YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020080-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 80
• Content Type: LIST

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hNFIDENTIAL'
II* ESTIMATE OF THE PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF
YUGOSIAVIA IN 19510
III* COMPARISON OF U*Se AND YUGOSLAV ESTIMATES OF
SATELLITE MILITARY FORCES*
V* CURRENT YUGOSLAV ATTITUDES*
VI. CURRENT STATUS OF YUGOSLAVIA AND DISCUSSIONS.
t.-ONFIDEN T
State Dept. review completed
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CONfttENT-1111 I
no ESTIMATE OF THE. PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA IN 19510
4m00.0.0.?
The basic oondlusion of NIE-29 (20 March 1951) was as follows:
"80 On the basis of intelligence available we are unable to deterc.
mine whether the Kremlin has made a decision to attack Yugoslavia0. The
Kremlin may estimate that in 1951 such an attack by the Satellites could
be carried through successfully without incurring effective Western
intervention or precipitating general war? On the other hand, the Kremlin
may estimate that the Western Powers would give large-scale support to
Yugoslavia, in the event of an attack, thereby making the operation
difficult and costly and creating a greater risk of general war than the
USSR was milling to accept, Finally, the Kremlin may be fully prepared
for the eventuality of general war and may launch an attack on Yugoslavia
regardless of the risks involved? Although it is impossible to determine
which course the Kremlin is likely to adopt: we believe that the extent
of Satellite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack
on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility? We
believe further that .such an attack, if launched, would be made by
Satellite forces with "unofficial" Soviet assistance as required*"
N1E49/1 (4 Nay 1951) noted the continuation of military peeparations
in the Satellites with a resultant increase in Satellite capabilities
for initiating an attack on Yugoslavia with little or no warning and
concluded that these developments did not warrant any change in NIE49
but did give added emphasis to the conclusion that "the extent of Satel-
lite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack on
Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility*"
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ONFIDENTIA
/II, COMPARISON OF US AM YUGOSLAV ESTIMATES ON SATELLITE MILITARY FORCES
1
Total Military Forces
dlt=aar
29 Dec 50
9 May 1951
(latest'
estimate)
ugo av
atemen
2
Popovic
8 Nov 50
3
Tito
28 Dec 50
?
10 April 1951
6 -
Bebler
23 April 1951
(latest
aabailable
statement)
No statement
No statement
No statement
No statement
130,000
195,000
195,000
No statement
250,000
300,000
No statement
No statement
5
125,000
165,000
200,000
No statement
505,000
600,000
No total possibl
800,000
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COMPARISON OF US AND YUGOSLAV FIGURES ON SATELLITE
Army Line Divisions
US Estimate
9 Mir 1951
Yugoslav Szttement
10 April 1951
(Albania)
Bulgaria
Rumania
Hungary
(4) No statemeat
13 1243
13 14-17
10
TOTALS
NOTES:
33
3640
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COMPARISON OF US AND YUGOSLA.11 FIGURES ON SATFLLITE MILITARY FORCES
US Estimate
m 195.1
Soviet
(Albania) (40)
Bulgaria 500
Rumania 200
Hungary 325
TOTALS 1025
NOTES:
Tanks
Yugoslav Statements
..31.111 1951
Soviet
No statement
600
600
150
1350
trarifffENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL'
V. CURRENT YUGOSTAV ATTITUDES
A. Possible Soviet moves in Europe.
Throughout the early months of 195.1s Yugo?lay leaders have shown
increasing concern over a possible Soviet or Satellite attacks result-
ing in various movess including a request for arms aids to bring
Yugoslavia into closer alignment with the Western powers., Yugoslav
concern was particUlarly evident following Chinese Communist inter-
vention in the Korean war =I at the height of the German rearmament
controversy. With regard to the latter, Yugoslav leaders questioned
the efficacy of Western policy ands in January and Februarys apparently
felt that Germany rather than Yugoslavia would be the next target of
Soviet.Inspired aggression and were tempted to envisage a situa.tion
in which Yugoslavia could remain neutra.l. The Yugoslays also felts
at that time, that it was essential to have a CFM. Since the first
of the years the Yugoslays hav apparently come to realize that they
weuld almost inevitably become involved in any hostilities in Europa,
ands with the lull in the question of German rearmaments their at.
tention has been focussed almost exclusively in recent months on
the queetion of Yugoslav security. Their coreern has not been
marked by the sem of frustration which was evident early in the
year but has been shown by specific measurers such as the request
for arms aid from the West, publication of the "White Books" and
current plans possibly to bring Satellite border violations before
the UN, designed to strengthen Yugoslavia and clarify the Yugoslav
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position in the event of hostilities.
Bo The Korean War.
The Yugoslav attitude toward the Korean war has been complicated
by Yugoslavia os peculiar political position between East and West.
