LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 19, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
RP LAR 78-010
19 October 1978
Corr
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
19 October 1978
CONTENTS
Argentina-Chile: New Tensions in the Beagle
Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
With the latest round of negotiations sched-
uled to end on 2 November, probably without
an agreement, the recent troop movements by
both countries have increased concern about
chances to resolve the century-old dispute
over the Beagle Channel.
Nicaragua: "Tachito" Will Benefit from National
Guard Buildup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Somoza government's plans to nearly
double the 8,200-man National Guard will
probably increase the personal power base
of the President's son, Major "Tachito"
Somoza, because of his direct role in
training the new recruits.
Panama: Policy Continuity Under New Government. . 7
Panama's new government headed by President
Aristides Royo contains familiar faces, and
in conjunction with other indications of
future policy, this suggests that the center-
left diplomatic tack and center-right
domestic course of recent years will be
little altered.
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Panama: Torriijos Turns His Attention to The_
Guard . . . . . . . . . . . .
The forced resignation of Colonel Garcia,
the Deputy Commandant of the National Guard
is the culmination of a long series of pol-
icy disagreements between Torrijos and the
staunchly conservative number-two man in
the military.
Cuba: Whither Raul Garcia Pelaez? . .. . . . . . . 17
The appointment of Garcia Pelaez as Ambassa-
dor to Afghanistan raises questions about
the political status of an important figure
in Cuba's party hierarchy, but also under-
lines Havana's growing interest in the
Asian nation.
Chile-China: Relations Being Strergthened . . . . 20
Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos' two-week
official visit to China is intended to foster
closer economic and political ties, which
could be advantageous to both countries.
Jamaica: Manley Embroiled in Political
Scandals . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . 21
Although the Prime Minister has managed to
deflect the sensational allegations now be-
fore the courts, his declining political
stock has been further weakened, and he
could be ousted if the main charges are
substantiated.
South America: Changing Patterns of Drums
Smuggling .. . . . . . . . . i . . . . . . 25
Ecuador has been a primary transit point
for narcotics trafficking, but over the
past year increasing numbers of Colombian
drug manufacturers have begun to buy di-
rectly from Peruvian suppliers.
Cuban Chronology for September . . . . . . . . . . 29
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Argentina-Chile: New Tensions in the Beagle Channel
Recent troop movements by Argentina and Chile are
the latest in a series of military actions that have in
i creased concern about chances for a peaceful resolution
S of the century-old Beagle Channel dispute. The latest
4 negotiating round is scheduled to end on 2 November,
probably without an agreement, and no decision has been
7 made to extend the talks. Although major spokesmen for
both sides insist they want a peaceful settlement, there
is always the possibility that Argentina may resort to
military action against Chile.
In the negotiations, which began last February, the
bilateral commission has made substantial progress in
the area of economic integration and possible exploita-
tion of maritime resources in the disputed region. But
there remains the major issue of drawing a demarcation
line beyond the islands awarded to Chile last year by
international arbitration. A complicating factor is the
/ lack of agreement among Argentine military and government
leaders over what terms they will accept.
Although recent official communiques speak optimis-
tically of an agreement being reached by 2 November,
7 _ both sides may be considering other initiatives in the
event of an impasse. Peaceful options may include a
limited extension of the negotiating deadline, a mora-
torium, or an effort to find some new form of interna-
tional arbitration. Meanwhile, however, both nations
continue to reinforce their southern military commands,
a development that has not gone unnoticed in the opposing
capital.
Other nations are beginning to regard the situation
with increasing concern. In South America, both Peru
mii Rnl i vi a hats in rii ratard that thrsv take thA nnssi bi 1 i $v
5 of military action seriously, and are watching develop-
ments closely. Brazil is reportedly sufficiently worried
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South
MAGELLAN
rsv
PACIFIC
OCEAN
I
TIERRA
L IE DEL
0
1 FUEGO
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
ARGENTINA
Falkland Islands
-.'(U.K.)
{ 01 HUAIA
~ ' aeAO C`~ nre,._--M;RTO--WILLIAMS
"Os ~t1 Is,, ISLA NAVARINO Cabo-SenPia
ISLA PICTON
AREA OF MAIN MAP
, aP
Islands the Argentines
might occupy
Cape Horn
Islands-and appurtenant islets and rocks awarded to Chile
by International Arbitration Court in May 1977.
