COMMUNIST STATEMENTS REGARDING INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 28, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved FoARelease 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00824A00040
SECRET
10_123
OCI No. 0505/66
Copy No.
COMMUNIST STATEMENTS REGARDING INTERVENTION
IN VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS
28 February 1966
25X1
SECRET
GROUP I
Approved For Release 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010 1~o d?~1o,d'~o.-
 STAT Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
 Approved FoiRelease 20041 T008ZQ,~000400010012-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.
28 February 1966
MEMORANDUM
Attached is a compilation of Communist
statements on possible direct military inter-
vention in the Vietnam situation, and on pos-
sible negotiations toward a settlement, received
since our. biweekly report (OCI No. 0504/66)
issued 15 February 1966.
Approxied Ear Release 900 . - 010012-8
SECRET
 Approved F2fi elease 2004/0-V&CR ,UdP79T00826A000400010012-8
SUMMARY
NEGOTIATIONS
INTERVENTION
USSR Moscow's position on the
subject of negotiations has
not changed in the last two
weeks.
China The Chinese continue to
underscore their opposi-
tion to any negotiated
settlement of the Vietnam
conflict except on the
Communist terms.
DRV Recent DRV statements on
the possibility of bring-
ing the Vietnam war to a
negotiated conclusion have
continued to insist that
the US must recognize Hanoi's
four-point stand before a
political settlement of the
war can be envisaged. Hanoi
has given special emphasis
to US acceptance of point
number three--that of deal-
ing with the Liberation
Front, Hanoi has insisted
that this is in essence the
'most important" of all its
points,
App
The Soviet Union's public
expressions of support for
the DRV have given no indi-
cation of any shift in Mos-
cow's position.
Peking appears to have em-
barked on a campaign to
stir up fears of a general
war in Asia by spreading
the word through private
channels, Public Chinese
statements, however, con-
tinue to imply that the Chi-
nese will not take the lead
in provoking a war with the
us.
The North Vietnamese have
continued to reiterate
their intention of giving
all-out support to the
South Vietnamese insurgents
but have made no specific
reference to cne possibility
of actual intervention in
the war.
25X1
SECRET
 Approved Fo'r Lease 2004/6,HC WDP79T00896A000400010012-8
NEGOTIATIONS
INTERVENTION
NFLSV During the past two weeks There have been no signifi-
the Front officials have cant statements by the Libe-
offered only the standard ration Front on the subject
reiteration of their posi- of intervention during the
tion on bringing. the war to past two weeks.
a negotiated conclusion.
Appr
25X1
SEz;xEr
 Approved 174=.Release 200M ? 'RDP79T008?5A000400010012-8
COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
Selected Soviet References to Intervention I?l
Selected Chinese Communist References to
Intervention I?2
COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM
Selected Soviet References to Negotiations Nml
Selected Chinese Communist References to
Negotiations N?3
Selected North Vietnamese References to
Negotiations N-S
Selected Liberation Front References to
Negotiations N-9
Page
Appr
ved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00040001
25X1
SECRET
 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8 I ' 25X1
COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
Selected Soviet Statements on Intervention
Selected Soviet
Public Statements
11 February 1966: A TASS State-
men w is attacked the agree-
ment of the Honolulu Conference
routinely reiterated Soviet
determination to continue ren-
dering the BRV "all comprehen-
sive assistance and support."
18 February 1966: In reply to
a question a a -press conference,
General Batitiskiy, the first
deputy chief of staff of the
Soviet army, stated that the
USSR had helped and would con-
tinue to help the fighting
people of Vietnam. He said,
"the US aggressors are already
coming to feel the Soviet peo-
ples' aid to fighting Vietnam."
23 February 1966: A Pravda
commentary which assessed. the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee hearings spoke of the
increased importance for all
anti-imperialist forces to
"multiply one hundred fold"
their efforts against US aggres-
sion in South East Asia.
Selected Soviet
Private Statements
The Soviet Union's public
expressions of support for
the DRV have liven no indi-
cation of change in Moscow's
position.
This very vague and general
statement adds nothing to the
strength of previous Soviet
statements,
25X1
SECRET
 SECRETI Mpproved For Release 2004107116 m 25X1
Selected Chinese
Public Statements
Selected Chinese
Private Statements
20 February 1966: The Peo-
ple's Daily declared that
25X1 should US imperialism dare
to attack China, it will be
25X1 courting its doom."
25X1
A repetition of Peking's
standard line implying that
China will not provoke a war
with the US.
0
5X1
5X1
This appears to be part of
a current Chinese campaign
to stir up fears of a general
war in Asia by spreading the
word through private channels.
