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Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 CONFIDENTIAL 220 Current Support Brief CIA/RR CB 64-58 September 1964 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports CONFIDENTIAL GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs, 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an. unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T?-I-A-L CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM A large number of Czechoslovak economists have been urging pub- licly replacement of the Soviet type of command economy in Czechoslo- vakia by a form of market socialism. This proposal, the most radical in the Bloc, is the focus of a general debate o-rer economic reform con- ducted under Party auspices since last fall in the hope of finding solutions to some of the country's severe and deep-seated economic difficulties? The proposed economic system has much in common with the actual sys- tem in Yugoslavia. It provides for: a devolution of authority to individual enterprises, excluding decisions for key investments and foreign trade;, the basing of enterprise incentives on current income instead of the ful- fillment of plan assignments, the formation of prices reflecting supply and demand, and the exercise of state controls mainly through financial regulations rather than through plan directives. The liberal proposal has been criticized by some economists who believe that Czechoslovak economic conditions are inappropriate for market socialism. Other economists have emphasized reforms that could be used to make a com- mand economy work better, especially through improvements in planning involving mathematical techniques or through management procedures similar to those of US corporations. The regime is proceeding slowly and cautiously in changing planning and management. Some reforms, such as a thorough,' but on the whole orthodox, revision of wholesale prices, have been implemented, and a simplification of plan directives for 1965 has been announced. An in- crease in the authority of enterprises and other changes desired by the liberals are to be introduced in. 1965, but these changes probably will fall far short of market socialism because of vested interests and the concern of the present leadership with retaining close control over the economy. 1. Economic Reform a Bloc-Wide Issue All the countries of the Soviet Bloc are experimenting with methods of economic planning and management, and in most of them the ideo- logical restraints on economic reform have been loosened greatly. In. the USSR, two years ago Liberman urged the use of profit incentives to regulate enterprise behavior in a decentralized manner, and the sub- ject was reopened in mid-August 1964 when Pravda published an article by Academician V. A. Trapeznikov that proposes even more liberal economic reforms. In addition, mathematical economists, such as Kantorovich, have been pressing for the formation of rational prices C-O-N-.F-I.D-?E-N-T-I-A-L Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 C -0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L by means of linear programing techniques. Hungary has introduced such innovations as an interest charge on fixed capital. In Bulgaria the author- ity of some enterprises (mainly local and construction enterprises) has been increased greatly, and some basic questions of socialist economics are being debated. In no other country of the Bloc, however, has the discussion gone so far as in Czechoslovakia, where a large group of economists has proposed a complete overhaul of the present economic system. Moreover, in no other country of the Bloc is the issue of eco- nomic reform as pressing and as politically acute as in Czechoslovakia. 2. Development of the Issue in Czechoslovakia Basically the serious concern with economic reform and the radical nature of some of the proposals being entertained in Czechoslovakia stem from the near absence of economic growth during the past 2-1/2 years. As early as 1962, Czechoslovak economists were pressing for reforms, and the need to improve techniques of planning and management was emphasized at the Party Congress in December 1962. Party leader Novotny, however, continued to blame some of the country's economic difficulties on the partial decentralization of 1958-60 and called for a tightening of central controls. In 1963, as the economic situation deteriorated further and cultural ferment