PARTY LEADS KOLKHOZ CONSOLIDATION IN USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600360063-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: November 10, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFICATION SECRET SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPOR'
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.
SUBJECT Political - Party in agriculture
Economic - Agriculture, administration
HOW
PUBLISHED
WHERE
Daily newspapers, semimonthly periodicals,
books
DATE OF
INFORMATION- 1950
DATE DIST/0 Nov 1950
NO. OF PAGES 7
SUPPLEMENT TO-
REPORT NO.
PUBLISHED' USSR
DATE
PUBLISHED 5 - 25 Aug 1950
LANGUAGE Russian
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ESPIONAGE ACT BO
A. I. C.. SI AND SS. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE RESOLUTION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORISED PERSON IS PRO-
HIIITID IT LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.
SOURCE
PARTY LEADS KOLKROZ CONSOLIDATION IN USSR
Numbers in parentheses refer to appended sources-7
The latest development in the "transition from socialism to Communism"'in
the USSR is the consolidation of many small kolkhozes into fewer and larger
kolkhozes centered around "agrogorody" or rural cities. The purpose of this
step, as indicated in the Soviet press, is to eliminate the "contradictions be-
tween town and country" and to strengthen party control over agricultural or-
ganization and production.
As will be seen in the evidence presented below, economic advantages ex-
pected to be derived from the move are: (1) more effective utilization of
latest machinery and scientific techniques in large-scale agriculture; (2)
an increased labor force, as a result of transferring a number of administra-
tive personnel to productive work in the fields; (3) increased and improved
construction of housing and productive and "cultural" (houses of culture,
"red corners," medical facilities, etc.) buildings in the agrogorody; more
effective electrification and radiofication of, the countryside by concentrat-
ing rural workerq in the agrogorody; and a general increase in the tempo of
agricultural production and deliveries to the state.
The press indicates that the political advantage expected to be derived
from-this latest step is the increase in party control in consolidated kol-
khozes, through formation of new, larger primary party organizations which
have the right of control over production, as opposed to the rural territorial
party organizations, which have largely been done away with in areas of con-
solidation. One surprising aspect of this development is the absence of press
?references to the political influence of LAPPS in consolidates kolkhozes. All
references to MTS stress trair economic role, while political control is at-
tributed to rayon ani primary party organizations.
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The extent of the consolidation movement is indicated by references to con-
solidation in all republics of the USSR except the Kirgiz SSR and by figures
showing the decrease in the number of kolkhozes. In Moscow Oblast, from Janu-
ary to August 1950, the number of kolkhozes was cut from over 6,000 to about
1,700, in Leningrad Oblast from 2,000 to 600.(1)
The Organization of Consolidation
Prose accounts indicate that the adoption of the decision and actual me-
chanics of unification are quite simple. Each arts; has a meeting at which
two thirds of the membership must be present] a decision to merge with certain
neighboring kolkhozes is adopted; and, upon approval of the executive committee
of the rayon soviet, the decision becomes affective. After the rayon executive
committee's approval is secured for the merger, the several united kolkhoses
bold a general nesting to adopt a kolkhos statute and elect a chairman, an ad-
ministration, an auditing commission, and decide other questions.(l)
What actually occurs in the campaign for, and organization of, consolida-
tion, however, is more co4lioated and reflects party influence and control.
Although there are a few references to the initiative of kolkhos members" (9)
and "spontaneous desire" to units (3), the roes generally asserts that the ini-
tiators of consolidation, were Oommunists (4i and "Muscovites" (5), ol'ohevi
states unequivocally that the Moscow party organization led the unification o
small kolkhozes, In January 1950) in connection with reports-election meetings
of its subordinate party organization, the Moscow Oblast Committee sent a letter
to all city and rayon committees and rural party organizations directing them
to propagandise the desirability of oonsolidation.(6) In March, N. B, ltrushchev,
secretary of the Central and Moscow Oblast OommittAes, V1P(b), stressed the ad-
vantages of consolidation and urged consolidation in speeches to the Moscow Ob.
last Soviet and to agricultural workers of Moscow Oblast, from Moscow the move-
ment spread rapidly, and by August its success uas being hailed throughout the
USSR.
The ramifications of the consolidation movement rapidly basis* evident in
the work of rural rayon and primary party organisations. Consolidation was pre-
ceded by active party and mass-political work in the kolkhoses. Rayon committees
sent lecturers and speakers from among party and soviet active i.rksrs to explain
the advantages of consolidation tc kolkhos workers, Agitators and workers of pri-
mary panty organisations read Kruehohev's speeches from ArMIa, conducted discus-
sions on the advantages of consolidation, and described ~fe aobiewments of neigh.
boring consolidated kolkhozes and those in Moscow Oblast, the Ukraine, eta.
