SOUTH ASIAN MILITARY HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 13, 1975
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Ruse 2005/02/orm'
yDP79R01142 Q700090002-1
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Daniel 0. Graham, USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Mr. William G. Hyland
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Dr. Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT South Asian Military Handbook
1. A revision and updating of the South Asian Military Handbook
is contemplated again this year. It was the opinion of representa-
tives from the various agencies participating in the major expansion
of the handbook in 1974 that an annual revision would be desirable.
Comments from consumers support this belief. The present edition of
the handbook is looseleaf and, hopefully, revisions this year can be
limited to selected pages. of CIA's Office of
Current Intelligence will again be the project officer, working under
the general supervision of the National Intelligence Officer for South
and Southeast Asia.
25X1
2. will transmit detailed instructions and proposals
directly to representatives of the various agencies and offices con-
cerned by 16 June. A cutoff date for information used in the revision
has been set at 1 July. Drafts will be due to 0 by 10 July 25X1
and an interagency coordinating meeting will be held at CIA Headquarters
on 25 July.
3. It is proposed that State/INR update Section I, "Background."
Section II, "Relative Military Capabilities," will be drafted by DIA.
Approved For Release 2005/02SEGBE DP79R01142A000700090002-1
 Approved For Ruse 2005/02/15 P79R01142A 0700090002-1
CIA/OER is expected to revise and submit Section III, "Military Ex-
penditures," and Section V, "Foreign Sources of Supply." Section IV,
"Domestic Military Production," and the Glossary will again be prepared
by CIA/OSR. Finally, CIA/OCI will update the Annexes, working with
CIA/OSI on "South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capability," and with CIA/CRS
on the "Biographic Sketches of Military Leaders." Tables, maps, and
charts will be prepared, as in the past, by CIA and DIA.
Geo ge AA. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/13R TP79R01142A000700090002-1
 Approved Fq elease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79RO11 2W000700090002-1
Secret
25X1
Intelligence
? ?
The South Asian Military Handbook
Secret
July 1975
Copy N2 247
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
 Approved FoJelease 2005/025/E16R JA-RDP79R011 2 000700090002-1
25X1
CONTENTS
Page
1. BACKGROUND 1947-1975
A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary ................... I-1
B. Pushtunistan ............................................... 1-3
C. South Asia and the Great Powers ............................ 1-4
D. Threats to Internal Stability ................................. 1-7
II. RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES
A. India ..................................................... II-1
B. Pakistan ................................................... II-5
C. Bangladesh ................................................ II-9
D. Afghanistan ................................................ II-10
E. Nepal ..................................................... 11-12
F. Sri Lanka ................................................. 11-13
Tables: 1. Selected Armaments and Forces .................. 11-17
2. Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border .................. 11-20
3. Military Advisers in Foreign Countries ............. 11-21
Maps: 1. India-Internal Administration
2. India-Army Order of Battle
3. India-Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle
4. India-Naval Order of Battle
5. Ground Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border
6. Jammu/Kashmir Area
7. Pakistan-Internal Administration
8. Pakistan-Army Order of Battle
9. Pakistan-Fighter/ Bomber Order of Battle
10. Pakistan-Naval Order of Battle
11. Ground Forces on Afghan-Pakistani Border
12. Bangladesh-Internal Administration
13. Bangladesh-Order of Battle
14. Afghanistan-Internal Administration
15. Afghanistan-Order of Battle
16. Nepal-Internal Administration
17. Nepal-Order of Battle
18. Sri Lanka-Internal Administration
19. Sri Lanka-Order of Battle
III. MILITARY EXPENDITURES
A. India ...................................................... III-1
B. Pakistan ................................................... 111-1
C. Bangladesh ................................................ 111-2
i
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142700090002-1
SECRET
25X1
Page
D. Afghanistan ............................................... 111-2
E. Nepal ..................................................... 111-2
F. Sri Lanka .................................................. 111-2
Tables: 1. Military Expenditures, South Asian Countries ...... 111-3
2. India: Gross Defense Expenditures ................ 111-3
