LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 16, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

as.~~ i^auvnu~ ~-'(~r~rnt
Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
State Dept. review completed
Secret
RP LAR 78-012
16 November 1978
Copy A ~..i
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
16 November 1978
CONTENTS
Brazil: New Measures Shape Political Changes . . . .
Security reform measures, while imposed
in an authoritarian fashion, will form
the basis for the liberalization expected
under President Geisel's successor.
Brazil: Short-Term Prospects for the New
Arc- inistration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Figueiredo government will probably
continue the effort to open the polit-
ical system, and Figueiredo could be the
last strictly military president.
Argentina: Criticism of Videla . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Argentine President's inept handling
of the Beagle Channel affair has focused
attention on the inefficiency of his
system of rule by consensus.
Chile: Labor Elections--Toward a New Labor
Relations System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Union elections ended a five-year ban
on labor activity and opened the way
for a new, depoliticized labor rela-
tions system.
Emerging Island States in the Eastern
Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Independence is unlikely to rescue
these microstates from a bleak economic
future and a decline in democracy.
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Cuba-Mozambic ue_ Increased Cooperation . . . . . . . 21
Cuban assistance projects in :Mozambique,
which are typical of Havana's civilian
efforts in Africa, have an economic
payoff for the Castro government.
FOR THE RECORD . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Cuban Chronol.o2jor October 1978 . . . . . . . . . 25
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Brazil: New Measures Shape Political Changes
The government's new--and notably less severe--na-
tional security law will almost certainly receive pro
forma legislative approval by the end of this month. The
new measure, along with other recently promulgated reforms,
will form the basis for much of the political change that
is expected under President-elect Figueiredo. Ironically,
the reforms are being handed down in an authoritarian
fashion that contradicts the professed liberalizing aims
of both the incumbent President and his successor. Still,
the new measures eliminate, or at least moderate, much of
the sweeping authority and arbitrariness with which the
military has governed over the years.
National Security Law
Among the major features of the new security law are
provisions that:
Eliminate the death penalty and life im-
prisonment.
-- Reduce substantially the penalties for a
large number of offenses.
-- Transfer investigatory responsibility from
/2" the military to civilian authorities.
-- Require the police to report immediately
to the judiciary the arrest of "national
security" suspects.
The law is significantly more lenient than the one
it replaces, which was enacted during a time of serious
political tensions and active subversion. Nevertheless,
some aspects have drawn serious criticisms from opposition
3 politicians, journalists, and the church. They point out,
-I for example, that there is still a provision for holding
suspects incommunicado, which clearly conflicts with other
laws reestablishing habeas corpus. Cynics also question
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whether giving prisoners the right to have a physical
examination while in custody will prevent abuse, since
security authorities determine who will administer the
examination.
A leading Rio de Janeiro daily has called the new
security law a contradiction of the political reforms
the regime claim,--, to be making. The National Council of
Brazilian Bishops has criticized the government's haste
in ramming through Congress a measure that conflicts with
the "demands of justice and the common good." Unhappy
congressmen have proposed at least 1.50 amendments, but
the government has made clear that it will accept no more
than cosmetic changes. In the end, the administration
will probably have its way since it has a majority in
Congress and is still operating with the sweeping decree
powers its reforms will. replace.
Political Reform Pack
Last month the administration pushed through Congress
a "political reform ;package" that, beginning in January
1979, will revoke! the chief executive's ability to:
-- Close Congress and rule by decree.
-- Deprive elected officials of -their man
dates or political rights.
-- Intervene in states or municipalities
without. respect to the constitution.
Moreover, the reforms establish the right of habeas
corpus in political cases and protect the independence of
the judiciary. At the same time, however, all actions
taken under earlier decree laws will remain in effect
and will be exempt from judicial review. Thus, there
is no provision for amnesty, nor are the persons who
have lost their political rights been aided by the reforms.
The reform package, like the security laws, evoked
significant--but ineffective--criticism from opposition
congressmen and others who felt it did not go far enough
and failed to address grievances such as the indirect
election of governors and of one-third of the national
senators.
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Standby Safeguards
Instead of the former decrees, the President will
have three levels of standby "safeguards" whose use will
involve the legislative branch. Under each level of
"safeguard," the Chief Executive will have the power to:
-- Order detentions of individuals.
-- Order searches and confiscations.
-- Suspend the right of assembly.
-- Intervene in labor unions.
-- Censor the media.