An example of more specific preparation occurred in the lelorussian SIR where
the Tachitskiy Rayon Party Ooamittee carefully studied every group of kolkhozes
to sea which combination could beet utilise the available MIN facilities, "or
this evaluation agricultural specialists, MTG workers and the best kolkhoa admin-
istrators and workers were oonsulted,-(7)
After this preparatory work had been carried out, rayon committee workers
and primary party organization workers brought up the subject of consolidation
at general kolkhoz meetings, The explanatory work of the Communists achieved
good results, sinot kolkhot members voted for consolidation with customary "un-
animity." As might be expected in the Soviet press, there have been no refer-
ences to opposition by kolkhoz workers to consolidation) all descriptions have
stressed unanimity of decisions.
No refvrenca has been found to the amount of party control over rayon soviet
executive committees' decisions as to which particular kolkhoses should be com-
bined. Such control would be "indirect," since party organizations in Soviet In-
stitutions"cannot exercise functions of control" (8)j but rayon Soviet executive
committees undoubtedly "take advantage" of such "studies" by rayon committees as
that mentioned above,
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Changes in Party Work Due to Consolidation
Consolidation raises many new tasks and problems before rayon committees
and primary organizations of the party. The first organizational change brought
about by consolidation is the elimination of many rural territorial party organi-
zations. In Rezeknenskiy Rayon, Latvian SSR, for instance, 11 rurea territorial
party organizations have been transformed into new kolkhoz party organizations
(9). As kolkhoz primary party organizations "have the right of control over the
work of the management of their particular establishments" (10), and rural ter-
ritorial organizations do not have that right (11), this is a definite step to-
ward increasing party influence and control at the lowest level. The new pri-
mary organizations can now more effectively criticize and improve the work of
kolkhoz administrations.
Party influence and control are strengthened even more, however, by amalgamat-
ing and setting up new primary party organizations in the consolidated kolkhozes.
Numerous examples are given in the press of new possibilities for party control
which had not previously existed. In Leningrad Oblast, before consolidation,
there were 423 party organizations including 2,335 Communists; now there are 392
party organizations with over 3,600 party members and candidates. Formerly, kol-
khoz party organizations had small memberships; now they have 20 to 30, even up
to 45, members, and about 40 primary organizations are headed by bureaus.(12)
In the Uzbek BBR, before unification, 500 out of 2,',17 kolkhozes had no party or-
ganizations. Now, after consolidation, 975 kolkhoz party organisations average
16 members each.(13) The fact that there are fever and larger kolkhozes affords
greater possibilities for establishing a party organiap.tion on every kolkhoz.
It also enables rayon party committees to control more effectively primary organi.
zations and the work of the kolkhozes. For example, before consolidation the Techit-
akiy Rayon Party Committee in Belorussia found it difficult to go into each of the
84 kolkhozes and study their work. As a result of consolidation, there art 24 kol-
khozes, and the rayon party committee can now "work with every kolkhoz chairman,
have closer ties with each kolkhoz worker, and know the needs of every kolkhoz in
time to render necessary aid."(14)
Many of the new, larger primary organizations now have bureaus, a new develop-
ment in many rayons (15), another factor might be expected to improve the work and
strengthen the control of pri.aary organizations.
The most concrete form of strengthening party control in the kolkhoz is the
release of many Communists from administrative posts and their assignment to pro-
ductive work. In this connection, when 2,425 small kolkhozes were consolidated
in the Uzbek SSR, 8,912 persons were relieved from administrative and service
positions and a signifr'cant number have been transferred to brigades, squads, and
livestock farms (16). In the Kolkhoz imeni Mikoyan in Tadzhikistan, before con-
solidation, the party organization had 15 members, only five of whom were engaged
in full-time production, while the other ten worked in the kolkhos administrative'
apparatus; party influence was therefore weak, according to the local press. In
July, the kolkhoz united with three others, the four party organizations were
consolidated by decision of the rayon committee, and mazy Communists were relieved
of administrative duties and sent into field work, thus increasing party influence
in production.(17) In Vinnitsa Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, 547 small artels were united
into 231 consolidated kolkhozes. As a result of this reduction in administrative
apparatus, party organizations could send more Communists inia field brigades and
livestock farms, "a significant step in spreading party influence to all aspects
of kolkhoz life."(18)
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New Problems Arising Out of Consolidation
The problem most commonly referred to after consolidation is that of select-
ing and training personnel for positions of party and kolkhoz leadership. The
rayon committee and primary organizations of the party exert decisive influence
in these functions. Communists are generally elected to leadership positions.
