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December 16, 2016
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April 5, 2005
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September 29, 1976
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25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M00983AO01300020009-4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M00983AO01300020009-4 Approved Felease 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP79M00A001300020009-4 The 4dashin ton Post September 23, 1976 CnLLeaiL Boiith Victim Toid PB Of Threats to Life, Frieu!s Satv: I t/ By Stephen T. 1?Lynlon and Rona!(! l e-s ter 1Jna'.:InEio _; Pos: 5t U h~: azrs Orlando Lete]icr, former Chilean ambassador to the United States for the Marx- ist. A I I e n d e government, told ? his friends and co- workers, that he had rc- ccived repeated t h r c a t s aganst his life before he was killed here Tuesday by a bomb in his car. Anonymous callers, some speaking in Spanish, had continually warned him for more than a year that he would be killed unless he stopped criticizing the mil, itary junta that ousted the late 1'resident Salvador-' Atlcnt~c,Scpt: 1!, 1.973 Leto-. tier's colleagues said ycster. day. ;,.? . ? . Last w c c k. Letc]ier re- ceived a letter from a well 'laced Chilean, his cow?or?k- rrs said. The letter allegedly reported a high-level discus, sion in the present Chilean government over whether Letelier should be killed be. cause of his outspoken crili? cisms of the current regime in Chile. The government in Chile has disavocrcd any link with Letetier?'s death and has dc? plin,?ecl the bombing. Letelier, 44, who screed a.r Allende's foreign minister and minister of defense in 1973 after his tenure as anr? Ilassador to the U n i t e d :;tales, was killed when a bonni-, exploded undecncath. 'his cat as he drove to work ,throu ;Ir Sheridan 01-60 1M W Tuesday morning with . two - colleagues. Ronni --and., Ali) chael Moffitt, Ronni Mortrtt' was also ' killed. Ifcr hus- hand was hospitalized. brief- ly for shock. ,11I 6rcc worked for the Institute for'holicy Studies, a private research "t p i n k. tank." where Letctier ' di- rected a foreign affairs re. search program. Lilian S. Montecino, Lelelier's assistant. said in air interview yesterday that lie had told her of receiving thrcats against his life about twice a month. "It, usually.- caure at odd hours (at his office) or at ' home, she said. The message, in, es- sence, she added, was that if he con- tinned his activities against the present junta.of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, Letelier would be killed or "eliminated." ;?;; :)'aril Weiss, charnran of the Institute fqr Policy Studies, recalled that bete- i er.;last, April had told him three or four times of warnings ,by callers who rraid, "We're going to get you." ,. James Petras, a political scientist at the State University of New York; re- - counted a conversation with Letelier last'April. Letelier said, according to this. account, that he had been warned' ,by the Chilean Embassy itself that he would face what Pet ras described as "unforeseen difficulties" if he con- tinucd his attacks on the junf.a. ...,The existence of the letter in whIclr Letctier was allegedly alerted to a VhUcan government debate over whether he should be assassinated 'was disclosed by, Egbal Ahmed and other coworkers at the Institute for Policy Studies. They did not produce, the letter itself, however. .Abrned and otherinstitutc offic.r1,-, gejro. asked not. to be identified, also ?ttecllned to name the Chilean v,11-30 'rc`rdte the letter, saying they wanted to avoid endangering him. The letter ' -re- said to have recounted It debate -b&t. c'een Chilean "hawks" who wanted f, ,feller killed, and "Cloves" es" who oh- 'j@'ctcd. to his suggested :assassination. t was unclear yesterday whether Letelier had reported-the recurring threats against. him to the F131 or sought F BU protection. A spokesman. for the I'13l's Washington field office, which is taking part in the investi,;a- tion?of his death, denied that Letelier. had. told the FBI of any such threats. ';airs. Montceino said, however, that Letelier had told her he had reported the, warnings to the Fill. In Rome ycs- ' -tt`dny, Agence France-P;-esse quo'cd lortensia Allende, the former Chi- an president's widow', as saying ,,Letelier had repeatedly requested k131. ' rotection. According to Mrs. Alontecino, Leta ?Zier had said FBI agents visited hint rTegularly and were notified when he 'pranged his residence.