THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A001100010002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: PAPER

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Robert Amory!.8`_style of cotmnand and control was normally
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ref,
c~pected its to be well done did not interfeee?
If he were ,_.
disagd nted, however, jh6 e,
could make hisyd spleasure kniwt inno
DurineAmory's tenure, Assistant ector, ORR cont:trued
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to grow' Its actual s r ength of { n January 1952)r creased to
in February 19.5/3' L8
On 23r"~'ebruary 195 O obert Amory b me Deputy Director,
Intellence, in suco ssion to Loftu esker, and Otter -Guthe,
The Office] of Current Intelligence
became ADRR.
OCI was a third Office derived from ORE, but one that had not
been originally contemplated. The Report of the NSC Survey Group
had questioned the propriety of ORE's production of current intelli-
gence and had strongly condemned its political research in duplica-
tion of that of the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research
(OIR, formerly ORI). William Jackson had intended that OI& L -~oul(r
have its pick of ORE's political analysts, after ONE had taken its
choice, and that any not chosen by ONE or OIR should be declared
surplus and dismissed. As it turned out, however, OCI was t'le ha.v':i
in which the surplus analysts of ORE found refuge, to Jackson's gr?~...
chagrin!
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Tho nucleus of OCI wau the short-lived Office of Special
.;oi-viccs (003), an attc pt to organize moro effectivoly the
exploitation of communications intelligence in CIA. OCI was
formed through the piecemeal accretion of former ORE functions
and parsonnal to gas.
Current Intelligence in CIA
Neither the President's Letter of 22 January 1946 nor the
National Security Act of 1947 said anything about a current
intelligence function in CIG or CIA. Every intelligence organiza-
-pion, however, produces current intelligence for the information
of the authority that it serves. The day that CIG came into
existence (on 8 February 1946, with the adoption of NIA Directives
No. 1 and No. 2), President Truman impatiently demanded of it the
immediate production of a daily summary of current intelligence.
lie wanted a single, all-sufficient daily summary to replace, at
least insofar as he was concerned, the multiplicity of departmental
summaries that he was required to read.* He received the first
amber of the CIG Daily Summary on 15 February, and was well pleased
with it. ZE85
President Truman was a remarkably dutiful reader of intelligence.
He desired the CIG Daily to summarize oar to ianal as~we te3li-
gence information for his convenience, bjLt was disap o , ted in t :apt --
vhe War and Navy Departments_refuse4--tQ., release operatiQnG.l nTorrn .?-
-cion to CIG. State, on the other hand, furnished its most sensitive
1es, under some restrictions with regard to their use.
("S/Sfl)_
ciL
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,j1h,O Socretart' of State (Mr. Byrnes) proteotod the publication
i' -L1i ("M Da.t'Ey Simnnn.i. In tho circumstances or 191-6 it won
t:,,rivcd almost entirely from State cables, duplicating; the State
Department's daily summery. The President rejected that protest,
:ay-Ing that CIG was his own personal intelligence staff. The
Secretary could only forbid CIG to comment on the significance of
State cables, reserving that function to State. Not long afterward,
however, President Truman demanded, and of course got CIG comments
on items in the CIG Daily Su mnary. 486
CIA's publication of current intelligence was more formally
sanctioned by NSCID No. 3, 13 January 191+8. It provided that all
intelligence agencies should produce and disseminate current intelli-
gence as might be necessary to meet "their own internal requirements
or external responsibilities." 1+87 DCID 3/1, 8 July 19?+$ provided
that current intelligence was not subject to coordi,.ation. 488/
The NSC Survey Group noted that the CIA Daily Summary, Weekly
Summary, and monthly Review of the World Situation were almost
This Review deserves passing notice. The first number was prepared
by the Global Survey Group, ORE, as a briefing for Admiral Hill?enkoetter
to present to the newly constituted NSC, at its request. It was fully
coordinated with the IAC agencies. Hillenkoetter was pleased with it
and ordered it to be published as an estimate. The NSC was also pleased
and requested that it be repeated on a monthly basis. When 25X1A
attempted to coordinate subsequent numbers with the IAC agent es, they
begged off, insisting that a monthly estimate was current intelligence.
