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December 14, 2016
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July 9, 2003
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February 18, 1972
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Approved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A02120007~~~t DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin State Dept. review completed Secret N?_ 042 25X1 18 February 1972 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 25X1 gpproved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/~/~-1~~1~-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 No. 0042/72 18 February 1972 Central Intelligence Bulletin NORTH VIETNAM: Renewed signs of concern over big- power summitry. (Page 1) EGYPT-UN: Cairo probably will encourage Jarring to resume his mission. (Page 3) INDIA--PAKISTAN: New Delhi hints willingness to be- gin preliminary talks. (Page 4) PAKISTAN: Bhutto's opposition is growing more res- tive. (Page 5) BANGLADESH: Public order ~~ituation. (Page 6) NATO: Allies agree to establish standing naval force in Mediterranean. (Page 7) MOROCCO: Proposed constitutional changes. (Page 8) URUGUAY: President-elect faces trouble with Con- gress and labor. (Page 9) HUNGARY-USSR: Moscow may oppose Budapest personnel shifts. (Page 10) DAHOMEY: Mutiny at army garrison unsettles politics. (Page 12 ) POLAND: Government plans ambitious railroad invest- ment program. (Page 13) EL SALVADOR: Government rejects opposition election sate s .-~P age 14 ) NATO: Status of Brosio mission (,Page 15) TURKEY: Opium compensation program (Page 15) THE NETHERLANDSa Metalworkers' strike (Page 16) Approved For Release 2003~~~~:?C1~RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08~2~~R~P79T00975A021200070001-8 NORTH VIETNAM; The Hanoi press again is giving heavy p ay to North Vietnamese concern over big- power summitry on the eve of Pre:]ident Nixon's visit to Peking. Recent articles in both the party's daily and theoretical journal have given vent to an apprehen- sion muted since :Last August. Common to the arti- cles is a fear that the US will be able to exploit dissensions within the Communist world to bring about, in the words of one article, "a detente among various big countries while continuing to intimidate small nations." The Soviet Uniori and China are both named more than once in this connection. Hanoi is even lecturing Peking and Moscow di- rectly. "Because these socialism countries have be- come increasingly strong in every respect, how can they accept the view that Nixon teas a new concept and a practical, intelligent attitude?" the theo- retical journal demands. "It is certain that-with all of its policies the United Si~ates will always consider the USSR, the PRC, and other socialist countries as its dangerous enemies." Behind the North Vietnamese rhetoric lies a concern about how their traditional policy toward the Soviet Union and China will Yee affected by the new political alignments they see developing in Asia and among the three great powers. While the North Vietnamese probably believE~ that they still can play the Soviets and the Chinese off against each other, their long-standing distrust of bicr- power maneuvers obviously persisi:s. 1$ Feb 7 2 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08~P79T00975A021200070001-8 25X1 gpproved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08~~.~i~6iDP79T00975A021200070001-8 EGYPT-UN: Egyptian leaders probably will seek to use the r talks with UN special envoy Jarring, who arrives in Cairo today, to underscore their position that reactivation of his mission is the most promising approach to breaking the deadlock. -The communique issued after Sadat's recent Moscow visit and subsequent Egyptian press reports have stressed the need for greater involvement in peace efforts by Jarring. The Jordanian ambassador in Moscow claims that Jarring is receptive to playing a role in proximity talk:> on an interim Suez arrangement, but nothing has keen heard from the envoy himself. Secretary General Waldheim earlier this month was publicly skeptical about an interim arrangement but sub- sequently, as a result of Israeli and US demarches, characterized the proximity talks and Jarring's mission as complementary. The impasse over the lack of a positive Israeli reply to Jarring's memorandum of February 1971 on overall-settlement terms has not been broken, and the Secretary General and Jarring are groping for a way to revive his mission. Waldheim told the US mission at the UN that Jax?ring has no immediate plans to visit Israel before returning to New York because he is fully abreast of the Israeli position. 