AN ESTIMATE OF INDEPENDANT LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: June 13, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
Intelligence Report
IR 5930
AN ESTIMATE OF.INDEPENDENT LIBYA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Intelligence Research
Date: June 13, 1952
Review of this document by CIA has
determined that
CIA has no objection to declass
If contains information of CIA
interest that must remain
classified at TS S C.
Authority: HR 70.2
Q It contains nothing of CIA Interest
Data' Reviewer
~JGy No, q5 SECURITY INFORMATION
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A002300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
U-
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
This report was prepared from information available through May 26, 1952
,by the Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract . e . . . ... . o o- o e e. o-. o o. . o. o o 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0
I. Political Stability 0. . ... 0 0 0. o .. 0 0 0 0
A. Subversives
B. Sectionalism . . . . . . e . e e o ? ? 0 . e e ?
C. National .Leadership . .. e.. . o .. e 0 0 e 0. 0 0 0 0 0 a e 4
II, Economic Stability o . . ? ? ? e ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 5
III, Pro-Western Orientation e o o e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 e e 7
A. Base Agreements a . . 0 01 . e . . . . 0 ? ? . ? ? 0 ? ? o e 7
B. Middle East Command . . o o a . e ? ? . ? ? e ? ? ? ? 0 ? ? ? 9
C. - US Prestige o 0 0. , o. a 0 0 0
US Military Aid o e o 0 0 00 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ?
2, US Bases in Cyrenaica o . . e . . o . ? 0 e 0 ? ? o ? . 9
Preponderant US Influence - 0 0 . . . e . e . o . e e . e e
IV. Factors Affecting a Change in Libya's Pro-Western
Orientation 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 . o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A. "Relations with Egypt .
B. Libyan Attitude toward the,West . . . e . . 0 o e . a .
lo Attitude toward the. US . `. o . e . . 0 . ... . . ? ? ?
2. Attitude- toward the UK a e o e . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0' o" e ?? 0 0
Attitude toward France 0 0 a . e. o e 0 o 0 0 0 0 e o s o 0 e
SECRET -
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
10
11
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
4. Attitude Toward Italy . . . . . . . e . ;
V. Attitude of Western Powers. Toward Libya .
Page
16
16
A. UK Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B. Position of France . . . . , . . , , . . , , , 17
C. Position of Italy . . . . . . . . 0 0 0 . 18
VI. Implications for US Interests in Libya . . 0 , . 19
This report is distributed by OIR/IDR, telephone ext. 414+8 or 4+14+9. When
it has outlived its usefulness, please return it to OIR/IDR, Room 101 SA-1.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY U
SECRET iii
SECURITY INFORMATION
Libya enjoys a superficial and momentary-political stability, but the government
is confronted with a formidable task if it is to achieve lasting national unity
in the face of (a) strong provincial separatism and (b) increasing tension arising
from the impact of modern ideas and techniques on a traditional rural society.
The economy is inherently unstable. Libya's limited resources. are subject
to the vagaries of capricious nature, and the country is heavily dependent on foreign
aid. Gradual improvements can be expected,.but without the discovery of some
hitherto unknown resources, Libya is likely to remain a .poor nation.
King Idris al-Sannusi I and his leading ministers are strongly pro-Western,
the .. P_ar_l_iament..less _so. The principal anti-Western political leader and several
of his associates were deported shortly after the February elections. Most of
the Libyan people are still politically apathetic. Anti-Westernism is pronounced
mainly in the urban centers but.is not yet sufficiently powerful to provoke a change
in government orientation. Influential in maintaining Libya's ties with the West
-are: (1) the important role. played by the UK Minister with respect to the King and
of British. advisors in the Libyan Government,; and (2) the technical and financial
.aid which is: being extended to Libya. There are signs that this friendly orientation
will be subject to change at some time in the future as certain developments draw
Libya away from the West. These include: (1) attempts by Egypt and other Arab.
countries to bring Libya into a common front against the UK; (2) fear of the
involvement of Libyan territory and lives in another major war as a result of Western
bases in the country;:and (3) the appearance of powerful anti-Western demagogues
who would inflame public opinion. .
In the period before Libya gained its independence, the predominant influence
of the UK proved to be of great assistance to the US in achieving its policy
objectives in Libya. In the first five months of Libyan statehood, however, there
have been (1) signs of a possible decline in British prestige in Libya, (2) a
confidential Libyan Government bid for the US to replace the UK in the leading role,
and (3) apparent divergences in the assessments by the UK and US Ministers in
Libya of the importance which should be attached to the maintenance of Libyan unity.
While the UK Foreign Office appears to appreciate the dangers to Libya's
future inherent in the King's lack of interest in establishing real unity among
the three sections of Libya, it.attributes the hesitancy of. its Minister to use his
influence with the King to encourage such unity to the delicacy of negotiating a
treaty and other agreements. The US Minister, however, fears that his British
colleague's inaction stems also from a desire on the part of the UK to place
friendship with Cyrenaica, where Britain's primary strategic interests lie, higher
than the preservation of Libyan national unity. By contrast, the US military
installations are in Tripolitania. A breakdown of the Libyan federation would leave
these facilities in a politically unstable territory whose future would again be
subject to the uncertainties of international power politics.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY ? 1
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMiATION
. POLITICAL $ ABILITY
The United Kingdom of Libya became an independent sovereign state on
December 24, 1951. The former Italian colony was occupied by British and French
? military-forces during World War IIe Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were each
administered-separately by the British, Fezzan by the French. When the four
powers' ?- France, the UK, the US, and the-USSR'-- were unable to agree on the
final disposition of Libya, the UN General Assembly on November 21, 1949, recommended
independence for Libya by 1952; during the interim period, the people of Libya
were to be assisted by a UN Commissioner and an international and Libyan council
in formulating a constitution and laying the groundwork for independence. The
Libyan Constitution provides for a ?federal monarchy under King Muhammad Idris al
Mahdi al Sanusi and his heirs, with a bicameral legislature and a Council of. .
Ministers appointed by the King and responsible to the lower house. Despite the
machinery for direct responsibility to representatives of the people, the Libyan
Government in practice is likely to follow the oligarchic pattern of other Arab states.
Libya's present internal political stability rests primarily upon: (1)
the political apathy of most Libyans arising from their-primary interest in tribal
membership and relations of consanguinity; (2) their loyalty and respect for King
Idris I, even though many Tripolitanians and some Cyrenaicans have certain mis-
givings on the advisability of recognizing his dynasty; and (3) the absence, as
a result of deportation, of such major troublemakers as the demagogic Bashir Bey
Saadawi and lesser upstarts such as the pro-Communist Enrico Cibelli.
The political atmosphere throughout Libya was quiet at the end of May 1952.
There was no evidence within the country to substantiate rumors circulating abroad
that anti-government elements were seeking to foment a revolt. According to the
American Legation in Tripoli, the Libyan police force (some 1,900 in Tripolitania
and 1,000 in Cyrenaica) were intent upon and capable of maintaining law and order;
in the unlikely event of a major revolt, the British (approximately 9,000) and
French (400) military forces presumably would be available if needed to support
the government.
