(SECRET) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 12, 'CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA.' 12 DECEMBER 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000300050002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 19, 1950
• Content Type: MF

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORC
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval
Intelligence
Brig. General Vernon E. Megee, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, Acting for Assistant to the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic
Energy Commission
National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
ME240RANDUM FOR: Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State
Dr. William L. Langer, Assistant
SUBJECT: (Secret) National Intelligence Estimate No. 12, "Consequences
of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea."
12 December 1950
which their forces in Korea will drive for a final military d
Hence the initiative to take any and all possible countermeas
our capabilities cannot be delayed in the hope of diplomatic
that the Communists are in the process of buying further time,
the Chinese Communist delegation and of Mr. Vishinsky, and th~
that negotiations may be resumed at some future date in Peipi
troops than this paper would indicate. With the departure of
consideration should be given to the question of utilizing Nat
importance at this stage of delicate negotiations, the law of
returns has already set in with respect to those negotiations,
elusion. Whereas the political implications admittedly are of vital
1. In the original Draft of NIB No. 12 the military implication UEGIB
appear to have been inadequately developed or weighed in the final con-
2. The amendments set out in Tab "A" are recommended.
*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
J. ILI
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ncl US
Tab "A"
This nt cegoltains t ? fatten at`faatiat tb. Directorate of Intelligence
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l.. The Director of lntolligonce, U.S.A. .e has .,reviewed patio. al
Intelligence Estis to No. 12, and offers the following on, en&ientfig
a* Raferea oo 1. and first sontciice as follows
e
ss he Chinese ',atios .isa$s have offered a task force of 33,000 troops
for service In Korea and possibly could provide ~a- sae -n to
abozat 153.,000 rs thout jeopardising the se ity of T .iu .E'
b. ft9to Revise as fo'+ lows a "There is pp
immodk&te c 19:Lq in Xoroa roq~aid~~ixa elan a Nationalist troo-as t?Dre-
~c~~at as, d~.aa.atre~rn bYa.a ~he3aee a ~ ~ ra~3.~~~xe~fi t? ba3 ~n ~s~ r~.'~'ss~u~irr sal~v
ation. of ss nrati=Caammist Chinese forces both in Korea and on tae chiaxes s
l-n a4.s os commitmelit d v_c~_ a ~~~tc~rs~lo of ect era yPae an imd.
Posssibl.y the ontires Par Eastern sltua.tioa~s. _ 7e Chtne n FatLo -moo fo,
u~ I~caes ~-%'e~~e~st~'ie3 onl ~-3s~bl~ a~ fox such el.ra ..,The
~51 ea a abaence of Chinese Nationalist troops in kore&, - e-~ a
within the &medA&U r
Lgj&K f uture ash
la, ter ctou1d not be a major factor affecting the ability of UT. forces to
establish and hold a defensive line across the peninsula against na rsssritmIly
vastly superior Chinese Coca nist forcessp resvidasd M- t
9 ue d
saisa'axeeenta direr
1
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a. R, eren, co D? ,, r? 3. Add at end of paragraph as followaz
"An inp,ortant requirement in Korea Is for additional infantry. _ us
tionalist Ag ntFZ as a e9reon9_ _foree, tareeeut UN forces in Korea cogi
be gad- csa effective a V a strik na forces. The defense of a beachhead
reg r e a mobile gerye which can counterattack gnia~ at the volAte gf
f?eatest a pressure."
d. &?nfegenge g, 2. ter, d. Revise as follova8 west Chin..
Comseuniut forca2 art now deulo"d in North gQrea pad Manchuria. If hosti -
itiee between the US and Communist China wore to spread beyond Korea, gr
should the Chines Nationalists independently initiate operations on tha+
Min]an e the commitment of Chinese Nationalist forces in ?Korea would re-
duee Chinese Nationalist offensive capabilities for carrying out operations
on the mainl?cac1.? such as supporting anti-Ce
ann
ist ,guerrilla operations,
On the other hand, utilizaation of Nationalist troops in Korea won to
to contgin greater numbers of Communist forces in Korea. whether or not tRh
f htiWhas Lread,_ Such containment in additiogmould leaseg the reoti
met for orcec! or?p.ction on the araig.anj.s
e, Ro?erence p, 2, nary 5. Amend first sentence and add a new
sentence as followas "Whatever the military- outcome in Korea, the employ-
meat of Chinese Nationalists there would, in the eyes of other nations,
further identify the US with the Chinese Nationalists and would constitute
as devot moral commitment for continuing US support of the Chinese
Nationalist regime, Since this moral commitment would at the same time
id` etffr U.S. intentions to s_aapuort anti-Communist forces within its c "
bill. ties, it would, have a ositive pezghologieal effect of potential, ly
treat valet thjaou&out Asia and the rest of theXorld."
