CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A001500350001-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 21, 2004
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 21, 1954
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79T00975A001500350001-6.pdf | 235.88 KB |
Body:
004/0ff/T01t&&6W5ffA975 or
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21 April 1954
Copy No. 75
dJ
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. __ _Z'
DATE:,g_ REVIEWER: J
RUTH: HR 70-2
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: Q0..9__
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
U DECLASSIFIED
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOS & DIA REVIEWS
COMPLETED
USAF review(s) completed.
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Indian spokesman denies interest in special UN session on
H-bomb (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. May Day practice fly-by reveals nine possible Type-37's (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. French air effort in Indochina seen inadequate (page 5).
4. Report of Chinese Communist army units in Indochina seen false
(page 5).
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told Ambassador Allen that as far as New Delhi is concerned, the
question rests with the UN Disarmament Commission.
GENERAL
1. Indian spokesman denies interest in special UN session on H-bomb.,
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India has not considered requesting a
special UN meeting on the H-bomb,
according to N. R. Pillai9 secretary
general of the Foreign Ministry. He
Pillai added that his government would
not be disappointed if the Soviet proposal to make India a member
of the subcommittee on atomic control were defeated, since New
Delhi does not wish to become further involved in this "contentious"
subject.
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Prime Minister Nehru, however, may not
share Pillai's views on Indian membership on the UN Disarmament
Commission's proposed subcommittee on the control of atomic weapons.
On 19 April the Disarmament Commission rejected by a nine-to-one
vote a Soviet proposal to include India, Czechoslovakia, and Commu-
nist China on this subcommittee.
SOVIET UNION
2. May Day practice fly-by reveals nine possible Type-37's:
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US officials in Moscow report that practice
fly-by's for the May Day air show occurred
on 13, 15, and 18 April. The first two demon-
strations were of little importance involving
only 24 IL-28's each. On 18 April 24 IL-28's
and one probable Type-37 were noted flying the regular parade route
over Moscow. A second sighting later disclosed 42 IL-28's and 9 prob-
able Type-37's. These aircraft were flying approximately 1/2 mile
west of the observers in 3 ship vees in trail with the Type-37's leading.
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According to observers, all US officials,
the possible Type-37 appeared to be three times.longer than an IL-28.
The wings were sharply swept back (estimated 35 degrees) and tapered
from root to tip. Most prominent part of the aircraft was the very
high vertical stabilizer. The horizontal stabilizer was located just
above the fuselage. None of the observers reported reciprocating
engine noise or saw propellers. All observers believed the aircraft
to be jet propelled. Among the US officials sighting these aircraft,
there were conflicting views regarding the engine installation -- three
indicating the probability that the engines were buried in the wings.
One observer believed that he saw one engine nacelle on each wing.
Another thought the aircraft looked like a B-52. All, after reviewing
the Type-37 photograph, agreed that in all probability the aircraft in
question were Type-37?sa
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D/I USAF Comment: It is considered
probable that as many as nine aircraft similar to the Type-37
were sighted in flight. No
Information was obtained from these sig tings which would alter pre-
vious estimates. that the Type-37 represents a jet bomber in the heavy
class. The existence of as many as nine Type-37 aircraft would indi-
cate that the Soviet heavy jet bomber program is significantly farther
advanced than hitherto estimated. The appearance of nine such air-
craft in flight indicates that series production of this model must have
begun around July 1953 at the latest.
D/I USAF estimates have not considered
that series production of the Type-37 would begin before sometime
in 1956. While currently held estimates have predicted the introduc-
tion of small numbers of turboprop heavy bombers in the Type-31
class in operational units by mid-54, the indicated availability of
serially produced Type.-37?s indicates that bombers of this more ad-
vanced type could appear in operational use by mid-54.
In view of the possible availability of these
heavy jet bombers a reappraisal of the entire Soviet long range bomber
program is being undertaken.
II
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. French air effort in Indochina seen inadequate,.
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filling its present or future missions without a basic overhaul of
logistics and personnel. policies. He believes that even with a drastic
increase in funds and personnel, the French, because of their inex-
perience in modern warfare, would still not be able to attain their
maximum capability in this theater.
At the end of his visit to Indochina,
General Partridge, US Far East Air
Force commander, said the French air
f orce in Indochina is not capable of ful-
Partridge stated that the French lack
enough aircrews to utilize fully the aircraft now at their disposal.
Noting the lack of modern airfields and of any modern flight control
or communications systems, he added that a "radical change in the
air force picture" will be necessary if any real results are to be
obtained.
4. Report of Chinese Communist army units in Indochina seen false,.
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The Chinese Nationalist Ministry of
National Defense asserts that about
5,000 troops of the Chinese Communist
19th and 53rd armies have joined with
three Viet Minh divisions in the Dien
Bien Phu area, and that a battalion of heavy artillery from the 10th
Artillery Division is now located with a Viet Minh artillery division
at Dien Bien Phu. Moreover, 1,420 troops of the 13th Army are
alleged to be en route to Indochina.through Lao Kay and Lai Chaua
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Current Soviet and Chinese Communist
denials of Chinese intervention in Indochina suggest that the Com-
munists are unlikely to introduce Chinese combat forces there on
a significant scale at this particular time. Identification of such
forces would in their view provide the West with grounds for inter-
nationalization of the war, which they apparently hope to avoid.
They are thus expected to refrain from provocation until they feel
able to estimate the unity and determination of the West.
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