accompanied a new wave of "destaiinization, " criticism of the regime's policies increased greatly, and some of the critics argued -- in direct contradiction of Novotny -- that the error in 1958-60 had been in decentralizing too little. Novotny and his followers were forced to admit that planning had been overambitious, that serious mistakes had been made in the allocation of investments, and that incentives did not give enough stimulus to technical progress and improvement in the quality of output. * Then, in the wake of a Party and government shakeup of September 1963, which replaced some of the dogmatic officials (espe- cially Vilem Siroky) by more pragmatic men such as Jozef Lenart and Drahomir Kolder, the Party gave official blessing to a thoroughgoing debate on the economic system. A group of economists, headed by Ota Sik, a member of the Central Committee of the Party and Chief of the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences, was charged with an intensive study of possible reforms and asked to present its recom- mendations to the leadership through the newly organized Economic Commission of the Party. Sik told a Central Committee Plenum in December 1963 that the traditional Soviet forms of socialist manage- ment no longer worked in Czechoslovakia, because there were no more For more detailed information on the economic difficulties, see source l/. -2- Approved For Relegaq,2p{1@10j5/12 Q AiRD W-U01003AO02100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L reserves which could be mobilized and with which inefficiency could be covered up. A large number of proposals and counterproposals on eco- nomic reforms began to appear in late 1963 and continue to appear in the Party press and technical journals. 3. The Liberal Proposal The essence of the liberal proposal, first presented in an article published in. the Party journal by Sik in November 1963 and developed by many other economists, is to replace the Soviet type of command economy in. Czechoslovakia by a form. of controlled market socialism resembling in many respects that of Yugoslavia. Although the liberals do not agree on all points and some aspects of the proposal are unclear, there appears to. be.a consensus of liberal opinion on most of its basic features. a. Planning Although central planning would continue, it would be attenuated and focused on long-term development. Long-term plans would be worked out by careful economic analysis of alternative means of achieving national objectives. As in Yugoslavia, central economic plans would provide guidelines for decisions at lower levels but would not have the force of law. Enterprises would establish their own operational plans. _ The state would retain direct control over key investments and foreign trade but otherwise would rely on indirect controls over enter- prises. to implement its policies. As in Yugoslavia, the indirect controls would be achieved through financial means such as taxes, the charging of interest on fixed and working capital, the regulation of prices and wages, and the extension of bank credits. In contrast to Yugoslavia, control organs other than banks would be organized mainly on. an industry and branch basis rather than on a regional and local. basis. * For a listing of liberal economists, see the Appendix, and for some of their articles, see source 2/. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L C. Management The enterprises themselves would decide what and how to pro- duce and with whom to do business within the limits imposed by state regulations and the direct controls in investment ana and thority in There is no suggestion of giving workers' organizations enterprise management comparable to that of the Yugoslav workers' councils. d. Incentives Enterprises no longer would be ordered to fulfill particular plan tasks assigned by higher authority but rather would maximize cur- rent income. Some of the liberals are in favor of using enterprise prise income" profits as a standard, but the majority of them prefer "gross 4hruby duchod) -- what remains of the receipts from sales after de- ducting purchases from other enterprises and wages would be paid from Yugoslavia, interest on capital, gross income. Minimum wages would wou d have, be observede but wage scales for different occupations additional payments to workers and managers would depend on what remained of gross income after all the above expenses had been paid. e. Prices In accordance