-- Temporarily occupy state agencies and
public corporations.
The three levels of "safeguards" are defined as:
-- A "state of siege," which can be de-
clared in case of war or a serious
subversive threat. It must be ap-
proved by Congress and cannot ini-
tially exceed 180 days, but can be
extended.
-- A "state of emergency," which can be
declared under less threatening cir-
cumstances. It does not need con-
gressional approval, but the Presi-
dent must communicate his intentions
to Congress. This cannot initially
exceed 90 days, but may be extended.
-- "Measures of emergency," which can be
applied in specific locations "threat-
ened by calamities or disturbances" not
warranting declaration of a nationwide
state of siege or emergency. Congress
must be informed within 48 hours of the
issuance of orders under this provision.
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Outlook
The political reform package constitutes a signifi-
cant departure from the unilateral, virtually unlimited
authority the regime has exercised until. now. Even so,
it is still decidedly authoritarian in that the govern-
ment will have considerable latitude to determine what
kind of measure is warranted b
c
diti
M
y
on
ons.
oreover,
it is not at al]!- clear whether the new Congress--which
was elected this week--will be permitted or inclined
to have a. will of its own or will remain a rubber stamp
as in the past.
With the expected approval of the security legisla-
tion, the basic rules defining presidential authority
will be in place, laying the foundation for Figueiredo's
administration. The next--and probably last--major under-
taking before the transition next March will be the mod-
ification of the present government-created party sys-
tem. The results of this week's congressional balloting
will most likely determine how drastic a revision of the
party system the government deems necessary.
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Brazil: Short-Term Prospects for the New Administration*
We expect the administration of President Joao
Baptista Figueiredo to continue the effort begun by
President Geisel to open the political system to greater
civilian participation. Figueiredo could even be the
last strictly military president.
This "liberalization" process, though, will be sub-
ject to setbacks, and its ultimate success is by no means
guaranteed. There are still, for example, important mili.-
tarr officers who oppose liberalization; moreover,
civilian pressures for further progress could eventually
unnerve either Figueiredo or the military establishment
as a whole and lead to a conservative backlash.
We expect the new government to continue the policy
of export-led economic growth that has characterized
recent years, and there could be new emphasis on de-
veloping Brazil's agricultural sector. The Brazilians
will remain highly dependent on and receptive to foreign
investment.
We also expect the new administration to scale
down--but by no means abandon--Brazil's massive nuclear
development program, whose centerpiece is the 1975 deal
with West Germany. Financial problems will probably
force the Brazilians to cut back, but their determina-
tion to master nuclear technology is in no way diminished.
Finally, we believe Figueiredo has an open mind
with regard to relations with the United States and
clearly hopes that recent tensions between the countries
over nuclear nonproliferation and human rights can be
overcome. Nonetheless, the new governing team will be
very wary of US intentions in these areas, which will
continue to be seen in Brasilia as potential stumbli
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q
Argentina: Criticism of Videla
Argentina and Chile have agreed to continue diplo-
matic efforts to resolve the Beagle Channel dispute, but
the prospects for a negotiated settlement seem as remote
as ever. Both nations are maintaining their military
forces in a high state of readiness.
While no hostile moves have occurred in the past few
days, the possibility of an armed confrontation is still
taken seriously in both capitals. Most Argentines real-
ize that the nation cannot be maintained :indefinitely on
a war footing, given the high costs involved and the
rampant inflation--which has already produced grumbling
among lower ranking officers over the failure of their.
wages to keep pace with the cost of living. Some hard-
:Line generals and admirals in Argentina reportedly are
making plans for a show of force in the next few months
if further negotiations prove unproductive.
Regardless of how the Argentine Government deals
with Chile in the negotiations, official embarrassment
over the handling of the Beagle Channel affair--which
has kept Argentina in a state of constant agitation for
months--has increasingly divided the government and left
it unsure of what its next move should be. Moreover,
the issue has focused attention in Buenos Aires on the
inefficiency of President Videla's rule by consensus.
Conservative military leaders, critical of the apparent
indecisiveness of Videla's conciliatory style, now seem
to be gaining ground at the President's expense.
Many senior officers see the present system of gov-
ernment--in which Videla is supposed to share power with
the military junta--as unworkable. They believe that
Videla is doing the best job he can but are disturbed by
his insistence on sharing key responsibilities with the
three services. While Videla claims to be maintaining
military unity in this manner, his critics believe that
authority at the top has been overly diluted, that no
one is really in charge, and that military unity is dis-
integrating.
