A. NSC POLICIES:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100020007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REQ

.,Approved For Rele2 200009/1;1! AA-RDP80-010600100020007-8
Security Information
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USC Policies:
Draft No. 2
There is a requirement for a national strategy determined by
top national military, economic., and diplomatic planners on the basis of
feasible and practical allocation of world-wide U. S. military and ec-
o:iomic resources..
Generally speaking, because overt manifestations of United
States policy have a direct effect on consistent covert operations,
is im;:erative that the U. S. adopt a firmer attitude and pursue a More
aggressive policy which would force the Soviets to resort to defensive
rather than offensive tactics.
CIA is hardly in a ')osition to state its policy requirements
until there is. a natio al strategy designed with policy guidances which
are capable of being translated into effective national actions. To
date, current policies have rarely been spelled out in the detail required
to guide the development of programs to attain U. S. objectives.
When courses of action for achieving national objectives are
established by the U. S. at the top -,overnment level, then CIA can
develop internal policies leading to actions designed to aev`e e
general U. S. objectives.
There is need for a policy to provide specific responsibility
for planning and executing strategic deception plans and operatiofis.in the
promulgation of the national psychological warfare programs.
Specifically, there is a need for a reevaluation of that portion
of NSC 10/2 which states that ' U. S. participation must not be indicated.
In some cases this particular requirement is unrealistic and detracts
from a forceful positive approach.
A review of USC 10/2, Paragraph lt, is required to spell out
the command relationships of covert assets generated by CIA in concert
with Allied nations during peacetime for military wartime use. Many
of these assets are basically Allied assets developed through tripar-
tite and multilateral agreements. No mention is made in the existing-
NSC 10/2, Paragraph 4, as to who shall command and use these covert
assets in wartime.
On the basis of
TOP SECRET 82885/1
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On the basis that clandestine effort is designed only to
support the national policy., an unequivocal and def;ni.tive statement of
11. S. foreign economic policies is necess'ny in order that CIA can pro-
vide a more efSective covert support. For example, it is not clear
whether the U. S. 'favors trade in peaceful goods with the Soviet orbit
or whether it should place an embargo on shipments of all kinds to the
Soviet orbit.
After establishing, definitive statements of U. S. foreign econ-
omic policies, delineations should be made within that part of the foreign
economic policies which are the concern of economic warfare.
There is a requirement for policy authorization for the use of
"litoisru" (defined here as the particular deviation from Stalinism of the
Ccxrwtnist Party in Yugoslavia) on a world-wide basis by the covert offices
of CIA as a wedge in splintering the Communist forces located in any part
of the world, .
- B. Inter-Beiaartmental Policies:
It should be emphasized as a policy that covert pro: mms cannot
conceivably operate unilaterally with any expectation of success,, and
accordingly, CIA's covert capability should not be considered a determin-
ind factor in devising U. S. strategy or in developing U, S. programs
in pursuance of that strategy,
~-1
Clear-cut policy guidance on certain basic problems is required,
such as the extent to which preclusive buying operations may be employed,
resort made to sabotage,, or the degree of violence, as instruments of
control.
A need exists for determination of priority on objectives in
clandestine war planning between mien and stay-behind organizations,
which include escape andvsiot Tht
ean nes.e same asses can not be used
for both purposes and official assets for both purposes are not avail-
', able, The conflicting requirements tend to confuse Allied national
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A statement of polic Desired concerning clandestine para-
military planning for the Sou tic and Southeast Asia areas to
`" include CIA relationship with donesia and to indicate
uk whether planning and operations should be on a unilateral, bilateral,
25X6 tripartite, or multilateral basis.-
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A clear-cut assignment of the responsibility for economic
warfare should be made to one government agency. While :MAC has the
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e 200a1 ~i'
WESTERN EUROPE
The U. S. Governor nt would enhance its national psychological
warfare programs if it covertly provided policy guidance for political.,
military, and economic leadership in those evolutionary movements engaged
in developing the political and economic integration of European States j
and the preservation of peaoo and. security,
A. NSCPoicies:
U. II u,-Ae tMnta] Po is es:
Than is a policy requ:lro ent to e:ztabUsh a basic tie between
the present S?anish government s.zd the U. S.,, as well as, with other
U. N. nations, Mich would assure an evolution of economic and social
structures within Spain to the point that they would be admitted
international organizations such as the Co ncil of Europe, NATO,
The Organization of European Economic Cooperation.
glia
0. rite, Poli s:
Spain:
Policy approval is required for the foil.)v?ng actions toward
1. Establ1sb.facilities to influence radio and press reports
25orably oriented. toward the U. S.;
-in"ana outs:i.de Spain to promotr, U. S./U,, N. objectives
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82885A
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M
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In general, this branch does
not feel an acute need for restatement
of broad substantive policies. It
is our opinion that clarification
of existing policies and interpretation
of policy changes inevitably must
continue to be sou~ht largely on
an ad hoc basis. he need,
therefore, is for closer, more
effective liaison between policy-
making and operating echelons, rather
than for a summary statement of
policy objectives, which, even if
formulated, would not necessarily
be valid for a long period.
It is believed that clarification,
if needed, of such questions as
relations with Spain, Titoism, and
attitude towards economic warfare,
should be requested in the context
of specific planned operations.
In the opinion of this branch,
useful and lasting policy statements
could be enunciated concerning
allocation of responsibility
among agencies.
Marginal comments have been
made concerning specific minor points.
Attached is a copes y/of a memo dated
12 June 1952 from the Deputy Under
Secretary of State concerning vuropean
unity which is illustrative of our belief
that policy statements require constant
review and revision. An earlier state-
ment (WE/C-2) was inadequate for a
planned operation, and it was necessary
to obtain the attached revision.
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