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December 22, 2016
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July 11, 2011
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February 3, 1956
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 DESTRUCTIVE DEFORESTATION IN EAST GERMANY 1945-1954 This report gives information on the effects of land reform and collectivization in forestry in the Soviet Zone of Germany, standing timber and lumbering according to Soviet plan targets, the organiza- tion of transport and distribution, reparations deliveries and forced exports of forestry products, neglect of timber reserves and of n g- estat ion, the SED personnel policy in the forestry service, organiza- tion of the East German forestry administration, and exploitation of the forest workers,] More than 136 million cubic meters of timber has been cut in the Soviet Zone of Germany from the beginning of the Soviet occupation to late 1953. The plan figures for the annual timber cutting were set by the Soviet occupation Power, and the SED guaranteed fulfillment of the plan by the use of terror against the forestry service technicians and lumbermen. e re of portsTto the grea Soviet ablocc ctheountcrieutstaimbndealsor or as . for Aed n siderabl. share was used by the occupation forces. Partners. A con- The following statistics give some indications as to the extent of repa- rations shipments of timber from East German forests. During 1949, the number of railroad cars which rolled each month to the East, loaded with timber and lumber, averaged 7,500 to 8,000. Between 1947 and 1952, [prefabricated] wooden houses of first-quality wood with a floor area of over 3 million square meters were delivered for reparations account. During June 1b54, more than 1,000 railroad cars passed through Frankfurt/Oder an route to the USSR with [pre- fabricated] wooden houses and furniture. These arbitrarily selected examples show the contradictory manner in which East Germany, which, in comparison with its domestic demand, is poor in food resources and formerly imported lumber from other countries including the USSR, was forced to export wood. The last example cited above indicates that, after the official termina- tion of reparations, the shipments of wood and wood products for the occupation power did not diminish. In addition to [prefabricated] wooden houses, furni= tore, cellulose, paper, railroad ties, and pit wood, timber is also exported now as in previous years to Soviet bloc countries, particularly to the USSR, which itself abounds in forests. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 During the last 9 years, the population of the Soviet Zone has suffered directly from this destructive deforestation, and it is still subjected to many sacrifices. Too little wood is made available for the demands of the public. Furniture is available in limited quantity and poor quality, and it is very expensive. Wood supplies for paper production are also extremely short. Even the ROs and the consumer cooperative stores do not have enough paper bags and wrapping material. Cardboard is a bottleneck in the entire consumer goods industry. East German plan figure for 1954 and 1955, as well as the long-range plan up to 1960, leave no douot that wood and wood products will continue to be diverted from the population to the Sovie? occupation power and its puppet, the SED government. The reckless exploitationdofoalltforestry workers. The wages of lumbermen are yde-a plorably low and, like all wages in the Soviet Zone, have little purchasing power. A system of work norms which is tied to the low level of wages forces the wor;ers to overexertions. In addition, they have little suitable work clothing, pcrticuiarly shoes. Modern timber cutting tools are also in very short supply. Motor saws in operating condition are seen very infrequently. E"'=r suv ?;i~uie r.:or.ua_ tools as axes and saws are of ir,:reased work efrorts. poor quality and demand f The East German economic plan systematically neglects the needs of the orestry service in regard to technical supplies in favor of other plan goals. This is also the case with consumer goods production generally. Of the total of about 2 million hectares of state-exploited woodlands, the Soviet Zone ),,as already completely deforested a total of 600,000 hectares, and a further area of 750,000 hectares has only half of its previous stand of timber. Reforestation measures taken up to the present time are so limited in scope that it will take about 100 years to repair the damages inflicted on the .crests. The measures taken ty the Soviet occupation power to change ownership conditions in the forestry field served merely to tic forestry exploitation into the organizational system of the monopolistic dictatorial economy. Dur- ing the so-called land reform, about 826,n00 hectares of privately owned forest lands were expropriated from landowners. holding 100 hectares or more. Of this total, about 457,000 hectares were di utrituted to small agricultural enter- prises. Under conditions in the Soviet Zone and with operating capital in short supply, these enterprises were too small to he economically viable, and ere forced to exploit their forest lands :eyond reason. After this reform of forest lands, the small agricultural enterprises with less than 100 hectares per 'arm controlled a total of 973,050 hectares of forest lands, but of these, nearly two thirds, or about 5 P,000 hectares, were split up into little patches of up to 5 hectares. However, the right of exploitation of forest lands was soon. taken array even from those agricultural enterprises which were not ex- propriated in the land reform, tot which to some extent profited from it. This was done through an exploitation control instituted by the SED government. Further, in mid-1952, the collectivization drive was launched, under terms of which all agricultural and forest lands still formally under private ownership are scheduled to expropriated and reorganized into agricultural pro- ducer cooperatives (LPG.) and state-owned farms (VE-Gueter). STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231 revolt in June 1 -"y"b1Y1ss on rrom mid-1952 to the workers' 953, a large proportion of the agricultural and forestry lands were expropriated. Forest lands held by enterprises not yet expropriated or collectivized have already been organized into "forestry cooperatives" (Wald- gemeinechaften) under the administrative control of the Kreis councils, which exploit the lands in accordance with the targets of the SED economic plan. Thus the entire forest land of the Soviet Zone is being incorporated into the monopolistic economy of the SED dictatorship, and the sovietization of the forest lands is being expanded. This does not proceed without opposition. The forestry experts have resisted the destructive deforestation with all ap- propriate means and have done their best to modify the more extreme measures. For this reason the SED has purged the forestry force in its usual manner, has eliminated most of the skilled, experienced men, and has replaced them with unskilled, inexperienced, but faithful party-liners. The criterion applied in the selection of these SED cadres was a willingness to fulfill the Soviet pro- duction quota and to exploit the forestry workers to the limits of their .trength in their pursuit of the destructive deforestation program. However, not all of the men selected by the SED have reacted as expected. Many of them, together with the held-over older experts, still place the long- term interests of the German people ahead of other considerations and do all they can by way of personal initiative and sacrifice to protect the forest re- serves from the policy of destructive deforestation. It is typical of the cynicism of the SED dictatorship that Rau, member of the Central Committee of the SED, has announced that it will only be a question of time before the regime also administers the forest resources of West Germany. He made this statement in his capacity as chairman of the State Planning Com- mission, at a time when the forestry experts told his that standing timber in East Germany was less than the plan goal set for 1954 and 1955, and that cut- ting at this rate could only he done at the expense of future timber resources. Furthermore, the Central Committee of' the SED, explaining to the forestry school of the Soviet Zone its request for an extremely large number of forestry stu- dents, said that these experts would be needed to administer West German for- ests! i. EFFECTS OF LAND REFORM AND COLLECTIVIZATION IN FORESTRY in 1945, before the !and reform the forest area of the Soviet Zone of Germany was as follows (in 1,000 hectares): Laender k M State Forests Comrunal Forests Over 100 ha Up to 100 ha Total ec lenburg 252 35 !45 19 451 Brandenburg 403 69 300 122 894 Sachsen-Anhalt S 122 19 168 249 559 achsen 188 49 133 103 473 Thueringen 198 75 80 142 495 Total 1,162 248 826 636 2,871 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 during the course Of which the following forest areas were expropriatedoas2.of I January 1946 (later changes were negligible) and incorporated into the land funds of the individual Laender (in 1,000 hectares): Laender Mecklenburg Brandenburg Sachsen-Anhalt Sachsen Thueringen Total State Communal Private Forests Forests Forests Over 100 ha Total 37 1 145 183 19 7 300 327 5 -- 169 ? 