While Peking has made general
public statements of support
for Laos and Cambodia in the
face of an alleged impending
US attack on those countries,
the Chinese are very unlikely
to fulfill these pledges by
sending troops except as part
of a larger decision to in-
crease the Chinese involvement 25X1
in Vietnam or as part of a
general Sino-US war involvin
all of Southeast Asia.
25X1
25X1
Apprnvpd For Pplpacp 700&107118 ? C:IA_RIlP79TnnR2AAnn Annn10019_R
25X1
25X1
 SECRET 25X1
COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM
Selected Soviet Statements on Negotiations
Selected Soviet Selected Soviet
Public Statements Private Statements
Em-
2 February 196
bassy o icia
CLINE .51MU-
e epin re urn from Hanoi,
Soviet officials including
Premier Kosygin have been em-
phasizing to the Indians that
the US should talk directly to
the National Liberation Front
about a Vietnam settlement.
Such statements by Soviet
officials underscore Moscow's 2(X1
appreciation of the limita-
tions on its maneuverability.
The USSR is still unwilling
to act out of concert with the
DRV.
25X1
25X1
 SECRET Approved or a ease - - 25X1
Selected Soviet
Public Statements
Selected Soviet
Private Statements
11 February 1966: The TASS
statement on the US-South
Vietnam Conference in
Honolulu repeated Moscow's
standard public position
that a "genuine solution"
can be reached on the basis
of the "just" position of
the DRV and the NFLSV.
5 February 1966: When queried
about the
role non-aligned countries
might play in easing the ten-
sion in Vietnam, Foreign NMinis-
ter Gromyko commented, "the
situation in Vietnam is compli-
cated and delicate. We cannot
give you any concrete aOvice...
We cannot act as some sort of
intermediary or as advisors
and we have not been authorized
by the DRV Government to do so."
Moscow's public position in
support of the DRV''s stand
on a Vietnamese settlement
remains unchanged.
SECRETI I 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
 SECRET Approved or a ease - - 25X1
Selected Chinese Communist References to Negotiations
18 February 1966: In an article
attacking British support for
US policy in Vietnam, the Peo-
ple's Daily asserts that Prime
Minister Wilson "took the lead
in very warmly welcoming Lyndon
Johnson's unconditional dis-
cussions swindle." It adds
"As soon as the US recklessly
resumed its bombing of North
Vietnam after the failure of
its pause-in-bombing trick,
Wilson declared that his
government had an obligation
to support this aggressive
action" and declares "not
reconciled with the failure
of one peace talks hoax after
25X1 another, Washington declared
that it would go on with its
maneuvers for peace talks."
Selected Chinese
Private Statements
Peking is reiterating its
standard hard line on nego-
tiations.
25X1
5X1
18 February 1966: Vice Pre-
mier Po -po declared that
"The Vietnam question must
be settled in accordance with
the wishes of the Vietnamese
people, namely, the four
point stand of the DRV and
the five-part statement of
the Liberation Front. The
heart of the matter is that
all US armed forces must be
25X1
Apprnvpd For Pplpacp 700&107118 ? C.ID-PlP79TnnR2AAnn Annn10017-R
 SECRET 25X1
Selected Chinese
Public Statements
18 February 1966 Cont'd: with-
drawn from South Vietnam and
that the US must recognize
the Liberation Front as the
sole lawful representative of
the South Vietnamese people.
There is no other alterna-
25X1 tive."
24 February 1966: NCNA re-
ported that a s Peking ban-
quet honoring the visiting
Ghanaian President,Liu Shao-
chi declared that the US
"only gave lip service to
peace but actually acted
to expand the war. Under
such a condition, whatever
the peace proposal may be...
its objective result can
only be helping the US in
achieving its purpose of
25X1 continuous occupation of
South Vietnam and of per-
petual division of Vietnam."
Selected Chinese
Private Statements
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
 SECRET pprove or a ease zuu - - 25X1
Selected North Vietnamese References to Negotiations
Selected DRV
Public Statements
Selected DRV
Private Statements
25X1
25X1
12 February 1966: An arti-
cle in the party daily by
"Chien Si"--fighter--stated
in part that "One cannot
negotiate with murderers;
the only way to end the
25X1 Vietnam warlis_for the US
o
25X1 South Vietnam.
II
sidered the most important
point of the "four-points."
no negotiations. This is con-
Premier am an ong a
that the only genuine political
party in the South was the
NFLSV. Negotiations therefore,
he stated, mean negotiations
with the Front. "If the Ameri-
cans do not want to negotiate
with the Front, there will be
One recent element in the
DRV's position on settling
the war has been the insis-
tance that the US must deal
directly with the Liberation
Front. While this is no dif-
ferent from the original DRV
position it does lay specific
emphasis on what has evolved
as a key issue in the nego-
tiations controversy.
