CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 11, 2004
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 14, 1970
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3.pdf307.57 KB
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Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017Segre11-3 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin State Department review completed Secret 0 14 September 1970 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/0AWIZP79T00975A017100080001-3 No. 0220/70 14 September 1970 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS Arab States - Israel: Efforts to obtain the release of the hostages continue. (Page 1) Cambodia: Chile: President Frei's Christian Democrats are at- tempting to close ranks in order to reassert their political influence. (Page 5) Korea: Pyongyang may gain diplomatically if Allende SFJarTies president of Chile. (Page 7) Approved For Release 2004/03/3EMRN}R, PP79T00975A017100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/035KEWEP79T00975A017100080001-3 CArab States - Israel: Efforts to obtain the release of the 50 or so hostages still in fedayeen hands are continuing. US Embassy officials in Amman believe that the remaining hostages have been split into at least two groups. There are signs that some of the hos- tages are being held in a large refugee camp on the outskirts of the capital. 'released yesterday said that he and about 20 others had been confined in a house in Amman. There is no precise information on the number or location of the groups, however. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- tine (PFLP), which is holding the hostages, seems to be concentrating on trying to conclude separate deals with the British, Germans, and Swiss. The Europeans are so far holding to a multinational ap- proach, but the British and the Germans are appar- ently wavering. Meanwhile, the role of the Red Cross is not entirely clear. Red Cross Vice Presi- dent Freymond told British, German, and US repre- sentatives on Saturday that the Red Cross was with- drawing from its negotiating role, because it would not be party to blackmail or serve as intermediary for deals with separate countries. In a statement to the press this morning, however, Red Cross Presi- dent Naville denied that talks had been broken off. Switzerland, meanwhile, possibly in an attempt to open an alternate negotiating channel, has asked the Arab League to use its good offices with the PFLP to obtain the release of the hostages. Israel remains strongly opposed to the prin- ciple of exchanging fedayeen it holds for the hos- tages in Amman. Nevertheless, the Israelis offi- cially announced yesterday that they had rounded up 450 Arabs--including 80 women--from the occu- pied territories; all were suspected of belonging to or aiding the PFLP, and two were said to be uncles of PFLP chief George Habbash. There are 14 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2004/03MCRIERbP79T00975A017100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/$MIORTP79T00975A017100080001-3 Cpress reports that the Arabs will be held as counter- hostages for the detained airline passengers. In London the unofficial Jewish Defense League announced Saturday that it had seized three Arabs employed at the Egyptian Embassy. Claiming that the three were fedayeen, the league said that they would be held until the hostages in Jordan are released. The blowing up of the hijacked planes has pre- cipitated a quarrel between the PFLP and the Pales- tine Liberatibn Organization (PLO). The PLO an- nounced Saturday that it had suspended the PFLP's membership in the PLO central committee for defying the committee's resolutions on handling the planes and the passengers. Last night, the PFLP threatened that if its membership were not restored, it would not observe the agreements to which it was presently committed--apparently a reference to the truce reached last Thursday between the Jordanian authori- ties and the PLO. Meanwhile, the relative quiet in Jordan was broken yesterday by fighting in the Irbid area in north Jordan, in which Jordanian Army troops clashed with members of the Palestine Liberation Army, the regular force of the PLO. Fedayeen sources charged that army units opened up with artillery on two com- mando jeeps, and that the bodies of some of the fedayeen were mutilated by army troops. Jordanian officials have expressed regret for the incident, which has so far not led to a general breakdown of the cease-fire. 14 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 2 Approved For Release 2004/03PREGR-E779T00975A017100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/64PtUIDP79T00975A017100080001-3 Cambodia: Fighting Slows In addition to routine harassments of Siem Reap and Kompong Thom cities and other locations in the countryside, the Communists killed 27 South Vietnamese troops in two sharp attacks over the weekend. 