D/I USAF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-35/2: 'PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA.'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000040007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 22, 1952
• Content Type: MISC

*U%s 'k S"AF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
V
D/I USAF WNfRIBUTION TO NIEre35/2: "PROBABLE j.6VELOPMtsNTS IN INDOCHINA,"t
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION. IN.IWDOCHINA
A. What is the currsrt situation in Indochina with respect to the
fo].].ovn' ~ i
lo( The status of combat operations in Vietnams Laos, and Cambodia?
What trends have there been in the past six months in the relative
military strength, combat effectiveness, and tactical disposition
of the French-Indochinese and Viet Minh forces?
(1) The French Air Forces
The French Air. Forces :i.n Indochina consist of the French Air Foroes,
Far Fast_FOrces Aeriennes an 1sktrems orient- FAEFO) and units of the French Naval
Docuo,
personnel is attached as Inclosure (1), R
oncmeof Nis aocumon tt by CIA A n s?
d=te;r.,i;nd cunt
(2) Air Facilities y_~ ^.; '% c, psstcn to declass
type fighter aircraft. There are also two light bomber squadrons equipped with
1126 Invaders, two transport, one reconnaissance0 and six artillery and observam
ion and liaison squadrons. For support, the FASO are dependent primarily on
MAP for supply of combat and transport type aircraft, aircraft munitions,;
armament and aviation fuels. The French Naval Air Ana in Indochina has a
current strength of 25 aircraft all shore based. The CVL Arrcalanches left
Indochina for France on 18 May for overhaul and is expected to return in the
latter part of August. Until. its return, there will be no carrier based air.
craft in Indochina waters.
A chart giving disposition of units, type of aircraft assigned, and
Air Arm. The FAEEO have a strength of 403 aircraft of which 372 are assigned to
squadrons under three tactical :.ands. Four fighter squadrons, which are based
primarily in the Hanoi and Haiphong sectors, are equipped with FSF and F6F piston
There are apyroici.ma_te `'- t`}~3]~ musstyt Approved For Release 20000829: CIA ROPAR01012P-010000d0007R 77 airfields ardd ,use ..T.t' Y.S `~?ei+o'R.. ailslJ.La
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 Approved F6r Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012AO 1000040007"-8
to the FAEEQ. Sixteen airfields meet the standards necessary to operate
combat .aircraft. Of these? twelve have permanent surfaced rucmays., five of
which have a runway length of over 5,000 feet and are capable of sustaining
medium bomber/,jet fighter aircraft operations. The remaining airfields have
over 4000 foot runways and are suitable for operation of light bomber/piston
fig'ntor type aircraft and limited jet fighter operations, The most important
airfield complex is located in the critical Tonkin Delta area. Here are based
approximately 60,E of all the FAEEO combat aircraft and it is from these airfields
that most of the close support and supply missions have been flown. Two air-
fields Do Son and Kim An., have recently been put into commission by the
French to relieve the eonjected situation existing in this vital area. The
two Hanoi airfields and the one airfield at Haiphong have been overcrowded with
aaires,aft with no adequate space for dieperual of aircraft, since the airfields
are surrounded by rice paddies. The French-Vietnamese Forces possess no
adequate radar or early warning systems capable of giving quick exarnfng to
Army, Navy and Air installations in the Tonkin area, There isy at present.,
one radar warning site located at Cat 131 airfield (Haiphong), providing less
than five minutes warning. Another of slightly better range is reported en-
route from France. As a result of the movement of some transport and liaison
type aircraft to Do Son and the use of Kien An and the three remaining delta
airfields for cothat operations, this situation should be considerably ire=
proved?
