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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
LE MONDE,
24 May 1969
?Cate-il'ivoire
IOUS LES DIPLOMATES
EN POSTE A MOSCOU
CPYT6411TAPPE1ES A ABIDJAN ,
McNeil, 21 mai D ,
? T01.16'1014 mombros do l'ArniMil-
Bade de COte-d'Ivoire a Moscou
ont ete rappeles a, Abidjan sans,
qu'aucune explication ait ete
fournle jusqu'ici par le gouver-
nement ivoirien. L'ambassadeur,
M. Deals Cali Bile, a quitte la
capitale sovietique jeudi et de-
Vail etre suivi par les cinq autres
membres de l'ambassade.
[La Clite-d'Ivoire et PU.R.S.S. ont
none en 1967 des relations diploma-
tiques qui no se sont guere epa.
noutes et qui, a Poccaston, That
mettle manqu?e chaleur. Des pole.,
miqus ont &late a plusicurs re-
lit" prises entre les autorites ivoiriennes
,et la presse sovletique. La ? Pravda ?
et les ? Izvestia ? ont particular?.
meat critique la politique de Ube-.
ralisme economique , du gouverne.
ment ivoirien.]
LE MONDE,
1-2 June 1969
Rupture
,entre la Ciite-divoire
it .l'Union: soyiotiqu.
cpyRGHT
%Se
Le dialogue entre Abidjan at
Moscou n'aura guere dare que disc-
halt
,
mois. Les autorites .1voirien-
.nes, qui. avaient attendu sept ans
apres In proclamation de linde-
pendance de leur pays pour etablir
,des relations diplomatiques avec
rUnion soyietique, vienrient de les'
rompre. M. Usher Assouan, minis-
tre ivoirien des affaires etrange..!
res, a cenvoque le charg?'affaires
d'U,R.S.S. 4 Abidjan an cours de
la matinee de vendredi pour lui
signifier cette decision et lui pre-
ciser que le personnel de rambas-1
sada sovietique devrait avoir quitte
la capitate avant dimanche soir.
L'initiative ivoirienne etait at-!
tendue. En effet, ii y a une. hui-1
taine de jours, la mission diploma-
tique de Cote-d'Ivoire a, Moscou
avail ete rappelee 4 Abidjan. Sans
qu'aucune raison alt, de part et
d'autre; officiellement ete donnee
cc depart, on rinterpretait comme
une des consequences de. la crise
universitaire qui sevit lx. Abidjan.?
Approved For Releas
CPYRGHT
Commentant 'cotta ens?, M. Tace,
president de l'Assemblee nationale,
? ecretaire general du parti unique,
avail accuse 4t certaans etrangers
dont il n'avdit pas precise la na-
1 ionalite, d'avoir indult les eta-
diants ivoiriens en erreur. A cotta
..alccasiona avail declare M. .1/ace,
nous denims a, quiconque le
drolt do voldoir inonIquor 11 no.
? nfants les doctrines de tous ordres
n vigueur ailleura que chez nous
4 t contrairea auxrealites de ,chez
nous
Fondateur et animateur thi Ra5,7
? emblement demacratique africain
M. Houphouet-Boigny,
gut fit durant quelques annees
oute commune avec le parti com-
aauniste franca's, an moment oil
'ouvrait In premiere phase de de-
olonisation du continent noir, se
ignale depuis une vingtaine d'an-
sees par an anticommunism? via
aiureux.' Chef de file des_ Etat4
inembres de l'Organisation ..com-
mune africaine et malgache, qui
yegroupe les pays e modores
trAfrique, ii partage -stir ce point
?ies convictions de piusieurs de ses
ollegues de l'O.C.A.M., dont M.
Tsiranana, president de.
in Republique malgache.
sanquiete a Abidjan de rin-
luence rine les diplomates sovieti-
Rues auraient tente d'exereer sur
hi partie de la jeunesse qui se
zuontre reservie a, l'egard du gou-
wernement de M. Houphouet-Bol-..
any. Mais on assiste surtout avec
4mpatience ?raccroissement de
7'activito politique de l'U.R.S.Si
dans tout le golf e du Benin.
nlantation a Lagos et a. Kano de
.echniciens sovietiques charges
d'assurer l'entretien des Mig ven4
dus an gouvemement nigerian,
a recent? visite d'amitie d'une
escacire sovietlque dans la capitale
sin Nigeria, ont amene la Cote-
d'Ivoire et l'Union sovietique a
'affronter indirectement en ter-.
.1toire nigerian. En effet, nul
nagnore plus le role important que
,e president de in Republique ivoi-
Jenne joue dans le conflit nigero-
biafrais. Son action personnelle a'
ieaucoup pese, semble-t-il, dans
a decision prise par la France
d'intervenir aliscretement aux cotes.
.les Biafrais dans in lutte qu'ils
inenent depuis deux ans contra les,
autorites de Lagos.
?
En prenant rinitiative. d'une
-upture, les dirigeants ivoiriens
?ent sans doute voulu trouver un
.'esponsable d e a tensions q u
:,.prouvent depuis pres d'un an leur
pays. Comme le Senegal, comma
e Dahomey, la Cote-d'Ivoire est
'en effet sournise a de sourds cou-
-ants d'opposition aux quo Is
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CPYRGHT
M. Bouphouet-Boigny est jusqu'i
present habilement parvenu a faire
face sans en trionmher totale-
ment. Au derneurant, ni les Boyle-
solidement installes au Ni-
geria, ni les Ivoirlans, resolurnent
deold6s poursuivre leur polltique
de cooperation avert les puissarr-
ces occidentales, no devraiont path'
gravement de la rupture randue
publique vendredi.
LE MONDE,
3 June 1969
Ceete-d'Ivoire
PMPtE DE L'UNIVERSITE
LrbIABIDJAN
, Al.adjaq, 2 juin r
? M. Felix nouphouet-Boigny, pre-
sident de la Cote-d'Ivoire, a decide
de ? pardonner aux etudiants
contestataires o et de rouvrir
runiversite de la capitale et les
grandes ecoles. S'adressant a plu-
? sieurs dizaines de milliers de per-
sonnes au eta-dc d'Abicljan,
M. Houphougt-Boigny a declare
samedi : ?A tous nous accordons
le pardon de la Cote-d'Ivoire. Les
etudiants egares viennent de re-
' connaitre leurs erreurs, de regret-
? ter leurs actes, d'implorer le par-
don... La Cate-d'Ivoire etant an
pays de liberte et d'amour fra-
ternel, 11 no saurait y avoir de
detenus politiques. ?
? Le president s'est declare ? terri-
blement degu? par le comporte-
merit de certains etudiants, qu'il
a qualifies de ? trublions ?, mais
qui, a-t-il dit, ne sont qu'une
?poignee d'extremistes ?.
Evoquant le ? dechainement de
?mine et de jalousie dans cer-
tains pays qui souhaitent notre
malheur ?, M. Houphouet-Boigny
a declare: ? Nous no souhaitons
de mal a personne, mals ceux qui
nous le souhaient ront 4 leur
porte. ?
L'ancien ambassadeur de Cote-
d'Ivoire en U.R.S.S. assistait au
meeting, ma's aucune allusion n'a
ate faite a la recente rupture des
relations diplomatiques ent re
Abidjan et Moscou. L'ambassade
d'Algerie a Abidjan a ete chargee
de representer les interets de
JU.R.S.S. en Ceite-d'Ivoire.
194A000500090001-2
DIFFICULT RELATIONS BeRVRIGIAT USSR AND THE IVORY COAST
CPXPISIATASiat?r3KM$6199M,Q9/OiiirRDP-7-9-e1-1-94A000500090001- -2
r -
Phe announcement of the decision by the
re).
Ivory Ooast to break diplomatic r_lations with thp TIRRIR cilrpriced
no one in Abidjan where, since the start of the recent university crisis,
rumors on this subject have been circulating with insistance. They have
never been confirmed nor denied.
On 27 May the political bureau of the government party, the PDCI,
(The Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast) stated, a propos of this crisis,
"we have proof that certain foreigners have led our children into error.
These foreigners will draw little benefit from their activity because we
deny anyone the right to interfere in our affairs. We deny to anyone the
right to want to inculcate in our children doctrines of all types in prac-
tice elsewhere other than in our country and contrary to realities here.
Although not aiming especially at anyone, these accusations were in-
terpreted as being addressed to the USSR. Four days earlier the Ivory
Coast ambassador to Moscow, M. Denis Coffi Bile and embassy personnel had
in effect left the Soviet capital for Abidjan without giving any particu-
lar reason to explain their sudden departure.
So it was in 1966 during the climate of detente between East and West
that the Ivory Coast and the USSR established diplomatic relations.
But 2 months after his arrival in Moscow in September 1968, M. Denis
Coffi Bile handed the press a violent reply to an Izvestia article which
reproached the Ivory Coast in equally violent terms for opting in favor of
the capitalist system. Previously, an article of the same tone had appeared
in Pravda provoking a spirited reaction from the PDCI.
The deterioration of Ivoirian-Soviet relations became further pro-
nounced following the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops which
was denounced in Abidjan in particularly strong terms.
Finally, the opposing positions taken by Moscow and Abidjan in the
Nigerian-Biafran conflict -- the former siding wholeheartedly with Lagos
and the latter recognizing Biafra as independent and sovereign -- was to
widen the gulf between the two countries still further.
Observers in Abidjan note also the publication on 22 May by the Soviet
Press Agency, Novosti, -- three days after the outbreak of the university
crisis -- of a long article concerning the "Ivoirian.Experience".
In this article of a particularly harsh tone the Soviet agency wrote:
"The puppet Ivoirian regime, already sold, body and soul to imperialism,
is meddling in the internal affairs of its neighbors by launching clan-
destine attacks against legitimate governments". And so the Ivory Coast
was accused of being responsible for the coup d'etat in Mali against the
regime of Modibo Keita.
"Novosti" also accused the Ivory Coast of being "imperialism's main
arm destined to exploit the Nigerian crisis and cause the rupture of the
unity of African countries". "The relations between the Ivory Coast and
Biafran rebels", the Soviet agency added, "only help imperialism which
has always been seeking to dominate Nigeria".
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ne 1941
CPYR
gitIN KIRKMAN
Sheldon said. He views recent Russian rendez-
CrIelesno-1-/nutned Celenre WrItoe
Apollo 11's scheduled July 20 moon landing
is virtually certain to win for the U.S. the
'eight-year moon race Russia is about to lose
because it made two monumental "tactical er-
rors" and discovered its space technology
couldn't keep pace with the U.S. ?
That's hOW space experts here view the race
.that apparently will end when astronauts Neil
'Armstrong and Edwin E. (Buzz) Aldrin Jr.,
plant the Stars and Stripes on the lunar sur-
face. .
The world will never know with certainty
what difficulties plagued the Russians' moon
program. But U.S. experts think they efred
, tactically in their choice of techniques and by
underspending.
/ The Library of Congress' veteran Russia
watcher 'Dr. Charles Sheldon believes the So-
viets' first and primary error was simply
choosing the wrong road to a lunar landing.
This decision was made in the early 1960s at
the end of a great international debate over
which was the safest method to go to the moon
and back. This controversy was so vitriolic in
the U.S., for example, it caused bitter argu-
ment, in public, between rocket developer Dr.
Wernher Von Braun and President Kennedy's
science adviser, Dr. Jerome Wiesner:
Dr. Von Braun espoused a seemingly compli-
cated three-stage moonship that would launch
a moon' landing team from a spaceship orbit-
ing the moon, while Dr. Wisener argued vigo-
rously for a technique that would hve launched
the landing team from a module that would
have remained in earth orbit.
The argument waxed so hot that Dr. Von
Braun and Dr. Wiesner staged a furious shout-
ing match at Huntsville, Ala., while an embar-
rassed President Kennedy looked on in amaze- \
ment. Dr. Von Braun's viewpoint eventually
' was accepted, of course, and became the now
familiar Apollo. ?
Dr. Sheldon believes there is evidence the
always-conservative Russians opted for a third
moon-landing technique that seemed simple at
first glance, but in practice turned out to be
too much for their technology.
BIG SPACE BASE _
The heart of the Russian moon landing sys-
tem apparently is a large space base orbiting
'near the earth that conld be used as a launch
pad for their moonships.
" Unfortunately for the Russians; rendezvous-
ing and linking a space station's pieces in orbit
requires the kind of precise maneuvering that
only high-grade electronics, sophisticated com-
puters and excellent communications can pro-
yetis ineLAC,..VCC3 Ct 1 their Sop..z 4 sad Zon.r.
5 spaceships, however, as signs the Russians
at last are ready to push ahead.
The Russians, then, may begin assembling
their giant space base some time this year,
most probably this summer, Dr. Sheldon said.
But the base probably will go slowly and the
Russians may not be able to land men on the
moon until 1971 or 1972.
The other big Russian mistake on the road
to the moon apparently was made in 1963 or
1964 when they chose not to invest rubles in a
space program similar to the two-man Gemini
flights the U.S. conducted in 1965 and 1966.
National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) expert Pitt G. Thome believes it's
-
clear Gemini was the turning point in the
great U.S.-Soviet space race.
Before the U.S. started flying ita. Gemini
spaceships, Russia's manned space dominance
was unquestioned thruout the world. From 1961
thru 1965, their Vostok and Voshkod spaceships
and cosmonauts flew rings around the U.S.
and scored one triumph after another.
During this period, the Russians orbited the
first space man (Yuri Gagarin), the first
space woman (Valentina Tereslikova), the
first two-man and three-man space crews and,
the first spaceships to fly in formation. Rus-
sians also awed the world with the first
l'spacewalk" and set the record for most or-
bits and most days in space (81 orbits in five
days).
While this was occurring U.S. spacemen con-
tinually were too little and too late. The first
U.S. astronaut to venture into space (Alan
Shepard, 1961) did so five weeks after Mr.
Gagarin and even then didn't go into orbit.
The first U.S. spaceman to complete one orbit
(John Glenn, 1962) trailed Mr. Gagarin by 10
months and by that time another Russian had
circled the world 17 times.
GAP WIDENS
The gap between the U.S. and Russia ? wid-
duce. ened in 1963 and 1964 with the high-flying Rus-
And Russian progress in these vital areas sians setting all the previously mentioned rec-
"has been so_slow it_surprised evervioile " ords, In contrast the best the U.S. could mus
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CPYRGHT
ter was a one-dor space flight (Gordon Coop-
er, 1963) at the tag end of its "Mercury" space
program.
Then, in classic tortoise-and-hare fashion,
the Russians inexplicably stopped launching
' spaceships in the spring of 1965. For two years
no Ittiosian orbited the earth.
It was at precisely this moment the U.S.
.launched its first two-man Gemini capsule.
For two years, while the Russians stood on the
'sidelines, 10 consecutive Gemini space ships
blasted off from cape Kennedy, each one car-
rying out a mission more difficult than the'
'last.
, In rapid succession, U.S. astronauts learned
to work and walk in space, zoom from one
orbit to another, rendezvous and fly spaceships
in formation, dock with rocket stages, live in
weightlessness for up to two weeks, and land
so accurately their splashdowns could be seen
on worldwide television.
"Gemini put us ahead," Mr. Thome said.
'"We learned most of the things we needed to
know to go to the moon during Gemini."
Dr. Sheldon pinpoints the flights of Gemini 6
and Gemini 7 in December 1965 as the turning
point in the U.S.-Russian moon race. In a
bril-
liant display of daring and space maneuvering,
,Geminis 6 and 7 flew nose to nose within one
? foot of each other, proving U.S, astronauts
could fly spaceships with incredible accuracy.
r As a bonus, Gemini 7 completed 220 orbits
during 14 days, smashing the Soviets' proudest
space record.
MUTUAL DISASTERS
Both nations suffered space disasters in 1967
the U.S. losing astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed-
ward White and Roger Chaffee in the disas-
trous Cape Kennedy launch-pad fire that gut-
ted the first Apollo moonship, and the Rus-
sians in April when cosmonaut Vladimir Ko-
marov was killed in the crash of Russia's new
Soyuz 1 spaceship.
? In retrospect, the Russian disaster apparent-
ly was the more technically crippling. It took
c. them 18 precious months to correct their
spaceship's deficiencies, extending the Rus-
. sians' absence from space to more than three-
and-one-half years..
Thus, it wasnt until last October that the
Russians could get back into space with Soyuz
3 and they found they must master most of the
space lessons the U.S. learned during Gemini.
The Gemini experience, then, is the reason
the U.S. was able to make such enormous
_ strides after NASA last fall declared the Apol-
lo moonship repaired and ready to go again.
In rapid succession, four Apollos have per-
,formed with near perfection in the last eight
months and Apollos 8 and 10 blazed the path to
the moon for those who will follow in Ap )110 11.
What the Russians will do if Apollo 11 ends
the moon race is uncertain. A National Aero.
nautics and Space Council expert thinks the
blow to their pride may be so severe they may
_ forego mending men to the moon 'Junta the
U.S. suffers another space disaster."
Dr. Sheldon, on the other hand, sees an or-
derly Russian moon program consisting of the
flight of an unmanned spaceship to the moon
this year, construction of the Russians' space
base, and a manned landing in 1971 or. 1972.
NASA expert Thome has a third view that
predicts the Russians will swallow their pride
and send men to a lunar landing this fall in a
surprise maneuver that would see the Rus-
sians flying direct from the earth to the moon
and back without using a space base.
HOPE FOR U.S. FAILURE
Mr. Thame belives the Russians have a vig-
orous moon landing program and still are root-
ing for the U.S. to fall flat on its space face in
the next four weeks.
He makes much of the fact that the Russians
purchased more than 3,100 moon pictures from
NASA last year ? photographs better than
anything the Russians were able to take with
their unmanned Luna spaceships.
These pictures, Thome feels, are being used
by the Russians to pick sites for moon land-
ings and possibly to select locations for perma-
nent manned lunar bases.
The very fact that the Russians were forced
to come to the U.S. for the pictures empha-
sizes the technological gap the Russians have
faced in their moon race with the U.S., he
added.
Like their poor moon pictures, Russian
space equipment has been crude and the re-
sults have showed it Said Mr. Thome:
"Many of the Soviet space flights have been.
scientifically useless becasue their equipment
has been poor, particularly the equipment of
the spaceships they sent to Venus, the moon
and to study cosmic rays."
Dr. Sheldon agrees with this assessment and
thinks the much-delayed Russian monster
racket the world has been anticipating for the
last three years also is a victim of poor Soviet
technology ? in this case, Russian inability to
build large rockets -that perform with unfailing
reliability.
Dr. Sheldon also thinks there is very little.
chance the Russians will attempt to send men
to Mars.
"That's too big, too risky and too expensive
for them," he said. -
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SOVIET REMARKS ABOUT SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS IN SPACE
KHRUSHCHEV, 1957 -- Soviet satellites in the vanguard
The United States had also announced that it was preparing to launch an artificial earth
satellite, calling it Vanguard?that's right. Vanguard. We announced that we intended to launch an artificial
earth satellite of the earth. Now everyone can see that the creative efforts of Soviet science and technology
have been crowned with auccess. After the appearance of a small Soviet moon, certain U.S. statesmen stated
that they had never thought of competing with the Soviet Union in the creation of an artificial satellite. This
is how they speak now when our Sputniks are flying around the globe. It appears that the name Vanguard re?
fleeted the confidence of the Americans that their satellite would be the first in the world. But experience has
shown that ia was the Soviet satellites which proved to be ahead, to be in the vanguard. -. Speech at jubilee
session of the USSR Supreme Soviet marking the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, November 6,
1957; Moscow radio broadcast, November 6, 1957.
KHRUSHCHEV, 1957 -- Socialism has won
The launching of artificial earth satellites is a kind of culmination of the competitionbe-
tween socialist and capitalist countries. And socialism has won it. -- Interview with Brazilian journalists
Victorio Martorelli and Tito Fleuri, November 21, 1957; TASS, December 5, 1957.
KHRUSHCHEV, 1958 -- Soviet science must hold first place in the world
Soviet scientists have made us happy with their great discoveries and scientific achieve-
*ts. The first atomic power station in the world was built in our country, and the largest accelerator of
roparticles in the world. Soviet scientists, working in cooperation with engineers, technicians, and workers,
created the first artificial earth satellites and were the first to send their instruments into the cosmos. The
Russian word "sputnik" has now entered the languages of the entire world.
All of this has been done by the intellect and the talent of Soviet scientists of the older
generation and of the young Soviet scientists and engineers reared by our higher educational establishments.
Soviet science and our higher educational establishments must always hold first place ia the world. It is a
matter of honor for Soviet scientista to hold the leading place in all branches of knowledge. -- Speech at a
Kremlin reception for Soviet intellectuals; Moscow radio broadcast, February 8, 1958.
KHRUSHCHEV, 1958 -- Legends dispersed like smoke
The creation of the Soviet artificial earth satellites has demonstrated convincingly the high
level of development of science and technology in our country, the level of Soviet industry, culture, and education
The legends invented by our enemies about the scientific and technical backwardness of the Soviet Union have
been dispersed like smoke. Who will believe such legends now? Each man in each country of the world can
now see with his own eyes the truly fabulous Soviet stars I That scientific and technical achievement of our
people, of our scientists, engineers, technicians and workers, has forcefully revealed the advantages of the
socialist system. Only the socialist system, which has set free millions and millions of people, has given
people an opportunity for full manifestation of their creative abilities, has created conditions for mastering
science, art, and all achievements of human culture. -- Speech at a Kremlin reception for Soviet intellectuals,
1V^,Acow radio broadcast, February 8, 1958.
NNW
KHRUSHCHEV, 1953 -- Taught conceited American leaders
Just as a mother is happy when ahe teaches her child to pronounce its first word "Mama,"
so we take pride in our successes, having taught some conceited American leaders to pronounce very dis-
tinctly that it is the Soviet Union, that is the country of socialism, that must be caught up with in the level of
of scientific development and in the level of training scientists and engineers. -- Speech at the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, April 9, 1958; Moscow radio broadcast. April 10, 1958.
KHRUSHCHEV, 1959 -- Majeatic event in building communism
In the first days of the new year, 1959, the first year of the seven-year plan, Soviet
scientists, designers, engineers, and workers achieved a new exploit of worldwide importance, successfully
launching a multistage cosmic rocket in the direction of the moon. The Soviet people are filled with patriotic
pride for their beloved motherland which is marching at the head of modern scientific and technical progress and
blazing a trail into the future. All progressive mankind rejoices with us in this great scientific exploit. Even
the enemies of socialism have been forced, in the face of incontrovertible facts, to admit that this is one of the
greatest achievements of the cosmic era and a new triumph of the Soviet Union. The creation in our country
of the first artificial earth aatellites, the launching of the Soviet cosmic rocket--which has become the first
artificial planet of the solar system?signifies a whole epoch in the development of mankind's scientific
knowledge. It is a majestic event of the epoch of the building of communism. -- Speech at the 21st Congress
of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, January 27, 1959; Moscow radio broadcast. January 28, 1959.
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8 June 1969
CPYRGHT
Peking, June eighth (HSINHUA)--The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has imposed
a naked fascist rule Of terror in the country tO intensify its oppression and exploi.
tation of the broad masses of the Soviet people. It has set up a large number of
"lunahc asylums" and concentration camps throughout the country, turning it into a
big prison.
According to incomplete figures, there are more than 100 prisons and concentration
camps in little over 4n areas in the Soviet Union. Among tbtm, 8 concentration camps
are located in the Altay 'erritory, 6 in Krasnodar Territory and 7 in Vitebsk Region.
It was revealed that in the Dnepropetrovsk Region of the Ukraine there are ten prisons
with more than 50,000 inmates, a figure higher than that under the rule of the tsars.
The Soviet revisionists also have many concentration camps for various kinds of
"political prisoners" in Karelia, Murmansk, the northern border areas, the islands on
the Arctic Ocean, the northern and eastern parts of Siberia and in the Par East.
Many concentration camps for life-long imprisonment have been set up in the south-
eastern part of Yakut, in Novaya Zemlya and other places. There are more "lunatic
asylums" than prisons and concentration camps throughout the country.
By means of concentration camps, prisons and "lunatic asylums", the Soviet revisionist
renegade clique exercises fascist dictatorship over the broad masses of the Soviet
people and genuine revolutionaries, ruthlessly torturing and maltreating them. The
inmates of concentration camps live in hunger and cold and are refused treatment when
they fall sick. Moreover, they are compelled to do manual labour beyond their power.
Anyone who shows the slightest discontent or resistance would be cruelly beaten up by
the special agents who interrogate them. Thousands upon thousands of the Soviet
revolutionary people have been tortured to death.
The Soviet revisionist renegade clique attempts to suppress the resistance of the
Soviet people with concentratio camps and by other most barbarous means. But the
Soviet people who have a glorious tradition of revolutionary struggle cannot be
suppressed. In the final analysis, th^ persecution of the revolutionary people can
only arouse them more extensively to rise in a fiercer revolutionary struggle. The
Soviet people are fighting against the revisionist renegade clique in various ways.
Theirs is a just struggle and is therefore bound to be victorious.
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25X1 C1 Ob
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?
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
(24 May - 20 June 1969)
1. World Communist Conference Perpetuates Rift.
The World Communist Conference of 75 Communist parties held in Moscow
5-17 June served as a formal confirmation that the new rift created in the
world movement by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia less than a year
ago is a permanent one. All parties of any consequence, both those supporting
the Soviets and those critical of them, reiterated their expected positions,
producing few surprises either for the Soviets or for the curious outside
world.
Fourteen parties, including Rumania and Cuba, withheld full approval of
the hackneyed and long-winded declaration which was the main product of the
conference, These are the bolder parties which are able to face up to the
threat of Soviet reprisals (mostly withdrawal of financial support) and are
an indeterminate fraction of those which would dissent if they could do so
with impunity. When one considers that five ruling parties--from China,
North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, and Yugoslavia-- and a number of free
world parties--most notably the Japanese--refused even to attend, itis
obvious that Moscow is far from being able to claim unity in the Communist
camp, much less undisputed leadership of it. In fact, calculating the
membership of dissenting parties one arrives at the startling conclusion
that, by conservative estimate, Communists at serious odds with the Soviet
Union number 23,000,000 or more, thus more than half of the world's estimated
45,000,000 Communists.
The parties critical of the CPSU argued on a number of grounds. The
Rumanians criticized the attacks made on China. The Australians* criticized
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, pointing to the damage done the international
movement by this act. The influential Italian party protested the invasion
and continuing suppression of Czechoslovakia, the attacks on China, and the
attempts of the CPSU to dictate to other parties. All insist more or less
vehemently that the independence and sovereignty of parties are more important
than loyalty to the Soviet Union and to the idea of international Communist
unity (summed up in the expression "proletarian internationalism"). In one
sense, the crux of the crisis in the movement is this demand for self-determina-
tion regardless of Soviet wishes or needs.
But there is an even more fundamental division: the difference between
the Soviet form of Communism and the different notion of Communism emerging in
the non-Communist world. More and more parties, living and struggling for
viability in an arena of freely competing political ideas are at long last
recognizing not only that Soviet Marxism is irrelevant to their own situation,
but also how sterile, even reactionary, the Soviet practice of Communism is.
*Plus at least nine others: Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Italy,
Norway, Rumania, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
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0 1
1-2
Before the invasion, free world parties saw in the Czech experiment a pro-
gressive development, an evolution and continuity in Marxist practice which
could become a model for free world, or at least European Communism. The
Soviet throttling of the experiment by military force became the watershed
separating the Communist stream in most of the free world from the sluggish
current of Soviet Communism. More and more free world parties are recognizing,
or will have to recognize, that their survival as an effective political
force depends on their independence from the CPSU, on evolving their own
programs and tasks. No longer can Moscow (much less the ideologically even
more primitive Peking) be considered the main center of Communist wisdom,
theoretical or practical. If Communism is to be viable in the Western world
without Soviet subsidy it will have to evolve in the direction of Togliatti's
"polycentrism." It may even be that the Conference marked the beginning of
a "second great schism," as one Western journalist has suggested.
