viet-inspired view to the,. revolution to the Commu a Communist movement future. "A ' united behind a strong For the Kremlin, that is mist movement in the lat.: and inspiring Soviet lead- quite a concession, a re- ter part of the 20th centu-; ership. i markable change in Soviet : yy. attitudes since the ,last ? If medieval Christendom Opposition Voiced international conference a -m But ' in , the end" the' little less . than a: decade, ,had its heretics, reformers eetin g demonstrated= ago. It is change, evgri and dissidents, so too does just the opposite.. - 1 though Moscow some-., `the Communist world of :Five, of ,.the World's 14, times chooses not to up-1 today. ruling parties were not. hold the principle, as was'- If the names of that even here to participate in, the case during the Soviet?.', earlier period were Martin the discussions. These in-~ led invasion and occupa J.uther John Calvin and eluded China, seemingly, tion of Czechoslovakia last. more preoccupied these, August. John Knox, today for com days with a Sino-Soviet ? Nevertheless, the Soviet munism, according to the .dispute which has turned leadership in effect has lead- gospel of Moscow, they are 'to bloodshed along its admitted that other lead. common border- with ; the' ers are competing for cen., 'Mao T s c-tang in China. Soviet Union. ter stage in the Commu. iV'icolao Ceausoscu' in no. Of the parties attending. nist world, or what stu?. Mania, Marshal Tito in the. conference, 14 of .the"dents of Soviet affairs. Yugoslavia, Enrico Berlin 75 voiced opposition in'one;,-would call the trend to goer in Italy, Fidel Castro Form or another .to.'' thet,,~polycentrism.. fan Cuba and many others. Kremlin view of the fu-!,:. ' puzzling question j ?lliessa a of Summit ture asset forth. in 'they. One of the. most, -swill g *main working document .,+= AR the Vatican lost the It 1s estimated'that'the 6I`, d e r i n g questions about, }battle against reform, and parties signing the dood,this summit conference is, ,stew centers of . Christiania ament represent in sum= . why the Kremlin insisted y o it t s t d e Rome, the ' hers only, about one-third . meeti the wit fuill blo vn Kremlin likewise is losing Y, 'the struggle against alien of the world's total party, political reformation now Ideological d o g m a a n d ,membership. under way in the Commu? new centers of comma-. As a guideline to' the'' ,nist world. Beneath all the .nism outside Moscow, ideological clatter, the on- That Is the message of, future, the position paper !ewer' seems' to 'be that these past two weeks and provides sometlang less;'%vithout the meeting the n o t It i n g illustrates the. than Inspiration, let alone.. ,move toward diversity, to- point better than the re-, a clear understanding of':`ward.a further dilution of cently concluded world where this movement is .'Soviet influence;' would- it lbave.,grown worse. Communist party summit he this conference Moscow has going, even timent. Accordingly, the confer- .had Its meeting, the first wants to go. It Is a, rence constituted -a major one in nine years. It has, document which means all Kremlin move to. stem a put forward communism's' ' things to all men, to be political 'tide that Is splin-' blueprint for the future. Interpreted in, any way tering the movement from, The real question now is within. Whatever the, what did it all mean-the any party chooses. momentum of this confer- endless speeches, the poll. , Cuba welcomed the pas- ence. 'the Soviet leaders tical self-massage, the mist. sage on peaceful coexis- -hope to continue it- sing parties.' 'the agree- . tence as a?license for.the ; through a series of con- ments and disagreements,- free export of violent revo- g the`>oaatmApprove6lott"?enlease9y8b2'9 and 4A 11' CPYR M. against imperialism seems- the only unifying thread, Communists have these days, it . Is noteworthy,' then,., to record divisions-. even on' this question. Romania argued, for ex 'ample, that -the cntlre~ !'emphasis of this latest' ,Communist encyclical is` !out, of step with presentt day realities. And the; ,Soviet leadership cannot; really expect to be taken? , seriously when it argues. on the one- hand the evils' of Western imperialism' and on the other the spiriti of East-West detente. A No knowledgeable's ,\Vestern :expert here Ile-' lleves that this confcrence1 ,can do anything morel than temporarily sloe the, jmove toward greater Coma Fmunist diversity and away. from strictures of Soviets ..flnflueace. What this 'conference, ?has produced Is a catalog. of what the movement; 'hates - imperialism. The' . main document talks ,about the unity of Com+ lmunists. But if there i such unity, it also should' have contained something about the goals and obj'ee? :t i v e s, specifically what this' movement should and ' ,should not, be. ; . 9 However, it was felt that the Soviet leaders probalr .ly are relieved with the -way these past two weeks. ,have' gone. No parties ,walked out of the meeting' as did Romania at' one of .t h e earlier preparatory 'sessions. Perhaps m o r e Important, there was; a minimum of ' embarrass- ment to the Kremlin on it% two most serious crises, China and Czechoslovakia.! While there may be relief on this, it can also be said that the Kremlin hasp 'failed to'resolve any of the' really critical 'problems now confrohting.thcXoni? unbs)w ppferefCt?.. ` a..A~L44-: , Approved For Release 1999109/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 HINDUSTAN TIMES 'CPYRGHTI9 June 1969 Moscow the idea of patching up with China, and it was not until the fury of the Chinese cultural revolution had convinced them that the schism between Moscow and Peking, was final that they set about holding the prepa- ratory meeting at Budapest in February 1988. Rumania had walked out of It when It was criticised for not toeing the Soviet denunciation of Israel. The World Conference Initially acheduled for last November seemed to be much of a gamble after the Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia in August had been roundly condemned by the West Euro- . pean Communist parties and others further afield. Even within the East European bloo the world, communist conference of 75 par- T ties in Moscow is that it ' met at all. Mr. Khruschev had planned It in 1962 to ? get the better of China which was disputing Moscow's primacy and denouncing his policy of "peaceful co-existence," but he was unable ?_ to go ahead with it. After his ouster In 1964, Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin had toyed with" HOME-TRUTHS The one indisputable achievement . of ference without further loss of face, but by postponing it till now it has not succeeded in muting the criticism. Moscow could not very well shelve the con- Rumania had openly criticised the invasion. .1 g p the first step is to call an anti-imperialist It is possible that this appeal was addressed Congress. This is the only tangible gain for to fraternal parties, such as the Rumanian, Moscow. But this is of little worth when with which the CPM has reasonably good several members of the conference decried relations. Nevertheless, it does seem strange Soviet imperialism in Czechoslovakia, despite that differences between Indian political the plea of Dr Gustav Husak, who replaced . parties should be sought to be resolved not Mr Dubcek as First Secretary of thq Czech. in Delhi or Bombay "or elsewhere in the Communist Party, that the Soviet interven- country but through third party later ii .+ tion Is ail internal matter and should not be , .op abroad. ? ~ , , :; ;, rx`,.~ The world conference was made possible only by Moscow agreeing at Budapest to drop its claim to leadership of the world communist movement and any critical refe- rence to China from the working document for the conference. Though it was recognised that unquestioned obedience to Moscow was a thing of the past, the Soviet leaders had billed the conference as having the objec- tives of forging the unity of Communist parties and reinforcing the anti-imperialist struggle. On this latter point all participants appear to have agreed, even though only 70 of the 75 have signed the main document ttin out a rogramme of action of which raised. More, Rumania among them, were angered by the attack on China at the con- ference in contravention of the basic under- standing and Mr Brezhnev, who joined in the attack, finally thought the better of backing the East Pakistan party's kiteflying of a resolution condemning China. Czechoslova- kia and China have been the ghosts at the conference, one present and the other hover- ing across the Soviet border. The Moscow conference has only under- lined how the world Communist movement is riven by the ideological clash between Moscow and Peking and their national inte- rests as in their border conflict. No less significant is it that the Soviet-backed pros- cription for relations between Communist parties, with Its hint of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty and the right to inter- fere in the affairs of another country, has been rejected by some of those subscribing to the main Moscow anti-imperialist docu- ment. Rumania remains a protestant in the East European bloc, having appended its signature with reservations and not wanting to walk out of the conference for fear of consequences. Against this disarray in the Communist world, the one good thing to be said for the conference is that the differences have not only been aired but publicised as well in the record of the proceedings to be issued. If Moscow has not secured a vote of confidence in? Kremlin's leadership, It has at least countenanced democratic stirrings at the conference: The conference was attended by some interesting delegations. These included those from East Pakistan, Nepal and the Philip- pines. The Communist Party of India was well represented but its leader, Mr Dange, appears to have stirred a hornet's nest at home by appealing to the World Communist parties to mediate between the CPI and the CPM and promote Communist unity in India. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500800'b1-3 CPYRGHT MAINICHI DAILY ISIS, Tokyo 19 June 1969 ~~~TORIL~L Role Of World Red Summif IT IIE recent World Communist Conference which: closed on June 17 apparently proved not soo productive as the Soviet Union confidentlyc anticipated at its opening. For instance, the number of participating parties`. this time was fewer than In the previous meeting: in 19G0. In addition, while the previous conference adopted the Moscow declaration which might be regarded as a joint platform for international Com-, munist campaigns, no such active character was: seen In the four-part document adopted at this year's' meeting concerning communism's basic aims. Furthermore, the document was signed by. only. 66 ,,of the 75 participating parties. It can be easily concluded from these facts that the International Communist movement has already. 'lost its past Iron-clad solidarity and begun showing a trend to diversity. Such a trend was clearly ob- served In the course of the conference. For example,' Romania definitely opposed any denunciation of Red China; and Italy made a frontal criticism of the Soviet armed Invasion of Czechoslovakia. It might be said that the Soviet Union's attitude toward their criticism was always compromising' throughout the conference. This is reflected In the. difference between the basic document and its- original draft reported earlier. The censure of Red China which was indirectly mentioned in the original draft, and the assertion on limited sovereignty which was emphatically ex- plained In the draft, were omitted from the formal document. Instead, only the anti-imperialist drives were stressed In the document as the sole batiner, of the Red bloc. Tills Indicates that' the Soviet 'Union had to make a concession by taking Into con-' sideration that a consedsus can hardly be gained, among the participating parties. should It stick to the problems connected with Red China and limited' sovereignty. It Is worthy to note, however, that the above -outcome had been predicted even before the opening if the conference. It may safely be said that they Soviet Union opened the conferencd although fully aware that the number of participants would be, fewer, and that the convention would be thrown; Into confusion If the problems of Red China and. limited sovereignty were taken up. If so, what was the true Intention of the Soviet.: Union In deliberately opening the conference under such a "disadvantageous" situation? - We think that the key to this riddle lies In the statement of Leonid I. Brezhnev, secretary general' of the Soviet Communist Party. In his speech on- June 7, he sharply condemned Red China as attempt Ing to split the anti-imperialist forces. The fact that Brezhnev openly hit Red China before the world Communist leaders might be inter- preted as suggesting that the Soviet Union Intended' to utilize the conference as a preliminary step to. deal with the Red Chinese Issue. At the same time, It might be said that the Issue, was one of the incentives to the trend of diversity In views among the other. Red parties. