HANDLING OF AMMUNITION/MILITARY RESERVE SUPPLIES AND DEPOTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060106-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 106
• Publication Date: June 17, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060106-8
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL OHTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT Handling of Ammunition/Military Reser-rr SupE.lies NO. OF PAGES 2
and Depots 25X1
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE
NO. OF ENCLS.
MISTED BELOW)
REPL
REPOR
THIS IS (UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
25X1
All Soviet Army ammunition and weapons, accept aerial bombs, were stored in artillery
depots. Explosives and demolition caps were also in these depots. AmmiLn;tioa for
rifles and machine guns was stored in a live condition. Artillery shells came to the
depots fully assembled from the factories, except for the powder, which vas also stored
in the ille depots. Thos: artillery depots which stored dangerous asnuuition
artillery and mortar shells, poisonous chemical shells, and
erp os~ve , heroical laboratories and "Pyyrotechnichinkii otdeli" (sections staffed
by experts on assembly and disaaoembly of ammunition). The laboratories tested the
condition of the powder. The above conditions prevailed in pea-letime. In time of
wax, iite zed "anariazhatelnii masterskii" (workshops
?-_,"auctions org"an-i-
--o
for assembling ammunition and checking on defective ammunition), which became part
of the artillery shops in the rear (til) of each army.
2. In Central Asia, all military storage was under the control of the military district.
It is probable that the same held true for all other military districts. Only
storage facilities in ammunition factories were not under the authority of the military
districts; they were under the jurisdiction of Moscow and the factory in question.
owever, he largest depots me -in the western
were housed in old fortresses. The forts had become useless as such, but were excellent
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060106-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060106-8
25X1
from the viewpoint of storage, transportation, and depth of shelter. They were
particularly good when used as artillery depots. In 1,940, the fort in Kaunas
(Kovno) was transformed into the largest artillery depot of the Soviet Army.
Important depots were also to be found at Brest-Litovsko,Grodno, Dvinsk,
Pei-my'sui and ualiuingrad (Kdnigaberg). The largest supply depot for food
and clothing, as of 1941, was at Roslavl.
In regard to sources of military reserves stored in Central Asia, many artillery
shells in storage had been manufactured as far back as 1922 and 1923 and there-
fore many of them had deteriorated. The shells were sent from Kazan to Central
Asia when the artillery depot was built near Axis in about 1930. Each of *he 25
warehouses in Aria held the equivalent of 30 railway freight cars. The average
czar in those days was 16 tons. Now the usual Soviet railway freight car is 48
tons and has two axles. New artillery rounds in the late 1930's came from Novo-
sibirsk. Other types of supplies arrived from various Soviet factories. Clothing
for troops, as well as equipment for horceu, was usually made in Tas:.kent or else-
where in Central Asia. Mortars first appeared in the Soviet Army in the spring of
1940. Therefore, mortar shells began to be delivered to the Central Asian military
district from the European USSR only after that time.
I have no information on details of military depots cr military reserve supply
systems or installations outside the Central Asian area.
Soviet mobilization reserve plans were utopian, based on industrial plane impossible
of realiz4tinn. There wao a wide gap between theory and actual practice in
strategic stockpilinG, particularly after 1939 when the Soviet Government began to
double the number of dL i3ions in the Soviet Army. Soviet divisions in the vest
were the only units which had more or less adequate mobilization reserves. In
contrast to what I imagine is US military practice, it must be remembered that
Soviet and European mobilization plane call for greatly expanded units in time of
war. The artillery was in the best position in regard to strategic stockpiling. I
would imagine the Soviet Army's general :situation in regard to
mobilization reserves is much better.
Iu regard to detailed data, such as name, number, location, capacity, type, layout
and details of no
militarv di
the artillery depot--military depot ramoer 201-near Aria,
which was the one which'etored dangerous ammunition, had wareholae:3 which were
constructed in a very primitive manner. The walls were of "glina" (clay) and the
roofs were of wood covered with clay. In 1940 the atructtres began to deteriorate
and the latest information available to me at that time was that it had not yet
been decided whether to repair them or whether it would be necessary to replace
the warehouses.
25X1 ry,
295. ! N
255.1
327N
255.1 45M
255.1
127N
255.1 225N
170.21
N
255.1 325N
173.72
N
255.1 65m
174.2
255.1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060106-8