In Ionishkskiy.Rayon, $hyaulyay Oblast, Lithuanian SSR, for example,
...the rayon committee and the kolkhoz party organizations render great
service to kolkhoz workers in the selection of worthy candidates for po-
sit4.ons of chairmen of consolidated kolkhozes, members of &:.ministrations
and auditing commissions, production brigade leaders, and heads of live-
stock farms. At their general meetings, the kolkhoz workers show great
faith in the Communists, electing them to leading posts. A majority of
consolidated kolkhozes are headed by Communists, and also by nonparty ac-
tive workers (aktivisty). Many field brigades and livestock farms are
also headed by Communists and Komsomols.(19)
In Rezaknenskiy Rayon, Latvian SSR, the rayon committee sent 13 politically
trained Communists into the villages. Some of them who had leadership experi-
ence and a knowledge of agriculture have been elected chairmen of consolidated
kolkhozes.(20) In Maltskiy Rayon, Latvian SBA, chairmen of consolidated kol-
khozes were recruited from among former leading rayon party aLd Soviet workers --
a former head of the agriculture section of the rayon soviet executive committee;
a former instructor of the rayon party committee; the former head of the recla-
mation section of the rayon executive committee, a man who had previously been
an MIS director; a former propagandist; and a former head of the kolkhos con-
struction section of the rayon executive committes.(21) One consolidated kol-
khos in the Karelo-Finnish SSR has all 14 party members and candidates working
in full-time production: one directs livestock productibhj one directs a field
brigade; one directs the newly formed construction brigade; one keeps kolkhos
accounts; one runs the kolkhos electricity supply system one runs the kolkhos
mill] one is a machinery expert (maehinoved)j and four note that only 11 work-
ers are accounted fo7 work in the construction and fie d brigades.(22)
In many cases, one of the chairmen of the small kolkhoses which are united
is elected chairman of the consolidated kolkhos, but party influence and con-
trol are still evident in continual ohec:.ing and training by rayon committees
and primary organisations of the party. Rayon party committees hold seminars
once or twice a month for chairmen of kolkhoses, production brigade leaders,
and heads of livestock farms. Reports are given by agricultural specialists
and leading workers of rayon party committees and rayon soviet executive com-
mittews.(23) Pravda noted that the increased importance of larger primary
party organise ons makes it esen more imperative that oblast and rayon party
committees give special attention to their leadership; to selection of secre-
taries, and to assigning Communists to decisive sectors of produotien,(24)
Seminars are held for primary organisation secretaries to discuss problems of
organising socialist competitions, selection and assignment of kolkhos person-
nel, content of mass-agitation work in field brigades, direction of wall news-
papsrs, and political education of women kelkhos workers. Section chiefs and
ihitructors of the rayon committee also give on-the-spot assistance to primary
isation secreteries.(23) Rayon and oblast committees '-egularly hear re-
ppo s from primary organisation secretaries on party work in consolidated kol-
khoses.(26) In Vinnitsa Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, a joint Oblast meeting was held
for chairmen of consolidated kolkhoses and rayon committee and primary organi-
#3;?sation secretaries of the party.(27) City party organisations often sponsor
kolkhcaes and aid them by sending Communists to the villages with reports and
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f r r'aeed fit tcr.~tc?r.. t.; tins. ci to nuts..? 1.;?a3ev e d b.usde of. A. ivcatooli:
farms of cans>f, : 1 . 1 :i:1G l;J. }Z.: ..o ?? Iht 1 : : re: P'.;y1 lii Gy b.33 grehtJ;i tih`xeaben
as a i.eeult of con.sol.icietiarc.. R^-..iron pa.rty coJmittees hold special meetings
for them to ditcuea gove.rnm=nt and Tel VIW(b) decrees on the 1950 .harvest and
organization of socia.li.tt comc?etition.(29)
.A_notb. e.raep.le r!' past,;; influence and control is the emphasis on perma-
neot or- each consolidated kolkhoz. In most ca?aes, this
brigade is headed by a C'ommunis't, comet.imea the secretary of the party organi-
zation??(30)
F'ol i ti ~_.dl. Ro1 of t>iE llT:>
'Fh paucl.ty of re.to the political. function of the MTS in the con?-
cc,l.i37t.:on mcven.ent? mrj;r ce f1{:uificau+.. The rule of the I!fS in economic-
organizational atrez,, he is?.z ref consolid?t?ed k_:l_khozee is frequently mentioned,
but the func:rion of tize l.?if'?3 dr?put-y director for political affairs (po politchesti)
in kcl.kfoz cnnsolidatioe IF rarely Numbers 1 through 8 (Ja.nus.ry through
August 1950) of Maehinn Trektoraa+~a St?a_i. i maiee no reference to .his function,
and there are eery few preen references through .August. Sovetskaya Beloruseiya,
vbich has dealt at considerable length vi th kolkhoz conssolidation, did not men-
tion the NI'S political function in a fall page devoted to kolkhoz consolidation
and J.fiS on 1:S '+ugust? 1950. One article in Sovetska Litva, 23 August 1950, des-
cribed tl.e ra,r,..?;i;ly estt.ablictied political section in the Ionishkskaya MPS and its
manning of an ag,it.ator grout' with the best, me hao cs, tractor operators, and bri-
gade leaders for mass-political work on consolidated kolkhozes. It reported that
the h1TS political aectionout practical. measures for aiding primary party
r,rge.nirat1ons, ce.ndid.ht.e end p5xty-Komeomol groups of consolidated kolkhozes, and
that. responsible workers of tho pc>lit.ica.. cect.i.on were rent to the kolkhozes.