3. India: Distribution of Defense Expenditures ...... 111-4
4. India: Percentage Distribution of
Defense Expenditures .......................... 111-4
5. India: Functional Distribution of
Defense Expenditures ......................... 111-5
6. India: Percentage Distribution of
Defense Expenditures .......................... 111-6
7. Pakistan: Military Expenditures .................. 111-7
8. Bangladesh: Military Expenditures ................ 111-7
9. Afghanistan: Military Expenditures ................ 111-8
10. Nepal: Military Expenditures .................... 111-8
11. Sri Lanka: Military Expenditures ................. 111-8
IV. DOMESTIC MILITARY PRODUCTION
A. India ...................................................... IV-1
B. Pakistan ................................................... IV-4
C. Bangladesh ................................................. IV-5
D. Afghanistan .............................................. IV-5
E. Nepal ..................................................... IV-5
F. Sri Lanka .................................................. IV-5
Tables: 1. India: Defense Production ....................... IV-6
2. India: Aircraft Production ....................... IV-7
V. FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY
A. India . ........................................ ... V-1
B. Pakistan ................................................... V-4
C. Bangladesh ................................................ V-6
D. Afghanistan ............................................... V-7
E. Nepal ...... .............................................. V-8
F. Sri Lanka .................................................. V-9
Tables: 1. India: Foreign Military Imports ................... V-10
2. India: Soviet Military Supply Agreements ......... V-11
3. Pakistan: Foreign Military Imports ................ V-12
4. Pakistan: Military Supply Agreements with China ... V-12
5. Pakistan: Military Supply Agreements
with France .................................. V-13
6. Bangladesh: Foreign Military Imports ............. V-13
7. Afghanistan: Foreign Military Imports ............ V-14
8. Afghanistan: Soviet Military
Supply Agreements ............................ V-14
9. Nepal: Foreign Military Imports ................ V-15
10. Sri Lanka: Foreign Military Imports .............. V-15
ii
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
 Approved Fo elease 2005/02/1S& (W- 000700090002-1
Page
C. Chronology of Major Events in South Asia 1940-1975 .......... C-1
GLOSSARY
Performance Characteristics of Selected South Asian
Military Equipment ...................................... Glos-1
iii
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
25X1
25X1
 Approved Forlelease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R0114k000700090002-1
SECRET
1. BACKGROUND 1947-1975
A. INDIA VS. PAKISTAN: AN HISTORICAL SUMMARY
Partition and Kashmir
In August 1947, following years of agitation by the Congress Party, Great
Britain gave up its Indian Empire. At the same time, as a result of Muslim
agitation for a separate Muslim state, Britain partitioned India, creating Pakistan
from two widely separated and predominantly Muslim areas.
The two wings of Pakistan had little in common other than religion and
were separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Even before partition became
official, millions of Hindus had moved from Pakistan to India, and millions of
Muslims had migrated in the opposite direction. Violence on both sides en-
couraged the exodus. Nevertheless, some 10 percent of India's population re-
mained Muslim, and several million Hindus stayed in Pakistan-almost all in
East Pakistan.
Large parts of the British Indian Empire had been ruled by theoretically
sovereign native princes. The British left to them the decision as to whether
their states would join Pakistan or India, or remain independent. In instances
where the religion of the prince and his subjects was the same, accession did not
become a problem in Indo-Pakistani relations. A few Muslim princes ruled pre-
dominantly Hindu populations in states not contiguous to Pakistan. Although
several of these princes either acceded to Pakistan or decided to remain inde-
pendent, all of their states were eventually incorporated into India.
In Jammu and Kashmir, a Hindu Maharajah ruled a population that was
mostly Muslim. When he delayed making a decision, some of his Muslim subjects
rebelled, receiving assistance from some Pakistani tribesmen. At this point-on
October 27-the Maharajah opted for India in return for Indian military assist-
ance. Indian troops arrived in the state the same day. The Indians and the Pak-
istanis fought in Kashmir for over a year, and in the end India held most of the
state, including the strategically important Vale.
Pakistan annexed part of northern Kashmir and gained control of a small
part of western Kashmir, the theoretically independent state of Azad Kashmir.
