CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A015000080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 25, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
51.
25 November 1969
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No. 0282/69
25 November 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Cambodia: Sihanouk is still allowing only limited
arms shipments to go to the Viet Cong. (Page 1)
Japan: Sato may seek a mandate on his Okinawa
agreement by calling national elections soon.
(Page 2)
USSR: Moscow may intend to commemorate Stalin's
90th birthday. (Page 3)
Bulgaria: Restrictions have been imposed on foreign
trade enterprises. (Page 4)
Chile: The Communist Party national congress is
being held this week. (Page 5)
NPT: Entry into force is still some time off.
(Page 6)
India: Congress Party split (Page 7)
Libya: Political opposition (Page 7)
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Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk appears to be
sticking to his policy of allowing only limited
arms shipments to go to the Vietnamese Communists
Sihanouk
has given instructions to continue the arms ship-
ments, but in limited amounts.
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rms question has become a major problem
a
~Thec
in Si anuk's relations with the Vietnamese Commu-
nists and is not likely to be resolved soon. Si-
hanouk has publicly condemned Communist pledges
regarding Cambodian sovereignty, the quid pro quo
for the transshipment of supplies. He clearly
views the arms issue as his strongest bargaining
point in getting the Communists to reduce their
activities in Cambodia. So far he has resisted
Communist pressures to release the large stocks
of arms he holds and has given no indication that
his olic of releasing only tok shipments will
change.
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Japan: Prime Minister Sato may seek a pop--
ular mandate on his Okinawa, agreement by calling
national elections soon.
Sato may dissolve the Diet in
early December and call for general elections
later in the month, if the Diet debate over the
Okinawa agreement goes satisfactorily. This time-
table would be intended to take maximum advantage
of the favorable public reaction to the settlement,
as well as the "law and order" mood prevalent in
Japan as a result. of recent leftist student ex-
cesses.
Aside from expected opposition carping, pop-
ular reaction has been largely approving. The
information media, which are usually critical of
government policies, have taken a surprisingly
positive editorial view of the agreement. The
press commended Sato for his apparent success in
avoiding a trade of economic concessions in return
for a satisfactory reversion agreement, but criti-
cized the "overemphasis" on military matters in
the, joint communique. Some concern was expressed
over the "ambiguity" in the communique about pos-
sible redeployment of nuclear weapons to Okinawa,
as well as Japan's "implicit assumption" of in-
creased responsibility for security of the Far
East in the reversion agreement.
Opposition elements, in an effort to cast
doubts on the government's handling of the Okinawa
issue, will probably subject Sato to close ques-
tioning during the extraordinary Diet session that
begins on 29 November. Sato, however, has shown
himself to be very adept at handling opposition
interpellations in the past, and with popular opin-
ion generally behind him should have little diffi-
culty d
eflecting leftist criticism.
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USSR: As the 90th anniversary of Stalin's
birth approaches, there is evidence that the re-
gime intends to commemorate the event for the first
time since Khrushchev denounced him in 1956.
Reports circulating in Moscow suggest that the
actual birthdate, 21 December, will be officially
recognized for the first time since 1955.
One of the reports says that plans for it are
to include newspaper and television coverage and
the release of a new edition of some of Stalin's
works, and that the impetus for official recogni-
tion is coming from Brezhnev and others in the
Central Committee. It was Brezhnev to whom a group
of Soviet intellectuals addressed a letter in 1966
warning against a similarly rumored plan to reha-
bilitate Stalin.
do not think it means the regime is
planning a return to the terror and repression as-
sociated with Stalin, but rather is consistent with
the recent emphasis on the positive aspects of his
activities. Most notable of these is his war re-
cord. The negative aspects of Stalin's rule, es-
pecially the purges, are being de-emphasized. An
official birthday commemoration, however, could be
construed as a warning, reinforced by Solzhenitsyn's
recent expulsion from the Writers' Union, that the
USSR's liberal intellectual community should desist
from its efforts to keep alive the anti-Stalin line
literature and scholarship.
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Bulgaria: Economic liberalization, which has
made little progress in Bulgaria, will be further
retarded with the passage of a law restricting the
:independent activities of foreign trade enterprises.
The enterprises, although loosely tied to a
ministry, for the past few years had been permitted
to conclude agreements without going through the
Foreign Trade Ministry. Henceforth they will be
required to obtain ministry approval before complet-
ing any trade contracts. The flexibility of enter-
prise officials in negotiating the terms of trade
arrangements, particularly with Western companies,
is likely to be reduced by the need to satisfy the
requirements of central government officials.
