Expenditure Implications of Alternative Soviet Strategic Force Projections

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100510002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT Expenditure Implications of Alter-
native Soviet Strategic Force
Projections
This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Strategic Research, CIA, in response to a re-
quest from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
for an informal assessment of the economic re-
source implications of several postulated future
Soviet strategic force goals.
LIDISTRIBUTION
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Expenditure Implications of Alternative
Soviet Strategic Force Projections
Conclusions
A comparison of six projected Soviet options
for 1969-77 illustrates the range of expenditure
levels and potential "savings" implied by limita-
tions on offensive and defensive strategic arms --
bombers, ICBM's, SLBM's, MR/IRBM's and ABM!s.
Savings do not accrue automatically to arms
limitations. Depending on Soviet economic and stra-
tegic objectives and the constraints on quantitative
and qualitative improvements imposed by a limitation
agreement, the options studied imply average expendi-
tures on strategic arms during 1969-77 as low as $7
billion or as high as $14 billion a year. This com-
pares with average spending of $112 billion a year for
a base case projection without arms limitations. (See
figure 1).
Potential savings, represented by the lower
portion of the $7 billion to $14 billion range, might
result if there are substantially restrictive con-
straints on both numbers of strategic weapons deployed
and limitations on qualitative improvements in existing
forces and if the Soviets take full advantage of arms
restrictions to reduce defense outlays,
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Force goals that imply average annual spending of
about $7 billion over the period, for example, could
be expected only if there are strong Soviet incen-
tives at this time to reach an agreement on arms
limitations primarily because of economic consid-
erations.
Other force options possible under the terms
of an assumed arms limiting agreement do not neces-
sarily imply savings compared to present spending
levels. Even with a freeze on numbers of strategic
delivery systems, future annual spending levels could
be $2-$3 billion higher than present ones if quali-
tative improvements such as MIRV's or MRV's are pur-
sued, and if an ABM system of several hundred launchers
is permitted.
In the absence of treaty constraints on its forces,
the USSR might be expected to spend an average of about
$11-$12 billion a year if it continued its spending
priority for strategic programs at about the level of
the last three years. If, on the other hand, it
selected strategic force goals representing an in-
creased arms race effort in an attempt to respond
to projected improvements in US forces, average an-
nual spending for strategic programs during the period
could exceed $18 billion a year.
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Discussion
01QQ,510002-3
The expenditure implications of six variants
of Soviet strategic force goals for the period
1969-1977 have been considered in this study. The
projections were-based on ACDA guidelines for re-
presentative -- rather than precise -- Soviet mili-
tary planning options. The projections reflect
broad alternatives in Soviet motivations and objec-
tives, both with and without constraints imposed by
an agreement to limit strategic arms.
The six force options and the major variations
in their resource implications are described in gen-
eral terms in the following paragraphs. The conclu-
sions about potential savings or possible increases
in expenditures are sensitive both to the assumptions
made about the possible terms of an agreement and to
the assumptions about Soviet economic and strategic
incentives that might underly an agreement. Detailed
tabular presentations of annual expenditures for
major elements of the strategic forces under each
set of assumptions are included in an Appendix.
These projections are preliminary and highly tenta-
tive, and should not be used to draw more precise or
detailed conclusions than those stated in the body of
this study.
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Base Case Without Arms Limitation
A. The Forces
Assuming the absence of arms limitation,
the base case postulates strategic weapons deploy-
ment rates reflecting the continuation of Soviet
efforts to develop and deploy new strategic systems
at a moderate pace.
Bombers and tankers are assumed to de-
cline because of the continuing emphasis on mis-
sile delivery systems for strategic attack. ICBM
launchers are projected to increase by almost forty
percent, principally due to the assumed deployment
of the SS-13. The number of submarine ballistic
missile launch tubes increase to nearly six times
that of 1969, as the new Polaris-type units become
available. The MR/IRBM force declines by about 10
percent throughout the period 1969-77. No MRV's
or MIRV's,.however, are assumed deployed.
- In the defensive forces, the number of
deployed interceptor aircraft is projected to de-
cline by one-third although the effectiveness of
the force increases with the deployment of newer
and more highly sophisticated aircraft. The number
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of SAM launchers deployed remains virtually the
same throughout the. period. The effectiveness of
the force will increase, however, as newer systems.
such as the SA-5 replace the old. ABM launchers
are estimated to increase, from 48 in mid-1969,
to a thin national deployment totaling some 500
toward the end of the period.
B. Expenditures
The base case, which does not assume an
arms limitation agreement, results in average annual
outlays of about 11 billion dollars, or more than
100 billion dollars for the entire 1969-77 period
as shown in the following tabulation:
Base Case Expenditures
(Billion Dollars)
1969-77
1969-72
1973-77
Total Strategic
Forces
103
53
50
Strategic Offense
48
29
19
Strategic Defense
55
24
31
As a share of total strategic force out-
lays, spending for strategic offense declines from
55 percent during the 1969-72 period, to 40 percent
in _ the _1973-77_ period.. This decrease is. the result of
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the declining bomber and tanker force and the comple-
tion of the ICBM programs.
