(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: STUDY

/; i f, oe.t A&
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Background and Current Status
1. The Kashmir dispute originated in 1947, at the time of the partition of India
and Pakistan. Despite the predominantly T-isltm population of Kashmir, its Hindu Maha-
rajah obtained accession to India, and a pro-Indian Government was installed under a
1 s]d.m, Sheikh Abdullah. These events touched off an invasion by Northwest Frontier
tribesmen, possibly aided by Pakistan, and eventually both India and Pakistan sent in
regular forces. After more than a year of conflict, the UN got agreement to a cease-
fire under which India now occupies most of Kashmir, including the Vale of Kashmir and
containing about 78% of the population. This territory is governed by Sheikh Abdullah.
The balance of Kashmir is ruled by the Pakistan-backed Azad Kashmir government.
2. At the time of accession, Lord Mountbatten, then Governor-General of India,
should
made it clear that the final disposition of Kashmir/be settled "by a reference to the
people". However, despite two UN Commission resolutions, continuing UN efforts at
mediation, and discussion by the British Commonwealth Prime Ministers in early 1951,
India and Pakistan have never been able to agree on terms for demilitarization and ad-
ministration of Kashmir during a plebiscite. Pakistan has accepted several proposals
for international policing, but India has absolutely refused to withdraw her forces
except on virtually impossible conditions.
3. In October 1950 India moved unilaterally to break the deadlock, through the
announcement by Sheikh Abdullah of plans for a Kashmir Constituent Assembly to decide
the form of government and affiliation of the entire state. Pakistan denounced this
plan vigorously, its leaders threatening war if it were carried out, and sought urgent
UN consideration. The US and UK joined in sponsoring a further Security Council reso-
lution, passed 30 March 1951, under which ex-Senator Frank Graham of the US was desig-
nated as UN representative to seek a solution to the demilitarization problem. India
the resolution kwnicn Ya. istan supportieuj, ouU ig.t't:~~u Uv iC~ ~! vc uloi~ou+, w.+.+
arrived in the subcontinent on 29 June 1951, and is due to report to the UN Security
Council by 29 September 1951, though he may seek delay.
4. Despite the Graham mission, Abdullah announced in June that Constituent Assembly
elections would be held between 10 and 30 September. Prime Minister Liaquat All Khan
of Pakistan then repeated that Pakistan would not permit such elections. Early in
A"aUE V1 CLASS,
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hastily to Kashmir (165, 000 . rogps) anc he Pakistan border in thi
.. tr/.. _....~+ _tT
f her
jab ,~,~,,:
( ~a= uding an armors gade). These are now opposed by large but
outnumbered Pakistani concentrations -- about / 000 troops, with another l 000 in
reserve, deployed for possible use in Kashmir, and about 51,000 troops on theAborder,
A. .uet+vt .
_Liu On the distant East Pakistan front, India has 20,000 men against about
10,000 Pakistani.
Basic Objectives of the Parties in Kashmir
5. The predominant interest"of both India and Pakistan in Kashmir is one of
nationalis tinged with religion. To Pakistan, founded on the principle of a separate
Moslem state, it seems intolerable that any substantial part of a predominantly~7 %)
Moslem population should be handed over to India. To Nehru, on the other hand, it is
equally important to prove that his concept of a secular state,already containing
nearly 40,000,000 Moslems, is preferable4oth Nehru 7a Kashmiri by birthand Gandhi
were closely associated with Abdullah in pre-partition campaigns for Hindu-Moslem co-
4'
0 144'
nmportant, but secondary,
one of national prestige going even beyond
strategic and economic interests.
Although so~ difficult of access from India, Kashmir c/o~uld be a military gatex,ray
/P1ntsid "r lJ..a !?'J mil A}f~f TA
into Pakistan, not only from India but from Sinkiang. Economically,) P session of
Kashmir would slightly improve Pakistan's control over the vital water supply obtained
from the Indus River and its tributaries, though it would not prevent India from carrying
out a present threat to impair the flow of two major tributaries that rise in India.
7. ~-- '---=r 1=rl^r roi z-nig umds he interests of both India and Pakistan
could be met by less than the whole of Kashmir. However, both parties are adamant in
demanding control of the central Vale area, the heart of the country, which has a Rbslem
majority but is on the Indian side of the present cease-fire lines and within the area
covered by the Constituent Assembly elections.
July, allegedly to counter Pakistani military moves, India moved the bull
operation in Kashmi
eel kth the progress of the dispute, public opinion in
its original foundations.