173 13 3 133 149 1, -- 8o 85 7F 11 826 915 According to figures as of 1 January 1947, it is reported that a total of )66,700 hectares of forest lands had teen expropriated and incorporated into the land funds. The taking over of state and communal forests was carried out without being called for in the law. This was done at the initiative of the local So- viet Kreis commanders and the local SED so as to be able to distribute land even where there were no private forests of more than 100 hectares. In general, the land reform was carried out largely on the basis of local political whim. The purpose of the Kreis commandants was undoubtedly to try to win the new settlers over to Communism. Forest land was distributed from the land funds as follows (in 1,000 hec- tares): To New To Former To State To Communal Laender Farmers Farmers Forests Forests Total Mecklenburg 95 19 67 2 183 Brandenburg 156 29 88 60 327 Sachsen-An- halt 64 -- 83 25 173 Sachsen 63 2 65 19 149 Thueringen 35 1 29 19 84 Total 412 51+ 333 125 915 Although forest lands are probably the most unsuitable land for small in- dividual exploitation, the forestry authorities failed in their efforts to prevent the division of the forests among the new settlers and to add the ex- propriated forest lands to the state forests. Just how much political considerations influenced the distribution of forest lands in the land reform can be seen from the fact that the target of 345,000 hectares to be distributed to farmers was exceeded by 113,000 hectares, whereas the target for distribution to communities feel 40,000 hectares below the plan goal of 165,000 hectares. )700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 STAT s' about 457,000 hectares, was distributed among new settlersetc., in a l d 3-5 hectares, and later 8-10 hectares, although these norms were dilutedfcon- siderably in practice. The division of forest reserves was carried out locally with little or no attention paid to the requirements of good forestry practice. The crite- rion was apparently to distribute the older, exploitable forest lands among the farmers, while the younger stands were given over to the state or com- munal forests. The resulting patchwork patterns of ownership could seldom be corrected because of the heavy pressure exerted by the SED, especially since the forestry experts were prohibited from taking any part whatever in the land reform program. The forestry laboratory lands (Lehrreviere) of the Ebers- walde forestry school were thus distributed and could only be reclaimed after long and arduous efforts. Just how ridiculous the distribution was can be seen from the fact that valuable hardwood stands were divided among farmers living 30 and 50 kilo- meters away. Only in Sachsen-Anhalt was it possible for an energetic, polit- ically powerful man to correct these excesses. The remaining 458,000 hectares of forest lands affected by the land re- form became state and communal forests. The distribution of the forest lands under the land reform in the Soviet Zone was as follows on 1 January 1946 (in 1,000 hectares): Laender Total - including - State Forests Private Forests Under 100 ha Mecklenburg 451 36 133 Brandenburg 894 121 301 Snr_hsen-Anhalt 559 45 314 Sachsen 473 66 167 Thueringen 495 94 178 Total 2,871 361 1,100 The forestry inventory carried out in the Soviet Zone in 1949 divided the private forests into those over 5 hectares and those of up to 5 hectares. Forest lands were then distributed as follows (in 1,000 hectares): State Communal Private Forests Laender Forests For t es s Over 5 he U2 to 5 ha H T t l o a Mecklenburg 272 42 13 119 445 Brandenburg 397 107 169 r 198 871 Sachsen-Anhalt 300 92 85 105 582 Sachsen 256 43 56 96 450 Thueringen 231 124 51 81 48 7 Total 1,455 407 374 599 2,834 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 If the foregoing figures should reveal a number of inconsistencies, it should be borne in mind that many statistics coming out of the Soviet Zone are undependable. All of the governmental offices there are understaffed, so that accuracy often suffers. It is interesting to note that the above statistics, issued by the sta- tistical office on the 1949 forestry inventory, differ from those of the for- est administration. The latter reports a total of 2,749,000 hectares, including 1,385,000 hectares of state forests, 374,000 hectares of communal forests, 368,000 hectares of private forest lands over 5 hectares, and 623,000 hectares of private forest lands up to 5 hectares (total: 2,750,000). In early 1952, the communal forests were turned over to the state for- ests, when the state forestry enterprises (STFBs) were organized. The so- called church forest was not affected by this measure and has not been touched up to now. Forest land owned by farmers was briefly freed of any kind of state for- estry supervision by the land reform, although the Regulation of Forestry in the Soviet Zone of 29 October 1945, issued with the consent of the SMA (So- viet Military Administration), clearly stated: All forestry in the Soviet Zone will be _entrally administered and carried out." The temporary freedom was granted in order to make the farmers believe that the SED intended to promote the interests of the farmers. At that time, forestry experts were prohibited from intercession of any kind in the exploitation of the forest lands held by farmers. It could not be expected that the farmers would follow good forestry practice. The reasons for this lay in the poverty of the refugees, new farmers, and small farmers, who tried to raise the money required for getting their farms going by exploiting their forest holdings. The farmers, stripped by the Soviet occupation of all resources required for operating their farms, were free to make what use they chose of their forest holdings, and this they did with an urgency corresponding to their poverty. In one rural h eis in Sachsen having a total of 256 hectares of land-re- form forest lands held by farmers, 25,000 cubic meters of timber was cut in the period 146-1950, which comes to 98 cubic meters per hectare, or, depend- ing on the stand, 11 to 25 cubic meters per hectare per year. Of this area, 29 percent was stripped without regard to proper forestry practice, but only 2.3 percent was replanted. The Mate of the area which was not stripped was described as follows: "Destruction of the backbone of the stand by cutting out the strongest trunks, exposing the rest to the danger of wind damage, decreasing crown density (Kronenschluss) from 0.9 to 0.3 area coverage (Rae- umde). Only 25 percent of this lumber ever reached normal trade channels. The rest disappeared into the black market and barter trade. In spite of this destructive deforestation, which was by no means the exception, no steps were taken against the land-reform farmers, since they were in great difficulties and there was a reluctance to embitter them polit- ically. Things were changed, however, when it was discovered that the repara- tions deliveries could no longer be covered by cuttings from the state forests. To withdraw the freedom of exploitation from the farm-operated forest lands by decree was a step no one wanted to take. As early as 1948: there was a certain amount of pressure from the SMA and SED to merge the farmers' forest holdings into cooperatives and thus to get their output under control. These efforts were at first entirely without success, since the farmers were opposed Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 o any kind of Official restriction. In view of the fact that their farms were already under the control of the state economy, they wanted to preserve their freedom to exploit their woodlands at all costs, and, with this freedom, their one means of acquiring ready cash. With the creation of the Association for Mu;ual farmers' Aid (VdgB), which was designed to control more or less forcibly the agricultural sector of the economy, a similar control of the farm-owned woodlands was established during the same year. In early 1951, the Forest Exploitation Directives for Forest Cooperatives and Peasant Foresters were n-m?ieated by decree. Financial pressures were applied to make the farmers joir the cooperatives. Farmers who were not members of the cooperatives had to pay to the state forestry administration fees per hectare of land and cubic meter of timber cut; which were five to seven times as high as those paid by members of cooperatives. Under this kind of pressure the distribution of forest land ownership was as follows by the end of 1951 (in hectares): Laender Total Farm Forest L d Forest lands in an s Forest c-..e?...