A. Subversives
While the Libyan political situation is now calm, developments in Tripolitania
in the past few years demonstrate the power of political demagoguery aided by
foreign funds to stir up mercurial mass feeling,, particularly in urban centers.
Prior to the nationwide elections of February 19, 1952 for members of the lower
house of Parliament, the stability of the new government regime appeared seriously
threatened by the activities of.Bashir Bey Saadawi, leader of the National Congress.
Party of Tripolitania. The government deported him shortly after the elections
on thegrounds that his party was responsible for disorders bordering on revolt,
which resulted in 8 deaths and 110 other casualties. Saadawi is a Tripolitanian
by birth but holds a Saudi Arabian passport; he commands the respect of many
Tripolitanians because of his long record of opposition to Italian rule in Libya,
his oratorical talents, and his prestige as an elder statesman and counselor to
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY ?
SECRET 2
SECURITY INFORMATION
King Ibn- Saud-. Essentially --an -opportunist-,' he :.hhd succeeded by-mid-;195l,, according
to competent observers, in identifying-.in ?the? minds-of most 'urban Tripolitanians
the -application--of federalism to Libya with the po'seib-ility .of.:.the--c6untry?s
partition- and the' -infiltrati;on of foreign .imperialistic control-. He had also
played on the Tripolitanian fear that a federal form of government-might result
in the domination of Tripolitania by Cyrenaica and Fezzan, Re had.t}ae support
of the leading-pro-Communist in Libya, Enrico Cibelli (until the latter was
deported in November 1951), several trade :unions in Tripolitania, and a large
number of anti-foreign extremists and malcontents.
Although the national elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for
pro-government forces (46 or 47 out of 55 seats)9.Saadawi?s party (winning 7 seats)
carried by large majorities'all districts of Tripoli City (the most important urban
center) and. some of its environs., where his following is said still to remain
devoted. His failure to gain more seats arose partly from (1) the system of oral
voting in the rural (and mostly illiterate) districts, where government-appointed
committees record the votes, with no candidates or their representatives permitted
to be present; (2) the local influence of government officials; (3) a tradition
of submission to established authority; (4) personal differences between notables
or tribal chieftains and their following,- and (5) favorable rains promising good
crops-. Furthermore, Saadawi?s attacks on the legitimacy of the constitution and
the new government were largely vitiated when Egypt, his chief foreign supporter,
hastily recognized the newly independent government and the UN General Assembly
passed a resolution of congratulation to Libya,
Since the deportation of Saadawi, there has been no one in Tripolitania
with comparable abilities of mass persuasion to unite the heterogeneous
Tripolitanian elements. The province lacks the political cohesiveness. of Cyrenaica,
where the tribal system unites the loyalties of all but the city dwellers of
Benghazi and Derna =- composed largely of settlers from Tripolitania and advocates
of Libyan unity -= to almost a blind support for the King. Nevertheless., the
strong support which Saadawi?s forces are still believed to possess in Tripoli
warrants close government watch for future anti-government developments in that
city. Thus far, there are no signs of any active Libyan interest in the formation
.ofa party on wholly national rather than sectional lines. Libyan political
parties continue to revolve around persons more than issues and to be unstable;
Communist influence in Libya is relatively unimportant and is confined
mostly to left-wing members. of the Italian community in Tripolitania.who have
sought to infiltrate the trade union movement. There is no recognized Communist
Party as such in Libya. The deportation of Cibelli and his chief lieutenants
dealt a serious blow to the movement, and the Libyan Government now appears to
be engaged in a determined campaign against all Communist sympathizers.
B. Sectionalism
Libya?s future internal political stability depends
fundamentally on the development of a sense of national consciousness among Libyans
strong enough to overcome (1) the threat of disintegrating sectionalism and (2)
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
- Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY
- - SECRET 3
SECURITY INFORMATION
the- struggle, between rural, tribal -and- coonservatiive society -- strongest in
Cyrena'ica-and Fezzan -- and urban, detribalized, and more-progressive elements --
mainly in-Tripolitania. -The factors encouraging separatism are numerous.
Geographically, the three-distinct areas which comprise Libya--- Cyrenaica
Tripolitania, and Fezzan -- are islands of,fertility and population widely
separated-from one another by the Sahara. There are striking contrasts among
predominantly-pastoral -and semi-nomadic tribal Cyrenaica, most of whose 300,000
inhabitants are followers of the Sanusiya religious sect;-more sedentary and
relatively detribalized Tripolitania, whose 800,000 people- are- somewhat more
sophisticated and less ethnically or politically cohesive; and Fezzan?s 50,000
largely sedentary'but politically untutored oases. dwellers. Not until recent times
has Libya had a distinct history of its own apart from the separate histories of
its segments or of North Africa as a whole. Libya was not a single governmental
unit until 1934.
Friction between Cyrenaicans and Tripolitanians has frequently occurred
within the Libyan nationalist movement, which obtained its initial hold during
the 20 years (1911-1931) of intermittent warfare and resistance to the Italians.
Cyrenaicans consider that they, in contrast to the Tripolitanians, did most of the
fighting against the Italians not only during and after World War I but also
in World War II. Although Tripolitanians-proposed Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi of
Cyrenaica (now King Idris I) as head of the country in 1921 (and again in 1939 as
well as later), they did so primarily because they were politically disunited
and unable to find a Tripolitanian of comparable stature. The Sanusi Amir (as
Sayyid Idris was designated by the Italians in 1920) was?revered as head of the
Sanusi brotherhood, which had given.the Cyrenaicans a.system of law and order for
almost 70 years-before the Italians and had been active-in-organizing resistance
to the Italians.. In 1947, negotiations on Libyan unity between Tripolitanian
and Cyrenaican delegations broke down because the Tripolitanians, although ready
to'accept the Amir, refused unconditional allegiance to his dynasty.
The British pledge in 1942 that Cyrenaica would in no circumstances again
fall under Italian domination after the war raised Cyrenaican hopes for separate
independence and Tripolitanian fears of Italian penetration of its territory
unless Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were united. Except for a small group of urban
intellectuals, fearful of conservative and probably reactionary policies'of a
Sanusi government backed strongly by the tribes and the British, most Cyrenaica.ns
would have preferred a separate state. As late as the spring of 1949, Cyrenaica
sent a delegation to the UN General Assembly instructed to press for separate
Cyrenaican independence, but these delegates joined with the Tripolitanian
delegation in favoring Libyan unity. In June 1949, the British recognized the
Amir as head of a Cyrenaican government with responsibility for internal affairs
and in September authorized him to issue a constitution for Cyrenaica. In
December, a Cyrenaican nationality law was enacted to prepare for the eventual
holding of elections, and the Amir later announced that plans were on foot for
the establishment of a Cyrenaican national army. By the spring of 1950, the British
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
and. the'Amir- were' preparing to conclude a treaty for the:--period remaining prior
to Libyan independence whereby Cyrenaica would be-granted in'effect'nominal
independence "without prejudice" to the provisions of the UN resolution, and
Britishh.mi-litary facilities would be assured. However, the forceful representations
of UN Commissioner Adrian Pelt that the treaty'would in fact prejudice the
achievement of Libyan unity brought a halt to treaty negotiations-in-April, with
the result that they were postponed until a Libyan government should-be formed.
