ESTIMATED SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING IN RUBLES: RECENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

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CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
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May 7, 2001
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December 1, 1977
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Approv d~for Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 r Trentd ant 'rO smc .d So v`en 91 d in i Rubles: : ess e 9 An %te en a As SR G'fr, Deco ;brrO'7 Aaaroved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A0013001 kO0 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 004836 Exempt from C>nsral Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: SK. 58(2) Automatic*Ny declassified on date impossible to determine Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles: Recent Trends and Prospects Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center Key Judgments Total Defense Spending Our estimates of the ruble cost of Soviet defense activities during the period 1970-76 indicate that: ? Soviet spending for defense, defined to correspond to US budgetary accounts and measured in constant 1970 prices, has been growing at an average annual rate of 4 to 5 percent, from 40-45 billion rubles in 1970 to 52-57 billion rubles in 1976. ? Defined more broadly, as Soviet practice might require, defense spending grew from 45-50 billion rubles in 1970 to 57-62 billion rubles in 1976. Composition and Allocation Ruble estimates provide insight into the resource composition of the Soviet defense effort and the trends in resource allocations among the branches of service. Analysis based on the narrower definition of defense-for which the estimates are more detailed and precise-indicates that: ? The shares allocated to investment, operating, and RDT&E re- mained fairly constant during the 1970-76 period. About half of total spending went for investment, about 30 percent for operating expenditures, and about 20 percent for RDT&E. ? The Soviet Navy and Ground Forces received roughly constant shares of investment and operating spending during the period. Spending for the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Forces displayed cyclical behavior, and the Air Defense Forces' share of investment and operating expenditures decreased by about one-fifth. Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Economic Impact The defense effort has had a substantial impact on the Soviet economy: ? During the 1970-76 period, defense spending consumed an almost constant share of Soviet GNP-11 to 12 percent or 12 to 13 percent, depending on how defense spending is defined. ? Defense production consumed about one-third of the final product of machine-building and metalworking, the branch of industry that produces investment goods as well as military hardware. Prospects The average annual growth rate of 4 to 5 percent implied by these estimates exceeds the average annual rate at which we expect the Soviet economy to grow in the years ahead. Econometric projections are that Soviet GNP will grow at about 4 percent a year through 1980, but that growth will fall off thereafter-probably to about 3 to 3.5 percent. Yet, the projected economic slowdown notwithstanding, Soviet spending for defense is likely to continue to grow at roughly its current rate into the 1980s, whether or not a SALT II agreement is concluded. Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Page Key judgments .............................................................................................. i Preface ............................................................................................................ iv Methodology .................................................................................................. 1 Confidence in the Estimates ...................................................................... 1 Estimates of Total Defense Spending ...................................................... 1 Resource Implications .............................................................................. 2 Prospects .................................................................................................... 2 Impact of a SALT II Agreement ............................................................ 4 Defense Spending by Resource Category .............................................. 4 Investment .................................................................................................. 4 Operating .................................................................................................... 4 RDT&E ........................................................................................................ 5 Spending by the Services .......................................................................... 5 Strategic Rocket Forces .......................................................................... 6 Air Defense Forces .................................................................................. 6 Air Forces .................................................................................................. 6 Navy ............................................................................................................ 6 Ground Forces .......................................................................................... 7 Command and Support .......................................................................... 7 Page Figure 1. Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Defense, 1970-76 ...... 2 Figure 2. Percentage Shares of Estimated Soviet Investment and Operating Expenditures for Military Services .................. 5 Figure 3. Growth of Estimated Soviet Investment and Operating Expenditures by Branch of Service, 1970-76 .................... 