NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031200150002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 17, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
17 March 1979
Top Secret
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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Namibia: Truce Talks in New York . . . . . . . 3
USSR-India: Results of Kosygin Visit . . . . . 4
Special Analyses
Arab States: Reactions to Expected Treaty . . 11
USSR: Arms Shipments to Cuba . . . . . . . . . 15
Overnight Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the
final section of the Daily, will often contain materials
that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and
Comments.
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NAMIBIA: Truce Talks in New York
South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha and
leaders of the South-West Africa People's organization
have agreed to meet with Western foreign ministers and
UN Secretary General WaZdheim in New York on Monday in
an effort to clear up objections to WaZdheim's truce
plan that are blocking the UN transitional program for
Namibia. Representatives of the five African frontline
states and Nigeria also will participate in the talks.
Their cooperation is essential to resolving the impasse
between South Africa and SWAPO.
The South Africans insist that a truce must provide
for effective monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola and
Zambia and must not allow any guerrillas in Namibia to
k th or set u bases SWAPO would adamantly
rms
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oppose such concessions. The group, moreover, wants the
UN peacekeeping force to include a Nigerian battalion,
which would be unacceptable to South Africa.
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South African diplomats have suggested that, if
the UN truce plan were revised to ban SWAPO bases inside
Namibia, the South Africans might not insist that UN
troops monitor the SWAPO bases in neighboring countries.
Instead, South Africa might accept UN liaison offices
that would verify monitoring of SWAPO bases by the host
governments. Zambia and Botswana have indicated that
they would accept such an arrangement.
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Angolan President Neto, however, has rebuffed this
alternative despite encouragement by the other presi-
dents of the frontline states to accept it. Neto also
has refused to send a senior representative to the talks,
although the other frontline states and Nigeria
said they will send their foreign ministers.
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South Africa's recent attacks on SWAPO bases in
Angola and Zambia are likely to prejudice the black Afri-
can participants against accepting any modifications
that may benefit South Africa. 25X1
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USSR-INDIA: Results of Kosygin Visit
The visit of Premier Kosygin to India, which ended
Thursday, was a public relations success for the Soviets;
it resulted in implicit Indian criticism of the US for
its suspension of the Indian ocean arms control talks
and public reaffirmation of India's interest in maintain-
ing close ties with the USSR. The Indians received
primarily aid benefits. The talks were not as cordial,
however, as those in former Prime Minister Gandhi's
time, and Kosygin apparently did not succeed in pZacing
new obstacles to a Sino-Indian rapprochement.
The week-long visit was clearly designed to high-
light Soviet-Indian relations in the wake of Indian For-
eign Minister Vajpayee's trip to China last month.
Kosygin clearly hoped that China's invasion of Vietnam
would be useful in frustrating Sino-Indian ra roche-
ment.
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India has been using Soviet concerns over Sino-
Indian ties to remove some longstanding irritants in its
relations with the USSR and to secure new Soviet aid.
The Indians apparently did secure additional imports of
Soviet-financed oil. The two sides also signed a long-
term framework agreement for expanded scientific and 25X1
technical cooperation, a protocol on equipment for a
state farm, a cultural cooperation accord for 1979-1980
and a health cooperation agreement.
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ARAB STATES: Reactions to Expected Treaty
Arab denunciation of Egyptian President Sadat and
the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is building. The culmination
of the effort will probably be a new conference in
Baghdad--possibly timed to open the day a treaty is
signed--and a vote to impose sanctions against Egypt. It 25X1
is ZikeZy that the effort by Iraq, Syria, and Libya to
stampede the more moderate Arabs into unqualified con-
demnation of the treaty will be largely successful.
Saudi Arabia and Jordan appear to be somewhat ambiva-
lent toward "punishing" Sadat. The full weight of anti-
Sadat pressure has not yet been applied, however. That
will occur at Baghdad, where there will be few significant
countervailing pressures. Given the moderates' reserva-
tions about the treaty, we doubt that they have the will
or the self-confidence to stand against the hardliners.
Jordan certainly would not unless Saudi Arabia took a
strong stand against punishing Sadat.
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Foreign Minister Saud told Ambassador West on Wednesday
that the immediate and "automatic" consequences of Egypt's
signing a treaty would be its ouster from the Arab League
and the Arab Mutual Defense Pact and the transfer of
League headquarters from Cairo. Participants at the
Baghdad summit last November agreed to such measures.
