LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 21, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/02/19: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO01000010013-4 0~r f
Foreign I F
Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
RP LAR 78-017
21 December 1978
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
21 December 1978
CONTENTS
Bolivia: Problems for President Padilla
The new leader faces a multitude of diffi-
culties, not least of which is the growing
disaffection of the military, and is unlikely
to last until national elections can be held
early next year.
Cuba: Evolving Energy Policy
Cuba's severely limited domestic energy re-
sources and a shrinking Soviet oil surplus
are forcing Havana to adopt a long-term
policy centered on nuclear energy.
The North-South Dialoque and US-Jamaican
Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Jamaican political leaders believe that the
North-South dialogue has significant long-
range importance for their country, but they
place a much higher priority on bilateral
relations with the US.
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25X1 FOR THE RECORD
Cuban Chronology for November 1978 . 22
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Bolivia: Problems for President Padilla
After less than a month in office, Bolivia's con-
servative President Padilla faces serious labor unrest
and growing disaffection within the highly politicized
military establishment. So far, he has not asserted
authority over his administration, which is dominated by
a loosely knit group of junior officers pushing for
national elections early next year. It is unlikely that
Padilla will last until then. He has not shown that he
has the skills needed to cope with deepening economic
problems and the highly conspiratorial political environ-
ment. Rumors of coup plotting are already widespread
and a move against the government could come at any time.
Late last month, the government reached a wage agree-
ment with the state-owned mining confederation, but ne-
gotiations with unions in the private sector have been
complicated by mineowners' claims that they cannot afford
to grant major salary increases. If a general accord is
not reached in the near future, the mining confederation
threatens to initiate an industry-wide solidarity strike.
Transportation, telephone, and public utility workers
earlier this week called a general strike to force the
government to grant salary increases and more union
autonomy, and to meet its financial obligations to the
national railway enterprise. Padilla has not indicated
how he intends to deal with labor's demands, but the
nation cannot afford to lose its rail service to key
mining areas for any length of time.
Both Finance Minister Alba and Lt. Colonel Gary
Prado--who as Minister of Planning and Coordination has
emerged as the strongest and most outspoken member of
this government--have promised to implement unpopular
austerity measures recommended by the International Mon-
etary Fund to ease Bolivia's balance of payments difficul-
ties, but their ability and willingness to follow through
21 December 1978
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is probably limited. prices
of petroleum products will almost certainly increase this
month or next. and a devaluation of the Bolivian peso is
under review. Both measures would reduce the already
shaky confidence of the local business community in the
administration. Devaluation could also play into the
hands of the military and civilian groups who are already
i
i
consp
r
ng to overthrow Padilla.
Military opposition to Padilla's government, and
especially to his cabinet, is also keeping the situation
unstable. Conservative officers fear that a rush to
elections will allow former President Sues Zuazo, who
has extensive leftist connections, to gain power--an in-
tolerable development for them. The brunt of their crit-
icism is directed against Interior Minister Raul Lopez,
who was in close contact with Sues Zuazo during Padilla's
coup. Earlier this month, officers in Cochabamba sent a
letter to Army headquarters in La Paz requesting that
Lopez and three other military officers who occupy high
tence, and leitist affiliations.
Officers of the Bolivian armed forces are deeply
divided between those who believe that they should re-
vitalize their professionalism by retiring from politics
and those who fear that elections will. breed more polit-
ical instabil:it;y by bringing a leftist or Marxist govern-
ment to power. These tensions worked to undermine Presi-
dent Pereda's government and have not been resolved by
P
dill
'
i
a
a
s se
zure of power.
The situation has been further complicated by the
Padilla government's shoddy treatment of former President
Banzer, who provided Bolivia with the longest period of
political and economic stability the country has known.
