CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A023000120002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 27, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Top Secret
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27 October 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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INDOCHINA: New North Vietnamese supply push about
to start. (Page 2)
EGYPT: Sadiq's resignation presents Sadat with an-
other cause for concern. (Page 3)
CHILE: Allende gains tactical advantage as pro-
tests wane. (Page 4)
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C INDOCHINA: The North Vietnamese are moving very
large quantities of military supplies south as the
new dry season resupply campaign is about to begin.
More civilian labor and vehicles are being used
in this transportation effort in the North Vietnam-
ese panhandle than have been observed since 1968.
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This increased vehicle activity in southern
Laos has been corroborated by airborne observers,
and it follows several weeks of maintenance and re-
pair work on major roads leading into and through
southern Laos. The present good condition of the
Laotian roadnet and the apparent availability of
supplies in southern North Vietnam could portend an
early start of the new supply push toward South Viet-
nam and Cambodia. F77 I
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C EGYPT: The surprise resignation of War Minis-
ter Sadiq is a further reflection of the domestic
crosscurrents presently troubling President Sadat.
Sadiq, who was generally considered loyal to
Sadat, concurrently held the key posts of deputy
prime minister, war minister, minister of war pro-
duction, and commander in chief of the armed forces.
Recently reported feuding between Sadiq and two
other high Egyptian officials may have figured in
his resignation, although other factors probably
were also influential. Sadiq had quarreled fre-
quently with Soviet officials and he may have been
considered an impediment to a more rapid thaw in
relations with Moscow.
Whether Sadiq resigned freely or was forced to
do so, Sadat must have carefully weighed the conse-
quences of alienating so formidable a figure. Al-
though the extent of Sadiq's popularity in the armed
forces is not clear, he undoubtedly has some sup-
porters, if only because of his outspoken attitude
toward the Soviet Union. Another point of concern
for Sadat will be the reaction of Chief of Staff
Shazli, reputedly a highly ambitious figure who may
resent not being given the top spot.
Named to replace Sadiq as war minister and com-
mander in chief of the armed forces is the chief of
Egypt's General Intelligence organization, General
Ahmad Ismail Ali. All is considered to be one of
Sadat's close advisers and was a classmate of the
resident in military school.
is loyalty to a at,
plus is ties to gyp s in elligence mechanism,
will serve to aid the president in dealing with
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHILE: President Allende has gained tactical
advantages as a result of his handling of the waning
protest movement, although negotiations with the
strike leaders on a "truce" have hit a snag.
During the strike, Allende's selective responses
to the shutdowns, his delegation to the military of
responsibility for maintaining order and minimizing
economic disruptions, and his restraint of extreme
leftists strengthened his authority. For the pres-
ent, he is in a stronger position to deal with the
rivalries within his own coalition. He has laid
the groundwork for blaming his opponents for the in-
evitable long-term damage to the already battered
economy. Moreover, the prolonged shutdowns have al-
lowed the administration to take over commercial,
distributive, transport, and industrial activities--
some of which may be retained--in a pattern already
established under Allende. Consonant with his style
of appearing to compromise, he will probably avoid
obviously punitive measures except against those
protestors charged with criminal acts.
A key element for Allende during the protest
was his confidence that, he could rely on the armed
services to carry out their responsibilities under
the state of emergency that he promptly declared.
This response by the military reaffirms their com-
mitment to support the constitutional government.
Although some officers were sympathetic to the oppo-
sition movement, there is no evidence that any of
them dragged their feet in containing the shutdowns
and the attempts to incite violence. They appear to
agree with Allende's charges that many of the dis-
turbances were aimed at. discrediting the military
as well as at. weakening the government.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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