All airfields in t:-is area are 'tdthin range of possible air attack
#r Chinese Communist airfields in the bordering areas of Yunnan. and Ewangei
Provinces and from Hainan' Island., If the Tonkin. Delta airfields should fall
into Viet Minh hands, five Airfield 300 miles to the eoutb would be the next
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 Approved For Release 2000N029: CIAROPAR01012A00100004000]8
Indochina,, the most important operational base is Tourane with 6400 fiat
runways and full facilities, Tan Son Nhut airfield near Saigon is the most
important in southern. Indochina and is the hose base of the FAEEO.
of the eight auxiliary seaplane stations available to the French
i?aval Air Arm,, Cat Lai Seaplane station, 6 miles East of Saigon and Cam Ranh
Flay near Phan hang are the only suitable seaplane landing areas,
Combat .hffective[mss
The capabilities of the FAS,EO are excellent in operations of a
',actical ground support nature.; which constitute their present basic mission.
French pilots are presently well-qualified to perform tactical support
and gunnery, During the past six months,, vital enemy supplies from
Communist Chinas key points along the supply routes,, and other key targets
have been effectively attacked, Through attacks against selected key targets,
the movement of supplies is made as costly to the Viet t4inh as possible,
The FAEEO are also efficient in conducting paratroop operations and supply
by airdrop. Transport activities, photo .and visual reconnaissance, observa-
tion and liaison are successfully carried out. Important French/Vietnamese
outpost garrisons west and north of Hanoi, because of their isolation and
poor lines of cansunication,, are supplied almost entirely by airdrops, Most
of the sutposts have cleared "drop Zones" in the vicinity, and a few have
short airstrips capable of handling liaison aircraft. The use of paratroops
as a tatictical maneuver has proven highly successful in the type of war
being fought in Indochina? The FAEEO would be relatively ineffective in
air defense operations because of the lack of modern air interceptor air-
craft, radar defenses and early warning; and fighter direction equipment.
 program in fighter combat tactics? air to air gunnery and air interception
techniques. Completion of Do Son and Kien An airfields 'has increased the
FMEO capability by providing additional operational bases and thereby
greatly relieving the conjosted facilities and providing more dispersement
of aircraft in Tonkin.
Shortage of personnel imposed by troop strength limitations precludes
the full utilization of aircraft currently available in Indochina. The
FAEEO is understrangth in pilots, having 332 pilots for over 400 aircraft.
Supply and maintenance staffs are short in aircraft technicians.
The combat effectiveness of the shore-based French Naval Air Arm
is goods within the limits of aircraft and facilities available, in per-
forming its mission of patrol, reconnaissance,, destruction of enemy shipping
and support of ground operations,
b. What are the present French-Indochinese capabilities to:
(1)rlspand their area of control and inflict heavy losses on
the Viet Minh. assuming the present nature and degree of
Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh;
(2) Hold presently occupied territory in Indochina against the
Viet Minh operating with the present nature and degree of
Chinese Communist assistance.
There has been no air opposition to the FAEEO or the French
Naval Air An in operati ns against the Vitt Minh. There is no evidence of
an operational. Viet Minh air force. although some unconfirmed reports have been
raceived indicating that Viet Minh personnel are undergoing aviation train-
ing in the Sino-Tonkin border area under the Chinese Communists. The Viet
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,}
 ILiarh have received no known air assistance in the form of manpower or material
from. the Chinese Communists, It is possible,, however,, that there may be a
few air advisors among the several thousand advisors already with the Viet
14inh forces, If the Viet 114inh forces are to have air support during the
period of this estimate, or the Chinese Corsriuniata should invade Indochina
with ground units and desire such support, t:is would have to be provided
by the CCAF, using regular units or "volunteers," Without oppositions
the FAFEO, within its present area of, operations, is able to carry out
effectively its current mission of tactical air support, subject only to
limitations of personnel and equipment, However, the FAEEO is incapable of
significantly expanding its air operations,
(3) Resist attacks by the Viet Mirth operating with substantially
increased Chinese Communist assistance?
(4) Resist attacks by combined Viet Minh-Chinese.Conmunist
Combat forces?