As the reluctant bride, Cyrenaica has accepted Libyan unity only on-condition
that the Amir and his dynasty become rulers of all Libya and that, because of
the disparity in the population of the three territories, the form of government
be federal.
Cyrenaican demands (strengthened by annoyance at the assignment of customs,
by far the chief source of Cyrenaican revenue, to the federal government) were
also responsible for several constitutional provisions including-. (1) recognition
of two capitals, Benghazi and Tripoli; (2) prohibition of immigration of non-
Libyans.into a province without its approval; and (3), establishment of a Sanusi
dynasty with considerable power.
C? National Leadership. If the present Libyan Government is tb mend the deep
cracks of sectional rivalry and weld the three provinces into a single nation,
strong national leadership is required by the King, his ministers, or'Parliamento
While the King will probably be able to depend generally on the support of the
majority of the appointed Senate (in which Cyrenaica and the Fezzan will have a
two-thirds vote), his control of the elected House of Representatives (in which
Tripolitania will have 35 out of 55 seats) will depend upon the degree to which
he can maintain the support of the Tripolitanian majority. Ministerial responsibility
to the lower house and the power of that body to block legislation (including
the ratification of treaties) could at some future date make for internal
political instability. This possibility has been postponed by the pro-government
victory in the February elections; the deportation of Saadawi, and the
tendency of Libyans to accept established Arab authority.
The first five months of Libya's statehood, although admittedly too short
a period on which to base firm judgments, appear thus far to indicate that-. (1)
the King would prefer to be the ruler of an independent Cyrenaica and thus is not
disposed to discourage Cyrenaican efforts to dominate the nation; (2) the ministers
who favor the strengthening of national union (notably the Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Muntasir and the Minister of:Defense Ali Jarbi)
have limited influence; and (3) Parliament has shown no promise in its first
sessions that it will exercise energetically its prerogatives as the representative
body of the Libyan peoples
Surrounded by Cyrenaican separatists who take advantage of his prejudice
against Tripolitanians, the King apparently has made no effort to avoid the
decision of the Constituent Assembly in favor of two capitals. He has refused
thus far to establish a part-time residence in Tripoli or even to revisit
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Tripolitanda -where he was- greeted with a bomb on his last-visit-in 19510 He
insisted-that-the constitution and the independence of Libya be proclaimed from
Cyrenaica-, that Parliament hold its first meetings-there, and that the seat of
the government be transferred between Benghazi and Tripoli, every six months.
The King has retained the title "Amir.-of Cyrenaica," and Cyrenaic -.'s?organic
law,`published recently, also provides that he is the supreme head of the province
and government of Cyrenaica.
In the event of the 62=year old King's death during the next few months
either from natural causes orassassination - Libya-would face a serious crisis,
Although the- Constitution requires him to determine the order of succession by
October 1952, the King as yet has not done so. He has no son but-' is still hopeful
of producing one. None of the persons at present considered most likely to
succeed him are believed to be especially well fitted. A. period of confusion
marked by palace intrigue might follow, especially as Tripolitania has never
wholeheartedly-accepted-the Sanusi dynasty. -
Few of the ministers take a broad Libyan approach to problems with the
chief exceptions of Muntasir and Jarbi. The former has had difficulty in
obtaining the King's approval of some of his views and has often felt obliged to
defer to the King's wishes. In February, he intimated to the American representative
in Tripoli that unless the King took steps to show regard for Tripolitanian views,
he might have to resign in the face of mounting Tripolitanian criticsma There
.appears to be no Tripolitanian of comparable stature who could successfully replace
him at present as a counterweight to the King's strong pro-Cyrenaican views.
There are indications that Minister of Justice Fathi Kakhia, a Cyrenaican whom
the King had earlier wished to name Foreign Minister, is being groomed to replace
Muntasir as Prime Minister. Jarbi's demotion from the post of Minister of Foreign
Affairs, which he held in the Provisional Libyan Government, to that of Minister
of Defense resulted from charges by his political rivals (including Fathi Kakhia)
that he is too pro-Western; indications are that he will shortly be assigned to
a diplomatic post abroad.
Most of the members of the Libyan Parliament are politically inexperienced,
not well known, and apparently without much desire for leadership; A small but
aggressive minority, composed of members or sympathizers of the ex-National
Association in Cyrenaica or followers of Bashir Saadawi in Tripolitania, constitute
the nucleus of an opposition, which on certain matters may be able by the oratorical
power of its leaders to win sufficient support to block certain legislation in
the lower house. In the first two series of meetings in Benghazi and Tripoli,
Parliament accomplished nothing significant.
If, ECONOMIC STABILITY
Primarily agricultural and pastoral, Libya's economy is characterized by
extreme poverty, scarcity of water and good cultivable land, harsh conditions
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
such'as low and capricious rainfall -with'-frequent droughts, crop' damage from hot
desert'winds, flash floods, and locusts and-,other--pests) the absence of valuable
known minerals 'or fuel, and lack'of-sufficient-technical skills and education.
Budget-deficits (amounting annually to some $3,000,000 - $5,000,000) cannot be
met by-increased taxation in a country where-the national income is about $35
per capita, one-of the lowest in the Middle East. With a perennially unfavorable
balance of trade, Libya'As receipts-from exports amounted in 1950 to only about
14.5 , percent of its payments for' imports, the deficit running to. about $8,000,000.
Roughly half of this deficit has been covered in the. past by the military
expenditures of the UK, France, and the US and the remaining half by British and
French grants-in-aid.
Over a long-term period it. should be possible with external assistance to
improve existing agricultural conditions by such steps as making more water
avilable and gradually extending dry and irrigated farming, increasing the production
and quality of cereals, fruits and vegetables, and livestock, and increasing
the opportunity for-agricultural training, demonstration, and research. There are
also some possibilities for expanding local industry for the processing of
agricultural and fishery products and of developing a tourist trade. However,
progress in economic development will require foreign financial and technical
aid for many years plus a spirit of enterprise and receptiveness of new ideas in
the Libyan people. The nation is economically fortunate in starting off with
substantial assistance from the West:
(1) The UK and France have guaranteed any budget deficits (France for
Fezzan, approximately $250,000 - $300,000 annually; the UK for, the remainder,
$3,000,000 - $5,000,000)0
(2) The UK will meet the annual balance of payments deficit-,insofar
as that deficit is not already being met by foreign exchange balances being built
up through British and French contributions to the budget and grants (along with
thole of other foreign nations) for Libyan economic development. This deficit has
fluctuated, depending on drought conditions, from a low of $2,000,000 in 1946 to
a high of over $11,000,000 in 1949 (at prevailing exchange rates).
(3) Substantial indirect benefits will derive from US, UK, and French
expenditures in Libya on military facilities and personnel; in the past year,
nearly $1,000,000 was spent by US personnel in rent, local goods, and services
and over $1,000,000 was paid by the US military and by civilian contractors for
local labor.