with the reliance on incentives based on current values and on financial controls, prices would correspond approximately to the relative scarcities of goods and services accounting as at present re- flecting the prevailing conventions would not be deter- Except for relatively few consumer goods, prices pric mined freely in the market. The te services, ? anduconsumer staples, of industrial materials, public utility a such as bread and sugar, and would the establish ~~ foanur goods. ing among buyers and sellers in t These fixed or controlled prices, from the levels called for bylsuPPly and deviate markedly or for long f demand. The proposal is intentionally vague because of the political sen-ct state sitivity of the question on the extent and anner cru caleque tions on the over investments and foreign trade and g relation of domestic to world market prices and the use of differential -I-I}-E-At-T-I-A-L Approved For Release 1b`&0}O5/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L taxes, tariffs, and subsidies to protect or encourage producers. There also are allusions to possible direct intervention by the state in other areas "if absolutely necessary. " The proposal, moreover, is being sold to the regime as a means of improving the real authority of the Party and government over the economy -- by comparison with the past system when many state directives were not observed or even had per- verse effects on the implementation of national policies. It is very doubtful, however, that the liberal economists really believe that state and Party control would be unimpaired -- rather they probably expect that thestate apparatus would be greatly curtailed and that the Party would have to make basic changes in its methods of operation. 4. Criticisms and Alternative Proposals Because economic reform is a proclaimed goal of the regime'sp:olicy and because dogmatism is out of fashion, it is difficult to find any staunch supporters of the status quo in the Czechoslovak economic press, al- though opposition to change is certainly widespread, not only among the state bureaucracy but also in faculties of economics, where sinecures are being threatened. 3/ A number of economists, however, have taken issue in the press with the liberal proposal or with aspects of it, although they too favor (or claim to favor) reforms of the economic system. Their criticisms range from the simple assertion that the liberal pro- posal verges perilously close to bringing back "capitalism without the capitalist" 4/ to sophisticated reservations 'about the possibility of creating an efficient form of market socialism. 5/ It is alleged, for example, that a system like that of Yugoslavia would not work well in Czechoslovakia, because of the tightness of the supply of labor and the favorable conditions for monopolistic practices in many branches of heavy industry, especially heavy machine building. Many economists have emphasized changes in planning and manage- ment that. could be used to make a command economy work better, al- though they also are advocated by some of the liberals. One group of economists, for example, is concerned mainly with improving economic planning through modern mathematical techniques, such as input-output and linear programing. 6/ Another group of economists, concerned mostly with industrial, management, takes its inspiration from large Western corporations, arguing that the combining of enterprises into branch-wide economic units with broad authority would facilitate tech- nical progress and bring a businesslike approach to management with- out much sacrifice of central controls. 7/ In regard to incentives, C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-] there is general agreement that the old system gi~ to gross value of production, but some economist proposal for introducing a single indicator of ente such as gross income or profits, and propose ins- of a variety of plan indicators, differing among bi the conditions of the branch and priorities of the i together, these proposals on "scientific planning, management, and selected incentives present a pc line for reform to that desired by the liberal econ native, which would salvage the essential feature: economy, apparently is being adopted by the regir Poland, and Hungary. Position of the Leadership 1003AO02100040001-3 ies too much weight reject the liberals' rprise performance, ;ead the establishment -anches in accord with -egime. 