The increase in strategic defense as a
share of total spending -- from 45 percent in 1969-
1972, to 60 percent in 1973-1977 -- reflects greater
spending for ABM's and SAM's which more than offsets
the decline in expenditures for interceptor aircraft.
Projected expenditures under the base case
would call for average annual expenditures: for stra-
tegic forces at about the same level as those in-
curred during 1966-1968.
Moderately Increased Arms Race
A. The Forces
Force projections under this case imply a
substantial increase in the pace of strategic weapons
deployment. This case, however, is not intended to
represent an unconstrained maximum arms race. ICBM
launchers are projected to increase some 40 percent
and SLBM launch tubes about four fold by mid-1977.
There is a slight reduction in the number of MR/
IRBM's but the force is improved during the period
by the introduction of mobile launchers. No
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MIRV's or MRV's are added to either ICBM or MR/IRBM
forces, and the long-range bomber force declines as
no new bombers are introduced.
Emphasis on the strategic defensive forces
continues and a large national deployment of some
3000 long and short range ABM. launchers is begun.
Some growth also.is projected in the number of SAM'S,
including a new low-altitude system. Interceptor
aircraft decline in number, but a new model is phased
in and constitutes about 17 percent of the force by
mid-1977.
B. Expenditures
The moderately increased arms race case,
as defined, implies costs to the Soviets of some 7
billion dollars more per year than required by the
base case, or a total increase of some 62 billion
dollars over the 1969-77 period.
Expenditures in the later period, 1973-77,
average 7.6 billion dollars annually, about 25 per-
cent higher than the near term (1969-72), mainly
as a result of the high costs of the ABM program
that impacts most strongly in the later years.
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Expenditures
(Billion Dollars)
1969-77
1969-72
1973-77
Moderate Arms Race
165
77
88
Base Case
103
53
50
Difference
+62
+24
+38
Average Annual
Difference
+6.9
+6.0
+7.6
The qualitative and quantitative improve-
ments in the ABM and SAM forces are quite costly,
and as a result, two-thirds of total outlays (110
billion of the 165 billion dollars) are allocated
to strategic defense.
Despite substantial expenditures for the
large SLBM program and the retrofitting,.of the ICBM
and MR/IRBM forces, the strategic offensive forces
account for only one-third of the outlays. This is
partially due to the decline in outlays for the
other elements and partially due to the assumed ab-
sence of qualitative improvements (no MRV's or MIRV's
for example) in the forces.
SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty)-Lo -- Limited
Qualitative Improvements Case
A. The Forces
The strategic offensive and defensive forces
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97
defined in this arms limitation case either decline
or are allowed to expand only moderately under the
assumptions about an arms limiting treaty. There
is a slight increase in the number of ICBM's as
SS-11 sites currently under construction are com-
pleted. Existing SS-7 sites are retrofitted with
the SS-9, and SLBM launch tubes increase by about
50 percent. The number of MR/IRBM's remains the
same but the SS-4 systems are retrofitted with a
new solid propellant missile. Bombers and tankers
decline, as do interceptor aircraft and SAM launchers.
In addition to the current ABM deployment at Moscow,
a follow-on thin national deployment program for an
improved ABM system is postulated,
B. Expenditures
The conditions imposed by an arms limi-
tation with limited qualitative improvements re-
sult in average annual savings of about 1.2 billion
dollars over expenditures required by the base case.
Expenditures
(Billion Dollars)
_
1969-77
1969-72
7
1973-7
92
46
46
Base Case
103
53
50
-11
-7
-4
Average Annual
Difference
-1.2
-0.8
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In the near term, the limiting of strate-
gic offensive weapons, particularly the ICBM's and
SLBM's, reduces expenditures and is largely respon-
sible for the savings. Although expenditures for
the ABM system increase in the later period as the
improved system reaches moderate deployment, they
do not completely erode the savings resulting from
the reduction of the offensive forces.
Expenditures for SAM systems constitute
the largest single element expenditure in both the
offensive and defensive forces due to the large
number deployed and the resulting high operating
costs.
SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty)-Hi -- Ex-
tensive Qualitative Improvement Case
A. The Forces
This projection assumes both quantitative
and qualitative improvements to the strategic offen-
sive forces. Accompanying the increase in the num-
bers of missiles (primarily SLBM's) are significant
improvements in system capabilities by the addition of
MIRV's to the ICBM's and newer type SLBM's. Existing
MR/IRBM sites are retrofitted with new solid propellant
missiles. Further upgrading of the strategic offensive
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forces occurs with the introduction of a new super-
sonic bomber.
The strategic defense posture would be
augmented by the deployment of a thin national
ABM system of 700 launchers, replacing the current
Moscow system in the early 1970's. The number of
SAM launchers and. interceptors declines throughout
the period.
B. Expenditures
The forces projected by this extensive
qualitative improvement case call for additional
expenditures of 2.4 billion dollars per year over
the base case or a total increase of some 22 bil-
lion dollars over the 1969-77 period.