Although they have abstained or voted against the Western powers in
all important Security Council votes on the Korean wars they have
for obvious reasons expressed approval of the principle of colleo
tive turity. They questioned the advisability of proceeding north
of the 38th Parallels and without pressing their view, have been in
favor of peace talks with the Chinese Communists. Within Yugoslavia'
reporting on the Korean war has in general been objective, based on
Western newspaper coverage of the conflict. At the present times
the Tugoalavs are attempting to have a correspondent of Politika
accredited to the UN forces in Korea, a development which could
have a beneficial effect on the Yugoslav attitude towards the
,Western powers and the UN.
Perhapm the most interesting aspect of the Yugoalav attitude
toward the Korean war is their appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations.
Yugoslav analyses have long dwelt on the possibility of a Sino-
Soviet split and apparently believe that, aa a corollary to the
Korean wars there is a strong possibility of Sino-Soviet friction
regarding revolutionary leadership in Asia. The Yugoslav UN dele-
gate in early April carried this reasoning so far as to suggest
that the Kremlin may be prepared to negotiate asettlement of the
Korean conflict. Although we recognise the factors in Korea that
2.
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could create serious disagreement between the USSR and Communist
China, the Yugoslav approach to this subject may have been in.
fluenced by their awn experience,
3.
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VI. CURRENT STATUS OF YUGOSLAVIA AID DISCUSSIONS
Since the Cominform break, Yugoslavia has obtained from the US
a total of $5500 million in long.term Credits and $92.8 million in
grants, including the $29.0 million grant from MDAP funds announced
by the President on 16 April and not yet implemented. During this
three-year period the Yugoslays have also obtained Z 15,0 triton
($42.0 million) in long-term credits from the UK, and the Fivneh
have recently assisted the Yugoslav economic endeavor by an agree-
ment calling for capital equipment loans totaling up to $11 million.
But further aid is necessary if the economy is to maintain and ex-
pand its productions Assuming the Five-Year Plan is in effect not
abandoned, it has been estimated (by the Department of State) that
Yugoslavia will require during the next several years between $250
?
to $350 millions to finance such imports as textile fibre, petroleum,
coke, rubber, tin, and iron and steel products. In addition, loans
to finance its capital and investment program will be required.
Above and beyond industrial aid, still further assistance from the
West will be necessary if. the Yugoslays are to import end-use
material for their armed forces.
The question of assistance for the Yugoslav economy, primarily
industrial aid, is currently under discussion in London by the US,
the ic., and France. Concurrently, representatives of the tame
three governments are in Washington considering the military supply
question. (CIA has not received comprehensive information on the
latter conferences.) The principal .objectives of the US delegation
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in London have been to reach agreed recommendations to the three
governments on the following points: (1) an approach to the Yugo-
slat- economic problem on the basis of broad policy considerations
already accepted by the three governments; (2) an estimate of the
present and future Yugoslav economic situation, particularly an esti-
mate of their needs prior to July 1952; (3) acceptance in principle
of tripartite responsibility to meet Yugoslav needs as estimated for
that period; (4) sharing of that burden among the three countries,
and, if possible, four countries; (5) general lines on which the aid
program may he made most effective, including the question of cooperae
tion required of the Yugoslays; and (6) meshing the short-term aid
program so far as possible with a long-term progr under considerem
tion by the International Bent?
To date the talks in London have produced tripartite agreement:
on the first three of these pointe, but the hope of the US delegae
tion for a epeedy conclusion to the talks was dissi tad, firet by
delays remulting from the French delegation, which was uncertain
of the position of the French government, and later by difficulties
injected by ths British? For several weeks the talks were begged
down in differences with the British? By subordinating political
considerations to British economic self-interesti and by reluctance
to support any but a very limited UK commitment, the British delega-.
tion had been at fundamental variance with us on baste principles?
On May 9, however, the British delegate indicated he had authority
to commit the UK to grant aid provided a burden sharing formula
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acceptable to the UK could be reached. Since that date, the confer-
ence has been concentrating on the latter problems, and there has
been some delay due to the French desire to limit their commitment.
Yet the US is apprehensive over any deley, however small, in ter-
minating the conference. Our concern is over the probable serious
consequences in Yugoslavia of failure to reach a mutually acceptable
agreement as soon as possible, consequences damaging both to the
economy and to Yugoslav attitudes or action.
With respect to their attitudes, it is interesting to note
that the Yugoslav Ambassador in London has indicated his countrymen
are worried about the significance of such extensive talks and fear
the International Bank loan which could run as high as $200 million
may be jettisoned. They particularly fear that the British, whoa
they distrust, will gain a dominant role in western aid to Yugo-
slavia. However, Yugoelav officials in Belgrade have recently
inquired about the status of the talks, but did not press for de-
tailed information and seemed satisfied with general reassurances.
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