-f Airfield
? Naval Station
OISIAMUEVA
[DRAKE PASSAGE
2
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j about a possible outbreak of hostilities to begin making
its own defense preparations. A leading Brazilian news-
paper said recently that international reaction must be
r one of "stupefaction" in the face of the assorted bel-
licose preparations of Argentina, which it listed as:
troop concentrations, movements of heavy equipment, mili-
/v tary exercises, mobilization, civil defense preparations,
emotional appeals to patriotism, parades, and a special
II "war course of instruction."
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.Nicaragua.. "Tachito" Will.Benefit.From National Guard
Buildup
In response to,the continuing guerrilla threat, the
Somoza government has set in motion longstanding plans to
nearly double. the size of the 8,200-man National Guard by
the end of next year. The President's son, Major Anastasio
"Tachito" Somoza, who commands the Infantry Basic Training
School and directed the counteroffensive against the guer-
rillas in September, will probably increase his personal
power base as a result of the buildup.
In overall capability or man-for-man, the Guard has
always militarily outclassed the guerrillas of the San-
dinista National Liberation Front. During the FSLN of-
fensive in September, however, the Guard was stretched
so thin that it had to concede temporary control of sev-
eral provincial cities until it could systematically re-
capture them over a two-week period. With the guerril-
las gaining in 'numbers and popularity and receiving in-
creased support from abroad, President Somoza sees a
clear need to maintain his advantage by building up his
mainstay.
Despite its recent widespread censure by the inter-
national press, the Guard seems to be having little trou-
ble finding the recruits it needs to increase its size
to 15,000. The Guard's public image--which had not been
good for years--was thought to have reached rock bottom
because of the harsh methods it reportedly used to re-
capture the provincial cities. Nevertheless, according
to the US Defense Attache, the Guard still enjoys some
prestige in rural areas. Illiterate peasants, who gen-
erally fill the enlisted ranks, evidently continue to
welcome the opportunity for upward mobility that Guard
service offers.
The Guard's haste to increase its numbers is evi-
dent. The senior class of the Military Academy was re-
cently graduated nine months early, skipping most of its
fourth year, in order to provide 28 new officers. Some
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1,500 new recruits have been enlisted in the past month,
3 and another 3,000 applications are being processed. I1?-
literate recruits, who are probably in the majority, will
continue to go through the regular five-month training
cycle, but enlistees who are literate will be rushed
through a new, special two-month basic infantry combat
training course.
The buildup will be coupled with an internal reor-
ganization of the Guard. Somoza has finally approved a
plan to establish a professional police force separate
from the purely military elements. In addition, the
"Becat" counterterrorist jeep patrols will be removed
from the 1st Armored Battalion to permit it to concen-
trate on its role as a heavy weapons unit.
The Guard will encounter some difficulties in rapidly
increasing its size. The Somoza family has historically
ensured the loyalty of the Guard through a range of con-
trols and patron-client techniques, including careful
screening of applicants. Some officers are concerned
that the rapid buildup will lead to less stringent secur-
ity investigations, enabling guerrillas or their sympa-
thizers to infiltrate the Guard. In addition, the Infan-
try Basic Training School cannot accommodate all of the
expected new recruits, so training facilities will have
J to be set up elsewhere, perhaps at Puerto Somoza on the
Pacific coast. Although the Guard has sufficient weapons
for the enlistees, it is short of uniforms, C-rations,
and other equipment. The government is currently trying
to make commercial purchases in the US to overcome these
shortages.
Major "Tachito" Somoza, who has established a sig-
nificant personal power base in the Guard over the past
two years, will most clearly benefit from the buildup.
/ In the past, he has succeeded in winning the personal
loyalty of new recruits, all of whom go through his In-
fantry Basic Training School. Moreover, the top officer
graduates of the Military Academy serve as his training
school cadre, and he has become influential with them as
uj~ well. "Tachito" will also be in charge of the special
basic training for the new police force, for which he
will be receiving the better enlisted men from the depart-
mental commands.
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fern a business career, the young NESSIOMMEM
provincial cities.
Despite occa- hi,~,~~~4i;;;,o,~ly
Na,. ?. r.
It is still debatable whether
the 26-year-old son of the Presi-
dent could take control of the
Guard if his father were to leave
the scene unexpectedly, but that
is the trend and apparently the in-
tent. The President's aging and
unhealthy half-brother, Jose R., is
technically second in command, but
during the guerrilla offensive last
month, "Tachito"' personally di-
rected most of the Guard's counter-
attack. Troops from his school
bore almost the full brunt of the.
fighting in recapturing the five
Major Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza
career and business pursuits usually go hand-in-hand in
Nicaragua. He is an intelligent, decisive officer, and
the longer his father remains in power, the more assured
becomes the eventual ascendancy of "Tachito"" to the com-
major enjoys leading the troops
and recognizes that a Guard
mand of the Guard.