(4) The US will provide considerable technical assistance, directly
under the Point Four and Mutual Security programs ($150,000 for 1951, $1,500,000.
for 1952, and $1,250,000 for 1953) and indirectly (through the high proportion of
US contributions to the UN)under the UN Technical Assistance program (the UN had
allotted $188,000 to Libya by the end of 1951 and it is estimated that $1,548,500
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
-US -OFFICIALS` ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
will be assigned in 1952),
(5) The US has agreed to contribute?$1,000,000 annually for economic
development, for 20 years;
(6) The UK, France, and Italy have contributed too-the Libyan Development
and-.Stab-ilization Agency, established to promote public capital.improvements and
provide a fund for drought contingencies The initial UK contribution was over
$1,000,000;- France, $280,000; and Italy, $28,000.,.
(7) The UK, France, and Italy have agreed to contribute to the Libyan
Finance Corporation, established to make low-interest loans-available for public
and private development. The UK has assigned $28,000 and France and Italy as yet
unspecified amounts; Italy has privately indicated a willingness under certain
conditions to contribute as much as $168,000.
(8) Italy has granted special trade concessions to Libyan imports.
It is clear that Libya cannot achieve economic viability in a short period-
and that it will long remain dependent on external aid to maintain even its present
low standard of living. This does not necessarily mean that Libya may not eventually
choose -- in the event anti-foreign sentiment should increase -- to dispense with
foreign aid, or that certain circumstances may not eventually reduce or eliminate
this aid entirely. Without foreign assistance, however, Libya would have to accept
a much lower standard of living; imports would have to be paid for almost entirely
by exports since the country would present too great a risk to foreign investment
capital; and government services would have to be cut by almost 30 percent. Such
a reduction in revenue could conceivably force the federal treasury into bankruptcy,
with resultant political and social chaos.
III. PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION
The Libyan Government's present pro-Western orientation is clearly implied
from its policy of sanctioning Western military bases on its territory and its
acceptance of substantial economic and technical assistance from the West. It
is further substantiated by the Libyan Government's apparent interest in participation
in the proposed Middle East Command and by its high esteem for the US. While
the majority of Libyans are in no way sympathetic to Soviet aims, they feel that
anti-communist activities are largely irrelevant to their own situation and.would
prefer to remain neutral in the East-West struggle if that were possible.
Consequently, the Libyan Government's chief motivation in participating more
actively is apparently to accommodate those states from which it must seek aid.
A. Base Agreements
Readiness of the Libyan Government to grant the US, UK, and France the
privilege of maintaining military bases on its territory is at least on its face
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
? ?
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
strong evidence of its present pro-Western orientation. All three nations separately
negotiated temporary agreements with the Provisional Libyan Government, and notes
were exchanged on independence day permitting the continued use of military
facilities pending the ratification of more formal agreements -- still under separate
negotiation by the Libyan Government with the UK and France but already agreed upon
with the US.
The: Libyan-US agreement is for 20-years and thereafter-until either government
gives: one year's notice of termination. The preamble states that the agreement
is intended "to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in
accordance with the principles" of the UN Charter and that the development of certain
areas and facilities in Libya would promote that-objective. The Libyan Government
permits the US to occupy and use -for military-and related purposes such areas and
facilities as shall be agreed upon from time to time.-by the two governments. The
Libyan Government will make all land acquisitions and arrangements required-to
permit US occupation and use of agreed areas, and the US will pay the Libyan
Government, which in turn will reimburse the landowners, an equitable annual rental,
not to be changed without the consent of both governments. Other provisions
relate to such matters as US construction and removal of,facilities-, US maintenance
of internal security in agreed areas, and the status of US personnel and-property.
The agreement is not formally an alliance or a mutual defense pact. Although the
Libyan Government considers the agreement in the nature of a treaty, the US regards
it as an executive agreement and as such, not requiring approval by the US Senate.
In addition to the notes exchanged by the representatives of the US and Libya
providing for the temporary operation of the military agreement pending its ratification
by the Libyan Parliament, a second series of notes was exchanged at the same time
whereby, without any reference to the military agreement, the US agrees to pay the
Libyan Government the sum of $1,000,000 a year for 20 years "when appropriated by
Congress" for the economic development of Libya.
The UK has discussed with the Libyan Government a short treaty of alliance calling
on each of the parties to come to the aid of the other in case of war and providing
the basis for British military installations in Libya. In addition, there will be
a military agreement in effect implementing the treaty, and which it is understood
will take a long time to negotiate, and.a financial agreement. Negotiation of
neither of these agreements had started as late as May 1952. A formal Libyan-French
agreement, according to the Libyan Prime Minister in mid-May, was still.some
distance off.
With the adjournment of the Libyan Parliament on May 19 for a 50-day Ramadam
recess,Parliament will probably not consider the ratification of the US,UK, and
French military agreements or treaties until at least July. Some opposition to
the terms of the agreements is anticipated, chiefly from the 7 representatives
supported by the National Congress Party of Tripolitania and one or twoCyrenaican
representatives members of the ex-National Association, and there may be requests
for certain revisions. However, ratification appears at this time to be fairly certain.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET 9,
SECURITY INFORMATION
The Libyan Minister of Defense, Ali Jarbi, whose uncertain future status
(see above) in the government and whose pronounced pro-Western attitude may.not
necessarily represent the long term views of the Libyan Government, informally
raised the question of Libyan adherence to the Middle East Command, when'and if
it were established. In March he told the US Minister that while Libya obviously
was not elegible for NATO membership, Libya was a strategic area and should be
regarded as an integral part of the defense of the Middle East. Jarbi observed
that the destiny of Libya lay in association with the UK and US and that Libyans
desired to do their share in the support of free nations. The US Minister replied
that he was appreciative of Libya's strategic significance and thought that at
some later date when Libya was in a position to make a military contribution to the area,
consideration might be-given to Libyan participation in the MEC. In May, Jarbi
reiterated his belief that the US and other NATO members should determine the role
which Libya ought to play in defense of the West and extend assistance accordingly.
C. US Prestige
In few countries and in no other Arab country does the US stand as preeminently
high as it does at present with the Government of Libya. Several factors explain
this reputation: (1) Libyan belief that the US is the least "colonial-minded,"i.e.
politically ambitious with respect to Libya, of all the powers with strategic or
other interests in Libya; (2) the tangible evidence the US has given of its friendly
intentions e.g., its strong support in the UN for Libyan independence, various forms
of economic and technical assistance, and numerous instances of generosity and goodwill
on the part of US military and civilian personnel in Libya ( air transport for
government officials, surgery for the Queen, anti-typhus aid in Cyrenaica); (3)
Libyan desire for military aid from the US; and (4+) Libyan interest in the establishment
of US bases in Cyrenaica.
1. US Military Aid. In making plans for the organization of a Libyan army,
Defense Minister Ali Jarbi indicated in March to the US Minister that while he would
look primarily to the UK to train Libyan soldiers, because the British have a long
history of experience in this region, he hoped also for US assistance in some form.