Late last month, for example, Banzer was reconfirmed as
Ambassador to Argentina only to be abruptly dismissed
two days later. Several of the ;junior officers who now
wield power were sent into exile during JBanzer's admin-
istration and have grievances against him. Their anti-
Banzer sentiment is not at all pervasive in the armed
forces, however, and efforts to discredit him could back-
21 December 1978
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If a coup is mounted against President Padilla, the
US Defense Attache in La Paz believes that Army Commander
General Azero is the most likely to lead it. Although
Azero appears to be loyal to Padilla's government and is
publicly supporting elections, he shows signs of being
an opportunist and could betray Padilla as he did Banzer
and Pereda.
With all these factors in play, the situation is
highly unstable. The fragile military unity that Banzer
was able to sustain as the mainstay of his lengthy tenure
is rapidly disintegrating as both active-duty and retired
officers maneuver behind the scenes. Bolivia once again
appears to be sliding toward the political chaos that has
inhibited policy formulation and economic growth for most
of its history.
21 December 1978
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of
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Kilometers
21 December 1978
6
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A `c
jj^^
lean de Avila Isar rh-,_.
Caniguey
Major Energy Installations
in Cuba
Hydroelectric
Air Nuclear power plant
Oil refinery
Major thermal plant
THE i1AHAMAS
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Cuba: Evolving Energy Policy
Cuba's severely limited domestic energy resources
and a shrinking Soviet oil surplus are forcing Havana to
adopt a long-term policy centered on nuclear energy. Im-
ported petroleum now accounts for over two-thirds of
Cuba's total energy needs, compared to about 45 percent in
1957. Growing demand will further increase Cuba's depen-
dence on foreign energy sources in the coming years, with
imported uranium complementing petroleum in the mid-to-
late 1980s when Cuba's first nuclear power plant is
scheduled to come on line. Plans for two power stations
suggest that the USSR is encouraging Havana to proceed
with the development of nuclear energy because of the
rising cost of imported petroleum the strain on So-
viet oil supplies. E
Cuba's Nuclear Program
The Soviet-sponsored nuclear power program in Cuba
has been in the planning stage for several years. Cuban
Vice President Jose Fernandez, who chaired a CEMA com-
mission meeting on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in
/ Havana from 21 to 24 November, has outlined Cuba's ambi-
tious program:
-- The first nuclear power station--scheduled to
begin partial operation by 1985--will be lo-
cated near the industrialized and heavily popu-
lated city of Cienfuegos.
L~ -- Studies are under way to pick a location for a
second power station nearby.
~" -- The Cienfuegos plant will house two 440 MWe
pressurized water reactors similar to those
installed in Finland and various East European
(CEMA) countries.
21 December 1978
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-- The Cuban Government has decided that nuclear
power plants will be the principal source of
future electrical generation (suggesting a nu-
clear program expanded beyond current plans).
-- Cuba has decided to connt modern nuclear
research center. 25X1
The Soviets have provided Cuba with scientists,
engineers and survey teams for the construction of the
power plant. They are also training Cuban technicians
and engineers in the Soviet Union to install, operate,
and maintain the equipment. These trainees are from the
Cuban Institute of Nuclear Research, a part of the Aca-
demy of Sciences. This institute headed by Raimundo
Franco since 3.974, will be responsible for bringing Cuba
into the nuclear age. It has 160 employees, only 75 of
whom are university graduates. 25X1
When the first stage of Cuba's nuclear program is
complete and both of the Cienfuegos reactors are opera-
tional in the mid-to-late 1980s, nuclear power will ac-
count for about :25 percent of Cuba's total electrical
generating capacity.
Petroleum
Petroleum is Cuba's present major source of energy,
providing over two-thirds of total requirements. Virtu-
ally all of Cuba's needs--120,000 barrels per day of
crude and 70,000 barrels per day of products--are obtained
from the Soviet Union at about four-fifths of the world
market price. Despite extensive exploration in recent
years with Soviet and Romanian assistance, Cuban domestic
crude production is minimal and accounts for only about
2 percent of needed supplies. Moscow has agreed to pro-
vide all of Havana's petroleum requirements through 1980
and will link the prices it charges to the price it pays
for Cuban sugar.
