THE CONGO CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 3, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
3 October 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Congo Crisis
1. The long-continued crisis in the Congo appears to be
entering upon a new and far more disquieting phase,
would be justified in attempting to estimate with any confidence
the course of events in that country, yet in general it seems
clear that the failure of the UN to achieve its objectives in
Katanga by military force threatens to upset the limited pro-
gress toward-stability which had been made with the establish-
ment of the Adoula government in Leopoldville. Tshombe will
almost certainly be confirmed in his determination to resist
Katangass reintegration into a united Congo. At the same
time Adoula will be under strong pressure to accomplish the
reintegration, by forceful means if necessary, lest his 25X1
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leadership in Leopoldville itself be endangered. The Congo
may again become embroiled in civil war.
2a Meanwhile, the ability of the UN to maintain some
measure of order and administration in the area has been
seriously weakened. This is owing in part to the disastrous
outcome of the Katanga venture, and even more to the death
of Secretary General Iiammarskjold, which bids fair to
paralyze the UN executive machinery generally, and render any
vigorous action in the Congo virtually out of the question.
This fact may afford the Communist Bloc,, and other states such
as Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR,, a renewed opportunity to inter-
vene in Congolese politics.
3. The issue between Leopoldville and Katanga came to the
fore most recently at the time of the Adoula government formation
early in August 1961 after lengthy maneuvering between domestic
Congolese factions and pressure by interested foreign govern-
ments. The installation of Adoula, a representative of more
moderate Congolese elements, was expected to herald an all-out
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struggle by the moderates to end the differences between the
contending regimes of Leopoldville, Stanleyville, and
Elizabethville. After considerable prodding and occasional
threats, Antoine Gizenga agreed to enter a coalition cabinet
as deputy Prime Minister, and a number of Gizengists followed
him into the cabinet to assume ministerial responsibility,
inter alia for Interior and Justice. All other key posts,
however, have been retained by Adoula supporters. Moreover,
Gizenga has continued to maintain Stanleyville outside of
central government control, has refused to permit the sub-
ordination of Stanleyville military units to ANC command,
and frequently threatens to withdraw his cooperation if the
goals of the timartyred" Patrice Lumumba are not vigorously
pursued by Adoula.
4. The Adoula government has also sought to reduce the
intransigence of the Katangans alternately through threat of
force and promises of high office. These efforts failed,
however, and Tshombe threatened to use force to prevent inte-
gration. The Leopoldville regime finally concluded that
force would be required to insure Tshombe'"s cooperation. The
UN at this juncture and at Adoula's urging interceded in an
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on a coup de frappe to reduce the obstacles to the province's
reintegration. Poor intelligence, an underestimate of Katangan
military prowess, and inadequate logistical support frustrated
the venture, and the UN was forced to negotiate a cease-fire.
violent opposition mounting in Elizabethville th UN cidod
who were opposed to the UN presence. With the thr
and the Belgian officers in the local gendarmerie forces
effort to eliminate the Belgian and other foreign advisors
bolstering Katangan separatism, as well as the mercenaries
5. Confusion in the UN executive structure as to the
organizations future policy in the Congo, coming with the
death of the Secretary General, could paralyze the UN effort
in the Congo. If this should occur, the position of Congo
moderates who have looked to the UN for advice and guidance
would be greatly enfeebled. Prime Minister Adoula, in
particular, is faced with the need to take steps to assert
the primacy of the central government. His Parliament, the
Gizengists, and some ANC leaders are clamoring for a campaign
against Elizabethville. However, the ANC does not have the
capability to subdue the secessionist province. Even with
substantial external assistance we believe that Adoula could
not achieve effective control of Katanga.
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6. It seems likely that, as agitation mounts among
his supporters, Adoula will alternately threaten and appeal
to the UN for a determined resumption of action against
Katanga. While he may make.,-with UN assistance, another
attempt at reconciliation with Tshombe, we do not believe
that Tshombe would prove flexible in view of the pressures
being maintained upon him in Katanga, including those of
vested Belgian interests and local chieftains. Tshombe also
will probably continue to receive some material support from
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. As a result, the
Leopoldville regime probably will feel compelled to renew its
plans for an ANC military operation against KatangPL and will
seek transportation and logistical support from the UNo
Refusal by the latter to sanction such plans would virtually
eliminate its influence upon Adoula, who then probably would
request support from the US, or from African states such as
Ghana and Guinea. We believe that, with the establishment
of Bloc Embassies in Leopoldville after their mid-1960 closing
by General Joseph Mobutu, it is possible that Prime Minister
Adoula would turn in desperation to the Bloc for support
against the Katanga separatists. Any such policy shift would
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constitute a serious threat to the Western position not only
in the Congo but in all Central Africa.