__ 114,410 Brandenburg 126,000 - 147,851 Sachsen 155,000 43,627 7,079 Total 974 608 , 378,586 The essential purpose of the exploitation directives was to merge the farm-owned forest lands into forestry districts (Reviere) administered by so- called peasant foresters under the Kress forestry offices. As of 1952, ex- ploiitatttionedof the farm-forest ::ands of less than 5 hectares was no longer erm without restriction and was planned by the state. In 19521952, pplans :called for about one million cubic meters from this source, but, only 22 percent of this plan was fulfilled. This timber has to be turned over to the state timber supply organiza- tion for the "normal price," which is still the ,44 ceiling price plus an additional payment. The additional payments average up to 50 percent of the normal price for logs, up to 100 percent for pit props, and up to 75 percent for fiber wood. In establishing the prises of veneers and plywoods, the ad- ditional payment is set by agreement with the buyer of the wood, so that no losses will result in production, In this manner, state exploitation of farmers' wood lots even of 5 hectares or less was accomplished. The farmers can cut wood from their lots for their own use only with the consent of the Kress forestry office. With this, the right of the farmers to make use of their woodlands, in- cluding those allocated to them by the land reform, was completely rescinded. The actual expropriation of the farm wood lots was begun with the collectivi- zation of agriculture in mid-1952. The forest lands of farms of over 20 hec- tares expropriated during the first wave of collectivization were turned over to the agricultural producer cooperatives (I.PGs), or to the local state Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 agricultural enterprises for later distribution to the LPGs. Furthermore, the woodlands of the smaller farmers whose lands were being collectivized were turned over to the LPGs, and thus into the hands of the SED dictator- ship. The capital of forestry is the standing timber in the woodlands, which continues to grow and increase. Thus the exploitation level depends on the standing timber and its rate of growth. In 1945, excessive cutting for armament and war needs had left the for- est resources at a subnormal level, without placing continued long-term ex- ploitation in jeopardy however. Although the Third Reich overexploited the Brest resources of the country, the forestry experts did manage to reduce the bad effects to a minimum. This situation was radically changed after the Soviet occupation. To gain an over-all view of the available forest resources, the SMA (So- viet Military Administration) ordered a survey of forest land in the summer of 1946. However, this survey was carried out in such an unscientific fash- ion and the personnel used were so few and so poorly qualified that no reliable result could be achieved. On the other hand, expectations of the SMA that the data would be unreasonably high so as to justify o.erexploitation, were not fulfilled. The forestry resources survey was repeated as of 1 April 1949. This was prepared in such a way as to permit the highest possible level of exploitation, but was, in the final analysis, completely worthless. 'dire the survey was carried out by reasonably competent personnel the results were perhaps acceptable. but in general they were no more reliable than these of 1946, largely because of too little time and too few people. The target was set at 100 hectares surveyed per day. Even a highly qualified forestry expert could only render a superficial judgement on this basis, and many were in no sense qualified. Same had no experience or training whatever and thus were forced to make rule-of-thumb estimates. The 1946 inventory set the available timber at 254,677,000 cubic meters for a forest area of 2,693,000 hectares. This breaks down to 95 cubic meters per hectare. Timber with a diameter of more than 25 centimeters at chest height, i.e., timber nearly ready for cutting, was estimated at 88 million cubic meters. Of this latter total, 17.7 million cubic meters was in Mecklen- burg, 24.6 million in Brandenburg, 16.3 million in Sachsen-Anhalt, 7.7 million in Sachsen, and 21.5 million in Thueringen. The 1 April 1949 surrey, carried out only for state and corporate wood- lands, estimated 1c1,500,000 cubic meters of standing timber on an area of 1,804.000 hectares, or about 1~)1 cubic meters per hectare. However, between 1946 and 1949 about 55 million cubic meters of timber was cut. This comeu to 20 to 22 cubic meters per hectare. In spite of this, the 1949 estimate was higher than that of 1946: Of course any survey on such a scale will contain a number of unavoidable errors. However, the foregoing figures clearly demonstrate that the surveys are vir- tually worthless. This is especially true since the normal age ratio of the timber, a factor which has a great bearing on long-term exploitation, has been thoroughly disrupted. Timler in the large and medium-size groups has been virtually all cut. The present make-up of the forests makes any estimate as to future growth completely impossible. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 with timber reserves of 149,687,000 cubic meters, or90cubic ~meters Per hectare. However, between 1949 and 1953, 953, 26 cubic meters per hectare were cut: Thus the inventory of 1953 can be no more relied upon than those of 1946 and 1949, the less so since it was designed to support the state forestry enterprises' plan as of 1 January 1953 and also to justify the highest possible exploita- tion level. It is demonstrated again and again that the SED dictatorship is trying to obtain its needs through exploitation of the remaining standing timber with no thought whatever for the need for future growth. The supplementary lumbering goals for 1953 and 1954, over and above those previousiy set, were the result of the fact that the Soviet Zone had been forced to go without the timber imports called for in its trade agreements with the USSR, Poland, and Hungary in favor of urgent imports of foodstuffs. During the first years of the Soviet occupation, not only the volume but also the type of timber cut by the forestry administration and its allocation among the five Laender of the Soviet Zone, were decided by the head of the SMA. The volume and type of lumbering were determined by the Soviet repara- tions end military needs, the German forestry experts having not the slightest ,Sy in the m tier. No attention whatever was paid to the needs of the German economy, insofar as it was not tied up with reparations contracts. The term reparations must be taken here in a very wide sense. In this sense the Soviets made use of all forestry products which could in any way be turned into foreign currency or other assets. By way of example, a complaint about a large quantity of veneer oak, which was supposedly delivered to Po- land as reparations, came to the Soviet Zone from Copenhagen! The forestry section of the SMA, which gave the orders for forestry ex- ploitations, always added a wide margin to the requirements of the reparations department so that there would be no stoppage of deliveries. The Soviet estry experts were most ea r to s, for- that they would not to seent~back toe thetUSany SR, rwhich Lwasothefusual vwayeof deal- ing with such situations. This fear had th.e natural result in that the stocks of cut timber were far in excess of a tolerable level. For example, on 31 December 1046 there were about 6 million cubic meters of cut timber awaiting pickup in the forests. By 31 May 1,J47, in a period of 5 months, this volume rose to 8 million cubic meters, and by the end of 1947, it stood at 11 million cubic meters, half of it in logs. Since 1951, a regulation exists that all timber cut in a given calendar year has to be shipped by 31 December. Compliance with this order, however, is always hampered by lack of transport equipment. When the "German Democratic Republic" was founded in October 1949, the right to order cuttings was transferred to SED officials. However, the Pankow government is just as much suiject to the reparations and foreign- exchange requirements of the USSR as the forestry officials of the SMA previ- ously were. If the SMA forestry department at first seemed primarily interested in getting German lumbering under way again, it soon became clear that their main objective was to subjugate Soviet Zone forestry to Soviet; interests to the greatest degree possible. They introduced the Soviet forestry year, based on the calendar year, in the Soviet Zone, replacing the German forestry year, which runs