Earlier this year, Castro called Cuba's dependence
on oil "a tragedy," indicating his awareness of the
energy crunch that is Last year, the Soviets
negotiated an arrangement with the Venezuelans whereby
Caracas ships 10,000 barrels of crude per day to Cuba,
and the Soviets provide a like amount to Spain, thereby
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saving transportation costs. The arrangement, which ran
into some initial difficulties, now seems to be working
smoothly, although prospects for the long term are uncer-
In the fall of 1974 Castro may have tried to ingra-
tiate himself with the OPEC countries in the hope of
broadening his oil supply. Commenting that "OPEC was a
just reaction" to the exploitative methods of large
transnational companies, he was critical of "US threats"
against OPEC's pricing policies. When Castro's call. for
OPEC support to developing nations went unanswered, how-
ever, his public posture changed. He complained that
while the developing countries had given "solidarity"
support to OPEC, they had not received the expected in-
vestment of oil revenues in their countries. In the fall
of 1976 Castro noted that while sugar prices had dropped
dramatically, oil-producing countries "have a monopoly
that allows them to set the price they so desire."
Other Sources
Cuba's second most important fuel is bagasse--the
fibrous pulp byproduct of the sugarcane milling process.
It is used primarily in the sugar industry because of
prohibitive handling and transportation'costs. In 1957,
R~- bagasse provided about half of Cuba's total energy re-
quirements, but since the revolution its contribution has
declined to about 25 percent because of greater reliance
on petroleum and the increased use of bagasse as a raw
material for paper and wall board.
Cuba has virtually no other domestic energy sources.
It has no known deposits of coal. Deposits of lignite
are small and remote, and peat deposits, although wide-
spread, are not economically exploitable. Hydroelectric
power is limited because Cuba's rivers are mostly short
and shallow and prone to wide seasonal variations in flow.
Although some wood and charcoal are used in homes and
small commercial establishments, their contribution to
the energy supply is very small and has no potential.
In limited contacts with US businessmen, the Cubans have
expressed interest in solar energy technology. This
technology however, so far has only marginal potential
heating requirements are minimal.
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Energy Shortage
Cuba's present electrical-power supply is inadequate.
Both industrial and residential demands have increased and
brownouts occur frequently. Most of the old, inefficient
plants--which account for about one-fifth of installed
capacity--cannot operate at full capacity. For example,
some plants contain components manufactured in the US up
to 50 years ago, making spare parts virtually unobtain-
able and creating severe maintenance problems. The Cubans
have recently completed a national grid system designed
to enable one locality to shift power to an area that is
experiencing a shortage.
Castro gave a detailed speech earlier this year on
the subject of Cuba's growing electrical needs and its
plans for the future. Noting that by the end of this
year Cuba will have five times the generating capacity
it had before the revolution
he added that "b
1980
,
y
Cuba will double the 1975 electricity producing potential."
OL
Castro commented that investment in an electrical system
can never stop and that it must move ahead of the rest
of the country's economic development. He also pointed
out that since 1958 the demand for residential electricity
has doubled and made a plea for conservation.
Cuba's energy policymakers are faced with the same
dilemma that has sent the economies of many developing
countries plummeting since the oil embargo of 1973. They
must try to meet growing industrial and residential
demand for energy, but have an almost total lack of in-
digenous energy sources to build on. Complicating these
conditions in Cuba's case is its unique relationship
with and dependence upon the Soviet Union.