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J n t-AZ 1
Panama: Policy Continuity Under
New Government
Panama's new government headed by President Aristides
Royo contains familiar faces, suggesting that the center-
left diplomatic tack and center-right domestic course
of recent years will be little altered. General Omar
Torrijos, former Chief of Government and now simply com-
mandant of the National Guard, sincerely wants to restore
civilian government, but his brand of democracy has def-
inite limits. Torrijos has continued to make the major
decisions, at least through Royo's election and instal-
lation, but he seems unsure how he will define his future
policymaking role. For now, despite Royo's ambition and
talent, the new President is a creature of Torrijos and
will follow past guidelines closely.
The principal people in the new administration in-
clude many of the same people Torrijos has had clustered
around him for years. The new faces reflect the same
left-right balancing that has come to characterize Torri-
jos' cabinet-level appointments. The General's contin-
uing control was manifested in Royo's uncontested elec-
tion on 11 October by the 505-member legislative assembly.
Royo's acceptance speech stuck to the same moderate
theme he has been emphasizing since Torrijos first "pro-
posed" him last month. Royo announced, for example, the
formation of a National Economic Council from the private
sector to assist the government in policymaking. For the
past three years, the administration has been tilting to
the right in an effort to bolster business confidence and
overcome economic stagnation.
Although Royo has a leftist background that includes
cooperation with the Communist Party, he is--like Torri-
jos--a capable, dynamic opportunist who will shift with
the political winds. As Minister of Education since
1973, he first supported leftist reform measures but
quickly abandoned them in the face of a popular backlash.
The moderate tone of his acceptance speech is typical of
his recent efforts to establish himself as a middle-of-
the-road pragmatist.
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ar'Unzi
Foreign affairs ostensibly will be in the hands of
Carlos Ozores who has been Deputy Minister of Foreign
Relations since 1970. Not a major figure in the admin-
istration, he seems nonetheless very much at ease with
Torrijos' independent policies oriented toward the Third
World. In any case, wide-ranging general ;principles,
which were laid down by the Foreign Ministry in July,
effectively institutionalize present policy directions.
In domestic: affairs, Torrijos' political reform
package will soon be ratified by the newly elected legis-
lative assembly in what is likely to be a pro forma ex-
ercise. Major changes provide for direct election of
the next president in 1984 and the lega:l.ization of cer-
tain political parties.
Although the legislative assembly will continue to
function, a smaller National Legislative Council will
be established, purportedly with real lawmaking powers.
One-third of this Council will be directly elected in
1980, but a comfortable two-thirds majority will be
drawn from the present, Torrijos-controlled assembly.
This package falls well short of opposition demands
for proportional representation and early, direct elec-
tions for the presidency and other public offices. In
protest, the leader of the major opposition Liberal Party
may withdraw from his working relationship with the gov-
ernment to join forces with the Panamen:i.sta Party of
former President Arnulfo Arias and work for the govern-
ment's overthrow. Even together, however, these opposi-
tion groups are no match for the government.
Torrijos seems quite pleased by having surprised
many observers with his decision to step back from total
control. He was partly motivated by personal reasons;
he chafed under the bureaucratic demands and ceremonial
trappings of office. The General, however, also views
himself as one of a new breed of enlightened Latin Ameri-
can military leaders who advocate increased participation
and control by "responsible" civilians. Torrijos opposes
a return to Panama's traditional political systems, leaders,
and spoils system.
In practice, President Royo's total. loyalty means
that Torrijos can retain as much or as little power as
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he wishes. The General certainly continues to make major
policy decisions. Torrijos may have moved back from the
limelight, but he is still firmly in control.
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Panama: Torri_Ls Turns His Attention
to The Guard The forced resignation last week of Colonel Rodrigo
Garcia, the deputy commandant of the National Guard,
was the culmination of a long series of policy disagree-
ments between General Torrijos and the staunchly conserv-
ative number-two man in the military. Panama's prolific
rumor mill ground out stories of a coup plot, but what
stands out is the General's apparent continued control.
Deputy Commandant Garcia--second in rank to Torri-
jos as the only full colonel in the Guard--has disagreed
with Torrijos over policies toward Cuba and leftist in-
fluence on the government in general. Anti-Communist
and conservative to the core, Garcia was the military
/ counterpart to former President Laka.s--?similarly a strong
conservative who had frequent reservations about policy
and an occasional falling out with Torrijos but who re-
mained personally loyal to the General and his revolu-
tion. In recent years, however, both Lakas and Garcia
,had less and less influence on Torrijos' policy deci-?
sions.