The main purpose of articles
by "Chien Si" is to get across
to the cadres the latest trend
in party lines on the war.
"Chien Si" is a pseudonym for
an unknown author, but he is
probably a party propagandist
associated with the party
daily, Nhan Dan. Articles by
this writer are periodic fea-
tures of the DRV press and
are usually heavily exhorta-
tive.
25X1
 SECRET 25X1
Selected DRV
Public Statements
Selected DRV
Private Statements
12 February 1966: Hanoi
Radio in an international
broadcast reiterated the
stand of the committee on
Vietnam of the tricontin-
ental congress. Hanoi re-
peated that the committee
had called upon the world's
peoples "to support the
25X1 five-point statement of
the NFLSV and the four-
point stand of the DRV."
25X1
25X1
25X1
16 February 1966: In an
interview with a Danish Com-
munist correspondent DRV
Premier Pham Van Long stated
in part that "Peace in Viet-
nam need not be searched for
anywhere. It lies in the
settlement, which are the expres-
sion of the Geneva agreements."
wanted the war in Vietnam to end
"it will have to recognize the
NFLSV as the sole representative
of the South Vietnamese people,
stop bombing the North, and ac-
cept the DRV four-points for a
if the US
Hanoi has continued to give
publicity to any group that
offers support for the DRV
position on settling the war.
It has been part of Hanoi's
propaganda campaign to demon-
strate that there is ever-
growing world support for
the Vietnamese Communists.
From recent private and public
statements it appears that
Hanoi views Ho Chi Minh's
letter of 24 January as the
latest official DRV pronounce-
ment of its position on settling
the war, This position differs
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
 25X1
25X1
Selected DRV
Pub is tatements
Approved or Release CIA-RDP7
-
Selected DRV
Private tatements
16 February 1966 Cont'd: in
the our-porn s an o the
DRY which is an expression
of the main principle of the
1954 Geneva agreements on
Vietnam, and in the 22 March
1965 statement by the NFLSV.
In his 24 January 1966
letter to the heads of state
of many countries, President
Ho Chi Minh pointed out the
only correct path to peace:
If the US Government really
wants a peaceful settlement,
it must recognize the four-
point stand of the DRY Govern-
ment and prove this by actual
deeds; it must end uncondi-
tionally and for good the
bombing raids and all other
war acts against the DRV.
Only in this way can a peace-
ful solution to the Vietnam
problem be envisaged." II
D
18 February 1966: An article
y uang L_o in the Hanoi
weekly Vietnam Courier stated
in part, o settle the Viet-
nam question, the Government
of the DRV has put forward
the four-point stand which
is an expression of the es-
sential provisions of the
1954 Geneva agreements on
Vietnam. This is a stand of
peace,
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
25X1
in no signif'.cant way from
the original pronouncement of
the four-points in April of
last year.
25X1
 SECRETI Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8 I, 25X1
Selected LRV
Public Statements
18 February 1966 Cont'd: Having
gone through over 20 years of
war, the Vietnamese people de-
sire peace more eagerly than
any one else to build their
life. But real peace can by
no means be dissociated from
jenuine independence. So long
as the US army of aggression
still remains on our soil, our
people will resolutely fight
Selected DRV
Private Statements
18 February 1966: An article
by "C_hien'Si -- ighter--in the
party daily Nhan Dan stated in
part that "Lime sometimes is
full of things which are as
clear as broad daylight but
which certain persons do not
see, do not want to see, or
pretend not to see. The prob-
lem of war and peace in Viet-
nam, for one, is as clear as
broad daylight; US imperialism
is the aggressor; Vietnam,
victim of aggression must
fight to the end in self-
defense. The United States
must end its war of aggres-
sion, then peace will im-
mediately be restored in Viet-
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
 Selected National Liberation Front References to Negotiations
Selected Liberation
Front Public Statements
14 February 1966: In an inter-
view with a correspondent of
the London Daily Worker Nguyen
Huu ThoChairman of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Libera-
tion Front asserted that "the
US imperialists must stop their
aggressive war in South Vietnam,
withdraw from there all troops
and weapons of the US and its
satellites, abolish the US
military bases in South Vietnam,
effectively respect the inde-
pendence, sovereignty, and
basic national rights of the
Vietnamese people as provided
for by the 1954 Geneva agree-
ments on Vietnam; the internal
affairs of South Vietnam must
be settled by the South Viet-
namese people themselves without
foreign interference. The NFLSV,
the sole genuine representative
of the South Vietnamese people,
25X1 must have its role and decisive
voice in the settlement of the
25X s ietnam issue."
Selected Liberation
Front Private Statements
25X1
This statement amounts to
a reiteration of the Fronts
five-point stand on settl-
ing the war set forward
in March of last year.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010012-8