5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01300130001-5 This report presents CIA's estimates of Soviet spending for defense during the 1970-76 period. It complements our dollar cost comparison of Soviet and US defense activities ' and expands upon the estimates which the Director of Central Intelligence presented to the joint Economic Committee of the US Congress in June 1977. The estimates are couched in ruble terms to reflect the costs of military equipment and activities in the USSR. Such estimates are done to assist in assessing the impact of defense on the Soviet economy, resource considerations confronting Soviet defense planners, and the relative priorities assigned to the forces and activities which make up the Soviet defense effort. Constant prices are used so that the estimates reflect only real changes in defense activities, not the effects of inflation. The use of 1970 prices permits comparison of estimated defense expenditures with other CIA estimates of Soviet economic performance, which also use that price base. ' SR 77-10140, A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1966-76, October 1977 (SECRET). iv SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles: Recent Trends and Prospects Methodology In the USSR, information on defense spending is a closely guarded state secret. Only one statis- tic-a single-line entry for "defense"-is re- ported each year in the published state budget. This figure is uninformative, because its scope is not clearly defined and its size appears to be manipulated to suit Soviet political purposes. (Changes in the announced defense figure do not appear to reflect the changes we have observed in the level of military activities.) To provide the information which the official "defense" entry does not, CIA annually estimates the cost of Soviet defense activities. Our estimates begin with the detailed identification and listing of the activities and physical components which make up the Soviet defense program for a given year. By a variety of methods this data base is converted into two value estimates, one in rubles, the other in dollars. For some components, such as military personnel, the data are costed directly, using available ruble prices and costs and dollar prices and costs. For other components, conver- sions are made from one value base to the other by applying dollar-to-ruble and, to a much more limited degree, ruble-to-dollar conversion factors. Where possible, the results of direct costing are checked for reasonableness against Soviet statis- tics. For two of the main components of defense spending-investment and operating expendi- tures-prices and quantities are estimated sepa- rately for each major element. The remaining component-military research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E)-does not lend itself to this approach. Consequently, the cost of military RDT & E is estimated by another method-analysis of Soviet information on ex- penditures for science. Confidence in the Estimates Our annual estimates reflect a continuing effort to acquire more and better data and to improve our methods. The past year's effort has increased our confidence in the estimates. Still, those presented in this report have a margin of error which could be substantial for some items. Our confidence is highest in the estimates of the aggregate total and the investment category. Analysis of published Soviet economic statistics and intelligence information relating to the year 1970 yields results which are consistent with our direct costing estimates for that year. Moreover, because the direct costing methodology reflects the actual changes observed in Soviet defense activities over time, we are confident that the general upward trend in these estimates is correct. Our confidence in the estimates at the lower levels of aggregation varies from category to category. We have high confidence in our esti- mates for major naval ships. These are easily observed and are costed directly in rubles, using Soviet data which have been found to be reliable. Reasonable confidence can also be assigned to the estimates of spending for missile and aircraft systems and for pay and allowances of uniformed military personnel. We have less confidence in our cost estimates for the smaller procurement items such as general purpose vehicles and some ground force weapons. We are least confident of the estimates of military RDT&E costs. These estimates rely on Soviet data which are ill- defined and difficult to analyze. Estimates of Total Defense Spending We do not know precisely how the Soviets define their defense spending. This report uses two definitions: one corresponding to that used in Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Defense, 1970-76 M Estimate defined as the Soviets might view their defense effort. Estimate defined for comparison with US accounts, the United States and a broader definition includ- ing additional costs which the Soviets might classify as spending for defense. These additional costs include expenditures for military stockpil- ing, foreign military assistance, and space pro- grams that are operated by the military in the USSR but by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the United States. Defined to correspond to US accounts, esti- mated Soviet spending for defense increased from 40-45 billion rubles in 1970 to 52-57 billion rubles in 1976, measured in constant 1970 prices. Defined as the Soviets might view their defense effort, estimated spending increased from 45-50 billion rubles in 1970 to 57-62 billion rubles in 1976. Under the narrower definition, for which the estimates are more detailed and precise, esti- Announced Defense Expenditures (Current Prices) mated Soviet defense spending increased at an average annual rate of 4 to 5 percent for the period. The annual growth rates varied during the period, however, reflecting primarily fluctu- ations in procurement outlays for aircraft and strategic missiles. As in earlier periods, procure- ment displayed a cyclical pattern as acquisition of older weapon systems tapered off before that of follow-on systems peaked. Resource Implications Although no single measure adequately describes the economic impact of the Soviet defense effort, defense spending's share of GNP often is used for this purpose. Defense now accounts for 11 to 12 percent of Soviet GNP under the narrower definition of defense spend- ing and for 12 to 13 percent of GNP under the broader definition. Because defense spending grew only slightly faster than the economy as a whole during the 1970-76 period, there was little change in the share of GNP taken by defense. Another indication of the economic impact of defense activities is defense's share of crucial industrial output. During the period, defense consumed about one-third of the final product of machine-building and metalworking, the branch of Soviet industry that produces investment goods as well as military hardware. Defense require- ments also absorbed most of the output of inte- grated circuits. These measures give evidence of a substantial commitment of resources to defense. But there are also a number of noneconomic considerations which Soviet leaders would weigh in deciding on future defense programs. These factors include the leaders' views of foreign military threats, their perception of the relationship between mili- tary power and the success or failure of Soviet foreign policies, and the strength of the institu- tional forces which support defense programs. Prospects The Soviet economy probably will continue to grow at its current rate of roughly 4 percent a year through 1980, but we believe that from 1981 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 through 1985 the average annual growth of GNP will fall-probably to about 3 to 3.5 percent, and possibly to about 2 to 2.5 percent. (The higher projection reflects the likely impact of a declining growth rate in the labor force and continuing Soviet inability to achieve offsetting growth in productivity. The lower projection reflects, in addition, the impact of a projected decline in oil production unaccompanied by vigorous energy conservation measures.) 