The true reason was that no IAC agency had anyone cognizant of the global
situation. To coordinate with GSG each agency had to send a squad of
regional specialists, and these regional specialists fell to quarreling
among themselves as each sought preferment for his particular region. 189
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,.:ntirely political in content. Probably at the instigation of OIR,
7.t questioned the propriety of those publications and recommended
their discontinuance. '9o/ in response Admiral Hillenkoetter pointed
out that they were the only current intelligence publications prepared
expressly for the President and the NSC, as distinguished from special-
ized departmental audiences. 491 He knew, as the NSC Survey Group
apparently did not, that the Daily was prepared at the express direction
of the President and the monthly Review at that of the NSC.
To General Smith it was as. axiomatic as it had been to Admiral
Hillenkoetter that CIA had a responsibility to keep the President
currently informed. In October-November 1950 there was no question
)f discontinuing the CIA Daily Surtnnary, but the current intelligence
:"unction was then transferred from ORR (late ORR)to ON,C in accordance
with plan.* Langer then discontinued the Weekly and the
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monthly Review.
Communications Intelligence in CIA*
The other part of OCI's background harp to do with the role of
the DCI in relation to communications intelligence and the arrangements
See above, p. 233.
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x-- For a full treatment of this subject, see
"History of SIGINT in CIA, 1917-70."
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made within CIA to control and exploit that highly sensitive source
During the war, and for some time thereafter, the Army and Navy
monopolized communications intelligence. The Navy confined itself to
naval communications, but the Army took all else as its province and
Thus it
was the Army, not State, that produced the Diplomatic Summary,
-_'or s:zre, something that you don't know." The Army was not disposed
to yield that advantage to anyone, especially to CIG/CIA.
This monopoly gave the Services, especially the Army,
immense advantage in joint intelligence estimating: "we know,
In December 1945 a coordinating body called STANCIB (State-
A:nmy--Navy Communications Intelligence Board) was established. Since
`i, could act only with unanimous consent, the Army's power to maintain
its existing control of the source was assured. There was at that
time no DCI. In June 19+6 STANCIB became USCIB with the addition of
he FBI (but not of CIG).
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h The Diplomatic Summary was edited by who was
terwards a member of the General Division, ORE, the National Estimates
Staff, and the Board of National Estimates.
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Asa Asaikitant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Vandenberg wcas
: to ta.,n ~x~ of the U0"'CI13. Whon ho became DCI, his ouccew3or, G(;ncraI
~;~a~nbcrlin, invited him to continue to sit in USCI3 as a member. !
12ius the DCI gained a voice in the coordination of communications
intelligence activities, but only as one among many, not was the
ut'~ority responsible to the NIA for planning for the coordination
of all intelligence activities.
To provide himself with staff support in his USCIB role,
Vandenberg created the office of "Chief of the Advisory Council."
This "Council" was nothing more than..a_small staff section concerned
with representing CIG (CIA) in the USCIB substructure, obtaining CIG
access to the Comint product of the_ m,.U, .tary services, and controlling
the use and security of Comint within CIG. 493
In July 19+7 the ADRE proposed the establishment of the
"General Division" in ORE to handle communications intelligence on
securely compartmented basis. For some time, however, ORE had
access only to the Army's Diplomatic Sutmnary. It was not until
April 1948 that the Army finally consented to allow CIA personnel
to handle the raw take of communications intelligence on CIA premises. 494+
The USCIB was merely a voluntary association without any duly
constituted authority. In December 1947 it was proposed to obtain for
it the sanction of a Presidental Executive Order. There ensued a
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tru?le between the Services and State, which now sought to wrest
control from the Army. Admiral Hillenkoetter was strangely passive
n this matter until 13 February 1948, when Secretary Forrestal
c:eclared that there was no need for an Executive Order, that the
:ational Security Act of 1947 had given the DCI all the authority
4_
,hat was required. Hiilenkoetter then proposed an NSCID that
ceparated communications intelligence from other intelligence, but
made the USCIB analogous to the IAC. Led by Admiral Inglis, the
YAC amended that to make the USCIB directly subordinate to the NSC
(not advisory to the DCI) -- which was, of course, the position that
the IAC had been claiming for itself during the fall of 1947.