Since the Viet Minh has no known air force in being and no
immediate prospect of developing such a force prior to mid-r-1953, any air
resistance to the FAEEO would presumable arise through the commitment of
elements of the Chinese Communist Air Force to support of the Viet Minh
forces? It is currently estimated that the Chinese Cwmaunist Air Force
has available to it, approximately 2000 combat aifferaft of various types,
Included in the combat figure are approximately 1300 jet type fighter
aircraft, Of this total, approximately 800 aircraft (including 450 jets) are
believed to be based in China proper, primarily in the Peiping,, Shanghai, and
Canton areas, The nearest known units to Indochina are two air regiments,
totaling 'i;, MIC?2.5 fighter aircraft, located at Canton. In south China,
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therm are 18 airfields capable of supporting combat aircraft within 315
 Approved For Release 2000N029: CIA RDPAR01012A0010000400078 + ` ' ~~ f H 1 F~~
nautical miles (the combat radius of the HIG-15 with two 70-gallong wing
tanks) of the Tonkin Delta air installations. Five of these airfields have
surfaced runways of 6000 feet or more and are suitable for sustained medium
bomber/jet fighter operatima. The remaining ten airfields have surfaced run-
ways between 4000-6000 feet in length and-can support sustained operations of
light bomber/piston type fighter aircraft and limited jet fighter operations.
Recent information indicates that Nanning airfield in southern China is absad-
c:ned and that the Chinese Communists have not performed any construction work
on this facility. Although the condition of the runway probably would allow
aircraft to land and take-off, the air facilities are not suitable for any
sustained operations. In event that the Chinese Communists were to attempt
an air attack on Indochina, an operational base in the Nanning area would be
essential. Lack of any activity at this airfield also indicates that there
probably has been no major build-up of airfields near the Indochina border.
The only evidence of construction in the area is that of a four-lane road being
built from the town toward the airfield. The completion of this additional
method of logistical support to the airfield may mean that the Chinese
Communists have future plans for the rehabilitation of this airfield. It is
believed,, moreover, that all Chinese Communist airfields in South China could
be repaired within a short period of time.
The commitment of a Chinese Communist force of ammparable size and
composition to that now committed by the FA11C would not be decisive, but would
materially reduce the freedom of movement now enjoyed by the FAEM, Loss of
freedom of the air w ould force the FASOD to change materially its combat and
supply tactics. Tactical support and bombing would be similarly affected since
a large percentage of available aircraft would have to be employed in air
6
 a irl
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intercept and combat patrol missions,
The addition of a Chinese Communist air force to Viet Minh
forces comparable in size to the French Air Forces, but including MIG-15
jet fighters would result in loss of air superiority to the French,, at
least in the Tonkin Delta area, The FAEZO now possesses no aircraft
capable of effectively intercepting jet type aircraft. It the Viet Minh/
Chinese Conmmnist ground forces commit MIG-l5?e,,.they will undoubtedly do
so by a surprise concentrated air attack on the Army.. Navy and Air
:installations in the Tonkin Delta area, The French-Vietnamese Forces do
not possess an adequate air warning system to give quick warning of such an
attacks and the effect would be to neutralize the French Air Forces in
Tonkin and at least partially destroy the vital installations in that area?
B. What is the current nature and level of Chinese CoLtmunist assts-
tance to the Viet Minh?
There is no known Chinese Communist air technical and materiel
assistance being, provided to the Viet Minh at the present,
C. What is the current nature and level of French sumort to the
Associated States of Indochina? The Associated States of Indochina have no Air Force in beings
although a small beginning has been made in training native pilots, On 1
April 1952, a Vietnamese Flying School was createdt, equipped with 30
.liaison type aircraft, and provided with a ;:raining staff of four French Air Force
Officers and 22 non-commissioned officers? Graduates will be used in artillery
spotting units, The initial class of 15 Vietnamese cadets is undergoing a
6 month course and a second class of 30 Vietnamese cadets is expected to
begin training in October 1952 In view of the difficulties in organizing,
 equipping and t raining a native air fbree, and the preoccupation ct the
French Air Forces in their present combat operations in Indochina, it is
unlikely that an effective Vietnamese Air Force will be created within the
period of this estimate.
D. What is the current nature and level of US suooort to the French and
Indochinese?