2 Our projections of Soviet spending for defense into the 1980s are less certain than our estimates of spending in past years. But the trends revealed by our estimates and the evidence gathered in preparing them provide a reasonable basis for such projections. We believe defense spending is likely to continue to grow into the 1980s at about its current rate-some 4 to 5 percent per year. The increasing costs of new military hardware, the weapons development programs currently under way, and continuing capital investment in the defense industries all lead us to this conclu- sion. The scant return likely from a transfer of resources from defense to civilian production and the Soviet perception of the future strategic environment also lead us to believe that Soviet defense spending will continue to grow. A major factor in the growth of Soviet defense spending is the rapidly increasing costs of new weapon systems. As in the United States, the increasing complexity of new weapons has re- sulted in escalating development, production, and maintenance costs. Such cost escalation is clearly evident in the new systems entering the forces in the 1970s-particularly in aircraft, ballistic missiles, and naval ships. Given the new weapons development programs now under way, the increasing cost of new military hardware is likely to become a more important determinant of defense spending in the 1980s. Military RDT&E programs include potentially costly systems for all of the Soviet armed services. In the strategic forces, new solid- and liquid-propellant ICBMs, including a large follow-on to the SS-18, are being developed, as are new strategic naval missiles. Air defense programs for improving surveillance and control and for new fighters and low-altitude surface-to- air missiles are being pursued. Still other systems are being developed for the air, ground, and naval forces. Not all of these systems under development will be deployed, but several will enter production by the early 1980s, continuing to shift the weapons acquisition mix toward more expensive systems. Even if procured at a slower pace than their predecessors, these systems will drive weapons acquisition and maintenance costs upward. We also see continued capital construction at defense industrial facilities-some apparently related to weapons development programs and some apparently designed to enhance productive capacity. Much of the capital construction we have observed is occurring at facilities associated with the production of land- and sea-based strate- gic missiles and high-performance aircraft- those costly systems that have been driving pro- curement and maintenance costs upward. We believe that if the Soviets were to reduce defense spending's growth as a remedy for their economic ills, they would have to break sharply with current spending trends to achieve appreci- able results. Our econometric analysis indicates, for example, that freezing defense investment at its projected 1980 level and reducing military manpower by 1 million between 1981 and 1985 would increase the average annual rate of growth in Soviet GNP by about one quarter of one percent.3 A shift from defense to consumer goods production-which might seem attractive to some Soviet leaders-also would yield limited returns and would be difficult to implement because many defense production resources could not be transferred readily to consumer goods production. Moreover, it would probably encoun- ter opposition from substantial segments of the civilian economic establishment as well as from the powerful leaders and institutions of the de- fense sector. ' See ER 77-10436, Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects, July 1977 (SECRET). 9 See ER 77-10436. Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Soviet perceptions of the future strategic envi- ronment also increase the likelihood that the upward trend in defense spending will continue into the 1980s. The Soviets are impressed by the dynamism of Western military programs and are concerned with the Chinese threat. They are particularly unsettled by recent US discussions of the neutron bomb and by decisions on the B-1 bomber, cruise missile, and M-X mobile missile. The uncertainty with which they view the future strategic relationship with the West argues for Soviet prudence in planning future military forces and discourages measures to reverse the upward trend in defense spending. Impact of a SALT II Agreement A strategic arms limitation agreement along the lines currently being discussed probably would not slow the growth in Soviet defense spending significantly. Strategic weapons devel- opment and production programs might be stretched out, and missile procurement levels could be somewhat lower than otherwise forecast. But procurement and maintenance of intercon- tinental attack systems subject to limitation cur- rently account for only about one-tenth of annual ruble expenditures for defense, and the impact of the strategic forces on growth in defense spend- ing has been muted in recent years by the increasing importance of expenditures for gen- eral purpose aircraft. In addition, because many of the resources devoted to strategic programs are highly specialized, the Soviets would be more likely to reallocate them to weapons programs not limited by the agreement than to civilian uses. Thus the effects of a SALT II agreement on economic growth and consumer satisfaction would be small and probably do not in them- selves constitute a strong incentive for an agreement. Defense Spending by Resource Category A useful way of analyzing Soviet defense spending is to break it down into three principal resource categories-investment, operating, and