In May, the US Minister reported that while he had discouraged Jarbi from expecting
the US to furnish military aid, Jarbi still maintained that US assistance was needed,
2. US Bases in Cyrenaica, During Minister Villard's first visit to Benghazi
in March 1952, the King and Cyrenaican Government officials made it unmistakably
clear that-US armed forces would be welcome in Cyrenaica. During the past year
or so, there has been some interest shown by the US Navy in a possible communications
center in Derna, and the possible usefulness of a former US wartime air strip
(Berka II) near Benghazi has at times been considered by US military officials.
One of the chief motives for the Cyrenaican bid is sectional rivalry with
.Tripolitania, which is regarded enviously because of the economic benefits enjoyed.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
0 US OFFICIALS ONLY 0
SECRET 10
SECURITY INFORMATION
from US activities relating to Wheelus Field. Another possible consideration may
be a Libyan desire to encourage competition with UK military interests.
3. Preponderant US Influence. In April and May, the Prime Minister confidentially
told US officials in.Libya that there was a growing body of opinion that the US
should assume primary responsibility for the Libyan nation rather than the UK or
France. While the Libyans,.he said, had nothing against the British, it was feared
in'some quarters that after a few years of primary British interest and support,
recent events in Cairo would repeat themselves in Libya. The US officials replied
that the US had many other commitments besides Libya and-that owing to the UK's war
experience in this area and general position in the Middle East, it was only natural
that the UK have primary responsibility for Libya.
Other instances of the Libyan Government's. desire for closer-relations with
the US include: (1) the personal preference of the. Libyan Prime Minister in May
for the granting of oil concessions to US rather than British companies and his
mild surprise at the apparent lack of interest (subsequently shown) by American
companies in the possibility of obtaining such a concession; and (2) the desire
for a civil aeronautics agreement with the US (now under negotiation) at the time
that the UK was negotiating on the same matter.
IV, FACTORS AFFECTING A CHANGE IN LIBYA'S PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION
The continuation of Libya's present pro-Western orientation will depend on
several factors, among them: (1) the maintenance of internal political and, relative
economic stability, (2) the influence of Egypt and the future attitude of the Arab
world toward the West, (3) the continuing influence of the British Minister on the
King and British advisers in the Libyan Government, (4+) the involvement of Libyan
territory and lives in another world war, and (5) the degree to which any of the
preceding will result in the exploitation of the existing undercurrent of anti-
Western criticism.
Increased sectional or personal rivalry in the absence of strong national
leadership could lead to a shift in. Libya's pro-Western orientation, particularly
if it resulted in strong reaction to the policies of the existing regime. A
deterioration in economic conditions, despite Western economic and technical
assistance, could lead to a popular tendency to blame part of the difficulty on
Western advisers and British financial policies. The views of the King and his
successors, and, should the Crown lose its present predominant role, the views
of his ministers, will obviously be important in determining future foreign' orientation.
The destruction of Libyan property and lives in another world war would certainly
provoke considerable resentment against the West.
A. Relations with Egypt
One of the chief threats to Libya's present pro-Western orientation is the
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
effort of Egypt to challenge UK influence-and to gain a position of political
ascendancy in Libya. Increased-Egyptian influence would tend to encourage an
unfavorable Libyan attitude toward foreign troops and military -installations in
Libya,- make- more difficult the settlement of-problems arising from their presence
or contemplated extension, raise the Libyan terms for renewal of existing base
agreements, and possibly stimulate a move to play one Western power off against
another.
Aside from the strong ties of Islam and the Arabic language, other factors
tending to orient Libyans toward the thought patterns of Egyptians include: (1)
the high proportion of the small but important group of educated Libyans who have
studied in Egyptian religious or civil schools; (2) the number of other Libyans who
have lived in Egypt, some of them as political refugees during the Italian occupation
of Libya, others as travellers en route to pilgrimages in Mecca or on business; ?
(3) the popularity of Egyptian newspapers, literature, cinema, and radio broadcasts;
(4) the increasingly influential role in the Libyan school system played by
Egyptian teachers which would be further facilitated by the plan now under consideration
for complete adoption of the Egyptian curriculum and Egyptian textbooks (already
extensively used) together with the unification of the systems. now in effect in
each of the provinces; and (5) the influential role in an important sector of the
Libyan political structure which Egyptian lawyers and jurists can be expected to
play as a result of the cabinet decision of March 22 to recommend to Parliament the
adoption of the Egyptian legal code, with suitable modifications, as the basis
for future Libyan legislation.
Despite the.present pro-Western orientation:of the Libyan King and cabinet,
there is a strong current of pro-Egyptian sentiment among urban dwellers and particularly
the intelligentsia. This feeling, which is part of a ,common attitude toward other
Muslim countries, arises mainly from: (1) appreciation of the efforts of Egypt
(and other Arab and Asian states) in opposing in the'UN General Assembly all moves
toward Libyan partition and trusteeship and. in favor of an-independent, unified
Libyan state, (2) identification of Egyptian opposition to British "colonialism
and imperialism" with Libyan memory of foreign occupation and with the somewhat
chagrined realization of Libya's continued dependence on foreign financial aid and
foreign advisers and (3) a realization that Egypt and other Arab states offer a
useful counterpoise or moral refuge to-"undue" Western influence.
In the national elections of February 19, the overwhelming support for the
National Congress Party of Tripolitania in Tripoli City and environs and the
election of several Cyrenaicans favored by the ex-National Association was in part
a reflection of pro-Egyptian attitude. This sentiment is likely to remain a popular
issue for vote-gathering in Libyan politics.for some time to come.
Libya's formal declaration of independence on December 24., 1951, marked
the start of a transitional period ending with the Libyan elections of February 19, 1952,
during which Egypt altered its tactics but not its objectives in Libya. Previously
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
U5 OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
Egypt directly and through the Arab League had worked to minimize the influence
of pro-British Sayyid Idris in the future Libyan state and to steer Libyan
con-st-itutional development toward a "democratic" unitary state with a strong
Parliament in which an ostensibly pro-Egyptian Tripolitania (with its preponderant
representation) could dominate French-supported Fezzan and British-supported
Cyrenaica. The declaration of independence and the simultaneous entry into full
effect of the Libyan constitution confirmed in power'the regime which Egypt had
previously opposed, and the pro-government election victory of February 19 destroyed
the validity of the previous Egyptian claim that the wishes of the people of Libya
had not been consulted.
Although the Egyptian representative in the General Assembly bitterly
criticized the provisional Libyan Government and the course of constitutional
development in Libya as contrary to previous UN resolutions and attacked the "imperialist"
intentions of the UK and France toward Libya, and although he unsuccessfully
proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops from Libya, he voted on February 1, 1952,
in favor of the resolution congratulating the Libyan Government on the establishment
of Libyan independence "in accordance with" the previous pertinent General Assembly
resolutions. Moreover, Egyptian claims for a readjustment in its favor of the
Libyan boundary (including a claim for the Oasis of Jaghbub -- a Cyrenaican shrine
as the historic seat of the Sanusi religious order ) were in effect withdrawn from
the attention of the General- Assembly when the latter took note on February 1, 1952,
of the intention signified by Egypt of entering into direct negotiations on this
question with the Libyan government.