18 FE,b 7 2 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08~Y~~-~(~A~R~P79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 Sl1,CK E'L' INDIA-PAKISTAN: The Irdians are signaling that they are willing to becin discussions with President Bhutto leading tov;ard formal peace talks. A senior Indian Joint External Affairs offi- cial told a US Embassy officer on 15 February that Islamabad must adopt a more conciliatory posture toward New Delhi before Indian public opinion would countenance a more forthcoming government attitude. He implied that these conciliatory Pakistani ges- tures need not be wholly public and he said that New Delhi could be magnanimous toward Islamabad at the conference table but, because of tactical con- siderations, not beforehand. New Delhi has approache3 the matter of formal peace talks with caution. Despite disclaimers, India may still feel it can obtain greater conces- sions from Islamabad by waiting. Alternatively, Army Commander Manekshaw rec?ntly intimated that his country was going slow on the negotiation question because "there is n~ sense in dealing with a chap who might not last as head of govern- ment." Moreover, according to the US Embassy of- ficer, Indian officials still display New Delhi's typically ambivalent attitud=_ toward Bhutto-- wariness of his sometimes contradictory statements combined with a stated preference for dealing with him rather than with military leaders. In revealing its interest in discussions with Bhutto, New Delhi may be attempting to demonstrate a flexible approach as well ~s to head off third party mediators. It is unlicely that India's long- term goals have been changed. The Indian official indicated that for the talks to succeed, Bhutto must indicate his willingness to soft-pedal "con- frontation" and agree to a comprehensive review of all outstanding problems whi:h would include the Kashmiri boundary issue. Central Intelli.~e7ce Bulletin 25X:1 Approved For Release 2003/08/~~,~6~~~P79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/0~/,~-1~~~i~~DP79T00975A021200070001-8 PAKI-STAN: President Bhutto's political oppo- sition is growing more restive. The indefinite continuation of martial law has become the major point of dispute: between Bhutto and his opponents. Bhutto says martial law will be lifted "much before" the end of the year, but opposition forces are demanding a. definite dead- line for the institution of democratic government. Disparate political group; appear to be coalescing around the National Awami Party (NAP) headed by Wali Khan in an effort to press Bhutto to set dates for convening the national assembly and to begin drafting a new constitution. They have also threat- ened to boycott elections to municipal and local politi-cal offices slated for 15 March, an act which would constitute deliberate defiance of Islamabad. Working out a division of power between the four provinces and the central government is one of the most difficult domE~stic problems Bhutto faces. The demand for greater provincial autonomy is particularly strong in the Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan. In both areas Bhutto's party is weak and Wali Khan's NAP' expects to con- trol the provincial goverrunents. The two leaders met last weekend, but Wali remains highly suspicious that Bhutto will attempt to keep the NAP from coming to power in the two provinces. Wali indicated to US officials that he was prepared. to counter such attempts by stirring up widespread latent discontent against the central government. Bhutto is confronted with so many economic and political problems that he cannot. afford a head-on clash with opposition forces at this time, and he may concede considerable provincial autonomy. On the issue of martial law, Bhutto may agree to curb the powers of centrally appointed, provincial gov- ernors in favor of the ministries to be formed shortly after the provincial assemblies convene on 23 March. 18 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08~~%~DP79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 sr;cx_ Jrr BANGLADESH: Recent clashes indicate that the law and o~~ rimer-situation continues to be uneasy. At least two skirmishes, with gunfire and casualties, have occurred recently between govern- ment forces and former Mukti Bahini guerrillas who felt they were being denied the prerogatives they deserved as ex-freedom fighters. One inci- dent occurred on Wednesday in Dacca when ex-guer- rillas who were being recruited into the national militia complained that their pay and amenities were too low in comparison with regular army of- ficers. The tension eased cnly after Prime Min- ister Mujibur Rahman personally visited the scene and urged both sides to caln down. Another out- break took place on the previous day in Comilla when police fought with Mukti Bahini who were in- sisting they should not have to pay bus fares. Additionally, reports of lotting and extortion by hooligans masquerading as ex-guerrillas are be- coming more frequent. For the most part, there has been little breakdown in public order ir. the two months since .independence. With the war-shattered economy un- able to provide sufficient employment, however, discontent among the former guerrillas--who greatly outnumber the government forces and in many cases still have arms--will grow Lnless the Dacca regime manages to find or create enough places for them in the government bureaucracy, the new national militia, and the country's educational institutions. The withdrawal of the Indiar Army from Bangladesh, scheduled for completion by 25 March, will add to the internal security burders of Bangladesh's under- manned police force and its approximately 8,000-man regular army. 18 Feb 7 2 Central Intelli~c nce Bulletin 5X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/art ~CI~ gL1P79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/O~J~'I~~IP79T00975A021200070001-8 NATO: The