But even this notion of several centers of international Communism appears
to be an obsolescent concept. The trend is more toward complete fragmentation
of the world movement into individual parties, each with its own peculiar
problems which cannot be solved by adherence to some abstract international
doctrine, but by concentration on the local scene. The indications are, however,
that even parties which are thinking ahead along these lines will take a long
time to unload the doctrinal ballast which now prevents them from effectively
competing in a democratic society. Most still adhere to a belief in the
dictatorship of the proletariat and they continue to preach the necessity for
violent upheaval in their society, before or after seizure of power. Further,
in many respects they continue their automatic obeisance to Moscow and in their
own propaganda and policies act in effect as arms of Soviet foreign policy.
In the light of the emerging trends in international Communism, it would
seem very impractical for the Soviets to attempt to restore some sort of
organizational control over the world movement, and there are few signs of
such an effort. Yet events of the past year show that the Soviets view the
world through lenses which distort the image in strange ways, and it is not
difficult for them to make a case for a latter-day Comintern which would
restore their position of unquestioned command over the movement.
2. Escalation of the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Bombast or Bullets?
The one move at the World Communist Conference which came as a surprise
to most observers was Brezhnev's blunt and wide-ranging attack on the Chinese
Communists. It was clearly a breach of contract by the Soviets since in the
pre-conference negotiations with parties suspicious of Soviet motives (such as
the Rumanian and Italian ones) it had been agreed that China would not be
attacked. Though the attack may have been a planned and cynical betrayal of
the Soviet promise, it may also have been a last minute decision prompted by
considerations of overriding importance to the Soviets. This latter explanation
seems more likely since breaking the agreement gave other parties an opportunity
to discuss the issue of Czechoslovakia -- a subject which the Soviets devoutly
wished to avoid and which ntsak obligingly declared unfit for discussion by
fraternal parties. It may be that since the conference had originally been
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July 1969
planned years ago for the purpose of reading the Chinese Communists out of the
world movement, the Soviets decided they had to salvage at least something of
the original design and thus used the platform of a 75-party conference to
denounce the Chinese. However, they were unable to prevail and the final
document issuing from the conference does not mention China in any derogatory
way.
During the conference both the Soviets and Chinese expended more than
their usual considerable energies in their propaganda war, partly to make sure
they retained the allegiance of their international Communist allies and did
not lose any by default. Another consideration for both the Soviets and
Chinese is the attitude of their own people. Invoking the spectre of a predatory
China (or, from the Chinese point of view, a predatory Soviet Union) undoubtedly
plays on real popular fears and thus is ideal for spurring a benighted, apathetic
population into greater support for the policies of the privileged ruling caste.
Speculation has inevitably risen that the border conflict has escalated
to a more serious level than is generally recognized. The speculation is fed
by the fact that Soviet Far East ambassadors have suddenly been recalled to
Moscow for consultation, and by reports from Swedish news sources that 100,000
more Soviet troops have been dispatched to the "sovereign" state of Mongolia
and deployed along the border. Rumors about possible preventive strikes by
the Soviets are being heard more and more.
3. The Czechoslovak Dialectic
Communists used to be fond of claiming that the dialectic process, or
conflict of opposites, is the universal law governing not only nature but the
development of society. As naive as such an explanation of social processes
is, it is one way to characterize recent developments in Czechoslovakia where
a dialectic between official repression and popular insistence on freedom
continued to operate. Gustav Husak has been performing well for his Soviet
mentors, even though he seems unready to restore the full force of a Novotny-
style police terror. At the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CSCP) Central
Committee Plenum on 29-30 May Husak forced through purge of the liberals in the
party's leadership, which was the beginning of a purge throughout the Party.
Those removed were replaced by conservatives, most prominent among whom was
Lubomir Strougal, notorious Interior Minister under Novotny and now Deputy First
Secretary. He had previously been a member of the Central Committee. Strougal
is widely considered a contender for Husak's job, and is apparently being held
in reserve by Moscow in the event Husak does not perform satisfactorily in his
drive to restore orthodoxy. The party purge was paralleled by continuing pressure
on journalists and newspapers critical of the regime, the strengthening of the
secret police, and dissolution of organizations outside the direct control of the
party. Symbolic of this gradual return to Stalinism was the fact that the program
of rehabilitating victims of the Stalin era slowed down noticeably. As if
dialectically, various sectors in the population still found the moral resources
to resist the encroaching Stalinism. Among the Central Committee liberals most
hated and feared by the Soviets was Frantisek Kriegel (now purged from the party
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altogether). He had the courage to speak out with full and critical frankness
at the Plenum that decided on his purge. His speech (text attached) was
mimeographed and clandestinely distributed by sympathetic fellow citizens,
among them rebellious trade unionists. Earlier, workers boldly resisted the
authorities by occupying a union hall to prevent a pro-Soviet rally scheduled
to be held there in commemoration of the Soviet liberation of Czechoslovakia.
Writers and journalists in various small ways are resisting regime pressures
to make them conform and are even putting forth demands of their own for
restoration of some journals earlier suppressed by Husak.
L. Briefly Noted:
a. Soviets Plotting New International Mischief
The Soviets announced at the last session of the World Communist Conference
that they will now try to organize a World Anti-Imperialist Congress, involving
presumably all the leftist forces they can muster. To this end, they have
already set up a preparatory commission consisting of representatives of 13
(unidentified) Communist and workers' parties.
b. Soviets Now Intervene in Non-Communist Finnish Politics
On the heels of their efforts to straighten out the Finnish Communist Party
and prevent it from splitting into a Stalinist and a modernist wing, the
Soviets again bluntly meddled in Finnish political matters, this time in the
internal affairs of the Social Democratic Party. At the party's triennial
congress in Turku, Finland 6-8 June, three candidates were contending for
election to the top job of party Secretary General. The Soviets evidently
decided that none of the three suited their taste and declared them non
gratae through Pravda. They did so by reprinting a Finnish left-wing socialist
newspaper attack on each of the candidates and headlined the Pravda article:
"Rightist Tactics."
The Finns have learned that the price of ignoring such warnings is
economic and military pressure by the Soviet Union, which is nothing short of
blackmail. Under the circumstances, the Social Democrats decided that to go
against so express a Soviet wish would bring nothing but grief not only to
the party, the largest one in Finland, but to the whole country. Sadly they
took the heavy-handed hint and elected an unknown non-controversial Social
Democrat to the post of Secretary General.
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NEW YORK TIMES,
18 June 1969
West EuropeamiReds See a Looser Rein
C PY VI BINDER
IRMA
VC t The New York Times
D
RONtl, June 17?Mt
Communist parties in Weste
Europe believe that the Inte
national Communiat conferen
in Moscow marked a new stat
of greater independence fro
the dictates of the once-omni
otent Soviet Communist party
There also appears to be
consensus among the leade
of the 3.3 million Western E
ropean Communists that t
strongest trend in their secti
of the "international mov
ment" is toward concentrati
on their domestic situations r
ther than on the internation
"tasks" proclaimed by Mo
cow.
These impressions were gat
ered in a sampling by corr
pondents of The New York
Times in a number of capitals.
The chairman of the 2,500-
member Norwegian party, Rei-
dar T. Larsen, said he thought
? that "Communist parties are
freer to express standpoints of
their own.' At the Moscow
conference, he noted, his party
and nine others criticized the
1968 Soviet-bloc invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
"There is an especially strong
Impulse, particularly in the
Western European parties, to
orient themselves toward na-
tional conditions and to believe
in their own strength," he, add-
ed. "They are more independ-
ent of Moscow, and this trend
will continue."
In fact, the somewhat divided
leadership was preoccupied
rt with the presidential election
and is uIue t-e cemed w t 1
Moscow
of the
criterion
ClUG-Iii
was the internal issues
movement, with the
being not so much
perialism as support for
n national politics than with the
Moscow
against China.
^" great affairs of the international
? "Second,
kt showed that im-
a movement. On the other hand,
e the French party was reported
perlallam
for thE
is not as big a danger
movement as China and
a to be clearly bent on maintain-
that i
nperialism was only a
ing "close ties with Moscow"
pretex
for the confrontation
regardless of the Czechoslovak
with t
le Chinese.
a issue.
"Thk?d,
Brezhnev did not
S In contrast, the 1,615,000-
dare E
nalyze the situation in
i- member Italian party, the larg-
the movement.
He, only spoke
e est in Western Europe, lived
about
strengthening the Soviet
a up to its independent reputa-
Union.
That is a sign he will
tion by resisting Moscow's de-
not la:
t long.
a mands for silence on Czecho-
"Finally,
his? lack of response
I; slovakia and for collective con-
to the
[tams shows he is weak
ii demnation of the Chinese Corn-
regard
ng the Western parties
I- munist leadership. The gap be-
and can
only perform with
tween the French and Italian
I- parties, nominally allied for
streng
h in Eastern Europe."
? ?
?` 'Independence Recognized'
Carl H. Hermansson, head of
the 29,000-member Swedish
party, which sent only an ob-
server .delegation to Moscow,
echoed those sentiments, say-
ing the conference confirmed
that the "independence of in-
dividual parties is recognized."
The 12,000-member Dutch
Communist party showed its
independence by refusing to
send a delegation. It has spoken
since then of "the so-called
international conference." Ac-
cording to a report from The
Hague, the party "does not
want to choose between Mos-
cow and Peking, but rather to
solve Dutch problems" through
attempts 'at a popular-front pol-
icy.
' The French party, the second
largest in Western Europe with
425,G00 members, disappointed
many Frenchmen by failing to
reiterate its condemnation
the inftffiner/M4VaraM
son
widened.
The British Communist party,
numbering 35,600 members,
also underscored its independ-
ence by repeating condemna-
tions of the invasion and de-
clining to sign the Moscow con-
ference's final documents until
they could be studied by its
Executive Committee.
Democratic Pluralism
In varying degrees the Finn-
ish, Austrian, Belgian and
Spanish parties displayed inde-
pendence at Moscow, as well
as their overriding interest in a
kind of democratic, pluralism
within the international move-
ment. Their stress was on facing
domestic problems in their own'
way without subservience to;
the Russians.
Asked whether the parties
regarded the Moscow meeting
as a victory for Leonid I.
Brezhnev, the Soviet party'
leader, some Times correspond-
ents reported that the mere
fact of the gathering of 75 par-
ties gave Moscow a certain
advantage in its struggle with
Peking. But they added that the
display of disunity was unprec-
edented. A party spokesman in
Rome said there had been no
winners or losers. 1
' A Yugoslav Communist in-.
formed on the tribulations of,
the international movement;
sa4.1 the Moscow meeting
showed not the decay of world
Communism but its transforma-
tion toward even greater di-
versification. He also remarked,
on deep contradictions evident
at the conference.
"Although it was called as
WASHINGTON STAR
8 June 1969
VICTCP, ZORZ,4
? 1
roo r
T'V
v; aldVld la uk
rgt r`r1
Ilkfin Position
Whatever t U.;
,.;;.-41 Communist meeting in
.:,1.1.1cow, the Kremlin cannot
?.7in. I: the meeting agrees to a
'foint deciarat ion of pe_nciples,
this will contain so little of
what the Kremlin has been de-
rnanding as to constitute a de-
feat for it. And if the Kremlin
does, against all odds, get the
sort of declaration it wants, ,
then a number of important
pal des will refuse to endorse
it, thus producing a formal
split in the world Communist
movement.
The Italian delegation, for
instance, has been instructed
to do everything it could to
change the Soviet draft. But if
this should prove impossible to
achieve during the conference,
the delegation has been for-
mally authorized to terns? to
This was no doubt Intended
as a warning to the Kremlin
that, if it does not give way,
tho Italians and a number of
other parties will hold out to
the very end. The Britis.h dele- ?
gation has gone even further.
It has announced that it is not
tagi4l4ggialtigollittlA7R13144
ho 14f4kftealuz 0900)1-2
? ? "
because it up to tho party c
(=thee at borne tg
iko
decisATOVeill'i EaWu
would no meet until after th
conference.
Czechoslovakia is the unde
lying issue, but this does no
_
mean that the argument
about inserting into the conic
enee document a clause tha
would condemn?or justify?
the invasion. The Kremli
knows that it cannot get a
endorsement of the invasion
and ifs critics know that the
cannot get a condemnation o
It, into the document.
Czechoslovakia is the under
lying issue in a much broade
sense, because the invasio
gave expression to the Krem
lin's claim to know what i
best for the world Communis
movement, and to act accord
ingly. This is what the othe
parties want to deny to th
Kremlin, because they fee
that they might thcmselve
come to harm if they accep
the Soviet claim.
Thus Rumania would expose
Itself to a future invasion
while the Italian party would
expose itself to defeat at the
polls. "Can one defend free-
dom in France," the Commu
nist presidential candidate,
Jacques Duclos, was asked in
a television interview, "while
at the same time approving of
the intervention in Prague?"
Ile tried to evade the ques-
tion. The Italian party, on the
other hand, is using the Czech-
oslovak issue to extend the
debate to basic matters of
principle. It believes that the
Soviet draft tackles the prob-
lem of relations between Cora.
x- * =mist arta
lease 19981091 AUffill/P
to the realities. Moreover, it
carries the .attack right into
the Soviet camp, and refuses
r- to accept "without reserve-
tion" the rosy picture of the
?s situation inside the Communist
r- countries conveyed by the So-
t Viet document.
In other words, Italian corn-
n munists insist that the Krem-
n
in should put its own house in
, order before it presumes to
instruct them on what commu-
1 nism really means. The defini-
tion of socialism in the Soviet
- draft, they maintain. "does
CR4Klad For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
"As I have already declared in
public and as I have told the
Chinese comrades, we do not
agree with lhe accusations made
by them against the Communist
party:of the Soviet Union.
"At the same time, wo have
ties that we do not agree with
!their accusations against the
Chinese C,rimmunist party."
Mr. Ceausescu's lengthy state-
trent at today's morning Session .
carefully went on to spell out In
detail Romania's independent
views on: an entire range of
world issues, including the
touchy subject of "limited sover-
eignty," a concept devised by
the Kremlin to justify the inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia. .
I In a reference to that doctrine,
first voiced by Mr. Brezhnev,
the Romanian leader said:
"Any weakening of interne-
tionalist solidarity harms the
cause of each country and our
common cause, but the principle
of internationalism cannot be in-
voked in any way for the nonob-
servance of other principles, for
interfere:ice of any kind in the
Internal affairs of a Socialist
country or of a fraternal party.
"Essential Condition"
"The sovereignty of the Social-
1st countries in no way contrav-
enes Socialist internationalism
but, on the contrary, is an esseri-
, ,
,tial condition for the strengthen-
ing of their solidarity, of their
freely consented and conscious
collaboration in the fight against
imperialism."
lie likewise defended Romania
against charges of-, natienallsrh
which, to Communists, means!
that a party is abandoning its
international outlook for selfish,
internal reasons. Romania's in-
dependence, particularly in for-
eign affairs, has caused the
charge to be made more or less
openly by several parties.
"Nationalism and national In-
sularity are foreign to the Ro-
111Arilan Conimunist perty and
people, while the ideas of inter-
nationalist solidarity, in their
correct understanding and pres.
entation, are dear to us," Mr.
Ceausescu said.
But he made it plain that Ro-
mania would continue evaluat-
ing world events based on its
own interpretation of Marxism.
Leninism,, rejecting dictates
.from any party. ?
15 June 1969
r.
Moscow, by :Ogrissidoic Papers . Over Some
CID`R(941?
MOSCOW?The 75 set speech-
es in which 75 leaders of Com-
munist parties are repeating 75
well-known positions at their
current Moscow meeting will be
followed this week by the equal-1
ly predictable signature, without
significant amendment, of a .doc-
ument which could have been
gleaned from the recent files of.
Pravda.
The gathering which will have!
lasted about . two weeks, un-
marked by debate or any change
in anyone's point of view or any
'decision on common action,'
bears the title of the Conference
of Communist and Workersg;
-Parties. This will sound imposing
.when the document and speeches
appear in Soviet propaganda,
and that is the principal purpose
a the conference.
? In the view of conference;
'sources, the goal of the meeting,,
long sought by the Soviet Union,.
is to reassure Moscow that de.!
spite the decentralizing trend in
world Communism?and partic-
ularly despite the Soviet-Chinese
break?there still exists a world '
movement and that Moscow is
its center.
speches by its clients although
the document with which the '
speeches nominally deal &lea nnt
mention China. In this way, the
sources believe, Moscow is hav-
ing its cake and eating it: Omit-
ting China from the final docu-
ment has permitted the parties
that oppose a condemnation of
China to attend, while denounce
ing China in the speeches haat
given Moscow what it wants.
Claim to Unity
The consensus' of Communist
observers here is that in the
conference the Soviet Union it'
coming as close as ft Can to its 1
:former position of unique leader- '
' ship of the world Communist'
movement. It can now claim that
a party which attacks the 'Soviet
Union brings down upon itself ,
the wrath of the bulk of theil
movement. In its broadside's',
against China, ? observers says:
, Pravda will henceforth be able :
' to pepper the verbal assault it
has been making for some years,
, with such phrases as, "As the,'
vast majority of the Communist
and workers' parties of the world,'
declared at the Moscow confer-.
'ence . ..."
The other .principal subject be- '
fore the conference will also not'
L Czechoslovakia was cited by,
name only by the sharpest op-
poInb of the Soria invaoion
of that country?by such parties
I as the Italian, British,'Australian
I and Austrian?and by a. few a
I the invasion's strongest support-,
ers. Others, such as the RUM.
.1-liens, have not named Czecho-
slovakia but have made it clear
; that their principal difference
with Moscow is over Moscow's
revamped doctrine ,of "Socialist
Internationalism." Moscow holds;
that this doctrine entitles Social*
ist,countries to intervene in other
Socialist countries M
of undefined international Sociak.
1st duty.
In a speech last Monday that
'remains the most discusSed state,'
ment of the conference, President':
Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania.
I accepted the principle of ?Social-
,
ist internationalism ' but said it
must not be used to vitiate such,'
other principles as sovereignty
and noninterference in the affairS'
1,of other countries. Mr. Ceausescu ,
said that his party did not be-
:lieve that meetings such as the:,
present one should "establish di-
rectives and normative lines.":
?Their purpose is rather to pro,
.11ide for a free exchange Of views,'
"after which each party can in
? For that reason, Moscow has raise its divisive head in the 'dependently decide on its con:
made Communist China the dom-
ARINEOVfie&I-Or Asa! Etasmel 999/0=
lotvva-tiktirltbli 94A000600,0490004A2he said.
3
Hs also disputed .the need for
A
restd itfixedaFtlx Rtileas
,centerv the. Communist move-
Mont. "It is not necessary to-
have any leading center,", he said..
?:
iCollection of Platitudes
But with the two 'principal is-
sues before the world movement,
China and Czechoslovakia
:omitted from the final, doctik
ment, the. result will be largely
a collodion of platitudes *Nag-
,ing no one. to anything: ? ?
.` ?Those who will not subscribe',
to ? it are objecting not against
any single statement in the .docto.
? ment but against its over-ad pro-;
Moscow emphasis and against,
,the very idea of common policy
statements where no common
policy exists. This view holds for,
;the Rumanians, It is a. fair as-
sumption. that ? Rumania would
,not sign the document if she were,
not, a member of the Soviet sys-
tem of alliances, if she did not:
? share a common border with the
Soviet Union, and if she did not
retain a vivid memory of the in-,
vasion of Czechoslovakia. ,
These considerations make the .
difference between the Rumanian ,
decision to go through with the. ,
motions as part of a majority'
i and the Italian refusal to sign.
Enrico Berlinguer, Deputy Sem-.
tary General of the Italian party.!
said that in the Italian view a
? monolithic approach to Commu-.
nism would be "not only .errone-
ous but ,utopian."
Mr. Berlinguer, while critk
cizing the policies of the Chinese
and their hostility to the Soviet.
Union, said the Italian party op-
.
posed any "excommunioation",
from the world movement and.
considered it wrong to answer
polemics with counterpolemics.;
Referring to the document the.
conference will adopt, he warned,
against the papering over of dif-
ferences and declarations of
unanimity based on "vague for-
mulas capable of diverse ? inter-
pretations." In the long run, he;
said, aham Unity makes diver-,
.gences worse by seeking to hide'
, them.
The conference will leave the
Communist, movement pretty
much where it was before. It will
neither narrow nor deepen the
breaches. But for a power group-
ing that lays claim to an ideo-
logical theme, an occasional dem-
onstration setting out a common
ideology may, be used to sustain:
the claim..
?
? .--HENRY 1CAM/VI,
e 1999 tkre:R6K-
,DP79-01194A000500090001-2
Red Summit '69:
A Joke
r2
CPYRGInII irtiTrit3
(X vrevs "Irmo el Th,Sstril
Moscow, June IS-1n the press
center of the world Communist
congress, a Romanian journalist
tells a joke about a telephone
conversation between President
Nicolae Ceausescu and Leonid I.
Brezhnev, the Soviet Party's
general secretary.
Mr. Ceausescu;' the story goes,
calls Moscow to Inform Mr.
Brezhnev it will, be possible for
Warsaw Pact troops?including
infantry, armored and airborne
1...3?to hold maneuvers on Ro-
neanian sod. ?
"And, comrade, what part of
Iatmaz?an territory can we
riser Int Russian leader asks.
''Moldavia"
Mr. Ceausescu answers: "Mol-
davia." ? .
Once part of Romania, Molda-
via was permanently grafted,
onto the Soviet Union after
World War H, an annexation!
many in Bucharest still resent
but one- not likely to be over-
rurned.
The anecdote, In its way, typi-
les the rather free-wheeling at-
mosphere that has developed at
.his conference since it opened
tine S. ? -
A f.ranLLy gkve-atatitake moodi
kac uncovered alnarp divisions of'
epinion among the 75 assembled
partan. These divisions in them-
mires imficate licrw far many of
the parties have matured politi-
rally from the old orthodox no-
tions of the pre-war Comintern,
which ran the Communist move-
nent under Kremlin direction in
Moscow.' ? ?
With the conference roughly
half over, it has become appar-
e it that a majority of delegates!
trent no return to Iron-fisted
S Met hogomony over the So.
c...alist camp.
, Blind Obedience
Blind obedience to Kremlin
Id kat, once the litmus test for
IMarxist-Uninist purity, is giv-
ing way to more independent na-1
't1( nal viewe?in fact, a coMpletel
re:asting of individual party res-I
ponsibilities under the theory of
pr Oetarian internationalism.
, Because change within the,
Communist movement ?car* at,
a glacial p it needed thLs
worldwide gathering to sharpeni
#hts fn-,,e nn *trams iksi
clan last met, In November;
1960.
That summit session, .for
ample, labored 20 days in abso-
lute secrecy, without a ningle.
public notice a ? meeting was.
even under way.
A final communique papered
over the then-incipiefit rift be-
tween Moscow and Peking, and
the conference itself was domil
nated by that strong-willed
showman, former Premier Ni?ki-
..
ta S. Khrushchev.
The current meeting Is oppos-
ite in almost every respect.
Although newsmen cannot
tend the sessions themselves,
full texts of major speeches, In-I
eluding those sharply critical Ofi
Soviet policy, are available at
the press center in Several lan-
guages within 24 hours. Three-.
hundred fifty journalists are
credited to the conference. '
Moscow-Peking Crisis
The deepening Moscow-Peking!
crisis is being dealt with openly!
and far from harmoniously.
While still a central figure, Mr.
Brezhnev has been challenged
repeatedly and, in some in-
stances,' his philosophy has been
rejected outright.
The Soviet view of Internation-
alism, which inspired the doe.:
trine of "limited sovereignty" to
justify the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia, has been discredited by
those Communist critics who
want no part of Kremlin domina-
tion.
Of those, Mr. Ceausescu has
been the most eloquent. As the
head of a ruling government, his
statements are an inspirational
beacon among the smaller par-
ties as yet striving for power. He
told the delegates last week:
"Nobody should pretend to be
the holder of the magic key with
which to find answers to all the
problenm ?
"It is necessary to start al,
ways from the truth that what
was just yesterday can become
obsolete, out of date today and
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CPYRGHT
Approved For
not an answer anymore to the
demands of the historical proce
ess.
. The Forms Of Struggle
"It is necessary to keep in
mind that the forms of revolu-
tionary struggle which proved
valid In certain circumstances
? cannot be mechanically applied
to otherhistorical ,condltians of
stages of development'', ?
? To this plea for antiO-diting'01
Marxist belief, Mr Ceausescu
added i temente!: appraisal bf ;
how. 'beat the worldwide Cohn.
muhist movement spilei ba
strengthened',
."The better ehch,pakty fulfills
Its responsibilities inward the
Working class' and iht.peoPle to '
which it ?belongs," lie caid, the!
greater, Will,be.tlie Confidence of
the xiaaSsee in its policy, Abe
more powerfut its role as itit%
Vanguard, ?the greater' the tyres-
emir tige of the'CoMmunist-and work- '
ing-class movement.
"This, representa .tflo maui
contributIon of each patty to the
common cause of socialism and
communism, to, the strengthen-
ing of the international power
and cohesion of the Communist
and working-class movement."
Instead of ,shoWcasing Corn-
munist unity, the.: conference
thus far more' clearly' reveals
the movement's, diversities?the
fact that in the nine year Since
the last suminit?iesSion, new
forces ? halm arisen that bring
into question those.Concepta
re-
ve'ed bY ,the'old? Bolsheviks,' of
another generation:. ?
Conference Priority 1'
The publiclY stfoted eonference
priority, for example?unity In
the struggle, against. imPerialism
;?---has been reversed so that dale.
gates now find '.the.Anselves,
preoccupied with internal prob-
lems implied' by' ".Chine and
Czechoslovakia rather than the
threat of capitalism,.?.' ,.!?? ?
AccordIngly,,; seOral.,,parties
again led by the Renisinians; be:
lieve the.prinelpatatimenit draft
of a staternent'aginot
irnper1al ,
Ism Is out of stop with reality,..'
Polemical rather than analytical
and inconsistent,WiththonatUre
Of things as they are;
For the Iremlln, this poses
dilemma: every' ::.compromise
fashioned in unity's 'mime dilutes
Moscow's leading role, ieut to the
degree Moscow fails to yield, the
Communist movement itself lbs.
!es just that much Credibility is
an alignment of free states offer.
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Rcicasc 1999/09/02 : CIA-R P79-01194A000500090001-2
iing an alternative cto 'Western
Ithought. . ?, -:' ' ''' '
- This ultimately maSepreve ton
high a price kr RusSia fo' pnyi,,
NEW YORK TIMES
18 June 1969
IWorld Reds End MoscagGIF'arley
By HENRY HAMM
pyRIGHITNew Some Parties Balk
th
nin ' objected seriously when e
York Thee
dozens of amendments still be-,
MOSCOW, June 17?
ore the '
mile meeting or most Of me
world's Communist parties, con-
,vened 'among much discord,
ended today with a communiqu?
hailing it as "an important stage
I hailing
on the road of strengthening
the cohesion of the Communist
movement."
However the editor of a lead-
ing newspaper from a Corn-
munist country, commenting on
the 13-day series of speeches
said; "the circus Is over, and
It was a 1)11(1one."