from 1 October to 30 September of the following year and which is thus more in harmony with the biological rhythm of nature. , Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Shortly thereafter, it became quite clear that the rhythm of nature was of no importance any more to the lumbering industry in the Soviet Zone. Whereas German forestry practice calls for cutting from fall to spring, tim- ber was now cut from 1 January to 31 Dece'aber, even though timber cut in the summer, during the growth year, is easily subject to deterioration. The timber felling plan target was divided into quarters, so that the fulfillment of the annual plan could be better supervised. The fact that 10,000 cubic meters of veneer oak, because of transportation failures, deteri- orated to such an extent that 9,000 cubic meters of it could only be used for firewood, seems not to have been a matter of interest to the SMA. Plans to cut another 10,000 cubic meters in the same place could only be blocked by going outside regular channels. Pine which had discolored as the result of having been cut in summer was refused as reparations delivery, but nonetheless the suggestion that summer cutting be stopped was turned down. Because of the lack of qualified personnel in the land forestry offices, a logical allocation of the plan targets for timber felling among the various forestry districts was very difficult anyhow. This allocation of quotas was often carried out in an even more illogical way by ...tervention of the Soviet forestry officers, who had little knowledge of local conditions but who med- dled in everything. By way of example, several thousand cubic meters of pine were cut each year on a peninsula of an inland lake for 3 years in a row without one cubic meter of wood ever being taken out of the woods; this on orders from the So- viet officials. That the Soviets were interested only in plundering the for- est resources of the Soviet Zone is indicated by the fact that the only basis used in establishing cutting norms was the total amount of standing timber available and not the amount maturing annually. For example, a quota of an additional million cubic meters of timber was transferred from Sachsen to Mecklenburg when it was learned from the survey carried out in the summer of 1946 that Mecklenburg had greater resources of pine and hardwood timber. In the same way, those industries working on reparations orders (paper, cellu- lose, textiles, etc. were g?.ven ariority in lumber supply. The official timber cutting quotas of the SMA, in round numbers, ran as follows: last quarter of 1945, 5 million cubic meters; 1946, 19 million; 1947, 21 million 1946, 17 million: 1.4y, 13 million; 1950, 14 million; 1951, 14 million; and 1952, 12 million. No final figures are yet known for 1953, but these can be estimated on the basis of available data at about 12 million cubic meters. This comes to a total of 127 million cubic meters of official timber felling. In the years up to 1949, the total annual cut was considerably exceeded on orders of the local Kreis commanders and other Soviet officials. After 1950, cutting in excess of plan was officially prohibited, but a new trick was used to reach the same end: the annual plan total had to be fulfilled ahead of schedule, i.e., by October. The timber felled during the rest of the year was then called "a start on the next year," without this total ever being taken into account in the total cut the following year. Overfulfill- ment of the plan was thus achieved by way of the back door. In addition to the centrally ordered cutting, there was a not inconsider- able local, unofficial cutting. In part, this was carried out as a special firewood action for the population, in part by the occupation forces for their own use, and in part it was covered up by entries as timber damaged by insects, an item which could not be checked. These additional cuttings could Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 be conservatively estimated as 1.5 million to 2 million The cubic total would ters per year, or a total of 9 million cubic meters to the end of 1950? thus be 127 million plus 9 million, or 136 million cubic meters, or 68 cubic meters per hectare on the state-administered or state-exploited forest lands of about 2 million hectares. This is many times the total which should have been cut on the Is of tie stand and its maturation. The Five-Year Plan again calls for 10 million cubic meters per year in 1954 and 1955, which means, on the basis of previous experience, that the quotas will be o!erfulfilled to about 12 million cubic meters annually. In addition to this, there will again be an uncontrollable cutting for military needs and on military training grounds. If one bears in mind that, of the 2 million hectares of state forests, at least three quarters have less than 40 or 50 percent of their normal stand of timber and that about 600,000 hec- tares have been completely stripped, it becomes clear that such large-scale cuttings can no longer be covered by t ma uring tibd mer an will have to come out c.^ existing reserves; which again will reduce the rate of natural increase. Th? Soviet Zone practice of expressing the excess exploitation in per- terms of tl:?= n.aturirl,; tinier is deliberately false and misleading, since they mate use of normal maturation rate figures which have long since lost their va lidit A mor. orest area wit yr , e revealing e1`t.'re is gice;, by con.ariab ; r h rate of cabin P oral i.', cubic meters per hectare. Sincewa~iargeoProportionaof texi helforestoarea isto no longer adequately stocked with standing timber, as has been shown above, the cutting rate per hectare of remaining timber is considerably higher. The continued overexploitation represents not only a present, but also a future damage to our forest resources.' esources. The wood that is being cut today does not by rights belong to this generation, but to our t;randcia ldren and great grandchildren. The damage dCr;e now cannot he made good for at least a century. The exploitation excess varies from wood type to wood type, depending on the degree to which the various species are required for reparations or for- eign exchange needs. The hardest hit are the srands of pine and oak, while spruce and leech fare somewhat f, :.i.nce they are exportable only as fiber wood and offer little tv way fore L'n exchange earnings. . The 6(u,. .^;i;n_odd hectare: of privately owned forest lands are not covered ry statistics u t.o 1952. The per-hectare cut is probably no lower than that of the state-administered forest land. The high wind and insect damage losses are essentially included in the foregoing figures. The great wind damage in the spruce of the Thueringen forests in June 1946 amounted to 1.3 million cubic meters of timber, while in the Harz it amounted to 300,000 cubic c:eters. Since Lhese quantities of tim- ter could not be worked away proritly because of the shortage of forestry per- sonnel, the fallen timber added greatly to damage by spruce bark-borer beetles (Fichtenborker:kaefer), which had vott-on a foothold durin the last years of the war and after the capitulation. Even though 1.4 million cubic meters of timber damaged by beetles had been cleaned up and decontaminated by the fall of 1914;, there were still about 1.7 million cubic meters left from the leetle damage of the summer of 1947 which remained to be decontaminated. To take the proper measures against the extensive beetle damage anticipated for the summer of 1y46, the forestry of- fices were relieved of all but the technical aspects of decontamination, while the recruiting, housing, feeding, and equipping of the necessary workers was made the responsibility of the minister-presidents or ministers of the Laender Thuerin,gen (Thuerin.ger Wald), Sachsen-Anhalt (Harz), and Sachsen Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 decontaminate about - `-- ----:-nary measures it was possible to to the fall of 1948.3 Themillion meters of from May cubic meters and left deforested areas totaling about 25,000 hectares.llion The area affected by dendrolimus pini (Kieferspinner) and by lymontria monacha (Nonne) totaled 1.5 million hectares, while a total of 13,000 hectares were completely denuded. The dendrolimus pins affected the the Brandenburg and Sachsen-Anhalt forests most heavily. Damage was lighter in Mecklenburg and Sachsen. The lymantria monacha damage occurred primarily in Sachsen, and to a lesser extent in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, and Sachsen-Anhalt. All at- tempts to combat the dendrolimus pini with insect lime failed, because neither suitable insect lime nor the necessary raw materials were available in the So- viet Zone. Not until 1948 did the SMA supply a number of planes, which made it possible to dust about 63,^00 hectares with insecticide during 1948 and 1949. The few experienced foresters in