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Indian and Pakistani Military Capabilities
tainly be able to defeat Pakistan. el-
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Force Militarily, India's land forces heavily outnumber those of Pakistan and its
Air force and Navy are likewise superior. In an all-out war, India would almost cer-
, is Navy could successfully blockade
Karachi, Pakistan's only major port, and its Air Force would almost certainly destroy the
Pakistan Air Force, though it does not now have the ability to carry on a steady bombing
offensive against Pakistani cities and installations. Using its superior armored forces,
India could.conduct a successful invasion of West Pakistan and in the judgment of US
observers could overrun Lahore within a week and take over most of the territory within
t two months 4 t&y
1) . - It 044
9. On the Kashmir front alone, however, India is less strong. The land tie between
India and Kashmir consists of only a single road, and while this might be kept open it
would be inadequate for full supplying of even India's present strength in Kashmir.
Initially, despite their numerical superiority, Indian forces in Kashmir would almost
certainly have tL4& ogive ground before a determined Pakistani attack, and might well lose
it
the Vale area. factors in a Kashmir campaign would be the attitude of the North-
west Frontier tribesmen, particularly the Pathans, and to a lesser extent that of Af-
fight again in -1+2 1;;%Qru-_St was in 1947, and if so their
Tr I
L
warlike qualities would augment Pakistani strength in Kashmir. Afghanistan E ~
which has been diligently courted by India in recent months, would probably make border
raids on Pakistan, but these would probably have no more than nuisance value.
10. Pakistan's military capabilities are the obverse of India's: little chance
of success (and the certainty of quick loss of East Pakistan) in an all-out war, but a
o..
strong chance of quic gains in a Kashmir-alone campaign. There is evidence that the
Pakistanis themselves, who are somewhat contemptuous of Indian fighting power, believe
that they could take over the Vale of Kashmir and at the same time fight a successful
delaying action, at least for a month or two, on the Punjab border in defense of Lahore.
(This view is more optimistic than that of US observers, who do not believe Lahore could
be held even for this period.)
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11. Weather factors might have a critical effect on the military capabilities of
the parties. The monsoon season ends in Kashmir about 15 September, but lingers in the
Punjab till about 1 October. It has been reported that floods in the Lahore area will
prevent military operations there until 1 October, and Pakistan is capable (through
connecting canals from northern rivers not subject to Indian control) of increasing
such floods to the point where they would constitute an effective barrier to India's
armor. Thus, there will probably be a period of 2 - 3 weeks during which Pakistan could
move in Kashmir without serious fear of a fatal thrust by India into West Pakistan.
During this period, however, while the monsoon wouldff,, still prevail on the East Pakistan
front, India's superiority here is so complete that !t~aou probably not affect her
ability to invade East Pakistan and defeat the Pakistani forces completely.
Indian and Pakistani Political Prospects
12. Politically, India's trump card is her present possession of the coveted Vale
of Kashmir. It is generally agreed that a plebiscite conducted under international
auspices would produce a substantial majority in the Vale for accession to Pakistan,
though the small Jammu area in the south might vote for India (and would go with Paki-
stan's blessing). On the other hand, control by Indian forces, with the central object
11 of barri aigning on religious grounds, would with equal certainty produce a
result favorable to India throughout the area to be covered by the Constituent Assembly
elections. Thus, if India is able to go through with the Constituent Assembly plan while
her forces are still in control of their present area, she will be able to present Paki-
stan and the UN with an accomplished fact.
13. Pakistan, on the other hand, because of its willingness to accept an inter-
nationally policed plebiscite in Kashmir, clearly has the upper hand over India in the UN
and in British Commonwealth circles. Dr. Graham has made it clear that he regards Nehru
as the stumbling block to solution. Any solution he may recommend, or that would be ac-
ceptable to, the UN, would almost certainly be favorable to Pakistan and would require
major concessions by India such as to undermine her chances of success in the plebiscite.
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 GA =' Constituent Assembly
-- wfl
Likelihoo~pr{areeFg' 'S'J
RQF 79 Q MAI 12 O 201-44tions )
14. India regards the Constituent Assembly elections as critical, and only very
great pressure would induce her to accept a postponement at this late date. Conversely,
Pakistan has made it clear that it regards the Constituent Assembly elections as ex-
tremely harmful, if not fatal, to her interests in Kashmir. A question therefore exists
whether Pakistan would provoke war to prevent Constituent Assembly elections.
15. From a military standpoint both sides are in a state of complete readiness for
war, and the forces are deployed in positions consistent with the probable respective
strategic plans. The only action by either side that would be a probable prelude to war
and of which there is as yet no evidence is a Pakistani arousing of the tribesmen.