8/ Taken It "businesslike" issible alternative omists. This alter- of the command nes in East Germany, As might be expected, the regime wants to h ve its cake and eat it too -- it wants to reform planning and manageme t so as to improve economic performance without relinquishing any important controls. According to top Czechoslovak leaders, 9/ "the g freed from part of the operational tasks and must damental problems of economic policy, It "econorr. than orders must be widely used to implement pol reflect supply and demand. On the other hand, tY to "strengthen the authority of the plan, which is instrument of management, " and also "continue tc ing role of _the Party. " A few changes already have been introduced i ment. For 1965, there will be a reduction of 14 1 of centrally planned and-rationed commodities an( number of directives given to enterprises. 10/ I announcement that no quantitative production assi to enterprises for 1965. 11/ There are no detail., not clear whether the change refers to only one of for 1965 or to all the stages. Various measures used instead of gross output to evaluate performer A general revision of wholesale prices was introd following 2 years of intensive work. 13/ The new among a much more precise assortment of produ( and reflect costs more closely. The new prices in the case of some close substitutes; goods in un )vernment must be concentrate on fun- ic instruments" rather icies, and prices should e same leaders want the most important strengthen the lead- n planning and manage- )ercent in the number of 53 percent in the here also has been an nments will be given however, and it is the stages in planning )f net output are being ace by an enterprise. 12/ uced in April 1964, prices, differentiate :ts than the old prices also reflect demand asually short supply; C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A- Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T 1003AO02100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L or certain byproducts, such as steel scrap. In general, however, the revision follows the conventional Bloc practice of basing prices on aver- age costs of production in each branch of industry. The regime has promised to introduce additional reforms in the latter part of 1964 and in 1965. 14/ Premier Lenart in May and the Party''s.:P'irs:t'^Secretary, Novotny, during Khrushchev's recent visit to Czechoslovakia spoke of introducing many of the specific proposals of the liberals, including increased flexibility for prices, the use of gross income to evaluate enterprise performance and as a basis for paying bonuses, the charging of interest on fixed assets, and a greatly increased use of bank credit for the allocation of investment funds. 15/ Statements by the regime, how- ever, also have emphasized "scientific" planning (including the use of mathematical tools), the grouping of enterprises on a branch basis, and the application of selected incentives. 6. Prospects for Reforms The prospects for economic reform in Czechoslovakia remain highly uncertain. There is no doubt that many changes in the system of planning and management, including some of those proposed by the liberals, will be introduced over the next year or two. The continued poor performance of the economy is a powerful incentive to making such changes, and part of the Czechoslovak leadership consists of men who are not dogmatic Communists. However, fear by the Party of a loss of control and vested interests are powerful conservative forces that probably predispose the regime to prefer modifications in familiar methods to more fundamental changes that could be :risky.. Last March the Party Presidium rejected.a proposal of the Economic Commis0ion, presumably because it was too liberal. 16/ It seems unlikely that the present leadership will give enterprises anywhere near the amount of authority desired by the liberals or allow market forces to determine output except within narrow limits. Accord- ing to Novotny, reforms will be introduced "step by step ... with much prudence" and "without upsetting upheavals. " This cautious approach gives the conservative forces every opportunity to prevent fundamental changes -- as such forces did so successfully in Poland after the promising beginning of the "new economic model" in 1956-57. Even if there is a substantial. devolution of authority to enterprises, it remains to be seen whether the regime will be willing to reduce the central state apparatus correspondingly. And