.ilenkoetter limply submitted this amended version to the NSC, but
Jidney Souers, the Executive Secretary, remanded it as unacceptable.
The IAC, however, refused to reconsider; in the end the NSC had to
choose between HiilenkoetterTs original draft and the IAC version.
Contrary to Souerst expectation, the NSC adopted the IAC version in
NSCID No. 9, 1 July 1948. 4951 Thus Admiral Inglis prevailed as
'k: ards communications intelligence.
Under the terms of NSCID No. 9, which required unanimous con-
L.rinee, the USC:CB remained incapable of cf2octing any mean:Lngftul
,yior,1ination. The Secretary of Defense thereupon proceeded to establish
See above, pp. 63-64.
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::Ze Aimed Forcer Security Agency (AFSA) to rationalize the com-
:,zur_ications intelligence activities of the three Services under
she direction of the JCS. L96
The NSC Survey Group avoided intrusion into the sensitive
-rea of communications intelligence. it expressed a suspicion
that all was not well in that area, but hoped that the study then
::-ecently initiated by the Secretary of Defense would produce a
colutian. (It produced AFSA.) The Survey Group's only suggestion
was that the DCI be made permanent chairman of,,USCIB. LN97 Hillen-
koetter, in his comments, declined that empty honor. In a Board
that could act only by unanimous consent, it did not matter who was
chairman. 498
The Office of Special Services
Such was the situation with regard to communications intelligence
.,hen Bedeii Smith became DCI. His first concern was to pull together
,:.ncler one clear command authority the oevcro.i elements in CIA concerned
~-.r ,h Comint. lie did that by combining the functions and personnel. of
the Advisory Council and the Special Research Centel; into one Office
of Special Services (OSS). The creation of that Office was announced
on 1 December 1950. l.99/
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The Special Research Center was not a command, but a place the
secure area that housed both the General Division of ORE and
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With the former General Division of ORB, OSS acquired from
t ~~;uo current intelligence publications. They wore the Daily
i:: ~rer Survnary, derived in part from coimiunications intelligence,
:,rid the Weekly Situation Summary, derived entirely from that source. 00
to the Office of Training and
c' r u t 3 or o3 91v 9a Wag - 25X1 A
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'.trho had been Chief of the Advisory Council since August 1950,
3 ter only a month as Assistant Director, was transferred 25X1A
his stead. 501
was appointed ADSS in 25X1 A
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..no Creation of OCI
On 18 December 1950 William Jackson announced that he was now
:?ady to take up the problem of current intelligence. 502 Three
~;'Wrs later he met with Lancer, _ and Babbitt to consider the
location that function Cam. 503 Babbitt Gontondod
ac current intelligence could not properly be produced without
-x, cd.iately available research support. That was 01E doctrine.
of-ckson angrily accused Babbitt of trying to perpetuate ORE in Oil,
and Babbitt acknowledged that to be true. Jackson could not be
c;,Tected to agree to that conception. Langer, for his part, did
not want to be responsible for current intelligence, if ONE could
otherwise be assured of prompt access to the "S/S" cables. Saying
that, he resigned the current intelligence function to OSS. 504
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As soon as Kingman Douglass took office, he put his staff to
work on trial runs for a new all-source Daily. 505 When 25X1A
1_oax ed of that, he protested vigorously, 506but in vain. On 12