RDT&E. Investment spending reflects the flow of new equipment and facilities into the military forces; operating expenditures are those associ- ated with the day-to-day functioning of the military; and RDT & E expenditures give some indication of plans for future force moderniza- tion. The resource analysis that follows is based on estimates of defense spending defined to correspond to US accounts. During the 1970-76 period the relative shares of investment, operating, and RDT & E expendi- tures in total Soviet spending for defense re- mained fairly constant. About half of defense spending went for investment, about 30 percent for operating expenses, and about 20 percent for RDT&E.4 Defense investment consists of the procure- ment of weapons, equipment, and major spare parts and the construction of facilities. Most investment-more than 90 percent-was for pro- curement, and most procurement spending was for the acquisition of weapons. The bulk of weapons acquisition outlays went for large, ex- pensive items-first for aircraft and then for missiles and naval surface ships and submarines. Spending for equipment for the support of de- ployed forces-such as radar and general purpose vehicles-was lower but grew rapidly and stead- ily throughout the period. Operating Operating expenditures can be divided into personnel costs and operation and maintenance expenditures. Personnel costs-for pay and allowances, food, personal equipment, retire- ment, and medical care-averaged about 60 per- cent of operating expenditures and approxi- mately 15 percent of total spending for defense between 1970 and 1976. Operation and mainte- nance expenditures-for the maintenance of equipment and facilities, purchases of petroleum and lubricants, utilities, transportation, and com- * A previous paper on estimated Soviet defense spending (SR 76- 10121) reported that investment and operating each consumed 40 percent of total spending. The difference between that report and this one reflects a Change in definitions. Spending for major spare parts is now classified as an investment rather than an operating expense. The change makes our reporting consistent with US Department of Defense practice and with reported Soviet practice as well. Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 munications leasing-were consistently lower than personnel costs, but increased more rapidly. Because the ruble cost estimate for RDT&E is based on highly aggregated and tenuous data, its Growth of Estimated Soviet Investment and Operating Expenditures by Branch of Service, 1970-76 g1 U W U1 dllU C01i1pUSiLuU11 Ca1111UL IJe U1sCUSSeU Will! 160 great confidence or in detail. Nevertheless, the information on which the estimates are based- 140 published Soviet statistics on science, statements by Soviet authorities on the financing of research, 120 and evidence on particular RDT&E projects- suggests that military RDT & E activities receive 100 approximately 20 percent of total defense spend- ing and that they grew steadily during the 80 period. 60 Spending by the Services The Soviet armed services are organized into five branches-Strategic Rocket Forces, Air De- fense Forces, Air Forces, Navy, and Ground Forces. Our costing methodology makes it possi- ble to estimate the allocation of much of defense spending among these forces. We cannot, how- ever, estimate how the costs of RDT&E or of Percentage Shares of Estimated Soviet Investment and Operating Expenditures for Military Services Strategic Rocket Forces Air Defense Forces Air Forces Navy Command and Support 1970 1973 1976 Calculated on the basis of data in 1970 rubles, I FIGURE 3 1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 Calculated on the basis of data in 1970 rubles. 574629 11-77 CIA SECRET 5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 certain command, rear service, and other support functions are allocated to the separate forces, The discussion that follows excludes RDT&E and assigns the command and support functions to a separate category.' Again, the analysis is based on the narrower and more detailed definition of spending for defense. Strategic Rocket Forces Spending for the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), which operate land-based strategic mis- siles, averaged about 7 percent of total invest- ment and operating spending during the 1970-76 period. But SRF spending moved in a cyclical fashion. From 1970 to 1972 it decreased both absolutely and as a share of total outlays, reflect- ing the decreasing procurement of the SS--9, SS-11, and SS-13 ICBM systems. Thereafter, the level and share of spending for the SRF increased as a new missile procurement cycle began with the deployment of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs.6 Air Defense Forces The Soviet Air Defense Forces are responsible for defending the USSR against attack by hostile aircraft and ballistic missiles. Spending for this branch of service averaged about 10 percent of total investment and operating expenditures dur- ing the 1970-76 period. Between 1970 and 1972, however, it fell both absolutely and relatively, and while the absolute level of the Air Defense ' This category should not be confused with command, control, and communications, the costs of which are distributed among all the forces in this analysis. ' We now believe that the SRF's average share of spending is lower and its cyclical fluctuations are less pronounced than reported in our last published estimates. The earlier estimates showed the share of defense spending allocated to the SRF growing from 11 percent in 1970 to 14 percent in 1975, compared with the current estimate of 7 percent in 1970 and 8 percent in 1976. A part of the change in our estimates is due to reassigning some of the costs of nuclear materials to command and support. This is consistent with our understanding of the Soviet treatment of such materials, which are centrally controlled by a Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. Most of the change results from new estimates of Soviet missile costs. The change does not reflect a decrease in the estimates of the number of missiles produced and deployed. It does indicate that these weapons are somewhat less costly than estimated last year. Forces' spending increased thereafter, their share of total expenditures did not. In 1976 their share was some one-fifth lower than in 1970. The decline in the early 1970s resulted from reduc- tions in the rate of procurement of the SA-2 and SA-5 surface-to-air missile systems and of Fiddler and Flagon aircraft. The rise in the absolute level of spending