Castro must feel he is being backed into a corner
by a combination of international economic pressures and
accidents of Cuban geology, neither of which he can con-
trol. He knows that if the USSR cuts off his oil supply,
about two-thirds of Cuba's foreign exchange would be con-
sumed by oil.purchases bringing serious consequences for
Cuba's already bleak economic prospects. Castro must
also be aware that the Soviets are worried about their
own shrinking oil supply, which adds more pressure on
Cuba to develop independent energy sources. As a result,
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major source of energy in the future.
the Cuban leader has little choice but to follow the
Soviets' advice and attempt to make nuclear power Cuba's
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The North-South Dialoogje and US-Jamaican Relations
Jamaican political. leaders believe that the North-
South dialogue has significant long-range importance
for their country, but they place a much higher priority
on bilateral relations with the United States. The
Jamaican Government will not allow North-South disagree-
States supports the dialogue in principle.
ments to weaken these relations so long as the United
logue.
Most Jamaicans, however, are far more concerned
with the country's serious economic decline under
Manley. Because he believes that his best. hope for
help in shoring up the Jamaican economy lies with the
West, Manley has been working energetically to improve
relations with the United States, the largest potential
source of bilateral aid. Manley is unlikely to jeo-
pardize that relationship through bilateral actions or
moves in other international forums because of lack of
progress or even stagnation in the North-South dia-
apparent benefits for their nation.
Prime Minister Michael Manley, the chief architect
of Jamaica's foreign policy, has been in the forefront
of the demand by developing countries (LDCs) for a New
International. Economic Order (NIEO); he will host a
seven-nation m:inisumnit on North-South issues late
this month. His views have been backed strongly by
his influential Foreign Minister, by Jamaica's highly
respected permanent representative to the United
Nations, and by the country's moderately inclined
opposition leaders. Virtually all informed Jamaicans
instinctively approve of the NIEO because of its
The NIEO and Jamaican Foreign Policy
Support for the NIEO is a logical outgrowth of the
2 development of Jamaican foreign policy since independence
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3
on US trade and investment.
in 1962. The small nation has developed an increasingly
independent foreign policy that aims to diversify trade
ties and sources of foreign investment in local enter-
prises. While national leaders generally have been
friendly toward Washington, they have long tried--with
little success--to lessen Jamaica's primary dependence
Jamaican leaders have allied their nation with the
Third World because they believe Jamaica has economic
problems common to LDCs. Jamaicans are actually better
off than most people of the Third World, and their economy
has a relatively diversified base in bauxite mining,
tourism, manufacturing, and agriculture. Nevertheless,
economic development has been hampered by a small domes-
tic market, by extreme dependence on outside economic
forces, and by the absence of natural resources besides
bauxite. After 16 years of independence, Jamaica is
still characterized by high unemployment--currently about
30 percent of the labor force--and by a severe maldistri-
Since 1972 Jamaica's nonaligned foreign policy has
been more precisely defined by Manley. He has been par-
ticularly effective as an LDC spokesman, and his elo-
quently expressed views draw on his assessment of recent
Jamaican history. He has enjoined the LDCs to band to-
gether in the UN and to strengthen their economic ties as
essential steps in overcoming their disadvantage in the
world economy. He has been a vigorous supporter of LDC
proposals on the Common Fund, debt relief, commodity
agreements, technology transfer, and foreign investment
codes.
3
countries and has succeeded to a considerable extent.
tect of foreign policy and its dominant voice in the
North-South dialogue. He has tried to make Jamaica a
respected influence among both developed and developing
The Architects of Foreign Policy
Manley.is unquestionably the country's chief archi-
Manley has made Jamaica a prominent member of the
nonaligned movement, and his nation has recently completed
a year as chairman of the Group of 77 at the UN in New
York. In October, the Prime Minister made a widely
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acclaimed address to the UN General Assembly, where he
had come to receive a special award for his eloquent
opposition to apartheid. In November Jamaica was
elected to the UN Security Council for a term beginning
next January. Since February Manley has met with at
least 16 heads of government from five continents and a
vice premier from a sixth.
Manley delivering stirring anti-apartheid speech at UN last October
Manley's positions in the North-South dialogue have
universal support. at home. Foreign Minister P. J.