-"The F131 told: Irbim if' anything unusual happened to deport it to the F131," sho said.' =? >? But Mrs. - Trontecino and others noted that Letelier dill not take any .special security precautions himself. "I-fe felt, "If I'ni going to be afraid of anything, I won't do, a thing, " site- said. Rafael Otero, counselor- for-public .affairs at the Chilean Embassy, said in air interview yesterday that no one front the embassy had lreerr ques- tioned by either the F13I or the Dis- trict police about the bombing. Otero said that the Chilean arnbas- sador to the- United States, Manuel Trucco, had contacted the State Be- partrnent to offer "full cooperation" in the Investigation. "We're very inter- ested its going on with this investiga- ? tion because this is the worst thing that could happen to my country at this momeut." Otero said. Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M00983A001300020009-4 Approved F.&*4kelease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79MO09WA001300020009-4 Otcro su}.vested that L.etclier's rnur- der, and those of other Chilean exiles in other countries that preceded it, have come in the fall and were timed to coincide with the opening of the United Nations General Assembly ses- sion., '? "We are asking to help. It's the first opportunity to find out who is making this attack a,!,I st the. Cb,ileard peo pie," Otero 5,11d. When awed about reports of threats wade here and reportedly in Chile against Letelier; Otero referred to the. IL(ling of.Leteli_r's Chilean riti- ~~ . DVS on 10 by ti i:over rraiit Otcro said. the "Clii?.Carl gonernment doesn't need other means" beyond revoking a per- son's, citizenship. Otero, a short, stout earl, was calm, rdur?ing much of the interview until in- formed ' that lie was being widely de- scribed by Chilean exiles and leftists in Washington as being the represent- ative of the National Directorate of intelligence (DINA), the most impor- tant secret police agency in Chile. Rearing this, Otero responded. with laughter and said that this report was "very funny." Otero denied having any' role in DINA. The reports, he said, were a way "for the extreme left to point the finger" at him, and lie said lie would report the Information to the U.S. State Department today since he took it as a threat against him. Otero also raised and denied 're- ports that he was affiliated with the CIA in Chile. Describing himself as a journalist, Otero said he had pub fished .SEPA,. an anti-Allende maga- zine, and that he had been Imprisoned 28 times "during Allende." Otero raised the question as to why.'* the explosion of Letelier's car occur. red within 100 feet of the Chilean am- bassador's residence ' at 2305 ? Massa-' chusetts Ave. NW. At several points during the inter- view, Otero repeated his - assertion that the Chilean government had not had anything to do with ? Letelier's. murder. "We know we don't have any,, thing to do with this murder," Otero. said. "We know . . . It's the.worst thing that can happen." City police and FBI officials ~re- ported no significant developments yesterday in their investigation of the bombing, "This is not going to be eas- ily'solved," said Assistant U.S. Attor- ney Eugene Propper, who is coon ?dinating the investigation. Results of laboratory studies of evidence col. lected after the explosion will not be available for a week or more, he said. Sources close to the investigation previously said the blast appeared to have been caused by a skillfully con- structed plastic bomb that was shaped to concentrate the main impact of the explosion upward into the' driver's seat. The bomb was apparently atta-' ched to the car's unclercarriage, these sources said, and may have been set off by a remote-contro:.lecl radio de- vice. . Propper met for about 1r/r hot rs yestcrday with D.C. police and FPf of- ficials involved in the investigation. Invgslk,'ator?s, he. said, are interview: _ ii. and Viiint rs of the junta (that distinction must be reserved for the air force's ~e l':r;ll Gustavo Leigh), bill he is certainly the most forceful, an([ he has created a whcilw new apparatus to reinforce his power. Its key corn- portents are the military C'o,r'iirr .lsrscrr, headed by General Labarca, the DINA, and the looser group of civilian ad- visors (the freinq rislas, as they have come to be nick- na:ned) anion g whom Jaime Gtizrna-r, the dedi,:ated young Catholic corporatist; is preeminent. The balance among the armed services is preserved within the cabinet, where jobs are still assigned according to a tacit quota system, but here the. simmering rivalry betweee the navy and tilt. `flr_ ila`? SS'L,:h w is the d; i in ttrr;.i. ;. eh r:) th co' , m ci started out with a clear' ascendancy within the government =encompassing the overall control of economic policy, plus the `finist.ie.; of Defense and Foreign Affairs..