The comment reflected the
consideration that the con-
ference demonstrated what has
been apparent for many years:
the Moscow-Peking split not
only has divided the Commu_
nist movement into supporters
of the Soviet Union or China
but also has added a third
group of parties whose limited
independence from Moscow
would be endangered by a heal-
ing of the breach or by a move
to cast China into limbo. ?
,
Three Attitudes Noted
By and large, the pro-Soviet
parties came and signed the
four-part document that will
be the principal formal result
of the conference; the pro_
Chinese parties and those who
come within China's sphere of
influence stayed home, and the
eutralist group, headed by Ru-
inania and Italy, came to voice
its opposition and reservations,cleared
Opposition and reservations
hwere voiced by 14 of the 75
participants. Five parties did
ot sign. They were the Cu-
an and Swedish parties, pres-
nt only as observers; the
British and Norwegian parties,
which will consult their mem-
erships before deciding wheth-
r to sign, and the party' from
he Dominican Republic, which
efused outright.
Four parties signed only the
hird section of the document,
ealing with the struggle
gainst imperialism. They were
he Italian, San Marino, Aus-
elease 1999/09/02 :5CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
?
of Statement
were mostly disregarded.
Silent on Chines e
As it was signed in the sump-
tuous St. George's Hall of the
Kremlin the statement made no
,
mention of the Soviet-Chinese
dispute or the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, the other issue
that makes the Soviet Union's
rule over its camp of countries
and bloc of parties uneasy.
The issues with which the
document does deal are the
stand-bys of joint Communist
pronouncements. "Imperialism,"
principally American, West Ger-
man and Israeli, is depicted as
the chief foe. Peaceful coexis-
tence remains the principal
mode of international life.
The superiority and growing
-
world ascendency of Communist ideology are affirmed, but
they are accompanied with
calls for greater vigilance
against "bourgeois" ideology.
The independence and saver-
eignty of each Communist par-
ty and country is emphasized,
but so is the obscure notion
of "proletarian international
ism, which served as the ideo-
logical cloak for the interfer-
ence last August with the inde-
nce andsovereigntyf
P_ende_ o
Czechoslovakia. '
, ..
tranan and Reunion parties.
?.
Five parties?from Rumania,
Spain, Switzerland, Morocco
and the Sudan?signed after
having expressed reservations,
The statement was not made
public immediately, but? its
contents were disclosed by
conference sources. Those who
signed despite misgivings d id
so largely because they con-
sidered it sufficiently vague
and innocuous so as not to
commit them to anything.
But even skeptical Commu-
nist observers believed that the
Soviet Union gained its prin-
ipal objective from the con-
ference. Moscow proved, they
said, that it could still per-
suade 74 other Communist par-
ties to attend a meeting that
only the Soviet Union really
wanted and get the majority to
support a common position.
This alone, the observers
said, will be welcome ammuni _
tion in the ideological battle
with China, in which Peking
has scored most of the points
so far. The Soviet Union
must have wanted this ammu-
nition badly, according to the
observers, because it paid the
P rice of disclosing formally
how weak is its 'hold on some
of the important parties among
the 74 -
The blandness of the state-
ment came as no surprise. The
original draft, which expressed
the Soviet view of the world
more bluntly, had been watered
down in nearly a year and a
half of preparatory meetings,
by hundreds of formal amend-
ments and thousands of infor-
mal talks.
The form in which the docu-
ment appeared before the con-
ference when it opened on June
5 was so diluted that no party
Two Parties Identified
MOSCOW, June 17 (Reuters)
?A conference mystery was
up today when two,
underground delegations that
had not been named in official
reports were inadvertently iden-
tified. The two parties were
from Nepal and the Philippines.
Correspondents who were es-
corted through a meeting room
saw the names on placeboards,1
to the apparent chagrin of con-
ference officials.
.
.
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NEW ? YORIC TINES' CPYRGHT
1 June 19?
PRAGUE LIBERALS
LOSE PARTY POSTS'
IN ABROAD PURGE
,Sik and Kriegel. Are Amonci
i4'Opportunists' Expelled by
the Central Committee .1
MOSCOW TIES STRESSED
,Husak Calls Close Relations
!Best Guarantee of National.
Security for Czechs
?
CPyRGH I
By PAUL HOFIVIANII
apcciai co ABC ANTI. ZVI. AMINO ?
PRAGUE, May 3I?Dr. Gus-
Itav Husak, the Czechoslovak
Communist party leader, an-
nounced a purge of "opportun-,
laic elements" today. His com-
ments Were generally believed
to mark the regime's adoption'
of an orthodox pro-Moscow pol-
icy.
He disclosed that Prof: Ota
Sik, a former Deputy Premier
and chief planner of last year's..
tentative economic reform, and
other political liberals, had
been; ousted from the party'S
Central Committee. ' ,4
The expelled men had clung
to ."non-Marxist, antiparty.
Maoris," Dr. Husak declared.
4,To such people we shall hayed,'
to say good-by."
Speaking at a 'Prague indus-1
trial plant, Dr., Husak also main.'
t.ained that clase relations withl
Moscow were the "best guaran-
tee, for .the country's security.)!
lie all but Condoned the Soviet-
ed invasion of Czechoslovakia
iast August. ?
' Intervention Explained
The "fraternal" Communist'
parties of the, Warsaw Pacts
group watched the events id:
Czechoslovakia last spring and:
summer with increasing uneasi-:
nessA D Htntfl
r. usak. said.
pprovea i-or Keiease
they gradually lost their con-i
fidence that the leadership of/
our party was able to restoriE
order by its own means." I
Dr. Husak's nationally teed!
Vised speech was a report on/
n two-day plenary meeting of;
the 180-member Central Cont.";
mittoe, which ended last night,
It. Was the first plenary meet.'4
Ing since he succeeded Alexan-!,
der Dubcek as First Secretaryi
of the party on April 17. '
? Some 1,500 party workers:
;listened to Dr. Husak in the'!,
imodern auditorium of the C.K.D.1
engineering complex on the cal:1.J,,
,ital's northeast outskirts. Presi1
'dent Ludvik Svoboda and Pre--:
' Mier Oldrich Cernik also spoke; :;11
' Appears in Control
The new party Chief sOundecil
ias if he felt himself in thorough.:
control of the Communist ep.;,.:
paratus. -
Dr. Husak fold the rally that
Dr. Kriegel and Frantisele:
Vodszlon had been elitninatecV,
from the Central Committee
be-
cause they had voted againse
an accord with Moscow Sanc-:
Coning the presence of Soviet
troops in Czechoslovakia wheet;
it was ratified by the National'
AsseinblY last October.
' Dr. Kriegel is a physician4
and a veteran of the Spanishl
civil war who served as PubliC
Health Minister' and medical
adviser to Cuba. Mr. Vodszlon
?fis also a leading liberal. ?
Every reference at today'si
rallsr to the Soviet Union
:brought loud cheers from the
.,audience.
, There was a standing ovation
,when Dr. Husak said that
:Czechoslovakia must closely
:cooperate with the . Warsaw,
.Pact countries and especially
the Soviet Union.
A "We cannot tolerate any!
1,anti-Soviet attitudes in our
l':ranles," Dr, Husak said. "This;
Iwould be against our principles
,and interests."
5
' Svoboda for Soviet Ties i
President Svoboda, who.,
'spoke before Dr. Husak, also:
stressed that it was against the;
country's best interests "to
nurture feelings of ? distrust'!'
toward the Soviet Union, !:Finri
and decisive measures" are.,
needed to reaffirm the Commu-
nist party's guiding role, the
CICICIWAYA9 taigiAeRnP7CIen1 1 cuAnnnsnnnqnnni.9
. Discussing the party purges,
Dr. Husak said that the new
leadership had in vain request-
:ed and "begged" dissenters to
give up their incorrect posi-
tions.
e Dr. Husak affirmed that "not
a single person has been ille-
!gaily arrested" or persecuted
under the present regime. This,
.he said, was a result of the
Communist party!s . departure
from old methods in January,
1968.
The present partyleadership
would strengthen democratic
principles and never perrnit
them to be violated, Dr. Husak
said, "for this we don't need
advice from Sik or Kriegel." .
Professor Sik, who returned
borne to attend the Central
Committee meeting Thursday'
and yesterday, was reported
today to be on his way back
,to Basel, Switzerland, where he
?1s On a lecturing assignment.:
Others in Purge Listed
The First Secretary an-
nounced also the ouster of
1Central Committee members
twho had signed the "2,000
'
words," a manifesto for democ-
ratization last June. They In-
clude Oldrich Stary, outgoing
rector of Prague's Charles Uni-
versity, and Karel Kosik, a
t philosopher.
Referring to the novelist
Ludvik Vaculik, the author of
i the "2,000 words," Dr. Husak
i'declared that the party was not
judging his qualities as a writer,'!
i but his political role.
"If you want to be a politi-
clan, you must take the risks;
'it's a risky job," Dr. Husak said
with a broad grin. The audi-
, ence, understanding the anti-
sion to the nine years in jail
Husak had served in the
nineteen fifties for alleged Slip-
vak "bourgeois nationalism,"
l:roared with laughter.
Dr. Husak spoke in Slovak,
,which is slightly different from
[Czech, but equally easily under-
, ?
"stood in Prague.
/ Premier Cernik indicated a
!return to central economic
iplanning and gave to under-
stand that a project to set up
/worker councils ,in individual
enterprises, ? somewhat on the'
pattern of the Yugoslays' self-.;
management system, had been,
shelved..
3.
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NEW YORK MYLES
4 June 1969.
_ , . . .
Conservatives Geeffiy14-1Posts in Czechoslovakia,
Strougal, Ex-Aide of Novotny
Named Deputy to Husak
CPYRGIAT
- my PAUL HOFMANN.
se fil
s eal The New York Tithes
PRAGUE, ' June 3 ? . The
Communist party's ruling Pre-
sidium today filled high posts
in the apparatus with
pro-Soviet conservatives, and
appointed one of them, Dr.
Lubomir Strougal, as deputy to
the party leader, Dr. Gustav
Husak. .
Dr. Strougal, a party func-
tionary of more than 20 years'
standing with a reputation for
unwavering Marxist-Leninist
orthodoxy, thus became in ef-
fect the No. 2 man in the new
Czechoslovak regime.
He is considered a driving
, force in the present purge of
progressives from regional and
local party organizations,
which has just eliminated the
last major liberal holdout in
the party, the Prague city com-
mittee.,
' Husak Widens Role
The - resignation of the
''. capital's Communist leader,
Bohumil Simon, a liberal who
gained vast popularity last
?year, and of the entire Prague
Icommittee Presidium, was an-
nounced today.
Dr. Strougal, who is 45 years
old, was an Interior iViinister for
four years under former Presi-
.
dent Antonin Novotny, a
hard-line backer of Moscow.
Since ?the Soviet-led invasion
last August, the new Deputy
First Secretary has consistently
advocated close relations with
Moscow.
Today's redistribution of re-
sponsibilities within the 11-man
Presidium placed Dr. Husak in
direct charge of the sensitive
party departments for defense
and security. In the Colfiliiiait
system of interlocking party
and state organs, the defense
and security departments
eractically transmit party or-
ders to the army and the
police, and therefore constitute
a fnrm Ma hio petuer canter.
Strougal' and BUM( in Party '
,
merly regarded as a moderate
and a "centrist," appeared to
be allied with ultraconserva-
tives.
The Central Committee ex-
pelted or disiplined some lib-
eral members, and in effect
urged a speed-up in the purge
nme assignments announced
by the Presidium today never-
theless did nothing to discour-
age current general speculation
that Dr. Strougal, a Czech with
a strong power base in Bo-
hemia and Moravia, was
lemerging as a potential rival
; to Dr. Husak, a Slovak who
.was persecuted and imprisoned
' In the Novotny era.
? The impression that Dr. Hu-
sak's powers were rather nar-
rowly defined was heightened
by the composition of the team
that he led to the Moscow
world conference of Communist
parties this afternoon.
The First Secretary was ac-
companied to Moscow by Dr.
Strougal and other pro-Soviet
party officials, including Vasil
Bilak, the former First Secre-
tary of the Slovak Communist
party.
The Czechoslovak delegation
to the Moscow conference, due
to open on Thursday, was in-
structed by the party's Central
Committee last week to oppose
any debate of last year's inva-
sion at the parley.
While rejecting any attempts
to "internationalize the so-
called Czechoslovak problem"
in Moscow, the Central Com-
mittee authorized the party
delegation to discuss the pres-
ence of Soviet troops with
other Communist parties in bi-
lateral talks.
The two-day plenary meet-
ing of the Czechoslovak Cen-
tral Committee last week ap-
proved a pro-Moscow power
shift in the Communist leader-
ship in which Dr, Husak, for:
,on tower party levels.
Simon's Successor Named
;
, Yesterday Dr. Husak and Dr.
Strougal were present at a tense
meeting of Prague's city com-
mittee that (saw the backers.
The committee had been sum-
moned for an extraordinary ses-
sion yesterday after it had
'voiced dissent from the deci-
tsions of the Central Commit-
tee, especially the ouster of
progressives, in an earlier meet-
/ing over the weekend. The par-
ty shuffle in Prague was dis-
,Iclosed only today.
A supporter of the present
, pro-Soviet central. leadership,
Oldrich Matejka, became Mr.
Simon's successor. Mr. Matejka
had been secretary of the in-
dustrial Vysocany district on
Prague's northeastern out-
skirts.
In today' smeeting of the cen-
tral Presidium Mr. Bilak was
placed in charge of the party's
foreign relations. Alois Indra
became head of the party de
partment for state administra-
tion and social organizations
and Jozef Lenart was made
head of the economy depart-
ment.
Mr. Bilak, Mr. Indra and Mr.
Lenart were among a group of
10 party.leaders whom the Pre-
sidium formerly cleared of
accusations that had been wide-
ly leveled at them of having
betrayed the country by col-
laborating with the Soviet in-
vaders last August. They all
were "honorable comrades,"
the party Presidium said in a
if.atement in April. '
2
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
31 May 1969
cpyRGRurge of the reformers
i?
The hopes of Prague liberals that Dr Husak
4,wou1fi have the, will and strength to hold the
' centre to a decent course in Czechoslovakia must
have dwindled almost to vanishing point now. In
little more than one month the clock has been put
/back nearly to where It was in the late days of
Novotny's rule. Indeed, there is oven less room
',for debate now than there was. then. For.
Listy " is silenced again, and who can expect
; that the Writers' Union, if indeed its congress is
'permitted at all next month, Will be able -to talk
back to the party chiefs as it did in the summer
'of 1967?
Once more, in the mouths of those Communist
;leaders who are doing the talking at present,'
Who voted against the treaty signed last autumn
which "permitted " the stationing of Soviet troops
In Czechoslovakia.
If Dr Husak is indeed fighting to save some of .
the substance of last year's reformprogramme,then he is at bay in a corner between the
dominant Czech conservatives ,and the require-
monis of his Soviet taskmasters. He retains the,
support of the majority of his Slovak party
? (though even there Vasil Bilak. the man whom,
he replaced in Bratislava and who now sits with,
him on the praesidium, will be waiting for any
, opening to oust him) and the survivors of the
liberal element among the Czechs. But neither'
, he nor, they can speak out to enlist support in
.centralism is all and democracy comes nowhere. . the country now that the press has been SO.
.In the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia comprehensively muzzled. i
particularly, the party, headed by Novotny's : Mr 'Brezhnev and his colleagues must be
Minister 'of the Interior, Lubomir Strougal, has ,reasonably satisfied with the present progress:
;embarked on an extensive purge whose end is of " normalisation " in Czechoslovakia. Mean-,
?by no means in' sight. The removal of Dubcek's. 'while, they seem to have taken a leaf out of.
,chief Ideologist, Josef Spacek, from his senior :their Pupils' book by reducing still farther the
'post in South Moravia earlier this week was only narrow scope for intellectual dissent and debate.
the latest of a series of "resignations " and out. in their own country. .The dismissal of Alexander,
right dismissals in which reformers have been :Tvardovsky from the editorship of "Novy Mir "
,replaced by conservatives. Alm%t every other and the removal of Yevtushenko and Aksyonor
,day the ,Czech press and radio, have carried from the editorial board of " Yunost " are two of
reports of regional party conferences at which n the heaviest blows that the regime has struck at,
'senior officials and editors of local party news- what was left of cultural freedom in Russia since
papers have been purged. Usually it was reported the removal of Khrtishchev, for these magazines
also that the meetings had been attended by Mr had been the main outlets for all that was most
Strougal or his ally Milos Jakes, the head of the lively and original in Soviet literature. Tvardovsky
i party's central control and a u d i tin g especially fought a long good fight for the work,
commission.
:of Solzhenitsyn, its most noble hope. i
. Evidently more is to come, especially if .Dr . . It seems a low, point, then, .for all those who;
tusak loses the struggle? for control which is have been working for freedom and'creative space
-reported to be going on in the meeting of the full In the Communist half- of Europe. Those
'central committee which has been in session In 'in the West 'who have Admired them and learned,
, Prague during the last few days. , Yesterday Milos from them can only hold fast, as they do, to, the
,Jakes was voicing the control commission's "grave ',belief that neither Russia nor. Czechoslovakia can
dissatisfaction over the inadequate development' afford for long to silence its most creative reen,?
of the ' struggle against rightist and anti-Sovietand ' alienate all those Who 'heed more nourish.;
, forces," and calling for the dismiSsal from ?tliev 'Plebt' ?than' the; Kremlinte , frozen ? dogmaa,. can
: central committee at those nieMbere,of Parliament :$0'44e g-001.1.01ti,,ti:vvoil* Pr.:E0Oulism?
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BALTIlioRE SUN
Approvertftorftelease 1999/09/02 : CI
LIBERALS
INPRARIE
NIT PARTY
Mass Action Follows
National Committee's
Expulsion Of Six
C 1:13 yR op. rirunwr S. SMITH
13101,s all Correspondenti
PI ague, Julie 3?The entire
liberal leadership of the influ-
ential Prague city Communist
party committee has resigned,
It was officially announced here
today.
No reasons were cited for the
event, which followed the ex-
pulsion of six reformist leaders
by the national party's central
committee Saturday.
CTK, the Czechoslovak news
agency, said the resignations
were accepted at the city com-
mittee's special session last
night. Those leaving include
Bohumil Simon, the committee's
progressive chief secretary, and
the entire eleven-man committee
presidium.
During the meeting the Prague
committee also discussed last
week's Czechoslovak party
'central committee resolutions
and their, effect on the city or-
ganization. The Prague organ-
ization was one of the leading
forces behind the Dubcek-era
party reform program.
? Following last August's War-
saw power invasion, Mr. Simon
incurred the Kremlin's wrath
for having organized the four-
teenth party congress, which de-
nounced the military attack and
elected a new, democratic-
minded central committee.
The congress, which was se-
cretly convened in a Prague
factory despite occupation
forces' efforts to arrest the dele-1
gates, was later declared invalidi
at Soviet insistence
A-RDP7991494A09050009000
Asked to explain the causes of
yesterday's mass resignations,'
a CTK spokesman replied: "We
don't know because we were not
told. At CTK we don't have any
more information than we are
giving out officially."
Yesterday CTK reported that
at what was apparently an ear-i
Her Prague party organization
meeting, the national central
committee's hard-line stand was
approved by an unspecified
"overwhelming majority," but
opposed by eight votes.
The national party's new line
was also discussed recently by
, the party district committee in
! Prague's First district, where,
according to CTK, "some dif-
ferences of views appeared"
over the orthodox "organiza-
tional and cadre measures."
Other Opposition
Opposition was reported else-
where throughout Bohemia and
! Moravia, although the rigidly.
! censored press played thisl
down.
Gustav Husak, the new Czech-
oslovak party first secretary,
has told the reformers to either
conform to the new course or
take a "vacation."
As last week's central com-
mittee resolution noted: "It is
possible that we shall have to
say good-by?possibly tempo-
rarily?to some people who can-
not be convinced. If there is no
other possibility, even this will
Fontribute toward strengthening
the internal ideological coher-
ence and the action ability of
the party." ?
Possibly it will, but the party,
which last year had the confi-
dence of many, if not most,
Czechoslovak citizens, is fast
:losing its popularity.
As Stefan Sadovsky, the Slovak
'party leader, pointed out today
in a speech in Bratislava, "part
of the population still does not
understand all the measures
and there is insufficient drive in
the work of Communist editors
and even in Pravda," The
Slovak party daily.
The nonchalance Mr. Sadov-
sky noticed In the editors has
also infected the workers, who
have slacked off and lowered
ipro:Auction levels.
1-2
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-Washington Post ,
2 June 1969
Rowland Et;ans and Robert Novak .."1
c pY
'
Harassment of Czech Journalists'
e Prelude to Total Police State
?
?. PRAGUE?Present (her-,
assment of leading; journal?
ists shows how far Czecho-\
slovakia has returned to the
controlled society . of ortho-;
dox Communism and, fur-;,
:her, suggests ominous poi.-
tenth of something worse in
the days ahead.
Some 16 newspaper and:
radio journalists who corn-.
prised the vanguard of last,
year's liberal revolutIon,,
having already, , been
missed from their posts, are ,
spending hours on end att,
the Communist Central
.committee building on the'i
banks of the Voltava for in,
terrogation about the hereti-ii
cal writings of last year. 0
' It's all very civil. Instead:
of trying to bully the here-7
tics into self-criticism, the,
interrogators are studiously:
[polite, offering 1ittlertsand-1
wiches and a glass of wine.
'Nevertheless, the journalists
:face expulsion from the
Communist Party and,
less they recant, exclusion'
from any job above the lever
of manual labor.
What makes this so ombi:
nous is the, possibility it is!
merely the. prelude . to.
thought control going tar
beyond the press. The very
momentum of the re-emerg-
ing police state may extend'
party control to the theater,
motion pictures, and crea,1
.tive relatively,,
free in Czechoslovakia the''
past decade. From there, the;'
Soviet-style police state withi
arrests, trials and imprison-
(wilts is not far away.
, 'THEY!' ALREADY have;
turned back the clock to
1066, one leading writer told
us. Before they stop, they
allay go all the way to the
195(th, '
Thus, deep ' depression '
blankets Prague 'in this dis-1
mal spring of 1069. Czechs
know they can never recap
rii,ture the buoyant freedom of
.'1968. The choice, they real-
th between ,the present,
:xelatively, restrained dicta.
.torship that Dr: Gustav
,Husak ' seems to favor or.
something much closer to
,the Soviet model backed by ;
!Lubomir Strougal.
7 ,Husak, a flinty Slovak
hard-liner who replaced Al.:
'exander Dubcek as Czecho-
slovak party secretary on
, April 17, Is scarcely an op-,
pealing figuro in Prague.
ilBut Czechs here are coming
to prefer him to fellow-
Czech Strougal, a party hart-
ger-on who now heads the;
Communist Party in the.
.Czech regions and is clearlY;
challenging Husak for ria-y
'tional power on a slavish,4?
pro-Soviet platform.
In fact, it is Strougal whol
has presided over the sys-.?
tematic demolition of the
10611 revolution. Besides ban.),
ning liberal weeklies and re-.:
placing liberal journalists in/
. the daily press and radio-tel.;
,evision with apperatchild,
(including some police
'agents), Strougal has intimi-,
`dated and eviscerated thei
student and worker move-.1
menta. Trade unions, emerg-,,
'ing' as a political force after';
last August's Russian-led ino,
,vasion, are back as a docile?i
icecipient of political doe-
'
trine at the end of the Cozne.
,munist Party!B tradit1onal3
transmission belt.'
Most impressive was
iStrougal's quick takeover of
the party organization in the'',
iCzech regions. Western ex.'.
,pert i had expected the,
,Czech party structure, thor-;
f,oughly liberalized through'
unprecedented democratic'
elections in 1968, to prove a'
lasting headache for pro-Sod
?viet hard-liners. Instead, the
liberalization : was wiped'
away by Strougal within a:
month. Only one (Prague::
'City) of eight regional Czech
communist secretaryships is
'still held by a liberal
AT THE same time, the,
e c r et police?dormant;
i through 1968?has been re-,
vived and reinforced. L1ber4
? als are sure that their
'phones are tapped and their.
.mall inspected. Before talk-.
Ing to Western correspond.
ents, liberals select a se-,
eluded restaurant booth and
then talk in a whisper. Exit;
'visas out of Czechosiovaklai
Ihave been denied to liberals
the past month.'
However, fragments . of;
the Prague spring of 1968,
linger in bizarre comb1na-1
tion with the current re-'i
pression. For instance, MTV
Hochmann ? a major force
In the 1D8 revolution ad,
? 'tt writer for The we ekl
'Reporter (now banned)?re-
plied with a four-letter o13-
,seenity two weeks ago wherr.
the Central Committee
asked him over for question-,:
Ung about his 1968 writings.?
!Hochmann immediately went
,off to his country place to;.
begin work on a novel andl
'Ia.s not been bothered up /
;to this writing.
!: Similarly, cultural unions
?theater, . movies, writers,
i'etc.?recently criticized the
; new repression despite a re.!
quest not to do so from the
Interior Ministry (though
'their statement went unpub-;
lished in Prague's controlled
,press.)
y But everybody here is '1
aware that defiance by ,
4
!Jiri Hochmann and the cul-
itural unions is an anachron.i
'ism that will soon wither,
:away whether medium-hard!
,Husak or ultra-hard Strou-;
iJ gal wins the power struggle
,?a realization that pro%
"duces intense despair ? in:
Prague foe intellectuals and
the general public alike. '4
CY 1969, Publisheri-lall Bindlont.
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CP
BALTIMORE SUN
6 June 1969
Moravians Demand Prague
Indorse Czech Invasion
?
RGHT 'By STUART S. SMITH
[Sun Staff 'Crespandent]
? Prague, June 5?A provinciali
Czechoslovak Communist organ-
ization has demanded that the
party Central Committee ap-1
prove 1st summer's Warsaw:
powers' invasitn, it was report-
ed here today.
In a Moravian resolution to
the party's top ruling body, the
local group called upon Czecho-
slovak Communist leaders to re-;
scind their August denunciation'
or the military intervention and
take the "correct" stand. ?
Threat To Svoboda .
' The event may pose a poten-
tial threat to the country's re-
maining moderate officials, In-
cluding even Premier Oldrich,
Cernik and President Ludvik
Svoboda.
The resolution was issued yes-1
terday by a miners organization
in Ostrava and printed ? this
morning on the front page of
'Rude Provo the official Czecho-
slovak party daily.
However, in what struck politi-
cal commentators here as a sig-
nificant ommission, the story
was not picked up later by CTK,
the official Czechoslovak news
agency, indicating that the na-
tional leadership probably does
not sanction the Ostrava action
?at least not yet.
Yesterday's miners' meeting
was addressed by Drahomir
Kolder, one of the Central Com-
mittee's most loyal supporters of
Kremlin policy and a man whom
Czechoslovak news media last
year denounced as a national
traitor and Russian eollaborator.
, As seen as the Warsaw pew.
6
er s troops marched across the
Czechoslovak frontiers last Au-
tust 20 President Svobdoa issued
an official statement opposing
the intrusion as an illegal inva-
sion.,
IThe country's principal gov-
erning bodies, including the
Communist leadership, the fed-
eral administration and the
Czechoslovak National Assem-
bly, quickly followed suit, accus-
ing their Communist allies of
violating international law and
breaking both the United Na-
tions Charter and the Warsaw
,treaty itself.