Most recently, Garcia disagreed with Panama's
moral and material support for the Nicaraguan guerril-
las. Garcia, like other conservatives, was also dis-
quieted by Torrijos' choice of left-leaning Aristides
Royo for the presidency and the selection of former
Labor Minister Ahumada As the new Minister of Govern-
ment. Ahumada, a past member of the Panamanian Communist
Party, has long been regarded by both Garcia and Lakas
as an irritating symbol of leftist inroads into the gov-
ernment. Personal frustrations may have helped fuel
Garcia's most recent dissatisfaction; he was one of
'those pushing for Torrijos to assume the presidency so
he, in turn, could head the Guard?
For his part, Torrijos may have been irritated
with Garcia over a diplomatic gaffe in August when Tor-
:rijos attended the inauguration of the Dominican Presi-
dent and transported several Dominican exiles back to
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Santo Domingo with him in his plane. To Torrijos public
embarrassment, one of the exiles was refused permission
to enter the Dominican Republic, and Torrijos held Garcia
personally responsible for the mixup.
Although forcing Garcia's resignation was a telling
demonstration of the General's power--after Torrijos, he
was one of the three most powerful men in the Guard--it
does not appear to have been the result of any serious
personal challenge to Torrijos. Like the other members
of the Guard hierarchy, Garcia held his position because
of his demonstrated loyalty. During a short-lived coup
attempt against Torrijos in 1969, Garcia fled the country
rather than accept an offer to serve as Chief of Staff.
In 1976, Garcia was almost wholly in charge of suppres-
sing serious student disorders. Over the last few years,
moreover, the Guard was frequently left in Garcia's hands
when Torrijos, drumming up support for the canal treaties,
was absent from the country.
Garcia may have grumbled, especially over contacts
with Cuba, but there has been no hint of serious coup
plotting.
though Garcia was personally rus an un appy,
he did not have sufficient influence to organize a
serious challenge to Torrijos on his own.
The sidelining of Garcia was not totally unexpected,
since he was due to retire next January, and some change
in the top echelon of the Guard was forecast. More inter-
esting developments may come with whatever additional re-
alignment emerges within the Guard. According to press
reports, G-1 Lieutenant Colonel Paredes is to serve con-
currently as assistant Chief of Staff, and the deputy
commandant position has been abolished. This is perhaps
an indication that even Torrijos, whose word has been
law for 10 years, is taking no chances of kindling the
ambitions of a potential successor.
Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Florencio Florez
becomes second in command in the Guard, but his position
is a bureaucratic one that does not provide a viable
power base. Florez has generally appeared quite loyal
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to Torrijos although on a few occasions his name was
associated with reported intrigue within the Guard. In
any event, he has not exercised a great deal of authority
in his post, and he is a relative short-timer, due to
retire in early 1980.
Having relinquished his Chief of Government post
last week, Torrijos will now be free to devote more time
and attention to the Guard, which will be expanding as
it assumes a greater role in canal defense. If Torrijos'
decisions on reassignments and promotions stick close
to the seniority list, as Panamanian military tradition
dictates, and he also opens up the full colonel rank to
more officers, he will probably further strengthen his
position. In any case, Torrijos hardly seems worried by
Garcia's disgruntlement with his Nicaraguan policies.F-
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Cuba: Whither Raul Garcia Pelaez?
The appointment last week of Raul Garcia Pelaez as
the new Cuban Ambassador to Afghanistan raises questions
about the political future of an important figure in
Cuba's party hierarchy. While other party Secretariat
officials named to high posts abroad--for example, Jorge
Risquet in Angola and Raul Valdes Vivo in Ethiopia--have
retained their membership in that key office, Garcia
Pelaez reportedly lost his Secretariat seat when ap-
pointed to open the embassy in Kabul.
The Cuban press no longer describes Garcia Pelaez
as a Secretariat official, which lends credence to the
private reports, but no explanation has been offered
for the loss of his prestigious party post. It there-
fore seems likely that he has suffered a serious polit-
ical reverse.
Garcia Pelaez, who received his doctorate in law
and diplomacy from Havana University in the mid-1940s,
is not new to diplomatic life. After several years in
party organizational and supervisory work, he was sent
to Moscow as Ambassador in October 1967. At that time,
a purge of pre-1958 Communists was in progress in Cuba,
and the Castro regime's relations with the USSR were
nearing an unprecedented low due to sharp policy dif-
ferences. Garcia Pelaez stayed in the Soviet capital
for over five years, during which time the negative trend
in Cuban-Soviet ties was completely reversed.