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3' Approved For Release 1999/09/02.; CIA-R[)RT9-01194 A00,05000800Q'l-3 . DIVERGENCIES AT THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. Parties Present and Absent Page 1 Parties which Attacked Peking Page 3 C. Mentions of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia Page 3 D. Reservations on the Main Document, Page 6 1 Approved For Release 19.99/09/02; CIA-_RDP79-01194A00050008000 -3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 A. PARTIES PRESENT AND ABSENT Western news. sources have identified the two "clandestine" parties Guyana--as well as two unnamed "clandestine"_ parties. Thirteen parties which had attended the 81-member world communist meeting in 1960 were absent from the roster of parties contained in the final conference communique. carried by Soviet media on 17 June. They, included, along with the Chinese and Albanian parties, those of the DPRK, DRV, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan, and Iceland. The deficit was partially made up at the latest meeting, at which 75 parties were represented, by the attendance of five parties newly recognized by Moscow as.CP's in the years since 1960--the West Berlin SED and the parties of Lesotho, Puerto Rico, Nigeria,. and as those from the Philippines and from Nepal. The latter was. also identified by Western press sources as the "illegal" party mentioned in the final communique of the Budapest consultative meeting in February-March 1968. .JC V.SA VNG conference. I The following is the list of participating parties provided in the final communique on the conference, the full participants arranged in Russian-alphabetical order with the.. two observer parties at the ,The communist parties of Cuba and Sweden, full participants in 1960, ._ _ , , if , of . . _ Communist Party of Australia Communist Party of Austria Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria Communist Party of Argentina Communist Party of Belgium Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin Bulgarian Communist Party Communist Party of Bolivia Brazilian Communist Party Communist Party of Great Britain Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Communist Party of Venezuela United Party of Haitian Communists People's Progressive Party of Gana Communist Party of Guadeloupe Guatemalan Party of Labor Communist Party of Germany Socialist Unity Party of Germany Communist Party of Honduras Communist Party of Greece Communist Party of Denmark Dominican Communist Party Communist Party of Israel Communist Party of India Ap'OM a t4e Yl999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080061-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 People's Party of Iran Communist Party of Northern Ireland Irish Workers Party Communist Party of Spain Italian Communist Party Communist Party of Canada Progressive Party of Working People--Cyprus Communist Party of Colombia People's Vanguard Party of Costa Rica Communist Party of Lesotho Lebanese Communist Party Communist Party of Luxembourg Party of Liberation and Socialism (Morocco) Martinique Communist Party Mexican Communist Party Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Nigerian Marxist-Leninists Nicaraguan Socialist Party. Communist Party of Norway Communist Party of East Pakistan People's Party of Panama Paraguayan Communist Party Peruvian Communist Party Polish United Workers Party Portuguese Communist Party Puerto Rican Communist Party Reunion Communist Party Romanian Communist Party Communist Party of Salvador San Marino Communist Party Syrian Communist Party h_. Communist party of the Soviet Union Communist party of the United States of America Sudanese Communist Party Tunisian Communist Party Communist Party of Turkey Communist Party of Uruguay Communist Party of Finland French Communist Party Communist Party of Ceylon Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Communist Party of Chile Swiss Party of Labor Communist Party of Ecuador South African Communist Party "Two underground partiesy9? unnamed for "treasons of security" Communist Party of Cuba (observer) Left Party-Cists of Sweden (observer) 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3. B e PARTIES WHICH ATTACKED PEKING . The following is a listing of the 50 parties, in the order in which:; their delegates spoke, which'according to Soviet accounts leveled explicit attacks at the present Chinese Communist Party leadership. At least some of the six parties whose delegates spoke on the ;first day of the conference--those of Venezuela, Finland, Lebanon, Haiti, Jordan, and Ecuador--could'have been expected to join in attacking the Chinese-if their delegates' turn to speak had followed . ' the Paraguayan CP s initial attack during the second day`s session. Paraguay Poland France Salvador. USSR West German KPD Denmark Uruguay West Berlin BED East Germany Chile Ceylon Bulgaria East Pakistan Iraq Hungary Argentina Switzerland Canada Brazil Italy Portugal Czechoslovakia Peru United States C. MENTIONS OF THE Sudan Belgium Costa Rica India Guadeloupe Luxembourg Mongoli a Nigeria Great Britain South Africa Honduras Guyana Turkey San Marino Lesotho Guatemala Bolivia Puerto Ricb. Panama Dominican Republic: Greece Nicaragua. Syria Iran INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA The following is a breakdown of the 14 parties whose spokesmen men- tioned the August intervention-in-Czechoslovakia, divided according to the anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet tenor of their statements on the issue.* The listings in each category follow the order in which the. delegates spoke. TASS sources are identified; PRAVDA's versions were substantially the same in all cases except, as indicated, in coverage of the Belgian CP speaker's remarks. While the conference speech by French CP Secretary General Waldeck Roehet on 7 June did not mention Czechoslovakia, AFP reported another member of the delegation, Secretary Marchais, as telling reporters at the Moscow press center on the 10th that his party "continues to disapprove" of the August intervention but refrained from bringing up the subject at the conference in deference to the Czechoslovak e arg s on eleae319~ 'b i ~ ~7 ~~9 ?~~ v id I 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 ANTI-SOVIET (8) CPYRGHT Australia [Anrnna] "alan aail1 that when the Australian delega- Switzerland Spain Italy- Sweden Belgium tion openly says that the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was wrong, it does so not because it wants to interfere in the internal affairs of parties that had taken that position." (TASS, 7 June) "During the preparations for the conference, the Communist Party of Austria agreed that the events in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will not be on the agenda, since it is now impossible to overcome differences on this question . . . .f? (TABS, 10 June)' "Proceeding from the same principles [rejection-of CCP splitting activities], we cannot also approve of the actions of five Warsaw Treaty member countries in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.." (TASS, 11 June) "We Marxist-Leninists must also take a critical position if we believe that negative phenomena exist in some socialist country. This happened when five Warsaw treaty countries took action in Czechoslovakia last year. Our disagreement with this is known." (TASS, 11 June) . "Precisely this concept [the independence of each party] prompted Italian Communists to take a position on the Czechoslovak events: from solidarity with the new course started in January 1968 to disagreement with the entry of troops of five Warsaw Treaty countries into Czechoslovakia." (TASS, 11 June) "We believe [autonomy,of each party] to be the main principled question, particularly against the back- ground of the critical discussion which followed the movement of troops into Czechoslovakia in August last year, from which we dissociated ourselves, like some other communist parties.'.' (TABS, 12 June) The peace movement in Belgium "was injured by such negative factors as sabotage of the struggle for peaceful coexistence carried out by the Chinese Communist Party and anti-Sovietism both from the left and the right. After the military action in Czechoslovakia, these trends were able to carry out their propaganda on an even wider scale." (TASS, 12 June; the reference to Czechoslovakia was omitted from the report of the speech in the 16 dune PRAVDA) Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 ? Approved For Rfjp X9/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Great Britain PRO-SOVIET (6) Hungary Czechoslovakia "Touching in this connection on the events in Czechoslovakia, the speaker said: We do not want to interfere in anybody's internal affairs, but there is no doubt' that the important decision of five'socialist countries to bring troops into Czechoslovakia had profoundly influenced every communist party. We have stated our disagreement with that." (TASS, 13 June) "Comrade S.C. Carpio expressed disagreement with the appraisal of the developments in Czechoslovakia given by the representative of the Communist-Party of Australia. Our party, he said, which is directly: fighting against imperialism and knows-from its own experience the insidious nature of its methods,' qualifies the assistance given by five socialist countries to the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia.- as necessary and timely." (TASS, 7 June) The Hungarian party and Government "have never said that they could remain indifferent to events in Czechoslovakia." They "were guided in all their activities by the principles of internationalism', by the sense of solidarity, and by nothing else, at every stage of the events in Czechoslovakia. We are interested in one thing only: we want the pro- blems in Czechoslovak society to be settled in a socialist way." (TASS, 11 June) "The leadership of the. communist -parties of neigh- boring allied states, Husak went on, gradually lost faith in the ability of the leadership of our party in the situation to stop that crisis development [the rise of "right opportunist"'forces]. Then came the well-known events in August. In these conditions the leadership of the Communist' Party of Czechoslovakia found the way out in the signing of the [26 August 1968]1- Moscow protocol, which is logically connected with the well-known Bratislava statement of 3 August 1968." (TASS, 12 June) [After attacking the speeches of the Australian, Spanish, and Italian CP delegates, Manuel Mora said:] "Imperialism . . . cunningly conducts subversive work in secret from the masses, as a rule. In this ".'situation,abstract application of principles is impermissible, since in this case they might turn into an obstacle for our cause. We bore this in mind when the events in Czechoslovakia took place. . .The socialist world has not broken any of our principle , since it was forced to take measures to defend I lea'2`OI~"9-OAdfO~v80001-3 5 CPYRGHT Aj avetFor Re sod9 10 106,ejGlAgRDFU-A11l 9 flOMQ@8P0 1-3 or their own policy, the world parties "also hav nternational obligations, because they are respo ible to the workers' movement as well. . . . Urbani stressed further that the Communist P f Luxembourg had fully and unconditionally suppo bed he measures of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw reaty countries last August in Czechoslovakia." (TABS, 13 June) Guyana 'Speaking about the question of the movement of coops of .socialist countries into Czechoslovakia hich was raised by some of the delegates, the peaker turned down the assertion that this step as a violation of sovereignty or rejection of .the ight to democratic development.' . . C. Jagan_ upported the point contained in the speech" of ustav Husak, "the point about the class content overeignty, about the fact that the rights and'd iea if socialist countries are linked inseparably," (TABS, 15 June) D. RESERVATIONS ON THE MAIN DOCU ENT The CPSU's Boris Ponomarev, presenting the main document tb the con- ference on 16 June in behalf of the editorial commission, declared that the commission had received "more than 70" proposals for CPYRG HT amendments from 24 parties and adopted "fully or partially about 30," according t TRZ)O. AIT MM , , thoroughly discu sed." TABS' and PRAVDA's daily diaries of the proceedings and le-eeun ig ef *he spee -9- aama at, -- -on troversy over the document, but were vague at times in indicating the nature of the objections raised. In the final session the dissenting parties took actions ranging from refusal to sign all'or part of the document, to deferral of action, to agreement to sign despite their reservations. CPYRGHT CPYRG While the conference issue no list of signers of the main document, the final communiq a carried by TABS on the 17th isted five parties- the Dominican, Aus , d Reunion CP's--as failing to sign the full document, stating that the Dominican party did not support any of it while the other four signed only the third section outlining the program of anti-imperialist struggle. But TABS' presentation left the impression that all the rest signed, and the picture was in fact more complicated. I The 18 June PRAVDA account of th final discussion session on the evening of the 16th reported-statements by the Norwegian and British CP delegates that they would defer final decisions on signing any part of the document until the next sessions of their parties' leading bodies. The British party, following an executive committee session, subsequently made known its decision not to sign, 6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 ? ft6&FbF N f9913169/0218 Ct -R DP7P 494 05OIY+080M1-3 of. he Norwegian delegation was apparently absent at the windup of the conference; Copenhagen radio on the 13th reported that delegation chairman Larsen ha , i CPYRGHT bhecb such charge was ref acted Iu 1A28 r,%UartofIrl0 TkS criticism of China at the gathering constituted "a breach of promise."' Delegation member Pettersen spoke for the Norwegian party in the final discussion of the document. ? . The Reunion delegate apparently shifted his position twice during the proceedings: He served notice on the 14th that his party, like the British and Norwegian, would defer a decision until after the con-CPYRGHT ference was over; on the lTth the final communique listed Reunion e. as signing only Part III; bu PRAVDA's account the next day listed Reunion delegate as signing the entire ocume , VIAFLI . The small Reunion party has a history of assertiveness: at the February-March 1968 consultative meeting in Budapest the Reunion delegate opposed making public the espisode that led to the Romanian walkout, and TASS reported his "abstention" on that meeting's adoption of its final communique. , In sum, available information indicates that at the windup of the Moscow conference three parties--the Dominican, Norwegian, and British--in addition to the Cuban and Swedish observer parties had not signed the document; of the three that declined to-sign, one announced a final decision and the other two deferred decisions. Three .parties had signed only Part III--the Australian, Italian, and San Marino CP's. Of the 67 parties that sl ned`the full document, at least 14 had expressed substantial reservatio PRAVDA s 8 June account of the evening session on the 16th, at which a number of parties explained their final positions,' names the Moroccan, Reunion, Romanian, Spanish, Sudanese, and Swiss parties as stating a decision to sign while registering reservations. The Soviet record, partially filled out, by scattered materials from other communist sources thus far available, identifies eight more that had expressed substantial complaints about the document--the Austrian, Belgian, Chilean, Costa Rican, Guatemalan, Mexican, Nicaraguan, and Northern Ireland parties. The objections ranged from the Italian party's view that the document was too "exhortative and propagandistic" and the Romanian view that it over- estimated the threat from "imperialism," through specialized complaints relating to Latin America and the Middle East, to the hardlining Costa Rican complaint that the draft did not condemn the Chinese and the Nicaraguan view that it should have condemned "splinter actions." A definitive compilation.of the objections to the document as finally adopted is not possible at this juncture because of the haziness of Soviet reporting on some of the debates, the incompleteness of available material from other communist sources, and the fact that some objections raised in the course of the debates were presumably accommodated in amendments or withdrawn. The listing below records identifiable sub- stantive expressions of reservations, gleaned from the public record. The parties are grouped according to their actions on the final day--the single party that announced a final decision not to sign, the two that deferred decisions,the three that signed only Part III, 14+ that signed 6deF **Wasttt9ft*WOVttmr4 pp#4"9gp14db gWee "d-3 .A) the two observers and hence nonsigners. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0005000800Q1-3 Party Nature of Reservation Final Action NONSIGNER: FINAL DECISION Dominican Sanchez "opposed the formulation of Republic the road of revolution contained in. the document under consideration, and first of all the formulation about the peaceful road." (TASS,- '14 June) "The document conceals real attitudes within the socialist camp and canonizes the national policies of a number of communist parties CPYRGHT F =licies w we do not share." (PRAVDA, 18 Jun ) `NONSIGNERS: DEFERRED DECISIONS Britain "Concerning the draft main docu- ment," Gollan said, "the confer- ence delegates undoubtedly know that our executive committee will make final decisions on our attitude. CPYRGHT the document after our return." (PRAVDA, 17 June) The document was he 13 June TABS report of Gollan's speech. CPYRGHT "Would not si i" TABS, 1 June) CPYRGHT "Would not sign" "Final decision" would be made at "next regular CPYRGHT session" of party executive committee. F PRAVIDA, 18 June) "unable to give its assent to the docu- ment as a whole." (British Communist. PYRGHT by Prague radio but omitted in TABS report of executive committee statement, both on the 30th. Norway Larsen stated that his party'p dele gation "agrees with some of the amendments proposed for the documents discussed at the conference and that it has a number of sugges- tions dealing chiefly with the main. document. Attention must be'concen- trated on it third d fourth sections." TABS, l0 June) Decision at "next plenum" of party. Pettersen said "we have no power to sign or approve this ' document. 18 June) CPYRGHT CPYRGH- Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 r a Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Part Nature of Reservation Final Action PARTIAL SIGNERS CI R ' PTart IIT Australia Aarons said his party "cannot sign Italy the document as a whole, since it PRAVDA9 une disagrees with some of the principles set forth in the document and since there are no substantial theses and principles in it." The document "disregards certain important phenomena in relations between socialist countries which negatively influence our entire movement." (TASS, 7 June) . CPYRGHT Berlinguer said "the document's style in the wbRI `-I ement and fails to examine 12 Junecryags nn ?,11a lith and PRAVDA is often more exhortative and propagandistic than analytical" and underestimates the difficulties, failings, and rifts which have occurred t socialist camp and reported only that criticized" the main confined his support stgued per b 941 (PRAVDA, 18 June) to Part III.. UP F\%j"1T Gasperoni "stated that his delega tion approved only that part of (PRAVDA, 18 June) program of our common at against imperialism." 18 June) SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS Austria, Muhri said his party "agrees jith Signed the draft of the main document but at the same time is in favor of improving it further taking into racialism, a phrase aireczea trip nFal for the struggle against the discussion." The Austrian CP "suggests including, in the part 10, June}` *.....: C-PY(GHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CJA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 I [ TA88 r l Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000 0i8Q001-3 art Nature of Reservation ion SIGt'ERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued) Belgium "The Belgian delegation's opinion is .that the conference is more the beginning than the end.- Despite the imperfection of the documents, which are the fruit of long dis- s,,it will adopt them." CPYRGHT FTABS, 12' June) Signed "Despite the many positive sides of the main document, we are not completely CPYRGHT satisfied with it. However, it is an acceptable basis for discussion. It cannot in any way hamper the political work or cause harm to the independence of any party." ( RAVD , e)=. Chile Corvalan said his party would not insist ' Signed that. all its amendments be accepted, but "there are some statements we would have wished expressed another way." Chile would have preferred substituting "armed CPYRGHT or nonarmed road" for "peaceful o nonpeaceful." (EL SIGLO, 11 June) PRAVDA's account omitted this specific obi Costa Rica Mora said he would prefer the document to Signed "contain less hesitations in the approach to great problems of the present-day revo- lutionary movement. We cannot understand why we must keep ad-1 - out abo the policy of the present le ders. of th Communist Party of China." (TABS, 12 une) CPYRGHT .Guatemala Martinez wanted "more precise formulas to Signed express the dialectic correlation between peaceful coexistence and the revolution- 14 ary proce ." s "not completely n Lati ith n Nile 'poi donna o sa isfied w America. (PRAVDAa 9 June) CPYRGHT Mexico Verdugo approved the document's "main Signed orientation," but "we continue to believe it is necessary and possible to improve it by adopting certain amendments which were submitted during the preparatory commission's work and at the conference itse q une) CPYRGHT 10 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Part Nature of Reservation- Final Action SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued) ,Morocco "We have expressed ourselves in Northern Murphy "said the delegation of the Signed Signed from the spirit of the unity and coopera- tion of all fraternal parties--both those present and those absent--and from our unwavering faithf etarian CPYRGHT internationalism." (PRAVDA, 8 June) We believe, Comrade All Yata said, that this inalienable right,one which is not subject to any doubt, has all the same not found sufficient reflection in the' main document. This has also compelled the delegation to make certain reserva- tions. However, fully recognizing our. responsibility, Ali Yata concluded, we are signing this document proceeding favor of stressing the national rights of the Arab-people of Palestine. Santos "noted that it was the opinion Santos "spoke about expose and condemn all splinter documents discussed. principled provisions on the need to Committee of the the draft main document should incluc'le''by the party Central of his party's Central Committee that the unanimous approval the rightwing de a on t as the ?leftwin v one " (TABS 4 June) actions within the communist move- ment, whatever their origin, on the attitude of communist and workers parties to the CPSU and the Soviet Union . , on the duty to condemn at -tie, (TASS9 conference. vv 14 June) CPYRGHT a more concise form, since the main struggle both in northern and southern { Ireland is directed against imperial-. ism. Nevertheless, the Communist Party expressed readiness to support the conclusions contained in the document and to apply them whenever possible in thp itions of its CPYRGHT country. (TASS, 1 June) Ireland Communist Party of Northern Ireland would have drafted this document in Party "would adopt a decision" on the main document "after, CPYRGHT the end of the conference. o. 14 June) areas of 'the world where the Verges "expressed a reservation in respect to the main document of the conference. -He said the document contained a certain understatement of the possibility of rapid and at times decisive changes in those Approved For Release 1.999/09/0211C1A-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Appbb'M For Re1eaAF19 9W9 ? V RDP79-01194A0005 0,8$i8n. SIGtRS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued) CPYRGHT nation tion movement acts." (TAS_S 4 June) "It contains insufficiently pre- cise formulations" on "relations between the socialist countries and the communist parties, and this allows them to be interpreted arbitrarily. The delegation CPYRGHT subscribes to reservations regarding the characteristics of the situation in the Near East." PRAVDA, 118 June) CPYRGHT -~ " (TASS 17 June) "Empowered to sign the main document on condition that the reservations set forth be noted and made publio." (PRAVDA,.18 CPYRGHT Romania "Our party conceives of international Ceausescu said his reunions of communist and workers party "adopts the parties not as forums called on to document in its CPYRGHT draw up programmatic documents which present form." are compulsory for all parties and , 15 une . to establish directives and norm- setting lines." (Ceausescu, Radio Bucharest, 9 June) "We cannot refrain from referring to the fact that in the document, especially in chapters one and two, wordings have remained which are not clear enough and may create confusion. . . . As an example in this respect, we refer to the way in which in some paragraphs the problem of the divergencies existing among socialist countries as well as among the communist and workers parties is dealt with. Consequently, the impression can be created that these divergencies are due to the activity of imperialism--and this in our opinion is not realistic--and that the possibilities for imperialism to divide the international working class movement are overrated." At the same time, the impression can be Lreated of a certain underrating of the capability of the socialist countries, of. the communist and workers parties, to repel any action of imperialism and-its propaganda directed against the unity of the socialist countries and the unity of the communists and the working .class PRAVDA, 18 June) Approved For Relveasetl 19%.AY1 G2 ` FA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 22 'Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-O1 1.94A000500080001-3' Nature of. Reservation .SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued) IRomania 1(Continued) CPYRGHT Spain: Final Action "As to the Middle East, we have set forth our standpoint and do not dwell on it now, although we consider that it would have been well for the document to deal more clearly with this problem, too. (Ceausescu, AGERPRES, 16 June) The 18 June o E PRAVDA summarized the Substance Ceausescu's remarks, but muted his reservations on the Middle East. Carillo said his party "expressed serious reservations about certain points which it would like to be more in accord with reality. The document, he specified, is not some 'program charter' outlining a 'general line.' It is the result extensive discussion con- taining a number of important new elements. At the same time, the draft has ambiguities and obvious omissions. These and other causes. make the conference different in character from the conferences of 1957 and 1960." ( ASS, 1 June) The party "has decided ,.to sign the document so as not to leave room for doubt regard- ing its firm adherence ld movement. (PRAVDA, 1 June) CPYRGHT CPYRGHT' tional.character@ decisions ar out of specific conditions. (PRAVDA, 18' June) on behalf of the ultimate interests of our peoples and must reveal de- fects in decisions of an interna-. 1967 on the Middle East, because the resolution contains serious defects particularly with respect to the Palestine problem. We, as communists," Suridzh said, "act "The delegation expresses a reser- "Supports and will- vation on one sentence where sign the main docu- reference is made to 'full' ' merit." (RAVA ,. implementation of the Security " 18 June) Council resolution (of 22 November 13 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 pa~r Nature of Reservation SIGNERS WI`fi RESERVATIONS (Continued) Switzerland Lechleiter said "the fact that some _- __ ___ __4. ,....-+? 4., +U- number of wordings of the document which are too general and inaccurate,, so as to avoid different interpretations. A number of such wordings idealize .relations between parties of work of the conference indicates that it is not yet possible to work out?a single document which could become the common, scientifically founded political and ideological platform for all the parties. . . . We believe it is necessary to make specific a " CPYRGHT which is not in I accord with the resent situation." 'OBSERVERS (TASS, 11 June) Latin American communist parties." Insufficient stress had been placed on the role of "bourgeois reformism" Rodriguez argued that the document -Status precluded should have given greater stress to signing "self-criticism" and should have pointed out "the weaknesses of the workers' movement in the developed capitalist countries." He disputed the statement that the Latin American communist parties "head the democratic forces and . . . fight courageously . . . for the attain- ment of revolutionary changes," a description which "does not corre- spond to reality with regard to certain in U.S. strategy in Latin America. 14 Final Action "Approves the docu- ment with the.afore Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79 01,1,94A000500080001-3 Party Nature of Reservation OBSERVERS (Continued) Cuba (Continued) While Cuba backed the document's concept of peaceful coexistence.' it-held that the defense of peace should not be the main aim of the anti-imperialist movement: "the anti-imperialist forces must establish as the essential aim of their actions the defeat and elimination of imperialism." treaty] GRANMA, 12 Irune) Soviet-, accounts the substance' of Rodriguez' objections, including his swipe at the orthodox Latin American communist parties. as object nproliferation CPYRGHT Although the Cuban party favors out- lawing nuclear weapons, so long as this is not achieved "our view--. which is very well known to those attending the conference--on the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons will remain un- changed." (Cuba is on record shortcomings from the point of view of coverage and analysis of the situation in the world. Omitted are important questions concerning evaluation of revolutionary strategy, in the 'third world.' . The thesis reading that each party itself should have the decisive say in the affairs document circulated has substantial.