0 ts'i a
16. Indian intentions: We estimate that the Nehru government is unlikely to
provoke a war during this period. Its reasons against war are formidable: (a) war would
prevent the holding of the Constituent Assembly elections; (b) time is all on lu~ de --
even if the Constituent Assembly elections were postponed, her possession of the disputed
areas leaves her in a strong position; (c) even a victorious war would be a serious
threat to Indian economic and political stability -- it would almost certainly lead to
~Pn1 t g o fie" general ewe s~
widespread communal rioting
- ate Jams The only contrary argument of any possible weight is that
war that led to quick victories
Nehru's wavering prestige;
swayed by this.
however,
in the West Punjab and East Pakistan would help
he is probably too well aware of the risks to be
17. Indian actions are consistent with this view of her intentions. The July troop
movements could well have been designed to forestall Pakistani fern-e with the Con-
stituent Assembly elections while further deterring Pakistan by the threat of a Punjab
counterattack. Nonetheless India is clearly willing to accept war, and if hostilities
were to break out she would certainly strike in the Punjab and probably in East Pakistan
and not permit Pakistan to confine the fight to Kashmir.
'S4i(a fK
lg. Pakistani intentions: We estimate that there is a eabrertg possibility that
Pakistan will provoke a war during this period through a local attack in Kashmir.
Rationally, the reasons against war are persuasive: in a long war Pakistan would almost
certainly lose East Pakistan (containing 60% of her population) and at least some Punjab
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territory, and her economic and political stability -- even her very existence -- would
be threatened. However, there are many signs that the Pakistani leaders have reached
a dangerous mood of frustration in which these considerations might be outweighed by the
desire to thwart the Constituent Assembly elections and by the tempting theory of quick
3
~
)
stani statements have used every possible argument to put India in the wrong and encourage
cam. tiiI
support for a contentionthat military action in Kashmir is justified because of Indian
obduracy and the illegality of the Constituent Assembly elections (which were spe-
cifically condemned by the SC Resolution of 30 March).
close proximity in difficult country. Incidents have already taken place and could
easily m
..--s- vii ra-l"11 uii.i pe1'1Vu uy U11L?'yr iuur exp-Loslve iaczors.
AW"Roughly in-the order of their probability and importance, these area
a) Unauthorized military action or a coup attenpt by Pakistani military leaders.
shmir gains, a holding action in the Punjab, and an appeal for a UN cease fire. Paki-
19. Ecren if neither government deliberately pro va*es war, there is a substantial
Considerable dissatisfaction with the government and its Kashmir policy is known
to exist in army circles, and an anti-government plot was nipped in the bud in the
spring of 1951,
b) A rise in general Pakistani public feeling. The GOP has been able sub-
stantially to control popular sentiment in the past, and the continued GOP reference
to this threat is robabl exa erated. But the `4'''~@~'
p y gg possibility of a dangerous
c) Renewal and/or increase of communal *94ing in Bengal. This could lead to
of hostility inboth countries.
W
~
(d) Indian internal politics
'he right wing of the Congress Party is now
engaged in a ekmPfft with Nehru. Some elements of the right are sympathetic to
the strongly anti-Moslem and anti-Pakistan Hindu Mahasabha, though others are
conservative businessman generally opposed to conflict. Apart from actual beliefs,
there is a strong possibility of inflamatory statements for political advantage.
->e) Border incidents. Both in Kashmir and in the Punjab the two armies are in '..
Probable Developments if and after Constituent Assembly Elections are Held
20. Once Constituent' Assembly elections are held, UN action will be of critical
importance. It can be assumed that India will make a maximum effort to propagandize the
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election results as setting the issue, at least as to the area actually covered. It
meet
may also be assumed that the elected Constituent Assembly will i within about a
month --- i.e., by 1 November -- and will then vote to approve accession to India. To
counter the effect of these developments, Pakistan will look to the UN.
M~ssroN
21. There is no present indication that the Graham vea will a solution
of the demilitarization issue. It is likely to reportcon or about its scheduled date
of 29 September- its lack of success and to propose the whole issue be submitted to
arbitration. It is almost certain that Pakistan will support such a proposal while
India will oppose it. Simultaneously, Pakistan is likely to seek a new SC resolution
denouncing and refusing to recognize the result of the Constituent Assembly elections,
and continuing efforts to achieve demilitarization.