On finishing his tour in Moscow in early 1973, Garcia
Pelaez was again given a party post, being named to the
Secretariat when that body--which had been largely a
paper organization--was given new life and expanded from
six to 10 members. Judging from his activities as re-
.J- ported in the Cuban press, he worked primarily in the
field of interparty relations. Later, he was made re-
sponsible for the Central Committee's Economic Department,
an office charged with formulating economic policy for
the Political Bureau's consideration. In this new
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role, he frequently presided at important meetings in
the economic sector at home and, in the international
sphere, represented Cuba at several meetings of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. He worked in
this capacity until receiving his assignment to Kabul.
While the loss of his Secretariat post represents
a personal setback for Garcia Pelaez, it does not dilute
the international significance of Havana's intention to
upgrade its relations with what it views as a promising
and exploitable new regime in Kabul.. Garcia Pelaez'
predecessor, Jose Lopez Sanchez, was a political non-
entity who was riot even assigned as a resident ambas-
sador. In contrast, Havana is now sending to reside
in Kabul a diplomat who has served for years in Moscow,
Cuba's most important diplomatic post, and has also spent
a lengthy term in one of Cuba's top party posts, so that
he presumably has good access to the inner circle of the
leadership.
Moreover, the Cubans probably anticipate great in-
terest on the part of the USSR in expanding its influ-
ence in Afghanistan, and hope to take advantage of Garcia
Pelaez' good rapport with the Soviets. Last year, for
example, a Soviet diplomat in Havana spoke highly of
Garcia Pelaez--who presumably speaks Russian--and de-
scribed him as a highly influential. person close to
Moscow.
The Cubans are also eager to take advantage of
Afghanistan's standing in the nonaligned movement, in
which it is presently a member of the Coordinating Bureau.
In addition, the Cubans may be hoping to ingratiate them-
selves by responding favorably to the Afghan Foreign
Minister's request of last May for economic assistance.
Havana may intend to provide public.health personnel,
construction brigades, and other technical assistance,
such as it has already supplied to more than a dozen
other countries. A Cuban official of Garcia Pelaez'
stature would be required to oversee such an effort if
it were substantial.
The "why" of C"Tarcia Pelaez' removal from the Secre-
tariat is not known. Posting him to Kabul implies that
his physical health was not a factor. Neither does he
seem to be in disgrace, for if he had run afoul of either
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25X1
Fidel or Raul Castro, he would not have been given an
assignment of such high visibility and importance. Cuban
officials guilty of political indiscretions usually dis-
appear from view in some minor administrative post.
On the other hand, Garcia Pelaez may have been a
source of friction to someone high enough in the leader-
ship to influence Fidel. Political Bureau member Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, for example, may have been dissatisfied
with Garcia Pelaez' performance in his economic duties
fl and could have urged that his talents would be better
utilized elsewhere. Such maneuvering by Rodriguez is
not unprecedented; for instance, when Isidoro Malmierca
was unable to carry out his duties as party organizing
secretary, Rodriguez used his influence to have him named
to the post of Foreign Minister after he was removed from
the Secretariat.
Whatever the reason for his removal, Garcia Pelaez'
career seems to have peaked, he is not likely to regain
such privileged status in the party once having lost it.
Ironically, his brother Pedro, one of only about a dozen
division-level generals in the Cuban military establish-
ment, was not long ago given command of the Western Army,
4 the most important of Cuba's ground forces units.
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Chile-China: Relations Being Strerthened
On 16 October, Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos
left for China on a two-week official visit intended to
foster closer economic and political ties. He carries
an invitation to Chairman Hua Kuo-feng to visit Chile
and hopes that President Pinochet will be invited to
China; the Chinese will handle these issues very cau-
tiously.
Relations between the two ideologically disparate
governments have been correct and improving for some
time. The Chinese Ambassador in Santiago recently ob-
tained Cubillos' partial endorsement. of his denunciation
of "USSR and US intervention and hegemonic ambitions."
Improving ties with a leading Communist power gives
substance to Chile's announced pragmatic, nonideological
foreign policy. Chile is also working to improve rela-
tions with other Third World nations to reduce US lever-
age and to end international isolation.
On China's part, the cultivation of closer political
and economic relations with Chile accords with its de-
sire to form as broad an anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban front
as possible, as well. as with its policy of diversifying
foreign trade. Although relations with the Pinochet
regime have cost China some support in Latin American
"leftist" circles and have evoked Soviet and Cuban dia-
tribes, Chinese :Leaders seem determined to ignore ideo-
logical labels in their drive to expand relations with
Latin American governments.