the Soviet Zone calculated that the re- maining standing timber will hardly cover the targets for 1954 and 1955. When informed of this, Rau stated that West German forests would be available for exploitation by that time: The reckless exploitation of East German forests not only affects present- day resources but will also affect the growth pattern of future timber. Brandenburg spruce has been the hardest hit. Experts estimate that by the end of the Five-year Plan in 1';!55, all spruce timber of class 2a (more than 20 centimeters in diameter) and upwards will be completely exhausted. This will also remove the parent trees for future growth of Brandenburg spruce. For this reason it is all the more welcome that the West Berlin For- est administration has taken steps to preserve the Brandenburg spruce parent stock in its forests and also has estaldished nurseries for spruce stock. A number of conscientious foresters in the Soviet Zone have also taken steps in this direction. III? TIE ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION As has already teen noted, the volume of cut timber left in the forests increased from 6 million cubic meters to 11 million cubic meters during 19117. It is obvious that a great proportion of this wood deteriorated badly before it was distributed to the consusPrs. This was not only the situation in 1947, but has been more or less the rule ever since. The reasons for this situa- ti.or. [have been explained above]. Transport facilities were completely inadequate. It was absolutely im- possible to bring out the timber with teams of horses, even though the Kreis commanders recklessly tried to enforce this type of transportation. Tractors and trucks were an insufficient solution, since they were not available in sufficient number, to say u-thing of the shortages of motor fuel, tires, and spare parts. In typically Soviet fashion, an attempt was made to improve transport of timber, not through a better supply of equipment, since this could not be done, but by means of a reorganization of the transport system. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 The originally for brinizing the the rcomout of the wo ds had brigades toftimber munities which had the right to use the farmers' teams. Since the matter was not going well, it was turned over to the forestry officials in 1;49, although this step did not make a single additional horse, tractor, truck, tire, or liter of gasoline available. The heads of the forestry service, who knew nothing about fores- try, agreed to take over the responsibility, even though they had scarcely enough personnel to take care of their forestry responsibilities. Naturally, there was no improvement in the situation. Then the DHZ for Wood was estab- lished, the responsibility for hauling the cut timber was turned over to this organization. Similarly, the distribution of timber to the consumer was repeatedly re- organized until it finally was again given to the forestry service. After 1945, the delivery of timber to the consumer was carried out as it had been before the capitulation, i.e., through the forestry service directly to the consummer. This system rot only prevented centralized control, but also had political developments. The political objective was to crush the privately owned wood-using enterprises. This end was not served by the non-Communist forestry officials giving these enterprises - sawmills, etc. -- (sometimes preferential) delivery of timber. A general ben on this sort Cf activity was unenforceable, and a close control in the widespread forest regions was not practical. The act was gen- erally not detected until after the fact, when the wood had already been de- livered and could no longer be returned. The first step was to take the delivery of cut timber out of the hands of the forestry service and make it the province of the so-called Industrial Offices (Industrie of the mender and Kreise, since these offices could be more effectively controlled politically. This exleriment could not be successful in view of the lack of specialized knowledge on the part of the functionaries, so the DHZ for flood was created which then took over the dis- tribution of cut timber from the forestry service to the various consumers. The DHZ for Wood at first alto controlled all wood users, especially furniture makers. These enterprises were soon taken away from it, so that it then became the DHZ for Tinter and Lumber (DI'Z Roh- and Schnittholz). In 1952, this DHZ had five branches in each of the five Lnender, each one of the branches covering three to five Landkrei:.e, in addition to which it had a so- called branch office (Aussenet,ellenbuerc) in each Kreis seat. The average branch had a turnover of stout 3C' million DM (East), col- lecting a commission of about 15 percent on lumber and 10 percent on cut tim- ber. Office personnel numbered 6o-t:t; persons. Traneloading stations were established at the ra aroad terminals, where the wood was delivered for shipment to the consumers. Each of these loading stations was in the charge of a manacr (Diepocent), who took over the wood deliveries from the forestry service and then consigned it to the various consumers. In the course of a year he handled about 2C.0 o units (10,000 cubic meters of cut timber and 10,000 cubic meters of lumber). A system of norms applied to the loading stations just as for the for- estry service. The basic wage, catalogued according to five location classes, ranged from 0.83 to 1.07 DM, or 0.93 to 1.12 DM. Additional compensations and premiums ranged from S to 15 percent of the 7asic wage. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12: CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Wood receipts were controlled by the forestry servi ce cutting plan. De- livery schedules were regulated by the goods distribution plan. Since these two plans did net agree in practice, there were countless breakdowns in the distribution system, especially since no lumber could be delivered without a written directive from the DHZ branches. Since cut-timber distribution on the Soviet pattern turned out to be too costly for the smaller area of the GDR , Jurisdiction over cut timber, bark, and resin was taken away from the DRZ for /lood. These products were then sub- ject to the control of the forestry service under the principle of "direct delivery from producer to consutser." he forestry service not only shipped these products directly from the forestTs, but. also handled such details as transloading and shipment directly to the plant. As o:' 1 January T-53, the forestry service (the state forestry enterprises) too, over the ins' tallations of the DRZ for 'Wood engaged in handling cut timber, bark, and resin, includ- ing stocks held as of tie end of 1952. The forestry service also took over personnel formerly employed by the DFZ for .docd at these installations. Distril:ution o:' cut timer is carried out in accordance with a material distribution plan prepared by the marketing divisions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry or of the Bezirke for the state forestry enterprises (for state forests) and for the ))gels forestry 'co,ir (:'_. private .atC woodlands). TV. REPARATIONS DELIVERIES AND FORCED EXPORTS OF FORESTRY PRODUCTS Since 1955, the lion's share o: the recklessly excessive cuttings of timber in the Soviet Zone has been taken over by the USSR to cover the needs of its occupation troops, for "reparations." and for forced exports. The scope of' the Soviet take from Soviet Zone forests is a "state and party secret." But extensile deforested areas mare it clear to even the layman that the dama,_e to c;erman forest resources will not be made good tar genera- tions. The amounts of the cut tinier user 'n the Ccviet Zone econoryy, by occupa- tion troops, or for Forced exports are hard to establish. The volume of lum- ber taken by the Soviets for reparations can not he estirated with accuracy, since all pertinent data had to be turned over to them or destroyed. Private statistics were prohibited and keeping such was dangercas, besides being in- adequate. The Soviets organized these r?:pjration ieliveries by numerous routes, so that any over-all picture was Made impossible. The cutting and stockpiling plans do not give an accurate picture either, since they were often deliberately misleading, to cover up the actual take. Some estimate of the scope of the take can Ic gained from the 194- monthly average of 7,500 to 8,oo0 railroad carloads of cut timber (lnfs, pi' props, etc.) and lumber (boards, planks, beams, etc. )going -vast, or to the sound-currency countries of the West, and thus alto rentered to Soviet !tdvar,tage. These carload figures do not, include industrial'; or~c e,i wood in the form of prefabricated houses, cellulose, paper, textiles, etc. Since deliv- ery of carloads is not accepted until they reach the border stations, rejected quantities are not paid for but are nonetheless shipped on to the East. The deliveries are credited at 1)44 prices. The prefabricated-house program required large gtantities of first-class spruce timber. The prefabricated houses were made In about five different types by the Soviet Zone for reparations or forced exports. The various types have a floor space of about 40 to 90 square meters. The price paid to the producer enterprises ranged from 12,000 to 30,000 DM. The USSR paid only about 60 percent of this price, the remainder being borne by the Soviet Zone. The export price collected by the USSR is not kro'.