Expenditures
(Billion Dollars)
1969-77
969-7
197 -77
SALT-Hi
125
55
70
Base Case
103
53
50
Difference
+22
+2
+20
Average Annual
Difference
+2.4
+0.5
+4.0
The extensive qualitative improvement case,
SALT-Hi, is very costly, but substantially below the
level implied by the increased arms race case.
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Expenditures in the earlier period for
the SALT-Hi reflect the complete retrofitting of
the MR/IRBM force and procurement of long-range
SAM launchers and new type interceptors. The
majority of the additional expenditures, however,
falls in the later period as ambitious programs in
both strategic offensive and defensive weapons sys-
tems proliferate. All ICBM's are MIRV'ed during
this period and the new supersonic bomber __ is de-
ployed. In addition, ABM deployment is assumed to
reach 700 launchers.
Expenditures for strategic attack systems
average some 20 percent higher than those for stra-
tegic defense during the later period, while in the
earlier period the expenditure allocations are almost
equal.
The ACDA Lo and Hi
The following scenarios were prepared by ACDA
by selective modifications to the force structure
outlined in the 1968 National Intelligence Projec-
tions for Planning (NIPP) series. They represent
two other possible options open to the Soviets within
the framework of some arms.control agreement.
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ACDA-Lo -- Freeze of Deployment, No Qualitative Im-
provements
A. The Forces
A broadly ranged reduction in strategic
offensive and defensive forces over the period 1969-
77, allowing only the completion of SLBM submarines
and ICBM launchers currently under construction,
yields a partial strategic disarmament case. A
freeze on strategic weapons deployment and on tech-
nological improvements (such as MIRV's) is instituted.
In addition, there are sizable reductions in such
systems as bombers, interceptor aircraft, and SAM
forces.
B. Expenditures
Of all the cases presented, this case re-
sults in the lowest level of expenditures and results
in average annual savings of 4 billion dollars rela-
tive to the base series.
With a virtual freeze on new systems, in-
vestment outlays decline continually throughout the
1969-77 period and as the following tabulation indi-
cates, annual savings are slightly higher in the
later period, 1973-77.
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Expenditures
(Billion Dollars)
1969-77
969-7
1973-77
ACDA-Lo
66
37
29
Base Case
103
53
50
Difference
-37
-16
-21
Average Annual
Difference
-4.1
-4.0
-4.2
Because of the sizable SAM forces main-
tained, sixty percent or better of the cumulative
1969-77 outlay would be incurred by the strategic
defense forces.
ACDA-Hi -- Freeze of Deployment, Moderate Qualita-
tive Improvements
A. The Forces
The strategic force levels under this arms
limitation case are expected to remain at the 1969
level, except that the SLBM submarines and ICBM
launchers under construction are completed. Capa-
bilities are upgraded in the future by retrofitting
new systems and the addition of MIRV's to some of
the ICBM force. SAM and ABM launchers increase and
a new low-altitude SAM system is introduced. The
augmentation of the ABM force includes additional
deployment of'the long-range system and the initiation
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of a short-range interceptor system, to a total of
700 launchers. Force reductions are postulated for
bombers and MR/IRBM's. Interceptors also decline
in number but force capabilities are improved by
the addition of new advanced aircraft.
B. Expenditures
The level of expenditures for a force
posture as outlined above amounts to a 1.9 billion
dollar increase over the average annual outlay in
the base series.
Expenditures
(Billion Dollars)
1-969-77
1969-72
1973-77
ACDA-Hi
120
59
61
Base Case
103
53
50
Difference
+17
+6
+11
Average Annual
Difference
+1.9
+1.5
+2.2
Average annual expenditures are somewhat
higher in the earlier part of the peri'od as would
be expected with both an improvement program for
the ICBM-MR/IRBM forces and a rather large ABM de-
ployment being undertaken simultaneously.
1
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Strategic defense systems by far account
for the largest share of total expenditures over
the period, especially during the later years (1973-
77) when spending for these systems accounts for
some 75 percent of the total.
It is apparent that despite the high cost
of MIRVing ICBM's and retrofitting the ICBM-MR/IRBM
forces, declining outlays for other strategic offense
elements are more than enough to cause a rapid de-
crease in strategic offense-expenditures, both ab-
solutely and as a share of the total.
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Methodology and Statistical Tables
The expenditures for the various projections
of the strategic forces are presented in terms of
equivalent dollars to reflect the general size of
the projected programs as if these-programs had
been purchased in the US. This is done in order
to present the relationships between the different
programs in terms which are comparable with US pro-
grams and which are familiar and meaningful to US
policymakers and planners.
Although their costs might have produced dif-
ferent levels of expenditures, such activities as
dispersing and further hardening of existing systems,
increasing the reliability and accuracy of weapons
beyond the present state of the art, increasing the
on-station and alert status of the forces, and civil
defense, could not be included because suitable cost-
ing parameters are not yet available.
In comparing US spending with Soviet spending
for similar forces, the following points should
be kept in mind:
a. Nuclear weapon costs are included
in-the Soviet figures.
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b. R&D expenditures are not included.
c. All Soviet outlays are stated in
1966 dollars.
d. There may be minor variations in the
categorization of Soviet and US expenditures,
due to differences in organizational structure
and availability of information.
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