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The recent Cabinet shuffle--in which Videla failed
to make good on his promise to name prominent civilians
to head the Justice and Education Ministries--provides
2 fresh evidence of his inability to assert his authority.
3 The armed services also reportedly rejected the Presi-
dent's first choices of retired military officers to
head the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and So-
cial. Welfare.
25X1 some nationalistic officers are talking about re-
placing Videla, we have no firm evidence of serious coup
r plotting or of wide military support for such a move.
The possibility of a coup seems remote so long as the
dispute with Chile remains Argentina's primary policy
concern.
At this point, however, the disarray in Buenos Aires
is seriously complicating the development of a politically
acceptable compromise to the Beagle Channel dispute.
Even though both governments agreed late last week to
continue negotiations, the long-term prospects for reso-
lution of the basic differences remain poor. No Argentine
leader seems willing to take full responsibility for the
1 7 diplomatic compromises necessary to meet the Chileans'
position. Meanwhile, officials in Santiago see further
talks as a useful mechanism for wearing down the Argen-
tines. Last week the Chilean Foreign Minister told the
.US Ambassador that Chile would continue to fence with
Argentina over procedural modalities in the bel~ of that
time favors Chile.
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Chile: Labor Elections--Toward a New Labor Relations
System
-~-?- -'!'
On 31 October about a third of Chile's 1 million
union members voted for new leaders in about 2,000 locals
in the private sector. This election ended a five-year
ban on union activity with a step toward a new labor re-
lations system and represents a building block in the
Pinochet government's new economic and political design
for Chile.
The elections were hurriedly called in response to
an AFL-CIO threat of a trade boycott, but the push for
a new labor union framework was homegrown. The govern-
ment envisions a labor movement restricted to economic
activity and insulated from political influence. The
government's goals are the productive working of Chile's
free market economic system and the elimination of a
base of political opposition. The regime will further
spell out its labor 'policy early next :year in a new col-
lective bargaining law.
Some Aspects of the Regime's Plan
The Chilean military regime explicitly supports the
principle of freely functioning economic associations,
including unions. The principle, written into the re-
gime's draft constitution, was reiterated by the Labor
Minister in his 27 October speech announcing the union
elections. He also stated a key qualification, that
if . union liberty, which is a projection of the natural
right to associate . . . can be restricted only by clear
reasons of the common good. . . ." The undefined "com-
mon good" implies a prohibition of labor involvement in
political activity. The regime has constantly asserted
that unions must be "depoliticized," and the rules of
the recent elections make this very clear.
The Apolitical Union Elections
The elections covered all private sector unions ex-
cept those in agriculture and the maritime industry.
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Both white- and blue-collar workers were to vote for of-
ficers of a single union in each economic unit.
Any Chilean who participated in political activity
in the last 10 years was ineligible for labor leadership.
In addition, upon election, new local officers had to
swear they had not participated in politics and would
not use union office for political purposes.
In a further attempt to separate labor from politics,
the regime declared ineligible all incumbent officers,
including some appointed by the government and some in
office since the coup. It thus removed all well known
labor leaders as well as numerous figures opposing the
regime.
Limiting the time available for campaigning was a
tactic employed by the government in the 4 January 1978
plebiscite and was used again last month; this time only
two or three days were given for election preparations.
In addition, sanctions were authorized against anyone
who criticized the election process, publicly suggested
candidates, or propagandized a position or recommenda-
tion with respect to the election. The effect of the
rules was that the elections were conducted without nom-
inations, campaigning, or discussion of issues or per-
sonalities, making difficult the election of even covert
candidates of political parties and removing conditions
that usually enable organized minorities to structure
and dominate election outcomes.
Three leaders were chosen for each local. Members
of each local--checked from government lists--were to
write the names of two candidates, each of whom had to
be affiliated with the union for five years. The three
candidates obtaining the largest number of votes were
elected for four years, dividing among themselves the
posts of president, secretary, and treasurer.
The Election
According to preliminary reports voter turnout was
high, and the elections were conducted honestly and with-
out incident. All interested groups doubtless did their
best to elect sympathetic leaders within the terms of
the election rules. The regime has since announced that
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it has no grounds to disqualify any of the some 6,000
union leaders elected, though there may be some weeding
out in the future.