Egyptian desire to maintain its prestige in Libya and its recognition that
altered conditions required different tactics have brought about assiduous Egyptian
efforts in the past few months to cultivate the friendship of the Libyan Government.
Even prior to the formal declaration of Libyan independence .(at least as early as
December 19, 1951) Egypt sought. to obtain the diplomatic deanship in Libya by
having the Egyptian Minister received before representatives of any other nation,
but the King-designate refused to receive him until independence was declared and
even then not until December 29, several days after other representatives had been
received. Moreover, the Libyan Government, even though it accepted the credentials
of the Egyptian Minister, considered as premature the recognition of the Egyptian
King's title as ruler of the Sudan, reserving such action until the people of the
Sudan had an opportunity to express their own wishes. There were rumours in
January that Egypt would still seek the deanship by being the first nation to raise
its Legation in Libya to an Embassy,
. The Egyptian Minister, Salah Fadal Bey, has established his residence in
Benghazi rather than Tripoli in order to remain as close as possible to the King
and influence his point of view. Egyptian influence in Libya also operates, although
to an unknown degree, through the prominent government positions of certain Egyptians
and Libyans whose previous long residence in Egypt tend to make them receptive to
Egyptian ideas even when they are not necessarily strongly pro-Egyptian.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
?
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
13
Although Libya would be welcomed into-the Arab League as an additional member
? and-ws a means for further extending the League's influence in North Africa, the
Libyan-Government has not yet-formally applied for membership. Libya's role in
the League would probably be a minor one, but its presence might possibly help to
modify extreme anti-British sentiment.
B. Libyan Attitude toward the West
The attitude of the Libyan Government toward the Western powers does not
always 'square-with the views of the small minority of Libyans who are interested
in Libyan foreign policy. An undercurrent of popular feeling against the West,
which-at times can be exploited by clever politicans, as illustrated by Saadawi
before the Libyan elections, could some day flare into a form ofnationalist
xenophobia comparable to that now evident in Egypt and Iraq-. Another war involving
Libyan property and lives and the appearance of another demogogue'with the
persuasiveness of Saadawi could create a'situation where no amount of financial
inducement could make a Libyan Government re.sist.a popular demand for discontinuing
its present policy of permitting foreign military bases on its territory. At
present, however, there are strong. deterrents in the high proportion of political
apathy and the lack of a strong sense of national consciousness.
1. Attitude toward. the US. Although, as shown above, the Libyan King and certain
of his ministers are strongly disposed toward the US, several Arab newspapers in
Libya contain overtones of criticism and hostility. The main elements of this
criticism appear to stem from: (1) resentment of US support for Israel during and
since the Palestinian War;'(2) fear that the US as well as UK and French military
facilities in Libya. will make :Libya a vulnerable target in the next war; (3) a
feeling that Libya has not been properly compensated for the damages of Allied bombing
and fighting in the last war;. (4) fear that American wealth may "purchase" (there
has been no publicity as yet about rentals) not only valuable farm land for military
purposes but also the right to interfere in Libyan domestic affairs; (5) fear that
the base agreement may be for too long a period and without adequate remuneration;
(6) association of the US with the "imperialist and colonial" UK and France as
"occupying" powers; (7) criticsm of US "passiveness" toward its two "imperialist"
partners, recently illustrated by the US abstention on the Tunisian question in
the UN Security Council; (8) impatience with the slowness of tangible results from
the US technical assistance-program and dissatisfaction with the proportion of funds
spent on highly paid foreign technicians; and (9) irritations arising from the existence
in Libya of US military facilities, such as the "loss" of.valuable revenue resulting
from the exemption of US personnel from customs and taxation and the exacerbation
of the housing problems by the influx of Americans prepared to pay more than others
in Libya can afford. .
2. Attitude toward the UK. The Libyan Government accepted the offer of UK
financial assistance for its budget and balance of payments deficits with reluctance
and resignation, realizing full well that no other nation -- except France with
respect to Fezzan -- was willing to undertake the financial burden. As a condition
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
0 US OFFICIALS ONLY ?
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
for British aid, Libya had to agree to the appointment of a British Financial'
and Economic Adviser with wide powers over Libyan financial affairs and a British
Auditor Generale British personnel were attached to the federal and-provincial
governments at various levels, among the most important being the adviser to the
Prime Minister and the Legal Adviser to the Minister of Justice. An additional
condition to,British financial aid, unstated but implied, was Libya's membership
in the sterling area.
There is a good deal of evidence of Libyan Government restlessness at the
prospect of undue British influence in Libya, among theme (1) the appeal for
greater US participation in and sponsorship of Libya; (2) the suggestion of Libyan
preference for dollar rather than sterling backing for its currency; (3) the efforts
of the Libyan Defense Minister, who disagreed with the British on such matters as
the size of the proposed Libyan army and the appropriate commander, to seek suggestions
and possibly additional aid from other countries such as the US, Turkey, Iraq,
and Jordan (the King's cancellation of Jarbi's proposed trip to the last three
of these countries was attributed by Jarbi to British intrigue); (4) the adoption
of the Egyptian code of laws as a model for future legislation despite British efforts
to draft a code based on Anglo-Saxon principles; (5) the plans for adopting the
Egyptian educational curriculum despite British preference for a different system;
(6) a general preference for granting oil and possibly other concessions to American
rather than British companies; and (7) a general resentment against several of
the British administrators in the Libyan Government because of their "colonial-
mindedness" and lack of sufficient appreciation for different Arab ethical standards,
The British had hoped that by blanketing British personnel into the Libyan
Government, they would ensure stability and a pro-Western orientation. There have
been signs in the past few months that this effort has not been completely successful,
in some instances because of personality clashes between "over-arrogant" Libyans
and British, Libyan patronage and nepotism, and the likelihood of increasing
Libyan preference for employment of Egyptians and Arabs from other countries. Some
of the British personnel have been released; others are thinking seriously of
resigning. While these may be isolated instances, illustrative only of the "growing
pains" of the young government, they may prove to be signs of a decline in British
prestige and influence. If the latter should become the case, unless the British
can counteract, this tendency or some other alternative course is adopted, there
may be an increase in Egyptian influence and a tendency of-Libya to become increasingly
less pro-Western, more intolerant of. Western "interference ",and more insistent on
"independence from foreign supervision."
Among the small proportion of Libyan people who concern themselves with the
matter, there is an even stronger anti-British feeling than is evident in the
government. This feeling has been stronger in Tripolitania, partly because of
(1) British favoritism toward Cyrenaica during the'past few years; (2) the greater
lack of political cohesion and tribal solidarity which in Cyrenaica has long been
associated with almost blind acceptance of any policy whatever of pro-British Sayyid
Idris; (3) Tripolitania's greater receptiveness to the anti-British propaganda of
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
? US OFFICIALS ONLY 10
SECRET 15
SECURITY INFORMATION
Saadawi and the Egyptians; and (4+) the larger urban population in Tripolitania (in
Cyrenaica the two urban centers of Derna and Benghazi have had-similar-feelings).