if the apparatus remains largely in- tact, it will have the possibility as well as the,incentive of reimposing controls whenever economic problems develop (as in Poland during 1959-60). As long as there appears to be a pressing economic need, however, economic reform will remain a major issue in Czechoslovakia, and basic changes in the system will be possible. - 7 - Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : IA~pP79Tp1Q03AO02100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Bohumil Komenda Cestmir Kozusnik Ota Sik APPENDIX LIBERAL CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMISTS Affiliation Economics Institute, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague Hruby- Benedikt Korda Frantisek Valenta Vladimir Kadera Bohumil Krejcar Rudolf Kocanda Ladislav Matejka Pavel Pelikan Zdenek Vergner Eduard Vopicka Antonin Cervinka Zdenek Kodet Hvezdon Koctuch Viktor Pavlenda D~q~6 Economics Institute, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague Economics Institute, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague University of Economics, Prague University of Economics, Prague University of Economics, Prague Research Institute of Economic Planning,** Prague Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague Party University, Prague Party University, Prague University of Economics, Bratislava University of Economics, Bratislava First name unknown. Subordinated to State Planning Commission. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 C-?-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Economist Affiliation 0. Kyn - Komensky University, Faculty of Law, Bratislava Radoslav Selucky Department of Political Economics, Czechoslovak Institute of Technology, Prague Julius Branik Research Institute of Ministry of Finance, Prague Rudolf Rohlicek Worker on staff of Central Committee of KSC and/or KSS Eugen Loebl Ministry of Foreign Affairs C-Q-N-F-I-D-E -N-T-I-A-L Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 1. CIA. CIA/RR EM 64-3, Czechoslovakia in 1963: the Year the Economy Stood Still, Feb 64. C. 2. Sik, Ota. "Improvement of Planned System of Management, If Rude pravo, p. 3-6, 22 Nov 63. U. (Cited in JPRS. 26256, 3 Sep 64. U. ) Vergner, Zdenek. "Problems of Planned Management of the National. Economy, " Hospodarske noviny, 3, 17 Jan 64, p. 6-7. U. Komenda, Bohumil and Cestmir Kozusnik. "Simplified System or Simplified Interpretation, " Hospodarske noviny, 13, 27 Mar 64. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 402, Translations on Czecho- slovakia, 211, 27 Aug 64. OFF USE.) Komenda, Bohumil and Ce stmir Kozusnik. "Some Fundamental Problems of Improving the Management System in the National Economy and Panel Discussion on Management, " Politka ekonomie, no 3, 1964, p. 219-272. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 383, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 206, p. 12-41 and 67-118, 11 Aug 64. OFF USE.) Kozusnik, Cestmir. "Flexible Prices and Planned Manage- ment of the Economy, " Planovane hospodarstvi, no 6, 1964, p. 25-33. U. (Cited in JPRS. QUO 377, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 204, p. 81-91, 5 Aug 64. OFD' USE.) Komenda, Bohumil. "Conditions for Working of the Market Mechanism in Socialist Economics, " Planovane hospodarstvi, no 7, 1964, p. 28-38. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 398, Translations on Czechoslovakia, '210, p. 48-63, 24 Aug 64. OFF USE.) Kodet, Zdenek. "Gross Income or Profit,'! Hospodarske noviny, no 23, 5 Jun 64, p. 3. U. , (Cited in JPRS. GUO 391, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 208, 18 Aug 64, p. 1-9. OFF USE.) Matejka, Ladislav. "Binding Nature of the Plan and Economic Management, " Planovane hospodarstvi, no 2, 1964, p. 31-37. U. Kocanda, Rudolf. "Economic Conditions of Planned Adminis- tration, " Planovane hospodarstvi, no 2, 1964, p. 23-30. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 302, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 170, 19 Mar 64. OFF USE.) "Political Organization and Law as Applicable to the Manage- ment of the National Economy, and Enquiry, " Pravnik, no 6 and 7, 1964. U. (Cited in RFE. Czechoslovak Press Survey, no 1511, 25 Jul 64, p. 1-"'32. U. ) - 11 - Approved For Release g0&/65/121-Ctf-t T$1003A002100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 3. State, Prague. Airgram A 410, 21 Feb 64, p. 3. OFF USE. 4. Vlcek, J. "Views Are Sorted Out, " Hospodarske novice, no 10, 6 Mar 64, p. I. U. (Cited in RFE. Czechoslovak Press Summary, no 1438, 20 Mar 64, p. 7. U. ) FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 8 Jan 64, p. gg 8. U. Selucky, R. "Economic Views Becoming More Closely De- fined, "` Veda a zivot, Mar 64. U. (Cited in RFE. Czecho- slovak Press Survey, no 1442, 1 Apr 64, p. 13. U'. ) 5. Sokol, Miroslav. "Application of Commodity Relationships in Management, " Planovane hospodarstvi, no 5, 1964, p. 31-44. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 358, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 202, 16 Jul 64, p. 1-18. OFF USE.) Tucek, Miroslav, "Planned Management of National Economy and Finance, " Finance a over, no 4, 1964, p. 199-208. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 358, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 202, 16 Jul 64, p. 33-48. OFF USE. ) 6. Klas, Anton. "Economic and Administrative Management, " Hospodarske noviny, 19, 8 May 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 397, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 209, 21 Aug 64, p. 1-10. OFF USE.) Kadlec, Vladimir, "Computers in the Industrial Enterprises, " Hospodarske noviny, 2, 10 Jan 64, p. 5. U. 7. Hospodarske noviny, 10, 6 Mar 64, p. 12. U. Ibid., 11, 13 Mar 64, p. 10. U. Politika ekonomie, no 3, 1964, p. 268. U. 8. Prochazka, Karel and Milos Ruzicka. "Prices Pro and Con, Hospodarske noviny, 20, 15 May 64, p. 4. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 391, Translations on Czechoslovakia 208, 18 Aug 64, p. 23-28. OFF USE.) Ditte rt, Josef. The Key Lies in Departmental Management, Hospodarske noviny, 13, 27 Mar 64, p. 4, 10. U. Vaclav. "Directive Plan and Monetary Relationship, " Filip, Hospodarske noviny, no 12, 20 Mar 64, p. 4. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 398, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 210, 24 Aug 64, p. 31. OFF USE. ) 9. Rude pravo, 6 Apr 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 16 Apr 64, p. gg 12. U. ) Ibid., 29 May 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 9 Jun 64, p. 7, 8. U. Ibid., 30 May 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 8 Jun 64, p. gg 5. U. ) Ibid., 24 Jun 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 14 Jul 64, p. gg 28. U.) - 12 - Approved For Release M5k2-Gtr-'ROP 9T01003A002100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 10. Hospodarske noviny, 7 Aug 64, p. 4. U. 11. Rude pravo, 30 May 64, p. 2. U. 12. Planovane hospodarstvi, no 7, 1963, p. 7-9. U. 13. Finance auver, no 3, 1964, p. 129-138. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 313, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 27 May 64. OFF USE.) Ibid., no 2, 1964, p. I. U. 14. Rude pravo, 24 Jun 64, p. 3. U (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 24 Jun 64, p. '99'3. U. ) Ibid., 28 Aug 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 28 Aug 64, p. (gg' 2. U. ) 15. Ibid.,. 30 May 64. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 8 Jun 64, p. g~g(7;,8. U. ) Ibid., 28 Aug 64, p. 2. U. (Cited iii FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 1 Sep 64, p. gg 7,'8. U. ) Ibid. , 30 Aug. 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 3 Sep 64, p. gg 15. U. ) 16. Ibid., 4 Apr 64, p. 2. U. Analysts: 25X1A C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 Analyst: A/E Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01 A010240060001-3 OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS St/P/RR - Control Section Control Sheet Series Number CIA/RR CB 64-58 Date of Document- September 1964 Copy No. 25X1A GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic dongrading and deciasciticatlon Returned 172 25X1A 29 Se 64 173 OCR " 174 O s 1G81 Hq.______ HR 175 18 0 181 182 184 185 -- ---__ -_ ~~. 186 187 182._ 190 229 Filed in St/P/C 29 Se 64 7tiX1A LS/CR for.Leon Lewins, 190 _ Bureau of International_Programs,_?__ ___ _ _ Roo 2314, Main Commerce 29 Se 64 1 - 2z -Iief -A~ 4 3 s apt t,o _ _ o cl r _ _. 