- ? signing Werner said "we believe that the Status precluded; main document." PRAVDA.says only that Werner "made y y p report of the speech in the 18 June' of its own peopl rmulated CPYRGHT ve recisel " (TASS 12 June) A r Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : e?A-RDP79-01194A00050008000(1-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 T?HE.'WASHINGTON fx9YVGHT 1T 'July 1969 Vr- CPYRG?HT ~ou an 1a -co ppo on `m ob It `'si or or :w, wo _ ay's ot otng to We III oon e launch of Apollo 11, like the launches of the er Apollo spacecraft before it, was beautiful, they say on television. It was so precise, so or-free, that you could not -entirely appreciate technical prowess that went into it. And be- se It got off to such a magnificent start, It is easy to overlook the quiet, cool courage 'and fidence of the men in the capsule and the men charge on the ground. On hand were a Vice sident, a former President, quite probably a rum of both houses of Congress, a huge turn- of foreign envoys and no, end of dignitaries expert observers, not to mention representa- of the press of this country and 54 foreign ds. It was, in short, a wide open affair-and, ordingly, wide open to embarrassment, or worse, nything had gone wrong. And this is not only ribute to NASA and to our whole space effort a commentary of some consequence on the trasting ways In which the two great space ers of this planet approach the great adventure or there are now two spacecraft racing across natural for the Russians to try to steal some of ou thunder if they can. That is not the point about the Russian pe formance that'augurs in for the long pull. Wh j is disappointing Is the Soviet continuing insisten on secrecy, whether it stems from national securi concerns or a lack of confidence in its own abilitie In any case, not even Col. Frank Borman, Co mander of this country's first.circumlunar missio was given a hint of the plan for Luna 15 In h otherwise friendly conversations with Soviet spa*,' officials. So we ? do not know what the Russian spacecra 1 Is up to, except for the fact .that it will real h t moon while Apollo 11 is still on its way. Accordin to the best guesses of space experts here, it m land, scoop up some lunar soil and return'to eart. If it does, the Russians will have upstaged Apoll 11 to some extent and won some part of the ra they and we embarked upon less than a deco ; ago. But that isn't the point, either. The world caj- judge, if it feels the need,- whether Apollo 11 sky toward the moon. One was launched on a - Luna 15 was the more spectacular affair, the m sion with the whole world looking on and the,' difficult and the more. scientifically useful of ective explicitly set forth In advance. The other, yet unknown, and it is this contrast, rather n any qualitative comparison between what we' setting out to.achieve and what the Russians setting out to achieve, that is significant. It ld be childish to fault the Russians for trying slip their moon shot in ahead of ours, as if the on was somehow ours this week. It was largely decision to make a race of this and just as we ld very much like to win this race, so it is THE WASHINGTON POST 15 July 1969 unuffluld! 80011zes ha W1 ow said yesterday that the unmanned Soviet space he heading for the moon proba- bly will go into lunar orbit, end a robot capsule to the urface and rejoin the parent hip for a flight back to earth with samples of moon rocks and soil. Westerners in Moscow and elsewhere have speculated in ecent weeks that such a teat ould be attempted In an ef- ort to upstage the Apollo 11 light, but there was still no fficial confirmation of any etails of the Luna 15 flight, yond ' the announcemeenntt atthe %mv 6B~ two. Over the long haul, as man presses on In t exploration of the universe, this judgmen may I n, matter much, for mankind, with all the probl confronting it and `drawing upon its resources, be the loser unless the spirit of contest gives to open collaboration among all those with a tribution to make to the unlocking of the secre of space. In the meantime, Apollo 11 will stars as a symbol of a nation that dares to operate open and is willing to share its successes, its failures anti, its knowledge with every man. , ]oscowSthys fial1ySili n .6 -te ? Mission Qi Lunar Probe Sir; Bernard Lovell, director of the. Jordell Bank Observa- tory in England, does not be. Bevel that, Luna 15. will bring back soil from the moon. Lovell, whose observatory has picked up signals from Luna 15, said he expected the Soviets to eventually recover rocks, with such uhmanned spacecraft, but "It Is unlikely the Russians can do this by I the testing of systems in one exercise." 'I think this is the begin. nIn of a new series of Rus- Re eaeorl #0.9108 I going to lead up to the recov- _-- -~ wnnlrw without the GHT intervention of man," he said The terse Soviet announce A West German space scion- ment of the Luna 15 High fist suggested that Luna 15 is said only that the probe woul probably a test for an even- continue studies of the moo tual direct moon landing with- and of space close to the lung out the help of a landing mod- surface.. ule. The Soviet Union has never Heinz Kaminski, director of before put a craft In orbs around the moon and returned Institute, based his deduction it to earth, nor has. it per. two articles that appeared! formed any capsule uncou June 13 in the Soviet maga? ,' piing and recoupling opera. tions in the vicinity zlne Cosmic Analysis, pub- of the fished by the Moscow Acad. moon. emy of Science. But the unofficial sources i Moscow aa1A .-A-6. ith w 11390 10d+ u psuie, the un- the Apollo 11 capsule blasts aient- of the Into ~+rhit from Cape Kennedy. Apollo moanbug, flare been carried but on oartls..._ ... !:,1,J YORK TL,,::S 14 July 1969 r-1pp"~- Release 1 CRAFT 1. TOWARD THE MOON bservers Believe Attemp May Be Made to Land ' and Return to Earth 5TH IN LUNA PROGRAM !estern Sources Doubt Th Russia Has Capability to Achieve Such a Feat By BERNARD GWERTZ Spectal to The New `lark Tinter MOSCOW, July 13-The S - let Union launched an u - anned spaceship toward ti 0 noon today, just three days ore the scheduled blastoff f merica's Apollo 11 on anned lunar landing missio - The launching of the Lu 5 mission appeared to obse rs here as a deliberate effo y the Soviet Union to ste I ome of" the moon publics way from the United Stat nd demonstrate that it is s uch in the space business. As usual, few details we eleased on the latest Sovi t pace venture. Tass, the official Soviet pre s agency, said that at 5:55 A. Moscow time (10:55 P.M., S - urday, Eastern daylight tim ) rocket carrier carrying L a 15 was launched. it said that Luna 15 "Was, aunched to the moon from 0 rbit of an artificial earth s -. lilte." The Alm of the Fllglu' "The aim of the flight is check -the systems on board t e - automatic station and to co, uct further scientific explo - ion of. . the moon and spa ear the .moon.' the announc neat said. The announcement's wor ) ng was vague enough to lea e' rn for any possible specul - with all varieties tonight. ~~jjso~~meeppobserrl1verss believed u tfrtAYdwufrhicl ~pt~ci-~ moon in April last year but did not return to earth. Others thought Luna 15 might be an ambitious effort by the Russians to land an unmanned spaceship on the moon and hen return it to earth, possibly with some rocks from the moon's surface. . if this were indeed the case, the Soviet Union could beat the United States In the "race" to. bring samples from the moon to the earth. Attempt Has Been Hinted Communist correspondents for the last four months have been advising some of their Western colleagues here that the main soviet effort would be such a space venture. But their predic- tions as to when the Soviet Un- ion would launch such a mis- sion have repeatedly been ;wrong. II Some correspondents had said that a launching was scheduled, for July 10, and when this launching did mot take place, they said that the Soviet Union would wait until after the Apol- lo 11 mission. Some Western diplomats have said that a "scooping" opera- tion to obtain lunar soil sam- ples appears beyond the Soviet capacity at the moment. These observers contend that the Rus- sians lack the ability to launch a vehicle heavy enough to can- tain a craft that could reach the surface of the moon and then take-off again. American officials were some- what concerned that Luna 15, whatever its mission, might present a hazard to the Apollo 11. The view was fairly general, however, that the Soviet Union. knowing in advance what Apol- lo 11 planned to do, would not interfere with it. Tass said that at noon to- day, Moscow time, Luna 15 was about 41,000 miles from earth. "There is a steady radio communication with the sta- tion," Tass said. The vehicle's equipment was said to be func- tioning normally. The first in the Luna series was launched on Jan. Z, 1959. It passed within 3,728 miles of the moon and then went Into an orbit around the sun. Luna 2, launched on Sept. 12, 1959, was the first probe to hit the moon, and Luna 8. launched on Oct. 4, 1959, was the first side. 94 006tr8lre3sed G TSubsequent Luna space shots emphasized attempts to make "soft landings" on the moon, with Luna 9, in February, 1969, making the first such landing. None of the Luna series have ever returned to earth. The unmanned Zond 5.? launched last September. and Zond 6. last November; circled the moon and returned to earth.. This led observers to believe then that the Russians might be planning a manned orbit of the moon. Earlier this year, a Soviet astronaut, Lieut. Col. Ajeksdi A. Leonov, was quoted by Japan- ese newvspncn as saying that he expected that rocks from the moon to be exhibited by the Soviet Union at the 1970 world's fair in Osaka, Japan. and that an unmanned craft !would pick them up. But there was- no evidence in the Tass announcement to- day that Luna 15 vgould at-; tempt to do this. For the last week, the. Soviet press has been focusing on the Apollo 11 mission, with one newspaper running ? the photo- graphs of the three astronauts who make up its crew-Neil A. Armstrong, who is a civilian,, and Col. Edwin E. Aldrin Jr. and Lieut. Col. Michael Collins,' both of whom are in the Air Force. Borman Met Podgorny The recent visit of Cola Frank Borman, the astronaut, and his family also provided the occasion for many articles on America's space efforts. After 'a 40-minute meeting in the Kremlin between Colonel Borman and President Nikolai V.Podgorny, the Soviet leader was quoted as wishing Presi- dent Nixon and the American people success with the Apollo 11 mission. Colonel Borman was re- peatedly asked by American newsmen during his stay here whether he knew of any Soviet. space venture in the near fu- ture, and he always indicated that he had no knowledge of any. So far, the new Luna mission has ? received scant publicity here, merely being reported on regular news broadcasts, with. out the serious tone that is reserved for major space achievements. If usual Soviet practice is followed, little will be made known about the mission until it achieves its objective or ends' Its mission -- with Tuesday afternoon probably being the earliest that any substantial amount of information will be feleased.. Approved For Release 1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3. NEW YORK TI MS 34 July 1969 CPYRGHT IVASA Officials FearnRussMns, Are Trying to Upstage Apollo By RICHARD D. LYONS Special to The NOW Tat ?ml, CAPE KENNEDY, Fla., July( However, space agency of- known to be i l h i ere are c a s 13-Space agency officials ap i f eared concerned and a bit concerned about the effect that p eared a mission would have on alarmed today. that the latest the attention focused on Apollo Soviet lunar flight might be a 11. For 10 years an argument dramatic attempt to upstage has raged over whether un- America's scheduled launching manned space exploration of a lunar mission on Wednes- would be not only less risky but also less costly the and day. 1 fruitful scientific They fear that the edge will standpoint as manned space be taken off the Apollo 11 mis- flight. sion, however successful, if the Commenting on Colonel Bor- Soviet Union lands on the man's statements, a high offi- cial of the National Aeronau- P tics and Space Administration ',that scoops up lunar soil, then said the agency had known ,,blasts off from the surface and "for some time" that the Soviet returns, to earth. Union "had the technical ca- i The. Apollo mission Is In- pability to undertake such a mission:" ,tended to land two men on ? He emphasized, however, 'the moon and bring back ram- that the exact nature of the aples of the lunar soil. Luna 15 mission was still ob- m- scure, as did Dr. Thomas O. Col F n the k B ran orma , } . co mander of the Apollo 8 flight Paine, the agency's adminis- trator. around the-moon last Christ- Dr. Paine said here: "We mastime, who returned last hope that the juxtaposition of week from 'a? trip to the Soviet two lunar missions in such a Union, said, here today it was close time frame points out his."guess" that this was; in the desirability of close cooper- tact, the mission of Luna 15. ,ation in space between the So- viet Union and the United He said Russian space exports States. he met in Moscow last week Colonel Borman, appearing on "had made references to it." the National Broadcasting Com- Tho Air 'Force officer assert- pany's program, "M" t the 'ed that it will be a geat feat" Press," said that ,unmanned if the Russians bring back a loner r,bes were worthwhile 'but them is no substitute for Isample of lunar soil, but added: human judgment." "An unmanned machine cen Experts familiar with the tainly will not take the edge 1Sovi(st space program were less toff Apollo 11." certain that an automatic lunar Other exerts familiar with it*'[ sampling station was the p ,objective of Lunar 15, despite the Soviet space program said, C'ulonel Borman's acknowledged however. that they believed eap crtise and recent talks with that the Soviet flight was Ithe Russians. aimed more at scooping up The experts pointed out that ',propaganda, rather than lunar ,it had been known for years soil. that in the Soviet Union the have lunar landing launching "win- "The Russians may dows"-that is, those times of figured that they could keep the month that are most pro- the world guessing and take pitious for moonshots-are six the edge off the fact that they to seven days ahead of those at woul were not attempting a manned 'thePbetot my. Th foris a Sov etl at landing on the moon," one said. tempt at three or four days He pointed out that the last ago, when there were rumors Soviet moon flight, Luna 14, in Moscow that an automatic, occurred 15,months ago. ;soil scooping attempt was go- 'Why launch Luna 15 now sing to be made. rather than -a~Oe Release 1,994 t to d1%,! _VB that was supposed to have been launched last week and not to, the one that went up today. The essence of the Counter- argument against an automatic soil sampling station was that Luna 15 was nothing more than another Soviet lunar orbiting flight. Even this type of mis- sion, which has been accom- plished by both the United States and the Soviet Union, would have a propaganda effect because it would, however mo- mentarily, deflect the focus of world attention from the Apollo 1.1 flight. Technical experts such as Dr. George Mueller, a I4ASA associate administrator who Is a propulsion expert, said last week that it might be possible for an automatic spacecraft to land and pick up material. But he said he strongly doubted that the craft would return to earth. ? Lack of Propulsion The key to