3oveteka. a La.tviyr., 25 Au.ru t. 1950, made a general reference to MT-i political sec-
tons which "must be center:.; of political end organizational work In the village,
must assist in strengthen.iru and emphasizing the it-eding role of party and Kom-
somol organization_ lr.I3TS and kolkhozes, and must train the broad masses of kol-
khoz ,icukers in the C?orjLu.mleet spirit.." The same article describes the ac:ti.vities
of Mlii worker a, expia~inlug; tree aavantc res of consolidation to kolkhoz workers and
}r?ldi.ug seminar's for field br?inedo leaders; but general press coverage in devoted
to dci cr i pt i r..n.; ',i' move prof i.tabl.e uti.l.i zati on of machi nary and agricultural tech-
niques by larger' rr;te one? ecoooeir reorgenizat.ion of MTS re.sult.trg from consol.i.-
detioc. 10. mn_n, c:r.,. cr. vh?:: e a tractor n.rlgade formerly served revera.l :olkhozea,
it .ao lierues pony co co ?Ch" ho kbnz imeni "Shlyakh do kommunizmn," Vinn.itsa.
OhlFast, ukraintan :1~iR, there. are three tractor brigades, and an "M'_1S Section"
(uctlextolc) uaa cuei. up.?(31) The. local press revea3.s that consolidation has brought
changes in d.trect.Io of M'T:S In Techttskiy Rayon, :@elorisi;ian SSR... It warn. that
it is now inpoa,ible. to dir,.ot bffS as P. whole; each tractor, thre. her, and, com-
bine brigade must 1:o tr.gardr:d separately. Rayon committee agitators are required
to go out, to all t.haie i:r.ita, And the bureau of the rayon party committee must
hear reports from in,il.vidual brigade leaders.(32) Emphasis on the rayon committee
and primary ort;tanizations of the party and lack of reference to the ITS political
function mi.; ht conceivably point to a new alignment of political control at the
lowest rural. level.