This action may have been decided upon after
the exposure of several recent scandals, apparently
involving the embezzlement of several million dol-
lars. The incidents in some cases were blamed on
officials who took advantage of the provisions of
the economic reform program? Some managers, unused
to the independence they were permitted by the re-
form, squandered capital on unsound deals, while
others probably enriched themselves with the funds
for which they no longer had to provide such care-
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Chile: The fourteenth national congress of
the Communist Party, which is being held this week,
is highlighted by the presence of several ranking
foreign delegates and tension over fears of a mil-
itary coup.
Leaders of the party, which is Latin America's
best-organized and most influential outside Cuba,
have made elaborate plans for their first congress
in four years. The opening ceremonies were held
at the legislative palace. About 30 high-ranking
delegates from most Eastern European countries, in-
cluding East Germany and Yugoslavia, are on hand.
The Soviet delegation is_4ed by a Secretary of the
party's central committee.
Until recently, Chilean Communist leaders were
confi nt that next year's presidential election
would be won by the far-leftist coalition in which
their party plays the leading role. Last month's
army uprising, however, and a fear that a military
coup is imminent have so alarmed party leaders that
they drew up plans to o erate on a clandestine ba-
sis for self-protection.
An additional problem became evident during
preliminary local meetings of Communist Party mem-
bers earlier this month. Many of the rank and file
expressed discontent with their leaders' lack of an
aggressive, militant attitude toward other political
groups and toward the presitial candidacy of Com-
muD st poet Pablo Neruca
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NPT: The outlook for the Nonproliferation
Treaty TNP was given a big boost yesterday when
it was ratified by the US and the USSR but its
entry into force is still some time off
Twenty-four countries have now completed rat-
ification of the document, which was opened for
signature in July, 1968. A total of 66 other na-
tions have signed the treaty but. have not yet rat-
ified it . The treaty will enter into force when
19 of these states finish the ratification process.
Several of them have indicated that they would _rg
ably act following ratification by the superpowers
The process of signature-ratification is cer-
tain focus over the coming months on the so-
called threshold nuclear countries and on the mem-
bers of the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM). Sweden and Japan, both threshold nations,
have indicated that they will be acting shortly--
Sweden to ratify and Japan to sign. Among the other
near-nuclear states, Israel and India have substan-
tial reservations and will not even sign in the near
future.
JThe Soviets have heretofore resisted US urging
to ratify jointly on grounds that they first wanted
West German signature, The reversal of that stand
probably reflects growing confidence in Moscow that
Bonn will do sot. The West Germans appear certain
to sign soon, as the Brandt government has decided
that Bonn's primary concerns have been satisfied
sufficiently
Like the other EURATOM countries, however, Bonn
will not ratify the document until EURATOM has worked
out an acceptable agreement with the International.
Atomic Energy Agency on safeguards against the di-
version of nuclear fuels to weapons use. Japan is
also likely to delay ratification during these ne-
gotiations, since it is worried that the resulting
agreement may give the EURATOM countries a favored
position regarding inspection arrangements.
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fighting will continue as the rival factions com-
pete for control of funds, records, and the vote-
India: Two rival Congress Party organizations
now exist, following the decision over the weekend
by Prime Minister Gandhi's faction to formally de-
pose old-guard president Nijalingappa. Her group
selected an interim president to serve until elec-
tions can be held at the next regularly scheduled
meeting of the party's governing All-India Congress
Committee in December in Bombay. Mrs. Gandhi's
faction has already begun to set up administrative
units duplicating those in Nijalingappa's so-called
"Organization Congress Party." The prime minister
commands a majority of the party's leadership in
parliament and in the organization, but bitter in-
getting election symbol--two yoked oxen.
Libya: cFurther signs of opposition to Presi-
dent Qaddafi and the Revolutionary Command Council
have appeared.
some Libyan Army units are in a near-mutinous state
as a result of their disenchantment with the mili-
tary junta. In addition, the civilian prime min-
ister and foreign minister have become more out-
spoken in their opposition, as have many Cyrenaican
politicians. To further compound Qaddafi's prob-
lems, the ministers of defense and interior, both
of whom are members of the military junta, may
Qaddafi is eventually forced out, however, it is
unlikely that his successes would follow any rad-
ically different policy
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