NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027400010040-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: February 15, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
February 15, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 15, 1975
CONTENTS
CYPRUS: Turks send artillery battalion to the island.
(Page 1)
USSR: Brezhnev relatively cool toward US in remarks
honoring Prime Minister Wilson. (Page 2)
WESTERN EUROPE: Decision on F-104 replacements likely
to be postponed again. (Page 6)
COLOMBIA-CUBA: Establishment of diplomatic relations
may be announced soon. (Page 7)
SOUTH KOREA: Most political prisoners to be released.
(Page $
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 9)
ANNEX: Israel Believes Risks in Golan Withdrawal Are
Serious (Page 10)
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 15, 1975
Turkey has sent an artillery battalion to Cyprus.
The US defense attache in Ankara reports that some 850
troops in combat gear were loaded on a transport ship
in the port of Mersin on Thursday. The reinforcements
are about equal in number to the Turkish troops with-
drawn from the island last week.
A few days earlier, the attache observed artillery
pieces for a battalion in the railyard at Mersin. The
attache's counterpart.in Nicosia reported the arrival
of artillery equipment at Famagusta on February 11.
On the diplomatic front, all parties involved in
the Cyprus problem.have indicated that they will not.
press for a UN Security Council meeting before next
week. No resolutions have been submitted.
I I The Greeks will pro y want ing stron er
than a mere reaffirmation of previous UN resolutions.
The Chinese ambassador is the council president this
month, and he is likely to continue the low profile China
adopted during the council debates on Cyprus last summer.
Moscow, on the other hand, will push its demands
for unity and integrity of the island and oppose the
creation of a separate Turkish Cypriot-state. For their
part, the West Europeans' reactions have not jelled.I
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 15, 1975
In a speech yesterday honoring visiting British
Prime Minister Wilson, Soviet party chief Brezhnev spoke
positively about detente, but he was critical of Western
behavior in many of its components and was relatively
cool toward the US.
Brezhnev was transparently critical of US policy
in the Middle East. While acknowledging that "partial
measures" are useful if they are not merely a delaying
tactic, he warned of "some who seem to want to offer
the Arab peoples a soporific."
On the other hand, Brezhnev did stress the deter-
mination of Soviet leaders to make detente irreversible.
He referred to "positive changes that have occurred in
relations with the West, but in this context he listed
the US after France and West Germany. Brezhnev made
no mention of the Vladivostok summit or of SALT, al-
though he spoke of curbing the arms race. On a similar
occasion last month during Australian Prime Minister
Whitlam's visit, Premier Kosygin went out of his way
to stress the importance to detente of the US-Soviet
arms limitation agreements.
Brezhnev also referred to the slow pace of CSCE
and did not issue the customary call for a rapid con-
clusion of the present state and movement to a summit-
level finale. His remarks on MBFR were limited to crit-
icism of the West for seeking "one-sided advantages."
Some of Brezhnev's sharpness was probably directed at
the British, who have tended to be resistant in East-
West negotiations.
Brezhnev's approach--combining a strong commitment
to detente with criticism of some of its specifics--is
similar to that taken recently by other influential
Soviets. President Podgorny, in an article appearing
in Izvestia on February 12, said that the USSR wants to
further improve its relations with the US and other West-
ern nations. Podgorny stated that Moscow is willing to
take practical new steps to advance military detente as
well as economic and political cooperation. He also re-
peated familiar--occasionally pointed--criticism of the
US and its allies.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 15, 1975
The four-nation consortium that is to meet in Brus-
sels on Monday is unlikely to make a final recommendation
on a replacement for the F-104 aircraft.
The consortium's steering committee of military ex-
perts will probably be directed to explore whether the
US and French manufacturers will give firmer price guar-
antees for new fighter aircraft.
The question of price guarantees will probably be
crucial, given inflation and the fluctuation of currency
exchange rates. Aware of budgetary limitations, Dutch
Defense Minister Vredeling earlier this week stressed in
parliament the need to prevent price escalation. He
flatly rejected, however, the suggestion of leftists in
his own Labor Party that the Netherlands should purchase
a cheaper and less versatile plane--the F-5E produced by
Northrop.
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February 15, 1975
Colombia apparently is close to a renewal of rela-
tions with Cuba. Foreign Minister Lievano recently
announced publicly that he would have important news re-
aardina Cuba "soon."
The Colombian attitude toward Cuba has generally
paralleled the Venezuelan view. During mid-1974, both
countries considered a joint announcement of relations
with Havana, but those plans fell through. On December
29, Caracas moved on its own.
The opposition Conservative Party has launched a
campaign in the Colombian press aimed at undermining
or at least slowing the overtures to Cuba. President
Lopez is unlikely to be deterred, however, and his
party's control of congress precludes legislative road-
blocks.
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February 15, 1975
President Pak has followed up his referendum vic-
tory with an announcement that political opponents
jailed last year under emergency security decrees will
soon be released. More than 150 prisoners may be freed,
including two Japanese citizens. Excepted from the
wholesale amnesty will be a number of persons accused
of being communist agents and sympathizers.
The best known among those scheduled for early re-
lease is Roman Catholic Bishop Chi Hak-sun, one of South
Korea's leading social activists. There is some govern-
ment concern that the outspoken bishop will issue a
strong public statement following his release.