On the important question of economic sanctions, Saud
said his government would "maintain its economic contacts
with Egypt" and continue "current commitments" but ruled 25X1
The treaty language is unlikely to affect the atti-
tude of the hardliners. The moderating role played by
Syria and Iraq in the recent Yemeni conflict--after Saudi
efforts to defuse the crisis floundered--probably gives
them added leverage with the Saudis. In the short term,
the peace treaty will quicken the pace of Syrian-Iraqi
reconciliation, particularly in the area of foreign pol-
icy and military cooperation.
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Palestinian groups probably will show their anger
over a treaty by:
-- Attempted acts of terrorism by radical Pal-
estinians against Egyptian, Israeli, and
perhaps US targets in Europe, the Middle
East, and Israel.
-- Encouraging continued protests by Pales-
tinians in the occupied territories and
demonstrations by Palestinians in Lebanon.
-- Acting to intimidate West Bank and Gaza Pal-
estinians who show any signs of willingness
to participate in the negotiating process.
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It is possible that Yasir Arafat and the more mod-
erate Palestinians, despite their harsh public state-
ments, will try to maintain some contact with the Egyp-
tians while they examine the terms of the peace for Pal-
estinian mains and assess the reaction of other Arabs.
line at any conference on sanctions. Sudan's President
Numayri has qualified his support of the current peace
move, probably in recognition that his link to Sadat's
effort is politically costly at home and in the Arab
world. Numayri told the US Ambassador that the key is
continued US efforts to work toward peace on the West
Bank and Gaza. Numayri hinted that his stand made US
support for his regime all the more important. Some
smaller Gulf states reportedly have consulted on ways to
Arab support for a treaty is meager. An Omani offi-
cial reportedly said his government would take a moderate
moderate the backlash against Sadat.
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Tunisia, flanked by rejectionist Algeria and Libya
has withheld official comment
D
The Long Term
The moderate Arab governments might eventually--per-
haps in two years--"accommodate" their positions to an
Egyptian-Israeli treaty and move to relax the isolation
of Sadat and to give some support to the negotiating proc-
ess on the West Bank and Gaza. The second Sinai disen-
gagement accord of 1975 offers a precedent of sorts. The
Arab world denounced Sadat for breaking ranks, yet the
Saudis swallowed their anger and continued aid to Egypt.
A similar adjustment cannot be expected any time
soon. It is especially not likely unless specific gains
for Palestinians occur on the West Bank and Gaza. Such
gains would include a diminished Israeli official pres-
ence, a large-scale release of Palestinian political
prisoners, and an end to restrictions on political ac-
tivity in the occupied territories.
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USSR: Arms Shipments to Cuba
billion worth from 1961 through the end of 1978; equip-
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The USSR has been the chief supplier of military 25X1
equipment to Cuba since the early 1960s, providing $1.55
Emphasis on Modernization
The pace of modernization began to pick up in 1976
and 1977 and accelerated last year. Concurrent with the
modernization push, the USSR began to replace military
equipment Cuba shipped to Angola. 25X1
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The USSR will continue to modernize Cuba's military
equipment this year, probably at a pace close to that of
1978.
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Future deliveries are likely to include the type of
ground equipment Cuba has been receiving since 1976. If
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(The items in the overnight Reports section have not
been coordinated within the intelligence community.
They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current
Operations with analyst comment where possible from the
production offices of NFAC.)
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Belgium-Zaire
Belgium yesterday brought home the first of some
250 of its paratroopers stationed in Zaire since last
month; the remainder are scheduled to begin leaving next
week.
Portugal
The US Embassy in Lisbon reports that the Communist-
dominated Workers' Confederation will sponsor antigovern-
ment demonstrations in Lisbon and six other locations
today. The demonstration in Lisbon may attract more than
100,000 people, many of whom will be bused into Lisbon
to ensure an impressive turnout. The Embassy comments
that there is considerable worker discontent, although
anger and frustration is general and not specifically
directed at the Mota Pinto government. Communist lever-
age in labor disputes has also been reduced by the quick
settlement of otentially serious labor disputes in re-
cent weeks.
Chad-France
Ambassador Bradford in Ndjamena believes the French
will soon abandon their role as an "honest broker and
policeman" in Chad, a move he believes may portend major
changes in French policy elsewhere in Africa. The Am-
bassador interprets recent French actions--an unusually
restrained military response to fighting in the capital
and continued evacuation of French citizens despite less-
ening tensions--as signs of a policy switch. Other
changes expected by the Ambassador include reductions in
economic aid, direct military support, and in political
backing on such questions as the Libyan-Chad border
dispute.
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