--has been steadily drivers back. The future of the present Foreign Minister, Admiral Patricia Carvajal, an honorable and likable man, but a singularly undynamic minister, is now in doubt. (A much doughtier figure is Admiral Arturo Troncoso, who is making a mark as it finister of Education by his system of loans for university students---on a sliding scale that varies from zero for sociology students to the full cost of education for engineers.) But all in all, it is a grave attempt that deserves more understandin'----and active support- from what remains of the capitalist world The rivalries within the military establishment cannot be interpreted, by and large, as policy battles. There is skep- ticism about the economic program among some middle- ranking officers, but General Pinochet has given it his imprimatur, and his authority is now uncontested within the high command. Nor are there signs that the old po- litical parties have much influence over military thinking. The Christian Democrats, for example, are often said to have important friends in the army, but many of the senior officers of my acquaintance tend to echo the views of the general who told me, with brutal simplicity, that "there are two ways to get to Moscow. One is the direct route. The. other "oes via Rome." Such statements begin to suggest the huge ravine that has opened tip between the junta and the old-style political Icaders of Chile-with the exception of some figures from the National Party. The gulf may be dangerously wide, in the sense that the regime has become intellectually isolated and closed to criticism, and in the more specific sense that it cannot afford an all-out conflict with the Christian Demo- crats. The overweening influence of a tiny conventicle of civilian advisors of a /rungi:isru tendency that sometimes ct: ;es r!n the theoc:r;ttic is dikurbing-;tall yet, in the pies ni c (ini;tte, it t;tn: almost t:nt h tflenrtc cf. J'c~~ltTc: like luiiitc: Citi,.t fan (a hrillim,t }vu:rg; hrtcltcclnnat r:ti 1 trove 1: nuwrt ansl liked sines his d .ry; as :r student activist in the he I : '1g; inst Ilt:ncle) now represent, and colt for, a land of total commitment to the system and an ecitraliy total rejection of 'mien" ideas tlia' is fundanrnenlally: at. odds with (he luiuc'a-f;u.crr trodilim of Chilean society. If tftay' hacl theft- way, they wutilrt be likely to turn Chile into an introveried, absolutist society where Morality and educ:a- tieit were nleterminctl by the state: and it: pticstly a,rlvisots -a kind of Parts;arty. OR C uLe, a highly sophisticated country whose prima asset has always been the creative quality of its peoples. the pursuit of such goals reflects a very stunted :trnhitior,. And the suppression of tire free intcrcl;::nc~ of ideas. is nqu;+!!y d!irter; Illy I ce t visit t': (ra aU: n'i i'; the weakncss of the liberal democracies is that the leaders do not make the basic distinction between sub- version (which cannot he tolerated) atut dissent (wltct'r must be tolerated), bitt the weakness of an authoriiaiian society stay be precisely tine- same--except that, this tirne, dissenter-, are hounded as subversives. The loss of a capacity for self-criticism is the beginning of social stagnation. Chile must devise a system that will allow more liberty and creativity than the present one. It vould be a tragedy if the end result of the revolution against Marxism in Chile; turned out to be just another Military dictatorship based purely on bayonets. Chile is living through another' transi- tional phase, whose outcome is far from clear anti will depend on many factors over which the Chilean% them- selves do not have control-the world price of copper, the intentions of the Cubans and the Russians, the support (or lack of it) from the. United States. I am fairly con- fident of the junta's capacity to Will through evert, if the international situation deteriorates further. Remember Franco's post-1945 isolation and the economic stagnation of Spain through thoic difficult postwar years when. the UN would not acknowledge its existence: yet Franco. is still there, and Spain has become a rich country- But I ant less confident about the construction of a civilized political system in Chile unless there is an urgent reappraisal of the country's institutions and the possible models for a new constitution. However, if that reappraisal is made, it is possible that we will have a great deal to learn from the future experience -of the Chileans in devising a "post- disaster system. - General Pinochet told me that he has come! to see Chile's future political system as a "nee-dcrnocracy," which would appear to mean a system of representative govern- ment without political parties. The president would be elected. The legislature