The UN Security Council called for a plebiscite to determine the future status
of Kashmir, but the plebiscite was never held. A cease-fire line was delineated
in the summer of 1949, under UN auspices, and served as the de facto boundary
until 1971.
I-1
Approved For Release 2005/0EL'IA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R011424060700090002-1
SECRET
Kutch and Kashmir
For over 15 years, despite continuing hostility, open fighting between India
and Pakistan was limited to border incidents. In the spring of 1965, however,
serious clashes broke out in a desolate area along the shore of the Arabian Sea
known as the Rann of Kutch, where India and Pakistan had conflicting claims.
Both sides eventually agreed to arbitration, and in 1968 a decision was an-
nounced that was generally regarded as favorable to Pakistan.
In August 1965, Pakistan began sending "freedom fighters" into Indian-held
Kashmir. India moved quickly to seal off the access routes, making incursions
into Azad Kashmir in the process. In any case, no enthusiasm for rebellion de-
veloped among the Kashmiris. On September 1, Pakistan launched an attack
against extreme southern Kashmir in hopes of cutting India's communications
with its forces farther north in the state. Five days later, India began a full-scale
attack in the Lahore area of West Pakistan. The Pakistanis held the Indians
outside of Lahore, and with little or no resistance captured extensive desert
area in Rajasthan, but were unable to advance farther into Kashmir. By mutual
agreement there was virtually no fighting along the border between India and
East Pakistan. After three weeks of fighting in the West, both sides agreed to
a UN-sponsored cease-fire. The Pakistanis were running critically short of mili-
tary supplies, while the Indians believed that their gains would not be worth the
considerable cost of protracting the war. Under Soviet sponsorship, the two
countries reached an agreement in January 1966 at Tashkent that restored the
border to that existing before the war.
Bangladesh and Kashmir
In Pakistan's general elections in December 1970, the Awami League, which
advocated provincial autonomy, won enough seats in East Pakistan to ensure an
absolute majority in the projected Pakistan National Assembly. The assembly
was to write a new constitution, and the leaders of the league refused to com-
promise on principles many West Pakistanis felt would eventually dissolve the
union. In early March 1971, the Awami League in effect took over the adminis-
tration of the province, and on March 25, the army moved to restore central
authority. The Bengalees then proclaimed their independence.
The Indian Government felt threatened by events in East Pakistan. About
10 million Bengalees eventually fled to India, creating major economic problems
and potentially serious political and social ones.
Inside East Pakistan, extreme leftists became stronger, although they never
became more than a long-term potential threat to the moderates in the freedom
movement.
India supported the Bengali guerrillas, hoping to force Islamabad to grant
the Bengalees' political demands. By fall, the Indians were clearly willing to
risk war, and by late November regular Indian forces, in brigade strength, were
conducting raids into East Pakistan.
On December 3, Pakistan launched air strikes at air bases in western India,
and full-scale war on two fronts began. In the East, on December 4, India in-
vaded East Pakistan. Pakistani forces surrendered after two weeks of fighting,
1-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/1 4E 'RDP79R01I42A000700090002-1
 Approved Foi elease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142 1000700090002-1
SECRET
and Bangladesh became independent. In the West, the main Pakistani attack
into Kashmir stalled, but both sides seized some territory along the cease-fire
line. In the strategic Lahore sector, there was relatively little fighting, but in
the Sind, the Indians seized over 5,000 square miles of territory. The Indians
proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire along the western border effective as of De-
cember 17, and the Pakistanis concurred.
In July 1972, at Simla, the two sides agreed to withdraw their troops from
occupied territory, except in Kashmir, where a new "line of control" was estab-
lished. The agreement commits the parties to a process of negotiations designed
to normalize relations.