the ? argument against return is propulsion. It' the spacecraft descended di-i rectly. as the American Suns veyor ship did, it would need an enormous propulsion sys, tem to blast off and return to earth. It,would be almost like landing a huge rocket back; .ward and then taking it oft again without launching ppad, gantry cranes and especially men to help. If the Russians were to put a craft into lunar orbit, detach, a smaller pickaback spacecraft to the surface for a soil pickup, then blast it off for a rendez- vous and docking with the mother craft, the weight would be less but the timing would be extremely complicated and perhaps impossible. Sir Harrie Massey, chairman of the British National Com- mittee for Space Research, said n Britain that lie believed that Luna 15 "was not of very spe- cial significance. In Washington the State De- partment issued a statement saying that while the Russians "have not yet stated the intent of the mission, we welcome this further exploration in space and wish them every success in s man's effort to better under- > 9-0.11.94A dAffff AOtf~'Pd3 , had some , connection wlttt SLLWile"3 W a,vavuc. &Ma.o.. 110.1' { could have been for a mission Approved For Releast 9I02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 NDI YORK TIMES 28 July 1969 REDS HELD GLUM . OVER MOON FEAT! Strains and Embarrassment Reported in Soviet Bloo By PAUL HOFMANN. i syedd to TM New Toek Mm" ' 1 PRAGUE, July 27 -- Well- informed Eastern European' sources report that the triumph. of Apollo 11 and the perform- ance of the Soviet Luna 15' spacecraft caused lively con- troversy within the Moscow leadership and strains through- out the Soviet bloc. The debate and recrimina. tions are said to Involve Leonid 1. Brezhnev, General Secre- tary of the Soviet Communist, party. Gloom and embarrassment over the landing of the United States astronauts on the moon and the apparent crash of the unmanned Luria 15 craft on the moon's surface are said to have hung heavily, over talks that Mr. Brezhnev conducted with Eastern European leaders In Warsaw last week. Mr. Brezhnev and President Nikolai V. Podgorny of the Soviet Union conferred there from Monday to Wednesday with Wladyslaw Gomulka, the, Polish Communist party chief, Dr. Gustav Husak, First Secre- ?.ary. cf_ the Czechoslovak Com- mun{st party, PrFmier Willi Stoph of East Germany, and other high officials of the three countries. A e occasion was the 25th anniversary of Communist rule in Poland. Soviet proposals.for `a collective security system to guarantee the status quo in Eastern Europe and the imp a1 cations of President Nixon. visit to Rumania, scheduled fort Aug. 2 and 3, were understood to have been major topics of the Warsaw meeting. The Communist leaders Rath ered in Warsaw were said tot have been disturbed by reports reaching them of the enthusias-I tic reactions across Eastern Europe to the feat of the Apollo astronauts. Live television coverage, via communications satellite. was provided by the state networks of several Eastern European' countries. not including th Soviet Union. which showe delayed videotapes of the a tronauts on the moon. The public response. taken a Indicative of lingering an latent sympathies for. th United Staes and its way of lie was reportedly strongest in th technologically most advance countries of the Soviet bloc East Germany and Czechosl vakla. interest Is Widespread Mass Interest for the Apoll 11 mission and some publi gloating over the Luna 15 epi~ code were noted also in Polan Hungary and Rumania. accord ing to Information availabl 'here. Communist officials respo aible for Mass media In th Soviet bloc are understood t be worried that many hew paper writers. editors an broadcasters in the area ma have gone out of their way t show goodwill toward th United States In connectio with the Apollo 11 success. It Is reliably disclosed th news media In various Easte European countries have bee requested by the Communi t authorities to stress, in repo Ing on President Nixon's ore ent tout of Asian eouMtrie ,. what b viewed as Uad States Aggression In via CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CI A-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 25X1C10b hk Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 REUTERS CTPii6Hr69 PYIRGHT To Establish Plans Parley End War. :Terrris to T1ii~iiets, 9 Two Parties SAIGON, April 7 (Mon day) -- South Vietnamese President Thieu proposed a;- six-point peace plan today,', including the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces nd the setting up of an in' ernational control system. The President said he would', all a conference of all leading olitical figures in a few days o? work out the basis for set-' ou Vietnam should adopt a policy of national recta conciliation. ? Reunification of the two, Vietnams to be decided by the: free choice of the entire popg? lation through democratic processes. ? An effective system of In ternational control and relia.. ble guarantees against "thei resumption of Communist ag Thieu said economid. and cultural exchanges between) ;North ' and South Vietnam; could be explored-"together; with other intermediary meas.' ures of peaceful coexistence" -pending reunification of the,. i'two countries. s He pledged that If North! Vietnam withdraws its "sub-; ,versive" forces and there is a drop In the level of infiltra tion and violence, South Viet- nam "will ask its allies to re- move their forces." He said Hanoi should pull: out troops stationed in . Cam- bodia and Laos and ' should+ Z--l- ---?... 1. . l a so `parties. One would be for the goo- ,ernment-headed by himself=-; and one for the'opposition. At the opening of a new ses- sion of Parliament, Thieu said' he would guarantee political `rights to former Vietcong Imembers once peace Is se- ,cured. "Those now fighting against :us who renounce violence and respect the laws will be wel loomed as full members of the national community," he said.' "As such they will enjoy full political rights and assume the same obligations as other law ful citizens under the national' "constitution," Thieu listed ' his . six points for peace as- * Communist aggression,' should stop. ? North Vietnamese troops and cadres should be ? com-i pletely withdrawn from South Vietnam.. ? The territories of the NEW YORK TIMES 7 April 1969 Saigon's A id in Paris Sup orts Supervised ote With Vietco l g1 PARIS, Monday, April 7 Pham Dang Lam, South Viet- nam's chief delegate t the Paris peace talks; said day that his country would a cept general elections under hit rna- tional control with. the p pation of the Vietcong whe fighting halted. Mr. Lam made the state ent In an interview publishe by the Paris morning newsp per, Le Figaro. The offer to give the Vie ong a role in elections was reg deg by observers as a diplo atic Initiative. . ,. . pre Mr. Lam strictly ' qualifie his the neighboring countries (Cam- offer by stating that the let- in bbdia and Laos)-should not be tong, the National Liber lion ch violated or used by North Viet-. Front, must "change their I el" namese as bases and staging to enter any elections. He aid of areas. forA11P Ped.F'or ~l~' el Lai 'cf181m `1 ~ . {FAi YRGHT THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 21 June 1969 Hanoi rebuff" on parley jolts India The Clirlitian Science Monitor New Delhi The Indian Government Is,' Now-'th-e s oo g down of New; Delhi's attempts to begin peace, talks has convinced many In. dians that Hanoi inflexibility'?is :prolonging the war. puzzled over North Vietnam's- abrupt request that Foreign Af fairs Secretary T. N. Kaul post.' .pone his talks in Hanoi. lieu t. had been announced, that Mr. Kaul would be going to Hanoi and Saigon to 'explore; ;the possibilities of speeding up the Vietnam peace. talks' lit Paris." This marked the first i time India, which chairs the In.' ?ternational Control Commission; has taken an active part in try. -ing to end the Vietnam conflict. India's position on the Viet-' nam war, during past years, has closely followed 'that of the So- viet Unibn: The United States. ?should. stop bombing the North,' ;Pull out its troops, and let the ,Vietnamese decide for them-! `selves." But there now appears to be. more sympathy for the Amer ican position in Vietnam: It be-+ :gan with President Johnson's' decision not to seek office again. 'The bombing halt and recently the proposed withdrawal of some American troops won In ,dian approval. On the other -hand, Hanoi has no + made CPYRGHT orally forbids Communism," it, electfJn PpR Vict we ac-- fw ' Communism, he added. name the 'government of their Coalition Regime Opposed ' choice." ut, he continued, "nothing = We sincerely hope that the ents the Front's people and 'political struggle will fireplace r partisans from taking part the war," Mr. Lam said: "Wt general elections if they are ready, as soon as the com- ge their label." bat stops, to accept general e strongly rejected the idea elections, under' International coalition Government ?say.. control i n ce sary, whatever CPYRGHT rov d For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3. CPYRGHT WARNING OF - LIMITS TO PATIENCE SAIGON (VNG) -- President. Nguyen Van Thieu Friday offered to let the Na onal Liberation Front aparticipate> in elections and to let them sit on an electoral commission a i they renounce vi lenee and pledge themselves to accept tb-e results of the elections.* also promised that the Go erment of Vietnam swill abi a by the results of the elections, whatever these res Its may be.a e new offer came in the for of a six-point set of pr osals contained in a nat nonal address aon the res- tor Lion of peaces in Viet. na . Tie President also ticked off eight repeated acts of goo will for peace made by the allies. S t he warned that athere is a point beyond which we sha I net tired of making uni- late al acts of good will.)) Ile also pointed out that eth re is an obvious connec- tio between free elections, sup rvised withdrawal of non-So nth Vietnamese forces and an end to violence and terrorism.) Six. points The gist of the six aprin- ciples> on which free electi. ons could take place : - All political hues) inc- luding the NLF... can partici- pate... if they renounce vio- l-;nce and pledge , themselves to accept the results of the elections; f' - An electoral commission which could include the NLF could be set up a to make sure the elections would be conducted in all fairness...;) - An international body should. supervise the elections; - a We are prepared to discuss with the other side the tune-table and modalities) for election; - aThere will be no repri- sals or discrimination after the elections ;) - The Government decla- res that it will abide by the results of the elections, wha- tever the results may be. We challenge the other side to declare the same.) The President said he was renewing ethe offer of private talks with the eNLFs, without preconditions, to discuss the above and any other quetions, toward the restoration of peace and national reconci- liation. a The other side should.not misconstrue our desire for peace as a sign of weakness. It should not be induced by our repeated acts of good will Into believing that It has only to remain adamant- tiy negative for us to accept eventual surrenders Gestures ' of good will The eight gestures of good will the President mentioned: - Pre-Paris contacts with non-involved parties for the purpose of negotiations ; - Agreement to par ial bombing halt of North Viet. nam in March, 1968; Agreement to dotal bomb leg halt.of North Vietnam in November, 1968; - Agreement to let a NLF) s t with Hanoi In Paris; -Agreement to attend Paris t Iks in spite of enemy hos- t itie'; -Agreement to simultan- e us withdrawal by allies' a d communist aggressors; - Offer by President Thieu i March of this year for' mate talks ; - Agreement to redeploy- i enl of U.S. troops in V etnam. He noted that none of t ese gestures had met with a y sign of reciprocal acts on tile o' her side.. _ i,ppr'oved For Release=-1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-O1194A0005000880001-3 CPYRGHT For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP + I1 AU 00080001-3 kVIET REDS URGE STEPPED-UP LIAR Calls Made On Anniversary Of Geneva Peace Pact PYRGHT BY~EDWARD K. WU [Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun] Hong Kong, July 20-The Com- unists in North and South Viet- m11 nmrlted the 15t1 annlversa- y of the tienrvu police agree- iens today with renewed calls o step up the war In the South. The official Rawl newspaper, han Don, In a commemorative ditorial entitled "Persist In and romote the Fighting, Advance oward Complete Victory," said he Viet Cong had "advanced' owerfully and steadily, with, ew posture, new strength,' new ilitary situation and new inter- ational position." In its clandestine` hideout In e South, the self-proclaimed rovisional revolutionary gov- ernment Issued an anniversary. ommunique today urging..con- inued fighting until not a single erican soldier is left. The editorial and the commu- ~,q:re, brvad: the county to be reunited b elections in lum. South e - nam did not sign the agree- ,.ment and in 1956 would not `agree to elections. t President Thieu has pro-. posed reunification through, "free choice" of the people of !the North and South.,The For-` eign Ministry statement today,, which in essence repeated this; statement,: said: "The Republic' of Vietnam solemnly asks North Vietnamese authorities to discuss directly and sera= ously ... reunification of the South and North through in- ternationally controlled gen. CPYRGHT I se 1999/09/02 : CIA-R a o e e! A i ,r 01-3 .1 b meet to discu ss closer ties be.' .tween the two sides." CPYRGHT :c7t YETESHA`'ORK S~tTL'.a~ JUNE 14. 969 iii ed States started bombing Nor It Vietnam in February 196.5 Ethiopia opposed and condemned this I honing. The raids against th. 0 A L ESCALATING PEACE EFFORTS ~ e end of the \'ietilaiil n tr ;ernes neither far ofl not in sight. It not seem far because Washington is bent on z, Process of Inilit, TV deg ialation.' But it is not in sight for Hanoi has so tilt. turtiecl its ba ?k ail escalation towards peace. The United States wants to get out )f .the mess'that has become the Vietnam ttau Find it is ise not to 1- lox an exit. Unless the effort to de-escalate the war is reciprocate 1, the conflict could degenerate into a situation that will further threat 'n world peace and stability. Hence the inlp)ortance foi broth sides to r 1. liz that the solution to tilt: Vietnan) problem is political and not it i- lita The cost of the iv:ar is astronomical. To date the tvar lias cost 1 es i ated 700,OIX) lives and S 1.3(0 billion. Though the heaviest bl r de of the war has been borne by the Vietnamese people, the Unit d Sta es has not been spared punishment. The United States -lids so f r spe at nearly. S 300 billion. Its casuality record reads 3:3?u(X) killed at d 20000 wounded. Vietnam has hurt the U.S. not only at the war fro it but also on the home front and around the world. No winder tli ii that the U.S- wants to get out of Vietuaun. The wain has proved it se v re unishnient to the punisher. North Were totally halted last October i id the cessation of the bomb log helped launch the Paris peace tall:. I'Ile fact that the talks have _:continued is an indication that no aicht ?emetlt ii is he eli made after done year a icl`does not furnish nluc?h c? ruse foi comfort. The. United States noix, has "announced that it will unilatei ills i?edin. t its troop strength in Vietnam b withdrawing ?? ,(XX) soldici?s. This should be welcomed a s a ratan st to the peace eff c it going on in Paris In the hest four pears, the United St t.