allies have agreed to establish a standing naval force in the Mediterranean. A joint meeting of the NATO military staff and allied military representatives agreed to request the Supreme Allied Commander for :Europe to begin to set up such a force--a move urged by Secretary Laird last December at the NATO ministerial meetings. The US has proposed that the force include a com- mander, staff, and designated ships along the lines of tree standing naval force in the Atlantic. The Italian, Greek, and Turkish representatives stated that growing concern about the Soviet mili- tary presence in the Mediterranean had made acqui- escence in the plan possible. For the moment, these three countries have pledged periodic participation, with continuous participation only if they can af- ford it. The UK apparently will ;participate but cannot make specific commitments at this time. The West Germans pledged to make one destroyer available for short exercise periods. The limited size of the projected force was undoubtedly a factor in acceptance of the plan since the Mediterranean allies were worried about its potential costs. Norway, Denmark, and Canada often have expressed concern that the alliance already pays too much attention to the Mediterranean but raised no objections t.o the concept at this week's meeting. Acceptance of the concept, nevertheless, meets the tJS objective of encouraging a more active European role in the Mediterranean. France, a non-participant in NATO's integrated military structure and an ad- vocate of removing the super-power rivalry from the area, presumably will make no direct contribution 18 Feb 72 Central Intelligence 13ull:etin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08~~~~I~DP79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 s~~;cur.~r MOROCCO: King Hassan has proposed constitu- tional changes that imply a substantial limitation of his absolute power. The King, who is Morocco's religious as well as secular leader, chose th= Moslem New Year to announce that a nationwide referendum on proposed constitutional amendments would be held before the end of the month. The amen~.ments will provide for the direct election of two thirds of the Chamber of Deputies; only three eighths of the present body are directly elected. "All executive power" will be vested in the government, wZich will be controlled by elected representatives. Hassan's role, he said, would be that of "national arbiter." The King, however, has made clear that he in- tends to retain substantial authority, at least equivalent to the power of the presidents of the US and France. While his proposals fall well short of those demanded by the opposition National Front coalition, the most influential of the groups the King has been consulting, tZe front probably will accept the challenge and attempt to capture a large bloc of seats in the new assembly. 18 Feb 72 Central Intelli~c-nce Bulletin 8 25X`1 Approved For Release 2003/08/3~~I~?~CI~i-~~P79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/0~~7~~1~,~DP79T00975A021200070001-8 URUGUAY: President-Elect Juan Bordaberry's new administration appears headed for trouble with an opposition-led Congres:~ and hostile labor unions. In its first act, the Criamber of Deputies has chosen a member of the Blanco op~>osition as its leader. Although the election results, announced on 15 February, gave the Colorados a slim congres- sional lead over the Blancos, thE~ leftist Frente Amplio coalition, which controls 18 seats in the lower house, repoz-tedly supported the Blanco candi- date. Voting in the Uruguayan 1F:gislature tradi- tionally has been split between t:he numerous politi- cal factions rather than along major party lines, and these divisions can be expected to continue. The Communist-dominated labor confederation has already denounced the new prE:sident in its re- port to the labor movement, adopi:ed late last month. While this latest diatribe contains nothing new, it assures a continuation of the pattern of repeated labor-government problems. A general work stoppage has been scheduled for 14 March, at which time la- bor leaders will present their dE~mands to Congress. 25X1 18 f eb 7 2 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/08~ 1~ (~P79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 SF.CR~;T HUNGARY-USSR: The Hungarian party leadership is considering personnel shifts, some of which may not be too acceptable to Moscow. At a Budapest party meeting on 10 February, politburo member and city party boss Karoly Nemeth announced that corrupt, bure~.ucratic, and inept officials at all levels should be demoted. Party leader Kadar also addressed the session and em- phasized that priority attention should be given problems in the party. Both Kadar and Nemeth em- phasized the generally orderly aspects of the in- ternal situation, but Nemeth warned against any temptations to use the proposed personnel changes as an opportunity to attack worthy officials or, in a special warning to conservatives, to begin anti-semitic attacks on Jewish liberals--some of whom are in Kadar's retinue. The proposed changes seem designed to root out bureaucratic opposition to Kadar's economic policies and simultaneously to order a go-slow approach to the economic reform. The day after the Budapest party meeting, Kadar