Patterson, a leading politician frequently mentioned as
Manley's likely successor, is a strong nationalist who
has probably advocated most LDC stands before the Prime
Minister. Jamaica's permanent representative to the
United Nations since 1973, Donald 0. Mills, is a po-
litical moderate and a highly competent diplomat whose
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commitment to the NIEO stems as much from personal con-
viction as from Manley's direction.
Although the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP)
has been bitterly critical of Manley's economic mis-
management, it has readily endorsed his foreign policy.
Under the JLP's leadership the government in the first
decade of independence brought Jamaica into the non-
aligned movement and launched the country's orientation
toward the Third World.
3
culture.
The present leader of the JLP, Edward Seaga, is
personally more cautious than Manley as well as the head
of the more conservative major party in Jamaica. Never-
theless, Seaga supported nonalignment and was one of the
first prominent politicians to evoke the economic
nationalism that is now central to Jamaica's political
and Third World debt relief.
Manley's Minisummit
Manley is playing on his international reputation
to convene in Jamaica on 28-29 December a multilateral
conference on North-South issues. The top leaders of
six other nations--Australia, Canada, Nigeria, Norway,
Venezuela, and West Germany--have accepted Manley's
invitation to meet informally to discuss various issues,
including commodity earnings stabilization, energy prob-
lems, technology transfer, international monetary reform,
The minisummit will be historic for Jamaica and
politically enhancing for Manley, although it will
probably have little impact on the North-South dialogue.
The Prime Minister's political boost, moreover, is likely
b to be short-lived, since the worsening economic hardship
that most Jamaicans attribute to Manley's mistakes is
certain to continue long after the world leaders have gone
home.
The Domestic Situation
Jamaicans are highly concerned by the country's
serious economic decline during Manley's seven-year rule.
Reliable polls show that they blame government mismanage-
ment for their worsening plight, and they apparently have
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little faith that the North-South dialogue can solve their
problems. Although Manley is closely identified with the
dis-
d littl
h
e
a
LDC demand for the NIEO, the issue has
cernible impact on domestic politics.
Committed to achieving economic diversification,
alleviating high unemployment, and redistributing ex-
tremely uneven incomes, the Manley government in 1972
embarked on a program that called for much greater
3 government participation in the economy. In 1974,
Manley imposed a 600 percent tax hike on bauxite
production and has since then partially nationalized the
local holdings of four North American bauxite companies.
Manley's nationalistic policies, however, have not
achieved the intended results. Since the 1973-74 world
oil crisis, the Jamaican economy has experienced one of
the sharpest sustained declines of any developing country.
The stage for this downturn, however, was set even before
the oil shock. Heavily dependent on private capital in-
flows, the economy began to slip following completion of
major foreign investments in bauxite/alumina and tourism
in the early 1970s. The pace of decline quickened with
the erosion in investor confidence induced by the Manley
government's leftward drift and the sharply higher oil
import costs. Since 1972 real GNP has dropped at least
16 percent, and unemployment has risen from 21 percent
to 30 percent.
By early 1977 Manley apparently became convinced that
considerable long-term foreign assistance would be needed
to shore up the rapidly deteriorating economy and that his
request for aid from the Soviet bloc had fallen on deaf
ears. He backtracked, therefore, on an earlier pledge
to his leftist supporters and turned to the US and the
International Monetary Fund for help. The United States
last year agreed to a $63 million aid package, and the
IMF agreed to a two-year credit contingent on adherence
to six performance: tests, half of which the government
had failed by last: December. The IMF' nevertheless agreed
to a new three-year loan last May that has again bailed
out Manley's government. The Prime Minister is now de-
pendent on this loan and on additional aid from the
United States, Venezuela, Canada, the United Kingdom,
and other Western sources.