would be elected from a list of candidates selected-by an appointed caucus--on the basis of their "qualifications." flow their qualifications would be determined remains unclear. It is possible that General Pinochet is inching toward a conception similar to Brian Crozier's idea of a "profession of politics" that would admit particularly distinguished men from various defined occupational categories. If this is the idea, it will clearly not appeal to Chile's civili.in politicians, above all the Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79M00983A001300020009-4 Approved FRelease 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP79M0a963A001300020009-4 Christian i)cc.nocrats. Sti!I, there is no e.eaping the dilemma that I stated brietty c;arliei: aft,.r :,!! that has happened, vtb ,';r tcrlings of hatred and reven!,y that have hcc:ri generat:cd, tend with the painful proccssof economic re- cons:ruct ion that has to be undergone, you cannot bring back the system that )vas destroyed just by waving a magic wand. And if you can't do that, it brc:oines inclisp zns,ible to clap out a political system (provisioned or permanent) that will allow scope for public p:tr(ic:ipation in decision- making and for le:aceful political change in the absence of the party system. The weakness of the liberal dTerraocracies is that their leaders do not inane 1h3 basic (lisiinct. on l)etfveern r v:tbir?e1'r,to>.r. (wili r%cart)'.oz be. r?,olei(itecJ) (lilit (CSse t (zvizicl rnnus- be toltsialed) What course is Chile likely to take now? It may be useful to sketch out half a dozen possible scenarios, in ascending order of probability. They are by no means mutually exclusive. Scenario 2 could lead on to scenario 4.i. I; scenario rr b could be wedded to scenario s. 1. The revohrtior, script. This is very hart to devise, since there is no serious military threat to the regime inside Chile-although armed leftist groups could play an im- portant role in the event of an external attack, possibly by Peru. The Communist Party's strategy is based on stealthy penetration of the administration, the Church, the Christian Democratic Party-and the armed forces. Its lone-range success; however, would appear to hinge on the demoraliza- tion of the armed forces and their voluntary withdrawal from power rather than on armed insurrection. 2. The "Argentine" scenario. It is always possible that the Chilean armed forces, finally convinced of their incapacity to cope wi?L1 the country's economic and social problems and tinder intense pressure from the U.S. and the UN, will one day decide to retire to the barracks-as General Lanusse retired in Argentina in 1973, or as Ibanez retired in Chile in 1930 (as the distinguished editor of El Mercurio reminded his readers in a remarkable article the other day). Such a decision could also be influenced by revulsion against the brutal techniques of a section of the security forces (as in Greece). Chilean politicians hopeful that this scenario will come to pass point to straws in the wind, like the fact that officers are more reluctant to appear in uniform in the streets now than they were in the heady days after the coup, when they were being hailed as saviors. The current state of semi-civil war in Argentina, however, has not escaped the attention of the Chilean military, and the fear that something similar might result in Chile (necessitating, in the end, a new period of military in(ervention) is likely to discourage them from bowing out in the near future. (The Argentine armed forces, according to Illy Buenos, Aires informants, have a plan to assume power again for an initial period of six *years.) 3. The "U.S. Embassy" scenario appears to be that, per- haps not long from now, a predominantly Christian Demo- cratic cabinet might be sworn in-still within the framework of authoritarian rule, but essentially as a first step toward returning to constitutional rule. I do not cnnsitier this Ilk to occur, at any rate not in that way. and any ctforl outsiders to flourish big sticks over the he.uds of fire n in the Diego I'urtales building will make it less, rather th more, likely to happen. 4. The "Peruvian" scerrrrrio. Under this scenario, cc tinned economic: recesxion will finally induce the stati in the army to abandon the present experiti-ent in marl economics and go over to a Peruvian-type economic r tionalism, possibly within the franiewetrk of a corporal constitution. The regime would -continua to be stront tinti Communist, but would now wiry the applause of e< comic nationalists throughout the Thircl 'orld--possit to the extent of getting some aid and invekstment frc Venezuela, Libya, etc. 5. The ;ter; ;norlel. It is possible (and devoutly to v i;^e