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Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 1, 2011
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Publication Date: 
June 17, 1954
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060106-8 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL CENTRAL OHTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT COUNTRY USSR SUBJECT Handling of Ammunition/Military Reser-rr SupE.lies NO. OF PAGES 2 and Depots 25X1 PLACE ACQUIRED DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE NO. OF ENCLS. MISTED BELOW) REPL REPOR THIS IS (UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 25X1 All Soviet Army ammunition and weapons, accept aerial bombs, were stored in artillery depots. Explosives and demolition caps were also in these depots. AmmiLn;tioa for rifles and machine guns was stored in a live condition. Artillery shells came to the depots fully assembled from the factories, except for the powder, which vas also stored in the ille depots. Thos: artillery depots which stored dangerous asnuuition artillery and mortar shells, poisonous chemical shells, and erp os~ve , heroical laboratories and "Pyyrotechnichinkii otdeli" (sections staffed by experts on assembly and disaaoembly of ammunition). The laboratories tested the condition of the powder. The above conditions prevailed in pea-letime. In time of wax, iite zed "anariazhatelnii masterskii" (workshops ?-_,"auctions org"an-i- --o for assembling ammunition and checking on defective ammunition), which became part of the artillery shops in the rear (til) of each army. 2. In Central Asia, all military storage was under the control of the military district. It is probable that the same held true for all other military districts. Only storage facilities in ammunition factories were not under the authority of the military districts; they were under the jurisdiction of Moscow and the factory in question. owever, he largest depots me -in the western were housed in old fortresses. The forts had become useless as such, but were excellent 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060106-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060106-8 25X1 from the viewpoint of storage, transportation, and depth of shelter. They were particularly good when used as artillery depots. In 1,940, the fort in Kaunas (Kovno) was transformed into the largest artillery depot of the Soviet Army. Important depots were also to be found at Brest-Litovsko,Grodno, Dvinsk, Pei-my'sui and ualiuingrad (Kdnigaberg). The largest supply depot for food and clothing, as of 1941, was at Roslavl. In regard to sources of military reserves stored in Central Asia, many artillery shells in storage had been manufactured as far back as 1922 and 1923 and there- fore many of them had deteriorated. The shells were sent from Kazan to Central Asia when the artillery depot was built near Axis in about 1930. Each of *he 25 warehouses in Aria held the equivalent of 30 railway freight cars. The average czar in those days was 16 tons. Now the usual Soviet railway freight car is 48 tons and has two axles. New artillery rounds in the late 1930's came from Novo- sibirsk. Other types of supplies arrived from various Soviet factories. Clothing for troops, as well as equipment for horceu, was usually made in Tas:.kent or else- where in Central Asia. Mortars first appeared in the Soviet Army in the spring of 1940. Therefore, mortar shells began to be delivered to the Central Asian military district from the European USSR only after that time. I have no information on details of military depots cr military reserve supply systems or installations outside the Central Asian area. Soviet mobilization reserve plans were utopian, based on industrial plane impossible of realiz4tinn. There wao a wide gap between theory and actual practice in strategic stockpilinG, particularly after 1939 when the Soviet Government began to double the number of dL i3ions in the Soviet Army. Soviet divisions in the vest were the only units which had more or less adequate mobilization reserves. In contrast to what I imagine is US military practice, it must be remembered that Soviet and European mobilization plane call for greatly expanded units in time of war. The artillery was in the best position in regard to strategic stockpiling. I would imagine the Soviet Army's general :situation in regard to mobilization reserves is much better. Iu regard to detailed data, such as name, number, location, capacity, type, layout and details of no militarv di the artillery depot--military depot ramoer 201-near Aria, which was the one which'etored dangerous ammunition, had wareholae:3 which were constructed in a very primitive manner. The walls were of "glina" (clay) and the roofs were of wood covered with clay. In 1940 the atructtres began to deteriorate and the latest information available to me at that time was that it had not yet been decided whether to repair them or whether it would be necessary to replace the warehouses. 25X1 ry, 295. ! N 255.1 327N 255.1 45M 255.1 127N 255.1 225N 170.21 N 255.1 325N 173.72 N 255.1 65m 174.2 255.1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/01: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060106-8