~s has initiated ,.n supported 20 .niia;ot peace efforts in `'ietnam. North \'ietti tin ai:cl its amines de- ,t serve. credit for reciprocating the bonibi w, halt i:)t- showing Lill in Pa- tit ~ns for peace-talks:: Another opportunity or it reciprocal aictioli is now offered' in the troop reduction just announced.' The ~va11 in Vietnailtt is being waged by the forces of capitali in and conminnisilt, and the\ are these forces that must tacitly agree o peace without victory. The people of,Vietnam hive had wars for o~~ r two clec a(les. I et them h ar c peace for achange: anous?peace efforts are trying to ei d the 10-year old tsar in S'ietna n. The combatants have manifest d a measure of willingness ti) -bring about a negotiated settlement I.)v holding pence talks in Paris. '~'haf has been done for peace in the la t one -.ear is good, but it hat.' 'mot been enough. Both sides must now i lake bigger and better efforts =b?T ' i acing arid `reeipwc eatin g in a cl -esealatio-n of the war. The world in general and the non-aligned states in particular must helps bringabout'a r-egQtired settlement by c editing iliitiated peaze?e efforts 'and by - encouraging reciprocity . pproved For Release-1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 YRGH.HE WASHINGTON POST 5 June 1969 Top . a ,oi Aide Ai.x?a 1?~~s Spurns By Murray' Marder washiniton post Staff Writer PARIS, June 24=North ' Vietnam's chief strategist in Paris rejects in advance any compromise with the Saigon r?gime for using a mixed commission of Communists 'arid non-Communists to organize a special election to decide South Vietnam's political fate. Opposition: to any form of compromise involving the 'United Press International LE DUO THO . "vicious circle" present government in Saigon ? -on which the Nixon Admin. istration has pinned its hopes for a diplomatic settlement of the war-was expressed yester- ; day by Hanoi Politburo mem. ber Le Due Tho. In an interview with The Washington Post, Tho equally ruled out any form of inter- national supervision or partici- pation in an election test in :'South Vietnam. He similarly brushed aside any prospect for .formal or tacit agreement to reduce the level of fighting so long as the Nixon Administra- tion, tries "to proceed from a position, of strength" to end. the war. The harshest language was aimed at President Nixon per. -sanaliy; 'Mr. Nixon's "personality" and his deeds since he has been in office, said Tho, have revealed a "warlike nature" that has produced a policy re- flecting "the most warlike military circles in the United States." Tho said that In the five months since President Nixon has been in office he has en- gaged in "futile . . . maneuv- ers" that "can be compared to building castles in the air." Now time is running out on the President, said Tho. "Mr. Nixon finds. himself in a vicious circle. He wants to withdraw U.S. forces from South Vietnam but he fears that the puppet rmy and - the puppet adminisatration will collapse. But if Mr. Nixon Is determined to pursue the war, U.S. casualties will increase ... . "The intention of Mr. Nixon is to stay in Vietnam in order Jo build up the puppet army and administration that will permit the prolongation of the war. But I think that time is not on the side of Mr. Nixon. "Now ... what has Mr. Nixon been able to achieve in .his last five months at the con. ference table? We. may say that he has achieved, nothing." The essence of Thbl,,3 attack has been reverberating for some weeks here across the conference table. But what Tho added was a highly personal attack from the leading Communist policymaker on this scene, who is one of the; highest-ranking colleagues' of, North Vietnamese President, Ho Chi Minh and a veteran revolutionary whose words carry special Weight in Hanoi.a M'ho's' as parent objective was to maximise the prew,sursa of American dissent and war frustration mounting on the Nixon Administration, to put, pressure on Washington to accept the Vietcong - North Vietnam ten-point plan for' ending the war--most especial- ly, to abandon the present South Vietnamese regime. . The thrust of Thos remarks was Intended to show no ray of hope; no way around yield ing to the demands of the Communist side. His comments appeared to support the prevailing allied strategy assessment that the Communist side is determined, at least in the next few weeks of these talks, to show a total- ly uncompromising posture in order to stimulate more Amer- ican and international de- mands on the Nixon Adminis tration for a change of policy. The question among allied .strategists is whether, after a time, the Communist side will shift to a more flexible nego- tiating stand if U.S..policy re- mains unchanged. Others Expound Theme Normally, Tho rarely speaks in public here, but now offi- cials on the Communist side of the negotiations have joined in expounding a similar theme. Tho's official title is "special adviser" to North Vi- etnamese ? delegation chief Xuan Thuy. But the white- haired Tho, a man of dignity and evident power, Is recog- I,iized as the dominant strate-; gist facing U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, as he did Lodge's predecessor, W. Aver ell, Harriman, who was much impressed with him as an ad- versary. Tho indirectly confirmed, In a recent remark when he re ferred to a discussion with Lodge, that he has talked with Lodge privately, at least once. In the interview, however,. when asked If she saw any` prospect for surmouting the negotiating barriers here by,; further private talks with Lodge, Tho said- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 CPYRGHT pprove or a ease "We think that private meet ings do not constitute a deci- sive factor in settling the problem. If the U.S. is not se- rious and has no good will, whatever private meetings there have been and how many private meetings there may be, they cannot settle the, problem." Tho also said: "In the previous month, Mr. Nixon spread rumors to the of- feet that there were many se- cret meetings between us and the United States Admin1stra-J Lion and that a settlement.wasl about to be reached. But the l truth Is not so. "On the 19th of June," Tho added, "Mr. Nixon also hinted at a settlement between two or three months: His intention Is to created hope among the G American people. But the facti is that no progress at all has; been made in the meetings. In fact, our positions are very far apart." (What Mr. Nixon said, at his White House news conference that day, was: "Now we are down to substance" and "the two sides are far apart. But we believe that the time has come for a discussion of substance and we hope within the next two to three months to see' some progress in substantive discussions.") ' E Tho, speaking In Vietnam- ese at his delegation head- quarters here in suburban Choisy-le-Rol, with a, North Vi- etnamese interpreter translat- ing his words into English, developed the theme that all responsibility for the impasse In these talks rests squarely on Preisent Nixon. "The personality of Mr. Nixon," said Tho, speaking partially from written notes, Is especially Important because "the President of the United States is in a position to make' decisions'on war without hav- ing the consent of the Senate and the House of Representa- tives." That reference was one of many scattered through Tho's comments that appeared to be acutely and adroitly aimed at appealing to the sensitivities of Mr. Nixon's war critics. The most important new` element in Tho's conments was his seeming off-handed re- 'ection of the most send-l ive objective in the Nixon Administration's attempts to udge the Saigon govern ent into negotiating range,of he Vietcong. This is the potential offer by the Saigon regime of a new form of "political settle- ment" which was referred. to on June 19 by President Nix- on--reportedly to Saigon's thigh irritation because Mr. Nixon publicly anticipated its action. This offer centers on the so-called mixed- commission approach to an election as an alternative to the Comr munist demand for outright replacement of the Saigon re- gime by a provisional coali- tion government, which would then conduct its own election for an entirely new govern- ment system. Denied by Saigon The Saigon government to- day.denied reports that such a plan, to allow Communist membership on an election board, is even in the offing. . There have been growing doubts that the Communists will participate in, an election that the Saigon government helps to organize. Those doubts have increased consid- l erably since the Vietcong an- nounced earlier this month that they have formed a pro- visional revolutionary govern- ment as an outright "legal" challenger to the Saigon re- gime. Tho virtually brushed the whole question aside. There is no room whatever for such an approach, he said, in view of the ten-point political program of the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong. That pro- gram is now the program of the new NLF government, as well as the program of North Vietnam. "As I have pointed out," he said, "in the ten-point overall solution, general elections are to be organized by a provision- al coalition government. And only in this way can fair and democratic elections be held. No other body than this pro- visional coalition government can organize fair and derhocra- tic elections." Tho was similarly Inflexible; on the question of internation- al supervision of any election. He said: "The general election is an internal affair of the South' Vietnamese people. There can can be no international super. visiori under whatever form to supervise these elections be- cause, such supervision would I supervision would not respect` the enemy, Mr. Nixon Is keep- self-determination of the rights ing quiet . and a number of papers under the influence of Mr. Nixon have not spoken about these counterattacks.; Mr. Nixon's Intention is to conceal the truth." Tho was asked for comment on recent statements by Harri-, Man that. the Communist side .was prepared for a "disen- gagement' last November.. Harriman said he and his then- 'deputy In Paris Cyrus R. Vance, believed that when the North Vietnamese pulled the bulk of their troops out of the northern provinces of South Vietnam this represented "a political action on their' part." But because North Vietnam never has admitted officially It has any troops in the South, Tho did not respond directly to the issue. He said: , of the South Vietnamese peo+ plc." In his indictment of Nixon' Administration policy, Tho singled out, as formal Corn. munist statements here have done, President Nixon's speech at the Air Force Acad- emy at Colorado Springs, on June 4. In the speech, Mr. Nixon firmly defended the ne- cessity of American military strength to preserve global stability and assailed critics of 'U.S.,military power. "This statement of Mr`. Nixon," Tho charged, "has re-, vealed the warlike nature of Mr. Nixon" and shows "that Mr. Nixon is still pursuing a policy of positions-of-strength on all problems of the world . these words by Mr. Nixon have been embodied In his policy in Vietnam, on the bat- well as at the con- ference table." The said that "the U.S. has been continuing to exert maxi- mum military pressure on the ,battlefield. The amount of bombs and ammunition it used during the last five months can be said to have exceeded the bombs and am- munition used in every other period since the beginning of Claims NLF Strong He said that "from the.ces- sation of the bombing of North Vietnam" on Nov. 1 `-to Janu- ary, 1969, the U.S. was of the opinion that the NLF forces. on the battlefield have been weakened and that the NLF forces have not been in a po- sition to carry on their activi- ty, and that is why the U.S. has. intensified its own activ- ity. "But the reality," he con- tinued, ".Is that NLF forces have not weakened in any way. In February, the Front Intensified the war just to give an answer to the intensi- fied attacks of the U.S...." Tho claimed that there have been more "counter-attacks" than the allied forces have ad-, m,itted. He said; "In the month of February When we counter- attacked the enemy power- fully, Mr. Nixon made noisy statements about this, threat- ening the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. But after his threats were re- "As to the comment made by Mr. Harriman, I think every person has a right to give his own comment and I, have no remarks on Mr. Harri - man's comment." ! Tho, tracing his version o the history of the Vietnames war, said the U.S. is -now e - gaged in duplicating Its "f l- ures" of the last 15 years. The U.S. was defeated In the "special war" it conducted] before introducing its own massive forces Into South Viet-1 nam, said The. Now, he added, "after four years of local war, which failed, the United States wants to withdraw gradually and build up the puppet army and administration to shoulder the, ,main responsibility of the war while the U.S. stands aside, commanding and aiding the puppet - army and administra- tion to carry on the war. In other words, the United States wants to revert to the special war as before." Sees Effort Doomed But this Is also doomed, said Tho. "The U.S. has start- ed to try this," he added. "This, can be seen at the Dakto bat- tlefield, Xuanloc and Blen- hoa, As can be seen from these' cases, the U.S. has let the pup- pet forces [be] directly de- feated and the U.S. had to, come as reinforcement and saving forces ... "We. can say that this was the first step of de-American- ization or 'Vietnamization' of constitute interference in the vealed [to be] in v a i n now the war, and that this first Internal affairs of the South at our people are increasing step of the maneuver, hasi Vietnamese people ,and such that counterattacks . against failed ..' ? J Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 ,,QPYRGHT Tho was asked to comment on the recent proposal by for- mer Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford for a withdrawal this year of "about 100,000" U.S. troops as part of a gen- eral pullout of all American combat forces by the end of 1970." He replied that "if Mr. Clif- ford desires to