7. Adoula is too firmly wedded to the goal of Congo
reunification and the precepts of neutralism to regard ac-
ceptance of Bloc aid as anything more than a temporary
expedient, A former labor union organizer, he has shown
himself to be both tough--minded and capable of sudden tacti-
cal shifts in order to attain his political objectives,
However, he probably is overconfident of his ability to limit
Communist influence and, perhaps even more crucially, probably
does not have a full appreciation of the incipient divisions
within the ranks of the Leopoldville moderates. Thus, any
establishment of ties with the Bloc probably would split the
moderates badly, produce a violent reaction within the Mobutu
wing of the ANC, and lead to serious opposition in the lower
Congo, Equator, and Kasai areas. Only the Gizengists within
the present coalition would strongly support recourse to
Communist aid. In addition, Adoula's credit in the Free World
would suffer a serious decline, possibly resulting in a recon-
sideration of existing Western policies. We would emphasize
that the Congo situation is inherently unpredictable, and that
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the course of developments we have sketched out, leading
to a connection between Adoula and the Bloc, should not
necessarily be considered as likely, but rather as a pos-
sibility, reasonable enough to warrant serious attention.
8. The present phase in the Congo also affords the so-
called Casablanca powers a renewed opportunity to intercede
in opposition to Tshombe. With the reported buildup of
Communist-supplied military equipment at Accra, Conakry, and
Bamako., the leaders of these states now have the potential
to aid Adoula and the Gizengists in mounting an attack against
Katanga. Perhaps of oven greater long-term significance, they
once again have a major issue for castigating the West and
fomenting opposition to moderate Western oriented leaders
in Africa.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
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SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
11 October 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUDJEDT: Comments on
Assessment of the Congo Situ,.A%tion
1. On 28 September African specialists from 0; NE,
OC% and I met with
an American business-
man who has spent considerable time in the Congo over the last
year, to discuss his observations and conclusions about the situ-
ation in the Congo, particularly with respoct to Katanga,
who has also discussed his concern over the situ-
ation with various people on the policy side, is convinced that
the Communist Bloc is now engaged in a well-organized clandestine
operation to gain control of Katanga and its resources., utilizing
the UN as an instrument with the aid of certain well-placed
sympathizers, notably Michel Tombelaino9 until recently the top
UN Civilian representative in Katanga.,
2. Reasoning that the Blocs top priority objective in
Africa at this stage is to disrupt the flow of raw materials
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most vital to West European industry, he concludes that
Katanga, because of its importance as a source of coppers
tin, and even more cobalts and because of its proximity to
Angola and the Rhodesian copper belt, is obviously a prime
Soviet target. On the basis of the observations he and rep-
resentatives of his firm have made in the Congo, he feels that
various moves which the UN has made vis-a-vis Katanga are part
of a Communist plan to gain control of Katangao
feels strongly that central government control of Katanga would
only serve Communist purposes, since it would probably lead to
disruption of the economy and to nationalii=,tion of the manes,
and that US interests would best be served by support of Tshombe,
whom he considers a far more respectable figure than many reports
would indicate.