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FOR THE RECORD
Ecuador: An Ecuadorean appeals court has ratified
the penalties imposed on five of the seven US tuna boats
currently in detention. Penalties against the other two
vessels are also likely to be sustained. Fines and fees
levied against the seven boats total nearly $2 million.
The boats' catch, worth just over $1 million delivered
in California, has been confiscated. Five of the boats
could have fished legally had they been licensed--at a
total cost of about $140,000--but the other two were in-
eligible for licenses. The tuna run continues to be ex-
cellent within Ecuador's claimed territorial sea. Other
boats are reportedly fishing in the area. Most are un-
licensed and more seizures can be ex ected.
esterday announced a modest antireces-
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o
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sion program designed to boost the sagging economy. New
measures will include additional loans to industries,
encouragement of more banking credit for housing construc-
tion, tion, and full disbursement of nearly $5 billion in public
works spending over the next two months. The measures
come on the heels of a sharp drop in economic activity
in the past three months. Unemployment also is at a
20-year high. The moves will help, but the de th of the 25X1
resent slump makes rapid recovery unlikel .
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 15, 1975
Israel Believes Risks Serious
In Any Golan Withdrawal
Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights will be-
come the focus of Middle East peacemaking efforts with-
in the next month or so. The UN mandate to supervise
the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement expires on
May 30, and it is doubtful that Syria will renew it un-
less there is progress toward another Israeli withdrawal
on the Golan.
A Golan pullback presents Tel Aviv with much greater
military and domestic political problems than a similar
move in the Sinai where, as Prime Minister Rabin recently
said, the size of the area makes it possible for Israel
to take risks in the step-by-step process.
In Tel Aviv's view, the risks in the Golan area are
all but unacceptable. Even in exchange for a final peace
treaty, Tel Aviv is not prepared to return to Syria--
which Israel regards as its most implacable foe--all of
the territory captured in the 1967 war. To do so would
give Damascus control of territory from which Syrian
gunners for 18 years fired directly into Israel.
Israel sees the Golan Heights, even though no wider
than 12 miles, as a battlefield where the Syrians can be
defeated before they reach Israel proper. The Israelis
would view even a partial pullback as a threat to their
ability to dominate this battlefield.
The Israelis have gone to enormous expense to con-
struct an interlocking set of fortifications along the
present disengagement lines. They have built large
numbers of heavily fortified strongponts, minefields,
trenches, and anti-tank ditches. The cost involved will
be cited by opponents of even a partial pullback to argue
that Israel's financially strapped government cannot
afford to keep on dismantling and rebuilding these for-
tifications, and that it must get a full peace agreement
with Syria before any withdrawal.
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Limited Room
Although there appears to,be only limited room for
compromise on Tel Aviv's part, some. Israeli flexibility
may remain. Rabin, despite recent unyielding statements
on the subject, probably still believes that theses
"maneuverina space" as he put it last Se~tember.l
As is the case with the Sinai,, Israeli policy-
makers probably find it easier to visualize in:a final
peace treaty than in an interim agreement what territory
on the Golan might be returned. Their price for a
pullback on the Golan will include:
--Syrian political concessions.
Demilitarization of the area relinquished.
--Interposition of an international supervisory
force.
--A promise of some sort of security guarantee
against Syrian attack.
The territory Israel occupies on the Golan is
larger than is strictly necessary for Israel's defense.
Tel Aviv could give up a good part of it without sub-
stantially increasing the risk of Syrian harassing
fire into the valley settlements in northern Israel,
provided Syrian field artillery is barred from the
area.
A partial withdrawal in the area south of Al-
Qunaytirah to a point past the Rafid junction would
probably be the least objectionable from Tel Aviv's
standpoint. There are few settlements in this area,
and the government might agree that a pullback there
would not unduly risk the security of the remaining
settlements or of northern Israel if the vacated area
were at least demilitarized.
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The Settlements
The 19 Jewish settlements on the Golan are a com-
plicating factor. Many of them were built to strengthen
Israel's claim to the area. Their existence cuts into
the government's ability to obtain domestic political
support for any withdrawals. Several of these settle-
ments lie almost athwart the present disengagement line.
The political influence of these settlers far outweighs
their number--fewer than 2,000. All of the settlements
are linked in one way or another with Rabin's.own Labor
Party or with one of his two coalition partners. The
settlers, regardless of political affiliation, will
oppose any withdrawal on the Golan.
From the standpoint of the settlements, a with-
drawal from areas in the southern Golan might be the
most difficult. The conservative National Religious
Party, Rabin's major coalition partner and a fi,rm.op
ponent of large-scale territorial concessions outside
the Sinai, is a sponsor of several southern Golan settle-
ments. Settlements in the northern Golan are affiliated
with political parties that have shown a greater-dis-
position toward territorial concessions, but the strip
of Israeli-occupied territory bordering on Syria, Leba-
non, and Israel is very narrow, and the government will
fight hard to keep it.
Political Survival
Rabin recognizes that his political survival could
easily be affected by the nature and outcome of an in-
terim settlement with Damascus that required a pullback
of Israeli forces. He has powerful domestic political
incentives to stall for time before entering into talks
with the Syrians and, once talks begin, to maintain a
tough negotiating stance.
Flexibility will probably not be introduced into
the Israeli bargaining position until there is some as-
surance of Syrian political concessions.
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