withdraw U.S. troops more rapidly than Mr. Nixon from South Vietnam than I raaliso that there is to some extent a positive aspect in his statement. But there is a very important point; that is that Mr. Clifford still wants H WASHINGTON POST 11 July 19 9 to maintain in South Vietnam the U.S. Air Force and logistic troops to help the puppet troops to de-Americanize- the war. This is the wrong point in his position." An equally "wrong. point" In Clifford's position, said Tho, Is that "only after the with drawal of what .he called. the North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam will the U.S, withdraw all its forces As for us, we demand the U.S. troops and the troops of its allies -be rapidly. withdrawn from South Vietnam without any conditions being imposed.!', Text of Thiea's T ' m rehen sine Offer is tk t g a j,a z text against us, can participate results may be. We chal- drawal of non-South 'Viet of South Vietnamese Presi- In the elections' if they re- lenge the other side to de- . namese forces, and an end: dent Thieu's speech propos- nounce violence and pledge elate the same. :ing a commission to arrange themselves to accept the re- to violence and terrorism. ''elections in South Vietnam: suits of the elections. It The controls 8 8 other side per cent o claimf the that today I renew the offer' this war cannot be per- 2) To make sure that the of private talks with the, muted to last indefinitely, elections would be con population of S out h Viet- NLF, without preconditions," It should be ended one way ducted in all fairness, an nam. We say that t hey to discuss the above and any, or another. We, the peace- , electoral commission could. dominate by force only a other questions, toward the loving people would like to be set u in which all - small portion of the papula restoration of peace and na- po solve this war by way of re- litical parties and tion. Let these claims be put tional reconciliation. groups, to the test of elections. If the conciliation. Including the NLF now The other side should not other side really believes its ,? To move the negotiations fighting against us, could be misconstrue our desire for forward, I feel that a major represented. own claims, and r e a 11 y peace as a sign of weakness.' stands for the right of self- initiative is needed. To that The electoral commission determination of the Viet- It should not be induced by 1. effect, we are willing to will assure equal opportune our repeated acts of good namese people, there can be ? make, as another act of good- ties in the campaigning to no reason for it not to acct will into believing A hat it.' will, ,will, a comprehensive offer all candidates. Pt has only to remain admantly f .for the political settlement of. It will also enable all polit- Our offer of genuinely free, negative for us to accept conflict. ical parties and groups to elections, in which they can eventual surrender. Both sides in this stru le Participate in watdhiup the participate without discrim- We are fighting for a just t have said that the internal.. Polls to see that people vote inatibu, not only the covot- ntrol cause and self-defense, have absolutely f r e e 1 y, and in ing but also in the control and we are becoming every of South Vietnam of the counting of the votes, day stronger. We shall not should be decided b the watching the counting of the by ballots to see that .they are with international supervi- grow tired in this struggle. f S o u t h Vietnamese them- lion: In fact there is a point be. selves, in a free and demo honestly counted. To be meaningful elect- ; static fashion. 3) An international body should g conducted yond which n unila gal` tions is to be established to su- tired of making unilateral The only way for the Peo- pervise the elections, and to under conditions under ' acts of goodwill. Hanoi will` plc of South Vietnam to ex- which, the South Vietnamese then have to bear all the e sure that the elections ercise their right of self- aarekh e 1 d under conditions people can exercise their consequences of the pro- f. determination, to ; partici- fair to all choice, free. from fear and tracted war, and It has to as pate In public affairs, and coercion. some full responsibilitis for, to determine they future of 4) We are prepared to dis- ' Thus, there is an obvious the sufferings that it im- the determine country, is through,elec- cuss. With the other side the connection between free poses on the people in both ttons In w h f c h they, can timetable and the Modal- elections, supervised with parts of Vietnam. enuinely express their hies under which the elpc choice. free from fear n,n i tions will be held. In this spirit, free elee- prisals or . discrimination Lions can be based on 'the 'after the elections. following principles- 6) T he' Government of 1) All political parties and.. Vietnam declares that it will groups, including the NLF abide by the results of the which Is now bearing arms elections,. whatever ,t tli es e REUTERS 6 April 1969 Hanoi 'Finds No Progress HONG KONG, April 6 (Reu- ters)-The Paris. peace confer- ence on 'Vietnam, after holding 11 sessions in 2 rponths, con- tinues to mark time, the North . Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIAVWrC_Q r Tho nevertheless made it evident, as he did at a recep- tion here Thursday night, that despite what he claims to be a total lack of movement in these talks on the part of the United States and South .Viet- nam, his delegation has no desire. to break them off, Even when asked if the allied and Communst sides here are "further apart than ever on political questions" as a result of President Nixon's latest show of'support for the S a I g o n government, Tho avoided any characterization of absolutely impenetrable The Hanoi 'daily newspaper said that the lack of progress was, the fault of the United States for refusing to discuss what, .it termed the fundamen- tal "problems-an end to United States a ression and the total i1 4 United States troops-ilk ss"Clv yie!!-i .. 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 A ,ppo~y,ecj For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 August 1969 CPYRGHT LAND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA Peru's Land Reform Law On 24 June President Velasco of Peru announced major land reforms that provided for expropriation and redistribution of all major landholdings in Peru, including those owned by U.S. companies. Under the new decree land holdings will be limited, thereby doing away with the large holdings of the wealthy and the extremely small plots worked by peasants. The maximum size for privately owned lands will range from about 75 acres in the mountain and jungle areas to approximately 370 acres in the coastal areas and up to 3700 acres for natural pasture lands. New, small landowners will be en- couraged to join in cooperatives. Large estates will continue to operate as units, but estate workers will share ownership and control. Only two days after the program was announced, the government started taking over the vast holdings of W. R. Grace and Company of New York, These plantations, which will be operated as cooperatives, produce about 17 per cent of Peru's sugar. Since officials of the company have been assured that fair compensation will be made for the expropriated property and that other industrial operations will not be affected, the company has announced its support for the reforms. The Peruvian government has promised compensation for the expropriated property, partly by paying in cash and partly by issuing 20-year non-trans- ferable bonds for the land; the bonds may then be exchanged for shares in new industrial investments provided shares of equal value are purchased for cash. Both skepticism and apprehension have been expressed as to the underlying motives of the military regime in announcing such sweeping reforms, as well as to the indications of other extensive and radical changes to be made in the entire economic and social structure of the country. Land Reform Elsewhere in Latin America, The problems created by land ownership in Latin America are well known and are not unique to Peru. Although redistribution of the land, such as outlined by the Peruvian government, is important in any program of land reform, it is only one aspect of the problem. Other questions include the use made of the land -- whether it is cultivated or lies fallow; the nature of land tenure -- whether farm workers are held in near-serfdom or live in independence and dignity; the education and social welfare of the peasants which, if increased, would help to close the great gap which separates them from the small ruling elite; the development of unsettled or under-developed land; and increase in agricultural production, both for domestic consumption and for export. The goals are therefore both social and economic, with the ultimate effect of restructuring the social, economic and political life of a major part of the nation. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 CPYRG A proved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Although it has taken many years to reach a national consensus in each country on the d sirability and nature of such reforms, these goals are now codified in reform laws in practically every Latin American country. A few countries started their reform programs years ago, with Mexico as the best known example. However, it has been mainly in the past decade that most countries have passed laws to promote reform. The impetus which led to their adoption came partly from a slowly developed recognition of the problem and its solution, and partly from encouragement by international agencies such as the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization. But the decisive push has come from violent protest by the peasants: invasions of private and public lands by peasants determined on reform or revolution. In general, however, significant action on agrarian reform laws has not been taken because of a variety of factors: Often proposed reform has been too broad in scope; instead of focusing on a few key issues, it has tried to change the rural tenure pattern, economy, society and technology of the country all at once. Inaction has also resulted from a lack of funds, as reform has frequently foundered on the financial inability of a government to provide the necessary capital to facilitate and accelerate reform. Finally, it must be acknowledged that in many cases inaction has been mainly because of a temporary lessening of pressure from disgruntled peasants. This respite, in turn, is due to various factors, including the failure of Castroism in Latin America, the pitiful example of Communist directed agriculture in Cuba, the time needed to digest the partial gains already made, and the hope raised by the passage of new reform laws in numerous countries. However, the respite will undoubtedly be brief it rapid and tangible progress is not made in carrying out the promises of the reform laws. The population explosion in Latin America will double in twenty-five years the number of peasants seeking land -- but the amount of arable land can-.. not be doubled. The rapidly growing population will also urgently need food to eat, which can be produced only as a result of a revolution in the agricultural methods of the continent. Adding to these problems, improved communcatio'ns'and rising.literacy'levels will make the peasants ever more conscious of the social and economic inequities they suffer and of the promises of extremists to eliminate them. Approved For Release 1999/09/92 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 Ap~~ elease'IJ99/Q9~02 : CIA-RDP70-01194A000500080001-3 26 June 1959 LIMA, Peru, June 25 (AP)- The Government of President Juan Velasco Alvarado today announced the details of Peru s sweeping new land reform law. It limits the size of land holdings, strengthens small and medium landholders and opens a way for the conversion tiof large landholdings that produce crops used by industry into co- operatives. General Velasco said that the law would be applied without favor to particular groups, and that it would "end once and for all the unfair social order that has kept_ peasants in pover,t The expropriated 'lands will e sold to cooperatives, peasant ommunities, agricultural so- ieties of social interest and Vela,own A warts Land Re hrm Will Be Applied Without Favor Crowds In the 'Plaza ;de Armas at the Presidential ce sang songs and danced: Es - t night when the President tlttid !the lands will be for "'the peasants." They shouted Br vnl Braavnl" wham hp 4n. es no longer would be callod unities." vtl AmericanConcerns Affecte4n The law will involve the ex- propriation of foreign - held ands, including holdings of tie merican-owned Cerro do Pasc'p fining concern and W.. R race & Co., which has sugar r The complex law estabiishe Government bond issue for onds along with cash pay rents as compensation fort ver. Cattle and agricultural l ash up to a certain vilue,' ith the balance of the spay ent in the Government bgpds. Bonds that the Government a made in cash, The Gov@ - o construct the respective co- ollectively _ to groups _. of ersons previously judged ualified. Lapd can be granted Price Will Fidetuate ` ' The price of each grant will be made through a buy-sell contract, with right of eminent domain for a prico that will be . fixed, according , to, the. economic capacity of the agri-', cultural unit that receives the grant. The sale price will be paid in 20 annual quotas, be- ginning with the date the land is awarded. .To be considered for a family plot, a peasant must be a citizen of. Peru, 18 years or older, head of the family, a peasant without land and a resident in the area. The Government will give, technical and credit assistance with priority to cooperatives, peasant communities and agri- cultural societies, which ' also will be given preference in direct export of their produc. tion to the foreign markets that pay the best prices, once national needs have been satis- The average minimum plot uovernment said. - Industrial agrarian - prop- erties-defined as agricultural an industry--will not be divided or separated under the law, but rather will be operated as units organization , of big landlards, tense campaign by television to stop the implementation of the reform, to halt sales of ag- ricultural products to creata a shortage, to start strikes against production and market- ing, to block roads with the aim of disturbing transporta- tion and to request support of sugar workers to cooperate in sabotage. The society rejected the Gov- ernment's accusation saying it strongly protested "these state- ments lacking in wldsom and seriousness." ', r A Correction The International Basic Econ? omy Corporation does not ex- peet to be affected by the Peruvian Government's agrar- ianreform bill, spokesmen for the company said yesterday. It was erroneously reported ,In 'he New York Times yes terday that the agrarian re- forrh measures ? outlined - by Por4's military junta Tuesday Would Involve properties owned by" 1.B.E.C., a New York con- corgl, `Ije spokesmen said that the Company's Interests In Peru Cons tft of an insurance concern, a poultry-breeding operation,! housing developments (which are sold with the land beneath' them to the public) and a super- market chain. . , , "Neither operation Involves any appreciable amount of lat-'d," the spokesmen said, "and th refore we do not expect to 1 `affected by the agrarian re- !f measure." Rj To. company has long been 'ss 014ated with the Rockefeller family. - which.. creatod, th works'=wide ' organization toj stimulate development of oor- er economies. i-fowevor, it Is now a publicly owned concern 'in which Governor Rockefeller' Owns "less than'one-half of 1 per dent of thO shnr, o144-the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 CF WASHINGTON POST 25 June 1969 Peru o eize . J.S.