>n exactly, but is considerably higher. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231 eparations _- _- "'? ucuual production cost and the 1944-level rase of forestry product reparations, irrespective of whether the commodity be cut timber, semifinished or finished wood products, resin, bark, etc. During the period from 1947 to 1952, prefabricated houses with a total floor area of 3.1 million square meters were turned over. Each square meter required 0.7 cubic meter of wood, all of the best class. Grade 2 lumber was rejected. The Soviets set exaggerated quality requirements for all wood de- liveries. They required first-class pine for use in railroad ties, packing cases, and the like. No counter arguments were tolerated. The Hitler war had to be paid for in both East and West Germany with a great loss of timber resources. The following is a comparison of cuttings in the Soviet and Uestern zones after the war (in cubic meters per hectare): 1945-1949 Soviet Zone Western Zone 1950-1,53 26 16 Total 1945-1,53 6e - This represents a depletion which by far exceeds the new growth. It has been ascertained that the greatest share of the 136 million cubic asters of timber cut between 1545 and 1953 in East Germany was consumed by the Soviet occupation forces or went for so-called reparations shipments. Since the beginning of 1954, the so-called reparations deliveries have been formally stopped. Actually, the shipments to the Soviets have not di- minished. Lumber, prefabricated houses, furniture, and other wood products continue to be shipped as "exports" to the Soviet bloc countries and their trade partners. The prices for these forced exports are barely higher than the prices used for r the Soviet occupation forces ~also continue oundiminished. Df TDring 1954 a to long trains loaded with lumber and wood products run daily from the S vs before, to the East. During June 1954, 37 trains passed through the Frankfurt/Ode /Zone railroad station with over 1,000 freight cars loaded with dr furniture, and ether wood products. prefabricated houses, M mom Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 42 26 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 V. NEGLECT OF TIM?IDM RESERVES AiiD OF RZ%FOR:,3TATIOI7 In the Soviet Zone of Germany, the fulfillment of the cutting plans and the supplementary cutting plans has been the center of activity in the forestry field from 191+5 until today. Only the efforts to camouflage this activity have been intensified through these years. area ThetStatistical0Offic hin Zone the size of the deforested 124,000 hectares; Sachsen-Anhalt, 76,000 hectares;6Sachsen, 64r000 hectares; ~g~ and Thuers n been n, 75,000sh e ctr es) 0, this amount, 35 percent, or 13';,000 hec_ tares (Mecklenburg, 22,000 hectares; A_andenbur;;, 42,000 hectares; Sachsen-Inhalt, 27,000 hectares; Sachsen, 22,000 hectares; and 73,000 hectares), The Central Forestry Office differed in its figures somewhat in that it listed the size of the deforeste3 area as 350,000 hectares and the size of the reforested area as 199,000 hectares. :C;ich of the two _firsures is closer to reality is difficult to say. The deforested area given is undoubtedly too small and the reforested area too large, insofar as reforestation is understood to mean the full stocicia~ of ;en ,.,,lture i : the appropriate locslit?r. In this last sense, the reforested area is estimated by specialists to be about one third to one half the size of the deforested area. The insufficient tree plantings may be traced to the unskilled or insufficient personnel or to ncial the re the means treoafulfillsons. areo not yamionavailableprominent at n the appropriatee tmenu On 1 April 1251, the Statistical Office listed the size of the area not yet reforested as 172,000 hectares. The same Statistical Office listed the deforested area around the end of 1) 0 as being; 400,000 hectares; the reforested area was given as l3`5,000 at that time. This leaves a deforested area of 262,000ahectares,iw.ict choTvevcr, was reported by 1 April to be only 172,000 heirs question that the difference between these i.e., 90,000 hectares, was ref'orestel durin e end of 1950 and 1 April ln'jl. Accordln- to t,,,, .) ' period plan, tile reforestation figure amounts to 320,000 hectares. >iinze the deforested area as of 1 April 1951 was given as 172,000 iectares and since a prohibition exists against complete deforestation, It follows that 143,000 hectares of deforested area must exist somew'.:ere or must be created in orier to fulfill the quota of the Five-Year Plan. It was inevitable that this rIestru_tiv:e deforestatio^ as well as the high cost of reforestation should noon i~eccr,c ,apparent to all. This was of course uncomfortable for the S21) regime since it operated with tae appearance of a socially minded economy. A way out was found. Sin-,e it was not desired to give up further forest exploitation, it was camouflaged with considerable propagan- distic efforts, such as prohibiting "rea,:t order to follow "new methods, based on. thek' ovledrre o liroic deforestation" in biology" and to convert to "eroLP?essi': pr e rtiot timber reserves." e forest :rana emen*, wit h+it'.aconsideration for As an example, they used a timber-reserve-winded management method which had been developed in the Erzgebirge by meritorious German Forestry Service workers. The method and its originators were than misinterpreted in an incredi- bly unscrupulous manner. The method of systematic afforestation was similarly mistreated. In order to emphasize the introduction of the timber-reserve-minded management method, the Forestry Office Menz (in Bezirk Potsdam) which was always rich in timber reserves, was picked as the exemplary forestry operat_-on.] Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Smaller cutting plans, not based on tree types, were set up for this forestry office and appropriate instruction courses were given. It is understandable that the young forestry service workers, who were being trained under the SED regime, turned with fervor to this new method, which was reportedly much better, because they too recognized the destructiveness of the deforest.,ci.on methods which had been employed. While they lacked all practical experience, they did expect it to become a forest conservation method. Less understandable was the position of some experienced forestry personnel, who were willing to offer these camouflage expediencies to the political regime and to propagandize in their behalf. Despite all the camouflage, however, the destructive deforestation continued. The high cutting plans and their timber species selection do not facilitate a timber-reserve forestry operation. Offi- cially the forests are not immediately denuded; instead, in an effort to fulfill the cutting plan by number and species and contrary to conservation methods, the best trees are cut and the poorest and most unusable trees are left standing. The resulting gaps in the forest are camouflaged in connection with Krutzsch's "Rejuvenation priorities" with the cover words "reju:eaation centers." Simultane- ously with the introduction of the conservational forestry method, complete de- forestation was prohibited. Exceptions to this prohibition could be made by the Government Forestry Office or the i` eis Forestry Office in cases where more than one hectare was concerned. 