Most of the present capability of the FAEEO is due to the MDAP
assistance received during the past two years. Present MDAP policy provides
for the replacement of aircraft and spare parts as needed to maintain the
level now reached by the FAEEO and to supply all the ammunition and POL
needed for combat operations as required. The lack of an air defense
capability by the FAEEO has been i constant weakness that MDAP assistance
has not alleviated? The French have repeatedly requested from the US jet
aircraft for air defense in Indochina. These requests have been refused
mainly because of their lack of air facilities to operate such aircraft, aid
insufficient maintenance and fuel storage facilities for sustained jet
operations. Recent developments and improvements along these lines in the
'Tonkin delta area, including opening two new airfields, have changed the
complexion of this question in recent weeks.
On 30 April 1952,, a recommendation for reconsideration of the
question of jet aircraft to Indochina through MDAP was proposed by Air Force
MDAP officialsa The proposal forwarded favors giving a squadron of F-86 to
the FAEEO by realloting remaining FY 1952 funds. It is felt by this group
that attacks by the CCAF, especially jet, could knock out a large part of
the MDAP air effort already made in Indochina, If this threat is to be
met by the French, an aircraft capable of forcing ccenbat on the 14IG-15 is
 ~-' "
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for purchase, with delivery beginning in July 1953, If the FAFLO should
acquire jets from the US, along with an early warning radar net also under
consideration, the critical air defense weakness of the FAEEO now existing
could, in time, be substantially alleviated,
II, FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURr Dli4IAPA`ENT;IN ItIDOCHINA
A. French-Indochinese Capabilities and ,probable courses of action.
1. How will French and Indochinese will and intention to resist
be affected by the following:
a. Political, economic, and military developments in
Western Europe, and within metropolitan France and the
French Union?
Any political, economic, or military development within metropolitan
France, other Western European countries, or the non=Indochinese parts of
the French Union would probably have a favorable psychological impact upon
French and Indochinese will and intention to resist if such development rem
nulted in a continuation of sufficient outside support to contain the
Communist threat to Indochina. In addition_, any development in these areas
which indicated a genuine French intention to strengthen native institutions
would tend to strengthen the Indochinese will and intention to resist
Communist pressures, However, any developments in these areas which indica.
ted a continuation of or a reversion tol, traditional French colonial
policies and attitudes would meet with a strongly adverse reaction among
the highly sensitive Indochinese peoples and would correspondingly deter
their will and intention to resist Communist pressures, Any development
in Metropolitan France, other Western European countries, or the French Union,,
which indicated that Indochina would not receive outside support at least
sufficient to contain the Communist threat would probably have a seriously
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adverse. affect upon the wi.11 and ,i:h r;ti ril o resist of both the French and
Indochinese?
 ba Political and economic trends within Vietnam,- Laos,
and Cambodia;, including attitudes toward French imperial
control and toward the Chinese Communists? (To what extent
are the Chinese Communists regarded as conquerors and to
what extent as liberators from white control)?
Within Vietnam (and? to a lesser extent, within the less advanced
stater- of Laos and Cambodia) there is a gsdual trend toward increased re-
cognition of the Communist threat and toward increasing native participation
in the French led resistance movement, However, despite substantial changes
in traditional French colonial policies in the direction of sponsorship of
native autonomy continuing suspicion of French policies and motives will
remain,- during the period of this estimate, as a deterrent to unqualified
Indochinese support for their own French sponsored governments and for the
French-led military struggle against the Communist-led Viet Minh forces,
It is estimated that identifiable direct Chinese Communist participation
in combat against the French-Vietnamese forces would result in an acceleration
of the present gradual increase in Indochinese support for the anti-
Communist struggle. In view of the paucity of reliable intelligence, this
estimate is based largely on the considered Judgment that, in view of the
traditional Indochinese hostility toward Chinese invaders and in view of
the increasing identification of the Chinese Communists in the minds of
politically conscious Indochinese with aggressive international Communism,
the threat posed by Como:*anist China will be regarded as over-riding the
continuing opposition to French colonialism?
e. Possible tripartite warnings to the CC to keep their
hoops out of Indochina?
The issuance of
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 being effective in keeping Chinese Communist troops out of Indochina would
increase French and Indochinese wall and intention to resist the Viet Minh
forces? provided that US material support of the Frene~-Vietnamese forces
continued at such a level that eventual victory over the Viet Minh did not
appear hopeless*
da Changes in the level of 'S economic and military assistance
and in the nature of the VS commitment for the defense of
Indochina?