-O tvned . erties LIMA, June 24 (UPI)--The Peruvian government an- inounced today it will expro- priate all major? land tracts now privately owned and di- vide, them among the people,1 including vast lands owned by such U.S. investors as the W. R. Grace Co., and New York Gov. Nelson A. Rocke feller. President Juan Vclasoo AI- yarado promised '"just com- pensation" for all land-hold- ers, foreign and Peruvian, whose properties will be turn- ed over to the peasantry under an agrarian land re- form. ? . . Velasca announced the.gen?` eral objectives of the land reform program that will af- fect millions of dollars worth, vian-held prope*ty in a na- tionwide television address.. His voice repeptedly broke. with emotion. H s immediate audience at the !Presidential' Palace interrupted his speech with applause anti shouts of ;'Bravo!" -and "Viva, land re- form L' The land reform law, Vetas.i co said, "will Pe . applied,! throughout the corn try, with-. out privileges and wwith no ex6 ceptions. Only in (his' manner will a coherent agricultural development be possible." This made it clear that all of the major U.S. Investors in Peru would feel the' bite of~ the reform law, a development Which swept far beyond even the most pessimistic predic- tions of diplomatic observers] he. , : ; [Under Peru's, previous , agrarian reform' law, the Ve-, lasco government earlier ex,I propriated agricultural land: holdings of the Cerro Corp.,, a U.S-based firm engaged' chiefly In mining. The come) pany did 'not oppose the move,? Last October, 'the govern ' ment seized the properties of. the International . Petroleum Co., a subsidiary of. Standard Oil of New Jersey, without! compensation.' Peru maintain-., ed that IPC had never legally, owned Its Peruvian' oilfields; "and' therefore owed the Kpv ift ,'ernment about $690 milliolf, ?pant profits. `~. The United States resp ,ed to the seizure lyy.suspen ng economic aid to Peru, share of the U.S. sugar impor4u? marker. It has postponed ful``h":.` -Cancellation 'of these Items un' _j til August, in hopes a settle ment can be reached between' Peru and IPC. . Relations we r e further ,worsened by Peru's seizure of. S. fishing boats in waters Mk sclaims are under Its sovereign-, :ty. The United States recog-" -nizes only a 12-mile '.: limpit,j " against the Peruvian claim to ?200 miles, and has cut off arms f.;; sales to Peru in retaliation for!,!" .the seizures. Among the U.S. firms stand? ' ing to be hit hardest by the new law is the Grace 'Co., ,which apparently will lose its vast sugar plantations at Para monga and Cartavio. Diplo- matic sources said the Grace 4holdings "will . be, in the. mll ?lions of dollars." 1 -About 40,per cent'of Peru's -sugar productionls estimated come' from U.S.-owned. plan- stations.,' .w, 500080001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 FROM: AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA Editor:. T. Lynn Smith Publisher: Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1965 BIBLIOGRAPHY The titles in this bibliography have been carefully selected Even though they total slightly more than i 50, they repre- sent merely a small fraction of the items thoroughly perti-, nent to the subject ' that might have been included. Such a list seems especially short if it is compared with those in the" two most comprehensive bibliographies in the field, one ed itkd by Accioly Borges and the .other compiled and edited by., Ca'iroll,'.which contain 1,164'and 1,072 items, respectively.: Moreover, the titles included here are by no means limited.: to those given in these two excellent sources. In determining specifically which publications to include, out of the welter of possibilities, there were many complex- ities to be faced and many decisions, some of them rather. arbitrary, to be taken. Perhaps ,a -brief mention of some of the basic criteria used and of exceptions made will enable the reader to evaluate more adequately the results of the en- deavor. First, it was considered essential to give preference to items that may be said to have professional standing represented by the books, monographs, and articles in rcc ognized journals in such fields as economics, history, geog- raphy, and sociology-over those that appeared in newspapers. or in popular magazines, or the many that have been circu- lated. merely in mimeographed form. Next, it was thought preferable to concentrate largely upon publications of a substantative nature, to which the reader might go for additional analysis and description of problems and programs, rather than to use much of the space for bibli- ographies, guides; and other aids to research. The two most recent and comprehensive bibliographies were included, how- ever, because they are lists that greatly surpass and outmode all earlier compilations. Because the bulk of the pertinent material is of recent. .-origin, a preference was. given to studies published since 1950. Nevertheless, an intensive search was made for earlier background materials, and a considerable number of the .more significant early items was included. Likewise, despite'. the fact that much of what has been published on the sub-;, ject of agrarian reform in Latin America deals. with matters in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia (for which Carroll includes 184, 1o6, and 75 titles, respectively, in contrast with only 4 for the Dominican Republic and 7 for Panama), an attempt was made to represent all of the widely divergent sections of Latin America. It was assumed that most of those who read this volume :;will find additional reading on the subject of agrarian reform Z,more accessible and more useable if the materials are in Eng= dish. Therefore, in this bibliography preference was, given to books, monographs, and. articles. written in .that language-.',,, Even' so, however, the predominance of those who write in t Spanish or Portuguese, among those who have made funda-` ., mental contributions to the exposition of matters related to agrarian reform in Latin America, is so great that approxj t matcly two-thirds of all the items In our list are available only In ono or the other of these languages. Finally, particular attention was given to the inclusion in this compilation of titles to works by Latin American econ'., mists, historians, geographers, and sociologists who have es'. ` tablishcd enviable reputations for competency in their rc spective fields, and to works by their fellows in the United States and Europe whose; names have come to figure promi- nently in the study of Latin-American peoples and societies: In conclusion it shoyld be indicated that many of the books in our list thpms4ves contain substantial and selected ''- bibliographies relating tb land tenure and the size of ogri- eultaral holdings, to t ie highly institutionalized and '4'.r% the soil in parts of Latin America, to locality groupingo~ lid ` community organization and development, and to other n ~'mf ters closely related to agrarian reform in the area under cc ; sideration. In this respect the books by such authors as Fa Gorda, Fernandez y Fernandez; Ford, IIom e, Leonard, M& Bride, Mendieta y' Nuncz, Nelson, Senior, Smith, C. G ::. Accioly Borges, Pompeu, red., Bibliografia s6bre Reformd Agrdria. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto dc Cicncias Sociaj, Universidade dc Brasil, r96z. F , Acci6n Sindical Chilena, Tierra y Libertad por la Re form Agraria. Santiago: Acci6n Sindical Chilena, 1961. .. Adams, Richard N., "FrcFdorn and Reform in Rural X)aln! America," in Frederic B. Pike, cd.,, Freedom and Re f ohit in Latin America. Notre Dame, Ind,: University of No(re.:.~. Dame Press, 1959, PP- 7.03-7.30. ?Aguilez Berlioz, Rodolfo,' Rdgirnes Agrarios. Guatem44 % I'allcres de la Tipografia National dc Guatemala, 1g5,.,:,l Alexander, Robert J., "Agrarian Reform in Latin Amcnca Foreign Affairs, Vol. No. i (October, 1967.), pp 191-7.07.,w The Bolivian National Revolution. New Brunswick,' N.J.: Rutgers. University Press, 1958. Antczana, E. Luis, Resultados de la Refornta Agraria en Bolivia. Cochabamba; F. O. Cuenca Sucs., 1955. Arze-Lourciro, Eduardo, Actitudes Sociales Rclacionadas con la Refornta Agraria en Bolivia. (Mimeographed). Ca-` racas: Escucla dc Ciencias Econ6micas, Unisversidad Cc-F:. tral do Venezuela, 1958. Baldcrrinta G., Adalid, La Iteforma Agraria' y is Experict r: t cia Boliviana. La Paz: Editorial dcl Estado, 19 S9. Barbero; Guiseppe, "Realizaciones y Problcmas de In Re- forma Agraria en Bolivia:" El Trimestre Econdmico (Mexico), Vol. XXVIII, No; ;4 (Octubre-Dicicnmbre; {. 1961), pp. 6 i a-65o. Barros, IIcnriquc dc, A` Estrutura Agrdria come Obstdculo rI ASdo Agron6mica; a Re forma Agrdria coma Problenla Econ6mico, Sao Paulo: Escola do Sociologia c Politica, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA= tI I.9-01194A00050008000'1-3 I3auta, Juan F,, "Posibilidadci Constitucionales: y Legi]es do 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3 la Redistribuci6n de Tierras en America Latina." Revista x Interamcricana de Ciencias Sociales, Vol. 2, No. 1 " the Prime Rlinister of Cuba, 1959? (1963), pp, 5-28. ' Dclgado, Oscar, "La Rcforma Agraria: America Latina Frente Bernhard, Guillermo, La Reforma Agraria en.los Poises a su Destino." Cuadernos (Paris), Na 53 (1961),pp?y Latinoamericanos. Montevideo: Imprenta Garcia, 1962 55 67? Beyer, Robert Carlyle, "Land Distribution and Tenure in "Revolution, Reform, Conservatism: Three Types of Colombia." journal of Inter-American Studies (Gaines Agrarian Structure." Dissent; Vol, IX, No. 4 (aa96a), pp. ville, Fla.), Vol. 111, No. 2 (April, 1961), pp, z81.29o. 350'363? , Bonilla, Frank, "Rural Reform in Brazil." Dissent, Vol. IX, De Young, Maurice, Man and Laud in` the Haitian. Eccn+ No. 4 (1962), pp. 373-38x? omy. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 3958. Brazil, Comisslo Nacional de Polltlca Agraria, Reforms Di6gues, Manuel, Jr., "Anteccdentes da Rcfornna Agraria no " Agrdria no Brasil, Estudos e Projectos. Rio de Janeiro: 'Editora e Grafica Guarany Ltda., 1956. Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, "Tensoes Sociais no Campo e Reforma Agraria." Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pol#ti i z (Octnher_ 1n61) _ nn_ ?7-26. cos. No . or "' "?6"""'~`? ` Duran Marco Antonio Del A rarismo a la Rcrol i6n' Aires: Edit. Asociaci6n Argentina por la Libertad de la ` g A l l Me i T Cultura, 1961. Carroll, Thomas F., "The Land Reform Issue in Latin America," in Albert O. Hirschman, ed., Latin American Issues. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. ???--- Land Tenure and Land Reform in Latin America: A. Selected Bibliography (Regimen, de Tierras y Reforma., Agraria en America Latina; una Bibliogra f is Anotada de Brasil, Cuadernos Brasileiros (Rio de Janeiro), Anq V,:, No.4 (Julho-Agosto, 1963), PP- 51-54 `.. i Populacdo a Propricdade da Terra no Brasil. Wash ington, D. C.: Pan A9ncrican Union, 1959. Duarte, Nestor, Reforma Agraria. Rio do Janeiro: Scnico gr co o. x co: allcres Graficos de ]a Nacibn, 947, --- "LaRcforrna Agraria en Cuba." Et Trimestrd`Eco. ndrnico (Mexico), Vol. XXVII, No. 107 (1960), pp. 410-469. Los Sofismas de la Reforma Agraria. Mexico: Liga de Agr6nomos.Socialistas, 1q;q. Cardcter Selectivo). Washington, D. C.: Inter-American; " versity of Minnesota Press, 1961. . Development Bank, 1962. . Escobar, Romulo, El Problema Agrario. El Paso: Imprenti ed L, Cr?acio . d, Nuevas U.#.4-des A r#coIdc ?, g Juarez, 1915. (Informe del II Seminario Latino-Americano sobre Pro- . Fals Borda, Orlando, El Hombre y la Tierra on Boyacd: blemas de la Tierra, Montevideo). Santiago: Regional Of- fice for Latin America of the Food and Agriculture Or Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Primer Seminario de Ia Reforma Agraria. Cuadcrnos 1, 2, 3, and 4. Bogota: Ccn tro de Investigaciones Sociales, 1963 and. 1964. Cleofas, Joao, Reforma Agraria no Brasil. Recife: Institutor Joaquim Nabuco de Pesquisas Sociais, 1960. Colombia, Ministerio de Agricultura, Reforma Social. Agraria. Bogota: Imprenta Nacional,. 1961 ? Conforti, Emilio A., Colonizaci6n, Reforma Agraria, Mi graciones Internas. Quito: Junta Nacional de Planifica-' rConselho Superior das Classes Produtoras, Reforma Agraria FemSndcz y Fernandez, Ram6n, "La Reforma Agraria Mex.' Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Conselho Superior das Classes icana: Logros y Problemas Dcrivados. ? Bolet#n de Estu- Produtoras, 1g6o. dios Especiales (I116xico: Banco Nacional de Credito Eji- Cook, Hugh L., "The New Agrarian Reform Law and Eco- dal), Vol. VIII, No. 93 (July, 1957), PP 211-2Z0. . ` nomic Development in Venezuela." Land Economics Reforma Agraria en Venezuela, Caracas: Las Novo (Madison, Wisconsin) Vol. XXXVII, No. i (February? ? dadcs, 1948- 1961), pp? 5-17 ------ "Reforma Agraria en el Ecuador.?i El Trim?stre Eca Cordero Michel, Jos6 Ram6n E., "Datos sobre la Reforma ndmicb (Mexico), Vol. XXVII' (4), No, .11x (Octubrc-; Agraria Republica Dominicana." Caribbean Studies Diciembre, 1961), pp, 569-594? (Puerto, Rico), Vol. II, No. i (April, 1962), pp. 23-33?; Econom#a Agricola y Reforma Agraria. Mexico: Cen-' Corvalan, Luis, Cosas Nuevas on el Campo. Santiago tro de Estudios Monctarios Latinoamericanos, Grafica= (Chile) : Imprcnta Lautaro, 1960 (?). Panamcricana, 1962. Cone inho Cavalcinti, Urn Projeto de Reforma Agrdria. Rio ~--- "Land Tenure in Mexico", journal of Farm Eco- c1 Janeiro lnslituto Nacional do Livro 1 nomiea Vol. XXV, No. i (February1943) PP? 219'x34? 2 vols , , 959 , a Ct s1ey, J. C., "Agrariann Reform in Latin America." The rerragut, Castro, "La Reforma Agraria Boliviana: Sus Ante-' rrrbaak of World Affairs,, Londoln:.Stcvcns and Sons cedcntes,.Fundamcntos, Aplicacioncs y-Rcsultados. Re-' Bases Socio-Histdricas pars una Reforma Agraria. Bogota: Edicioncs Documentos Colombianos, 1957. 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