4nen ::ere than 3 '.:ectares were to be stripped, the Central Forestry Office had to rant permission. ,since the plan, including the highly demanding species plan., !.ad to be fulfilled, it became necessary to make 10 one-hectare cuttings instead of one 10-hectare cutting. Lumbermen sarcas- tically refer to these woodlands an "parks with playgrounds." Little can be seen of a reforestation of these re,:uvenation centers; in genernl,the reforestation has also been seriously impeded by a lack of funds and manpower. The same applies to the care of young timber. The clearing of older stands and dense forests requires considerable funds and labor without bringing any in- come and is therefore not desired. The one of forests as (razing lands for cattle, which was introduced again witi: the land reform program, is not easily curtailed. The present picture of :;not German forests nay be presented as follows: one third of the state-managed forests are thinned-out and mutilated middle-aged for- ests without any chance for forestation, anot'':._r third consists of young timber which as yet is not worth very much, and the rerrainiag third consists of poorly reforested or unreforested bare areas. The reforestation of these areas is sorely neglected because, in the Soviet Zone, planning is done from the top echelon to the lower echelons in the forestry service too. The reforestation plan is arbitrarily set up at the higher echelon and just asar'sitrarily passel town the line. Whether or not the seed or seedlings are available at the location or whether they are conditioned for the particular area is only of winor consideration. IDsvertheless, regardless of how plans and actuality may balance, no holder of a forestry position would dare report the nonfulfillment of a plan. Resin extraction from p_ne trees 'a, been. --ons derably in_rease(i. Normally those trees which are marked for -:uttinrin the near future are so cut for resin extraction that the "Lechten," herrir:,;bone-design cuts from which the resin seeps, do not cover more than two thirds of the tree, so as to keep it sufficiently alive. Timber which is to be cut in the coming winter in. the Soviet 'Zone--and that includes timber in the intermediate stage between pole timber and timber with a larger di- ameter (chest-high diameter of about 20 centimeters) -- is tapped for resin in three levels, one above the other (by means of a ladder). 'dith this system, a great part of the timber dies before cutting. The lumbermen call this system "tapping to death." In contrast to thi, ir: the "live" tapping system used for timber to be cut in future years, in which t::e tree is tapped at only one level and sufficient bark (at least one third) is left unslashed. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 However, since pay is no longer based on the number of cuts, but on the area covered by the various resin cuts, the workers are encouraged to leave not 33 percent, but only 10 to 20 percent of the tree's bark unslashed in order to earn more money. Thus, "live" tapping is changed to "death" tapping. Despite the timber-reserve-minded forestry service, resin tapping is not done on a tree-by- tree basis but on bark-area basis. VI. THE SED FSgSONTIEI, POLICY IN TIM, IDRESTRY SERVICE From the very beginning the East German personnel policy in the forestry service was aimed at weeding out all persons who would not willingly accept or even resist the destructive deforestation. The regime wanted to have lumbermen who would be loyal fu,-tionnries bent on fulfilling the Soviet cutting plan. This remained the basic point of view of the personnel policy of the Communists and the Soviet officials in the forestry service. This policy continues today. An active Nazi past on the part, of forestry personnel is of little consequence in this personnel policy. The only decisive factor for former Nazis is subordi- nation to the orders of 3ED regime. In October l;+45, te Ji?11 (Jeviet 'i1it:ry Alrar:istr_tioa) retained former GIL':,P (National Jociaii:;t German corkers Tarty) forestry officials. However, L, November 1945, General Zhukov, the Soviet commanding officer, ordered the dis- mi:;:a1 of all officials and employees [of the forest-- cervicel. This was done because the 3o:lets Were not satisfied witl. the slow reorganization of the ad- ministration. (in the Soviet sense) and partially because the opposition of the profs -;tonal forestry men to t'.e plan to cut 5 million cubic meters of timber durir., the quarter October-December 1951 was being felt. Even though the dismissed forestry personnel was retained at first on location so as to prevent, t'.e severest damage, the measures soon aimed at the complete exclusion of personnel. The local JED party executives and the unions increased the pressure on the professional forestry personnel which eventually lead to their dismissal. SED followers tried to find a cozy little nest in the local forestry positions. T::e positions looked desirable not only because no difficulty was foreseen in cutting down the required timber, but also because in addition to a high income, otherwise not attainable to these individuals, the position offered a control of shortage .ommodities; namely, wood and food, the latter from the public Lands (Dienstlaendereien), with which all personal needs could be satisfied by [illegal) bartering. By defamations, denunciations, intrigues, etc., professional people were replaced ruthlessly by lumbermen who were able to ingratiate themselves with local autnorities and people not familiar with the profession. The new per- sonnel knew only one goal, that is t.e punctu,l overfulfillment of the timber cutting plan, without any reg'ud for forestry principles. Ever. though it was possible at first to remove the forestry service from the jurisdiction of local political units (Kreise, Bezirk(i), the local political forces soon gained so much support from political personnel offices of the Laender forestry offices that, by 1947-1943, only a few forestry field stations were occupied by ex- perienced personnel. As early as 1946, training of forestry personnel was started at the for- estry schools at Eberswalde and Tharandt and in five forestry schools of the Laender to combat the damages which quite naturally resulted from the place- ment of inexperienced personnel in forestry positions, which later also in- cluded positions on the highest level of the forestry service. In addition, training courses were offered on a continuous basis for the forestry service examination. Unfortunately the training did not have the effect desired by the training personnel, despite all their effort. .. rw Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 The selection of trainees by the political bodies was contrary to all professional traditions and was based exclusively on Political considerations. Only "workers' sons" were accepted, and all applicants from families of for- estry officials were rejected. Forestry training is permeated with political instructions, and often not the professional knowledge and ability of the trainee, but his political outlook and activity, are the deciding factors at the time of the examination. It must be noted that the training personnel at the forestry faculties and at the forestry schools are not without success in teaching on as broad a basis as possible. Unfortunately, the guidance in the field and the trans- fer of experience from the older forestry personnel to Vie new personnel re- mains insufficient. This was the result of t'e GED regire's earlier prohi- bition against placing the new personnel in the hands of e:cperienced forestry personnel, and the situation is now being perpetuated because only a few ex- perienced forestry people rer^nin active. politA ca cidc, an-1 number oferatithe newly tra the fore,try people succumb to the system of ? entry to the political arena flevetlelessoI it hmustabelnotedsthatst eon ' percent- age of such instances rennin:: relatively low. Most of the new forestry is concerned wit., the professional training and gettin3 ; ahead person- refuting Communist Hen. anal the ']ED dicl , whil le performance in the storsitip, ever, though professional position is restricted by the general conditions. The training of the new forestry personnel since 19':6 has enabled the partial sartialsreplacement'of untrained personnel, narti_ularly in forestry field Y Pr cal forestry work is to be done. In the higher forestry offices t', is not the case as yet. Particularly the leading forestry position, are preferably geld by j -'D functionaries, who implicitly adhere to the political directives and denlads. Since the leading personnel understands very li`tle Cr nothing of forestry, there is no super- vision or control. Only a snail n tuber of thoroughly trained personnel with Pre-1945 experience in forestry week and aleinistratioa hold offices to the Percents,,(- of such personnel of the f dab; under 10 percent. Thanks i^ due T:::em for i orestry perso eat to la turn future hear, ileac their best to sun over generations forest's hies to ::o!, fear the scars o^ the present mis- management. The training of rmst(!r i'oreal ore Forsteirt) has undergone many changes since 1946, often through arbitrary local improvisations. Since 1?50, all applicants, whether they are applicants for the colleges, for forestry schools, or for work in the forests, must unclergo a asi- of 2 yearc. The npprent.lces, nor.: live in work training period of c of piton l live n apprentice homes, are organ- iced apprentice brigades under to direction of a brigadier; they learn all phases of forest fie11 wor;: and :rise attend the professional school (Berufs- schule), which is supplemented to some eytr:nt by forestry ir.ctruct?ons. The future progress of the apprentice depends err the outco:e of the final examination and