In August 1973, India and Pakistan, with the concurrence of Bangladesh,
agreed to a three-way repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war from India,
Bengalees from Pakistan to Bangladesh, and Pakistanis and some non-Bengalee
Muslims from Bangladesh to Pakistan. Pakistan and India withdrew troops from
occupied territory in December 1973. By February 1974, Pakistan was willing
to extend official recognition to Bangladesh, and at a tripartite meeting in New
Delhi in April, Bangladesh gave up all plans for holding war crimes trials of
captured Pakistanis. The repatriation of the prisoners of war was completed by
May 1. Pakistan and India agreed to re-establish mail, travel and telecommunica-
tion links in September 1974, agreed to the resumption of shipping in January
1975, and signed a formal trade agreement on January 23, 1975.
A new factor in Indo-Pakistani relations emerged with the explosion of a
nuclear device by India on May 18, 1974. New Delhi's public assurances that the
test was only for peaceful purposes did little to calm the strongly negative reac-
tion in Pakistan. Moves toward normalization of relations between the two gov-
ernments were expected to be more difficult in the aftermath of the nuclear
explosion because the government of Pakistan could not afford to appear to be
negotiating new agreements with India under the threat of nuclear blackmail.
On February 24, 1975, the US announced the lifting of the ban on the sale of
lethal military equipment to South Asia. Indian leaders expressed disapproval of
the decision, claiming it could slow down the improvement of relations between
India and Pakistan.
B. PUSHTUNISTAN
Pushtunistan is a Afghan term that generally refers to the two eastern prov-
inces of Pakistan: Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier. Sparsely populated
by tribesmen speaking Pushtu, Baluchi, or Brahui, the two provinces comprise
more than half of the land area of Pakistan and have an extended Arabian Sea
coastline.
The Pushtu-speaking tribesmen were separated from their fellow tribes in
Afghanistan in 1893 when a British-Afghan agreement established the Durand
Line as the international boundary between British India and Afghanistan. This
boundary was confirmed in a treaty between the two countries in 1919.
When Pakistan became independent in 1947, Afghanistan stated that it con-
sidered the 1893 treaty invalid because it had been signed under duress, and
further asserted that it did not recognize the line as the border between Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Continuing at varying levels over the years, the dispute reached
I-3
Approved For Release 2005/02/4c -RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
SECRET
its peak in 1960 and 1961 with border clashes, restrictions on the seasonal migra-
tion of Afghan nomads into Pakistan, and Afghanistan's refusal to use its
only railway link to the Indian Ocean at Karachi. Relations improved after the
resignation of prime minister Mohammad Daoud in 1963.
In July 1973, when a military coup returned Daoud to the presidency, he
immediately reactivated the dispute and has since pursued it by diplomacy and
propaganda. In response, Pakistan instituted an aggressive policy that included
an increased military and official civilian presence in tribal areas bordering
Afghanistan, and a firm refusal to discuss its policies and programs in the two
provinces.
Afghanistan has never publicly gone further than demands for self-deter-
mination for the people of Pushtunistan, but most Pakistanis are convinced that
incorporation is the Afghan goal. The Soviet Union has backed the Afghan posi-
tion since 1955, while the US recognizes the Durand Line as an international
boundary.
Relations between the Great Powers have important repercussions in South
Asia. In the 1950s US-Soviet tensions played an important part in determining
not only the relations of South Asian nations with the Great Powers, but rela-
tions among the South Asian nations themselves. The emergence of China in the
1960s and the detente in Sino-US and US-Soviet relations in the 1970s have also
had a significant impact.
Washington's policy of containment during the 1950s put the US at odds
with India and led to a military alliance with Pakistan:
- India's policies, such as its ambiguous stand during the Korean conflict
and its abstention on the UN vote to condemn the Soviet intervention in
Hungary, led to serious strains between Washington and New Delhi;
- US efforts to contain the USSR resulted in the inclusion of Pakistan in
SEATO and CENTO, and in bilateral defense agreements with the
US in 1954 and 1959.
Moscow, after Stalin's death in 1953, placed a high priority on developing
close relations with India as a large new nation advocating socialism.
In South Asia, while India bought arms from Western Europe, principally
Britain, a major US military supply program, including grant aid, enabled Pakistan
to challenge Indian dominance. Nehru claimed the military assistance agree-
ment prevented further progress on resolving the Kashmir dispute.
China, not yet a Great Power, chose the Third World as its forum for inter-
national expression and also developed close ties with India. At the same time,
India emphasized its own nonalignment and acted as a leader of the Third
World.