22. With these proposals before it, the UN would have several possible courses.
These would include, on the part of the Security Council, denunciation of the Con-
stituent Assembly elections, appointment of an arbitrator ( or arbitrators) to forsa-
elate a demilitarization plan regardless of India opposition, and a request for ex-
planation of troop movements. Reference to the General Assembly in November is also
a possibility (and need not mean withdrawal of Security Council jurisdiction); Pakistan
might welcome this as a more effective means of bray world opinion pressure to bear
on India. _--
23. The effect of any of these measures on Pakistan is uncertain. The wind-up of
the Constituent Assembly elections (Octoberr would undoubtedly increase army and popular
pressure for war, and this pressure could become irresistible if the Security Council
ensuing
failed to take even the steps of denunciation and proposing arbitration. The Xxxs?xg
accession vote of the Constituent Assembly (1 November or later) would create another
highly critical period in which these pressures could get out of hand. Pakistani
feeling will undoubtedly be intensified on both occasions by the extent of Indian
t1crowing'1 over the results. On balance, so long as the UN appears to offer hope of
effective action, the GOP would probably not resort to war after the Constituent Assembly
elections if itAdelined to do so before then. However, the popular pressures would
probably be even greater after the Genstituent Assembly elections and the chances of
unathorized army action or irresistible clamor would increase. Thus, the aggregate
chance for war would decline little if at all up to the end of 1951, unless-Mae
c' ut~pe6 by the UN during this period.
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2L.. On the Indian side, the favorable Constituent Assembly election result and
ensuing accession vote would diminish immediate popular pressure for war and reduce
the already small chance that the GOI would actually provoke war. However, these events
would also strengthen India's sense of self-righteousness and make it all the more
difficult to obtain her consent to any UN proposal. However, tho
proposal might be unacceptable to India; it probably would not increase the likelihood
of deliberate war by her or even the popular pressures for war.
In summary, the avoidance of hostilities up to the end of 1951 is dependent, L
on numerous factors, of which the most important are a) whether and to what extent India
pursues her Constituent Assembly election plan (and subsequently attempts to integrate
Kashmir into India); b) the extent to which the UN is able to achieve a plan that has
at least general world backing and affords hope of an impartial plebiscites ?r.
t~-.:.-t~aunt~s. ?:l~a~c~a~r
There exists the slim possibility that Nehru and Liaquat Would
stage a dramatic meeting to effect a settlement (perhaps extending to other issues such
as the water dispute). But it must be concludes _that on the present facts there is a <
substantial chance of hostilities within the next four months and only a very slight
chance that the issue will have reached a satisfactory solution by the end of 1951.
Consequences of War for US Security Interests
2 . If war should break out, it is extremely unlikely that it could be confined
to Kashmir itself. The disadvantages to India of thatbattleground are so great and her
superiority in other areas so clear that she would certainly strike in the West Punjab
and in East Pakistan. UN cease-fire efforts are not likely to be successful in the early
stages of conflict, at least until a stalemate is reached such that neither side has hope
of major immediate gains.
2g. War on a broad scale, whatever its outcome, would have a very serious impact
on US security interests. Extended hostilities would so weaken both India and Pakistan
as to make the maintenance of orderly government a matter of question. There would almost
certainly be Vast communal disturbances and a resulting increase in the severity of,_.the
refugee problem. Under such conditions there is a serious possibility that in India the
local Communist party would be able, possibly with Chinese help, to assume control of
the government. A Communist coup is less likely in Pakistan, but at the least a state
of internal chaos and immobilization would result.
1 _ / / .1 ... / i ~A A r z * 6 - 6 L 4 &J" t ~~C , 6' 14c Aft AMW-
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If the.Communists gained control in India, neighboring states would-be
Pakistan and Celon would find it difficult, if not impble, to take a firm position
t off and fall under Communist domination. The retively pro tern governments of
'exposed
military threat from the flank. Southeast Asia would pro bly be pinched
IQ\
againsti oovieti om inese aggression even it stronA?-Ylestern military support,\forth-
coming. Neutralism wotfd be greatly encouraged in Iran, the Arab Near East, and in
the Philippines.
seriously from Southeast Aq' -(rubber, in, and oil). obilization(ortIndian
29. More specifically, the "VS rtuld lose substantial quantities of strategic
materials (especially manganese.='mic , and graphite) from South Asia, and even more
control) of Pakistan w c ld deprive the Wo of excellent potential air bases from
sisting of g'cruiser, three destroyers, and miscellane us smaller craft,and a small
air force composed largely of World War II type aircraft. India is believed to have
add to the military power of the Soviet bloc an army~ of about L.00,000 men, a navy con-
&bbgt'l,500,000 trained reserves and, given Soviet equipmentss ` fight, in time, develop
/__Lri?~army comparable to that of the Chinese Communists.
30. Even if the consequences of war should be something less than a Communist
take-over in India, political stability in the subcontinent would be gravely threatened
by a prolonged conflict and the ensuing chaos and economic and financial pressures
would severely weaken, if not destr,vy, these groups presently most favorably disposed
to US security interests in the a rea. -
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