Aside from the political overtones of Cubillos'
trip, Chilean officials point out that economic and
trade issues will be high on the agenda. They believe
that Peking's search for more copper, iron, steel, and
fertilizer will lead to further trade agreements and
improvement of the already favorable Chilean balance of
trade.
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Jamaica: Manley Embroiled in Political Scandals
Prime Minister Michael Manley's declining politi-
cal stock is being further weakened by a number of cur-
rent scandals. Although Manley has managed so far to
r j deflect the sensational allegations now before the courts,
he could be ousted if the main charges are substantiated.
Background
The past year has not been a good one for the Prime
Minister, who has been forced to cope with the fallout
7 from a series of highly dubious actions by various ele-
ments of his government.
In January, the military illegally executed five
alleged opposition gunmen after luring them to an iso-
lated site on the Green Bay Army base outside Kingston.
Despite Manley's frantic coverup efforts, relentless
press investigations and the probing of the opposition
party exposed the incident.
In July, the government yielded to opposition pres-
sure and released a judicial commission's report accusing
Manley's radical Housing Minister of using his office
to victimize political opponents and of associating with
gunmen. Manley, who probably has reason to be wary of
his unsavory minister, has defended him by questioning
the findings of the commission.
In August, Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Lloyd, once
a rival for the top spot in the Army, claimed that he
was sacked last year after he informed the "political
directorate" of various irregularities in the military,
including the use of torture. Four army enlisted men,
in press statements, have corroborated the accusations
of torture.
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6
In August, an exconvict and former government
worker, Albert "Spy" Robinson, charged that Manley and
other high goverrunent officials had hired him in 1976
to carry out political "dirty tricks" that included
spying on the opposition party, the US Embassy, and the
Canadian High Commission.
Albert "Spy" Robinson, who has been tes-
tifying before the Corruption Commission
this month
at the camp and to report the raid strictly as a crimi-
nal matter. Probably impelled by a desire to avoid
public criticism of his longstanding patronage of radi-
cal causes, the Prime Minister probably also wanted to
prevent an embarrassing open confrontation with other
pro-Cuban leftists.
The Scandals }?acing Manley
The Green Bay massacre has provided headlines
damaging to Manley for nine months, and more revelations
In September, Manley or-
dered another coverup after the
police ambushed a "revolutionary
guerrilla camp" in the hills
outside Kingston. The consta-
bulary force killed four of the
estimated 15-member terrorist
group that police believe is
connected with Jamaica's lead-
ing independent radical, Trevor
Munroe--who has close links with
the left. wing of the ruling
party. Although the alleged
intermediary between Munroe
and the terrorist group was
mysteriously assassinated late
last month, many details of the
incident have leaked to the anti-
government press. Munroe, a
"critical" supporter of Manley,
has suggested publicly that the
CIA planted the Communist lit-
erature found at the site.
Manley, for his part, reportedly ordered the police
to remove Soviet and Cuban flags from the cache uncovered
are likely.
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An eight-week
G, 7
(11
coroner's inquest resulted in the arrest last July of
10 military personnel, including several middle-level
officers whose impending trials will ensure more dis-
closures. The scandal has apparently already demoralized
the military and further lowered Manley's esteem among
the security forces.
Although we have no evidence to implicate Manley
directly in planning or ordering the executions, he is
highly vulnerable because of his role in the abortive
coverup and because of his direct responsibility for the
military as Minister of Defense. In an uprecedented
action, all opposition senators boycotted the upper cham-
ber from late June to early September after the senate
president, a member of Manley's party, refused to author-
ize an investigation of the military intelligence unit
that staged the killings.
Manley's problem with his Housing Minister dates
from February 1977, when the hard-fisted minister ordered
the forced eviction of over a thousand opposition party
supporters from a public housing project in a Kingston
ghetto. Apparently to prevent a rift with the radical
faction of his party, the Prime Minister refused to dis-
cipline the minister and instead referred the charges to
a one-judge commission of inquiry in the hope that the
storm would blow over.
The release of the judge's report in July, however,
reopened the issue at a time of greater vulnerability for.
Manley. The Prime Minister's rejection of the findings
has again shown his overriding determination to preserve
the unity of his troubled party. At the same time, he
has taken a serious political risk by repudiating signif-
icant groups such as the Jamaica Bar Association and
the independent press, which have demanded disciplinary
action against the controversial minister.
