Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 6, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 8, 1954
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9.pdf204.29 KB
Approved For Relea , 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000 060017-9 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 8 February 1954 t tANDUM FOR: I Colonel W. H. Hennig, USA G-2 Coll Charles L. FRood, USN G31 ) 11s USAF(AFOI1t-2B2) Captain Ray Malpass, USN (JIG) SUBJECT : Pbat Morterms REFERENCE z ONE Me?orasda for the IAC dated 3 June 1952: Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies in National Intel).igenes Estimates 1. The attached paper is the first action taken by 01QE on post aortems sines March 1953. 2. Past experience with the procedure outlined in the reference indicates several flaws. Tying the post mortem to 3ndividitial estimates proved generally unsatisfactory. In many cases the problem was to determine what conclusions to draw from available facts rather than to collect more facts. In other oases, appropriate collection action had already been taken as the result of a prior estimate on the same area and axgrfurther action would be duplioatosy. In maxgr instances, no specific action was considered necessary other than for each agency to take continuing action within the field of its responsibilities; it was considered superfluous to initiate special procedures to tell each agency to continue carrying out its assigned mission. The net result was a series of post marten memos which concluded that no action was necessary, and thereby implied that no intel- ligence deficiencies existed, 3. It is obvious, however, that intelligence deficiencies do exist and that the IAC bears ultimate responsibility for de- tecting them and initiating action for remedying them. It is believed that some of the deficiencies in the present procedure could be remedied by a post mortem issued quarterly rather than after each estimate. The post mortem could be issued simul.- taneously with the quarterly revision of the estimates program. Such a publication would provide further guidance to research and collection agencies and would provide the basis for amore comprehensive attack on intelligence deficiencies. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9 SECRET Approved For Releaz 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A00Q40~0060017-9 4. Fbr the present, however, we want to review the 1953 woduoticn to identify aigntfioant gape. This will also give us a chance to test out the ye riodie rather than estimate-by estimate approach. 5. egg: would you therefore please review the attached for eubatance and hens your representative meat with us at 10:00 Monday, 15 Tebruary, In Roan 3,46 South. 25X1 Deputy Assistant Director National Estimates Distributidn erg" Approved For Release 2005/06/ IA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9 Approved For Releasee.2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79R00971A00WO 060017-9 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 5 Febrtaary 1954 SMU=g POW - Cr 1953 PRODUC'1'IO? The following is a review of intelli?saee deficiencies r* w,,LU,(I! during preparation at Nstiotm1 Yactelltgenoe Esti tutee during 1993. Tie principal estisrtes upon are findings are based acre l .atmi in TAB "`A.w 1. T BLOC The gaps in our intelligence with respect to the So iet BL-pa .,wj-t tees widely aecog"sed. for a long tine. Mny of tbsec will prWmbl erever be fined. During 1953 a need me expressed for mare etf wt can the resistance potential in the Bloao Amordingly, the IAA authorised creation of an Ad Boo Resistance Intelligence Camittes can 8 Deeesher 1953. Rrperienee during 1953 also indicated a need or ,geeatar eoileetian wed research efforts in the following kay ate.. a. Airoref Production. Strenuous efforts should be continued to resolve existing differences in proved -r for estiarating airy t production. With the g res . of Soviet atowle power, accurate estimates of ..owlet longvraeadp cad tighter aircraft production are of critical Import"". Approved For Release 2005/CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9 BUST COpy AVAILABLE Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9 Approved For Rele 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79ROO971AOOQ409060017-9 SEMT TAB " 0/ER MenD to 7AC representatives 8 Tebruary 1954 PRINCIPAL NI8 PRC2JCTION BASE FQEt 1953 POST MONTRI( FMMB 1. 8uvtler BLOC NEC.(* Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957 NIE.81 Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Oerray through Mid-1954 1U-( Probable Developments within the &ropsan Satellites through Mid-1955 NIN-90 Soviet Bloc Capabilities tbsough Mid.1955 NIE-95 Probable Soviet Bloc Courses at Action through Mid-1955 SZ-36 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through Mid-1955 81.36/1 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through Mid-1955 56-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Eeatroaagastie Warfare M39 Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Maleakov to Leadership in the USSR 56-40 Coa^amist Reactions to US EstabIlsboact of a "Volunteer Preedois Corp.' 89.42 Current Communist Tactics 82-46 Probable Long Tern Developeztt of the Soviet Bloc and Western Per Positions SE.47 Probable Effect of Recent Develop cants in Eastern Oera%W on Soviet Policy with Respect to Oera. .8- Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9 Approved For Release 005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79ROO971A000400060017-9 i%ftw am= PAR ALA' x-74 Probable nsrs],ojwits in Soma through 1953 MIS-77 Probable D~essl+arpr-nts in Indonesia MM 40 00MAU ist drpabilitisa and Probable Courses at Aatias~ in Korea MM-91 Probable Dasslopoeats in Indoehitr throw. 1934 U-37 Probable Wfoots ce the Soviet Bloc at Certain Courses at Action Directed at the Internal and mcterrsal Casiwce at Car1nist Chloe, M-43 Thailand"s Ability to Withstand ocown et Pre wur a or Attacks tbrou* Kid-1934 M ,JA Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action or the llspublio or Soea with Respect to the Aridstics in E,orsa 88-31 The Sidnitiezaaca of the Her IMoneslan Gown - 1, M53 Probst" Cassentst Relations to Certain Possible Dnsiapssnts in 10doehina 30 MAMOM NM= NO-63 France's Probable Putttre Role in the Western Security System 11.63/1 Probable Short Tenzer DeveloPernts in Pesch Policy 111-71 Probable Outlook for Italy 11143 Probable Deselopeesnte in T os]svia T!w Political. CutLlook in Italy -9- Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9 Approved For Relea, 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79ROO971AOOWO 060017-9 RRlIIII 4. MR RABZMAFRICA MM-73 Coi ditions send Trends in the budle no" Afteoting US Security KI -75/1 Mobsbls Dewlaposta in bin tbra 1953 AIR-76 Prabsbl. Dwe2 u .ruts in Rapt 1M-79 Probable Dowelupoats in South Asia RIt-83 Conditions end Trends in Tropical Africa 25X1 AIR-1CA Probable D weloprents in Ilea through 1954 U-49 Tb. Current O ttlack in Iran 5. IATO AMR IV-84 Probable Dseelo ments in O *tesals NO-83 Probable Do elopnents in Chile NIX-86 Probable Dssw1opeents in Brasil Approved For Release 2005 CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9