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After pledging last year never to cut back his
social programs or to devalue further the Jamaican dollar,
the Prime Minister has since been forced to do both. The
devaluation last May was the fourth in 15 months and the
sixth since 1973, when Manley imposed Jamaica's first
unilateral devaluation. The IMF package also calls for
a wage ceiling that is almost certain to hurt Manley's
relationship with his trade union power base and to
spark labor unrest.
HERO FIDDLES WHILE HOME BURNS!"
Jamaica's independent Daily Gleaner spoofs Manley
Manley's political stock has consequently declined,
and there is now little chance that he can recover the
stature he had through the 1976 election. Polls indicate
that his popularity is at its lowest point since he came
to power in 1972. Moreover, voter surveys confirm that
his People's National Party (PNP) has steadily lost the
wide margin of support with which it routed the opposi-
tion almost two years ago. In July the opposition JLP
came out ahead in a poll for the first time since Manley
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took office. The PNP's labor union arm, which is essen-
tial to winning elections, has recently experienced sig-
nificant defections to the union affiliate of the opposi-
tion party.
Manley is increasingly on the defensive with polit-
ically sophisticated union members, businessmen, small
farmers, and the mmass of unorganized but pragmatically
inclined urban and rural workers who will elect a new
government by 1981. If present trends continue, local
pressure groups within Jamaica's traditional two-party
system are likely to defeat Manley--despite his achieve-
ments as an LDC leader or the promise of the NIEO.
It also appears that Manley's domestic failings are
gradually hurting his international. reputation. Some
Caribbean leaders such as Prime Ministers Tom Adams of
Barbados and Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago have
rejected Manley's bid for regional leadership because of
ments.r They believe Tthat his rhetoric of cooperation
2 disguises the damage he has done to smaller scale inte-
gration efforts within the English-speaking Caribbean.
In June Venezuelan President Perez returned from his
visit to Jamaica reportedly unimpressed with Manley,
privately charging that he lacked :ideological integrity
and was mismanaging the Jamaican economy.
US-Jamaican Relations
US-Jamaican relations have never been significantly
affected by the North-South dialogue. Bilateral rela-
tions became tense briefly in 1973 after Manley expelled
the US Ambassador, but the precipitating incident involved
a personal conflict and not conflicting national inter-
ests. Bilateral relations sank to their lowest point in
1976 because Manley came to believe--as he still does--
that the CIA had tried to destabilize his government.
These incidents, however, have been the only important
departures from the long tradition of friendly relations
between the two countries.
Ironically, as Manley has become increasingly dis-
appointed with the progress of the North-South dialogue,
he has tried.harde:r to improve bilateral relations with
--' the US--which he sees as Jamaica's best hope for aid.
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He apparently believes that the present US administra-
tion is more sympathetic than previous ones to Jamaica's
problems and less likely to intervene in the island's
internal affairs. Manley was reportedly elated by the
multilateral discussion with President Carter in Panama
on 17 June. He stated that the President showed great
understanding of Third World problems and that there is
now new hope for the North-South dialogue and for "more
meaningful" US-Jamaican relations.
The Prime Minister has undoubtedly been angered by
some US positions in the North-South dialogue, but he
has never allowed his displeasure to hurt improving
bilateral relations. Manley invited President Carter to
attend the abortive minisummit last May and sent an even
warmer invitation for December. The Prime Minister has
probably been disappointed by successive turndowns and
annoyed by President Carter's agreement to participate
in the recently announced four-nation Guadeloupe confer-
ence, so close in time and distance to the Jamaican mini-
summit. Nevertheless, Manley apparently continues to
believe that the President is sympathetic to the North-
South dialogue.
Prospects
There is likely to be little significant spillover
from the North-South dialogue into US-Jamaican relations
so long as the US maintains its present cautious but
f ' dl 1-,w Manley's political survival does not
os
rien y p
~J depend on the NIEO or any North-South issue, and he will
/~' almost certainly avoid bilateral confrontations over
them.