Party Support Elsewhere
Despite overbearing Soviet
pressure to validate the invasion
ex post facto, the country's legal
position still remains tha the
troops entered without just
cause. 4
Numerous important Corn-
munist parties now attending the
international conference in Mos-
cow sided with Czechoslovakia
at the time. The French, Austri-
an, Spanish, English, Scandana-
via, Itlaian and Romanian par-
ties rebuked the Soviet leaders
with particular vehemence.
For the Czechoslovak party
now to admit that the invasion
was warranted would not only
sanction the so-called Brezhnev
doctrine of the limited sover-
eignty of the Socialist common-
wealth states, but also would cut
the ground out from under the
Romanians, Italians et al and
alqn jorTn1di99 President 'Svc-
hoda.
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CP
BALTIMORE SUN
29 May 1969
RIGHTS GROUP'?
IS BANNED BY.
CZECH REGIME
Decree Says Society'
? Functioned As A
Political Body
YRGHTT.UART X. ShillTIVI
[Sun Stall Correspondent]
Prague, May 28?The Czech
republic's Interior Ministry to-
day banned Czechoslovakia's
Society for Human Rights.
The organization, Which has
some 3,000 dues-paying mem.
bers, was founded May 3, 1968,
during the height of the nation's
democratization movement.
A Socitey official explained to-
day that the group's goal was
the implementation in Czecho-
slovakia of the principles em-
bodied in the United Nations De-
claration of Human Rights.
Includes Respected Figures
The organization's leadership
Includes some of the country's
most respected public figures,
including Frantisek Tomasek,
Archbishop of Prague, Eduard
Goldstuecker, a Communist
party Central Committee mem-
ber and Vilibald Bezdicek, the
Czechoslovak Minister of Educa-
tion. .
' A society spokesman noted
that the group was dedicated
to the: same ideals as are all
-other humanitarian organize
-
lions in a Democratic .,com-
`ti
unity.
' "Disbanded" By Action
' ilowever, an Interior Ministry
CPYRGHT
1ecree alleged that "the actIV1-
lies of the Society for Human
Rights" prove that it is funda-
mentally . ?. fulfilling the func-
;ion of a political organization
)ctively working . within the
?onulation.
CTK, the Czechoslovak news
igency, published without fur-
tier clarification that the de-
:ree published today has "not
(et come into force."
Nonetheless, the society
Tokesman tonight commented
hat the group had been "dis-
)anded" by the government
iction.
Vendetta Carried Out
The ban is just one of count.'
.ess blows which the Czechosio-
,ak authorities have recently'
'truck against the short-lived
.reedom the people enjoyed:
during the liberalization initiatA
by Alexander Dubcek, the
"omer party leader.
Sifice Gustav Husak replaced
Kr. Dubcek last month, the par-.
v's orthodox wing has been al,
lowed to ? carry out Vendetta:
gainst legions of journalists,
?ducators, intellectuals, work-
Ts, labor union leaders and par-
y official who were responsible i
last year's democratic
on Program.
Adopted A Year Ago
The program, which was
dopted as official party policy
t a Central Committee meeting
ist a year ago, has passed into
irblivion and Czechoslovak news-'
? apers have either been silenced
intirely or turned into propagan-
I :a organ by the new regime.
Yesterday, the Czechoslovak
? ress boss announcedt hat the
;overnment is "now trying
iduce publishers to exert great-
a' influence" over the new they
mint "not fly to suppress
armful material but also to win
ctive Oppork' . ? for state
.1,.? ?
7
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,Czech Offictal'A sks Further poete Liberals}
pVR(HTIAul, HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times
PRAGUE,. Julie IT?The ris-
ing leader of conservatives
in the Czechoslovak Corninu-
Mat apparatus, Dr. Lubomir
Strougal, announced today -a
campaign of further purges of
liberals.
, Personnel changes in party
bodies "must take place," Dr.
'Strougal Wrote in Rude Pravo,
the main Communist news-
paper, because some members
were "asses" while others were
"resorting even to obstruction-
ism."
Dr. Strougal's call for a new
shake-up in the party's struc- The party statement eh
tures after the recent gains by defeat the political platform or served that "right-wing viel,v.s,
conservative factions followed these forces, to isolate their and positions,' mean-ng
a party statement yesterday representatives, to split their eralism, had "influenc-d pi
urging the apparatus in bell'. centers of organization and to radii-- large section bf
Commu-
nists.
!,WHTcluding Commu-
Strougal Demands Continua'
Tightening of Press Curbs
and Personnel Shifts
restrict their possibilities of in-
fluencing public. npininn "
The Bureau disclosed that it
had re-examined the situation
of the Press and other informa-
tion media, apparently with a
cose language to curb Commu- view, to tightening censorship.
nist liberalism. The bureau announced that
it had suspended the party
'
The statement 'was issued by memn,bearsphiogre p
progressive sivLe writer
Paachd-
the national Central Commit- ma
tee's Bureau for the Czech Re- chess 'Champion, who had re-
gions, which is headed by Dr. cently denounced the conserva-
Strougal. A separate party tive line in an unauthorized
r
organization exists for the rally of foundry workers in
Slovak part of the country.
It is now the party's task,
the Czech statement said, "to
Ostrava. Suspension is a milder
party censure than outright ex-
pulsion. -
NEW YORK TIMES
9 June 1
'Prague, A /ter Brief Relaxation,
Tightening Security Measures'
By PAUL HMO, 414'Ti0,4?11141-
PYRGHT Special to The NeYk'orkniee
PRAGUE, June 8?European
diplomats here say that Czech-
oslovak security measures have
been noticeably *ightened late-
According to tl.ese sources,
embassies and ci nsulates in
Prague and other foreign?not
only Western?agencies and
individuals are being as closely
watched as before the short-
lived liberalization last year.
Czechoslovaks who work for
foreign employers or are known
to have other international
,connections also are again
coming in for much attention
from security agencies, it is
understood.
While tourists and business
visitors from abroad continue
to receive a friendly welcome
in .casual contacts with the
hospitable and jovial people,
Czechoslovaks are again wary
of associating _with foreigners
who might cause them trouble.
"Don't call me?I'll call you,"
Is the rule for the Czechoslovak
dealing with an alien, and if
the call is actually put through,
It is likely to be from a pay
telephone. ?
T1.. '1;r1^"'"C' -i?areneaa at
more stringent security follows
recent appeals by Communist
party spokesmen and the
press for a stepped up fight
against "enemy intelligence."
The sources of the alleged spy-
ing and plotting are usually de-
fined as "antisocialist forces."
At the same time the Com-
munist party apparatus, now
firmly controlled by pro-Soviet
conservatives, is extolling the
work of security forces, ob-
viously including a reorganized
secret police, and deploring that
they were hampered and sub-
ject to harsh criticisms by
liberals last year.
Heightened vigilance over
foreign activities in Czecho-
slovakia was reportedly ad-
vocated also . during the last
plenary meeting of the Com-
munist party's Central Com-
mittee May 29 and 30. The
federal Minister of Interior, Jan
Pelnar, who is in charge of the
police, is understood to have
called for increased watchful-
ness. His speech, said to have
been Very detailed, has not
beeri.published, ?
? ? .
lii toc14)es nuae rravo ar-
.
that "a serious destruction of
valid Marxist,- Leninist prin-
ciples and values took place"
during last year's liberaliza-
tion.
Dr. Strougal is in Moscow;
together with Dr. Gustav
Husak, the party head, at the)
international Communist con-
ference, whicb closed today.
Dr. Strougal, who is 44 years
'old, was named deputy to Dr.
Husak two weeks ago and is
widely considered his rival.
Last week Dr. Strougal made
an unannounced trip back to;
Prague while Dr. Husak ap-
parently stayed on in Moscow. I
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NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1969
r Impassive Bohemian
Lubomir Strougal
ovE,69hegew York "rimeli
tad-MalCi' May 29?The
muccular =turps.
nist party chief of Bohemia-
Moravia, Lubomir Strougal,
had a reputation for tough-
ness even as a 19-year-old
law student at the end of the
World War II when he went
into the streets of Prague to
cheer the Soviet liberators.
Now, at 45, Dr.
Man
Strougal is a lead-
er of the "new
realists,, who are
News convinced that
Czechoslovakia' s
fate hinges on good relations
with Moscow. His name is
still a byword for toughness.
Lately he has kept up a
denunciation of "petit bour-
geois" and "nationalist" cur-
rents and pressed for stern
measures to curb lingering
.dissent in the news media
: and among intellectuals and
. students. ?
The public oratory of
Dr. Strougal (pronounced
STRO-gahl) is hard on listen.
ers and newspaper readers,
, full of Marxist-Leninist jar-
gon and lacking the folksy'
humor that Czechoslovak
audiences like..
? :Students cif ft:zeal:ram&
power shifts have always
.considered Dr. Strougal a
'model functionary of the
party apparatus.
' He has survived the Stalin
era, de-Stalinization, last,
year's liberal "Prague
spring," the Soviet-led inva.;
United Press International
A survivor of many a -
political upheaval.
there will be a scarcity of
policemen, people remarked
in 1961 when Dr. Strougal
took over the Interior Minis-
try, which controls the police.
No dearth of policemen and
informers was observed dur-
ing the nearly four years that
Dr.. Strougal remained Inte-
ntion Miniiitier. Altinatiim INTB--
-votny, -a 'holdover from the
Stalin era, was then President
and party leader.
As Mr. Novotny came un- '
der increasing criticism from
party ranks, Dr. Strougal
went back into the corridors
of power at Communist head-
sion of August, and the ,fall, , quarters.
r
of Alexander Dubcek in, He served as a secretary of ,
,April. Looking impassive the Central Committee, as
hind 'his eyeglasses, the ' be -
-
chairman of its committees
1..'
i
bushy-haired south Bohemian,
on legal questions, agricul-
has become politically
tune and standard of living.
,,stronger all the time.
?
In the hectic days at the end
Butt of Sardonic Jokes of 1967, Dr. Stroup]. was
Dr Strougal was born on mentioned as a possible suc-
cessor to Mr. Novotny, but
Oct. 24, 1924, at Veseli nad is said to have declined as
iLuznici, northeast of BudweiS., did other prudent party lead- '
i He is married, and a brother ers. The post went to Mr.;
' works in the government's
only 35, Czechoslovaks noted drive started.
ers. In inner party councils, ,
as a Deputy Premier, but kept.
his distance from the reform-
Dubcek, and the liberalization '
government in March, 1968, ,
Dr. Strougal rejoined the
foreign trade agency.
There are the usual sar- ,
donic Prague jokes about Dr. ,
Strougal's political fortunes.
When he was made Agricul-
ture Minister et the age of .
he, reportedly warned against
no; their 1 staple tasuig
h
r! Last November, Dr. Strou- ?
'gal was given a new post,
:and he quickly transformed
;It into a personal power base.
? Czechoslovakia was about ,
i'to be reorganized as a feder-
ation of two semiautonomous
units, the Czech and Slovak
republics. This bolstered the
;old Slovak party, which had _,,'
,retained a separate identity. I
,. The Czechoslovak leader. -'
; ship and its Soviet advisers
'thought that some counter- -
part must be created in the -
Czech section of the country. 4.,
Compromise Emerged 2
0
Unwilling to set up an in-, .
dependent Czech partyor-
ganization, the party theor.?
lsts devised a compromise,
creating a new agency,
1 named Bureau of the Czech- , oslovak Communist party for ."
the Management of Party
Work in the Czech Lands.
' The Czech ? lands are Bo-
hemia, including Prague? and,
lirci?.tv la., vistimt 11(1) milli= ad .
he ccrantrfs 14 Million peo- -
pie live. When Dr. Strougal
gave up the deputy premier- ,
ship last January, ostensibly i
to devote himself fulltime to ,1
,the Czech lands, he was
:ready one of the most power-
ful men in the nation.
1 He was considered a can-
didate for succession to .Mr.
?Pubcek, reportedly favored ,
,by Moscow over Dr. Gustak
Husak, the Slovak national-
ist, who eventually won the
:post on April 17.
\ Since then Dr. Strougal
.has purged the Bohemian
'and Moravian regional and
, 'local party organizations, de.
Moting or ousting liberals.
that ateatt
..
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NEW YORK TIMES
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'HUSH ADVOCATES
FIRM PARTY RULE
Sets Aim in Opening Talk
to Central Commktee
YR RATA. HOFMANN
SPeelal to The Noy, Tork ?thus
YKAUUZ, May 29 ? Di.
Gustav Husak, the Czechoslo-
vak Communist leader, ad-
vocated "the restoration of the
leading role of. the party" at
the opening of a Central Corn-
'mittee meeting here today.
iThe session of the party's
180-member policy body began
at Hradcany Castle amid spec-
ulation on leadership changes.
Most Czechoslovaks appeared
to expect that the meeting, the
first to be held since Dr. Husak
succeeded Alexader Dubcek
as party leader on April 17,
would indicate a hardening of
policies toward news media, in-
tellectuals, students, dissidents
and the trade unions.
The decisions will be an-
nounced after the end of the
session, probably tomorrow
night.
According to a publiihed
summary of Dr. Husak's open-
ing statement at the closed par-
ty meeting, he called for a re-
assertion of party dominance
in government administration,
economy and culture.
Bloc Relations a Topic
He also declared that the.
committee would discuss the
party's relations with "fraternal.
Communist parties of the Soviet
Union and the other socialist
countries that represent the
basis of our foreign policy."
Dr. Hnsak will lead the
Czechoslovak delegation to the.
world conference of Commu-
nist parties in Moscow, sched-
uled to begin on June 5.
A highly qualified source
said the Soviet Union was
"most eager" to obtain from
the Czechoslovak party a for-
mal declaration justifying the -
invasion of Czechoslovakia last '
August on the ground that
socialism had been threatened ,
by "counterrevolutionary",
_forces.. .
CPYRGHT
Moscow wants to obtain
such a statement from Prague
before the world conference,
the source affirmed. The source
said that Dr. Husak had so far
resisted these pressures.
Strougal a Rising Star
In his report Dr. Husak was
said to have urged "the res-
toration of party unity." This
was understood as an implicit
acknowledgement of continuing
feuds within the party between
progressives, conservatives and
other factions.
The chairman at the proceed-
ings was Dr. Lubornir Strougal,.
the 45-year-old conservative
twho heads the party apparatus
In Bohemia and Moravia. He
is widely regarded as a rising
[star and a possible rival to Dr.
Husak.
Dr. Strougal presided in his
capacity as a member of the
party's ruling Presidium. The
chairmanship rotates amon
the 11 Presidium members.
A number of party and gov-
ernment officials and the edi-
tors in chief of Communist
newspapers were admitted as
invited guests.
While the Communist leader-
ship met in the baroque Span-
ish Hall of the brooding castle
high above the capital, Roman
Catholic prelates and a congre-
gation estimated at 3,000 per-
sons gathered in the adjoining
St. Vitus Cathedricl, at a req-
itilem mass for Josef Cardinal
teran.
Mourners walked into the
Gothic church past rows of the
squat black Tatra limousines of
party officials in the courtyard
of the castle.
' Cardinal Beran, exiled Arch-
bishop of Prague who spent
17 years in Nazi and Commu-
nist prisons, died in Rome
May 17.
The requiem mass was con-
celebrated by the Apostolic Ad-
ministrator of Prague, Bishop
Frantisek Tomasek, and three
other Bohemian bishops. A bust
Of the dead cardinal was in
front of the main altar. Rela-
tives of Cardinal Beran and
Western diplomats also attend-
ed the rite.
ic
ApproVirerrarRETUM-r999109162-7CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
4 WAtH1NCRON POST',
5 June 1969 ?
ose z
Offici
cpyRGH
n
By Dan Morga
T. ?
? wasaington Post Foreign service a
fPRAGUE, June 4?Dr. 1:ran-
itisek Kriegel is purported tO
shave told Czechoslovakia's
;Communist Party Central
'Committee Friday, right be.
fore his expulsion from that
'body, that those responsible
for murder and torture in the
,19504, and economic crisis
now, still retain their seats on
I
? According to a text circulat-
ing here, Kriegel noted that
"until now no one has been
41 21
?
er
Lsyri
lcuite.s
r Czech Ills
'chalked, "Bravo, Mr. Kriegel." t1st year. He was the first to'
Under present censorship .be forced off the uuocex lead-
and tightening restrictions on ;ership team. He now heads a
diggerni naHnn ,nf infrtrmoHory ;Pragiu.
fit was impossible to authenti- Among those he said were
cate the speech, but it was responsible for present prob.
:judged to be authentic in both lems were former Premier
;official and unofficial quart- (Josef Lenart, former Deputy
ers.
Premier Otokar Simunek and
Aside from charging con- Jiri Hendrych, a protege of,
servatives with co-responsibil- discredited Party leader An-
ity for the present crisis, Dr. tonin Novotny. Kriegel indi-
Kriegel said the invasion via- cated that all were responsible
'Iated the Soviet Union's deli- for the present situation.
'nition of aggression siibmitted
' ha the past few weeks, a
as an adjunct to the United large number of Party oft!-
dismissed from the Central I? He said also that the Czech
eials from the Novotny era
Committee who had direct re- roslovak question, which the
: According to observers, the
Kriegel speech sent the
plenum into turmoil, shocked
the leadership and forced an
adjournment. It occurred just
at the moment when Party;
chiefs were laying down a new
I policy forbidding criticism of
'Party actions before or after
Ithey are taken.
After meeting privately for
a few minutes, the 11-man rul-
ing Presidium returned and
Husak, reportedly furious, an-
nounced that Kriegel's ouster.'
not only from the Central;
Committee, but also from the
Party, had been proposed.
Though some , remainingi
' moderates thought the speech,
would rally support against,
the conservative deluge, only;
23 voted against the Kriegel'
expulsion and 18 abstained.
The Party body has more than'
180 members.
Shortly afterwards five'
more liberals were expelled,
from the Central Committee. ;
? The next day, in a nation-,
wide television speech, Hunk;
bitterly ridiculed Kriegel, say.:
Lug, "We will not kill anybodybut neither '
..7,! 71,!. 1,:g1.1.14
have returned to high posts.
sponsibility for the fact that
dozens of people met an un-
worthy death at the hands of
the hangmen," or for the fact
that "thousands were con-
demned for long years of tor-
ture and prison on the basis of
their accusations
These remarks, in which he
also defended his opposition
to the legalization ef the pres-
ence of Soviet troops in Czech-
oslovakia, resulted in his ex-
pulsion from the Party on the
spot?after 38 years?and a
bitter denunciation from the
Party leader, Gustav Husak.
pro-Soviet leadership here
wants to keep off the agenda
of the Moscow conference of
Communist parties, which
opens Thursday, was highly
pertinent and should be dis-
cussed there.
"Our delegates and the 'Pre-
sidium of the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia ask
other parties not to deal with
the August events in the
1CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist
IRepublier the text said, "It
even uses the, words the so-
, called Czechoslovak events,' Is
someone trying to say that Au-
gusts 1968, was no event at
The plenary sitting certified! , all?"
,Czechoslovakia's return to the; I ? Dr. Kriegel, 61; who fought
,doctrine of democratic central-
ism and orthodox Marxism-
Leninism.
In view of the rapid return
of authoritarian control over
Party and state in the last few
weeks, Kriegel's speech was
against Franco in Spain and
later against Hitler, was one
of those members of deposed
Party Chief Alexander Dub-
'cek's Presidium seized by So-
viet troops on the night of
. Aug, 20. He is something of a
11 as an act of courage. Thc: national hero. The Soviet au-
text of what is purported to be! ; thorities released him on ,the
ais opening statement was eir-, demand of President Ludvik
ulating widely in Prague at :Svoboda. a
he highest level. . : Dr. Kriegel, who is Jewish,
It was also posted in varioust was the target of "anti-Zion-
Ist" propaganda in the ortho-
nstitutes at Charles Univer-
ty and on one wall dowfl.I ;dox . Eastern European press
town the Inscription was
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"IL
WASH=
5 June
CP
ON POST
oved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
_ .
ech's Vs ledietory: Les ders Isolated'
:Following is the text of the We can take one sphere'.
speech purportedly , given 14 after another from our eco.;
Dr. Frantisek Kriegel before nomic and social life and
.the Central Committee of the.' ask who is responsible, who;
Czechoslovak C o in in un let 1, 'carries the coresponsibility,
Party last Friday immediately = for the present unhappy sit-
before his ouster from the' uation.
Committee and from the' . It is no secret that here in
:Party after 38 years: '.' , this room there sit a num-
, ;+ ;bee of members who for
years held responsible lead-
ing of the Central Commit- ,ing positions in our public
te will consider that sew life, and they cannot avoid;
egal comrades be dropped the responsibility, or at least
frbm the Central Commit- :the coresponsibility, for all
the things which our public:
tee, and I among them. This'
is so angrily criticizing ,
is because I voted against today.
5Comrades: Today's' meet-
' the treaty for the temporary ) 'I heard with interest Com-
stationing of Soviet troops rade Krajcir's (former Trade'
on the territory of our re-' , Minister and protege of the;
public. Through this .I ex* ; former Party leader An.
.+ceeded Party discipline. ' ' tonin Novotny) comments-
.; First, I would like to yesterday. I was confounded'
'make a few comments. The by his short memory. In the
, 'suggestion says' nothing., documents of the Central'
' about which body decided Committee the critical eco-
this treaty, and so far as I.' nomic situation is mem;
know it was nota formal de... tidned. Does Comrade-
cision taken at the meeting Krajcir believe that he.,
:of the Party's parliamentary. "ministered" for 20 years,
,caucus. ' that he was vice premier;
; I would like the Presid; and for year after year ai
''.
.ium to explain this aspect. member of the Central Corn-'
1
. cumstances opposed to prin.,
'Furthermore I would like
mittee without sharing re-:, .ciples of coexistence of so.
'to call the attention of the., 1
sponsibility for the crisis. cialist people' and Interne-
,
' Central Committee to ,the
fact that until now no one Names Comrades Atonal documents. 1
:has been dismissed from the f ?
treaty for temporary station. ! To these acts belong
+bag of troops in the CSSR. It )'bombardments or shootings,
is known that I refused to ,0n the territory of the peo-;
,sign . the so-called MoSeow 'pie of another state."
' ^ 1 I voted against the treaty
1 0 ?
Protocol.
'Explains Opposition : 4 as deputy (of the Federal
i . I refused' because I saw In :National Assembly) in uni-':
4
,it a document which corn- Non with feelings and wishes'
:?pletely bound the hands of,
our republic. I refused it, 1
:of 'the vast majority of the.:
therefore, since everything' ,electors and citizens of this
, happened in the atmosphere, 'country. ,
,of military occupation with.' Occupation Opposed
,out the benefit of consulta-, ',' '
?
tion with constitutional hod.; Apart from this, we know
les and in contradiction to! '
the feelings of the people of . . -
that the military occupation
this country. ; ;some significant Communist
of the CSSR was rejected by'
Then when the treaty was 1 parties. which are in power,:
,presented to the National; ;and :many Communist par.;
Assembly for ratification, I :ties in' capitalist countries',1
Voted against it, as ' this :including the most impor-$
'?
:tant.' '
treaty was in contradiction ' ,
to the principles of interne,: We know that even the
tional coexistence and to the congresses of several Par.
tenets of the Warsaw Pact.1 les for example the Ital.:
' The treaty lacks specifi-1 iians, condemned the odcupa.'
ally the basis of a nor'mal r,, 'Lion of the CSSR by the,
agreement; that is, that it be: troops of the Warsaw Peat
,,
signed voluntarily. The ,No : one can lie about the
.
treaty was signed in an at- fact that the military occu-,
mosphere of political and t potion severely damaged in.
power coccion under cir- ternational communism in
'f?the eyes of the world public,.
. and proved that the socialsit
;countries were incapable of
:solving their disagreements
' on the basis of peaceful co.
existence.
.1 Torced to Sign
'Central Committee who had Present also are .Com '
!rade t Hendrych, Simunek, :
It was signed in the pres.
;direct responsibility or was : enart and many other for-,:
primarily responsible . for: L , ence of hundreds of thou-
, mer functionaries who led sands of foreign troops and
thy death at the hands of'
:the fact that dozens of Irmo-
. ,this country for years. Don't
.-
' these people have responsi-: ' a huge military-technical an'
:cent people met an unwor-
tthe ? hangman; that thou-- bility for the present situa-,: senal. The treaty was not
sands and tens of thousands'
tion? ' ' signed with pens, but with
''.
were condemned to long rade Hendrych was; , the muzzles of cannons and
) ?
I 1 Com (
':years of torture and prison for years the second?and, . machine guns. 1
through his activity and In-:: ' In this connection let us,
%tions, and many of them met fluence practically the first cite the Soviet Union's defi-!
'on the basis of their accusa-
1?man in this state. Ha S he+ `nition of aggression, which.
'their end in prison without ibility?
I ever having seen the light of" .no respons
i ,it recently presented to the',
; ) To load all this on the. United Nations. It says, "Ant
!freedom. .
+ i post-January period is much ;armed aggression, direct or
Stresses Responsibility 'too transparent a maneuver. Indirect, is the employment:
I
Until now, likewise, no Ihere 'T are attempts to shift , of the armed power of the
one has been removed from ,
c. -
responsibility onto otheg. ;initiator ? state against an.
t
the Central Committee for': people, but these can't sue-:'other state, in contradiction
his responsibility for the ..ceed. Thervis too little time' :to goals, principles and reg-
protracted economic crisis .for me to talk of large prob. 'ulations of the U.N. Charter.,
which has led us to the pros: lems, but everyone knows Such acts, insofar as the m-
eat situation, and which can-
i-
,What I am talking about. :tiatdr state carries them
not be altered by palming I. Of Course, tough sanctions f:
through without a declare-
off the causes on the last,' are conversely demanded ',eon of war, are an ' armed
; against opponents of the' 'Aggression." ' .,
few months of last year. . ,s
2
ADDrovcd For Rclmcc 1999/09/02 ? CIA RDP79 01194A000600090001 2
;Sees NATO Strengthened,
It characterized the pie-
ture of the inner contradic-,
'lions of the Communist,
;movement, which are so
manifest in the Sino-Soviet,
:conflict, and which do con-
flict, and demonstrated the
:disunity of views between.
'several members of the War.;
, saw Pact and a. large num-
ber of outside Communist,
parties.
, The occupation by War.,
saw Pact troops undoubt-,
, edly slowed the disintegra-
tion tendencies in NATO'.
and actually strengthened;
the influence of the United
States of America in NATO.
In this connection allow me
to make several comments
on. the document prepared:
for the 'Moscow conference,
of world Communist parties., ?
?
, r (
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
OM' delegates and the'.
-Presidium of the Conamu-.
? nist Party of Czechoslovakia:
? ask other parties not to deaL
.With the August events in.
'the CSSR. It even uses the:
(words "the so-called Czecho-
'slovak events." Is someone,
'trying to say that August,1
11968, was no event a tall?,
In the draft proposal fait'
the Moscow conference It,,
.,:was said that the deVe1op,4
'Mont of socialism in one'
.country is a matter for thei
',Nvhole movement. If this Is,
Ise, then one cannot forbid;
I other parties to express'.
their views on the August,.
;events in the cssrt.
It is incumbent upon the;*;
. (entire international move-
ment that it adopt a definite,
stand assuring against a rep-
etition; of the events in the
CSSR.
? (v.
Beyond Czechoslovakia -
This is not just a Czecho-?',.
'slovak affair. It, is true RI
, concerns us first, but it also
concerns .principles?of the.'
;right of one or several coun-
tries to exploit their advan-
tage as stronger powers to
, coerce the weaker?arid in,'
, this the August events ex-
ceeded the realm of Czechozi
.(1
slo.vakia. .
_ .