Shortcomtn -s in Or. ;axiizaticn of Consolidation
Alt-hough tI.: e?.:eb?_n?.si e. consolidation movement is relatively r.ew In. the USSR,
swift progress has Lech her led In the press. kt the same time, however, there
are the inevitable ref`eceo: a to shortcomings. Some newly consolidated kolkhozeg
are not meetio.; 01-1z produ^tion..plane. Others are suffering from poor and inex-
perienced lea.dersh.ip. k'or example, I. Abdullayev, Minister of Agriculture Azer-
baydzha.e SSR, complained that in Shemaichinskiy, M^.razinskiy, Divichinskiy,,Khudat-
skiy, Lenkoreuak'iy, and Lerlkssiy rayons some :Illiterate persons with no l.eader-
s:rip erper?i.ence were nanad kolki;oz chairmen. Ile claimed that leaders of party
and soviet organizations did not tnn.derstand the importance of these positions to
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strengthening agriculture, and recommended tLat specialists be chosen who have
secondary education or higher training in agriculture-(33) In the Kazakh SSR,
a rayon party committee secretary criticized the onlast agricultural adminis-
tration for not manning the rayon cceviet agricultural section with qualified
personnel,(34; It is said that a majority of new kolkhoz chairmen in Novoros-
siyskiy Rayon, Aktyubinsk Oblast, Kazakh SSR, lack enough experience to direct
large agricultural enterprises.. They need qualified aid, but neither the party
committee nor the rayon soviet executive committee help them in selecting bri-
gade and farm leaders. The rayon party committee has not even held a seminar
for secretaries of primary party organizations of new kolkhozes. The chief of
the Party, Komsomol, and Trade-Union Organizations Section said that could wait
until all consolidation in the rayon is completed.05)
In Belorussia, where the subject of consolidation has received the most
press coverage (through August), the TsK KP(b) of Belorussia had a long dis-
cussion on the work of the newly consolidated (in June) Kolkhoz imeni Kirov
in Pukhovichskiy Rayon. The kolkhoz was not fulfilling its production plan,
so the TsK KP(b) of Belorussia studied the work of the kolkhoz in great detail
and made specific recommendations for the kolkhoz administration, the primary
party organization, and the rayon party committee to improve economic and mass-
political organizational work. The party organization together with the kol-
khoz administration was to strengthen labor discipline by checking on work at-
tendance, holding open party meetings to discuss the reasons for 40 to 50 of
the 90 members of a brigade appearing in the field at 1000 or 1100 hours, and
deciding how to get all brigade members to work on time. The nine party mem-
bers and candidates of the primary organization were exhorted to improve their
work in decisive sectors of the kolkhoz economy; the secretary of the rayon
party committee was told that he must himself study the work of the kolkhoz.
In addition, recommendations were made to the Ministry of Agriculture Belorus-
sian SSR to send an agronomist for permanent work in the kolkhoz, to speed con-
struction of the Krasno-Turinsk Interkolkhoz State Hydroelectric Power Station,
to deliver one truck to the kolkhoz, and to guarantee delivery to the kolkhoz
of 2,000 fruit trees from the state nursery. The TsK also approved the deci-
sion of the kolkhoz administration on radiofication of all houses of kolkhoz
workers and obliged the Authorized Representative of the Ministry of Communica-
tions USSR for the Belorussian SSR to guarantee radiofication of the Kolkhoz
imeni Kirov before 1 September 1950.(36) It would seem that this study was in-
tended to serve as an example to other consolidated kolkhozes in Belorussia, be-
cause as early as 8 August 1950 Sovetskaya Belorussiya referred to the discus-
sion by the TsK KP(b) of Belorussia of the Kolkhoz imeni Kirov in connection
with criticism of other ko.lkhozese
The above information derived from the press indicates that, criticisms of
shortcomings to the contrary, the kolkhoz consolidation movement is making head-
way. It may be concluded that the local party organizations are given more con-
trol (rather, more active control is forced upon them) through the reorganization
of agriculture, but at the same time their responsibility and accountability to
higher party organs is correspondingly increased..
1: Trud, 16 August 1950
2. Sovetskaya Litva, 24 August 1950
3. Pravda Vostcka, 6 August 1950
4. Sovetskaya Litva, 23 August 1950
5. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 22 August 1950
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6. Bol'shevik, No 12, June 1950, p 49
7. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 9 August 19.50
8. 1939 Party Rules
9. Sovetskaya Latviya, 15 August l9j0
10. 1939 Party Rules
U. Voprosy partiyno-organiLAtsionnoy raboty (Moscow, 1948), p 23
12. Leningradskaya Pravda, 5 August 1950
13. Pravda Vostoka, 24 August 1950
14. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 9 August 1950
15. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 22 August 1950
16. Pravda Vostoka, 24 August 1950
17. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 25 August 1950
18. Pravda Ukrainy, 20 August 1950
19. Sovetskaya Litva, 23 August 1950
20. Sovetskaya Latviya, 15 August 1950
21. Op. cit., 17 August 1950
22. Leninskoye Znamya, 2 August 1950
23. Kommunist Tadzhik!stana, 18 August 1950, and Sovetskaya Litva, 23 August 1950
24. Pravda, 16 August 1950
25. Sovetskaya Latviya, 15 August 19j0
26. Bol'shevik, No 15, August 1950, p 58
27. Pravda Ukrainy, 20 August 1950
28. Sovetskaya Latviya, 15 August 1950
29. Sovetskaya Belor?.issiya, 9 August 1950
30. Sovetskaya Latviya, 24 August 1950
31. Bol'shevik, No 15, August 1950, p 46
32. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 9 August 1950
33. Bakinskiy Rabochiy, 17 August 1950
34. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 24 August 1950
35. Op. cit., 22 August 1950
36. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 6 August 1950
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