Over the past month, another judicial commission has
been hearing sensational and widely publicized testimony
from "Spy" Robinson, who has testified that Manley and
some advisers used him to entrap the opposition party
and the US Embassy in a fake antigovernment plot during
1976. The police intelligence head, who has readily
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altered other police reports on orders from Manley, ap-
peared before the commission last week and reportedly
withheld evidence supporting Robinson's claim that he
was working for Manley's party and not for the CIA or
the opposition party--as some leftists, including Munroe,
now contend.
spate of scandals--which is impossible to predict at
this time--he will, undoubtedly lose more ground with
It is too early to assess the impact of only par-
tially credible testimony from a disreputable witness,
but the Prime Minister--whose contact with Robinson in
1976 has been clearly established---cannot be helped po-
litically by the outcome. Moreover, the commission
will soon turn its attention to Lieutenant Colonel
Lloyd's accusations of military improprieties, and de-
tails of the September raid on the guerrilla camp will
probably continue to leak to the press.
Manley is a shrewd tactician who has consistently
undercut promising, opposition maneuvers, but he is
struggling in a political climate that is increasingly
turning against him. Largely because of Jamaica's seri-
ous economic downturn, Manley's popularity is at its
lowest point since he came to power in ].972. Since last
May, when he acceded to stiff International Monetary
Fund austerity measures, his problems have grown even
within the ruling party. In June, for the first time
since Manley's election, the opposition came out ahead
of the ruling party in a voters' preference poll. The
poll claimed that a majority of Jamaicans believes that
Manley should resign. Even if he survives the present
Jamaica's conservative electorate.
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South America: Changing Patterns of Drug Smuggling
In the past, Ecuador has been a primary transit point
for narcotics trafficking between Peru and Colombia--the
principal South American drug growing and processing
countries, respectively. Over the past year, however,
Ecuador's role has changed somewhat as increasing num-
bers of Colombian drug manufacturers' have begun to buy
l coca paste directly from Peruvian suppliers.
Ecuadorean narcotics police officials estimate that
the number of known Colombian traffickers entering Ecua-
dor to conduct drug transactions has declined 20 percent:
over the last eight months. According to these offi-
cials, the remote border cities of Iquitos, in Peru, and
Leticia, in Colombia, now serve as direct links between
.v the two countries.
The main reason the Colombians have begun to bypass
traditional smuggling routes through Ecuador is to in-
crease the security and efficiency of their narcotics
transactions. Inspections along the Ecuadorean-Peruvian
border are more frequent and may be strict at times, de--
pending on political tensions between Lima and Quito.
In addition, larger quantities of coca paste can be
transported from Iquitos to Leticia using clandestine
airstrips and jungle rivers than Ecuadorean highways.
To say that South American drug smuggling patterns
are changing is not to imply that narcotics trafficking
in Ecuador will cease altogether. Established networks
are still active in Guayaquil and have not been affected
by the increased direct connections between Colombians
and Peruvians. Eventually, the level of drug activity in
Ecuador will probably diminish particularly if the di-
rect Colombia-Peru link is sustained and the promising
steps toward improved drug enforcement in Ecuador are
continued.
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Barbados
c Grenada
~nTrinidad and Tobago
am
Guyana * arjmarmu
C / ame: -,,Cayenne
Surin
Bolivia
(j Fr7cr, Guiana
Fr
Paraguay
Chile
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Colombian authorities have recently made record
multiton seizures of marijuana because some networks
have concentrated their activities in a single region.
There may also be a concomitant rise in multikilo co-
caine seizures if other Colombian traffickers persist
in dealing directly with Peruvians.
In the short run, most of the trafficking networks
in South America can use their resiliency and ingenuity
to foil the authorities. In the longer run, however,
persistent enforcement efforts will at least reduce the
possibilities and options available to the traffickers.
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ECUADOR: The government has announced that the second
round of the presidential election, coupled with a leg-
islative election, will be held on 8 April 1979. The
transfer of power to a civilian government is scheduled
for the following August. A new electoral tribunal was
named on 5 October to complete a review of returns from
the initial round of the presidential balloting held on
16 July and to supervise the runoff' election. Some top
military leaders were thwarted last month in 'their at-
tempt to annul the first round election results. The
long delay before the April elections, however, provides
ample time for further plotting.
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CUBAN CHRONOLOGY
September 1978
1 September Angolan Construction Minister Rezende de
Oliveira and delegation arrive in Cuba.
Fidel Castro meets visiting Mozambican
Deputy Defense'Minister Manuel Emitio
Guebuza, who is visiting Cuba.
Cuban Government offers to release between
500 and 1,000 political prisoners and al-
low them to come to the US.
2 September Havana television carries commentary
scoring colonial status of Puerto Rico.
Three Cuban war prisoners are freed by
South Africa in exchange for South African
soldiers held by Angola.
