POLITICAL SENTIMENTS OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A008600880004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 20, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP80-00810A008600880004-0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by .law.
COUNTRY Yugoslavia
REPORTI
Political Sentiments of the Yugoslav DATE DISTR. 20 December 1955
People
NO. OF PAGES 2
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
DATE ACQUIRED
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
This is UNEVALUATED Information
The possibility that the present regime in Yugoslavia may gradually evolve
into a truly democratic government should be excluded. The great majority
of the population is anti-Communist and anti-regime, but the people are not.
organized and there is no hope that they could even attempt to overthrow
the regime. The financial aid, material assistance, and moral support given
to Tito by the West has greatly effected the moral of the nationalist messes
because 'they conclude that the Western world is interested in maintaining
Tito in power.
2. The grozt majority of the Yugoslav population wholeheartedly desires the
cotebliohmont of democracy in that country. The majority of peasants in
Serbia favor tho restoration of the monarchy, while the urban population
of Serbia and moot of the remainder of the country favor a government of
federated republics. The oympathioa end hopes of the people are with the
United Statoo. They despise the Soviet Union because it established the
Communist regime in Yugoslavia and because of the atrocities and plundering
committed by Soviet troops and administrators during the period 1944-1948.
The public is auspicious of the normalization of relations with the USSR
and fears that Yugoslavia may return to the Soviet Bloc.
3e
There is no covert anti-regime activity in Serbia.
The population
or ce on a to, for the moot part, anti-regime; butp as with the Albanian
minority in Kosmet, they are chauvinists and separatists and are no real
threat to the regime. The Hungarian minority is anti-regime, but most of 25X1
them are pro-Cominform in sympathy (sic). The German minority is anti-regime.
In general, although most of the people long for the liberation of the
country from Communism and for the restoration of personal freedom and
political liberty, they are apathetic. No active movement against the
regime can be expected unless the opposition receives. moral and material 25X1
assistance from the West.
4. The participation of Yugoslavia in any armed conflict between the East and
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by
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the West would result in the liquidation of the regime regardless of which
side Tito joined. Tito would find himself with very few supporters and the
nationalist masses, the Catholic church, minority groups, and the covert
Cominformists would take advantage of the opportunity to overthrow the
government. At the present time Tito could not organize an effective guer-
rilla action in the country because he would receive no support from the
population. The Army and the regime would surely collapse very shortly
after the beginning of the conflict.
5. At the present time the covert Cominformists in Yugoslavia constitute the
only serious danger to the regime. In 1948, following the split, a large
number of Cominformists were arrested and sent to prisons and forced labor
camps. Most of these persons were released in 1954 and 1955 as a gesture
to the USSR. A small number of Cominformists were executed after the split,
while others succeeded in fleeing to other Communist countries where they
still live and work against Tito's regime with Soviet support and protection.
,It would be wrong to assume that Tito succeeded in detecting and liquidating
all Cominformists and that the Soviets pulled out of Yugoslavia without
leaving a network of agents behind. It is reasonable to believe that a
considerable number of Cominformista remained undetected by the regime and
kept their positions in the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia where they
continued to work covertly against the regime. If, to this number, one adds
,the Cominformiste recently released from prison as a concession to Moscow
plus the Cominformists recruited since the normalization of relations, these
persons now at liberty in Yugoslavia is considerable. They are ideologi-
cally motivated, dynamic, well organized, led and supported by the Soviet
Union and devoted to Moscow. They work underground on preparations to
overthrow the regime and will swing into action when they feel confident
of success or when ordered to do so by Moscow. The regime is aware of
this danger and considers it one of its most important problems. Although
the regime's actions to counteract this danger are unknown, many political
observers believe that the Cominformist danger is one of the main issues
which compels Tito to remain on friendly terms with the Went, where he will
turn for protection when needed.
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Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP80-0081 OA008600880004-0