1-4
Approved For Release 2005/00tRCIV-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
 Approved For" (ease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79RO1142J 900700090002-1
SECRET
The 1960s
Beginning in the late 1950s, the growing power of China began to change
relationships in the sub-continent:
- China and India began to see each other as rivals for leadership in Asia
and in the Third World;
- Sino-Soviet rivalry encouraged close Indo-Soviet relations;
- Pakistan began to see China as a potential ally against India and as
early as 1961, entered into negotiations with Peking for a border agree-
ment, which was finally signed in 1963;
- The US, desiring both to offset growing Soviet influence in New Delhi
and to contain China, took some tentative steps toward improving rela-
tions with New Delhi.
The war in the Himalayas in late 1962 brought most of these trends to a
head. The US and UK rushed arms to India to demonstrate their support for
New Delhi. Pakistani faith in the US as a protector against India was badly
shaken by these actions. The war also pointed up the mutual hostility of Pakistan
and China toward India. The USSR, forced to choose between a Communist and
a non-Communist country, opted for India. Soviet arms shipments began arriving
the following year.
The US continued to be the major arms supplier to Pakistan, but, when the
US imposed an embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, it was replaced
by China.
Decreasing strains in US-Soviet relations during the 1960s were both re-
flected and encouraged by the parallel policies of the two countries in South Asia:
- Both sought to contain China;
- Both worked for stability in the sub-continent;
- In late 1965, US efforts with India and Pakistan undoubtedly contributed
to the receptivity of each country to the eventual Soviet mediation at
Tashkent;
- Both sought to increase their influence in India and Pakistan. Following
the 1965 war, the USSR improved its relations with Pakistan slightly, at
minor cost to its relations with India.
The 1970s
In the early 1970s, there was some swing back toward the relations
existing in the 1950s. The Sino-US detente obviated Washington's interest in
India as a vehicle for containing China. The detente also eliminated a major
complication in Pakistan's foreign policy, allowing Islamabad to maintain re-
lations with one of its Great Power allies without offending the other. US and
Chinese policy toward the subcontinent began to coincide. For example, the
policies of the two countries during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war were roughly
I-5
Approved For Release 2005/02/ c 1RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
 Ow ' ow
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
SECRET
parallel. Finally, the detente and the continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry, together
with Indo-Pakistani hostility, resulted in closer relations between New Delhi
and Moscow-symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.
The Indians, however, have consistently refused to participate in Moscow's
proposed Asian Collective Security Scheme, have turned down Soviet requests
for port facilities and have refused to mesh their planning process with that
of the Soviet Union. As Indo-US relations have thawed, since 1971-72, India has
sought to balance its ties with Moscow through increased aid, trade and tech-
nological assistance from the US. The resumption of arms sales to Pakistan
has clouded the US-Indian relationship, but it has not significantly diminished
India's appreciation of the advantages of diversified sources of economic assist-
ance.
The independence of Bangladesh injected a new factor into the South Asian
equation. Dacca's relations with the Great Powers tended to parallel India's.
Bangladesh, however, stood in much greater need of economic aid from the U.S.
Its relations with the USSR were limited to some extent by Soviet reluctance
to undercut New Delhi's influence in Dacca. China originally refused to have
any dealings with the new nation but was expected to extend recognition
itself following Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh in early 1974 and abandon-
ment by Dacca of all plans to place Pakistani POWs on trial for war crimes.
The Future
The beginnings of further shifts in the Great Power-South Asian relation-
ship are already visible. By May 1974, there were hints that China and India
had begun moving toward rapprochement. Indo-US relations, badly hurt during
the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, were improving. The USSR was once again seeking
better relations with Pakistan, and Pakistan, for its part, seemed to want a more
amicable relationship with Moscow. The effect on Indian and Pakistani relations
with the Great Powers of New Delhi's decision to detonate a nuclear device on
May 18, 1974 was not yet clear as this edition of the handbook went to press.
25X1
1-6
Approved For Release 2005/02I W I TA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1
Next 139 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1