Bilateral and multilateral aid, on the other hand,
will be required for Manley's political survival for at
least the next three years. Jamaica will require bal-
ance-of-payments support in addition to the IMF loan at
a time when the country's credit rating abroad remains
poor. The US-sponsored Caribbean Development Facility,
a multilateral aid fund established earlier this year,
will help with a $50 million pledge from the US, Venezuela,
4 4
Canada, the UK, and other Western donors. The crisis
will revive by mid-1979, however, unless new donors of
much larger donations arrive in time.
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Manley's bid for a third successive term as Prime
Minister would be unpromising even in better times.
Neither union-based party has ever accomplished it, pri-
marily because their near-even balance in popular support
requires only a slight swing to change governments, and
the island's limited resources give the party in power
inadequate funds to deal with high voter expectations.
The PNP's unpreced.ently wide reelection margin in 1976--
57 percent of the vote--has apparently vanished in less
Without US bilateral aid, moreover, Manley would
almost certainly be forced to call early elections within
the next year. This overriding fact points up what has
always been self-evident to most Jamaican leaders: bi-
lateral relations with developed countries have priority
than two years.
over LDC solidarity. As Manley struggles to prevent
his return to the opposition benches, there is no ap-
parent reason to believe that this situation will change.
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FOR THE RECORD
CHILE: The Pinochet government's thoroughgoing
economic reform program has reversed Allende's socialist
revolution and transformed Chile into a market-oriented,
free-trade economy. Santiago has restored economic
growth, broken hyperinflation, and at least temporarily
eliminated payments problems. Industry and agriculture
are becoming more internationally competitive, the coun-
try is now living within its means, and overriding de-
pendence on copper exports has been greatly reduced.
With US bankers and businessmen in the vanguard, growing
international business confidence in the junta's program
has paved the way for new loans and new direct invest-
ment, enabling the junta to relax austerity policies
that have hit hard at the poor. The US Letelier investi-
gation, possible armed conflict with Argentina, and/or
the Regional Inter-American Labor Organization's planned
boycott of Chilean products could trigger international
payments problems in 1979. Nonetheless, we expect the
economic gains and structural improvements of the reform
program to continue apace. To maintain economic growth
in the 6-percent to 7-percent range beyond next year the
Chilean junta must take steps to boost domestic savings
and investment from their still relatively low levels.
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1 November Levi Farah, Minister of Construction,
meets with Iraqi construction dele-
gation in Havana.
1-4 November -Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca pays
official visit to Madagascar. Commu-
nique issued 5 November stresses sup-
port for nonaligned movement.
2 November Cuba and Guyana sign fishing cooper-
ation agreement in. Georgetown.
4 November Cuba commemorates 61st anniversary of
USSR Revolution at Karl Marx Theater.
Members of Cuban Communist Party
Politburo preside.
Vilma Espin, head of the Cuban Women's
Federation signs cooperation agree-
ments with Congolese, Mozambique
women's organizations.
Head of Cuban Interests Section in
Washington, Sanchez Parodi, says there
are 3,000 political prisoners in Cuba,
most of whom will be eligible for
emigration to the US.
4-8 November Cuban Foreign minister pays official
visit to Tanzania..
7 November Fidel Castro attends party at Soviet
Embassy marking 61st anniversary of
Soviet Revolution.
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7 November Lionel Soto, Central Committee member,
heads Cuban delegation to Portugal
for meetings with Portuguese Communist
Party.
8 November Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca pays
official visit to Mozambique.
Sao Tome President Manuel Pinto da
Costa arrives in Cuba. Castro meets
him at airport and presents him with
the Jose Marti order.
Vladimir Promyslov, mayor of Moscow,
arrives in Havana at invitation of
People's Government.
11 November Sugar harvest begins.
13 November Iraqi Health Minister Riyad Ibrahim
Husayn arrives in Cuba to study Cuban
public health system.
Cuban Government allows 36 US citizens
and 99 of their dependents to leave
Cuba. This is the third group of
dual citizens to leave and brings
total to 404.