The .problem exceeds thel
-borders of our country. It Is]
:not by chance that Para,
'graphs 13 :and 47, Chapter.
IV, of' the proposed docud
.tnent for the Moscow nego-j
liations are so formulated tel
read: "The participants ofi
the consultations confirm
the unity of their views on
the point that the basis of
mutual relations between
?fraternal parties are prole-
terian internationalism, soli-
darity and mutual support0
respect for independence
fond equality, mutual nonin-
terference in internal af-t
fairs. The principle of the,
maintenance of these prinei-
pies is an important condi-
tion for the development of :I
'comradely cooperation be-(
,tween the brotherly Parties,
Or the. consolidation of
unity of the Communist(
movement." ,0
It would be just as appro-
priate to cite a few more of
these clauses from the doeu-,
ment, but I will limit myself 1
to this one quote.
Ouster Unjustified
? . :
In connection with the
suggestion for my removal.;
from the plenary I wouldfj
like to say this:
I consider the proposal.;
*unjustified. The goal is!
!transparent and aimed fur-i
ther than my person. It is`,
'well known that the devel-
opments of the recent ;
months and weeks have',
raised fear and doubt de.:'
spite explanations that we ;
:will fulfill the post-January"(
'policy. The series of tied:,
slons by lower Party organs,
:the ' reconstruction of the,
Party apparatus, the tough
":purge which is being carried
, out in various institutions',
"and in the apparatus, extend:
past January, 1968. .,
, f
. Isolated From People . 1
,
i .They mean a wide-reach.'
lIng rdstoration process of etc
:forts to legalize August.
,Only - experiences can co&
"iviee the people. For the me.:
ment, ;however, I assume the
?i
.negative echo of the people,
the Party and the.non-Party
group is are no secret to lood-'i
;era in Party and govern-
ment. ? f
The tempo is quickeningf
lto'the point where the Party'
Is isolated from the people,
the leadership is isolated.'
from the Party members, sol,
that the Party changes froio,
?a moral and political leading!
i.force to an institution which";
'Is? almost exclusively,,; al
1,power organization. ?,,,
i ? Inasmuch as my Party?
discipline goes, comrades, I:
.have proved myself to you i
,after 38 years of Party mem-
Irbership, under ' eircumstAl
iances historically and per-i
!aonally very complicated.
f... I don't accept the eharge:,!
Cof violating discipline and I,.
I, do not agree with the pro-;
;;posal for , my dismissal, I.!
',have stated' my position sot
,Ithat ? no further errors are:
made by those In this room';
who far too often have,1
(raised ? their hands in ap-
proval mistakenly. , ?? . 1
.? The history of the past
two decades . is rich in MI
,warnings 'of tragic experiq
'Le,ncesc,?? ,,,,;,'.10..z--;; utr,):..,' 4/,
New nik Times,
? 3 June 1969 ?
?
Prague Concedes
CPYRG:171 TAN, HOFMANN
SpecIal to The New York 'Meg
.441144e) 4-zle
Won to Its Soviet Policy
exAczue, June ne t.zecn-
osiovak Communist party con-
ceded today that last week's
pro-Moscow policy shift, re-
sulting in a purge of liberals
was meeting with opposition in
local units. ? ? ?
? The party reported some dif-
ferences of views in the
Prague'city organization, which
js headed by a well-known pro-
gressive 'Communist. Bohumil
Simon. ?. ?
Approved For Release
However, the top leadership
maclo it pj rk that party dis-
cipline would La A...0.1j at-
forced on regional and local
levels through what is official-
ly termed "democratic central-
ism," meaning dominance by
national headquarters and its
apparatus over the "rank and
file.
Party officials and members
at large who faild to endorse
the pro-Soviet line face cen-
sure or expulsion, which is how
the Central Committee dealt
with dissenters in its midst last
week. ?
1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011
3
Ram cc'a Acts
The Central Committee's ex-
?Vripi,-4'e pany vows-
paper, Rude Pravo, declared
today, is to belollowed by of-
ficials on all lower levels of
the party leadership. These of-
ficials, the paper said are ex-
pected to 'restore the party's
life on the basis of Marxist-
,LenIst principles as soon as
possible, and to act as resolute-
ly as the supreme 'party body"
and in accordance with Corn-'
munist principles. -
Meanwhile, the central party
apparatus was understood to
have started today at least
Nita
941 s
1461viet-led ?August. '
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 19
One inquiry was into the
activities of two Central Com-
mittee members, Gen. Vaclav
Prchlik and Milan Hub!.
General Prchlik, who was
in charge of the Communist
party's security, services,
caused irritation in Moscow
when he publicly advocated a
reorganization of the Warsaw.
Pact alliance last July, charg-
ing that it wai dominated by'
Soviet military leaders.
Sill OnCentral Conunittee
. .
Under Soviet pressure, Gen-
eral Prchlik was removed from
his sensitive post three weeks
before the invasion. He has re-
mained a Central Committee,
member.
Mr. Hubl has been in charge
of the central school for party
officials. ?
Another party inquiry con-
cerns the involvement of 'party
members in the document
"2,000 Words," a manifesto
that appeared ;est June. It'
urged more rapid progress in'
the liberalization movement
Central Committee members
who signed the document were
reprimanded or expelled last
week. ? . . .
? The third investigation ex-'
amines the activities of Gov-,
ernment members who were
abroad during the invasion and
failed to return home at once.
Foremost among them Is former
Foreign Minister %lid Hajek, a
Central Committee ;limber.
Former Vice Premier Ota
who also was abroad last Aug-
ust, was expelled from the
Central Committee last Friday.
9/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
NEW YORK TIMES
29 May 1969
PRO-SOVIET RALLY'
BARRED IN PRAGUE
'Longshoremen Seize a Hall
to Prevent Meeting
qPYgGika, HOFIV1ANN
Speclat to The New Ter& Thus
PRAGUE, May 28 ? Long-
shoremen occupied a union hall
In the northern outskirts of
Prague tonight to prevent a
planned pro-Soviet rally.
About 150 would-be partici-'
: pants in the meeting, sched-
uled to commemorate Czecho-
slovakia's liberation by Soviet
forces in World War II, milled
in front of the two-story union
hall and then reboarded five
buses that had brought them to
the hall.
Some of the frustrated visi-
tors looked as if they had been
brought in from the country.
They included middle-aged
women, one carrying a bunch
of red flowers, which she took
away with her.
Jeering by Workers
There was some jeering from
workers inside the hall who
crowded the windows. Later a
scuffle flared in front of the
hall, but was quickly broken up
by four policemen who seized a
young man and took him away
in a radio car.
I Only 20 uniformed policemen
guarded the area In the Liben
district around a shipyard on
the Vltava River that builds
dredges and river craft.
Persons outside the hall said
that the workers would not
,allow the meeting to be held
because they had not been pre-
viously informed of it.
? When an American news-
man tried to enter the hall, a
man in plainclothes told union
personnel that no outsider must
be admitted because of the
danger of "provocation."
The incident at the shipyard
followed a Communist party
warning against "anti-Soviet
hysteria, one of the most dan-
gerous forms of antisocialism."
Public Support Urged -'
The party appealed also for
support of the security police
against espionage and crime.
The appeal was contained in
a report from a session of the
party committee of the Interior
Ministry. A resolution praised
members of the Interior Minis-
try who "defended Marxism-, kellik
Leninism, proletarian interna-
tionalism, socialist patriotism
and friendship with the Soviet
Union" last August, only to be
unjustly slandored.
The Czechoovak radio apol-
ogized on Itil.r.?:,ty to policemen
it said it ha,, slandered when
they were d,:?iiounced as col-
aborators and traitors last'
August. The party resolution
from the Ministry of Interior
,declared that this apology had
come very late and was hardly
sufficient.
The public assertiveness of
the ,security services came on
the eve of a plenary meeting
of the Central Committee to-
morrow that is expected to
mark a hardenling of the posi-
tion of the Prague regime.
The new party head, Dr. Gus-
tav Husak, is scheduled to give
the main report at the meeting,
the first to be held since ho
csucceeded Alexander Dubceh
as First Secretary on April 17.
4
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
NEW YORK TIMES
17 June 1969
'FLOOD OF LETTERS :
4141ORRY111GPRAGUE
Party Assails Campaign to
Circulate Liberal Views
?
C ,. YMatlat. NIL?yort Tu. ,
IlAOUE, Acne 16 ? Tti,v
Czechoslovak Communist party
,showed concern today oyer the
letter writing Campaign that is
going on as a way of registering
opposition to the new Con-
., servative pro-Moscow regime.,
, !Rude Pravo, the main party
newspaper, acknowledged that
it was receiving a spate of
anonymous mail "full of anti4-
socialist poison and anger."
Most of these messages, the
'newspaper said, gloomily pre-
'dieted the return to conditions
!prevailing before January,
11968, meaning the era of for-
!Eller President Antonin -Novot-
ny,lif or even the nineteen-fit-
Ales," the years , when Stalinist
;terror was lingering on in
!Czechoslovakia longer than in
Imost other Communist coun-
tries.
Rude Pravo challenged the
senders of such letters to sign
them "if they think they are
right."
Foreign embassies and many
domestic agencies, offices, en-
terprises and private individ-
uals also are known to be
recipients of a flood of political
i messages expressing criticism
of the present party leadership.
flot all of this materiEd is anon?
-
ymous. ?..,.,
'Speeehes Reproduced
3 Many of these letters repro- ,
duce opposition speeches by
liberal Communists that the
; controlled party press fails to
t publish. ?
It is hard, to determine how
twideIy this semiciandestine lit-
erature is being circulated, but
longtime residents with a large
circle of acquaintances affirm
that it is reaching the majority
t- of the active population,-espe.'
[cially young people. ,
To speak, of the underground
press at this stage would be ad'
!,exaggeration. Most of the oppo
sition material in circulation Ii
i.typewritten with many carbon
copies on onion-skin paper,.I
'Isome mimeographed. Very little;
s printed.
The political dissidence In.
4udes caustic poetry, black
rhumor and taped "resistance
songs" by local folk artists.
; Trustworthy informants re-
' port that the political letters
; are being openly read and dia-
, Cussed by groups of workers in
?factory canteens during lunch
!or beer breaks. ? I
e The central leadership of the
metalworkers union urged
r members last Saturday to dis-
sociate themselves from "sedi-
tious" opposition pamphlets
that it said were being illegally
'icircubited, in industrial plants,
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HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Helsinki
5 June 1969 Pravda:
Oik isto taktikoi
CP8 okouksessa
(Translation)
CPYRGHT
PRAVDA:
xao6ktrv a, 4. 8. (MT) NMI. vver-
tolitton kommunistipuolueen
?n-
kannattaja Pr adv ilmoitti kes-
kiviikkona Iyhyesti Suomen sosi-
aalidemokraattisen puolueen, tule-
vast& puoluekokouksesta. Lehtl
tyytyi enimmalta osalta ,.lainaa-
mann Paiviin Sanomia. Aimee
?kammentti sisaltyi kirjoituksen ot-
sikkoon "Oikeisto taktikoi".
Pradva vlittasl suomalaisiin leh-
tilausunteihin ja totesl, etta puo---
luekokonksen taytyy antaa Vas.
thus kysymykseen, jatkavatko so-
sialidemokraatit joitakin vuosia
Mitten alottettua myantoista kehi-
tysta vai onnistuuko puolueen oi-
keistosiiven estaa se.
Kirjoituksessa todettiin Paivan
Sanomia lainaten, ettei oikeistosii-
pi, johon kuuluvat Burman, Pit-
sinki, Karkinen, Korvenhehno,
Wuokko, Puntila, Mimics jtie.,
"eptirOi menna sille kommunismin
ja Neuvostolitton vas-taiselle lin-
jalle, iota puolue seitrasi kaikille
tutun Tannerin johdolla". Oikeistol
plirit yrittavat nyt saada oman
miehensa puoluesiluteerin paikalla
ja toivovat lisaksi voivansa atheut-
tea Rafael Paasion eron, sanottiln
kirjoituksessa.
Otsikkoa lukuunottamatta ei kir..
joitukseert sisaltYnYt Pravdan arra& ,
komatemmia.
11?1.1.111111?111?11?1111S10
"RIGHTIST TACTICS AT THE SDP CONGRESS."
Moscow, 4 June (STT [Finnish News Service]). Pravda, organ of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, made a brief announcement Wednesday, 4 April con-
cerning the Finnish Social Democratic Party congress. The newspaper was
content for the most part to follow from Paivan Sanomat. The only commen-
tary was contained in the headline for the article: "Rightist Tactics."
Pravda referred to Finnish newspaper statements and affirmed that the
Congress will have to give an answer to the question: "Will the Social
Democrats continue the favorable development started a few weeks ago or
will the right wing of the party succeed in preventing this development?"
Borrowing from Paivan Sanonat, the article declared that the right wing,
which includes Burman, Pitsinki, Karkinen, Korvenheimo, Wuokko, Puntila,
Piimies, etc., "will not hesitate to embark on the anti-Communist and anti-
Soviet line which the party followed under the leadership of the notorious
Tanner." The article continued: "Right-wing circles will now try to get
their own man into the post of party secretary. They also hope to remove
Rafael Paasio from his post."
Apart from the headline, the article did not contain any of Pravda's
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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES THREATENED IN PERU
The recent arrests and deportation of Peruvian journalists and politicians
who have criticized the regime have led to mounting protests against the
government for measures it has taken to eliminate such criticism and thereby
failing not only to uphold the basic principle of freedom of the press, but
also failing to respect the constitutional guarantees of civil liberties.
The incident which aroused the most furor, both within Peru and elsewhere,
MRS the arrest and deportation of Enrique Zileri Gibson, publisher of the
biweekly magazine Caretas. Zileri was arrested, reportedly by about twenty
plainclothes policemen, on 24 May, the day after the 23 May - 12 June issue
of his magazine appeared on the newsstands. Copies of the magazine were
removed from the stands the day of his arrest, and further sales of that
edition were prohibited. It carried a rumor that had circulated in Lima for
more than two weeks that the military rulers had secretly authorized a thirty
per cent pay raise for the armed forces. Also, Zileri had criticized a
recently published law, by which certain senior military officers could be
"encouraged" to retire early and thereby create vacancies for younger officers,
on the basis that the government could use this as a means of getting rid of
its opponents within the armed forces.
Zileri was held incommunicado overnight and put aboard a flight to Lisbon
the following morning, reportedly without luggage, 'money or personal papers.
On his arrival in Lisbon, he claimed he had not even been questioned, nor had
he been given the "slightest explanation" for his deportation. In a later
press statement, issued in Madrid, Zileri denied the charges of conspiracy
made against him by the Peruvian Qovernment and dismissed the far-fetched
claim of the Minister of Interior, General Armando Artola Azcarate, that he
and Manual Ulloa, the exiled owner of the Lima paper Correo and former Finance
Minister, were involved in a conspiracy to bring about war between Peru and
Chile.
Zileri had been arrested once before, and his magazine was forced to
cease publication for a brief period. On that occasion the local journalists'
union staged a one-day sympathy strike and protest march against the Velasco
government's action. More recently the military regime issued warnings to
journalists against reporting on differences or divisions among the ruling
military officials. The warnings were formally rejected by the Peruvian
Journalists' Federation as a "threat to freedom of speech and attempts to place
the will of the military junta over and above the provisions of the nation's
Constitution and the press lay." The organization then reaffirmed its decision
to defend freedom of speech and stressed that freedom of the press is an
"attainment older and nobler than any government."
The Interior Ministry has tried to justify the Zileri expulsion on the
basis of national interest and in defense of national sovereignty and dignity.
The Ministry has been supported in its stand by the Cabinet, which has taken
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e
July 1969
the view that Zileri's expulsion must be considered within a political rather
than a juridical context, and therefore the government is obliged to defend
the "high national interests of the country."
The government's stand has served only to stir the press to further attacks,
and to arouse protest from numerous groups and organizations against the blatant
violation of press freedom and of constitutional guarantees. The Federation
of Peruvian Journalists has charged that the Minister of Interior has criminally
abused his authority and should be suspended. The Inter American Press
Association (IAPA) cabled Velasco that it was "shocked" by the deportation of
Zileri. Claiming that this action constitutes a violation of freedom of the
press, the IAPA expressed hope Velasco would use his "good offices" to bring
about the return of Zileri and to ensure that "this basic freedom is observed"
in Peru. In addition the IAPA referred indirectly to the situation in a state-
ment it issued to mark Freedom of the Press Day (attached).
On 10 and 11 June security police raided the printing plant of Caretas
and confiscated about 30,000 copies of the magazine that were to appear on the
newsstands on 12 June. Lima newspapers, including the pro-government El
Comercio, carried editorials deploring the government's action, and the Peruvian
Federation of Journalists denounced it as "an arbitrary measure...to censure
the press." In addition, the national federation, together with the Lima
journalists' organization, declared that Peruvian newsmen will hold staggered
strikes throughout the country "as the beginning of a movement of protest and
struggle against repeated viblations of freedom of the press."
An interesting and ironic sidelight in the Zileri case is that his mother,
who is co-editor of Caretas, asked Alberto Ruiz Eldridge, President of the
Lima College of Lawyers(which formally condemned Zileri's deportation), and
legal advisor to the Velasco government, to represent Zileri in bringing a writ
of habeas corpus before the local courts. Ruiz Eldridge rejected the request,
saying that Zileri's case was of no concern to him or to the bar association.
In a similar suit brought on behalf of Jose Maria de la Jara, Secretary-
General of the Popular Action Party, and Eudocio Ravines, a TV commentator,
both of whom were deported last February, the Peruvian courts ruled their
deportation was unconstitutional, and indicated they should be permitted to
return. Yet the press has reported that police officials at the Lima airport
have been instructed to prevent de la Jara from leaving the plane, should he
return, and de la Jara stated in Buenos Aires that the airlines have refused
to sell him a ticket to return to Peru. These reports thus contradict a
recent statement made by the Prime Minister, General Montagne, that both
individuals are free to return. The Lima newspaper Expreso has pointed out
that if these persons are not permitted to return, this will demonstrate that
the judiciary cannot assure that the junta will respect its decisions.
There have been rumors that the junta is ready to issue decrees which will
limit freedom of the press and ban political activity, but the strong protests
against its actions to date may have delayed this action.
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ANSA, Buenos Aires (in,Spanl -
12 JUNE 1969
CPYRGHT
NEWSMEN'S STRIKE
Lima, 12 %fume?Peruvian newsmen will hold staggered strikes throughout the
country as the beginning of a movement of protest and struggle against repeated
violations of freedos of the press." The decision was made by the Federation of
Journalists of Peru (PPP) and thi Federated Center of Journalists (CFP) of Lima.
The strikes will begin on 14 June. -
A joint communique released by the two federations states that *whereas the invest-
igative police at the service of the Interior Ministry raided the press shop of the
magazine CAMAS, confiscating a whole issue of the magazine and assailed newsmen
while they were performing their Jobs, thereby engaging in another grave attack on
freedom of the press and reaffirming the inadmisssble policy of flagrantly violating
the constitution, they resolve:
"To hold staggered strikes throughout the country starting on 14 June as the beginning
of a movement of protest and struggle. against repeated violations of freedom of the
press.
"To denounce the violations of freedom of the press by the military government to the
UN Human Rights Commission and the labor organizations- throughout the continent.
, "To demand the immediate return of the confiscated edition .of CARETAS magazine and the
elimination of all coercive measures against that magazine and journalism in general.
"To declare the executive committees of the PPP and the CFP of Lima in permanent session
With the narrieirn+inn or the ,.. gas& od V.LAWIT counciL,
,.,
WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
9 June 1969
c*G51rangied Press
CPYRGHT
most invidious repression of all. As one
Brazilian editor told TAPA: With sP1f-
A
EACH June, the Inter-American Press
Association (IAPA), an organization of
about 1,000 newspapers and magazines,
commemorates "Freedom of the Press
Day." This year, tragically, finds a
near record number of publications in
Latin America being strangled by total-
itarian governments.
"We are all aware," IAPA President
Agustin E. Edwards notes, "that the
Americas are going thru one of the
most restrictive periods in its history as
far as the fundamental freedom of the
press is concerned."
The main reason for Latin press cen-
sorship is a resurgence of militarism.
Eleven countries south of the border to-
day live under military rule, and almost
all suppress freedom of information
. with techniques ranging from the rapier
to the sledgehammer..
In a few countries, Brazil, Argentina,
and Paraguay among then, 0/,911;.,
'RJL
IbilingliediEfAnlIR@IPMAPed 9 cen-
sorship on newspapers ? perhaps' the
censorship you never know what the./
will object to until after the paper
comes out. If they find something they
don't like, then they can seize the pa-
per, arrest the editor, or both."
There is a paradox in press suppres-
sion by the Latin military. As Mr, Ed-,i
wards (himself the editor of the leading
newspaper in democratic Chile) points
out: 'Military regimes profess to be
guarding their countries against Com- .
munism, and yet their tactics have all
been too typical of the methods of the
Communists."
While "Freedom of the Press Day" is
a time to deplore events in Latin Ameri- ?
ca, it also provides a chance to cheer
the press freedom which we enjoy, rel-
ish and guard in North Amer ic a.
IAPA's words are appropriate:
"Humanity has demonstrated that no
power on earth can dostroy man's Ca-
pacity to criticize and dissent. It is the
proud claim of the newspapers of the .
democratic world that we rovidea red-
: CIAAIDR71941t1 0500080001-2
useful anu purposeful development of
this noble capacity."
Approved For Rele
SOCIEDAD -I
?dri.0 ' ' t't,'''
A Arl? A ,1,4??
INTER AIVIERIC' tvs, igisples ,,AsociA0:4410N
AWRORSOcitAREIRM-Stgigigt4q00?0
n,?,, 4,?
. A .,,,,, ? ? , , ? ,
SOCIEDAF)E ihrre ivi*Sag1/4 tit' ANA DE ,i1V1PRIENA . ,
. ,.., , i 1 . 'A, ? ?
A 't. ,..,*' ' _ ket ' !:- 1 ,i ?4 B
' .
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;
' surrs 764 , ?6 1 &EV? tORK, N. t; 10021, 0 :.. (212$ thuonA14 ,411....
1.86
:41
' PRESS RELEASE
For publication In AM's of Saturday, June
A ATTUENT BY PRESIDENT AGUSTIN ES'EDWARDS OF THE /NTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION.
., ..
'aree220CASION,__JJOFFIOSAINLVEANEILSAL JUNE 7
. i.
4
fr,4-
uL Liie :,1riter , ? ' ' ' '- ? ' ' ..' ' '' ',' '::' 4.;04t:
,As President
000 members 34 this hemisphere and on' Others Wile believe in elemOcratio7'...?:
,
. '. . 1 ...t '. i 131- ..'.: ' ' ' ' ' ' . ' .' ' 4 r
civilization to condemn all governmen 0 wn c curtell their.Oitizene,.right,to.-i
. ...,
3mow.what is going On in theirwn.ceuntries andin':.the world,
cal/ on this great ComMUnitY*tieWapaPo'rs.,and Magazines-1 _condtimai:ylocir.i-
"
all governments which threaten anChartio64nfermation Mediap:an& 1
Vp condemn
' 7:,,,,r?b?''',:i.,.-,.? , : . ? , . ..- : .,, ... .!'.... - ,. !,,,,.;... .i ? ;
47
the governmen
,4-ly governments ?of Cuba and Mail, ?O ditati,unt tori, of . tii,o' fundamental.:?;.*...
.. .- , ? ? . ? - '''*?'7,
' fi ' :?.c ' ' I .! ' 444i' Y
"tft,k
%
human right; the,right to knolVi
' We condemn tlieitctions'iiif these so,verpmeatacin the full knoi4ledge ths.c, the
il.,?. ; ', '4 :....1.1, .1.''', ..i' i' : ',, ': . ' : " ; .,; ,,, ..' .7' , ?ti , ,,? r ; ::..: t
in power fl20 often
oseetattvee.'ef 'the toiled toi,ces'wha' SeiZed'eontro1-Aw.4,
the
sincere beliefthat they cetad'serve theircountriee only.14 this wolui Thoy
., ,.! :1.,. ? !':,; j,";: ''.44: ,V*,.;;:.;, ... ' . - : ''. ? ' 1 ,. e....- '. '" .: :t.' '' '
nd
,believe also with equal sincerity thatthei, haV,e.a right and a duty:te'selecta
., .
: ? ,;.k '.',., ,:il!,,). ,. ,?,,4";
?,.
censor any information made availableAo-theii, fellow citizens')
.;-..)..,,,,:?,. . ."..,:.,; / ?
,/t is our duty equallY to.6ombatwith.?011.--Our strength this misguide4 oiairW'
o the possession of truth which historY,has'ahoWn wilI"..lead to greater,
-. '.r "i . ' ? '' .v" .
:outrage and.upheayal.than any which thithse gOvernMents'were,forMeatO prevent,.
..: .
, '''' A ''...:' , .-:. :...:. . ' 0:;,.N. , e if:',',' 't '' '?...'".."' "i"'! i, 4". ' T " -,.,..."::, . ,--? ." '.. hl ? . ' ? ii4. .4
t is o obiton our lgai,to keep yiv2day ait'lvev.iri,g,11.-c-bur-pecvlos4_.?ool twareness,,,
? ,... .. _ ." . . ., .1),.,.,, , ..'. ? , ., ? e?
. ,
'..:_lOttheirobso/otO'rightp'koowytio....,.... 1114v,ri ito'their cogintriesAm44a.,
-,, , , ,; ?..,,.J,-,,...!.,,,..:.., 4.,? ,, .,. ? .,.,,tt.,,...
l eJi:411.00ii4
,,,,..., 1' ? : ' 4
;
1:0,PIMLMI , I 6
;?1. ;" ? ? .!.S.
q?,,,+tkital14.(044Ved fed Mai I eiai 64 989 Aff010211i
- t?
..that :the governments of our hemisphere ,wil
tt
? 1: ? ?
41.1 public, feeling,
iSY4jj Ta
,1
gritiippko 654 ol17-c".':
?
ouch it. only at :the-00st -of outraging'.
. In establishing chirselves as' thevigilanty and ferceftil.guaidians,:ef one Of the
,
"' ? ;' ,? .
fundamental rights .of all our ci,tizenst the nevi's,: media ofthis heaiispliere :Undertake,
? : ? -? ? ? : q ? - ,14f,
a duty which hinds us to scrutinize the purity of mot.iVel ond'Ahe, hooesty'.f.0
,.,? ?
our actions Condemn 'and protest ,only f we cdn'demenstrata,,?publ,iclii ian
?? ?
y,
., ,
constantly that we truly serve the,great--funetion 'of transmitting accurate; infer+ 1
?
'nation.
it is that by our, example we
The experience 420
these 'few months,,?has "'taught. once. agairrho fa'tal',4Ianger
F, '?'.'? ' ''" " '??? ' ",,,,?... ',.- ? '.'i ' :', ??' 4 ::, :?,,?'.?;.- ' ,? '
?of complacency, of Compromise 'and ,,.tof .reltixatiOn... a'.ouii:diity. and our . 'function, to be
? . , 4 " ' 1",f '. i '.., ,... , --,, ., , - , . ., ,
".. .
, real. servants of our readers. or. it.74i. Octir.With: their .convinced , support i.,. only' by ,,,,,
..?
:
,. ,
. ...,,;: ,,?, ? 1 .:?!..?!.:' ? ,:.q .?,, ,,,:i.,,,,.., ....:,:,::;,T,?.:.-...-q ...,,.,:,? : :::?,..:?,..??1?-?:, ,i, -.??.'p, 2cr .,, :,.?.....-;..., ':!jt,., -,?.; :?,,,, .,.;?., ?