However, anti-British feeling in Cyrenaica increased considerably, in 1951 after it
was revealed that the British had concluded an agreement with Italy on the touchy
subject of, Italian property in Libya (even though the agreement specified it was
without prejudice to the rights of the Libyan Government under the UN General
Assembly resolution on economic provisions relating to Libya).
There is a strong sympathy with Egypt's point of view in the present Anglo-
Egyptian crisis, stimulated in part by the prevalence of Egyptian press and radio
propaganda; a tendency to regard the British as still having "imperialist" designs
on Libya; resentment of the influence which the British have with the Libyan
Government; and criticism of the number of "foreigners" (i.e. British and Italians)
in government jobs and of their better pay than Libyans. There is also the usual
tendency to blame most of the country's ills in the past few years on the British
and failure to understand why the British administrations, handicapped by the uncertainty
of Libya's future, and operating under the "care and maintenance" policy of the
Hague Convention,had not done more for Libya during their occupation.
3. Attitude toward France. Realizing the usefulness of French financial and
technical support in Fezzan, the Libyan Government has been careful to give no
public indication of the suspicion with which most Libyans-regard France. The
government is also aware of the French skepticism regarding the readiness and
capacities of Libya for independence and believes that France would not be sorry
to see a failure of the Libyan experiment as an object-lesson to nationalists in
French North Africa. Moreover, Libyan leaders are also privately suspicious
of French intentions with respect to Fezzan and to the border oases of Ghadames
and Ghat, to which the French laid claims prior to Libyan independence. In May,
the Libyan Prime Minister told the American Minister that there were "real
difficulties" with respect to the French. The French Minister has informed his
American colleague of a controversy with the Libyan Government with respect to his
residence near Tripoli, which he believes the Libyans want him to relinquish for
use of the Muntasir family rather than, as claimed; for the Queen. He also stated
that the Minister of Justice, Fathi Kakhia, had indirectly accused the French,
without proof, of subsidizing tribal unrest near the border of Cyrenaica with Fezzan
in order to increase French influence in Libya.
The people in the coastal provinces of Libya regard France as the arch-
imperialist and make no effort to disguise their sympathies with the nationalist
movements of French North Africa. The Mufti of Libya recently told the US Minister
that his "heart boiled"withinhim at French "imperialist" policies in Tunisia.
Although the government press apparently confines itself to reporting facts on
the French North African situation, the independent Arab press is vitriolic in its
comments against France. Nothing is known of the current public attitude toward
France in Fezzan, but the Four Power Commission of Investigation, in 1948, found
that the people appeared to be satisfied with French influence and grateful not
only for the preservation of law and order but also for the improvements in public
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
0 .
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
.SECURITY INFORMATION
works, health, and education.
4, Attitude Toward Italy. The Libyan Government, although apparently satisfied
that Italy has reconciled itself to Libyan independence, is inevitably wary of
any step that might in any way give its former enemy'any political influence in
the country. The chief problem at the present relates to the status of Italian
property in Libya.
Although the Libyan people get along well with the 1+6,000 Italian settlers
in Tripolitania, they are suspicious of any evidence,of increased Italian
immigration. Cyrenaica's opposition to the return of Italians to its territory
was responsible for the constitutional requirement of provincial consent:prior
to the immigration of non-Libyans into a province. As long as the Italian settlers
in Libya do not try to participate in Libyan political matters, they will remain
in the good graces of the Libyans, and they may become Libyan citizens under
certain constitutional conditions. A bitterness against Italy for its former
policies as a colonial power will remain for some time, but there are already signs
of its gradual disappearance. Popular misunderstanding of the technical aspects
of the status and disposal of Italian property in Libya tends to support the
feeling that Italy is getting a better property deal than it deserves.
V. ATTITUDE OF WESTERN POWERS TOWARD LIBYA
If.Libya is to remain oriented toward the West, the positions of the
Western powers (i.e., US, UK, France, and Italy) most directly concerned with
Libya must be (1) mutually compatible with one another and (2) be such as not
to unduly antagonize the Libyans. As will be noted below, these positions do not
fully satisfy these characteristics.
A. UK Position
The primary interest of the UK in Libya stems from its strategic location
.in the eastern Mediterranean. If the British are forced to withdraw from the
Suez Canal Zone, Libya's strategic importance to the UK will increase. The British
have always shown particular interest in Cyrenaica, particularly since Foreign .
Secretary Eden pledged in 1942 that the Sanusi would never again fall under Italian
domination. The UK's earlier postwar aim was for trusteeship over Cyrenaica or,
if Cyrenaica became independent, British domination and primary influence. However,
the UN General Assembly's resolution of November 1949 for the independence of a
single Libyan state obligated the UK to cooperate with the UN Commissioner in Libya
in its implementation. Consequently, when the Commissioner objected strongly in
1950 to the treaty which the UK had. been planning to conclude with Cyrenaica as
detrimental to his efforts to promote Libyan unity, further efforts to conclude a
treaty were postponed until after independence; now the UK must negotiate with
representatives of all of Libya rather than only Cyrenaica. When other states
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
? US OFFICIALS ONLY ?
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
were unwilling to make firm commitments to support Tripolitania financially, the
UK decided, during the constitution= making period to extend. to Tripolitania the
financial assistance which it had originally planned to render Cyrenaica. Present
British military plans in Libya now envisage,it is understood, the quartering of
a number of the-British field units in Tripolitania (it is not clear for how long
a period), not only because of the scarcity of available facilities in Cyrenaica
but also because of Tripolitania's potential usefulness as a wartime base of operations.
However, Britain's predominant and longterm interests lie more in Cyrenaica than
Tripolitania both because of its strategic location and because it has greater
political cohesion than Tripolitania and thus is easier to dominate.
Although there is no justification for supposing that the UK Government does
not remain fully in support of Libyan unity, the personal attitude and policies of
its chief representatives in Libya reflect little interest in positive steps to
promote unity. Instead, they seem to indicate a doubt that unity will succeed
and a determination that, come what may,. primary support must be given to the King
even if his Cyrenaican parochialism and apparent disinterest in unity should result
in the triumph of separatism.
Both E.A.V. de Candole, the former British Resident of Cyrenaica, and Sir
Alec Kirkbride, the present British Minister in Libya, have followed a policy of
treading lightly with the King, even when pressure seemed desirable from the stand-
point of Libya's and Britain's best interests. Thus, while the issue of two
capitals was still being debated in 1951, de Candole apparently made little effort
to persuade the King, on the grounds of the additional expense which the British
would have to pay, to take a strong stand in favor of a less expensive and more
practical solution of the problem.
Kirkbride's approach to Libyan problems is based on 3i years experience in
Transjordan where he maintained British influence chiefly by cultivating a close
personal friendship with Abdullah. He has taken up residence in Cyrenaica in order
to live close to the King. Kirkbride apparently prefers to regard the King as
if the latter were an absolute monarch or the head of a small oligarchy and to
deal with him directly, even bypassing the Prime Minister. The UK Foreign Office
appears to feel at present that Kirkbride, in view of his known understanding of
the Arabs, should be given largely a free hand, particularly during the delicate
negotiations with the Libyan Government of a treaty and financial and military
agreements.