164 1 pproved'~orl~eTe`ase1~5T~-R P79T01003A002100040 01-3 Recipient Classification I U III-CRIFIDENTIAL Number of Copies 280 Approved For Release 200A A~ RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 "WOR1 SUBJECT- Distribution of Current Support Brief No, 64-58, Czechoslovakia Debates Market Socialism --- Se ptember 1264 (Confidential Copy No 1 O/DDI, Room 7E32, Hdgtrso 2-3 NIC 4 -12 OCI Internal 13 - 15 ONE 16 - 21 St/CS/RR 25X1A zz 23 - 31 4/DD NSA/ 25X1A 32 33 - 280 ORR Iistribution, St/A/ Document Support Section, Room GH0915, Hdgtrs (Distributed by OCR) CONFIDENTIAL GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and;.:: declassification Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/05/12: IA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3 eo,4, -/Ds Distribution of Current Support Brief No. 64-58. Czechoslovakia Co."r No. 33 .AD/RR 34 DkAD/RR 35 Ch/E 36 St/PR 37 - 41 D/A (~. each branch) Recipient 42 - 47 D/M,S (1 each branch) 43 - 53 D/R (I each branch) 54 MRA 55 - 59 DIP (I each branch) 60 - 65 D/F (I each branch) 66 St/PS 67 - 75 D/I (1 each branch) 76 - 77 D/GG _ 78 - 79 D/GC 80 D/GCIX 31 - 86 RID/A1, Unit 4, Room IB4004, Hq. 37 st/P/A 25X1A 38 St/FM 39 Analyst/Branch A/E) 90 GR/CR 91 BR/CR 92 FIB/SR/CR, Room 1G27, Hq. 93 Library/CR 94 IPI/CR 95 VMR. A-18 96 AD/OO 97 Chief, FDD 93 CD/OO 99 OCI/SA/R, Room 5G19. Hq. 100 DDI/CGS, Room. 7F35,, Hq. 101 - 10Z DDI/CGS/HR, Room 1CaI, Hq. 103 ri 105 OSI 106 081 25X1 A 107 - 108 Q'-.rR/I.S/IP, Room 532, Broyhill Bld . (1 - OrR/SIC) 109 NPIC/CSD/REF, Room 15518, 110 Commandant National War College, Ft. Leslie McNair. Attn; Classified Records Section. Rm. 26, National War College Building, Wash.. D. C. 111 - 112 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Y. SA, Room 4D825, Pentagon 113 - 151 Defense Intelligence Agency, DV.-AQ-3, Room 2D233, Pentagon 152 - 155 USIA, Warren Phelps. IRR/D, Room Walker John non Building, 1734 New York Avenue, N. W. 812. 156 - 167 State, !NR Communications Center, Room 7318, State Dept. Bldg. 1.68 .. 169 Dr. Neilson Debevoise, NSC. Room 365, Executive Office Building 170 -- 171 Frank M. Charrette. Agency for International Development, Chief, Statistics and Reports Division, Room A-204, State Annex #10 172 - Z29 St/P/C/RR, Roora 4F41, Hq. Records Center 230- 280 Approved For Release 2 R +9fi~Sin ffl owegrading and? :. decta~siticatlotG "=~ k002100040001-3 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/05/12 CIA-tDP79T01003A002100040001-3 F 2 October 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR'. Chief, Dissemination Control Branch,, DD/CR FROM Chief, Publications Staff, OR.R SUBJECT Transmittal of Material It is requested that the attached copies of CIA/ R CB 64-581 Czeohoslova~siai 7 ebetes 2 rket Socialism September 1 1, Confident al, e foxvarded fa cwss State, IN1t Communications Center Room 7818, State Dept, Bldg, Suggested distribution for Embassies in MaOCO1, Prague and London 25X1A Attachments C< ac leis #i92 - ,194 of CB 64-58 Tt~s.: Ku .9 d !P~.TLD by this memorandum has been completed, BY : "?7d " Date: ;b y GROUP I Approved For Release MnAL fl NITWE Ift! ,~IA- 8 AW W 3AO02100040001-3 RSA 1~ daciassificatian R'r A Appr ed For Release 2000/0/q !; 1~1449T01 003AO02100040001-3 16.516 CIA/RR CB 64-58 Czechoslovakia Debates Market Socialism --- September 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL) 25X1A A/E ha-' pPa 'Ro-t,aniia. e , s:rs,lvsi and .3r. anch i;?SS R. e c3.4 Cg%7 k ~ ripe l grade. yugosla%ria `ra.. 5uat,zerinara tn, `.aier.manv sst4a. Belg:iarxk e~_ungar :en, Denrr ari'..: inland 3"ya ' taw ll. R;?rne . It:a lv HA give _ Nehc: v laid s i 11 E Approved xcluded troM 'SUMAC For Release 20 cWHIEKNAt D 7 J~uss~ l A BRA Hon r Kong, Mexico Guatemala Panama Kuala Lumpto . ,:..lava Brazillia. Brasil. Buenos Aires. Argentina i gong iet Bogota, Colombia r 1eoii Fox e Santiago. Chile Taipei E. -a La Paz, hoti.via Montevideo, Uruguay Japa,i Caracasa zr''erse:uela. Vientiane. La:xs .Phnom Penh., C aE?nbodi. Colombo,. Ge k, on Near :East r% Scut! Asia a Yaounde, Cam>roun Leopoldville, Congo Addi Ab Eth b i Ankara, Turkey a, s a on a Accra. Ghana Athens, Gre- e Abidjan.. Ivor, Coast U0Yt1iE3r'uR Nairobi Kenya Mon.i.ovia i. L#be na Kabul, Afgh at, ta.n Tripoli, Libya d rac hi,, :Pa c, >~ a : #ew F e3bi: in `a =_ti c r-s a Cyprus 1'ehrPp. (ran. 13aghda~ roc Tel. Aviv.. Is r e,J r 1a Sand s' '."? --a Ottawa. Canada GROUP 1 .a.bat. Mo ?'x~ co Laos, Mogadisc .o. SQmal Khartoum. Sudan Tunas? "a~1hnii sia Pretoria, South. Airii a A.ieierse:ieria 4 o4onnou, O=Horn'-v Dakar, S 'ne-za.i D02100040001-3 v Approved For Release 2000/d 5MT-:-OI R-bP79T01003AO02100040001-3 2 e-1, PT.' 9LIC,l TTON S CON tl OL PRC.)C1SS1NG SF.F.K'l 43ran&i :f+. dated !raft : t f. (it aft the Text .:.'heck. -urce cheek Sc- F G E~~ W? le to #l sent to AD/RR #z sent to DDI 3 checked for release OL/PSD notified to Disstieminatj IA-RDP79TO1003A002100040001-3