." an evidently., honest' striving to represent :their interests and ,?asPirat ions t''''. that ' ,we......:t?
? .
., '-''.'?-.:. ' -, .., ? ? , ? ? -, -' - .?'? '.. -?li',...!.-c. I . ., .',".1.`'; ' ..?'' ' .. ...! i; i ; ISI,.; , it.:_
claim the, right te ' condemn ; and '.pro..teet..riV
...anttacit,',Ufion. Our; OriiiViCe' to iy.therd.?
? i,-i -. . :..- . ..? ,,, .?? ? .,....,.: ., v,?'-. !',-'4;'..?:','?-?,,',, ,00.' ,.. r -7-,-.....,. c.',..,:':.: :-..:' ; ':,',,,. ;,! ,:: .;,*,11 :,,,,. --: :.,?', ' ', '. ',,,..) , ',.? .
Humanity has demonstrated-thrOli0614t.:i4SJV?i.li's6 ''..,thAif n6.. p.4:,n,40.i ?1i -4,1410 its'''1.1'"
' qi,,,,.,,,..?....,t,
destroy man'S ? capacity ..to ?C(Fiticize'.';'and.?diaSent;.i.4..:;'Z't'.16 :the pr4itici). 'c i aim !,ort'..tli0
. - ,.. ..? ,, :, '1',i';?.,;- ,' , ., ; .., ..:.:.,' : .. '..' +''''
newspapers Of the democratic world ,thatoVe provide 4 '14: riniirrii6ty. e't ttcieni,'Toch
qq? ,..,
. ?
,
useful, and purposeful, dervOlOprrinnt r.:.if ',this Tribble ":cripeait ??,, ... _?,? ?.
..?, -,..,'? ? ,_ f : ?,,,, ?,--',.. ',.., ?,),!,...- -,--,,,,, ..., ,..?-...-, -. -. 7 , ' ' ' ''; -
Sc :41:11,. ' ., ? ; .' : ,.'; .!:' ,; ;.: 1 i,,'. . ,
,, ? .. ,,. f
and humble awareness 'of oUr?;.fi,InOtioni.,i and despite' 'th'e imperfections,
: ' - ???;'!. - *:'?-?;? ???:' - ? ', ..:1: j:V ,:lf.1i. . ;.%4 4'-',..i'::: :.7.'...,,,, ,. , ...: . - !,, ,,? %.'.
. . , t. ? ...
em,and'(the.".rlght:Ao
,.......iti
strive to reMOVO, from our ,fulfillment , of i
? ?
?
inform to criticize and to dissent
Because of the alarming; events, of these last few menthe we, today address this
demand particularly to those i'oveOsiTelitiiit' Whi.5iii, ..profesEiing the iiblitiCal,.. ideals
. , /t?2? k ?-, . - ? ??? . . ? . ? ? t..-',. ?,,,-..3,,-i$'f ,..-?:t . ? ?
.?! ,c.: ,,, ..? ..., 1.,..,,,,,?.4,. .,,L,..--j,,,i' ?? v ' ???.: ? . /1., , .; ?.? ,
. .
which the great majority of ouy peoPlea live, -.0tave ? arregantly -c imecVfor themselyes
he sole' posses sion:',o f , 'truth...
t
25X1 C1 Ob
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
1milibiliN114.0111?01111?Pilimi July 1969
THE ILLUSORY "MIRACLE" OF EAST GERMANY'S ECONOMY
Late last year an East German from Dresden summed up the feelings of
many when he wrote to the local paper saying he saw no need for the country
to "climb to the top heights" in world economic competition. "We have
really worked hard and accomplished much in our republic," the letter
said. "Why can't we have a little peace and quiet now?"), This same diver-
gence of opinion between the leaders and those being led has typified
attitudes about the East German economy ever since the Soviet Union grant-
ed East Germany the rights of "autonomous republic" in October 1949.
Impressive as it may seem that the republic of East Germany boasts of
being the world's tenth industrial power, that she can claim an average
annual growth rate of nearly six percent since 1949 -- most of this ap-
parent economic burgeoning fails to reflect any real improvement in her
economy. It is true that in twenty years the "German Democratic Republic"
has staged a dramatic recovery from wartime devastation and has overcome
many of the disadvantages of partition. But, when analyzed, the accomp-
lishment of "recovery" fails to live up to the "East German economic
miracle" that has been touted by most commentators in the East and by
many in the West.
Inflation and Inflexibility
Once started, the postwar recovery process was rapid: GNP grew at
seven percent per year, industry at eleven percent, and agriculture at
three percent. By 1956, most sectors of the East German economy had
reached their prewar levels.
It was in the late 1950's that the biggest problems which were to
plague the economy throughout the 1960's made their appearance: while
production rose steadily, quality failed to improve. Complaints about
poor design, shoddy materials, and sloppy workmanship of East German
products came from both foreign and domestic customers. Inventories of
unsalable end products and unsuitable raw materials began to grow. At
home, signs of inflation appeared as incomes went unabsorbed by in-
creased purchases. In foreign trade, the unsalability of export items
created problems in financing the equipment imports needed to maintain
industrial production, resulting in a strained balance-of-payments
situation for East Germany. Manpower loss to West Germany grew and the
regime's pressure for agricultural collectivization hastened the move-
ment of farm labor to the cities andrestricted agricultural production.
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Crisis and Reform
Obsessed with competing with West Germany's economic growth, the Ul-
bricht regime ignored the advice of East German economists about the growing
signs of trouble and launched an ambitious long-range development plan. The
period was to be 1958 to 1965 and the goal was to be "to overtake and sur-
pass" West Germany in all areas of consumption. The Plan did not succeed.
By 1961 the economy was strained to the breaking point and the labor exodus
had reached an intolerable level.
The "Berlin Wall" gave the regime a breathing space. It temporarily
halted the stream of refugees to the West. The regime also felt secure
enough, bolstered by an additional 50,000 combat troops, to instigate some
unpopular measures such as raising prices and reducing incomes so as to
halt the inflationary spiral. More important, the long-term plan was aban-
doned and with it went many unrealistic investment plans, and the construc-
tion sector was told to concentrate on finishing a very large number of
incomplete projects.
Nevertheless, the basic need was unchanged: to improve quality and
efficiency in an industrialized economy that was short of labor and depen-
dent on foreign trade. East German economists had long argued for replac-
ing the rigid Stalinist system of detailed central planning with a system
that would give individual producers greater freedom and initiative. The
crisis of 1961-1962 made these ideas more attractive even to the Ulbricht
regime, whose leaders knew that decentralization could threaten their
absolute political control.
East German Planning Commission Chief Erich Apel, an ambitious man who
was untainted by "dangerous idealism," convinced the leadership that a mod-
ified program designed to restore some confidence among the disaffected
managerial and technical elite could benefit East Germany without undermin-
ing the Ulbricht regime's authority. The result was the much-vaunted NES
("new economic system" of planning and management), announced in July 1963.
It sounded good, and perhaps if all features of the NES had been put into
effect and allowed to operate for a number of years, the East German economy
might have become more efficient and modern. In fact, however, many fea
tures never got beyond the discussion stage, others were applied only ex-
perimentally, and most were modified to suit Ulbricht's need for administra-
tive reshuffling without any dilution of political controls.
The final blow to the NES came as the long-term-plan goals for 1965 to
1970 were firmed up by an agreement with the Soviet Union. An economic:pol-
icy which emphasized improved efficiency (at the cost of stressing continued
rapid growth) would only have been possible if the USSR had agreed to reduce
its import demands, to maintain its level of exports to East Germany, to re-
schedule East German debts, and to extend credits on an unprecedented basis.
The Soviets, tired of East German demands for credit, concerned about their
unprofitable raw material exports to East Germany, and involved in their own
(Inmestic tensions and economic debates, refused. In his office In _East Berlin
Erich Apel shot'himselfon the day the longterm agreement was signed with the
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USSR. All momentum for major- economic reforms went with. him.. E. Germany' agreed
to continue to reserve 50 percent of its exports for the USSR and to
deliver some 300 merchant ships to the Soviet Union at prices 30 percent
below what Western buyers would have paid. The USSR agreed to supply
oil, iron ore, and other raw materials - at prices well above the world
market.
Trying for a New Look
The NES was not formally abandoned; it was renamed the "economic
system of socialism." A new approach was tried with foreign trade, the
last area about which East German economists were optomistic after 1965.
The hope was, partly through joint East-West industrial ventures, to
increase trade with the West in order to bring to East German .industry
the more advanced technology and the modern equipment available only in
the West. Again, East Germany failed to make the grade as a competitive
producer in Western markets and was unable to finance its large increase
in imports -- mainly machinery and equipment bought on credit -- thereby
creating new pressures on the balance of payments.
The last chance for meaningful reform disappeared with the invasion
of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The consequences of Czechoslovakia's
interest in expanded trade with the West showed that the political lia-
bilities of such ventures were prohibitive. All talk in 1969 has been
of strengthening ties with the East bloc and trade with Western countries
is reported at a standstill. Plans for joint East-West projects have
faded and, conversely, East German-Bloc trade agreements for 1969 include
greatly increased exchanges of machinery and equipment. However, East
European machinery is still rated as obsolete and of inferior quality and
expansion of this trade cannot be expected to provide the needed re-
sources for further rapid development of East German technology.
Persistent Problems
Probably the sole accomplishment of the NES was that it succeeded
in diverting the attention of the public from the regime's economic
failures. For the first time, the technical and managerial elite thought
the government was listening and the populace began to take pride in some
of East Germany's economic achievements. However, the old problems of
labor shortages, inventories of unsalable products, increasing consumer
prices, and inflationary pressures persist.
The regime may believe that as long as no attempt is made to force
rapid growth, these problems can be controlled. However, for 1969, and
indeed for a period up to 1975, the regime has disclosed plans under
which production in some fields is to rise by 16 percent each year. The
brunt of this endeavor will be borne by the East German worker and there
has recently been evidence of new grumbling and dissatisfaction among
the population of 17 million. At the end of 1968 the East German govern-
ment was telling the populace that they could not expect a reduction in
high consumer prices. At the same time, the reglme's party newspapers
were issuing warnings against attitudes of "paralyzing self-indulgence,
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CPYRGHT
THE REPORTER
11 August 1966
Copyright (4) by Welles Hangers, 1966
'coo'
East Germany:
The Prosperous Prisoner
CPYRGHT WELLES IIANGEN
Death of a Planner
The apostles of East Germany's
new economic system must still con-; -
tend with ? the old "tonnage ideol-
ogy"?the cult of producing the
heaviest possible products for the
sake of fulfilling arbitrary plan
targets, regardless of cost or mar-
ketability. They must also fight:
poli(ically motivated interference,:,
especially from Moscow.
That this battle is by no means:
won is shown by the fate of the man '
generally regarded ai the father of -
East Germany's economic reforms,
the late Erich Apel. Like his fellow .?
technocrats in the GDR, Apel was an
' engineer first and a party member
second. In fact, he did not even .
:deem it necessary to join the SED until
1957, two years after he had become
Minister of Heavy Machine Build-
ing and five years after his return
from die Soviet Union, where he
had spent time in a prisoner-of-war ,
camp and had helped reassemble
German plants removed by the Rus-
sians ,for reparations.
When the sr.!) embarked on its
economic reforms in 1963 it named
Apel, already a candidate member
of the Politburo, to be chairman of !.
the State Planning Commission, the
top 'economic job in the country.
Two years later on a trip to Moscow
, with Ulbricht, he refuted to sign a
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five-year trade agreement harnessing
the country's economy to Soviet
needs. In the margin of a goods list
! later smuggled to the West, Apel
penciled the percentage overcharge
I compared to world market prices
that East Germany was paying for
:raw-material imports from Russia:
crude oil, 88.3 per cent; diesel fuel,
80 per cent; coal, 83.6 per cent;
'chrome ore, 113.4 per cent; and pig
:iron, 86.4 per cent.
Apel's obstinate resistance to So-
viet demands caused a crisis in re-
lations between Russia and its once
docile German iatellite. At the end,
:of November, 1965, Leonid Brezh--
!nev, the Soviet C,ommunist Party
i chief, flew. to East Berlin. He in-
sisted that the draft agreement pro-
!viding for $15 billion in trade over
the next live years be signed will'-
: out further delay. Ulbricht was
ready to yield but Apel continued
to hold out. Finally, on the morning
:of December 3 the Soviet side is
stied an ultimatum: sign by 11 A.M.
, or else. During a recess in the negoti-
ations, Apcl's Politburo colleagues
told him there was no choice but to
comply. A few minutes later the:
:planning .chief entered his office,
pulled a- -revolver from his desk
!drawer, and shot himself. He was:
forty-eight.
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3 March- 1969
(Excerpts)
WHY COMMUNISTS GET
CPYRGHT TO
GH OYER BERLIN:
Ulbricht rides high. Ulbricht, many
experts agree, is currently the toughest
anti-Western Communist in Europe. His
prestige is at an all-time peak among
Communists who want no part of de-
tente with the West. Further, Ulbricht's.
economic record in East Germany is the
envy of Communists everywhere?includ-
ing the Soviet Union. ?
What Ulbricht has done is to come
closer than any other Red leader to mak-
ing the Communist economic system
work, transforming a poverty-stricken
postwar "wreck" into the most prosper-
ous Red country in history.
East Germany, like West Germany, !
,
is enjoying a genuine boom.
There is no doubt East Germany suf-
fers by, comparison with its Western ,
counterpart, but even the experts who
hold no brief for the Communist way of
? doing things are impressed by the East- ,
; ern section's climb to industrial power.
! These experts now rank East Germany .
among the world's top 10 industrial
giants?and it is still growing.
Living conditions. Political repres-
sion under Ulbricht remains severe, but
there is no doubt the 17 million people ,
in East Germany are sitting on top of.
the heap in the Communist world.
? Wages have gone up 50 per cent in
the last 12 years?to an average of $170
a month. Prices of basic commodities
have remained fairly constant.
? Rents are subsidized and unrealis-
tically cheap. It is possible for an East
Berliner to move into an apartment at
double his previous rent and still end
up paying only $25 a month.
? A system of subsidies guarantees
that prices for food staples stay low.
It is in obtaining what the Commu-
nists call "luxury" items that the East
!German comes off a distant second to .
his West German counterpart.
Imported foods are sky-high. Cocoa
costs $8 a pound, coffee $10 a pound. .
Electric appliances are staggeringly
expensive. A television set costs $300 or
more, a standard washing machine $300, ,
and a tiny refrigerator $340.
ppoved Foi e ease 1999/09/02 .
The private car remains a rarity. Only
10 per cent of families own autos. The
wait for a car can drag out for years.
A car buyer has his choice of two
East German models: the small Trabant,
which costs about $2,000 and has a
three or four-year waiting list, and the
!Wartburg, which sells for $3,500 and is
obtainable in a much shorter time.
The East Germans' problems in buy-
ing autos and appliances are matched by
a deep ignorance of Western-style sales-
manship. In East Berlin only the shops
. along the famous boulevard Unter den
. Linden display any degree of flair or
imagination. In the smaller cities there
! is no real effort to attract customers.
These "drawbacks" in the economy
, do not alter the facts that national in-
come and industrial production in this
! country have doubled over the past 12
lyears. Imports and exports have trebled.
Back from defeat. MI this has been
accomplished in the face of considerable
handicaps. Like its Western counter-
part, East Germany was badly battered
by Allied bombing in World War IL
Soviet artillery brought more havoc.
Then, when the war was over, the Rus-
sians bled the shattered economy for
some 20 billion dollars in reparations
over the next 10 years.
Take-off point for the East Cennan
boom, in the view of many economists,
was when the Berlin Wall was erected,
August, 1961. Until then, the country
had suffered painfully from the exodus
of top-quality workers to the West.
When the Wall went up, the manpower
situation was brutally "stabilized."
Building of the Wall was followed a
few years later by the adoption of a ser-
ies of far-reaching economic reforms.
This "new economic system" involved,
among other things, decentralization of
management and establishment of the
profit motive in production.
Since 1964 the East German Commu-
nists have pioneered in these capitalist
innovations with growing good fortune.
Bureaucrats still call the shots in most
factories turning but heavy industrial
goods. But there is a surprising amount
of freedom given to the men in charge
of plants making consumer goods.
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CPYRGHT
. Example: A shoe-factory manager is
allowed to choose styles and decide how
many pairs to make. His competence is !
determined by sales and profits.
New mood. The obvious success of
the new economic system has not pre- I
ve?ted Communist leaders from reassess- /
I ing their economic reform in recent I
months. Behind the thinking:
First, many East German officials I!'
were frightened by the Soviet Union's I
invasion of Czechoslovakia to halt "lib- I
eralization." They noted that economic
reform bad been an integral part of the
Czechs' liberalization program.
? Secondly, East Germany's .own statis-
tics have turned up "soft spots" in
growth. Officials wondered if the capi-
talist innovations might be responsible.
Economic progress has been consis-
tent, but below planned targets in re-
cent months. National income? supposed
. to be rising at the rate of 5.4 per cent
: a year, is not touching 5 per cent. Trade
was projected to increase by 7 per cent
a year, but is up by only 5 per cent.
! Export earnings are held down by a
trade pattern that stifles expansion with
the West. 'Forty per cent of East Ger-
man trade is with Russia, another 35 per .
cent with other Communist nations.
Prospects for any dramatic increase
in trade with the West are dim. Even
if "policy wraps" were removed, the
quality of East German goods is, by
and large, so relatively poor that they
cannot compete on the world market. '
Lack of labor. A big problem for
the East Germans, too, is the shortage
of manpower-The Berlin Wall sealed off
the country, but the present labor force
of 7.7 million is smaller than when the
: Wall went up.
What happened? The death rate is
inching upward and the birth rate is
dropping. The country is top-heavy with
old .people., Tile ratio of ,men to women
is out of proportion?there are 118 wo-
men for every 100 men. Women now
make up 47 per cent of the work force.
? West .Germany, on the other side of
the Iron Curtain, solved its manpower
shortage by absorbing some 1 million
foreign workers. But there is no great
rush of Poles, Hungarians and other
Eastern Europeans into East Germany.
More housing needed. One reason
Communist workers from other lands
hold back is hatred of the Germans? _
! still strong nearly 24 years after the end
ofWorld War II. Another reason: There
bi a shortage in this country of decent
living quarters for workers.
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In the more than 20 years of its ex-
istence, Eat Germauy never has been
able to build more than 92,000 housing
; units in any one year. That is hardly ;
enough.
A real effort is being made in housing
Construction now, but the, finished Prod-
uct is no great TuTe. Most of the new
. .4 buildings consist of dna), identical 10-
story apartment units standing in un- !
imaginative, soldierlike rows.
Buildings are not all that need more I
color and cheer. Main streets in East
' Berlin are in sharp contrast to the traf-
fic-clogged, neon-lighted thoroughfares
in West Berlin. At night, the buildings
are usually dark and the .streets nearly!
, empty. Compared with such Communist
; pities as Prague and 13udapest, East
Berlin looks grim.
- I Outside East Berlin the drabness is
even worse. As one woman said recently:
' "This is the way all war-scarred German
cities looked in the late 1940s, before re- ,
construction started."
Red capitalists. A surprising rem- .
nant of pre-Communist days in East
Germany is the private businessman. The ?
"superorthodox" regime of Ulbricht has
permitted close to 800,000 people to go
on making a living by operating small,
Individually owned firms.
These businesses have little impact
on the over-all cconotny. Although some t.
30 per cent of industrial enterprises are
.. privately owned, they account for only
2 per cent of production and employ but
3 per cent of the labor force.
Still, the small businessman often does
surprisingly well, individually.. One local!
baker here is the envy of his neighbors
because he owns two cars while most of
, them are still waiting for delivery of
? their first.
There also is a change in "fundament-
al Communist principles" in education.
For years it was almost impossible for
anyone other than the son of a working-
class family to enter an East -German t.
university. Now a third of the students .
come from families officially classified as
intelligenz?intellectuals to whom uni-
versity doors used to be dosed.
Toeing the line. For all these signs !
of relaxation of tight Communist doe-
trine, the Ulbricht regime remains one
of the most repressive in Eastern Europe. I -
The press is censored. Intellectuals are !-
kept in line. Protest is swiftly and severe- !
ly dealt with.
Even the threat of punishment has not
, erased all dissent. There were open dem-
onstrations protesting the Russian
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CPYRGHT
ApprawdlomEgkau 191,9ft/09/02
the streets in Leipzig to protest demob-.
tion of a historic medieval church.
There have been murmurings about East
Germany's being tied to Moscow's eco-
nomic apron strings.
Restiveness, it is felt, is on the in-
crease here. But that does not mean re-
bellion is brewing. Thousands of East
Germans ?revolted in 1953 and Russian
tanks crushed the uprising. The Hungari-
an revolt in 1956 and the invasion of
Czechoslovakia last year have reinforced
the feeling that Russia will not hesitate
to take action to maintain control of ,
Eastern Europe.
So the East Germans, cut off from the
' democratic and more ? prosperous Ger-
mans: of the West, are consoled by this:
' fact: As they push ahead on the indus-
trial front, they continue to ?lead the
Communist world's _economic parade.,
at1141-1967
CIA-RDP79-Vc1P669,9M99P2,9P1,73 not
recognize Ulbricht's government diplo-
matically, is all in favor of stepping
up trade. Economics Minister Karl
Schiller last month urged West German
businessmen to attend the Leipzig Fair.
Bonn later adopted a Schiller proposal
for expanded credit guarantees to West
German firms trading with East Germa-
ny. Finally, Bonn has put off for a year
; ?until June 30, 1968?the repayment
deadline for some $100 million in trade
deficits already owed by East Germany.
I No matter how stubborn Ulbricht
. may seem, his country's westward trade
drift is inevitable. At least 30% of East
Germany's exports and imports are with
Western nations?and of that, one-third
is with West Germany. In the wee hours
of the morning, even Walter Ulbricht
must admit to himself that his country
can only benefit by importing the vastly
superior, much more varied products
put out by the Germany on the other
side of the Wall.
TRADE
Fair Enough
it may fairly be said that the Leipzig
Trade Fair is an annual event?the one
now in progress is the 802nd. But this
year there is a new sound to the old
show: while sonic 70 nations display
their wares, Communists and capitalists
alike arc clamoring for increased East-
West trade. Says Cristina Dimitriu, di-
rector of Rumania's exhibit: "We arc ,
now interested more in business than in
propaganda." Says Poland's Natalia
Czaplicka: "We will sell anything to
anybody."
About the only sour note was struck
by East Germany's intransigent Walter
Ulbricht, an old Communist who has
yet to come in from the cold. Ulbricht
lavished praise on the Soviet Union's
exhibit?considered by most Western
fairgoers to be Russia's most mediocre
in years. And he notably managed to
ignore the fair's biggest (and perhaps
best) exhibit: that of West Germany.
Ulbricht's next-door unncighborliness
was ironic in light of a 20% trade in-
crease last year-between the two Gcr- --
manys. Of $750 million worth of goods
exchanged between the two countries,
West German exports, mostly in indus-
trial products, accounted for $425 mil-
lion; East German exports, mainly agri-
cultural, textile and mining items, made
up the rest.
NEW YORK TIMES,
13 January 1969
LEIPZIG TRADE FAIR
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
, March 2- II, 1969
August 31 .September 7, 1969
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NEW YORK TIMES,
13 January 1969
est
CPYRGHT
By RALPH BLUMENTHAL
; Special to The New York TIM
BONN ? "To invest in In-;
'-' ance Inv inuilv ; works foiloW,,
to bicycle pares anct knitting
Inathhir,b. Swim 0.1
ts
d I
involVe only technics ,assist-
Li ILA appikriCv3 API C CO
tronics and Iron and steel'
tive ot one of West Ger. ehlnery from est Ger.
. many's biggest companies re- . ? small when measured against
Still, the investments are
merited recently. "However, ? The German motives for, the Bonn Government's econ-
not to invest in India is &veil such foreign investments are -
$ sillier."
' cheaper production, nearness omy. According to a conflden-
, tial study by the Loan Bank,
More and more every day, to raw materials and mar.,
West Gernian businessmen kets and diversifipation of in- for Reconstruction in Frank--
, furt, investments represented,
are following this dictum for vestment a.reas.
. 0
, a 'range of countries. But, in , In 1961, total West Ger. only.9 per cent of the value
11, of mternal trade last year
. ' the opinion of some experts, ', man investments abroad were and 1.4 per cent of the value
West German export of capi- ., put at just under a billion
t tat and know-how still lags , (Mars. A of exports
1 far behind the potential.- ,, , . 1 ,Almost all other highly In
movement of ad- Investments Triple , dustrial nations, except hi.
evanced West German produc-, ' At the end of 1967 the fig-- Pan, were investing largpe,
I tion units abroad takes many tire had more than tripled, to shares of their economy,
: forms. Siemens, A. G., the just over. $3-billion. By last . abroad. ? ,1
West German equivalent of ' June the figure was up to ' , The Bonn Government --;.'
? International Business Ma- $3.26-billion. as well as the nations re-
chins. has full ownership or ' Seven years ago, West Ger-, ceiving investment -- eager-,
l majority control of telecom-, mans invested $280-million ly welcomes the estalylish-oi
!lated industry in 100 foreign ' ed $515-million and the 1968 ,, production units abroad tol
l munications factories and re- , abroad. In 1.967, they Vest- ment of advanced German
, countries. The units abroad figure is expected to show ' build international goodwill,
, bring in about $400-million a another healthy increase. , and restore German prestige,'
the company's $2.2-billion an-. ? Europe c'ontmues to be the , More important, perhapsd
nual sales. Main theater of West 'Ger- the long-term foreign invest.!
, There are many more man foreign investment. Lat- , ments help cut down West!
smalits German ,eonceins that f,, \ in America* Canada, the Unit- ' '/ Germany's trade surplus of
sign agreement with foreigW, ed States,. Africa and '. Asia ; about $4-billion a year, which'
companies to manufacture ' follow in descending order. :, has brought international
thousands of other products, , The field is led by the eheml. , pressure for an upward val..
.frork enameled Iron bathtubs cal industry, worth nearly uation
AL Of the mark.
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE,
17 March 1969 (Excerpts)
? e - A
Germany's,growth tempo in the closing
months of 1968 accelerated dramatically,
over the already high rates of the earlier
recovery period, with the real Gross Na-
tional Product in the last quarter exceed-
ing the fourth quarter of 1967 by at least
10.5%. Corresponding percentage gains-
for industrial production and new orders
were, respectively, 13.5% and 18% ac-
cording to the semiannual Economic
Trends Report from the U.S. Embassy in
Bonn.