4 September Division General Senen Casas Regueiro
opens military training school on the
Isle of Youth.
Fidel Castro speech opening new school
year. Castro says, "The export of tech-
nical services has become an important
factor of this country's economic devel-
opment."
6 September Local authorities in Havana deny reports
of Cubans infiltrating Nicaragua or tak-
ing part in any FSLN actions.
Foreign Minister Malmierca opens annual
Foreign Ministry seminar for Cuban Ambas-
sadors in Havana.
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7 September Commander Antonio dos Santos, member of
the Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) Politburo, arrives in Cuba at in-
vitation of Raul Castro.
8 September Raul Castro meets Cuban prisoners recently
exchanged for South Africans.
Fidel Castro grants lengthy interview to
expatriate Cuban journalists.
9 September Ugandan President Idi Amin denies published
reports of presence of Cuban soldiers in
Kampala.
Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez ar-
rives in Cuba. Meets Fidel and Raul
Castro.
Cuban Government issues statement express-
ing its militant solidarity with Nicara-
guan people. Rejects Somoza's accusations
of Cuban involvement.
Cuban UN mission in New York is bombed.
US State Department condemns bombing on
12 September.
Fidel Castro meets MPLA Politburo member
Dos Santos. Also present are Raul Castro
and Juan Almeida.
10 September Raul Castro meets Mozambican military
delegation visiting Cuba.
Fidel Castro and Spanish Prime Minister
Suarez hold press conference in Havana.
Castro says he will visit Spain.
11 September Fidel Castro stops in Moscow en route to
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to attend revolu-
tion anniversary ceremonies. Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez is with Castro group.
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Havana AFP says Cuba will receive 500,000
tons of Venezuelan oil this year. Agree-
ment involves swaps with Spain, USSR,
Venezuela, and Cuba.
12 September Raul Castro meets Guinea-Bissau National
Assembly President and Armed Forces Min-
ister Joao Bernado Vieira in Havana.
Fidel Castro and delegation arrive in
Addis Ababa. Attend rally in Revolution
Square. Receives Ethiopia's highest dec-
oration from Chairman Mengistu.
13 September UN special committee on decolonization
approves Cuban-sponsored resolution on
Puerto Rico.
Meeting of chiefs of economic offices
abroad opens in Havana. Isidoro Malmierca
and Hector Rodriguez Llompart preside.
14 September Ivan Arkhipov, Deputy Chairman of USSR
Council of Ministers, meets Joel Domenech,
Vice President Council of Ministers, in
Moscow.
Fidel Castro speaks at opening session of
Conference of Afro-Arab Peoples Against
Imperialism in Ethiopia.
The governments of Cuba and Angola sign
1979 construction cooperation protocol.
18 September In Ethiopia, Fidel Castro meets Joshua
Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe Patri-
otic Front leaders.
Transportation Minister Antonio Enrique
Lusson signs air and maritime cooperation
agreement in Aden, South Yemen.
19 September Fidel Castro makes stop in Tripoli, Libya.
Meets Colonel Qadhafi.
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Fidel Castro arrives in. Algiers. Meets
President Boumediene. He states at press
conference that the Camp David agreement
is the consummation of treachery." He
leaves for Cuba.
20 September Division General Rigoberto Garcia heads
Cuban delegation to Mexican independence
celebration.
21 September Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Moscow
from Algiers.
Transportation Minister Lusson signs sev-
eral agreements in Baghdad, Iraq.
Cuban medical team returns from service
in Guyana. Another group of 22 doctors
replaces these returnees.
22 September Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets Politburo
member Suslov in Moscow.
23 September Tanzanian Public Health Ministry delega-
tion arrives in Cuba.
24 September Foreign Minister Malmierca meets separately
with Liberia's Foreign Minister Cecil
Dennis and SWAPO head Nujoma in New York.
25 September Foreign Minister Malmierca speaks to UN
General Assembly. Condemns Somoza regime,
attacks Camp David meeting, and supports
Puerto Rican independence.
26 September Tomas Borges, founder of th FSLN, arrives
in. Havana. Met by Ulises Estrada. Meets
Fidel Castro on 27 September.
Fidel. Castro meets Gus Hall, Secretary
General of the US Communist Party.
27 September Transportation Minister Lusson signs co-
operation agreement with Algeria.
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29 September Cuba and Ethiopia sign economic coopera-
tion protocol.
30 September Cuba and Tanzania sign scientific and
technical cooperation agreement that will
apply until 1980.
Cuban party delegation headed by Alfredo
Menendez Cruz leaves for Peru to attend
50th anniversary of founding of Peruvian
Communist Party.
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