the forest worker test. Taecreti,,lly, forestry knowledge and ability is decisive; however, in practice, the political development of the apprentices, which is influer:cod considerably by the frequent studies of current events, is decisive. Applications of apprentices who hold a diploma from n secondary school, who have passed the forest worker test satisfactorily, and who have the political recommendation of the SED will be accepted by the forestry schools at aberswalde and Thnrandt. The duration of the studies is roughly the same as at 41est German forestry schools; however, some semester progress examinations have beed added. Final examinations lend to the degree of graduate master forester; if the oc- casion should arise, the degree of Doctor of Forestry may be granted. - 19 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Forestry worker examinees who are not admitted to the forestry schools - political and subject qualifications are the same as for university study -- may be admitted to a forestry trade school on completion of a special entrance ex- amination. The forestry trade schools were founded in 1946 in Rabensteinfeld, Mecklenburg; Eberswalde, Brandenburg; 3tolberg, Sachsen-Anhalt; Tharandt, Sachsen; and Schwarzburg, T?nueringen. he forestry trade school at Eberswalde was dis- solved or combined with the itaben3teinfeld school as the result of "political un- reliability," or in other wcrds, as the result of denunciation. (Six students were arrested and given long sentences.) The Stolberg school was moved to Rossla, and finally to Ballenstedt/liar z. Since 1946, the four forestry trade schools, with their 2-year courses, have been developed into schools of forest technology (Forsttechnikum) with six-semester courses. T'hc students are graduated for- estry engineers after completion of the final examination. No basic differentiation is made in the employment of 7-aduate master for- esters and fareatry engineers in either forestry administration or in the field. The positions are open to all, depcndin. only on political suitability and re- liability in the SED sense. This is roughly similar to the Soviet system, or the Pe of thathet thatlte's he attitudeitowardnthe SED dictatorship andspoliticalesuit- ability is decisive and that even the person not at all familiar with the field is given preference over the "politically retarded" graduate :.aster forester or forestry engineer. This has 'mad the result that some of the trained forestry personnel have gone into other occupations. Those forestry worker apprentices who are not admitted to either a forestry school or a forestry trade school re- main forestry workers and can work their way up to the postition of brigadier (timber cutting boss, loading boss) in timber distribution, timber trr.nsportation, etc. Those in political favor with the 33D or who have rendered outstanding service may, in exceptional cases, be given training opportunities and a chance to rise by way of the workers and peasants schools; through correspondence courses for matter forester, which have been initiated by one of the forestry trade schools; and, in the case of graduates of forestry trade schools, through ad- mission to university study. The number of master fore,+.:r trainees has, in the meantime, been sharply increased. At the order of Minister of ''dueation, the entrance committees of the forestry schools at E',~t_rswnlde. and The.rard? were directed to admit forestry students each for the semester beginning on 1 ie tember 1953, 75 meihatng the total number of forestry students and o fewer at Tharandt. When the schoolss imotested wthat there about were 0neithersufficient facilities for such a large number of students nor positions for them on gradu- ation, they were informed that the order would nonetheless stand. Reason given: the students would be required to fill positions in hest German forestry offices: This gives n clear indication as to how the Pankow regime visualizes a reunifi- cation of Germany. VII. ORGAi1I5ATIOt1 OF :fv.:itST GERI u: FO 3-~Tlly IDMETI3TRATI0I1 The organzzntion of the Fast Gcrran forestry administration has been subject to constant changes since 1,45. The basic principle behind these changes was ob- viously to eliminate all forestry administration tradition, which was equated with "reaction," and not only basically to reorient the previous tradition, but also to impose the Soviet economic organization with its totalitarian planning principle. The present form of the "i'eople-Owned State Forestry Enterprises" is approximately the same as that of the Soviet Satellite states. STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 The goal of sovietization of Last German forestry was not at all times. In part this was due to the special circumstances preys there, in part to conceal pursued directly difficulties in the nee tile reparations deliveries, or in order toovercome transportation or distribution of timber. Parallel to the administrative organizations dominated by the Sr"'D administration, Land governments, Kreis governments ministration of the Soviet (central forestr iilitary ?dminist )' there was a control ad- try administration in the S6A Karls' ration [fore , Thus there was a various Land administrations, and also ar..orst and aofficerry'a ifced with in the control functions with each breia commander. onomic The fore offi to the Land administrations forestry y rt tiimee a buyers; the hoLac Officers do iasAel 'ereoIn :: part foresters and in a Kreis co..:anders as arule had neither threstr crrastrn no r lumber experience. This Soviet control apparatus the Pankow regime, not only influenced and controlled Germane istration at all leve admin- ls, but also iirectly interfered with forestry operations. This was particularly the case witi: she Kress co.:aanders. A description Of the develcirent Of forestry in East Germany from 1945 the resedtncanreflect 3sent a frost section of the average circumstances to '4 ne is local circumstances at all times. are frequently deal ocal imrrovi;rtion, in E ven now there ree a rl great deycontradictory, net in harmony wit t of all detailed h sl or, In icy 'i , poorly conceive 3. 'i'cere beinf a lack Of' forestry nknowledgein the e?re crecognized nied. nothing is done about this situation; indeed, it is often not Forestry in East Germany was hit just a the s hard as other parts of the econ- omy by Soviet measures, although it was affected somewhat later. In any exploitation has greater long term e ffects, and is therefore ase, imore serious . The forestry offices -- Land ;?orest offices, forest boards and forest districts -- were occupied only inadequately or not at all in 1945 nel had been "transferred" previously or had fled to the '.Jest ahead of the entry of Soviet troops. h ' The person- and Kreis Insofar as these people did not return soon the local munists, Political aadministration s filled these positions with "reliable" Com- up their w work ut d to rn Shortly order y experience The Land fort took the d not entirely without trained forestry e war in similar fasoffices hion, though personnel. Not until August 1945 did the Soviets create the "Central Administration for Agriculture and Forestry" with a "Central Forestry Office" within the framework of the Central Administration of the Soviet 'Lone. Shortly thereafter the S,'V, institt,;,,.; the "Forestry Order in the Soviet Zone of Occupation." In essence this order pro ected the formation of a for- estry office (which was to administer all forests, irrespective of t ownership) on the former German pattern: a central fore-try office zone, five Land forest offices, type for as well as local boars of a for the g siere to and forest districts. The or a plan aite adhrdat itheuprin cipletthat the forests should not be stubnecttto any local e, s government. In metros cad be t`'e direct responsibility op the Land only to bring some semblance of order into forest loier was pot into effect reparations deliveries possible. exploitation so as to make Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000700240231-7 :.i'tcr e ;empornry and 2>rov'_sio na'_ licati r. of the_':>r: ter fm_ ^ ' r y o.' were re t' .:'.ant, r (Oberfoerstereien or ni ?e?i ) s 171 t ?cu ied a es for ;s subordinate to the Kr: is c 'tic 1 th . au oritie T eao -; ?^ , of various sizes, dependin_; o:: the forest area of the :L-A3 11.,000 hectares). An instructor ''' a~pointcd to er"c?? of nrcnt ricta to direct ands ' :'soil forest boar,.) `.. of t'n forest ?.lintri_i::. (? !: Concurrent with the ._ _ution of ^eia forest ,lid not control the peasant rc,o._and;, ter ae?ra ta:.en tolr.:r-" o. adciinistrative wo,.;-,,,.:,:, of 1tt.:b ?_ Yr (.'.i r.?.. i(rt, ?.`- r,: .,unsibility of large s , In - :c tc, amnia~d b,. ^or?_.,t bon?lr. ?'1' t y ' e inst ll t(; liscrl:'ed and were rtor;?e,'. ' rest,`rs. ,. -t . m,0. i P.'tne_^' -,__,;',nt~. , rC:; llli:e?i in .-, l