This burst of activity carried GNP in
constant prices for the year as a whole to
a level nearly 7% over 1967, with the
, AFIrigtiVed 145 Mil Od?idrift 0/843/0
1 reaching almost 9%. These results take
on added significance in light of earlier
predictions of 1968 real growth in the
14-5% range. //? *
Even more,
the German Government has adopted a
policy of actively encouraging imports in
orker to reduce the persistent balance of
payments surplus, a policy which may not
be limited to the 4% tax refund on im-
ports discussed above. ei
Geiman gross private long-
term capital exports, at the unprecedented
level of nearly $3 billion in 1968, proved
: C IALIN6PIPANtr641Aleleabgb8g6 01 -2
5
jr I I N?...71 I I
thAppndivtatirEOnaeisiase s1499/09/0 : CIA-RDPREptitumagp5ap9sopint2
within bounds. Most of this outflow was
Spring Fair?Germany's largest for con-
in the form of bank loans and deutsche- sumer goods?augurs well for this sector.
mark-denominated bonds. Although some Particular strength is also indicated for
slowdown in issuance of such bonds oc- the chemical industry, electrical equip-
curred last fall, due to revaluation fears , ment, and paper, while iron and steel, non-
and introduction of a rationing system to ferrous metals, automobiles, and rubber
prevent overburdening the German capital should show higher-than-average activity
market, the volume of new foreign issues ! In coming months,
is again at previously high levels. ' Examples of significant new investment
So long as the interest rate differentiall projects planned for 1969 Include a $110
between the ?amen capital market and
million 'Volkswagen plant in Salzgitter,
foreign financial centers remains wide-1 .two huge nuclear power plants of Siemens
and with normal business loans available I and AEG-Telefunken, and large new
at 6.5% -7.5%, it is at present consider- aluminum smelters in Essen, Hamburg
ably cheaper to borrow in Germany?a and Dinslaken. Civil engineering and road
sizable long-term capital export can prob- and subway construction projects, stimu-
ably be anticipated again for the current Intact by continuing high investment at the
year. It 4 * ocal government level, should also show
rong results this year.
In the context of searching for ways
to reduce the German balance of pay-
ments surplus, leading Government and
banking figures are increasingly urging
a serious attempt to stimulate German
direct investment abroad. The Govern-
ment is reportedly preparing a proposal
which might involve credits and/or in-
terest subsidies to German firms investing
abroad.
I The main impulses for the extraordi-
nary 1968 expansion came from industrial
investment, which rebounded with un-
expected vitality from the 1966-67 re-
cession, and from an export boom far
surpassing earlier predictions. Total in-
vestment in fixed assets grew by roughly
10%, virtually erasing the losses of the
recession, while a massive inventory re-
stocking?$1.9 billion?was a further
major contributor to the upswing.
Although strong domestic demand
boosted imports of goods and services by
1370`, in 1968, exports of goods and serv-
ices climbed at the same rate, resulting in
an unprecedented high net foreign balance
on goods and services of $4.5 billion, ex-
ceeding even the $4 billion recorded in the
recession-year 1967. .
Private consumption expanded at a
more leisurely pace in 1968-51/2 %?al-
though higher employment and wages re-
sulted in some acceleration toward the
end of the year.
r A strongly expansive tone will continue
to characterize at least the first half of
the current year. Production and sales
arc developing strongly, unemployment
remains low by any standards, and in-
dustry order books are full. Business con-
fidence, as measured by surveys, is even,
higher than during the previous 1964-65
boom, and industrialists plan to invest
one-fifth more this year than last.
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LE MOIS EN AFRIWE, No. 23
Dakar, November 1967
CPYRGHT
WEST GERMAN - AFRICAN TRADE RELATIONS (Excerpts)
Gjographic Distribution
A.phrase that is often heard when one 'hearti of cooper-
ation between Germany and Africa is "Africa received more .
German aid per inhabitant than any other continent-a". If.thiii;
is true, nevertheless, one must merely look at the other
-continents and see their size and population density:tO:See
that the statement is a gross exaggeration. Moreeloselywe
can look at the geographic 'distribution of the German govern
tent and "KW" Bank commitmenta-total of 1,21-0
in 1965, to see that Africals4hare'has been reduced in favor
of:Asian and Europeanunderder400(1.
1965. 1966
Africa 28% 19%
Latin America 8% 6%
Asia 49% 61%
Europe 10% 14%
Others 5%
The same evolution can be observed in the domain of technical
assistance, where Africa's share has gone from 57.1% to 45.8%
in favor of Latin America and Europe. However, these percent-
ages are still impressive. Africa holds great attractions
for many Germans, especially the young people. Beyond this,
almost all the private aid agencies -- especially the Church .
groups, ,began sanitation, health and education projects even
before the independence in Africa, so that there is a certain
basis of experience and personnel on which the public aid can
depend.
There has been much talk in the last two or three years
of replacing the "water-spout" policy by one of "centers of
gravity,'" that is, to create centers of development in the
(various continents and certain regions, concentrate on certain
co ntries so that there is no waste by spreading the capital
too thin. An examination of the figures prove, however, that
from the beginning of cooperation between Germany and the Third
World there have been "centers of gravity," both in the field
'of credit and in technical assistance. For example, India
received 30% of the credits and capital and 10% of the total
;technical assistance. On the other hand, most of the 29 pro-
Aects for changing the social structures of countries have
taken place in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Algeria, and Ghana.
Among the 72 underdeveloped countries that receive aid from
Germany, 12 have received 53% of the total amount. With re-
gard to the African continent, twelve of the thirty-eight
countries tied to the West German Republic by technical assist-
ance treaties get 80% of the .funds devoted to this end in that
continent,
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,
dhnsagYediMstlItsOiCZIWIM25PRIORite
theless state -- and this has to do with capital primarily, but
also somtimes involve technical assistance --that it is the
countries that trade most with Germany in the Third World that
also get the most technical and monetary assistance. Thus, the
UAR, Germany's best partner after the South African Republic,
hag received, in the form of credit and contributions, an
amount equal to 300 million DM. In all, the UAR owes Germany
one billion DM, of which 800 million are considered as a pure
loss by the West German Government. Tunisia is another
country in which there is a lot of German money and several
German experts. Germany's investments in Tunisia totals 114.0,,,,
million DM. The projects revolve around improved agricu1tura17:
production and improved tourism, linking private German
in-
vestment -- in the form of new hotels, etc. to Government
money grants and the sending of technical experts. Thus,'
there are 145 Tunisians studying hostelry in Germany, and
;there is a hotel school under construction in Bizerte so that
the Tunisians can be trained right in their own country.
Morocco Can also be considered as a "center of gravity:".
in Africa. The Federal German Republic has given it credits
amounting to 40 million DM to finance a chemical complex in,
Safi and insfrastruoture work. Another 50 million DM is to
go towards strengthening the tourist trade, and a third don.a.
tion of 20 million DM has been put at the disposal of the
Moroccan Development Bank by a consortium of German banks.
In the area of technical assistance, the West German Govern-
ment sends experts in agricultural machinery, landscapers,
.specialists in the cultivation of sugar beets, consulting
en-
gineers for industrialization, etc. Another African country.
Tanzania, almost became another "center of gravity." This -
was stopped twice: when Tanganyika merged with the exGerman_
colony of Zanzibar and when the East German Government set up
a consulate in Dar-es-Salaam. Since that time, no new projects
.have been discussed, but the old ones have been carried out
routinely. Private and semi-public activity which undertake
smaller technical assistance projects, housing projects, etc.,
were not affected at all.
. In West Africa, Togo seems to be the favored one. .
West Germany gives it long-term credit and other donations:
with a total value of 110 Million DM, Including 3.3
CPA francs for the construction of the port of Lome.: The rest
is to finance the establishment of two model villages, ' an
agricultural experimental station, a hygiene institute,a..
printing factory, seven doctors and nurses, a small fishing
fleet, and sixteen agricultural teachers and monitors.
other West African country is also privileged: Guinea. If in
the case of Morocco and Tunisia, and even more.so in the case,;
of the UAR, aid followed ttadel? and if in the cabe.of-Tanza-!--
nia and Togo it is a sentimental attaohment.to the colonial
past and the two Presidents -1fr Nyerere 0lympi?.
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CPYRGHT
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for Guinea neither reason is valid. Here the German commit-
ment was one of political opportunism and the result of very
hard work on the part of German and Guinean diplomats. It.:
was mostly when the USSRlailed to fill the void left by
France that Germany stepped in. The Germaprojectscarried/-
out in Guinea -- in fishing, water for Conakry, radio, the
school in Kankan, etc., were all carried out to the satis-
faction of both partners. German "military aid" is often
cited, though it is criticized in other contexts. In Guinea,
German soldiers build roads, improve the communications sys-
tem, and three "military factories" financed by German money
produce clothing, shoes, and machinery. The German special-
ists are very pleased with their soldier-workmen, and the
Guineans are, too.
Another word about the "military aid." Germany has
given such aid to the following African countries: Sudan Soma-
li, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Libya, Nigeria, and Tanzania.
This aid was violently criticized at the Parliament and in the
newspapers; in the case of Sudan, Somali, and Kenya, it is
possible that German military aid accentuated the tension
among these countries, but it was really on a small scale.
As a whole, the independent countries of Africa receive
between 10 million and 100 million DM of foreign aid and
technical assistance. Besides the "centers of gravity" already
mentioned, one can add on a lesser scale, Nigeria, Ghana,
Rwanda, and Chad; ? in these infrastructures, projects are more
numerous than industrialization projects. Up to now, the
Federal Cooperation Ministry, the Federal Statistical Service,
and the agencies of the private economy, have not published
information on what projects foreign aid is spent, although
this was done regarding the Americas. This is not very com-
prehensible; since the data exist, although scattered around,
they would merely have to be gathered together, and the rather
large margin of error Could be eliminated by an official pub-
lication of these data.
Private Investment
Published figures on German investment in Africa is
done by country and not by economic sectors Or branch of
activity; this will be changed beginning next year, when the
extactive industries will be dealt with independently. The
latest figures for the first three months of 1967 show a total
figure of 415 million DM that German private industry has
invested abroad, with 158 million DM going to the underdeve-
loped countries. The lion's share went to Libya, where the
62 million DM invested this year show that German investment
there has doubled.
The latest statistics published by the' German Chamber
of Commerce and Industry give 666 million DM for the African
continent, of which 557 million DM are for the African coun-
tries.. _exoluding the' Republic of South Africa. This last
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figure is about equal to the German investment in European
undApibenedIRIfr Relintost .899109MM I16PRE070,1351 13314s4040.500090100 1-2
and Gteece -- and is almost double the German investment in
Asia. Compared with German investment in Latin America,
German investment in Africa does not even equal a third: with
1,787 million DM, the Latin American countries - expecially
Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Peru -- have half of
the German investments in underdeveloped countries. Africa,
without including the South African Republic, gets only one
fifth. If Africa receives more foreign aid per inhabitant,
it is only in second place as far as investments are concern-
ed, while Latin America is first in this area.
The absence of information on branches of activity
makes it difficult to interpret the statistics. It is, how-
ever, possible to say that of German investments in the
extractive industries, Libya, Liberia, Ethiopia, Guinea, and
Nigeria get the most, so that what is left over for the trans-
formation industries is practically nil. Compared to other
continents, Africa hs not received much investment. Only two
countries, Liberia and Nigeria, have received investments
totaling 100 million DM. Beyond this, the political regimes
in the African countries do not seem to influence the choice
of German capitalists in particular; the Ivory Coast, which
is known for its political stability in West Germany, was able
to attract only 19 million DM, while Sekou Tourels Guinea got
29.4 million. Considerations of economic profits seem to
overcome any political feelings of the German private invest-
ors.
In order to encourage German investment in underdeve-
loped countries and to supplement weak or non-existent capital,
the Federal Government set up the German Development Society.
This organization, though backed by the Federal Budget, ope-
rates like a private business. Its capital is 115 million DM.
It was able to double its participation during the five years
of its existence, reaching 53 million DM, and through it 270
pillion more were invested. The Society participates directly
and indirectly in 100 enterprises, representing a total value
of 450 million DM, which shows a capital mobilization ten times
as large. Besides financing, the Society also handles market-
ing, development and management problems, etc., when the
countries themselves are not equipped to handle them. The
societies created by it and through it, or with its financial
backing work in all branches of industry and transformation.
Besides the textile enterprises, the Financial Develop.
ment Company is charged with creating local industrial units.
Three companies of this kind exist in Africa already: in
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; together they have 53 projects
to carry out. Recently, the German Development Society has
entered the hotel business. Seeing the great opportunities
for tourism in the underdeveloped countries, especially in
Africa, as a souroe of foreign currency and creator of labor,
it formed, with some large hotel companies, tourist agencies
and airlines, the German Hotel Association for the Underde-
veloped Countries, ,
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25X1 C1 Ob
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500090001-2
THE ECONOMIST, London
? 114 June 1969
Vietnam
cp/pheTnew escalator
It is now clear that the communists have
raised their terms for breaking the dead-
lock in the Vietnam peace talks.' Last
year, when they were trying to persuade
President Johnson to end the bombing of
North Vietnam, they seemed to be saying
" that that act alone would be enough to ?
open the way to serious negotiations lot
a political settlement. "Things will take
a new turn" Once the bombing had stop-
ped, said Mr Thuy, North Vietnam's
chief negotiator in Paris, on October 23rd.
'More specifically, Mr Pham- Van Dong,
the North Vietnamese prime minister,
said on August 3oth that "to end the
war the United States must immediately
and unconditionally stop the bombing
and ... recognise the National Liberation
Front and enter into discussions with it."
The bombing was stopped at the end
of October (though the Americans-were
wrong in thinking they had got the Viet-
cong to stop rocketing South Vietham'S
towns in return); the NLF was admitted
to the table in Paris; and President Thieu
of South Vietnam offered, on March 2oth,
to negotiate directly with it. Yet the peace.:,
talks are still stuck in a barren exchange
of propaganda. The communists now
-seem to be saying.' that a . settlement
requires the Americans to meet two fur-
ther conditions. One is the immediate,
total and unconditional evacuation of all
American troops, with the question of
the North Vietnamese army in the south
to be settled, according to point three of
'the NLF's ten-point programme of May
8th, by the (unspecified) "Vietnamese
parties." The second is the establishment
? of a provisional coalition government
which, by the look of point five of the
NLF's May 8th programme, would
exclude members of the present Saigon
government. If this bogus coalition, and
North Vietnam itself, are meant to be
the "Vietnamese parties" that would
deal with the question of the North Viet-
? namese troops, it is not hard to-guess.what
Would happen. ?it:rather- what would not.
CPYRGHT
Esealation a Word that has been worn
ttilAin over the past four years; but it is
urious hoW few people have commented
that this is Precisely what North Vietnam
1.and the, NL. are practising. President
Nzson enhotmcid on Sunday the with
of 25,000 American troops from
IVietnam., QirTnesday the :NLF conyerted
itself into a ." revolutionary government."
Mr :Nixon will have to, decide how far
the can carry ,unilateral,concessions before
.the ,other, side concludes. That it need,*
.npthing except -sit ? and , wait -for the
escalator, to ,carry, jt,into,,Saigop.
I JAPAN TIMES
10 June 1969
'Midway Decision '
criFit; byclelicom
Trz ear A NA c31listi-
1(AP)?Thai Foreign Ministeri
1Thanat Khoman Monday de.;
;scribed U.S. President Rich. ;
?ard M. Nixon's Midway troop '
withdrawal decision as a...
`North Vietnam will see it that ,
"gesture to restore peace in
'Vietnam" and said he hopes',
may.
Vt. Here for the fourth ;ninis.
,?terial conference of the Asian ,
and Pacific Council (ASPAC),";
;Khoman said In a prepared'.
.statement "We hope the other '
side will take this gesture for
what it is intended to be, that '
it is a gesture to restore peace -
'.in Vietnam. Thailand sup.'
tports the move as a peaceful \
,step leading to a settlement of1j
the Vietnam conflict and we .
;aarnestly hope the other side-,
4111 give an appropriate? and',
'corresponding response by:
' also removing North.
namese forces, from., 'South'
Vietnam. and the neighboring
countries of % Laos? and Cam-4
bodia." .. .,-
. -Thailand hask, 12,Q00 troop,
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THE WASHINGTON POST
22 June 1969
Pressure Is on Nixon to EndWar
But the Enemy Refuses to N. Ii tide
CPY ?GPIchalmers M. Roberts
. Washington Post Staff Writer
Piveklent NIAeu WIWI!"
News Analysis
That, said Mr. Nixon,'
would be a "surrender on
strated yesterday just how 11('
ttrapped he is between the 4
Scylla of domestic demand ;
for a quick end to the war
and the Charybdis of a Com-- 1
munist enemy which thus I
far refuses to negotiate on
his terms to end the conflict. I
I He amazed his press con-
ference listeners by a per- ;
1,sonal attack on former De- '
jense Secretary Clark M.
Clifford. And then he went
to say twice that he !,
ihoped. to "beat" Clifford's
,accelerated timetable for t
-'withdrawal of American
ground forces.
' The Clifford program calls -
?1
for taking out 100,000 men ,
this year. Senate Republi-
cans have been saying they
?
.undertood that the Nixon.
program's maximum figure
was 70,000 but nobody in the I
Administration had been ;
'talking of withdrawing all _
ground combat forces by the
end of next year.'
Indeed, both before ' and
After the recent Midway
meeting between Mr. Nixon ,;
And South Vietnamese Presi-
dent Thieu, White House
sources were stressing the
careful and cautious nature
of the withdrawal planning.
They stressed 'that they
must move as fast as Thieu's
own army can take over the ,
hburden but not so fast as to I
make'the o n ;
,%:the Administration plans
'rwhat was termed an elegant
Lbugout.
t Just what Hanoi 'how will
think can only be imagined.
But the Nixon statement, '
, whether or not it was the
result of anger at Clifford,
I will buttress, the argument
of those who ask why the'
Communists should concede
anything at the Paris peace
:talks if the Americans are
going to withdraw unilater-
ally.
' It is true, of course, that
neither Clifford nor the
President was talking about
taking out all troops. But
many officials fear that such
a rapid withdrawal of
ground forces, even with re-
maining American air and
logistical support, could lead
to massive Communist mill-,
tary gains.
As to the negotiations,.
Mr. Nixon had nothing en-
eouragthg to offer. He said
the two sides are still "far,
apart." The best he could
de was to "hope" for "some,
, progress" in the next two to,
"three months.
The President stuck vali-
antly to Thieu, saying both
;that the United States can
take`mo action he does not:.
approve and that the Unite&
? States' is not going to ac-
cept the Communist demand'
Abet Thieu and? his chief,
i'leutenants, if not his en-
'
tire government, be thrown
ovt, of office before' there.
? an ubstant1vtaIks
'turning South Vietnam over
to the North Vietnamese
Communists.
The only hopeful note
the President could offer ,
was the same one hinted at '
after the Midway meeting: :
that Thieu soon "will be
making an offer of his own
with regard to a political
settlement."
For months the Nixon Ad-
ministration has been push-
ing Thieu to take more risks;
in order to reach some com-
promise political solution'
with the Communists. Just
what the new step will be
, has not been disclosed but
? there is some reasbn to think
It will be a broadening of
the Thieu government, per-
haps including the release
from Jail some of his non,'
Communist political ene-
mies.
' Meanwhile American mili--
tary orders will not be al-
tered and the casualties can'
he expected to continue. The
President said that the casu-
alties during the nearly a
year Clifford was Defense
Secretary were the highest
of the war. But the rate since
Jan. 20, when Mr. Nixon was
sworn in, have not been.
much lower.
As of now, there is no rea-
son to believe that the Com-
munists will accept any
, And Mr. Nixon will be ?
Thieu proposals, old or slew.,
plagued by domestic doves
to -"beat", the Clifford troop
LWithdravial proposals. ,
2
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TIME,
20 June 1969
CPyRGHT
How the Troop Decision Was Made
Even before he won the Republican nomination for
President in 1968, Richard Nixon proposed "a fuller en-
listment of our Vietnamese allies in their own defense."
, TIME Washington Bureau Chief Hugh Sidey traces the
evolution of the Nixon Administration's efforts to carry
out that aim through the Midway meeting.
IN January, when he acquired both the responsibility
I and the information to deal with the war's intricacies,
Nixon felt that he should not meet with South Viet
Nam's Nguyen Van Thieu until well after he had pub-
licly outlined his own ideas on ending the war. Then,
early in May, the Viet Cong proposed its ten-point plan
in Paris, and less than a week later the President re-
sponded with his own eight-point proposal (TIME, May
23). The prospect for movement was growing faster than
Nixon had anticipated. The meeting with Thieu, first
14600 planned for July, was moved up to June 8.
The U.S. military had already been long at work on up-
grading South Vietnamese forces. But the enemy's win-
ter offensive was soon in progress. When the attacks
abated somewhat, firm plans could be made to begin sup-
planting American troops with South Vietnamese.
?
In Saigon, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker worked with
the Thieu government; two days before the Midway meet-
ing, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger flew to
the summer White House in San Clemente, Calif., with
a draft of the troop-reduction statement.
' From the start, roughly 25,000 was the target figure.
The President could have rounded up every cook and clerk
and made a more dramatic gesture, recalling as many as
100,000. He rejected that idea: to act responsibly in his
view meant pulling out a maximum of 70,000 troops this
year, and to remove them all at once would have looked too
much like what White House insiders call "an elegant bug-
'
out." In aiiy event, there would be opportunity later to take
out more support personnel. To underline his seriousness,
Nixon felt that most of the men to be replaced initially must
be combat troops.
When Nixon and Thieu met in the modest house of
tho U.S. base commander at Midway, Nixon moved quick.
ly to the troop question. "We have claimed for years
that we were getting stronger," Thieu replied. "If it is so,
we have to be willing to see some Americans leave."
Thieu agreed that the announcement might help the
Paris negotiations. Said Nixon: "We do not want to
break the umbilical cord to your people." The troop re-
placement would not, said Thieu.
After an hour of detailed discussion, Nixon was sat-
isfied that Thieu was in genuine agreement. He brought "
out the U.S. draft statement and asked: "Is it agreeable
then that when we go out for pictures I read this state-
ment?" A Thieu aide, Nguyen Phu Duc, wrote a com-
panion statement for Thieu. There was more discussion
and some minor changes in each draft.
?
Nixon asked his secretary, Rose Mary Woods, to type,
the Thieu text. Because there was no typewriter in the
house, Miss Woods went outside and picked her way
through the island's ubiquitous gooney birds in search of
one. After 45 minutes, she returned. While they waited,
the two Presidents talked cf problems of military lead-
ership and negotiating strategy. Later in the day they
would discuss political conditions and economic reform
in South Viet Nam. But the main business at hand was
that of troop replacement and they took a break to go
into the bright sunlight and face the press. Nixon began
what may some day be viewed as an historic statement:
"I have decided to order the immediate redeployment
from Viet Nam of the divisional equivalent of approx-
imately 25,000 men . ."
TIME
20 June 1969
CPYRGHT A Mixed Response
_I.. the U.C., n,aiy eAFr...3scd ,
vations about Nixon's move. John Sten-
nis, chairman of the Senate Armed '
Services Committee and a charter hawk,
doubted that "South Vietnamese forces j
will be able to rapidly assume this bur-
,
den of fighting and -be effective." Sen-
ator George McGovern spoke for many
critics of the war: "I don't see that as
anything more than token action." Yet
there was also a sense of relief. In Man-
hattan, Hubert Humphrey declared the
prospects for political settlement to be '
"brighter now than they have been for
a long time." John Sherman Cooper of
' Kentucky, one of the Senate's most re-
spected doves, found the announcement
"a step forward and a very hopeful
sin." H dded?th t the U
APIZE5MmgrAarxpkaap 44 /02
of all its troops. "We have done enough,"
he said.
I m m thctri Na
tional Committee Chairman Fred Harris,
complained that Nixon could continue
buying time with the U.S. public al-
most indefinitely by a series of small
withdrawals?which is a possibility im-
plicit in Nixon's approach. Averell Har-
riman, chief negotiator at Paris in the
Johnson Administration, had a more ,
; trenchant criticism. "This is a replace-
ment, not a withdrawal," said he. "The
1, first order of business is the reduction
of violence. We still have orders for all-
out pressure on the enemy. How can
we expect the enemy to end their fight-
ing if we don't? We should be taking a
more defensive position and at the same
time demand that the other side re-
: CIAPROP7liel 11941taib5000911001-2
e
LOS ANGELES TIMES CPYRGHT
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1
rthdrawal of 25,000 Troops
'daMs",ome would retuin
the United States,' but he
left open the possibility'
,
CRYRGHT, .
. ,some would be sent to;
ii BY TED SELL ? - American bases in Okinal
'? fithriu Mal( Vv. Oar a ? i kV 4 ilia ?LIVIA!".
, .
-WASHINGTON
Secretary of Defense' Melvin R.
Laird, returning early Monday from,
Related stories, Pages 18-22.
the Midway Island meeting at which,
:Mr. Nixon made his announcement, ;
rreferred to the step-by-step nature ,
i.of the plan on arrival at Andrews:
$Afr Force Base near here, ' ?
0.
As the President. said," 'Laird
`.declared, "this is the first anntunce--
"ment. The program will be under'
continuing review and another deci=
,sion will be, made in early August.")
' The decision in August, according
to Pentagon sources, will involve
!whether the United ? States , will
continue the withdrawal at the.
:planned rate?another 15,000 men
after pullout of the first 25,000, with'
the? balance in increments roughly.
once 'a month after that. -
This plan covers only the time up I
to Dec. 31. What will happen 'in 1970
Is Unknown. Presumably it depends
'On events and Olt .political decisions
'not yet made. . "
'4
In the Midway announcement, Mr.
.Nixon said the United? States first4
:would withdraw the equivalent of a.,
division. He did not disclose what.
'proportion of the 25,000 men would
be combat soldiers and how many.
['Would be from support and logistics
"units.
Late Monday, Laird told tin
:impromptu meeting in the Pentagon
press room the first group would be;
;"heavily weighted" with combat.
forces.
Laird said a reason for pulling out
;mostly combat units, as opposed to
,.'support units, was that "our U.S.
!forces will have to supply some of
The support for the South Vietna-
hese forces" who replace American
'units and who lack the complex
support structure of the 'U.S. Army.
.2 Elsewhere, it was learned that the
Initial group would include 15,000 to
16,000 men in combat-type units and
;their immediate headquarters ele-
bents. The 9,000 to 10,000 remain-,
' g troops will be in units directly
volved in ?support of that Size-
-
: Althoue the initial 25,000 with-
.drawal am,..lunts to only about 41/2%
,of the total 538,500-man U.S. force in
;Vietnam, it will be about 9% of total
,icombat un is there as ,measured by
."maneuver battalions" . available to'
the U.$..cor anander, Gen. Creighton':
'W. Abrams . ;
; Maneuvei battalions are infantry,'
;armored ca ?ilry, and reconnaissance
unit? whic's actually seek out the?
lanerriy; suprorted by artillery, tom-,.,
'bat engine aviation and other;
cb at talio ns not counted in tha!
:Maneuver
' . There are 11 combat divisions cir
`their equivalents in Vietnam. Eight.
:and :one-third are, Army; two' .and.
19;le-third Marine..1
p.,.An Army division nor-
ally has about 16,000 ;
Inen. Those in.Vietnam'le
i`are: larger because most:
have a tenth infantry
tbaitalion, compared to
Epight or nine in a stateside4
givision, and each batta-01
on has an additional riflei
empany. '
.:Identificatiad t h e
mks to be pulled out first,
Pentagon spokesman',
'Said, "will be the subject.
"of talks ,in Honolulu" ba-''",
inning Thursday.
Taking part will be re-
presentativea ,of the Del
if en se Depart/tent, t h e4
taint Chiefs of Staff, the:-
?,13 a cifie coinmander in
rif,thief, the i4/.S., military
kcommand n Saigon and
Ithe Military Airlift Com-1
'!'inand and 'Military Sea.
'Transportation, Service. ;
'The latter two
qoands will he' key ele-I
ments in 'talks which thes
entagon said will
,,into all phases of logistics''
;requirements fo r, t ha;
movement , of troops. from
,i
:outh Vietnam." ? 1 '
- ? Destination Vague,'
Laird was vague about
here the troops would be
UM/L.44e witehdi,a_W.4 1.4';
AL my dud
'aims officers have sub-
mitted plans which call for
?
one reinforced regimental'l
,landing team (equivalent"
to an Army brigade, one-;
'third of a diVision) lanai;
tone or two Army brigades1
to be withdrawn first.!