after 1972 was due to increased procurement of interceptor aircraft-first the Foxbat and then the Flogger. The Soviet Air Forces include three compo- nents-Long Range Aviation, Frontal (Tactical) Aviation, and Military Transport Aviation. Ex- penditures for the Air Forces averaged about 20 percent of total investment and operating spend- ing during the 1970-76 period and-like those for the SRF-moved in cyclical fashion. Between 1970 and 1973, spending for the Air Forces increased absolutely and relatively. Thereafter it decreased as a share of total forces spending, but its absolute level fluctuated slightly from year to year. Over half of this spending went to Frontal Aviation. The second largest share-a little more than 30 percent-went to Military Transport Aviation, and Long Range Aviation got the small- est portion. Investment and operating expenditures for the Soviet Navy consumed a fairly constant 20 per- cent of such spending for the military services during the period. The primary items driving the growth of naval spending were ballistic missile and attack submarines. There was also a trend toward the procurement of ships such as the Kiev-class ASW carrier and Kara-class cruiser which are larger, more capable, and more expen- sive than the major surface ships of the 1960s, but which are produced in smaller numbers. In the later years of the period, spending for naval aircraft-particularly the Backfire bomber-was also an important factor in the growth of the Navy's spending. Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Ground Forces Unlike the other combat branches, the Ground Forces took a larger share of total operating expenditures than of total investment spending. Personnel costs were especially important, in- creasing in absolute terms and consistently ac- counting for about one-third of total spending for the Ground Forces. (The increase in personnel spending resulted from an increase in manpower rather than in pay rates.) As for all the combat branches, however, investment spending for the Ground Forces was larger than their operating expenditures. During the period, investment ex- penditures grew each year. Major procurement items for the Ground Forces were self-propelled artillery, mobile tactical SAMs, and tanks and armored vehicles. Command and Support Some costs are not allocated to a specific combat branch because they relate to general support provided by the Ministry of Defense apparatus. Other costs cannot be allocated to the combat branches because of lack of information. We assign both types of expenditures-which include rear services, salaries of Ministry of De- fense employees, space operations of a specifi- cally military nature, and retirement pay-to a category called command and support. During the period, the command and support share of spending for the forces was constant at slightly over 20 percent. Within this category, expendi- tures for personnel and operation and mainte- nance were about twice as large as those for investment. The author of this paper is Military-Economic Analysis Cen er, ice o Strategic Research. Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to telephone 351-5238. Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION DISSEM: & "B"s 14 Dec. 77(OSR "P" dissent 12 Dec.)OSR/ME/E .jOSR/ME/E NUMBER ER 77-10156 OF REPORT SECRET DISTRIBUTION TO RC 8 0 STATINTL DATE OF DOCUMENT Dec. 77 STATINTL NUMBER OF COPIES 500 NUMBER IN R 0 COPY Y RECIPIENT DATE SENT RETURNED OSR for 12 Dec. STATI .~ DD/NF'AC L _-- ? s7 1. ' st-- "I"S s --- - 369 - - Kq ericy Archives 37 G 31 Records en er 4 ~ in PPG/R&D --- - for carter lLb2 ary-__ STATI TL P TPB _~_ - _ - - - 498 7 -- Dec. rte t&filed Dec. T .~ e c. 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Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on reverse. e following service is requested (check one). Show to whom and date delivered--.-.-..-... 150 Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350 RESTRICTED DELIVERY. Show to whom and date delivered------------- 65? RESTRICTED DELIVERY. Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850 A D 2. ARTICLE DRESSED TO: 3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION: REGISTERED NO. CERTIFIED NO. INS (l URED NO. w.. fit ys obtain signature of addressee or agent) I have received the article describe SIGNATURE E3 Addressee CLERK'S INITIALS se 2001/681T - 01708%14 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 PENALTY FOR PRIVATE, USE TO A ID P~I((YYMENT OF STAG. $300 (Street or P9 Box) UNITED"STATES POSTAL SERVICE OFFICIAL BUSINESS SENDER INSTRUCTIONS Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in the space below. ? Complete items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse. ? Moisten gummed ends and attach to front of article if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article. ? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja- cent to number. RETURN TO WASHINGTON, DI C. X0545 PENIN.TY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300 CENTRAL 13TELL'GENCE AGENCY f0 1(C G (Street or P.O. ox) UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE OFFICIAL BUSINESS SENDER INSTRUCTIONS Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in the spece below. ? Complete items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse. ? Moisten gummed ends and attach to front of article if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article. ? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja- cent to number. PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300 RETURN I All Cfl~ LIAi. ' ENCT WASNINCI r , D, C. X3`05 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE OFFICIAL BUSINESS SENDER INSTRUCTIONS Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in the space below. ? Compete items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse. ? Moisten gummed ends and attach to front of article if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article. ? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja- cent to number. PEf LTY FOR PRIVATE USE TOF PAVOID PAYMENT OSTAGE$00 RETURN 7 !'T .~ 4 .CF AGENCY TO t t ?A1 11. ; E.~~~. WASIIINGTON, 61 C, ii 05 (Name of Sender) ICE UNITED STATES pPOSTA LRV SENDER INSTRUCTIONS Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in:00- spbas 01bw. ? Complete items 1, 2, and 3 on the rrssgg ? Moisten gummed ends and attach to nt/d )ar~iole if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article. ? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja- cent to number. RETURN Cc Tp i ^ ~~-Y TO EN i R iL Ii'~ LL1G !! !':-E:RC ~f WASIIII~ GTGI~, D. C1 `0505 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130Q0I-5 0 SENDER: Complete items 1, 2, and ,. Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on reverse. 1 following service is requested (check one). Show to whom and date delivered............ 150 [] Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350 F1 RESTRICTED DELIVERY. Show to whom and date delivered............. 650 RESTRICTED DELIVERY. Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850 2. ARTICLE ADDRESSED TO: /'fir CJwiU,erSt 3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION: REGISTERED NO. CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO. II y (Always obtain signature of address., or agent) I have received the article dzv bed above. GNATURE ^ Add L h i d ressce ut or ze agent >4 . DA TE Qif ERY 5. ADDRESS (Complete only it reque t-Wd J V 6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE: CLERK'S INITIALS }x GOP: 197f -.:{t-2D3-456 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE SENDER INSTRUCTIONS below Print your name, address, and ZIP We in the space ? Complete items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse. ? Moisten gummed ends and attach to front of article if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article. ? Endorse artide "Return Receipt Requested" ad)a- RETURN c i ~? TO CEI T A ~ i T I tL~ U ~ KIGE AC.ENCT WASMIN T QN U, C, w 2fl5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 38 01/` r/1~L Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01-qk J D-?I-S-S.WL-M-1. 1N--A. -T-I-O-~} L-I-S-T I' --O--R: REPORT NO. 9 - /CZ/sf6 SUBJECT: ORIGINATING BRANCH 'NO. OF COPIES TO BE MADE: 'l> TOTAL: Cys. required for codcword reports( S NOT INCLUDE ved~or Release 200140814: IRA-RDP7~9B0045d7A001 0013 ~ 1-5 ys. requi_a ec or on co ewer ( PERSONAL COPIES reports DISSEMINATION LIST FOR BLUE NOTES AND PERSONAL COPIES OF OSR REPORTS 'Alf ,prove IlF ,s F be ,s )2001/08/14: CIA-RDF,7PB0045769~WR13 Copy # 0 P&PD/FIP Rm. 154 (Microfiche Copy) President - Jimmy Carter WHITE HOUSE lAssist. to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski Col. William Odom (Military Assist.) Director, ACDA -- Paul C. Warnke, Rm. 5930 Asst. Director, ACDA International Security Program Bureau ACDA ISP) Jain Newhouse. Rm. 4498 Office of Operations Analysis (ACDA/OA) Alfred Lieberman Rm. 5672 1 Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau (ACDA/WEC) Robert Behr Rm. 5843 AIR FORCE Secretary, USAF - Honorable John C. Stetson Rm. 4E871 Pentagon Under Secretary, USAF - Honorable Hans. Mark Rm. 4E871 Pentagon Chief of Staff, USAF - Gen. David C. Jones Rm. 4E929 Pentagon Vice Chief of Staff, USAF -- Gen. Wm. V. McBride Rm. 4E936 Pentagon Assist. Chief of Staff for Intelligence - Maj. Gen. James L. Brown Rm. 4A932 Pentagon Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations, DCS/P&O Lt. Gen. Andrew B. Anderson, Jr. Rm. 4E1032 Pentagon Director of. Doctrine Concepts,_Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Ops. q it, ST+TI NTL Maj. Gen. James R. Brickel Rm. 4D1083 Pentagon Assist. Chief of Staff Studies and Analysis Gen. Jasper Welch, Jr. Rm. 1E388 Pentagon Commander-in-Chief, USAF in Europe APO, N.Y. 09012 De u Chief of Staff for R&D Lt. Gen. A. D. Slay Rm. 4E334 Pentagon Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 -2- Copy 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 ARMY Secretary of the Army - Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. Rm. 3E718 Pentagon Chief of Staff - Gen. Bernard W. Rogers Rm. 3E668 Pentagon ACSI Arm - Maj. Gen. E. R. Thompson Rm. 2E464 Pentagon Deputy Actin Chief of Staff, ACSI/Armor Brig. Gen. John A. Smith Jr. Rm. 2E464 Pentagon I JConce is Analysis Agency (Cannot receive codeword material) Maj. Gen. E. C. Whitehead 8120 Woodmont Ave., Fethesada, MI 20014 Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Develop.ment & Ac--uistion) Dr. Percy A. Pierre Rm. 3E390 Pentagon Commander, US Arm. Material Command Gen. John R. Deane, Jr., 5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alex., Va. 22333 Maj. Gen. M. R. Thurman Ran. 3C718 Pentagon Deputy Chief of Staff for Research Development and Acquisition Director Programs and Analysis Evaluation Office Staff/Army )7 Lt. Gen. Howard H. Cooksey, Rm. 3E412 Pentagon Assistant.'De ut Chief of Staff for Research Development and Acquisition Maj. Gen. Philip R. Feir Rm. 3E412 Pentagon DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Secretary of Defense - Harold Brown Mail to: _ Deputy Secretary of Defense - Hon. Charles Duncan, Jr RXIAssistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) Sec. of Defense Attn: Classified Control Rm. 3A948 Hon. David E. McGiffert Rm. 4E806 Pentagon c~I ~l IDirector_, Net Assessment 'OSD Andrew W. Marshall, Rm. 3A930 Pentagon a_ ~j~ Assist. Secretary (Program Analysis & Evaluation) OSD(PA&E) Honorable Russell Murray Rm. 3E966 Pentagon Princi D r to - RVAane 2981of08/8 : C&T-a ' 9R@ #_ A001300130001-5 Dr. Robert J. Hermann, Rm. 3E282 Pentagon %~~aac a 1. i u.L & 1 - ' .i Secretary, Program Analysis & Evaluation(OSDLPA&E) (Deputy Assist. Secretary, Regional Programs (OSD/PA&E) Paul D. Wolfowitz Rm. 2E334 Pentagon Actin Director, Pro rams Analysis & Evaluation, Europe Div. (OSD/PA&E)I Robert L. Schneider Rm. 2C270 Pentagon Cost and Economic Analysis (DASD/PA&E) Milton A. Margolis Rm. 2D278 Pentagon ist. Secretary for Euro can and NATO Affairs, ISA James Siena Rm. 4E840 Pentagon ist. Secretary (Eaasst Asia and Pacific Affairs) Morton I. Abramowitz Rm. 4E830 ' Pentagon Militate Assistant to Secretar. of Defense dam. Thor Hanson Rm. 3E880 Pentagon Director, DOD MBFR Task Force (OASD/ISA) Louis G. Michael Rm. 4B880 Pentagon Director of Defense Research and Engineering, OSD Dr. Wm. J. Perry Rm. 3E1006 Pentagon istant Secretary, Policy, Plans, and NSC Affairs (ISA) Dr. Lynn Davis Rm. 4E820 Pentagon DIA Director, DIA - Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, Jr. Rm. 3E258 Pentagon 3 \,' (Vice Director for Production - R. Adm. Wm. Robertson Rm. 3E259 Pent. Director for Estimates - Brig. Gen. James A. Williams Chief, Eastern Division, DB-2 -3- Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (cont.) Chief and Deputy 'Chief, Long Range Forecast Division Rm. 1006 Pomponio Plaza Rm. 1085 A.H.S. "A" Bldg-FATINTL Rm. 1021 Pomponio Plaza Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 -4- Approved For RdWamMM8/14f Cft4jXN~qj?BQ A001300130001-5 --- Copy it y 31I,- tkOJO Hon. James R. Schlesinger, Sec. of Energy, Wash., D. C. ~ 20 Mass. Ave., N.W Director, International Security Affairs Ray