Postelection Unions
There are undoubtedly political party "sleepers"
among the newly elected leaders. One criticism of the
election rules was that--contrary to their intention--
they gave power to clandestine minorities. How many
Trojan horses were selected is a very important question,
but one which is not immediately answerable. On the
other hand, there were unquestionably leaders elected--
how many is impossible to say--who sympathize with aspects
of the regime's projected labor relations system and who
want to work within it.
In the short term, all elected. leaders, whatever
their beliefs, will keep the unions politically neutral
and concentrate their energies on economic issues.
Since Chile is now entering a period when its workers
believe they should be rewarded for their voluntary eco-
nomic restraint during the last five years, satisfying
workers' economic demands will be the supreme test for
the new union leadership.
The Rest of the ;System
Although the regime permitted union elections, it
has not restored union liberties. Workers cannot meet
freely, cannot bargain collectively, and do not have the
right to strike. Apparently the right to meet freely
and to bargain collectively will be granted in new labor
legislation in the first quarter of 1979. The right to
strike--though abolished for public sector unions--will
probably not be denied, but it will be highly qualified.
Undoubtedly it will become a legal last resort after
unions have exhausted alternatives. The power of labor
unionism in Chile may also be diminished by eliminating
the dues checkoff and by limiting the financing of feder-
ations and confederations to voluntary contributions
from union members rather than from affiliated local or-
ganizations. in general, the power of local unions to
form larger organizations still seems undecided; the
opposition charges that the new system seeks to "atomize"
the labor movement.
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The.Eastern Caribbean
POertQ icORicon Anguilla
Jnbn (UK)?
(~ Ibom
St. Martin (Guadeloupe)
ls(/Mana Vieques Virgin Is
(Pic. Rico) (U.S.) St. Maarten o St. Barthelemy (Guadeloupe)
C1, (Neth.) Saba (Neth.) i Barbuda
. St. Eu>;tatiusw
.... U.S.A{
THE
DBI- (
NAM
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BAHAMAS
I
CUl~A ~- - DOMINICAN
HAt~ HEPOSLIC
IAMAtIA
CARIBBEAN SEA
(Neth) St Kitts
St. KittsNevts I Antigua (U.K.)
FNevis(U.K.) i Anigua
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The Opposition and the Future
Even in its embryonic form, the new system has aroused
considerable opposition from political party leaders and
labor officials who held office before the coup. Most
of the latter, as well as many of their allies, now find
themselves disbarred from union office. Their loss of
personal power as well as their beliefs motivate them to
work against the new labor relations system. The target
of their effort..-, will be the Chilean workers themselves,
for what matters ultimately is whether. Chilean rank-and-
file workers affirm or reject the regime's new labor
unionism. The outcome of this struggle is by no means a
foregone conclusion. It cannot be assumed that the op-
position labor elites speak for ordinary workers. The
regime hopes they do not, and it will seek to persuade
workers in the coming months that their best interests
will lie with the new system.
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Emerging Island States in the Eastern Caribbean
When the island of Dominica became independent early
this month, it began a movement that is almost certain
to result in independence before 1981 for four other
aid -hungry microstates of the eastern Caribbean--Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent, Antigua, and Saint Kitts-Nevis.
These predominantly black, impoverished islands--whose
total population is under a half million people--face
severe economic problems and a growing potential for
political instability.
The Failure of Regional Integration
The apparently irreversible course toward independ-
ence ends a century of unsuccessful efforts by the United
Kingdom to bring about a federation of its many Caribbean
territories. Saint Kitts-Nevis, Antigua, and Dominica
were members of the Leeward Islands Federation formed in
1871, and all five island groups have enthusiastically
supported various integration schemes since the end of
World War II. They belonged to the Federation of the
West Indies (1958-62), which tried to impose political
unification on 10 English-speaking territories, and in
1973 were among the founders of its less ambitious eco-
nomic successor, the Caribbean Community.
After the breakup of the West Indies Federation,
the small islands tried to form a "rump" federation and
came close to agreement on the establishment of common
services and a unified system of taxation. The negotia-
tors, however, could not overcome traditional obstacles
such as leadership rivalries, competitive economies, and
political insularity. In the late 1960s, the five became
separate home-rule states "associated" with the UK, which
has since provided budgetary support for their weak, ag-
ricultural economies.
The trend toward fragmentation has affected even
the least populated island group of Saint Kitts-Nevis.
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John Compton.