.Under these plans the
marines would be sent to,
Okinawa and the Army'',
units would be divided.
either between Okinawa'
and Hawaii or Hawaii and ;
a home base in the United
States.
These units plus suppor^
-troops ? who might b.
:sent to a number of bases
'here and abroad ? corn-
't? prise the initial 25,000-
man withdrawal.
If other increments lot;
low on the expected sche--,
dule, military comman=
ders hope to use them to
'rebuild the Pacific Ocean
strategic reserve which
[ before Vietnam stood at
two full divisions in Okin-'
",
awa and Hawaii. It is now.
.down to two brigade equi-
valents, one of which is a
mobilized National Guard,
;infantry brigade due for4
release by December. -
Which to Leave
? As to which units will b4glik
? ithdraw n, Pentagoi?
sources indicate the Ma-,
One brigade equivalent, in
cthe initial increment ob,
;viously will come from the
? Corps sector, in , far,
'northern South Vietnam
,.where all: marines are:
,atationed.'
One Army brigade pro-
bably will come-from thel
sector north of Saigon,
!although there may be,
tshifts also 'involving a-.
.realignment of the sector
in the Central Highlands'
Where the 4th Infantry
Division operates.
The third brigade equi-
(valent rimy also come from"
I
'1 Corps, according to milli
(tary sources. It could he.
either_a Marine or an.
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It:Kririy unit?more likely1
the latter. In addition tol,
two and one-third Marine,.
...divisions, there has been a .
`similar Army force in the
$,northern corps .area since..;i
the 1968 Tet offensive.
r, Army officers said the4
i!Units to be returned would
hot be the units as pre-..,
--eently manned. They said
that before departure the:
'units probably would be?
filled with men finishing '
their 12-month tours in,,
'Vietnam. Men in the del
?
signated units with more
time to serv,e will .bei
:transferred ? to outfit S,
'which ? will stay, in,
-nem: ,
? Hence the first immedi-;;
,ate personal effect of thel
1110r:withdrawal will be on men'
',waiting to: "be sent., t(!!
:Vietnam as replaceMents
-Withdrawal of. 25,000,
troops will cut replace-
ment needs?now runningi
about 50,000'' en a month
?L-by about 2,200 men.:
That number of men tick-
eted for Vietm.ri now wilr;
;?be surplus to replacement'
needs every . month after,
the withdrawal. is com-
plete.
, Pentagon officials noted:.
that in one sense
'1?11.xon's announced 25,000-,
inian withdrawal actually
"amounts to a larger cut.'
'U.S. strength in Vietnam:
had been scheduled to
[reach .549.500 'by July 1. It
qs 11,000 below that figure.
;Bence, the withdrawal in
this c.omnutntion actualLy,
amount+. ea won mern ifa
'terms of what the plans'
had been. ?
. Other Forces
, , Of present U.S. strength,
Vietnam, 360,000 . are-
tArmy; 81,000, marines;
000), airmen; 36,000, sailorS;
"xid 0O, coast guardsmen.,
front South Vietnam as "a
good sign for an eventual
peaceful settlement' of the.
Vietnam conflict."
Mblik said this after a meet-I
Ing with Lord Shepherd,
visiting British untlersecre..,
tary for Asian affairs.
"This is proof of the
United States' seriousness in
reducing its troops in Viet-
nam to pave the,tvay for a'
peaceful settlement," Malik!
said. He described the United':
States decision as "unilateral.
withdrawal" since North Viet.4
%.nam has not expressed willine
tness to do the same..
JAPAN TIMES
10 June 1969
Holyoake Praises]
Nixon's Pullout
JAPAN TIMES
10 June 1969
CIITRPlit Lauds Move'
TrrAKARTA (TTPD?For-

,
JAPAN TIMES
CiPankk0i3i1969
Ir-N11 Alli.;11.0.1141011
CANBERRA, Australia
(AP)?The Australian Govern-
ment will not seek a reduction,
of its forces in Vietnam follow-
ing the announcement of
'America's intention to with-
draw 25,000 of its men. ;
.. Prime Minister John Gorton'
made this? clear in a state.;
went. He said: "I feel it would
!be a Wrong thing for Australiai
to-do." .
?
? He said the Americans had
greatly increased their forces
since the Australian conting,
ent was committed to the area
The Americans had also
,built up South Vietnam's(
. forces to take over some of the
'burdens now borne by thl
500,000 American troops. .,t
? Gorton added, "It would be
a shabby thing for Australia',
to wijhdraw its own forces;
D.nd to that degree impose al
further burden, or at least toj
that degree prevent a lesseni
ing of the burden, borne by
(the United States." '
Bila saiiiI inz? hirdi earl:line
poihted out it would be at
tragic mistake for North 'i
;Vietnam or anyone else to
interpret the American action:
'as a prelude to general with-
drawal or any retreat by the
;United States from its deter-
mination to persevere until
,attainment of their. objective.
?.the right of self-determina-
tion for South Vietnam's
(people. ? '. i
l' He added, "We must coni
tinue to hope for a peaceful"'
settlement along the line94
Suggested in Nixon's eight-
point plan and for an oppor-
j
I
tunity for the South Viet-
namese people freely to de.,
termine the kind. of goyern-
tivant.,".
I eign Minister Adam Malik
Monday hailed the U.S. deci-
skin todWithdraw 25,000 troops ment they
17JVIT .T MICJITTIN. 'MAW 7.:ea-
land' (AP)?Prime Minister
Xeith Holyoake said Monday
that ,the joint decision to
withdraw American troops
from South Vietnam reflects
the progress which South
Vietnam has made ? in assum-
ing responsibility for its own
kdefense.
"We must now hope this
tinit\ial withdrawal of allied
itroops will be matched by
IwithdraWals of North Viet-,
amese troops that would
!mean an over-all redttction in
Ithe level of hostilities.
r "Nor have we given up
ihope that agreed withdrawals
by both sides will be possible
in the near future."
Holyoake said New. Zealand
will be reviewing its own
'level of troops in Vietnam but
the practicability of this had
jto be considered.
Holyoake also pointed out
.that the United States and
(.Australia had both increased
?their. military forces since
Zcaland tta4rad 4111
ipresent 'level of military sup-
tport.,
REUTERS, Bangkok
11 June 1969
Thcaland Seeking
cliktikipliroops Out
3tIttitnn,
-acir xir.TCOPC.. .Thine rt?Thaii
combat troops in South Viet-
nam will be withdrawn as,
soon as South Vietnamese
forces can replace them, the
:communications minister, -Air
,Chief? Marshal Dawee
sapya, said today.
; The 6000 Thai troops now in.
South Vietnam were needed
in many parts of .
,Dawee said.
I Dawee told reporters. Thai-
. .
land has asked the United
States to make preparationel
;,for South Vietnamese 'troops
'ipo take' over the fighting in'
4.he Bencat area near Saigon;
.14 eTlw.1 Luuyi tue babel ?
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*U.S. Is :Said to Consider
2fiew Pullouts of Troops
CPyRGHT
By WILLIAM BEECHER
ap.sti to The Now Took Dom
WASHINGTON, June 17 ?
The Nixon Administration
has drawn up tentative plans
for two additional troop with-
drawals from Vietnam this year
?one in August, the other In
October?accerding to authori-
tative sources. The withdrawals
would total 45,000 to 75,000
men.
The plans are contingent in
large part on how the forces
of Hanoi and Saigon react tO
the pullout of the 25,000 troops
decided on at the Midway con-
ference between President
Nixon and President Nguyen
Van Thieu of South Vietnam.
If South Vietnamese, forces
move aggressively and if North
Vietnamese and Vietcong troops
either do not try, or try and
fail, to launch 'successful mili-
tary offensives, the rest of this
year's withdrawal plan prob-
ably will be carried out, these
sources assert.
The new withdrawals would
involve ;two combat divisions,
the 10,000 Army reserve troops
.remaining .in Vietnam, and var.:
ious support and service units.
After the three withdrawals,
the total reduction of United
States troops would be 75,000
to 100,000.
A progressive schedule of
American withdrawals, ?the
sources contend, should reduce
antiwar pressure at home while
demonstrating that even with
smaller forces, the allies
are capable of fending off the
enemy on the battlefield.
If North Vietnam becomes
persuaded of this, the hope isl
that it will agree, formally or
tacitly, to a mutual withdrawal
plan that would see the bulk
of both North Vietnamese and
American troops out of South
Vietnam at a much faster rate,
than under unilateral United
States. witbdrawa1s,
1A-RipP7/9111 Jr
I out in tianoi reruses to con-
sider mutual reductions, I t
strategy looks toward re-
moval of 340,000 American
troops over the next 'three
years, leaving behind "in-
definitely" enough of a force
to so bolster South Vietnamese
troops that they could contend
with anything the enemy could
throw at them.
This would involve a resi-
dual force of about 200,000
Americans.
.The Defense Department re-
leased details today on the dis-
position of the 25,000 troops
scheduled to, come out by
August. About 16,000 soldiers
and marines will be moved to
garrisons in Hawaii, Okinawa
and Japan.
About 8,000 Army men, in-
cluding about 2,000 active duty
reservists and National Guards-
men, will return home. Some
1,200 Navy men will be re-
assigned both in the Pacific and
the United States.
The 8,000 men in the Ninth
Marine Regimental Landing
Team will go to Okinawa, the
7,400-man First Brigade of the
Ninth Infantry Division and di-
vision headquarters will go to
Hawaii, and a 400-man Marine
squadron of F-4 jet fighters will
go to Japan.
The 6,000 men in the Second
Brigade of the Ninth Division
and 1,200 reservists will return
to the United States. New York
reserve units in this group are
the 74th Field Medical Hospital
and the 316th Medical Detach-
ment, with a total of about
190 men.
Administration officials make
clear that they would have pre-
ferred to work out a mutual
withdrawal with North Vietnam,
but have despaired of achieving
such an agreement'soon.
Rather than leave the initia-
tive with Hanoi, they have
moved to unilateral withdrawals
at a deliberate pace, hoping to
achieve the same finaLresult.
t
;are signed n part uce
opposition to the war by re-
ducing the number of Ameri-
can troops involved, and thus
both the cost and casualties,
and by persuading the public
there is an end in sight.
Further, it is hoped, that Sai-
gon will realize that It must
[move its troops to the fore-
front if it is to avoid military
ri foot,hi orplitinn fQ fafrhil.
.tey. .41M/ It0 livid ea it.
'people.
, And, finally, it is designed to
suggest to Hanoi that 'with an
increasingly lighter? lead, the
American public would assent
to keeping sufficient forces in
South Vietnam_ over the long
haul to insure that . the pre-
vious investment in .1.ives and
dollars will not ,have been
wasted.
"Make no mistake," said one
Administration planner, "Hanoi
has some time pressures, too,
!both in the north and the
south."
In the north, he said, there
are increasing reports of black
marketeenng, shirking of work
assignments and a general dis-
illusionment with the burden of
the we.
In the South, he said, with
each passing day the South
Vietnamese military forces are
becoming noticeably stronger,
the Government more en-
trenched, and the Vietcong po-
litical apparatus?the element
that will be Hanoi's principal
force to fight the post-war po-
litical battle?loses more and
more experienced men. ?
Administration officials agree,
reluctantly, that despite the
obvious improvement in the
South Vietnamese forces,' sub-
stantial reductions in American
troops do represent a lessen-
ing of the allied military punch
and thus a calculated risk.
One official said: "We be-
lieve we know the worst that
the enemy can do: the Tet of-
fensive of 1968. We held then.
!We don't believe he is capable
of mounting as massive or ef-
fective an assault in the future.
' And we should be able to
hold." ?
In the Mekong Delta area of
South Vietnam, there are no
plans to reinforce the three
South Vietnamese divisions as
the only American combat units
?two brigades of the Ninth Di-
vision?move out.
"They'll have to carry a
larger load," one officer con-
ceded, but he pointed out that
American fighter-bombers, heli-
copter units and artillery would
provide increased close sup.
,
2pmvsnlosplpl,latnhe ctaltsatifvoerl
the removal of the` Third Bri-
gade of the Ninth Division in
August. Along with the rest-of
the Third Marine Division in
the northern provinces of South
Vietnam.
But to guard against the pos-
sibility that North Vietnam will
suddenly move one or more of
Its divisions from its territory,
Third, this division win 6e
deployed to Okinawa where it,
would be in position to rush
back in an emergency.
Additionally, the remaining.
10,000 Army reserve and Na-
tional Guardsmen in Vietnam
who were called to duty last'
year. are 'expected to be re-
'turned home and demobilized
in the August withdrawal.
The October withdrawal an-
nouncement, according to this
same schedule, would' involve
another division-size combat
force ? as yet not selected",
and various support troops.
Some Pentagon planners at.
already lookinz beyond these
tentative 1969 withdrawals, but
have not yet reached specific
choices for 1970 and 1971,
sonrces say.
Administration officials sax
that North Vietnam might want
to try another offensive this,
summer to demonstrate its
strength, ? to raise questions
among American planners about
the feasibility of their time-
table of withdrawals, and to
shake Saigon's confidence in its
Ameridan allies.
If that offensive fizzles, offi-
cials say, Hanoi might then be
ready to contemplate mutual
withdrawals suggested by Pres-
ident Nixon on May 14.
A basic sticking point, they
concede, is over a political
mula that might provide
tection for Vietcong elemett?s
that remain behind.
The Hanoi regime remembers,
one official pointed out, that
while the Geneva Accords of
1954 guaranteed amnesty to
Vietminh rebels, about 15,000
of them were killed subsequent-
ly.
"We're convinced that Presi-
dent [Ngo Dinh] Diem was sin-
cere in intending to live up to
the amnesty" he said, "but he
didn't have control over many
of the officials at the village
and hamlet level."
Hanoi, then, would be ex-
pected to demand some kind,
of politiCal settlement that, at
the very minimum, would pro-
tect the Vietcong before agree-
ing to pull out all of Its forces,
,officials note.
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APESingsFROPMPPIRMigrikoP WARIFUPgal iiiiiiNo5RPOWA2
President Thieu's June 9 Press Conference statements coneerning "withdrawal"
instead of "replacement":
"I would like to emphasize that you should not confuse
the two terms. On the one hand, gradual replacement of the
US troops by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam as
the situation permits and as the development of the Vietnamese
Army permits, and on the other hand the defeatist term, the
distorting term, and the term which causes a loss in the morale
of the Vietnamese people and in the morale of the armed forces,
and which causes confusion in the national ranks, and that is
the term "withdrawal" of the American troops."
GOTEBORGS HANDELS-OCH SJOFARTSTIDNING (Liberal), Sweden
10 June 1969
A DWARF'S STRIDE
"The decision on the relatively modest reduction can
hardly give rise to any great relief either in the U.S.A.
or elsewhere. The American doves' harsh criticism seems
to be compensated by disappointment in wide circles. The
first step in deescalation of the American war effort be-
came only a dwarf's stride....
Whether American troop reductions in the near future
are of such dimensions and character that they really
bring a noticeable relaxation of tension is uncertain. A
decisive factor, of course, is Hanoi's willingness somehow
to respond with a similar reduction of its forces in South
Vietnam. The visibly most important decision at Midway
cannot be said to open any promising vistas for peace in
Vietnam. One can only hope that greater things are hap-
pening out of sight."
DJAKARTA TIMES (English-Language-Independent)
10 June 1969
"(This is)... third bombshell to be exploded by a
USA president in period of 15 months in ,the effort to find
peace in Vietnam.... However, unilateral measures will
not be sufficient if war is to be ended. The other side
of the warring parties should also show reciprocal actions
to scale down war activities. What North Vietnam has so
far done is making all possible efforts to justify the
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presence of its troops in South Vietnam. This, for certain,
cannot be described as Ancerity to find peace.
What remains to be seen now is how the other side will
react to this."
DAIEVY TELEGRAPH, London ((Conservative)
10 June 1969
"The Communists in Vietnam have been fighting for
20 years. They ignore public opinion. Time is a much
less valuable commodity to them. This is the background
against which the results of the Midway conference...
have to be judged.
It (troop removal) will not immediately reduce the
exposure of American fighting troops to possible casualties.
Nevertheless, the announced withdrawal is not to be
' sniffed at. It is significant that the North Vietnamese
delegation in Paris yesterday described it as 'a vulgar farce.'
Anything they castigate like that must have good in it."
DAILY MAIL (Conservative)
10 June 1969
Ne can be optimistic but we must be cautious.... The
progress is slow and painful. But at least it is in the
direction of peace:"
FRENCH RADIO (State-owned)
9 June 1969
"President Nixon very sincerely wants to find an honor-
able end to a war that represents a tragic error in American
history....
But Nixon also has to reckon with the fact that if he
ends the war too quickly or...sells out Vietnam, this may
alarm some allies, especially in Southeast Asia....
That is why he is compelled to act step by step and
to find an adequate formula for withdrawing honorably."
8
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COMMENTATOR ON FRENCH TV (State-owned)
9 June 1969
"But let us not forget that there are others besides
doves in the U.S.
It was difficult for him (President Nixon) to go
further. You have heard that the North Vietnamese claim
that the troop withdrawal is a farce.... I think they are
exaggerating....
From a military point of view the decision is more
symbolic than meaningful, but from a political viewpoint
it is very important because it is the first time the
Americans have committed themselves to disengagement....
I believe the North Vietnamese after thinking it
over will find some satisfactory points in the American
gesture, and it is quite possible that the Midway conference
will revive the Paris conference."
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (Right-center)
10 June 1969
"Midway has produced a fair compromise which enables
both the Communist and allied sides to save face and thus
opens the way to...progress toward a political solution
....Nixon is right when he speaks of a historic decision:
The military withdrawal has begun. This is an irreversible
decision."
WEST GERMAN TV
9 June 1969
"It would be unfair to reproach Nixon for doing a half-
hearted job. In arriving at his decision, he had to con-
sider Korea, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and even India, where
it is no longer fashionable to condemn the U.S. for its '
engagement in Vietnam....
The situation today is not much different from yester-
day, except for one thing: 25,000 is a beginning.".
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"Once again the U.S. has proved that it really wants
peace in offering its opponents an opportunity for real
negotiation. The first reaction from Hanoi does not show
the same goodwill."
CANBERRA TIMES (Independent)
10 June 1969
"The Midway agreement marks the beginning, a small
beginning, of the end of U.S. engagement with Communist
forces in Indochina...
The first U.S. withdrawal is the start of a continu-
ing process, but the process will continue well into the
seventies."
DAILY TELEGRAPH (Conservative), Sydney
10 June 1969
"President Nixon's decision indicated the sincerity
of his intention to bring the war to an honorable end and
the enormously increased capacity of the South Vietnamese
to provide their own defense.
The Prime Minister is right to point out that it should
be 'interpreted as a sign of strength' -- and that 'it
would be a tragic mistake for North Vietnam or anyone else
to interpret it as a prelude to any retreat by the U.S."
EVENING POST, Wellington
10 June 1969
"No matter how comparatively small is the number of men
involved or how bleak the prospect of a military settlement
or an acceptable political agreement, President Nixon's announce-
ment of the pending withdrawal of 25,000 troops from Vietnam
will be widely, regarded as a definite' ray of hope."
10
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BANGKOK WORLD (Pro-U.S.)
10 June 1969
"In establishing his eight-point program, Mk. Nixon
advanced the sound thesis that any withdrawal to be effective
must be properly supervised by an international body accept-
able to both sides.... The message makes clear that Vietnamese
leaders, both in the north and the south, must assume a greater
part of the initiative if the conflict is to be resolved.
PHILIPPINES HERALD (Independent), Manila
10 June 1969
"Without waiting for the North Vietnamese and the Viet
Cong to promise similar moves or to match the initiative, the
U.S. and South Vietnam have gone on to prove their sincerity
and good faith by taking the first step.
TRIBUNE DE GENEVE (Independent)
10 June 1969
"The right of the people of South Vietnam to self-deter-
mination has been forcefully reaffirmed.... Mk. Nixon thus
refuses to play the game of the doves who would impose on
Saigon a government of coalition and capitulation...
"The prudence of this removal of 25,000 troops indicates
that the South Vietnamese are to be given a chance to prove
on a small scale their ability to assume tasks formerly
entrusted to American troops, and Hanoi is to be given the
opportunity to take a reciprocal step."
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11 June 1969
"Hanoi and the NLF would be.very.naive if they try
to drag things out in the hope that. de-Americanization
will be translated into capitulation."
GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN (Catholic), Brussels
11 June 1969
"The U.S. de-escalation move, reflects the growing
confidence of the Americans in the increasing strength
of South Vietnam. Any reduction in U.S. troop strength
will henceforth indicate an improvement in the situation.
Nixon has effectively shown his goodwill."
LA LIBRE BELGIQUE (Catholic), Brussels
11 June 1969
"Outrageous Communist reactions do not diminish the
value of Mr. Nixon's gesture, measured though it may be.
What is proclaimed in Moscow or Hanoi is not important,
but rather what As said backstage at the Paris talks."
LA PRENSA, Buenos Aires
? 11 June 1969
"President Nixon has given the .impression that he
wishes to make peace -- a just peace without victor or
vanquished --.and without disengagement from the commit-
ments the U.S. has undertaken in:Southeast Asia."
EL TIEMPO, Bogota
11 June 1969
"A great step toward peace...the U.S. at Midway, Paris
and Saigon is continuously seeking out(openings susceptible
of acceptance by 'the 'other side as platforms for positive
discussion...." ?
12
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LA REPUBLICA, Bogota
11 June 1969
"As a result of the talks the U.S. has recovered its
freedom of action, retained its prestige, and having re-
duced its military expenditures ,can turn its attention to
other domestic and external problems. This will serve us
all. We welcome it."
LANERHAV, Tel Aviv
11 June 1969
"South Korean, Nationalist Chinese and Thai leaders
are frankly afraid that Nixon might want to discard all of
?the U.S. military commitments in the Far East and let the
anticommunist states there shoulder the burden.
"What President Nixon was saying to Saigon leaders is,
'If you are determined not to surrender to the Viet Cong and
if you are opposed to a coalition government incorporating
representatives of the NLF, then you must increase your share
in the war against the Viet Cong."
FREE PRESS JOURNAL (Left-of-center, independent), Bombay
11 June 1969
"The North Vietnamese have little to-lose by responding
to the American gesture in a manner that would create con-
fidence abroad-in their intentions for the future."
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HANOI RADIO
10 June 1969
"Nixon's statement on the withdrawal of 25,000 U.S.
troops only represents a propaganda act aimed at easing
public pressure and dodging the just demand by the
Vietnamese and world peoples that the U.S. unconditionally
withdraw all U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Nixon's ,
perfidious measure cannot deceive U.S. public opinion."
VIET CONG RADIO
10 June 1969
"The real situations in South Vietnam and the Paris
conference on Vietnam and the Midway meeting between
Nixon and his lackey have further bared the Nixon Admin-
istration's scheme to stubbornly pursue the war of ag-
gression and implement neo-colonialism in South Vietnam.
"But no matter how frantically he squirms and no
matter what tortuous or perfidious tricks he may resort
to, Nixon will be unable to salvage the U.S. warmongers'
war of aggression in South Vietnam."
IZVESTIYA
10 June 1969
"The Midway meeting only confirmed once again that the
U.S. has no intention of extricating itself from the quagmire
in which it was landed by Washington's military-political
machine...
"This mean p that...the Republican Administration is
still following in the steps of its predecessor.... Instead
of constructive steps we have a futile propaganda move..."
SOFIA RADIO
10 June 1969
"The cutback is a propaganda bluff."
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BUDAPEST RADIO
10 June
"The withdrawal is not significant and cannot be
regarded as an expression of goodwill."
MOSCOW RADIO
11 June 1969
"The talks prove that the United States does not
intend to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam, but
clings to its demand for 'reciprocity' in order to pro-
long the intervention and gain time to strengthen the
Saigon army."
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Excerpts from Communist Points
on Pre-Conditions to Peace Negotiations
"Five Points" of National Liberation Front (now called the South
Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government) as issued by the NLF Central
Committee on 22 March 1965:
Point 1 - "...all negotiations are useless as long as the U.S.
imperialists do not withdraw all the troops, weapons and means of
war of the U.S. and its satellites .from South Vietnam and destroy
their military bases in South Vietnam..."
"Four Points" of North Vietnam as presented in a speech by Premier
Phan Van Dong on 8 April 1965:
,Point 1 - "the U.S. must withdraw. from South Vietnam all U.S.
troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all
U.S. military bases, cancel its .'military alliance' with South
Vietnam."
North Vietnam's Revised "Four Points" as issued by the Foreign
ministry of the DRV on 17 July 1968:
Point 1 - "...demand that the U.S. withdraw American and Satel-
lite troops from South Vietnam..."
"Ten Points" of Viet Cong Proposal in Paris, as submitted by Chief
Delegate of NLF, Tran Buu Kiem, 8 May 1969:
Point 2.- "....the U.S. must .withdrawfrom South Vietnam all U.S.
troops, military personnel, arms and,war-materiel..orithout posing
any condition whatsoever; liquidate :all-U.8,4military bases in South
Vietnam..."
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Excerpted from Newspaper Article6'
on Troop Contributing Nations
in South Vietnam
mid June 1969
Since July 1964, when the Saigon government launched its appeal for
military (and non military) aqsk-nce from the free world, troops have
been'arrivihg'in South Vietnam d port cities from Australia, South Korea,
New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand. With the addition in February
of the last 4,000 Thai combat troops, Asian and Pacific nations will have
contributed a total of over 71,000 men to Saigon's fighting forces.
Thai Black Panther Division.
11,566
Royal Australian Regiment
7,663
New Zealand's Artillery Battalion
562
'Philippines Armed PHILCAG Teams
1,521
Republic of Korea's White Horse
and Tiger Divisions and Blue
Dragon Marine Brigade 50,295
71,607
(N.B.: The total number of free world troops who went to the aid of
South Korea when she was attacked by North,Korea and later by Communist
China came to about 48,000 -- exclusive of U.S. and South Korean forces.)
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July 1969
DATES
July 2-8 Brussels
July 21 Vietnam
August 1 China
August 1 Poland
August 16-23 Helsinki
August 18--28 Lige,
Belgium
August 20-21 Czechoslovakia
August 24
August 24
August 25
August 28
September 1
NATO
Soviet Union
France
Czechoslovakia
September 21 China
WORTH NOTING
9th World Congress of International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions and 20th
Anniversary of ICFTU.
15th Anniversary of the Geneva Accords on
an Indochina Armistice, the partition of
Vietnam and the neutrality of Laos and
Cambodia.
Army Day -- commemorating the founding of
the Chinese Red Army in 1921.
25th Anniversary of the World War II
Warsaw Uprising against Nazi German occu-
pation, 1944.
Youth and Student Conference on Vietnam,
sponsored by the (communist) International
Union of Students and the World Federation
of Democratic Youth.
7th General Assembly of the (non-communist)
World Assembly of Youth.
1st Anniversary of the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia by Soviet, East German, Hungarian,
Polish and Bulgarian forces of the Warsaw
Pact.
20th Anniversary, NATO Treaty (signed April
4) which went into effect in 1949.
30th Anniversary of the Soviet-Nazi Non-
Aggression Pact.
25th Anniversary of the liberation of Paris
by French and U.S. forces, 1944.
25th Anniversary of the Slovak uprising
against the Nazi German occupation, 1944.
30th Anniversary of the beginning 6f World
War II -- Germany invaded Poland from the
West September 1; USSR invaded Poland from
the East, September 17, 1939.
20th Anniversary, Chinese Peoples' Republic
proclaimed, 19)49.
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