A. NSC POLICIES:

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 1, 2000
Sequence Number: 
7
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
REQ
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8.pdf320.11 KB
Body: 
.,Approved For Rele2 200009/1;1! AA-RDP80-010600100020007-8 Security Information it . r W6 G 1 ERA- USC Policies: Draft No. 2 There is a requirement for a national strategy determined by top national military, economic., and diplomatic planners on the basis of feasible and practical allocation of world-wide U. S. military and ec- o:iomic resources.. Generally speaking, because overt manifestations of United States policy have a direct effect on consistent covert operations, is im;:erative that the U. S. adopt a firmer attitude and pursue a More aggressive policy which would force the Soviets to resort to defensive rather than offensive tactics. CIA is hardly in a ')osition to state its policy requirements until there is. a natio al strategy designed with policy guidances which are capable of being translated into effective national actions. To date, current policies have rarely been spelled out in the detail required to guide the development of programs to attain U. S. objectives. When courses of action for achieving national objectives are established by the U. S. at the top -,overnment level, then CIA can develop internal policies leading to actions designed to aev`e e general U. S. objectives. There is need for a policy to provide specific responsibility for planning and executing strategic deception plans and operatiofis.in the promulgation of the national psychological warfare programs. Specifically, there is a need for a reevaluation of that portion of NSC 10/2 which states that ' U. S. participation must not be indicated. In some cases this particular requirement is unrealistic and detracts from a forceful positive approach. A review of USC 10/2, Paragraph lt, is required to spell out the command relationships of covert assets generated by CIA in concert with Allied nations during peacetime for military wartime use. Many of these assets are basically Allied assets developed through tripar- tite and multilateral agreements. No mention is made in the existing- NSC 10/2, Paragraph 4, as to who shall command and use these covert assets in wartime. On the basis of TOP SECRET 82885/1 Security Information Copy~44 of 1? Copies V Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8 Approved For Relea r+'2000/09k1 'CIA-RDP80-0106500100020007-8 On the basis that clandestine effort is designed only to support the national policy., an unequivocal and def;ni.tive statement of 11. S. foreign economic policies is necess'ny in order that CIA can pro- vide a more efSective covert support. For example, it is not clear whether the U. S. 'favors trade in peaceful goods with the Soviet orbit or whether it should place an embargo on shipments of all kinds to the Soviet orbit. After establishing, definitive statements of U. S. foreign econ- omic policies, delineations should be made within that part of the foreign economic policies which are the concern of economic warfare. There is a requirement for policy authorization for the use of "litoisru" (defined here as the particular deviation from Stalinism of the Ccxrwtnist Party in Yugoslavia) on a world-wide basis by the covert offices of CIA as a wedge in splintering the Communist forces located in any part of the world, . - B. Inter-Beiaartmental Policies: It should be emphasized as a policy that covert pro: mms cannot conceivably operate unilaterally with any expectation of success,, and accordingly, CIA's covert capability should not be considered a determin- ind factor in devising U. S. strategy or in developing U, S. programs in pursuance of that strategy, ~-1 Clear-cut policy guidance on certain basic problems is required, such as the extent to which preclusive buying operations may be employed, resort made to sabotage,, or the degree of violence, as instruments of control. A need exists for determination of priority on objectives in clandestine war planning between mien and stay-behind organizations, which include escape andvsiot Tht ean nes.e same asses can not be used for both purposes and official assets for both purposes are not avail- ', able, The conflicting requirements tend to confuse Allied national % ~ r" ""~ ' l A l po icy need exists for the coordination of 1target selection an I riorit d t ti i b C d p y e erm na on y IA an the Military, and the establishment a N~ n +. n"--+ a_n-; -- -*U - -_' 1.. ... __._ r._ _ i _- for A statement of polic Desired concerning clandestine para- military planning for the Sou tic and Southeast Asia areas to `" include CIA relationship with donesia and to indicate uk whether planning and operations should be on a unilateral, bilateral, 25X6 tripartite, or multilateral basis.- Copyae S J 4: Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8 Approved For Relear 2000/01 FUDP80-010600100020007-8 A clear-cut assignment of the responsibility for economic warfare should be made to one government agency. While :MAC has the Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8 25X1 C Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8 Approved For Ref, r q ? "G e 200a1 ~i' WESTERN EUROPE The U. S. Governor nt would enhance its national psychological warfare programs if it covertly provided policy guidance for political., military, and economic leadership in those evolutionary movements engaged in developing the political and economic integration of European States j and the preservation of peaoo and. security, A. NSCPoicies: U. II u,-Ae tMnta] Po is es: Than is a policy requ:lro ent to e:ztabUsh a basic tie between the present S?anish government s.zd the U. S.,, as well as, with other U. N. nations, Mich would assure an evolution of economic and social structures within Spain to the point that they would be admitted international organizations such as the Co ncil of Europe, NATO, The Organization of European Economic Cooperation. glia 0. rite, Poli s: Spain: Policy approval is required for the foil.)v?ng actions toward 1. Establ1sb.facilities to influence radio and press reports 25orably oriented. toward the U. S.; -in"ana outs:i.de Spain to promotr, U. S./U,, N. objectives %QII01 MA0001 00020007- 82885A Copy of 17 Copive Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8 M AplgrO LPrR Detaching Form No. 38-13 for the purpose Fr.the Intraoff a Use of OSO and OPC Only-as a Cover Attachment to Form No. 38-13 of securing this form to top secret docu- menu is prohibited. ATTENTI ON.-Access to top secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assistant top secret control officer who receives and/or releases the attached top secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in columns provided. Each individual who sees this top secret document will enter date of handling and sign his full name in the proper columns. Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should sign full name before further routing. ROOM NO. f' :~_ I io/2 SPP DATE 28 FORWAR CONTROL NO. COM ENTS In general, this branch does not feel an acute need for restatement of broad substantive policies. It is our opinion that clarification of existing policies and interpretation of policy changes inevitably must continue to be sou~ht largely on an ad hoc basis. he need, therefore, is for closer, more effective liaison between policy- making and operating echelons, rather than for a summary statement of policy objectives, which, even if formulated, would not necessarily be valid for a long period. It is believed that clarification, if needed, of such questions as relations with Spain, Titoism, and attitude towards economic warfare, should be requested in the context of specific planned operations. In the opinion of this branch, useful and lasting policy statements could be enunciated concerning allocation of responsibility among agencies. Marginal comments have been made concerning specific minor points. Attached is a copes y/of a memo dated 12 June 1952 from the Deputy Under Secretary of State concerning vuropean unity which is illustrative of our belief that policy statements require constant review and revision. An earlier state- ment (WE/C-2) was inadequate for a planned operation, and it was necessary to obtain the attached revision. THIS FORM MUST BE DETACHED PRIOR TO TRANSMITTING TOP SECRET MATERIAL OUTSIDE OF OSO OR OPC X6 __--- OFFICER'S FULL NAME TOP SECRET 16-61700-1 /F < PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM TO REGISTRY Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8