The British remain unofficially suspicious of French intentions in Libya.
They would also resent any indications that the US was trying to vie for predominant
influence in Libya (particularly Cyrenaica), although they would welcome additional
US financial contributions (especially to Tripolitania) to lighten their own burden.
B. Position of France
France's chief interest in Libya stems from the proximity of Libyan territory
. SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
Ub OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
18
to French North, West, and Equatorial Africa, the strategic value of French
military bases in Libya as a means of advance protection against possible invasion
of French-dominated territory in Africa, and the usefulness of air bases in
Fezzan for transSaharan traffic to French posessions. France hopes to continue
maintaining its present influence in Fezzan through financial and technical
assistance and through close relations with the Governor of Fezzan, Ahmad Bey
Sef al Nasr, head of an important French-supported local family. Although committed
as a member of the UN to support Libyan national unity, France would prefer as
loose a federation as possible.
When France took the first steps toward a rapprochement with its traditional
opponent, the Sanusi, in the fall of 1950, the French envoy informed Amir Sayyid
Idris that Ahmad Bey had certain fears as to his status and that of Fezzan in a
Libyan union. At French suggestion, the Amir wrote Ahmad Bey a letter in which
he recognized-..(l) the Bey and his family as the traditional and hereditary leaders
of Fezzan, (2) the desire of the Fezzanese to have no outside interference in
their purely local affairs, and (3) the special relationships. established between
France and the Bey since the war. The Amir gave his,assurances that he would not
interfere with the last two matters. According to a British official in Cyrenaica,
the French envoy was unable to obtain written assurances that the Amir would do
nothing to harm French interests in the areas of Chad, Sahara, or French North
Africa.
. French suspicions of UK intentions in Libya have been apparent on numerous
occasions in the past few years. Most recently, in May, when the Libyan Minister
of Justice indirectly accused the French of subsidizing tribal unrest along the
Cyrenaica-Fezzan border, the French Minister replied that the source of money
was not France but the UK, which was trying to extend. its sway over both Cyrenaica
and Fezzan at the expense of Tripolitania. He told his American colleague that
he was firmly convinced that the British policy was to create a greater Cyrenaica,
isolating Tripolitania and leaving it to fend for itself in some undetermined manner.
C. Position of Italy
Italian interest in Libya arises mainly from the desire to ensure protection
for the 46,000 Italians living in Tripolitania and for Italian property in Libya,
from historic ties, and from geographic proximity. Italy is anxious to participate
as fully as possible in economic relations with Libya, as illustrated by the special
tariff concessions for imports from Libya and by Italian interest.in contributing.
to the Libyan Stabilization and Development Agency and the Libyan Finance
Corporation. Although Italy has apparently abandoned for the present any hope of.
obtaining political influence with the new state of Libya, it would probably be
opportunistic if in the future the chance to regain prestige and control was presented.
Italy is attempting to retain as much as possible of its former investments
in Libya, among other reasons, in the hope of satisfying domestic opinion in Italy,
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY ?
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
These investments, particularly the agricultural concessions and settlements,
19
represent a substantial contribution to the Libyan economy. A UN General Assembly
resolution of December 15, 1950 laid down certain principles with respect to the
disposal of Italian state, parastatal, and private property in Libya. The UK
concluded an agreement with Italy on June 28, 1951, relating to Italian property
ostensibly private (including parastatal property in which Italy maintained there
was no Italian state interest). Italy was permitted to establish a liaison agent
in Cyrenaica, and the UK was to arrange a procedure for property owners or their
representatives to return to Cyrenaica to take over and dispose of their property
held in official custody. The denunciation of this agreement by the powerful
ex-Prime Minister of Cyrenaica, Omar Mansur Pasha al Kakhia, eventually prevented
its implementation in Cyrenaica. The Italian Government tried to reach a property
agreement with Libya prior to independence, but negotiations have been repeatedly
postponed by the Libyans. The UN Arbitral Tribunal established by the 1950
resolution is available in any event to settle questions on which the two governments
fail to agree.
VI, IMPLICATIONS FOR US INTERESTS IN LIBYA
US interest in Libya stems from: (1) the strategic value of Libya, and
(2) a desire to maintain the friendship of the Libyan people, both in peace and
war. As a member of the UN, the US supported the General Assembly resolution on
Libyan unity and independence and is concerned with maintaining Libya's internal
stability and pro-Western orientation.
While US military facilities are confined at present to Tripolitania, the
US-Libyan base agreement will permit the US, with the consent of the Libyan Government,
to establish bases anywhere else in Libya. Should the US eventually decide to
establish bases in Cyrenaica, they would probably not be on as large a scale as those
in Tripolitania, among other reasons because of limited available physical facilities
(e.g. ports and water supply) but also because of probable UK reluctance toward
extensive US penetration.
Although the US has acted on the assumption that it is desirable for the
UK to retain the predominant position of influence in Libya, the Libyan Government
has privately indicated that it would prefer US to UK predominance. Thus far the
US representatives, while expressing appreciation for this high Libyan regard,
have given no encouragement to the Libyan Government but have referred to the burden
of many other US commitments in the world and the US high regard for British
abilities.
This Libyan bid for increased US support may be nothing more than wishful
thinking as the result of (1) a desire to avoid becoming as closely dependent on
the UK as was Jordan under Abdullah, and (2).a realization that the US today would
be a more powerful and wealthy sponsor than the UK. It could also be an indication
of a serious decline in British prestige in Libya and of a desire to look elsewhere
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02300040021-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1
US OFFICIALS ONLY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION.
for political support -- the US if possible, and Egypt and the Arab world. Any
US effort. to rival the British for political predominance would probably endanger
the achievement of the mutual security objectives of both countries by engendering
Anglo-American illwill, transfering to the US the latent Libyan hostility against
the British, and creating . numerous. practical and technical problems.
For the present, it seems.clear that.the Libyan Government has no practical
alternative to accepting existing UK and US arrangements. It .realizes that,
however much Egypt may promise Libya in the way of economic or technical help,
Egypt-cannot afford to match the aid Libya now receives from the West. There
is no evidence-and little likelihood of any Libyan inclination to turn to the
Soviet Union for any kind of assistance.
Although overall Anglo-American strategic interests in Libya harmonize
and although both nations favor Libyan unity,.there is a divergence in emphasis
in US and UK lines of action with respect to Libyan unity which stems basically
from the primary strategic interest of the UK in Cyrenaica and the extensive
installations of the US in Tripolitaniao The UK's interest in Libyan unity, however
much it may respect the principle, is secondary to its fundamental interest in
ensuring the preservation of its interests in Cyrenaica. Although the UK Foreign
Office is aware of the dangers inherent in the Libyan King's lack of interest in
national unity, it has avoided pressure on the King,while negotiating.important
agreements with the Libyan Government. Libyan unity is of major concern if the
political isolation of Tripolitania -- where US military facilities in Libya are
now located -- is to be avoided.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040021-1