E. Chapman Germantown, Md. *Wants 1 copy only of codeword reports to be sent to Ray Chapman Germantown, Md. per SSO/ERDA 29 Sept. 1976 **Has SI and TK clearance but does not have storage facilities. De ut Assistant Administor for National Sec urit Gen. Edward ller Germantown, Md. JCS Director, Joint Staff, JCS V. Adm. Patrick J. Hannifin Rm. 2E936 Pentagon Chief Studies Analysis and Gaming nc Brig. Gen. Eugene D. Scott Rm..1D936 Pentagon Chairman, JCS - Gen. George S. Brown, USAF Rm. 2E865 Pentagon Director, J-5 (Plans and Policy) Lt. Gen. Arnold W. Braswell 1 l/"_ Rm. 2E1000 Pentagon I De u Director International Negotiations J-5, JCS Adm. Edward Welch, Jr. Pentagon Director of Naval Tntelli ence Rear Adm. Donald P. Harvey Rm. 5C600 Pentagon Secretary of the Navy - W. Graham Claytor, Jr. Rm. 4E680 Pentagon Chief of Naval O erations - Adm. J. L. Holloway III Rm. 4E660 Pentt Director, S stems Analysis Division R. Adm. Carl A. Trost, USM Rm. 4A526 Pentagon Commandant,' US Marine Corps - Gen. Louis H. Wilson Rm. 2004 An. Annex. De u y Chief of Naval O erations (Surfa'ce Warfare) Pentagon V. Adm. James H. Doyle Jr. De ut Chi.ef of Naval Operations (Flans Policy, & Operations) V. Adm. William J. Crowe Rm. 4E592 Pentagon Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO013001300D1-5 -5- ApproAi6aAFd le 2009M ? MA- EW Director, NSA - Adm. B. R. Inman d0,1-Z1e a de ) NSC (Rm. 381 EOB) NSC Staff Member (Security Analysis) Victor Utgoff JNSC Staff Member (Intelligence) Samuel .Hoskinson . 'STATE , Secretary of State - Cyrus R. Vance 7th Floor Director of Bureau Intelligence and Research (State/INR) Harold H. Saunders Rm. 6531 Deputy Director for Research,' Bureau of Intelligence and Research Martin Packman Rm. 6535 (Director, Bureau of Politico--MilitarV Affairs Leslie Gelb Ambassador at Large -"Ellsworth Bunker Rm. 7260 Director, Office of Disarmament and Arms Control (PM DCA) Vincent Baker Rm. 7424 Counselor for the Dent. of State Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper Rm. 7250 Director of Economic Research & Analysis (INR/DDR/REC) Michael H. Ely Rm. 8722 Director Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (INR/DDR/REA) Herbert Horowitz Rm. 8840 IDirector Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affi-)-irs IEUR RPM Stephen Ledogar Rm. 6227 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001$Q : qUfibRq?PJ'9B00457A001300130001-5 Copy # Director, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe INR DDR/RSE) Paul K. Cook Director, Political-Military Affairs and Theater Forces NR~DDR PMT) Robert H. Baraz Rm. 6638 Director Strategic Affairs, Bureau of Intelli.cLence and Research INR DDR STA) Ross Cowey Rm. 6524A ~ De ut Director for Coordination (INR DDC) William McAfee Rm. 6635 Economic Relation (RE~C/!CER) Martin J. Kohn Rm. 8666 Director, Bureau of Eur peanAffairs, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (EUR/SOV) John E. Reinhardt *Deputy Director USIA Charles W. Bray III, Rm.. 700, 1750 Pa., Ave., N.W. DC) *Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors, 314 Old EOB Honorable Charles L. Schultze Director, Office of Management and Budget, EOB James McIntyre (Acting) ** Can receive SI material, only Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 encr Wants 1 cy. only Rm. 700, 1750 Pa., Ave., N.W. DC) of )codeword ) reports Approved For Release 2001/08/1.: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES Copy # >5 20319 *Commandant National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Wash., D. C. Attn: Classified Lib Rm. 30 :*Superintendent, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, Calif. 93940 **President, Naval War College, Newport, R. I. 02840 *Commandant, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013 *Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 23511 *Commanding General/Commandant, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 60027 *Commanding General/Commandant, U. S. Army Intelligence School, Ft. Hauchuca, Az. 85613 *Commander, Air Universi, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 * Can receive TK material ** Can receive SI material only Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Page 8 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 SPECIFIED RECIPIENTS FOP PERSONAL DISSEMINATION AGENCY COPY NO. RECIPIENT The Honorable Fred P. Wacker B DOD 971 Assist. Sec. (Comptroller) 3E854 Pent. Ltc. Michael Higgins OASD (MRA&L)WR Rm. 2B323 Pentagon Bruce Clarke Sec. Def. Rep, to--M F R Neck 4B880 Pent. Dr. Robert J. Hermann (1 personal, DIA 12 supp. c s. Principal De Asst. Sec. Def. .Commando Control, Communications and jIntelligence Rm. 3E282 Pentagon OASD Rm. 3A874 Pentagon Deputy Comptroller(Plans & Systems) Eugene C. Fubini Chairman, Def. Science Bd. 3D1040 Pent. Deputy Asst. Sec. for International Economic Affairs, ISA Rm. 4E830 Pent. Robert Turner Rm. 3C125 Pentagon Office of Asst. Dir. (NTA) ODDR&E OASD(LA) Rm. 3E822 Pentagon DIO/USSR Rm. 2C238 Pentagon DIO/Strategic Forces Rm. 2C288 Pentagor TL DIR4E Rm. 2801 AHS AHS P DIA /1 o 0,- J. Dale Pa fen erg STATINTL Daniel Gallik ACDA ACDA _ Sth F l oOr SA-6 Bldg USAF AF /INS Rm 4A882 PPntagern NSC - /o f Ft. Meade, Md. CIA STATINTL Deputy Asst. to the Pres. NSC for National Security Affairs Rm 381 EOB Chief SALT Support Staff 3F22 Has. Asst. to DCI 7E12 Has. D/CRG 7G50 Hqs. STATINTL STATINTL P State // 1,' John Polansky, EUR/RPE__ 64261) a e Same Westbrook b 0 NSC tiff P ACDA ___, Barr Blechman Rm. 5843 New State Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Personal Copy ,No, -9- RlesN?~1/$/S1~RtQ~j9~~j1L3~0130001-5 ApprovedC,fA D'C I ~, DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) Adm. Stansfield Turner via SA/DCI Acting DDCI (Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) STATINTL John F. Blake AD DCI (Assistant to the Deputy Director) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY '(IC) EA DCI (Executive Assistant to the DCI) Acting D'/DCI/IC (Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community) John McMahon NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS D NFAC Mr. Robert Bowie DD/NFAC Sayre Stevens SA/NIO (Special Assistant) STATINTL NIO/CH (China) ~r1? _ I NIO CF (Conventional Forces) NIO/E (Economics) (NIO) NIO- EAP (East Asia Pacific) STATINTL NIO/LA (Latin America) (acting) STATINTL NIO/ AF (Africa) STATINTL NIO/NE/SA (Near East South Asia) STATINTL STATINTL NIO/SP (Strategic Programs) . NI'O USSR (USSR and East Europe) NIO E (Western Europe) NI-o SS (Special Studies) NIO/NP (Nuclear Proliferation) Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 CIA INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (PERSONAL) -10- DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATION (DDA) DDA (Deputy Director for Administration John F. Blake=-= A/DDA (Associate Deputy Director for Administration) Michael J. Malaniek DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (DD/S&T) IDD/S&T (Deputy Director for Science and Technology) Leslie Dirks ADD/S&T (Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology) Ernest J. Zellmer OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER (O/Comet) Comfit (Comptroller) James H. Taylor AC Com t (Assistant Cpmptroller and Resources), Compt/R&E (Asst. Com troller, Re Requirements and Evaluation Staff) STATINTL NIO/SA/Compt (NIO/Special Activities) Rm.5G00 STATINTL OFFICE OF IMAGERY ANALYSIS (OIA) D/OIA;(Director, Imagery Analysis) Noel Firth DD/OIA (Deputy Director, Imagery Analysis) - Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 CIA. INTERNAL DISTRTBUTION (PERSONAL) Personal Copy No. -11- OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE D OCR (Director, Office of Central Reference)' Harry C. Eisenbeiss DD/OCR (Deputy Director, OCR) STATINTL OFFICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AND CARTOGRAPHIC RESEARCH (OGCR) 7 D/GCR(Director, Geographic and Cartographic Research)James P.Lynch DD/GCR (Deputy Director, OGCR) STATINTL OFFICE OF REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (ORPA) D/ORPA (Director, Regional & Political Analysis) John K. King DD/ORPA (Deputy Director, Regional & Political Analysis CIA OPERATIONS CENTER (CIA/OPS/CEN) C/CIA OPS CEN (Chief, CIA Operations Center) Vincent Heyman STATINTL DC/CIA/OPS/CEN (Deputy Chief, CIA Operations Center) OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (OER) if D OER (Director of Economic Research) Maurice C. Ernst __ DD OE.R (Deputy Director, OER) (( OFFICE OF TRAINING (OTR) /OTR (Director. of Training) Harry E. Fitzwater DD/OTR (Deputy Director of Training) Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 CIA INTERNAL I Approved For R . I -12- Personal Copy No. OFFICE OF SIGINT OPERATIONS (OSO) r DD/OSO (Deputy Director of Office of Sigint Operations) OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (ORD) STATINTL D/ORD (Director fo Research and Development) Phili K. Eckman DD/ORD (Deputy Director of Research and Development) OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE (OSI) OFFICE OF WEAPONS INTELLIGENCE (OWI) f I`~ ID/OWI (Director of Weapons Intelligence) R. Evan Hineman OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING (ODE) DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION (DCD) C/DCD (Chief, Domestic Collection Division) M DC/DCD (Deputy Chief, Domestic Collection Division) D/OSO (Director, Office of Sigint Operations) Edward_R anQTQTiNiTi D/OSI(Director of Scientific Intelligence) Karl H. Weber DD/OSI (Deputy Director fo Scientific Intelligence) - DD/OWI (Deputy Director of Weapons Intelligence) JD/ODE (Director of Development and Engineering) DD/ODE (Deputy Director of Development and En ineer'n STATINTL NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER(NPIC) D NPIC / (Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center) John J. Hicks DD/NPIC(Deputy Director, NPIC) Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 DISSEMINATION LIST FOR UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, Page 13 AND SECRET OSR 1;.1f1.'ORTS Approved For'RUM0'1- 00457A001300130001-5 No. of Cys. Copy No. (s) Recipient r-1 DCI (via SA/DCI) 7E12 Hqs. /c2 3 A/DDCI 7E31 Hqs. STATINTL 2 / (/ DCI/IC, Rm. BW09, Community Hq. Bldg. 1. DCI/IC 1. D/OPEI 1 ~oZ 1 12 -2 6 _/ 4_- /3 NFAC (unmarked) 7E44 Hqs. NFAC Staff, 2F28 Hq. NFAC/Registry, 7E47 Hq. 2. SALT 1. CSS 1. NFAC CAR 1. NFAC/CL 1. NFAC/Registry 1.3~/ Inspector General, 2E24 Hq. f /3, OGC, 7D07 Hq. 13 ~ - /.?j CRG 1. Director 1. PDB 7 ? STATINTL ORPA, 7G15. Hq. ~0 --- 1. Director Y `----1. S RP / 7 / 1. E CS L/ -'I - /'-/3 2. Lr- s npro1ved G 5 S/2 /VV- - /s/2 jqd OCR/ADD, GF28 Hq. 1. D/OCR 2. ISG 1. CLD/DSB/DOC O/COMPT. 4E12 Hq. 3E63 O/COMPT/RES, 7G0-0 Hq. 1. SIGINT 1. RECCE 2. HSG 1 /'.Sr3 DCD/SD, Rm. 811 Key Bldg. 1 Op s . Cente 7F33 Hq. STATINTL 4 D/OGCR, Rm. 1232 Ames Bldg. Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5 -14- .2f Cy wApprovd pr lefis4 2001/08/14: CIA-RDPEMJ~Hj 1300130001-5 1 1/ OGCR/CD/V GH-16 Hqs. 2 Q, /(/ DD/S&T 6E45 Hqs. 1 /(, OLC 7D35 Hqs. 1 OSO 1D06 1 / 6 L ORD 612 Ames Bldg. 4 65 ODE 1B19 C 0 `---- - M"WL D/EBIS 1005 Key Bldg. c -0 STATINTL OTR 936 C of C 1 -- II 2 ODE 1 1 - OSI 6F24 Hqs. OER 4F21 Hqs. OWI 1D0401 Hqs. DDO GB38 Hqs. OIA 1S518 NPIC/Info Br. 1S315 COMIREX BW09 t-> 1- ADP, L-70 y Z, / t& OP-96, Dept. of Navy 4A684 Pentagon 1 ,2c a 1C925 Pentagon USSR, E. Europe, and Asian Communist Countries only) STATINTL 80 6 ACDA/IS Rm. 6510A State D/NSA Attn: Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Ft. Meade, Md -15- NO. + of Gys ? Appt ROc ROIe se 2001/08/14: CIA-RLR blffi#A001300130001-5 1 . V-oc/ci 1 l 3 OSD, Agency Archives Records Center -- Supplemental Dist. Air University/INS Attn: Ted A. Cherry Principal Deputy Assist. Secretary (International Security Affairs) Mr. Walter Slocorte Rm. 4E813 Pent. (Gep s._--s-ent--to- -C/PPG,- SA/t' L PDB, C/ 1 B and C-aster ~...,_) STATINTL R istr STATINTL *64 OSR Registry except-- 68 cys if Far East countries and not NFD or NDA 42 cys. if NFD or NDA and on the Far East countries 38 cys. if NFD or NDA *************************************************************** MICROFICHE 1 Camera original to Agency Archives 1 Diaso Copy to Agency Archives 1 Silver Duplicate to OCR/CLD/DSB, Rm. ?H1129 Hqs. 1 Diaso Copy to OGCR, Rm. 1232 Ames Bldg. 1 Diaso Copy to PPG/R&D, Rm. 7G09 Hqs. 1 Diaso Copy to OSR/SF/N, Rm. 3F50 Hqs. Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5 Office of Strategic Research MEMO BUM F~K ele a Yio~no 1a 'le IA DF179 00 rn 0e3001 e Director, US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency This report on Soviet defense spending in rubles elaborates upon the estimates which the Director of . Central Intelligence presented to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress in June of this year. 30001-5 This report on Soviet defense spending in rubles elaborates upon the estimates which the Director of Central Intelligence presented to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress in June of this year. gyn. Chief Military-Economic Analysis Center 14 DEC 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: General David C. Jones 2 Chief of Staff, USAF TiZt'tr Room 4E929 The Pentagon proven r. or