14 November Cuba and Guyana sign several coopera-
tion agreements including scientific,
technical, and trade.
Japanese economic delegation arrives
in Havana.
14-18 November Cuban Foreign Minister, visiting Sri.
Lanka, accuses China and US of leading
a campaign to weaken the nonaligned
movement.
An earth tremor registering 4.6 on
the Richter scale hits Santiago,
Cuba's second largest city.
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14-18 November Cuba's Foreign Tirade Vice Minister,
German Amado Blanco, arrives in Peking
to sign 1979 trade protocol.
16 November Cuba and Austria sign economic, in-
dustrial, and scientific cooperation
agreement.
Head of Cuban medical team in Angola,
Dr. Narey Ramos, says there are more
than 800 Cuban health technicians
working in Angola.
Saul Robinson, Deputy Secretary Gen-
eral of Jamaican People's National
Party, arrives in Cuba.
Havana domestic service carries report
stating Cuba has granted 600 scholar-
ships to Namibian students.
1.6-18 November Joshua Nkomo, chief of the Zimbabwe
African People's Union, visits Cuba.
Meets with Fidel Castro, foreign
policy adviser Carlos Rafael Rodri-
guez, and Politburo member Raul Valdes
Vivo.
17 November Cuba and Bulgaria sign trade protocol.
1.8-20 November Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca
visits India.
In Cuba, Iraqi Health Minister states
that there are more than 300 Cuban
doctors, nurses, and technicians serv-
ing in his country.
20 November Talks between representatives of
Cuban Community Abroad and Cuban
authorities begin in Havana. Fidel
Castro meets with the two groups.
20-30 November Delegation from Turkish Communist
Party visits Cuba.
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21 November Havana hosts 25th session of CEMA
commission on peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
Armed forces radio commentary stresses
importance of upcoming nonaligned
summit.
Cuban Foreign Ministry issues decla-
ration on Tanzania-Uganda conflict.
Calls Uganda the aggressor. Says no
Cuban troops in Tanzania.
21-27 November Cuban Foreign Minister visits Afghan-
istan.
22 November Fidel Castro, responding to stories
in US press, says at press conference
that Cuba has had MIG-23 for a year,
and that they are for defensive pur-
poses.
Fidel Castro holds press conference
at conclusion of meetings with repre-
sentatives of Cuban Community Abroad.
He says Cuba will release 3,600 polit-
ical prisoners.
23 November Bulgarian Politburo member Pencho
Kubadinski visits Cuba, and signs
cooperation agreement between Bul-
garian Fatherland Front and Cuban
Committee for the Defense of the
Revolution. Meets with Fidel Castro
25 November.
Cuba and the Philippines sign fishing
assistance agreement.
24 November Cuba and Romania sign cooperation
and education, and
1979 science,
culture agreement for in
c
25 November Cuban UN Ambassador Raul Roa makes
statement in support of the Polisario
struggle of the Western Sahara people.
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27 November Col. Richard Rodriguez, Chief of Staff
of the Benin National Defense Force,
arrives for visit at invitation of
Armed Forces Ministry.
Jamaican Information Minister, Arnold
Bertram arrives in Cuba.
28 November Cape Verde Minister of Transportation
and Telecommunication Herculano Vieira
arrives in Cuba.
29 November - Fourteenth Congress of Central Organ-
2 December ization of Cuban Workers (CTC) held
in Havana. Fidel Castro presides
over last session.
30 November Beninese defense force delegation
visits the Isle of Youth.
Cuban Politburo member Ramiro Valdes
and Angolan Deputy Prime Minister
Carlos Rocha Dilolua sign 35 new co-
operation agreements in the economic,
technical, and scientific fields at
the conclusion of joint commission
meeting in Luanda. Agreements call
for stationing of some 10,700 Cuban
advisers in Angola in 1979.
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