flew to Moscow where h~ probably discussed the proposed changes during three days of talks with Brezhnev. Kadar may haae had trouble con- vincing the Soviet leader of the desirability of improving the economic reform at the expense of replacing veteran Communists. Only a week before, Pravda had pointedly reminded Budapest of its past problems with excessively li:~eral, younger members. The Soviet paper also implied support for the Hun- garian "conservatives" by wa=Wing that the country had proved particularly susceptible to nationalism and Zionism. Kadar also may have discussed Hungary's bal- ance of payments and investment problems with Brezhnev. Moscow is not haply with Budapest`s economic performance. The Pravda article, for ex- ample, had made reference to problems in bilateral 18 Feb 72 Central Intelligen~~e Ba~lletin 10 Approved For Release 2003/O~~~i~F~DP79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08~~.~/~~P79T00975A021200070001-8 a trade, and other sources have indicated Soviet dis- pleasure with Hungary's indebtedness to the West. A Soviet party-government: delegation will visit Budapest later this year for discussions on economic and scientific-technological cooperation. Kadar is a cautious politician and he will not tip the scales in favor of either liberals or con- servatives. Any personnel changes probably will be designed to avoid seriously offending the Soviets, 18 Feb 7 2 Central Intelligence BTr.lletin 11 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/g~(~~~P79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08/`2^1H : C^KI~A-RDP79T00975A021200070001-8 111..1 CJ 1 \~ irI` DAHOMEY: A mutiny at the important Ouidah army garrison, now in its th:.rd week, continues to unsettle Dahomean politics alid to feed rumors of coup plotting. On 28 January, junior o~'ficers and enlisted men jailed their commander aid took control of the Ouidah post, located only 25 miles from Cotonou, Dahomey's administrative ceni:er. Attempts by the government this week to disb~.nd and reassign the mutineers have so far been unsuccessful. Govern- ment orders have been flatly rejected by the re- bellious garrison, and there are unconfirmed re- ports that the mutineers are in battle dress. The Ouidah unit is well-armed any. mobile. The mutiny has further :trained relations within Dahomey's three-man Presidential Council and has opened opportunities for maneuvering by politically ambitious elements within the govern- ment and military. There are a variety of rumors and reports of impending power plays by different groups or individuals, at lu st some of whom are almost certainly in contact Hith the rebellious troops at Ouidah. Dahomey, c~hich has experienced five military coups since it became independent in 1960, may face yet another military take-nvar_ 25X1 18 Feb 7 2 Central Intelli~en~ a Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/OFi~/~4~~~IDP79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08~~-I~P79T00975A021200070001-8 POLAND: Warsaw is embarking on an ambitious railroad investment program in an effort to close the chap between growing demand and existing capacity. Investments in the railroad sector, which will continue to handle more than three fourths of total inland traffic, will rise by more than 50 percent during 1971-75 compared with the previous five-year period. The program consists of the construction of new facilities as well as the modernization of existing installations and equipment. The construction of a new 89-mile railroad linking Warsaw and the Katowice/Krakow area of Silesia by 1975 is the major element of the ex- pansion program. This central arterial line will be electrified and double-tracked and will handle a major part of the growing freight traffic, thereby freeing existing facilities for faster passenger service. Transshipment stations at the Soviet bordE~r and domestic port terminals as well as in- land freight yards will be expanded. Ten new container terminals and a classification yard also are to be constructed. Although Polish transport pclicy calls for the elimination of steam i~raction. by the early 1980s, one fourth of rail freight. traffic will continue to be moved by steam by the end of 1975. In fact, only 800 miles of_ existing line is to be electrified during 1971-7_`i compared with the nearly 1.000 miles electrified during 1966-70. Central Intelligence Bulletin 13 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/B1E(~~~~79T00975A021200070001-8 Approved For Release 2003/08~~1CJ~~ J~pP79T00975A021200070001-8 li:L SALVADOR: The government's rejection of several opposition slates for the legislative elec- tions on 12 March could mar tt~e calm campaign at- mosphere and cause a backlash against its candidate in the presidential election can Sunday. The rejections have all been based on techni- calities. Initially the gove~?nment was on fairly safe ground when it rejected :.fists in four depart- ments filed late by the left-cif-center opposition coalition. The coalition, sui~fering from internal conflict and division of leadership responsibili- ties, unhappily admitted that the fault was its own. The subsequent disqualii`ications--another coalition slate that had been submitted on time plus several submitted by the two small rightist parties--were less valid and