Premier of Saint Lucia
Milton Cato
Premier of Saint Vincent
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C. A. Paul Southwell
Premier of Saint Kitts-Nevis
Vera C. Bird
Premier of Antigua
Patrick John
Prime Minister of Dominica
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For a century the British administered the two neighboring
islands along with Anguilla, 70 miles to the northwest,
as a three-island unit, which today has a combined popu-
lation under 60,000. In 1967, however, Anguilla rebelled
against the Saint Kitts - based government--British'para-
troopers and marines put down the rebellion in 1969--and
eventually reverted to colonial status in 1971. Last
year Nevis voted overwhelmingly to follow suit rather
than become formally independent in association with
Saint Kitts, but chances have since improved for resolv-
ing this conflict.
Independence, which has had little apparent mass
support on any of the islands, has been encouraged by
political leaders who believe it will boost their domestic
political positions and make international aid more acces-
sible. The UK wanting relief from its aid burden, favors
the movement. Integration remains the universally ac-
knowledged wiser but unachievable course.
Economic Prospects
The economic outlook for all the islands is bleak,
although Saint Lucia and Antigua have better managed
and relatively diversified economies. Although the two
islands have per capita incomes under $700, this is more
than double the amount for each of the others. Unemploy-
ment ranges from about 20 percent of the labor force in
Antigua to about 60 percent in Saint Vincent. Unemploy-
ment and underemployment are especially acute among young
people, a demographic majority in all five states. While
the islands have few exploitable resources and only
limited hope for diversifying their one or two-crop
economies, their labor forces will probably double within
the next decade.
A top priority, but a probably elusive goal as the
islands become independent will be to attract foreign
aid and investment. Keeping what little capital and
foreign investment they already have is likely to be dif-
ficult enough. Local political conditions will discourage
new investors, and finding aid donors to replace the UK's
traditional budgetary assistance will not be easy.
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Political Pros scts
The five governments, all based on moderate labor
movements, are still democratic but are becoming in-
creasingly authoritarian in the face of seemingly insur-
mountable economic problems. This trend is even stronger
among the emerging generation of national leaders whose
leftist views will encounter decreasing opposition in the
wake of a middle-class "brain drain" that has accelerated
in the 1970s.
The leaders of Saint Kitts and Dominica have in the
past expressed admiration for the "socialist" development
strategies of Guyana and Jamaica, and small but growing
pro-Cuban radical movements exist in at least three of
the islands. Jamaica and Guyana, now in obvious economic
decline, have decreased in appeal, however, and a turn
to socialist :models has been further slowed by the West-
ern countries' involvement in a multilateral development
fund for the Caribbean. At least one of the island
leaders, Patrick John of Dominica, seems to have altered
his political orientation accordingly, abandoning his
earlier decision to accept Cuban technical assistance
and taking instead a strong public stand against Commu-
nism.
Nevertheless, political development in the region
does not favor democracy. Political leaders are typically
heavyhanded, and local. democratic structures are ex-
tremely weak. Cabinets are generally inexperienced and
often staffed with incompetent and corrupt ministers,
the direct result of the flight of better educated people.
Parliaments and political parties seem to be influenced
by autocratic leaders rather than responsive to the pop-
ular will. Electoral systems are increasingly susceptible
to manipulation by ruling parties, and young people are
apparently becoming more impatient with "ineffective"
democratic procedures. Unless the grim economic picture
improves dramatically, the gradual decline of democracy--
probably hastened by labor unrest:--will probably continue.
Foreign Policy
The five countries will base foreign policy on an
aggressive search for aid directed primarily at Western
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sources. Although they will remain friendly toward the
US, they will generally support Third World positions in
international forums and will probably establish diplo-
matic relations with Cuba.
Since 1976 Cuba has offered aid to the governments
of Antigua, Dominica, and Saint Vincent, and Havana has
links with radical movements on all three islands. Cuba,
however, is not likely to gain significant influence over
any Eastern Caribbean government in the near future. The
moderate leaders of Barbados and "oil-rich" Trinidad-and-
Tobago, which has already launched an aid program for the
islands, will carry much greater weight than the Cubans.
The increase in the number of small English-speaking
states in the Caribbean will undoubtedly present some
early problems for international organizations such as
the Organization of American States (OAS). Statehood
for the small islands could eventually place a decisive
English-speaking voting bloc in the OAS. The potential
international influence of the islands is limited, however,
by their extreme dependence on outside economic assist-
ance and by their historical tendency to act independently
of one another.
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