14 Sep 70 (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 Approved For Release 2004/(?3V19.WRDP79T00975A017100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/0SECitkr-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3 Meanwhile, the Route 6 convoy is still stalled 15 miles north of Skoun. Cambodian troops are at- tempting to clear entrenched Communist elements from the area. Villagers report that Communist, reinforce- ments are moving into the area from the north, sug- gesting that the convoy, which has been on the road for a week and is still 35 miles from Kompong Thom, is in for more trouble. 14 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 4 Approved For Release 2004/0?W7CaEWDP79T00975A017100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/AJW:1DP79T00975A017100080001-3 Chile: President Frei's Christian Democrats are attempting to close ranks in order to reassert their political influence, but prospects for block- ing Allende's succession to the presidency are not good. As the Christian Democrats become increasingly aware of the threat that would be posed by an Allende government, there is a growing move to resist the chronic indulgence in internal differences that has marked the party's six years in power. Its members seem tardily to realize that they must stick to- gether if they are to salvage any influence as the largest political party with the strongest represen- tation in Congress. Most of them were initially disconcerted by Allende's victory in last week's popular election. Their defeated candidate, Radomiro Tomic, and some of his leftist supporters hastily tried to ingratiate themselves with Allende. The exodus of large numbers of influential Chileans, the rapidly spreading economic dislocations, and the Allende forces' heavy-handed grab for power, however, have spurred the party to the realization of its own poor prospects and the need to act while it can. The direction and efficacy of this emerging cohesion are not yet clear. Many party leaders dislike the plan to elect runner-up presidential candidate Jorge Alessandri in Congress next month in return for his promise to resign and bring about new elections. The guarantees that they have pub- licly demanded of Allende would not be difficult for Allende to circumvent by maneuver or timing. President Frei's leadership and popularity are es- sential to the success of the Christian Democrats, but Frei's commitment to his constitutional respon- sibilities outweighs his own fear of what Allende will do to Chile and limits his exercise of influ- ence on party strategy. 14 Sep 70 (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin 5 Approved For Release 2004/03AVgishIP79T00975A017100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/ftEdN,F.d1179T00975A017100080001-3 Meanwhile, Allende's public claims of assassi- nation plans against him and his supporters' threat of a strike are merely conspicuous examples of the strong pressures being applied at many points to ensure his accession to the presidency. The chance of action against Allende by mili- tary leaders, never strong, seems to be dwindling as they, too, seek assurances from Allende that he may or may not choose to honor. 14 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 6 Approved For Release 2004/03/1 7100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/0??4cElltP79T00975A017100080001-3 Korea: Pyongyang may gain substantial diplo- matic benefits if Salvador Allende becomes presi- dent of Chile. Allende has made it clear that he intends to recognize the Communist governments of the divided countries, including Korea. Such action would probably lead the South Koreans to close their embassy in Santiago. But more disturbing for the South Koreans is the possibility that Allende will pull Chile out of the UN Commission for the Unifica- tion and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). Al- though UNCURK's only important function in recent years has been the preparation of an annual report to the General Assembly, it is valued by the South Koreans as a symbol of UN support for their country and the peaceful unification of the peninsula on non-Communist terms. UNCURK, along with the UN Command in Korea, has been under increasing attack by Pyongyang's friends in the UN. Chile's withdrawal would en- courage like action by the Pakistanis, whose mem- bership in UNCURK is an embarrassment to their relations with Peking and Pyongyang. The with- drawal of one or both of these countries could throw the very existence of UNCURK into question with serious ramifications for the whole range of Korean-related problems in the UN. Although the usual Communist resolution to dissolve UNCURK probably will again be defeated by a wide margin, this year's debate, if compli- cated by Chile's resignation from UNCURK, is likely to add to South Korean feelings of insecurity, which have been heightened by the scheduled cut- back of US forces in Korea. 14 Sep 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7 Approved For Release 2004/6fiMDP79T00975A017100080001-3 25X6 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3 Secretpproved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3 Secret Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017100080001-3