(See aA b and c above)?
is, A cease-fire in Korea?
A cease-fire in Korea., without effective Western action to deter
Chinese romnunist military action against Indochina and/or without assurance
of continued substantial US material support, would encourage defeatism among
the French and Vietnamese and might lead them to seek a negotiated settlement
with the Viet Minh forces,
f.. An expansion of the Korean war?
An expansion of the Korean war would probably have little effect
upon the French and Vietnamese will and intention to resist., unless such ex-
pansion was of rich a. nature and rnagrAtude as to remove from Indochina the
threat presently posed by the presence of large numbers of Chinese Communist
forces near the China border and by Chinese Cotmnunist logistical aid to the
Viet Minh forces
Po1i.ti.cnl, military, and economic developments elsewhere
in Southeast Asia?
Po-! itA cal? rd.? itary r*nd e conomi.c developments elsewhere in South-
east Asia are of significance to t he French and Indochinese will and intention
to resist to the extent that such deve3.oprrents increase or decrease the likeli-
 hood that the anti-Communist position in Indochina will be out-flanked, For
example, Communist acquisition of control of Burma would constitute at
least a potential threat to the anti-CommUraist position in Indochina, and
would probably tend to discourage French and Indochinese will and intention
to resist,
2, What trends in French-Indochinese capabilities to resist
or reduce Viet Minh-Chinese Communist pressure are probable?
a. In trained manpower, organized forces, and material
supply (including Us aid)?
No significant changes in the Fretcho.Indochinese capabilities is
expected to occur during the period of this esbime, The FAEEO are expected
to receive sufficient logistical support under MDAP to maintain the present
level of operations. There is a current shortage of pilots and trained
maintenance technicians, and the ability of the French to\supply sufficient
personnel to support additional aircraft is questionable, No appreciable in-
crease in air defense capabil5ties by Mid-1953 is evident, as the FA1EO are
not expected to acquire F-86 jet aircraft prior to mid 19530
B, 1. What trends in Viet Minh-Chinese Communist capabilities
are probable through mid-1953 assuming a continuation of
the present situation in Korea:
d, In terms of Chinese Communist ability to commit combat
forces in Indochina?
The Chinese Communists now have, and will continue to have
through mid==1953, sufficient air strength in jet and piston aircraft to
=able them to launch damaging attacks against French-Vietnamese installations
iaangqTonki.ng, without appreciably lessening the present scale of Commvnist
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 in Indochina' there siauad have to he improvement of South China airfields,,
atockpil$ng of suppliers at these a:?rfieldsz, and redisposition of aircraft.
Although these preparations could be made b-z r2id='1953, there is no reliable
evidence that they have r=:t begun,
 2 Vrtt of ect would an expansion of war in Korea or a
cease-fire in Korea have on Communist capabilities in
Indochina?
An expansion of the war.,in Korea would presumably include
expanded Communist air operations, and therefore place a further limit-
ation on Communist capabilities to coavnit air strength to Indochi.nae
iii the event of a ceasefire in Kweay The Chinese Communists would ho
capable of employing, for sit, operations in Indochina, all or any part of
their present air force in being when released from its Korean mission,
:subject only to logistical and air facilities limitations in the Indochina-
China border area,
)gai.n'.and., PLC'?
+.t. is c onsi.der ed 0nt nve -a)1. Comma taint interests and policy in
Ho:: will Chinese Conjnuni.:,t courses of action in Indochina
be influenced by the following:
+=o Over-all Communist interests and policy in the Far East?
f. Other contingencies such as the release of Nationalist
55+rti,_t-nees An Indochina, combat operations h; Chinese
5.^t is cam;.?s i. +
.r_ Sout.hes.st Asia, or against the
Et. A tripartite warning to keep their troops out of
Indochina?
Changes in the Korean war?.
ba A chance in French-Indochinese capabilities?
c, A, change in the strength and effectiveness of the
Viet Minh?