3. To mention only the highlights of his presentation,,
considers that Tombelaine, a French Marxist who
'leaped" at the opportunity to get the Katanga UN assignment,
has played the most important role in the Communist bpo:cation
against the Katanga Government, first through systematic and
sustained efforts to misrepresent Tshombe to the Western press
and to his UN superiors, and secondly as the principal advocate
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of the recent UN military offensive; although
had some inconclusive indications that General Cruise O'Brien
had displayed Communist leanings as a young man, he felt that
O'Brien had probably just followed the lead of the more experienced
Tombelaine in his actions and recommendations*
cited the failure of the UN to maintain the Elizabethville-
Port Franqui rail lines, while insuring the continuation of rail
operations between Katanga and oriental provinces, as evidence
of a plan to facilitate the invasion of Katanga by Gizengist
troops. He also cited indications that the Ethiopian and Ghurka
troops encamped near Kabala had been secretly preparing for
large-scale combat operations some weeks before the UN decision
to move my noting that this was not consistent with the theory
that the UN had expected no opposition to its moved
Evaluation
1. d his associates have been in a position
to watch developments in the Congo from a point of special vantage
and we consider their f actual reporting to be essentially accurate#
However$ we believe that
explanation of these events
as a part of a Communist master plan going back to the middle of
last year is not supported by other evidence we have.
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5. We assume that the Communists have been keenly aware
from the outset of the Congo crisis, as has everyone else, of
the economic and strategic importance of Katangaa For this
reason, and because of the opportunity provided for depicting
the Delgian and other white supporters of Tshombe as agents of
imperialism, the USSR has consistently sought to bring down the
separatist Katangan regime,, with the ultimate hope of bringing
Katanga under the control of a leftist -- oriented central
government.
6. However, the USSRts path has been beset with diffi-
culties, not only because of the opposition of the West and the
independent course taken by Hammarskjold but also because of the
volatility and unpredictability of Congolese politicians. Thus,
by necessity if not by choice, the Soviets have used flexible
and opportunistic tactics- first supporting Lumumba, though
he was far from an ideal "chosen vessel,' then Gizenga, who
also left much to be desired, and finally seeking to do what
they could with an Adoula government whose formation they had
opposed. The Soviets almost certainly favored the UNts military
move against Tshombe and persumably did all they could to put
pressure on the UN and the Leopoldville Government to move in
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on Elizabethville. However, the operation was possible only
because Hammarskjold and his associates, whom the Soviets so
distrusted in virtually every other respect, had been deeply
convinced from the outset, on grounds of their own, that re-
unification of Katanga with the rest of the Congo and elimination
of undue Belgian influence there was essential to solution of
the Congo problem.
7. In this connection, we believe that the role of
Tombelaine should not be overrated. We agree with
about his unsavory qualities, as have some leading UN officials in
the Congo; with some pressure from the US he is now being re-
lieved of his assignment there. By misrepresenting the situ-
ation, Tombelaine may have persuaded the UN authorities to
authorize more extreme measures in Katanga than they otherwise
would have done and may have begun preparations for a military
showdown before getting a go-ahead signal from headquarters;
this may account for Hammarskjoldta denial to Spaak shortly
before the operation that military moves were in the offing.
However, we do not believe that the operation took place without
approval up the line, including that of Hammarskjolcl. Ample
evidence exists that the Secretary-General and his chief adivsors
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chose the course of action they did for their own reasons, and,
while they may have miscalculated the amount of resistance they
would encounter,, were willing to take the risks of abrupt uni-
lateral action,,
8. We have no other evidence on the continuation of opera-
tions on the Flizabethville-Port Franqui rail line by the UN or
on the preparations by Ethiopian and Ghurka troops near Kabalo for
combat operations. We have no reason to doubt
I
porting on these points, but believe that9 if correct., they Y uflert
UN preparations for the use of force against Katangaj not Communist
control of UN operations?
9,, In sum., we believe that
useful observations on matters of fact., but that he has not pro-
duced evidence to support his thesis that UN operations in Katanga
were essentially Communise-inspired. And though we agree with
I s to the potential dangers of a forcible reinte-
gration of Katanga into the Congo., we are equally concerned that
continuation of an independent Katanga regime will lead to new
recrimination against the Belgians and the other supporters of Tshombe
and to increased pressures on Adoula to take action, if necessary
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with Bloc and radical African support. Asi himself 25X1
indicated,y ou best hope is for some sort of compromise between
Elizabethvilie and Leopoldville and the sooner the better.
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SHERMA,N KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Is it agreeable with you to send
copies of this memorandum to the USIB
members and to the White House (Bundy,
General Taylor. and Rostow) ?
Sherman Kent
AD/NE
FORM
US10-101
AUGN 54 Iv l WHICH RELACES FORM
ED.
3 Oct 61
(DATE)
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