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f. Fe&f rence R L- a and In par. B. Revise as follovss. *W ou
cart to ue re the non.?aoas uniet world for such 4S 2141M. a major.
Sty of UN nations would probably reject a US proposal to use Chinese
Nationalist troops in Korea. There is a general apprehension that the
smployment of Chinese Nationalist troops in.Norea would give impetus, or
at least provide the pretext, for increased militancy on the part of Con.
monist China. Uesuite the repea ed assurance of the US'UN to respect the
t i Brat ns the 3 an8 nes st militan - 23
bas
a shy reached a hiati level in committiaee the Fourth pi
reers1snts the best available Chinese Oarnmist mill
difficult to AMA= nev form which this militsn could take.
11aaw- -Usne w IfterEforeg there voua,d be little increase in the
danger of a general war with Communist China, which #et-turaQm} t-de~sebe~
*M -Aeba&-ww alneft exists. This, too, will have 13~edireect
effect ItoMt f development of a lobe
-+ fir. XEG-MA#ilOMg Altho94, at
least is the beginning, the Western Naropesn nations ws"d MA&I feel
strongly that the US was jeopardising the first-priority task of defense
of the Rnropean continent by
be+soatng-iaveived a coat nq? ivo~-emet-t
in protracted hostilities in Asia, it is unlikely that those nations
would withdraw their troops cad active suVDort fwon Korea,. They mis}-t
am to a of ate the determiggtJon of the US to take constraati% actl.%
in an area vi ortsn in t e OARIAst S vi t t d
Co?manist 19=11612A. The employment of the Chinese Nationalists vot4d
sOidt alienate those elements n certain other Asiatic countries,, Mhteh
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who consider the Chinese Nationalists to be reactionary, palitioally
incas?etsnt, and already repudiated by their own peopple, on t other
viii to ra-ist w- t "W62169.
+tdateea#-tip- iaa-iti
MIG 22M ieee-t:a3~s#-tae?pa-+Few3~4~g-thy-~Feeiia~a. In addition.
ti d t ? t' i e t
stand in Koreas,._theE yi12-be XV-0 L ggW a T they reoomise this as
themseleres. ~ .
g. Egarogg .. 3. ar,.: T. Amend as follows& Ngt -a ire? o!
delicate nag atiat, tioae the use of Chinese I ationalist troops in Korea
Yen~1d-- ?. te$ea-mss-a~~t-eee~#t-e~ might have ura udise d
a political solution of the Korean c onfiict derivinSthose new
.them~L--Ss>edt-fiha9-Cezamne~,ot--a#ee!-dh
+~e~-Beget-staeSeg3e-epee Vf~e's'r..?~``-?~e~~1--e~
e{+bie~e~.a~5s.?a~-~-?e~t-ea~t~-~?~-~0~~'~-~~ E
This ronld not necessarily have arealud??. howev er. a later uoiitiaal.
.It, ]anent. It was. theraf
3 1
uoliticai solution Yore gym. But since Chinese Coamist iptersaation
a ssioa BeIg As r o f1da- -Ed singe itiaai of tion derir
Ina Irantoresont negotiations now Mears either_ ossibie or too 10
ed to be ei'fept . the sheM-ailitary and nsrcho gg Ndsap "
o the use of se N tionalis torces in orea and freei t
4
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restraints
imposed bir the U.S. urevsatf them f . Am3tixta auaainat
the Chinese mtnlsud~ vapid appear to ontwei other gmsidsratso"
If minimum interests of the MS-UN are to be g#e is Asiae
mill aid In the deterioration of our sent tan IMAO
view of Chinese Communist vninerabilittee and the votenat for axel.oit..
atlon Chinese snti-Commnist forces with U S d as t
eonsiderablo.? '
b. _RjCjLr_ence P. 3. Mar,, S. - Delete entire paragraphs "mss
NBIEsS~4-ee~ws~tse~a-]~asss~ . . . ~ea~t~st~g_,s
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