It C: ~:?, l?
 deterrent to Chinese Communist aggressive action in Indochina will be a
Western (essentially US) warning which convinced the Soviet bloc that such
Chinese Communist aggression would result in unacceptable retaliation against
Communist China itself? Changes in the relative strength and effectiveness
~4 the French.'Indochinese forces and the Viet Minh forces, changes in the
ii.orean war, and other contingencies will not have deteriiiining influence
(though they could have some contributory sig'tifictnce) upon Chinese Communist
c;our?3es of action relative to Indochina.
 Inclosure (1)
Strength and Dispositionr, French Air Force, Bar East Assigned
to Tactical Commands
flghter
Light Bomber
Photo Reconnaissance
Artillery Obs, & Liaison
Transport
Assigned Aircraft
83
35
1
12
6
168
2
--7&-
372
Fighter Sq. 1/8
Transport Sq. 2/62
Photo?Recon, Sq, 80
Artillery Obs, Sqo 23
Transport Sq. 2/64 (Detach)
Transport Sq. 1/64 (Detach)
Fighter Sq. 3/6
Bomber Sqo 1/19 (Detach)
Bomber Sq, 1/25
Artillery 0bs~ Sq. 21
TACTICAL COt? NAM}- Center- Hue
Bomber Sq. 1/19
Fighter Sq, 2/9
Liaison Sq. 54
Transport Sq, 1/64 (Detach)
Transport Sq, 1/64
Artillery Obs, Sq* 22 (Detach)
Vietnam Flying School
Transport Sq. 1/64 (Detach)
F8F
047
Ju-52
Martinet
Penguin
Cricket
Hiller
FSF
Crickets
C-47
Ju-52
FSF
8-26
B-26
Cricket
8-26
1526
F6F
Martinets
Crickets
Penguins
Ju-52
Ju-52
Cricket
Cricket
Ju-52
No, of
Aircraft
Location
Boo Mai Airfield (Hanoi)
n It n IF
it it IS n
n u It
n
n to It IF
to n IF to
n n it It
Gia Lem Airfield (Hanoi)
It It to IF
It It n IF
10
1
7
4
12
3.
2
12
2
30*
2
Cat Bai Airfield(Haiphang
it IF to
n
u it It It
Do Son Airfield (Haiphong
Tourane Airfield
of IF
n
IF
to
n
IF IF
it It
IF it
Nha Trang Airfield
to n n
if n it
Vientiane Airfield
These thirty (30) aircraft are to be used as trainers, however, an are
fully equipped for primary miusict of coriaat, operations?
 TACTti_~PL GaIVIND South = S~E.on
_, ...__..~ #z ..
Fighter Sq. 2/9
Transport Sea 2.164
Transport Sq. 1/64 (Detach)
Bomber Sq. 1/19 (Detach)
Artillery Obs. Sq. 22
Liaison Sq. 52
F6F
C-47
Jun.52
RB-26
Cricket
29artinet
Cricket
Penguin
Hiller
NOTE: Fourteen (14) Ju-52 aircraft have been equipped for dual purpose with
external bomb racks plus a '"D-.30 Bronzaeiae sight permitting use as a
bomber with external maximum bomb load of 2000 pounds.
Pilot a
Other Aircrew
Other (French)
Other (Indigenous)
220
69
291
Patrol Bonhher Sq0 8F
Patrol Recon Sol, 83
Bacon Sq. 93
Liaison
ido. of
pe Aire a t Aircraft
PPB47
PBY 5A
Sea Otter
Ct47
Morane
Location
Tan SonWhut Airfield(Saigc
II it it if it
112
275
56;'9
332
344
5990
Saigon
(1) Haiphong
(1) Saigon
Cat Bai.
Saigon
Iiaiphong
The CVL Arromainchan, c3!rrently undergoing overhaul in France, is
expected to return to :cndoch3na raters the 'Latter part of August
with a comp1e.ent of appnxi.mately 44 aircraft, 30 pilot officers,
and 310 aircrew t:.rsoraael.
Of i;orn `7
7S8
35 pilots (officers anrd
No. of
Aircraft